BOSNIAN GENERAL ELECTIONS OF 2010 AND THE POST-ELECTION CRISIS

2010 Bosna-Hersek Genel Seçimleri ve Sonrasında Yaşanan Kriz

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Abstract:

This paper examines the 2010 general elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and the post-election crisis. Currently, Bosnia's political system is the result of the Dayton Accord that stopped the Bosnian war in 1995. Bosnia is described as a country with a multi-party system that regularly holds free, fair, and competitive elections. The 2010 elections brought significant changes to the composition of legislative assemblies at the cantonal, entity, and state levels. SNSD¹ continued to dominate among the Bosnian Serbs, while HDZ² and HDZ 1990³ received the highest votes in the Croat majority areas. SDP,⁴ as only selfdeclared multi-ethnic party, won the majority of votes among Bosniaks. SDA⁵ secured almost the same number of seats while the Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina⁶ suffered the biggest loss. The phenomenon of each constituent people voting for their respective ethnic parties continues to characterize Bosnia's elections. Election results showed that there must be a wide range of political parties creating a parliamentary majority due to a rather complicated way of decision-making and lawpassing procedures in Bosnia's political system. It triggered several waves of political crises since the leaders of political parties were not able to agree on a Prime Minister and other ministerial posts.

Keywords: Bosnia and Herzegovina, elections, political campaign, electoral law, political crisis.

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¹ SNSD – Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (ethnic Serbian political party; center-right)

² HDZ – Croatian Democratic Union (ethnic Croatian political party; center-right)

³ HDZ 1990 – Croatian Democratic Union 1990 (splinter group from main HDZ BiH party; ethnic Croats; centrists)

⁴ SDP – Social Democratic Party (multi-ethnic political party; center-left)

⁵ SDA – Party of Democratic Action (multi-ethnic, Bosniak-dominated; center-right)

⁶ Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina (multi-ethnic, Bosniak-dominated; centrist)

Özet:

Bu çalışma 2010 yılında Bosna-Hersek'te yapılan genel seçimleri ve sonrasında yaşanan siyasi krizi ele almaktadır. Ülkede yürürlülükte olan siyasi sistem 1995 yılında Bosna Savaşı'nı sona erdiren Dayton Anlasması'yla kurulmustur. Buna göre, Bosna–Hersek düzenli aralıklarla özgür ve adil seçimlerin yapıldığı çok partili ve rekabetçi bir siyasi sisteme sahiptir. 2010 yılında yapılan genel seçimler ülkede hem kantonlar, hem Boşnak–Hırvat Federasyonu ve Sırp Cumhuriyeti hem de Bosna-Hersek devleti nezdinde önemli sonuçlar doğurmuştur. Bosna-Hersek'i oluşturan üç ana etnik unsurun sadece kendi partilerine oy verdikleri bir kez daha doğrulanmıştır. Ülkenin karmaşık olan karar alma ve yasama süreçlerinden dolayı çok geniş yelpazedeki siyasi partilerin bir araya gelerek parlamenter bir çoğunluk oluşturmaları gereği bir kez daha açıkça görülmüştür. Nitekim seçim sonrası yaşanmakta olan krizde politik aktörlerin bir araya gelip Başbakanlık ve Bakanlıklar üzerinde anlaşmaları hala mümkün olmamıştır. Bu ise sadece Bosna-Hersek için değil üyesi bulunduğu uluslararası teşkilatlar için de ciddi olumsuzluklar doğurabilecek bir durumdur.

Anahtar kelimeler: Bosna–Hersek, seçimler, siyasi kampanya, seçim sistemi, siyasi kriz.

INTRODUCTION

Free, fair, regular, and competitive elections have always been an integral part and keystone of any democracy and an essential tool for the peaceful transfer of power. Democratic institutions prosper on the exercise of choice at regular intervals by the electorate. The fifth presidential and the sixth parliamentary elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) were held fifteen years after the end of the Bosnian war and were the second elections since the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement to be fully administered by the local Bosnian authorities. As in the previous elections, the Bosnian political scenario was characterized by a multiparty system with many political parties, coalitions, and independent candidates competing for the posts in the executive and legislative branches of the government and thus representing a wide political

spectrum. For many observers, these elections were considered as the most interesting, and in terms of results, the most unpredictable ones in the post-Dayton Bosnia. These elections were generally conducted in line with international standards for democratic elections, although further efforts are needed particularly with regard to the equal access and usage of media. Therefore, the sixth general Bosnian elections represented further development in the consolidation of democracy and the rule of law.

This study analyzes the 2010 elections in Bosnia by referring to parties, coalitions, candidates, the conduct of elections, and finally, the election results for country's national parliament, the tripartite national presidency, the parliaments of both entities, Republika Srpska (RS), the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the President of the RS.

1. BACKGROUND: UNDERSTANDING THE BOSNIAN ELECTIONS

Bosnia's political system is a result of the constitution, which is formed primarily by the Dayton Agreement, the peace agreement that ended the 1992–1995 Bosnian war. Under the constitution, the country is split into two so-called "entities": the primarily ethnic Bosniak (Muslim) and ethnic Croat (Catholic) Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the primarily ethnic Serb (Orthodox Christian) Republika Srpska. Each entity enjoys considerable autonomy, each with its own parliament, cabinet, police force, and other institutions. On the other hand, the government at the state level was deliberately made weak to better facilitate power sharing, which is a necessity of the government as tensions among Bosnia's three main ethnic groups (Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs) have remained quite high.

Post-Dayton Bosnia consists of three layers of the executive and legislative authorities being elected during the election: state, entity and cantonal levels. First, the state level consists of the collective presidency composed of three members: a Bosniak and Croat (directly elected from the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina) and a Serb member of the collective presidency (directly elected by the electorate of the RS).

The state parliamentary assembly is composed of 42 representatives, 28 of them elected from the Federation, whereby 21 were elected from five multi-member constituencies under the proportional representation formula, and 7 were compensatory mandates elected from the territory of the Federation as a whole. 14 representatives were elected from the RS, nine (9) were elected from three multi-member constituencies under the proportional representation formula, and five (5) were compensatory mandates elected from the territory of the RS as a whole.

Secondly, at the entity level, ninety-eight (98) members of the parliament of Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina were directly elected from twelve (12) constituencies, each having minimum of three (3) and maximum of fifteen (15) members. Of the 98 members, between 23% and 27% were elected on the basis of compensatory mandates, while the rest were elected from multi-member constituencies. Of the eighty-three (83) members of the National Assembly of RS, between 23% and 27% were compensatory mandates, while the rest were mandates directly elected from six (6) multi-member constituencies with each having a minimum of four (4) and maximum of fifteen (15) members. Furthermore, the president and two vice-presidents of RS are directly elected through elections.

Thirdly, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina is further divided into ten cantons with each having its own parliament elected during the general elections. The number of representatives in each cantonal assembly varies from 20 to 35 and depends on the total population of a canton:

- Canton 1 (Una-Sana Canton) composed of 30 delegates
- Canton 2 (Posavina Canton) composed of 21 delegates
- Canton 3 (Tuzla Canton) composed of 35 delegates

- Canton 4 (Zenica Canton) composed of 35 delegates
- Canton 5 (Bosnian-Podrinje Canton-Goražde) composed of 25 delegates
- Canton 6 (Central Bosnian Canton) composed of 30 delegates
- Canton 7 (Herzegovina-Neretva Canton) composed of 30 delegates
- Canton 8 (Western Hercegovina Canton) composed of 23 delegates
- Canton 9 (Sarajevo Canton) composed of 35 delegates
- Canton 10 (Livno region) composed of elected 25 delegates

A total of 518 terms in office were supposed to be elected in these elections. It is important to mention that political parties, coalitions, lists of independent candidates, and independent candidates cannot participate in the allocation of mandates if they do not win more than 3% of the total number of valid ballots in an electoral unit.⁷

General elections in Bosnia are held every four years, as the election law of Bosnia provides that the mandate of the members of the Collective Presidency, House of Representatives at the state, entity, and cantonal levels is four years. Only under certain circumstances can snap or anticipated elections be held.

On the May 5th 2010, the election commission of Bosnia and Herzegovina announced that the sixth general elections in the post-war Bosnia will be held on the October 3, 2010. The deadline for the party registration was on May 21st, and the total number of 3,127,778 local voters and 36,474 voters from abroad were able to take part in the elections at a total cost of 12.6 million KM⁸ (€6.35 million). Elections were announced despite the fact that Bosnia and Herzegovina did not

⁷ "Election Law of Bosnia and Herzegovina." Article 9.6. *Official Gazette of Bosnia and Herzegovina*. 23/1, accessed October 5, 2010.

http://www.izbori.ba/eng/default.asp?col=zakon.

⁸ Bosnian Convertible Marks (BiH's national currency)

implement the decision of the European Court of Human Rights in the case of Jakob Finci and Dervo Sejdić vs. Bosnia,9 condemning Bosnia of discrimination towards national minorities. The official pre-election campaign lasted from September 3rd until October 2nd. On the day of election, a total of 5,276 polling stations were established, and 142 municipal/city election commissions accredited a total of 53,738 observers of political parties. Elections were observed by 779 observers, 20 Citizens' Associations and 485 international observers on behalf of 35 international organizations. In total, 3,126,599 voters were registered to vote: 1,934,417 of them in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and 1,192,182 voters in RS. It is important to mention that only 36,673 voters registered to vote by postal ballot from abroad: 16,691 of them to vote in the Federation of BiH and 19,982 in RS. This is a rather small number taking into considerations that, according to some unofficial estimates, around 1 million Bosnians (the majority of them being Bosniaks) still reside abroad. Furthermore, post-election results show that only 23,020 of registered voters from abroad participated in the elections, 10,074 of them voted in Federation and 12,946 in RS.

2. ELECTION CAMPAIGN: KEY ISSUES, PARTIES AND CANDIDATES

Since the war, Bosnian election campaigns have typically been dominated by bitter arguments over the country's constitutional future, and 2010 was no exception. The polls were described as the most crucial vote since the war ended 15 years ago. Much of the campaign focused on

⁹European Court of Human Rights, Case of Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina (Applications nos. 27996/06 and 34836/06). Accessed October 9, 2010.

http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action=html&documentId=860268&portal=hb km&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649. Finci is a representative of the Jewish national minority and Sejdic is a representative of the Roma national minority in the country. They are both prominent figures in the public national life. The applicants complained that despite possessing experience comparable to the highest elected officials, they were prevented by the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina from fielding candidacies for the Presidency and the House of Peoples of the Parliamentary Assembly solely on the grounds of their ethnic origin.

ethnic division, with political parties urging people to vote for candidates of their own ethnic group.

At one extreme, there were figures like Milorad Dodik, President of the Coalition of Independent Social-Democrats and the current Prime Minister of RS, who used the International Court of Justice ruling in July 2010 (which stated that Kosovo's declaration of independence from Serbia was legal) as the basis for his demand and wish to see the entity of RS granted a full independence. For him, "only the RS is self-sustaining, [whereas] Bosnia and Herzegovina is not. Republika Srpska forever, Bosnia only for as long as it has to exist."¹⁰

One feature of the campaign was the presence of political leaders from neighboring Serbia, whereby Dodik, who has often been portrayed as a nationalist by the Western media, gained support in his campaign from Serbian President Boris Tadić and Serbian Foreign Minister Vuk Jeremić.¹¹ Being openly supported by Serbia, Dodik has been seen as a main threat to the survival of today's Bosnia and Herzegovina as he has openly criticized the current structure of the state, announcing that Republika Srpska would look for independence in case its autonomy is endangered. For him, Bosnia is an impossible state that exists only in the thoughts of certain foreigners and there is no reason to believe in Bosnia and the possibility of its development.¹² On the other hand, there were figures like Haris Silajdžić (the holder of the Bosniak seat in the Collective Presidency) who wanted to abolish the two entities and create a single pluralistic state. Reconciling these two extremes has so far proved impossible, and has been the biggest problem in Bosnian politics.

¹⁰ See Nezavisne Novine, *Srbija za Dodika, Radmanovića i SNSD [Serbia for Dodik, Radmanović and SNSD]*, September 30, 2010.

¹¹ "Boris Tadić podržao kandidate SNSD uoči izbora u BiH" [Boris Tadic supported SNSD candidates prior to the Bosnian elections]. Accessed October 14, 2010. http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Republika-Srpska/209527/Boris-Tadic-podrzao-kandidate-SNSD-uoci-izbora-u-BiH

¹² "Republika Srspka Prime Minister: Bosnia 'impossible' state." Accessed January 27, 2012. http://www.b92.net/eng/news/region-

article.php?yyyy=2010&mm=09&dd=29&nav_id=69974

The economy has also proved to be an important issue. Much of Bosnia's infrastructure remains unused due to a heavy damage suffered during the war and lack of financial resources to repair it and make it functional following the war, let alone updated for the 21st century. Officially, unemployment in Bosnia hovers around 40%; though the existence of a substantial grey economy means the figure is more likely around 25%, that's still an enormously high figure. EU membership remains a far-off dream for Bosnia, in contrast to its neighbors Serbia and (incoming EU member state) Croatia.

Thus, the 2010 general elections were conducted in the background of a high rate of unemployment (especially among youth), quite low GDP per-capita, ethnic division, an absence of any type of cooperation among elected political elites representing the three main ethnic groups in the country, rampant corruption, and the establishment of a new political party (led by Fahrudin Radončić, owner of the most circulated daily newspaper *Dnevni Avaz*).

The sixth general elections were held on October 3rd 2010, following an official 30-day long campaign period. Elections were held throughout the entire country. A total of 39 political parties, 11 coalitions and 7 independent candidates (including 4,259 Bosniaks, 1,926 Serbs, 1,713 Croats, and 299 "others") participated in the elections. 44 candidates did not declare their ethnic identity.

Since its independence in 1992, Bosnia's political spectrum has always been ethnicity based. The three main ethnic groups in the country are the Bosniaks (50%), the Serbs (40%) and the Croats (10%).¹³ Bosnian war drastically changed demographic picture of the country. Around 2.2 million persons were displaced from their homes, 1.2 million fled the country, and around 1 million of them remained internally displaced. Therefore, the exact number of the Bosnian population is not known. The

¹³ These are my own estimates of the total population as the last census was held in 1991 and since then huge internal and external displacements of peoples have taken place.

country's state parliament only recently passed the Law on Census, which will be conducted in April 2013.¹⁴

Most parties represent a particular ethnic group. Though there are a few self-proclaimed multi-ethnic parties, the vast majority of their electoral body, however, comes from one particular ethnic group. The main Bosniak political parties registered to participate in the elections were Party of Democratic Action (SDA), Union for a Better Future of BiH (SBB BiH),¹⁵ Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina (SBiH) and Social Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina (SDP) (which although outwardly claimed to be multiethnic party receives a majority of its votes from Bosniaks). The Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina (HDZ BiH), the Croatian Democratic Union 1990 (HDZ 1990) and the Croatian Party of Rights (HSP BiH) were the main Croat political parties. The Party of Independent Social Democratic SINSD), the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS), and Party of Democratic Progress (PDP) were the leading Serbian political parties.

The Bosniak and Croat-backed political parties were strong supporters of a unified Bosnia, while the leading political parties from RS advocated the separation and independence of their entity.

3. ELECTIONS RESULTS

Polling for the elections took place between 7:00 a.m. and 7:00 p.m. on October 3^{rd} 2010 in a quiet environment, with the voting process conducted in a smooth, peaceful, and orderly manner. There were no reports from observers of any serious irregularities during the voting hours. Prominent discussions were held during the time of election campaign regarding potentially low public interest in the elections and

¹⁴ Sluzbeni Glasnik Bosne i Hercegovine [Official Gazette of Bosnia and Herzegovina] Vol.10, Year XVI, February 7, 2012.

¹⁵ Media entrepreneur Fahrudin Radončić formed the Party for Better Future (SBB) in 2009 and it was the first time for this political party to participate in the elections.

fears of low participation of voters on October 3rd. However, a total number of 1,671,977 (or 53.48% of all registered voters) cast their votes.

3.1. Presidential Election

When votes were counted after the end of the polling period, some unexpected presidential results were recorded. Voters in the Federation (again independently of their own ethnic affiliation) could only vote for either the Croat member of the Presidency or for the Bosniak nominee. For the Bosniak seat, Haris Silajdzić, the outspoken Bosniak politician who had called for the abolition of Republika Srpska, has lost his post in Bosnia and Herzegovina's tripartite collective presidency. Voters instead elected the Democratic Action Party's candidate Bakir Izetbegović, the son of the first president of independent Bosnia, Alija Izetbegović. Most people predicted that Silajdzić would win the race as a member of the Presidency. However, Silajdzić came up with the least votes from the election, obtaining only 25.1% of votes. He was not able to even manage obtaining second place, which went to Fahrudin Radončić, President of the Party for a Better Future (SBB), who won 30.49% of votes and finished only four percentage points behind the winner Bakir Izetbegović, who secured 34.86% of the vote. In contrast to his predecessor's hard line position, Izetbegović ran as a moderate. He urged politicians to give up their "stubborn" policies and unite around interests that are unique to all citizens of BiH. Izetbegović's election campaign called for extending the hand of reconciliation, a greater degree of tolerance, stabilizing the situation in Bosnia, and to bring a better future to its citizens.¹⁶

Meanwhile, among Bosnian Croat candidates, there was no contest. Incumbent Social Democrat Željko Komšić was re-elected for a second term, beating his rival with 337,065 votes (namely 60.61%), thus defeating the candidate and nationalist from the biggest Croat party,

¹⁶ Mark Tran,, "Muslim Moderate and Hard-line Serb Set to Share Bosnian Presidency," *The Guardian* October 4, 2010. Accessed October 5, 2010.

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/oct/04/bosnia-election-muslim-moderate-serbian-hardliner

Borjana Krišto of HDZ (who only received 19.74% of the votes). Krišto, however, prevailed in many areas with a Croat majority population and sought to rally her political base behind calls for a third Croatian entity in BiH. Given the relatively small size of the Croat ethnic community in BiH,¹⁷ it's clear that a vast number of Bosniaks, instead of voting for their Bosniak candidates, instead voted for Komšić. However, the mainstream Croat political parties, HDZ and HDZ1990, consider Komšić as not a "real" Croat because he was elected with the Bosniak votes. They do not question his ethnicity *per se*, but deny him the right to represent the Croat people in the Presidency. For them, there is a major difference between being a representative of the Croat people elected by Croats, and being a representative from the Croat people elected with the votes cast by others than Croats.¹⁸ What is surprising, however, is that both HDZ and the HDZ 1990 do not use the same line of argument with regards to the ethnic Croats elected in RS (such as Emil Vlajki, Vice-President of RS, who was elected with Serb votes).

Voters registered in RS (whether Serb, Croat, or Bosniak) could only vote for the Serb member of the Presidency. The outcome of the presidential race between Serb members was tight. However, incumbent Nebojša Radmanović, candidate of the SNSD, garnered 48.92% of votes and managed to beat Mladen Ivanić, a former Minister of Foreign Affairs and the candidate of the united opposition (PDP and SDS) who received 47.31% of votes from voters in RS. Ivanić was considered an unlikely winner, so his strong showing came as a surprise to many. (See table 1)

¹⁷ Croats were around 752,000, namely 17.2% of the population, according to the pre-war 1991 census. According to some estimates, the number of Croats in Bosnia today is approximately 400,000 people.

¹⁸ Čović: Komšić je trebao biti bošnjački član Predsjedništva; Raguž: Otkloniti postojeće stanje [Čović: Komšić needs to be Bosniak member of the presidency; Raguž: Current situation has to be overcome]. Accessed October 5, 2010.

http://www.otvoreno.ba/vijesti/bih/12176-covi-komsi-je-trebao-biti-bosnjacki-clan-predsjednistva-raguz-otkloniti-postojee-stanje-

CANDIDATES	Political	Vot	es
	Party		
Bosniak Candidate	· ·		
Izetbegović Bakir	SDA	162	,831 (34.86%)
Fahrudin Radončić	SBB	142	,387 (30.49%)
Silajdzić Haris	SBiH	117	,240 (25.10%)
Dedović Ibrahim	DNZ	13,3	369 (2.86%)
Demirović Mujo	BPS	8,95	51 (1.92%)
Latić Džemal	A-SDA	8,73	38 (1.87%)
Spahić Ibrahim	GDS	6,94	48 (1.49%)
Kešetović Izudin	BOSS	4,22	28 (0.91%)
Croat Candidate			
Komšić Željko	SDP		337,065
			(60.61%)
Krišto Borjana	HDZ		109,758
			(19.74%)
Raguž Martin		HDZ	60,266
	1990-HSP		(10.84%)
Ivanković-Lijanović Jerko	NSRzB		45,3397
			(8.16%)
Galić Pero	Independent		1,581
	Candidate		(0.28%)
Kutle Mile	Independent		1,069
	Candidate		(0.19%)
Serb Candidate			
Radmanović Nebojša	SNSD		295,629
			(48.92%)
Ivanić Mladen	Coalition	for	285,951
	Democratic Srp		(47.31%)
Popović Rajko	Union	for	22.790
	Democratic Srp	ska	(3.77%)

Table 1: Results of the 2010 Presidential election

Source: Confirmed results of 2010 general elections, Collective Presidency, Bosniak, Croat and Serb members, Accessed November 26, 2010. http://izbori.ba/Finalni2010/Finalni/PredsjednistvoBiH/Default.aspx Upon announcing the first preliminary results, it was striking that such a large number of votes were invalid (74,906 or 7.3% in the Federation and 66,147 or 10.9% in RS) and due to that PDP, SDS and SBB refused to accept election results.

3.2. State Parliamentary Election

The Bosnian political system has been structured in such a way that is rather difficult, rendering it almost impossible for one single political party to secure the required majority in the parliament and consequently create the government. The results of the 2010 parliamentary elections produced effects that resulted in SDP and SNSD achieving their best results ever as parties and emerged as the relative winners of the election, with each one securing eight seats in the parliament. SDP more than doubled its number of votes compared to the last elections in 2006. They are followed by the SDA, which secured seven seats, two less than in the previous elections. However, SDA reduced the number of votes in each of the five electoral units in the Federation, thus obtaining the worst results in its twenty-year political history. SDS emerged as the second strongest party coming from RS, having received four representatives in the parliament. The two main Croat political parties, HDZ and HDZ 1990, obtained three and two seats respectively. It is more than clear that SBiH suffered the heaviest loss in the elections by only being able to secure two seats, compared to the eight representatives this political party had in the previous term. Four candidates of SBB were able to get seats in the parliament, which might be considered as a good result for this political party, taking into consideration that it was its first time participating in the elections.

	2006		2010	
Party	Votes and	Seats	Votes and	Seats
	percentage		percentage	
SDP	131,450 (15.40%)*	5	266,023 (26.07%)*	8
	143,272		284,435	

Table 2: Results of the 2006 and 2010 Parliamentary Election

	(10.17%)***		(17.32%)***	
SNSD	262,203 (46.93%)**	7	269,009	8
	269,468		(43.30%)**	
	(19.08%)***		277,819	
	· · · ·		(16.92%)***	
SDA	217,961 (25.54%)*	9	197,922 (19.40%)*	7
	238,475		214,300	
	(16.88%)***		(13.05%)***	
SDS	108,616 (19.44%)**	3	137,844	4
	108,816 (7.71%)***		(22.19%)**	
			137,844	
			(8.39%)***	
SBB			124,114 (12.16%)*	4
			130,448	
			(7.94%)***	
HDZ-	68,188 (7.99%)*	3		
HK-HNZ	69,333 (4.90%)***			
HDZ	52,095 (6.10%)*	2		
1990-	52,686 (3.73%)***			
HZ-HSS-				
HKDU-				
HDU-				
Demochr				
istinas				
SBiH	196,230 (22.99%)*	8	74,004 (7.25%)*	2
	219,487		86,669 (5.27%)***	
	(15.54%)***			
BPS	37,608 (4.41%)*	1	28,102 (2.75%)*	-
	38,474 (2.72%)***		28,704 (1.74%)***	
DNZ	16,221 (1.90%)*	1	14,843 (1.45%)*	1
	16,542 (1.17%)***		15,153 (0.92%)***	
DNS	19,868 (3.56%)**	1	28,511 (4.59%)**	1
	20,100 (1.42%)***		29,658 (1.80%)***	
PDP	28,410 (5.08%)**	1	40,070 (6.45%)**	1
	28,410 (2.01%)***		40,070 (2.44%)***	
NSRzB	27,487 (3.22%)*	1	49,050 (4.81%)*	1
	33,020 (2.34%)***		49,050 (2.98%)***	
HDZ			112,115 (10.99%)*	3
			114,476	

			(6.97%)***	
HDZ			49,549 (4.86%)*	2
1990-			50,071 (3.05%)***	
HSP				
Others	174,005		182,872	
	(12.32%)***		(11.14%)***	
Total	853,372 (60.43%)*	42	1,020,293	42
	558,706 (39.57%)**		(62.16%)*	
	1,412,088***		621,276(37.84%)**	
			1,641,569***	

Source: Confirmed results of 2006 and 2010 general elections, Members of the House of Representatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Accessed December 2, 2010. http://izbori.ba/rezultati/konacni/parlament bih/index.

http://izbori.ba/rezultati/konacni/parlament_bih/index.htm#

*Number and percentage of votes in the Federation entity

**Number and percentage of votes in the RS entity

***Total number of votes and percentage in both entities

It is important to observe that no political party with the headquarters in the Federation, mainly SDA and SDP was able to secure any seat in the Parliament reserved for candidates from the RS. It was, for the first time since the first post-Dayton elections were held in 1996, that all 14 candidates coming from RS were from predominantly Serb political parties (SNSD, SDS, PDP and DNS).

It demonstrates at least two things. First, ethnic cleansing of the Croat and Bosniak population conducted in the RS during the war has been reflected on the ballot boxes and culminated in these elections. Second, such a great amount of division and animosity among Bosniak political leaders, and the absence of any type of coalition among the federationbased political parties (mainly SDA, SDP, SBiH and SBB) that participated in the RS, resulted in the fact that *none of them were able to pass the threshold* and consequently were not able to secure any of their candidates a seat in parliament. Meaning to say that the de-facto Croat and Bosniak population from the RS has noone to articulate their concerns and promote their interests in the parliamentary assembly in the coming four years.

The newly elected MPs met in an inaugural session on November 30th 2010, but only to take their oaths.¹⁹ However, the Lower House was constituted on May 20, 2011 and House of Peoples was constituted on June 4, 2011. Since all legislation needs to be adopted by both Houses, there was no legislative work at all carried out for eight months after the elections.

	2006		2010	
Party	Votes and	Seats	Votes and	Seats
	Percentage		Percentage	
SDA	218,365 (25.45%)	28	206,926 (20.22%)	23
SBiH	190,148 (22.16%)	24	78,086 (7.63%)	9
SDP	130,204 (15.17%)	17	251,053 (24.53%)	28
SBB			121,697 (11.89%)	13
	-			
HDZ-HK-HNZ	64,906 (7.56%)	8		
			-	
HDZ 1990-	54,210 (6.32%)	7		
HZ-HSS-			-	
HKDU-HDU-				
Demochristina				
S				
BPS	35,223 (4.10%)	4		
			-	
NSRzB	27,132 (3.16%)	3	48,286 (4.72%)	5
BOSS-SDU	27,200 (3.17%)	3		
			-	
DNZ	16,014 (1.87%)	2	15,082 (1.47%)	1
HSP-NHI	21,152 (2.46%)	1		

Table 3: Results of 2006 and 2010 Elections at the Federal Level

¹⁹ Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina, House of Representatives inaugural session held on November 30, 2010. Accessed December 27, 2011. https://www.parlament.ba/sadrzaj/plenarne_sjednice/predstavnicki_dom/default.aspx?id= 21484&langTag=bs-BA

			-	
SNSD	12,564 (1.46%)	1	9,505 (0.93%)	1
HDZ1990-HSP			47,941 (4.68%)	5
		-		
A-SDA			19,254 (1.88%)	1
		-		
HDZ			108,943 (10.64%)	12
		-		
Others	60,987 (7.12%)		116,756 (11.41%)	
		-		-
Total	858,105	98	1,023,529	98

Source: Confirmed results of 2006 and 2010 general elections, Members of the House of Representatives of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Accessed January 7, 2011.

http://izbori.ba/Finalni2010/Finalni/ParlamentFBIH/Default.aspx,

http://izbori.ba/rezultati/konacni/parlament_fbih/FBiH_rezultati.asp,

Election results at the Federal level show that ten political parties, one less than in the previous assembly, were able to pass the threshold and therefore have their representatives in the parliament. SDP got the highest number of votes that secured 28 seats for their political party in the lower house of the parliament. They were followed by SDA, which was able to secure 23 seats in the parliament (five less than in the previous convocation). SBB and SBiH followed these political parties with 13 and 9 seats, respectively. Results were quite disappointing for SBiH as the number of representatives comparing to the previous election was reduced by 15. In spite the fact that SDP claims itself as a multi-ethnic party, it is a fact however that Bosniaks make an absolute majority of the electoral body for the above mentioned parties.

Croat votes were mainly captured by the HDZ and the coalition between by HDZ1990 and HSP. These two blocks secured 12 and 5 parliamentary seats, respectively. Other smaller political parties such as A-SDA, NSRzB, and DNZ captured the rest of the seats. (see Table 3). However, things became much more complicated, as under the election law, the Federal government can't be formed until the House of Peoples of the Federation is constituted (i.e. until all 10 cantonal assemblies sent their delegates to the Federal House of Peoples).²⁰

	2006		2010	
Party	Votes and	Seats	Votes and	Seats
	percentage		percentage	
SNSD	244,251 (43.31%)	41	240,727 (38.00%)	37
SDS	103,035 (18.27%)	17	120,136 (18.97%)	18
PDP	38,681 (6.86%)	8	47,806 (7.55%)	7
DNS	22,780 (4.04%)	4	38,547 (6.09%)	6
SBiH	22,642 (4.01%)	4		
SP	20,031 (3.55%)	3		
SDA	19,137 (3.39%)	3	16,861 (2.66%)	2
SRS RS	16,454 (2.92%)	2	15,166 (2.39%)	1
SDP	14,079 (2.50%)	1	19,297 (3.05%)	3
SP-PUP			26,824 (4.23%)	4
DP			21,604 (3.41%)	3
NDS			13,440 (2.12%)	2
Others	62,905 (11.15%)		73,021 (11.52%)	
Total	563,995	83	633,429	83

Table 4: Results of 2006 and 2010 elections at the RS level

Source: Confirmed results of 2006 and 2010 general elections, Members of the People's Assembly of Republika Srpska.

Accessed January 10, 2011.

http://izbori.ba/Finalni2010/Finalni/NarodnaSkupstinaRS/Default.aspx, http://izbori.ba/rezultati/konacni/narodna_skupstina_rs/RS_rezultati.asp

Elections in the RS for the seats in the National Assembly were not as thrilling since it was known in advance that incumbent SNSD was going to win the majority of seats. The issue was only whether it would have a

²⁰ According to the Election Law of Bosnia and Herzegovina, "the election of delegates to the House of Peoples of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina shall take place as soon as a Cantonal Assembly convenes after the elections for the Cantonal Assemblies and no later than one month after validation of the results." See *Election Law of Bosnia and Herzegovina*, Article 10.13.

majority of the seats in the National Assembly, and hence be able to create the government on its own or whether it would fall short of few seats and therefore be obliged to make a post-election coalition with smaller political parties. Results showed that SNDS secured 37 seats in the Assembly, four less than in the previous term. SDS appeared to be the strongest opposition political party with 18.97% of votes that enabled it to secure 18 seats in the National Assembly. Other smaller political parties such as PDP, DNS and DP captured the rest of the seats. SDA and SDP (as the Federation based political parties) were able to secure 2 and 3 seats, respectively. SBiH, which had 4 representatives in the previous convocation of the Assembly, was not even able to pass the high 3% threshold in this election and therefore will not have its representative in the current National Assembly of the RS. (See Table 4)

CANDIDATES	20	06	CANDIDATES	2010	
	Party	Votes	1	Party	Votes
Serb Candidate			Serb Candidate		
Milan Jelić President	SNSD	271,022 (48.87%)	Milorad Dodik President	SNSD	319,618 (50.52%)
Dragan Čavić	SDS	163,041 (29.40%)	Ognjen Tadić	Coalition for Srpska (SDS- PDP-SRS RS	(35.92%)
Bosniak Candidate			Bosniak Candidate		
Adil Osmanović Vice-President	SDA	22,444 (4.05%)	Enes Suljkanović Vice-President	SDP	15,425 (2.44%)
Mirsad Mahmutović	SBiH	18,744 (3.38%)	Šefket Hafizović	SDA	14,843 (2.35%)
Croat Candidate			Croat Candidate		
Davor Čordaš Vice-President	NHI- HDZ-HSP Đ. JHNZ	4,598 (0.83%)	Emil Vlajki Vice-President	NDS	6,101 (0.96%)
Željko Grebenarović	NSRzB	4,465 (0.81%)	Ivan Kmdelj	HSS-NHI	5,487 (0.87%)
Others		70,257 (12.66%)	Others		43,961 (6.94%)

Table 5: Results of the 2006 and 2010 Presidential Elections in the RS

Source: Confirmed results of 2006 and 2010 Presidential elections of Republika Srpska. Accessed January 12, 2011.

http://izbori.ba/rezultati/konacni/predsjednik_rs/RSPredsjednik.asp?nivo=600 http://izbori.ba/Finalni2010/Finalni/PredsjednikRS/Nivo.asp

Presidential and vice-presidential elections in RS are held concurrently. These elections were held in the light of direct political struggle between the president of SNSD, Milorad Dodik, and Ognjen Tadić, candidate of Coalition for Srpska (composed of SDS, PDP, and SRS RS parties). Dodik beat his first opponent with a majority of 92,000 votes and thus became the 8th President of RS. Enes Suljkanović from SDP and Emil Vlajki from DNS were elected as vice presidents from the Bosniak and Croat peoples, respectively. (See Table 5)

Elections were held in all ten cantons and many changes have taken place in the composition of the cantonal assemblies. SDP got the majority of seats in 4 cantons, the majority in five cantons was captured by the HDZ, while SDP and SDA secured an equal number of seats with ten each in Canton 4. SDP improved its results by 7.50%, increasing the number of representatives in all Cantonal assemblies from 43 to 61. Compared to the previous composition of the Cantonal assemblies, SBiH and SDA have lost their domination in all cantons which they previously had. Thus, SBiH's number of seats in all cantonal assemblies was reduced by 36, while SDA has lost 19 seats in all Assemblies comparing to the 2006 results. The biggest debacle SBiH faced was in the Sarajevo Canton, where the number of votes was reduced by $2\frac{1}{2}$ times and seats in the Assembly from 13 to 4. SBB, a party established in the middle of 2009, was able to capture more than 114,000 votes and secure 29 seats. HDZ gained the majority in all cantons where predominately Bosnian Croats reside and make majority of the population, increasing its majority in each one of them. They were followed by the HDZ1990 and NSRzB, which secured 18 seats each. Other smaller political parties such as A-SDA, BOSS, DNZ, BPS, HSP etc., were able to capture the rest of the seats in the Cantonal assemblies (see Appendix 1).

4. ELECTION'S IMPLICATIONS AND POLITICAL CRISES

It is quite clear that the 2010 general elections results show that Bosnians voted for change. But the question is whether the change will bring the country together or further deteriorate the political climate by bringing

more division among elected political elites. It has been widely expected that negotiations for the formation of government would take a maximum of six months. However, it took more than 16 months for political leaders of main political parties to agree, create a parliamentary majority, and approve the government. The six main party leaders (SDP, SDA, HDZ, HDZ 1990, SNSD and SDS) have held a number of meetings. The constant bargaining about the ethnic distribution of posts in the Council of Ministers has done nothing to improve regional and international image of the country. Nevertheless, an agreement at the state level has been made recently with regard to the distribution of positions of ministers, deputy ministers, and positions in the most important state institutions. As a result of this lack of constructive cooperation among political elites, Bosnia has been facing its worst crisis since the end of the war.

The 2010 post-election crisis in BiH began with the extremely complicated process of government formation in the Federation of BiH. Namely, a week after the government of the Federation was formed, the Central Election Commission (CEC) ruled that the House of Peoples, which is supposed to elect the President and approve the government, had not been properly constituted and therefore the election of the president was null and void.²¹ Several days later, the High Representative suspended this decision and the election of the president, nomination of the prime-minister and establishment of the government at the Federal level were declared legal.²² This suspension has not been lifted as of today. As a result of this, two main Croat political parties, HDZ and HDZ 1990, consider the formation of the government in the Federation to be unconstitutional, illegal, and illegitimate.

²¹ Central Election Commission decision 05-1-07-5-219/11, March 24, 2011, p.2.

²² Office of the High Representative, "Order Temporarily Suspending Certain Decisions of the Central Election Commission of Bosnia and Herzegovina Adopted at its 21st Session Held on March 24, 2011 and any Proceedings Concerning Said Decision" March 28, 2011. Accessed December 12, 2011.

http://www.ohr.int/decisions/statemattersdec/default.asp?content_id=45890

Following the crisis in the Federation, the RS National Assembly inflicted the strongest possible blow to state's institutions by calling for a referendum on whether people of RS "support laws imposed by the OHR in Bosnia, in particular the laws on Bosnia's state court and prosecution."²³ Political elites of RS justified the referendum on the basis that the state court has been biased against Serbs and has not dealt adequately with war crimes committed against Serbs. However, under the huge pressure from the international community and upon the visit of Catherine Ashton to RS, its President announced that call for referendum has been retracted. This clearly showed that RS politicians have continued to ask for the return of BiH to something like its original Dayton design (which means a less functional union, whereby most governing tasks would be handled by the entities, with the state playing a coordinating role and exercising few powers).²⁴

Political climate was further aggravated by the Bosnian Croat leaders call for amendments to the constitution that would open the door for the division of BiH into at least three entities, with one of them being the Croat majority. According to the resolution of the Croat National Assembly:

> "Only a thorough reform of the constitution, providing for full institutional equality and a new administrative-territorial arrangement of the country on the basis of several federal units, of which at least one would be for the Croatian majority, can guarantee actual equality of the Croatian people in BiH."²⁵

In such constellation of political events, it has been almost impossible to make improvements in terms of making any progress towards fulfilling

²³ Odluka o raspisivanjurepubličkog referenduma, [RS National Assembly Decision on Referendum], No: 01-614/11. April 13, 2011. Accessed December 27, 2011.

http://www.narodnaskupstinars.net/cyrl/?page=134&kat=3&vijest=1315

²⁴ International Crisis Group, *Bosnia: State Institutions under Attack*, May 6, 2011, pp.7-8.

²⁵ Hrvatski Narodni Sabor Bosne i Hercegovine [Croat National Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina], Resolution, Article 8. Private Archive.

some of the conditions that were put forth by the EU and NATO on Bosnia's way to become their full member. Consequently, for more than a year, the performance of the executive and legislative authorities at both state and entity levels was extremely poor. At state level, the parliamentary assembly adopted only 10 laws, only amending existing legislation. No progress was made in addressing the European partnership priorities as the adoption of a law on state aid and the necessary adoption of amendments to the Constitution and election law to abide by the Sejdić and Finci Judgment.

Given the existing political stalemate, foreign direct investment was around \notin 33 million in the first half of 2011, down by almost 20% compared with the first half of 2010, while unemployment continued to be as high as 42% of the workforce.²⁶

As a result of such a difficult political climate with an evident lack of trust and with repeated calls for reducing the relevance of the state institutions, secession of one part of the country or creation of another entity, even politicians with the best intentions will have a hard time to fulfill the country's essential international obligations. Hence, the strong presence of international community resembled in the OHR will have to be present in the country as long as domestic political elites are not able to have a minimum level of consensus vis-à-vis decision-making and law passing procedures in executive and legislative institutions.

CONCLUSION

Elections in 2010 ended with some astounding results. Željko Komšić, SDP candidate, was re-elected to the post of the collective presidency with mainly Bosniak votes. SDA's Bakir Izetbegović defeated Haris Silajdžić, who lost ground along his political party that conceded humiliating results on all electoral levels. The SNSD strengthened its presence at the entity and state level as well. Nebojša Radmanović

²⁶ International Crisis Group, *Bosnia*, p.10.

narrowly defeated Mladen Ivanić for a post in the collective presidency while Milorad Dodik won the race for the President of RS. SDP appeared to be the biggest winner of the elections, securing the highest number of seats in the cantonal assemblies, federal parliament, and sharing the equal number of seats with SNSD in the parliamentary assembly at the state level. Newly established SBB was able to pass the threshold and have its representatives at all levels. HDZ, as the main Croat political party, significantly improved its results by winning majority of votes in all areas mainly populated by Croats (compared to the previous elections). Therefore, it is expected that SDP, SDA, SNSD, and HDZ will all play predominant roles in forming the government at the state level. Other political parties led by the SBB should have the role as a strong and constructive opposition.

Post-elections crisis risks have serious consequences not only for BiH itself, but also with regard to its membership in international organizations. Elected political elites must also look beyond the immediate situation and seek fundamental agreement on how the interests of the three constituent peoples can best be served in a united country in which tensions between fair representation, decentralization, and establishment of a functional state are no longer the main debated issues. At the same time, the wide range of power enjoyed by international community has to be adequately exercised against those who undermine sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia.

APPENDIX 1: RESULTS OF 2006 AND 2010 ELECTIONS IN ALL CANTONS

CANTON 1	2006		2010	
Party	Votes and	Seats	Votes and	Seats
	Percentage		Percentage	
SDA	32,171 (35.13%)	12	24,873	7
			(22.70%)	
DNZ	15,401 (16.82%)	6	14,636	4
			(13.35%)	
SBiH	15,127 (16.52%)	6	9,001 (8.21%)	3
SDP	14,621 (15.97%)	6	25,850	8
			(23.59%)	
S-SDA			12,793	4
			(11.67%)	
SBB			7,918 (7.22%)	2
NSRzB-KS-			5,925 (5.41%)	2
E5-LDS				
Others	14,255 (15.56%)		8,600 (9.42%)	
		-		-
Total	91,575	30	109,596	30
CANTON 2	2006		2010	
HDZ	4,855 (32.85%)	7	6,937 (40.02%)	8
HDZ 1990-	3,712 (25.12%)	5		
HZ-HSS-				-
HKDU-HDU-				
Demochristina				
S				
HDZ 1990			3,683 (21.25%)	5
		-		
SDA	1,698 (11.49%)	2	1,907 (11.00%)	2
HSS-NHI			697 (4.02%)	1
		-		
PS			685 (3.95%)	1
		-		
HSP			529 (3.05%)	1
		-		
HSP-NHI	1,200 (8.12%)	2		
NSRzB	1,089 (7.37%)	2		

SDP	1,057 (7.15%)	2	1,037 (5.98%)	1
SBiH	591 (4.00%)	1	560 (3.23%)	1
SBB			568 (3.28%)	1
Others	597 (4.03%)		729 (4.20%)	
Total	14,799	21	17,332	21
CANTON 3	2006		2010	
SDA	54,373 (31.03%)	12	55,435	10
			(25.45%)	
SDP	46,554 (26.56%)	11	66,801	13
			(30.67%)	
SBiH	32,057 (18.29%)	7	17,801 (8.17%)	3
BOSS-SDU	9,230 (5.27%)	2		
NSRzB	7,887 (4.50%)	2	10,304 (4.73%)	2
BPS	5,492 (3.13%)	1	8,266 (3.80%)	2
SBB			22,077	4
			(10.14%)	
HDZ			6,550 (3.01%)	1
Others	19,659 (11.21%)		30,569	
			(14.03%)	
Total	175 252	25	217 002	25
Total	175,252	35	217,803	35
CANTON 4	2006		2010	
		13	2010 42,453	10
CANTON 4 SDA	2006 39,832 (29.28%)	13	2010 42,453 (24.81%)	10
CANTON 4	2006		2010 42,453 (24.81%) 43,816	
CANTON 4 SDA SDP	2006 39,832 (29.28%) 17,492 (12.86%)	13 5	2010 42,453 (24.81%) 43,816 (25.60%)	10 10
CANTON 4 SDA SDP SBiH	2006 39,832 (29.28%) 17,492 (12.86%) 36,533 (26.85%)	13 5 11	2010 42,453 (24.81%) 43,816 (25.60%) 14,631 (8.55%)	10 10 4
CANTON 4 SDA SDP SBiH BPS	2006 39,832 (29.28%) 17,492 (12.86%) 36,533 (26.85%) 8,477 (6.23%)	13 5 11 3	2010 42,453 (24.81%) 43,816 (25.60%) 14,631 (8.55%) 5,906 (3.45%)	10 10 4 1
CANTON 4 SDA SDP SBiH BPS HDZ	2006 39,832 (29.28%) 17,492 (12.86%) 36,533 (26.85%)	13 5 11 3 2	2010 42,453 (24.81%) 43,816 (25.60%) 14,631 (8.55%) 5,906 (3.45%) 8,757 (5.12%)	10 10 4 1 2
CANTON 4 SDA SDP SBiH BPS	2006 39,832 (29.28%) 17,492 (12.86%) 36,533 (26.85%) 8,477 (6.23%)	13 5 11 3	2010 42,453 (24.81%) 43,816 (25.60%) 14,631 (8.55%) 5,906 (3.45%) 8,757 (5.12%) 22,418	10 10 4 1
CANTON 4 SDA SDP SBiH BPS HDZ SBB	2006 39,832 (29.28%) 17,492 (12.86%) 36,533 (26.85%) 8,477 (6.23%) 5,246 (3.86%)	13 5 11 3 2	2010 42,453 (24.81%) 43,816 (25.60%) 14,631 (8.55%) 5,906 (3.45%) 8,757 (5.12%) 22,418 (13.10%)	10 10 4 1 2 5
CANTON 4 SDA SDP SBiH BPS HDZ SBB NSRzB	2006 39,832 (29.28%) 17,492 (12.86%) 36,533 (26.85%) 8,477 (6.23%) 5,246 (3.86%) 4,347 (3.20%)	13 5 11 3 2 	2010 42,453 (24.81%) 43,816 (25.60%) 14,631 (8.55%) 5,906 (3.45%) 8,757 (5.12%) 22,418 (13.10%) 11,152 (6.52%)	10 10 4 1 2
CANTON 4 SDA SDP SBiH BPS HDZ SBB	2006 39,832 (29.28%) 17,492 (12.86%) 36,533 (26.85%) 8,477 (6.23%) 5,246 (3.86%)	13 5 11 3 2	2010 42,453 (24.81%) 43,816 (25.60%) 14,631 (8.55%) 5,906 (3.45%) 8,757 (5.12%) 22,418 (13.10%) 11,152 (6.52%) 22,007	10 10 4 1 2 5
CANTON 4 SDA SDP SBiH BPS HDZ SBB NSRzB Others	2006 39,832 (29.28%) 17,492 (12.86%) 36,533 (26.85%) 8,477 (6.23%) 5,246 (3.86%) 4,347 (3.20%) 24,118 (17.72%)	13 5 11 3 2 1	2010 42,453 (24.81%) 43,816 (25.60%) 14,631 (8.55%) 5,906 (3.45%) 8,757 (5.12%) 22,418 (13.10%) 11,152 (6.52%) 22,007 (12.85%)	10 10 4 1 2 5 3
CANTON 4 SDA SDP SBiH BPS HDZ SBB NSRzB Others Total	2006 39,832 (29.28%) 17,492 (12.86%) 36,533 (26.85%) 8,477 (6.23%) 5,246 (3.86%) 4,347 (3.20%) 24,118 (17.72%) 136,045	13 5 11 3 2 	2010 42,453 (24.81%) 43,816 (25.60%) 14,631 (8.55%) 5,906 (3.45%) 8,757 (5.12%) 22,418 (13.10%) 11,152 (6.52%) 22,007 (12.85%) 171,140	10 10 4 1 2 5
CANTON 4 SDA SDP SBiH BPS HDZ SBB NSRzB Others Total CANTON 5	2006 39,832 (29.28%) 17,492 (12.86%) 36,533 (26.85%) 8,477 (6.23%) 5,246 (3.86%) 4,347 (3.20%) 24,118 (17.72%) 136,045 2006	13 5 11 3 2 1 35	2010 42,453 (24.81%) 43,816 (25.60%) 14,631 (8.55%) 5,906 (3.45%) 8,757 (5.12%) 22,418 (13.10%) 11,152 (6.52%) 22,007 (12.85%) 171,140 2010	10 10 4 1 2 5 3 35
CANTON 4 SDA SDP SBiH BPS HDZ SBB NSRzB Others Total CANTON 5 SDA	2006 39,832 (29.28%) 17,492 (12.86%) 36,533 (26.85%) 8,477 (6.23%) 5,246 (3.86%) 4,347 (3.20%) 24,118 (17.72%) 136,045 2006 3,887 (32.68%)	13 5 11 3 2 1 35 9	2010 42,453 (24.81%) 43,816 (25.60%) 14,631 (8.55%) 5,906 (3.45%) 8,757 (5.12%) 22,418 (13.10%) 11,152 (6.52%) 22,007 (12.85%) 171,140 2010 2,880 (21.47%)	10 10 4 1 2 5 3 35 6
CANTON 4 SDA SDP SBiH BPS HDZ SBB NSRzB Others Total CANTON 5	2006 39,832 (29.28%) 17,492 (12.86%) 36,533 (26.85%) 8,477 (6.23%) 5,246 (3.86%) 4,347 (3.20%) 24,118 (17.72%) 136,045 2006	13 5 11 3 2 1 35	2010 42,453 (24.81%) 43,816 (25.60%) 14,631 (8.55%) 5,906 (3.45%) 8,757 (5.12%) 22,418 (13.10%) 11,152 (6.52%) 22,007 (12.85%) 171,140 2010	10 10 4 1 2 5 3 35

NSRzB ²⁷	580 (4.88%)	1	1,401 (10.45%)	3
BPS	484 (4.07%)	1	817 (6.09%)	2
SBB			1,722 (12.84%)	3
Others	1,391 (11.69%)		1,242 (9.26%)	
Total	11,893	25	13,411	25
CANTON 6	2006		2010	
SDA	23,228 (23.49%)	8	20,639	6
			(17.89%)	
SBiH	20,915 (21.15%)	7	8,546 (7.41%)	2
HDZ	18,469 (18.67%)	6	23,857	7
			(20.68%)	
SDP	8,996 (9.10%)	3	20,530	6
			(17.79%)	
HDZ 1990-	8,442 (8.54%)	3		
HZ-HSS-				
HKDU-HDU-				
Demochristina				
S				
HSP-NHI	4,483 (4.53%)	2		
NSRzB	3,785 (3.83%)	1	6,784 (5.88%)	2
SBB			15,442	4
			(13.38%)	
HDZ1990-			8,234 (7.14%)	2
HSP				
HSS-NHI			3,553 (3.08%)	1
Others	10,582 (10.69%)		7,799 (6.75%)	
Total	98,900	30	115,384	30
CANTON 7	2006		2010	
HDZ	17,493 (19.77%)	7	29,035	10
			(29.46%)	
HDZ 1990-	17,062 (19.28%)	7		
HZ-HSS-				
HKDU-HDU-				
Demochristina				
S SD A	1 < 0.0 < (1.0, 0.0 m)		16 610	
SDA	16,806 (18.99%)	6	16,618	5
			(16.86%)	

SBiH	13,578 (15.34%)	5	4,688 (4.76%)	2
SDP	5,980 (6.76%)	2	15,125	5
			(15.34%)	
HSP-NHI	4,365 (4.93%)	2		
BPS	3,247 (3.67%)	1		
HDZ 1990			10,489	3
			(10.64%)	
SBB			8,376 (8.50%)	3
HSP			4,331 (4.39%)	1
NSRzB			3,852 (3.91%)	1
Others	9,967 (11.26%)		6,056 (6.14%)	
Total	88,498	30	92,514	30
CANTON 8	2006		2010	-
HDZ	9,395 (36.68%)	9	18,106 (51.42)	13
HDZ 1990-	7,795 (30.44%0	8		
HZ-HSS-				
HKDU-HDU-				
Demochristina				
S				
HSP-NHI	4,298 (16.78%)	4		
NSRzB	2,361 (9.22)	2	4,089 (11.61%)	3
HDZ 1990			5,455 (15.49%)	4
HSP			4,471 (12.70%)	3
Others	1,761 (6.87%)		3,088 (8.77%)	
Total	25,610	23	35,209	23
CANTON 9	2006		2010	
SBiH	58,073 (32.13%)	13	22,173	4
			(10.64%)	
SDA	42,457 (23.49%)	10	37,396	7
			(17.94%)	
SDP	29,153 (16.13%)	7	50,387	10
			(24.17%)	
BOSS-SDU	12,426 (6.88%)	3		
BPS	8,084 (4.47%)	2	9,879 (4.74%)	2
SBB			36,022	7
			(17.28%)	

NS-NSP			9,745 (4.67%)	2
SDU			7,238 (3.47%)	1
BOSS			7,163 (3.44%)	1
NSRzB			6,310 (3.03%)	1
Others	30,523 (16.89%)		22,158	
			(10.62%)	
Total	180,716	35	208,471	35
CANTON 10	2006		2010	
HDZ 1990-	5,346 (22.86%)	6		
HZ-HSS-				
HKDU-HDU-				
Demochristina				
8				
HDZ	4,127 (17.65%)	5	7,973 (26.15%)	7
SNSD	3,779 (16.16%)	5	3.654 (11.99%)	3
HSP-NHI	3,390 (14.50%)	4		
SDA	1,484 (6.35%)	2	1,702 (5.58%)	2
SBiH	1,138 (4.87%)	1		
SDP	1,110 (4.75%)	1	1,377 (4.52%)	1
NSRzB	912 (3.90%)	1	3,101 (10.17%)	3
HDZ 1990			4,008 (13.15%)	4
	-			
HSP			2,924 (9.59%)	3
	-			
HSS-NHI			1,472 (4.83%)	1
	-			
DNS			1,346 (4.41%)	1
	-			
Others	2,098 (8.97%)		2,931 (9.61%)	
Total	23,384	25	30,488	25
All Cantons	2006		2010	
SDA	215,936 (25.50%)	74	203,903	55
			(20.16%)	
SDP	127,417 (15.04%)	43	228,247	61
			(22.56%)	
SBiH	181,109 (21.39%)	59	79,425 (7.85%)	23
DNZ	15,401(1.81%)	6	14,636 (1.44%)	4

HDZ	59,585 (7.03%)	36	101,215	48
			(10.00%)	
HDZ 1990-	42,357 (5.00%)	29		
HZ-HSS-			-	
HKDU-HDU-				
Demochristina				
S				
HSP-NHI	17,736 (2.09%)	14		
			-	
NSRzB	20,961 (2.47%)	10	46,993 (4.64%)	18
HDZ 1990			31,869 (3.15%)	18
BOSS-SDU	21,656 (2.55%)	5		
			-	
BPS	25,784 (3.04%)	8	24,868 (2.45%)	7
SNSD	3,779 (0.44%)	5	3,654 (0.36%)	3
NSRzB-KS-			5,925 (0.58%)	2
E5-LDS				
BOSS			7,163 (0.70%)	1
SDU			7,238 (0.71%)	1
NS-NSP			9,745 (0.96%)	2
A-SDA			12,793 (1.26%)	4
SBB			114,543	29
			(11.32%)	
HSS-NHI			5,722 (0.56%)	3
PS			685 (0.067%)	1
HSP			12,255 (1.21%)	8
DNS			1,346 (0.13%)	1
Others	114,951 (13.57%)		99,123 (9.80%)	
TOTAL	846,672	289	1,011,348	289
			[+164,676 or	
			19.44%]	

Source: Confirmed results of 2006 and 2010 general elections, members of Cantonal Assemblies in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Accessed January 15, 2011.

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