

TURKISH WORKERS IN GERMANY - AN UNDECLARED IMMIGRATION

Prof. Dr. Dietrich Thränhardt*

1. West European Migration Trends in Recent Decades

Turkish migration to Western Germany has emerged as the biggest stream from one single country to another in Western Europe since 1950, but it is by no means a unique phenomenon. As industrialization leads to concentration of capital, industries, and work force (either by specific production necessities or because of other political or economic factors), migration has been connected to industrialization since its beginning. So it was not accidental that Britain, the first industrialized country, became an immigration country in the nineteenth century: workers came from the continent, particularly from Germany, and even more from Ireland, John Bull's first colony, as G. B. Shaw used to say. Reading Engels' classical study on the Irish workers in England one can see a lot of parallels to the economic and social processes in industrialized countries today.

The system of national states and national economies which had become dominant in Europe at the end of the 19th century tended to confine migration processes within the limits of national states. So workers moved from Eastern Germany or Bavaria to the Ruhrgebiet, from Brittany or the Massif Central to Paris, from farmlands to industrializing districts. Industry created new opportunities for fastly growing populations in the nineteenth century, between the end of societal birth control around 1800 and the development of free individual birth control in the developed societies of today. So the population of what is now West Germany doubled from 1816 to 1895, and quadrupled from 1816 to 1952.

(*) University of Münster.

General Pattern of Migration in Western Europe in the Early Seventies




Table: 1

West German Population 1816 - 1981 (millions, within borders of today)

1816	13.7	1900	29.8	1950	50.8	1975	61.8
1840	17.0	1910	35.6	1955	52.4	1976	61.5
1861	19.1	1925	39.0	1960	55.4	1977	61.4
1871	20.4	1930	40.3	1965	58.6	1978	61.3
1880	22.8	1939	43.0	1970	60.7	1979	61.4
1890	25.4	1946	46.2	1974	62.1	1980	61.6
						1981	61.7

Source: Statistisches Jahrbuch 1982, Wiesbaden 1982.

From the beginning of industrialization foreign labour was imported if there was no sufficient native work force, if this native work force was becoming too costly (foreign labour could be used to lower wages), if undesirable jobs could not be filled with the indigenous work force or if there were special or seasonal demands, e. g., railroad construction or agriculture. So, for example, the famous St. Gotthard tunnel in Switzerland was constructed with Italian labour. Following the economic breakdown after the First World War and the Great Depression after 1929 the numbers of foreign workers dropped sharply between 1918 and 1950. On the other hand the boom decades after 1950 brought unprecedented growth rates, and also unprecedented numbers of migrant workers in all industrialized European countries. See the numbers of aliens in some countries:

W-Germany	Switzerland	Belgium	France	Sweden	Netherlands
1951 1,0 %	1941 5,5 %	1947 4,4 %	1946 4,4 %	1945 0,4 %	1945 1,2 %
1955 0,9 %	1950 6,0 %	1954 4,3 %	1960 3,3 %	1954 1,5 %	1960 0,9 %
1961 1,2 %	1960 10,5 %	1961 4,9 %	1970 6,7 %	1960 2,5 %	1973 2,1%*
1968 4,0 %	1970 15,7 %	1970 7,2 %	1974 7,7 %	1970 5,1 %	
1974 6,7 %	1974 16,5 %	1973 7,9 %		1974 4,9 %	

Source: Ray C. Rist, *Guestworkers in Germany. The Prospects for Pluralism*, New York: Praeger 1978, p. 8 sq.

* Not including the Surinamese, who are Dutch citizens.

Before World War II migrants mostly originated in Eastern Europe and Italy. After 1945 new patterns arose. France, Britain, and Holland received large numbers of immigrants from their former colonies : North Africa and Black Africa, India, Pakistan and the West Indies, Suriname and Indonesia. Even Italy had its post-colonial immigration : The largest part came from Eritrea.

Large new migration streams began to flow from the Mediterranean countries in the sixties. Germany, today the biggest immigration country, concluded migration treaties with Italy (1955), Greece and Spain (1960), Turkey (1961), Portugal (1964), and Yugoslavia (1968). In spite of a certain internationalization of the European labour market we can observe special relationships between certain emigration and immigration countries : Yugoslavs are most numerous in Austria, Italians in Belgium and Switzerland, Portuguese in France and in Luxembourg, Fins in Sweden, and Turks in West Germany and in the Netherlands (actually, there are more people of Surinamese origin in Holland, but they have Dutch citizenship). All the European industrialized countries have been immigration countries (Germany, France, Switzerland, Austria, Benelux, Danmark, Sweden, Norway, and Great Britain), the less industrialized capitalist countries in Europe have been emigration countries (Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece, Turkey, Ireland, and Finland). When it became politically feasible, migration also took place from Eastern Europe. There were legal arrangements in the special case of Yugoslavia, a socialist market economy. But where administrative controls became weak, migrations began also to flow from countries of the COMECON bloc. Illegal migration from Poland, with the silent consent of Polish and Western authorities, is a recent example in 1982/83.

STOCKS OF FOREIGN WORKERS IN SOPEMI IMMIGRATION COUNTRIES 1980

(thousands)

	Austria	Belgium	France	Germany	Luxembourg	Netherlands	Sweden	Switzerland
Algeria	—	3.2	382.1	2.7	—	—	—	—
Austria	—	—	—	87.2	—	—	—	19.45
Finland	—	—	—	3.6	—	—	108.0	—
Greece	—	10.7	—	138.4	—	1.3	7.5	4.78
Italy	2.1	90.5	157.6	324.3	11.2	10.0	—	233.81
Morocco	—	37.3	171.9	16.6	—	34.2	—	—
Portugal	—	6.2	434.6	59.9	13.7	4.3	—	7.46
Spain	0.2	32.0	128.9	89.3	2.3	10.6	—	62.1
Tunisia	—	4.7	73.2	—	—	1.1	—	—
Turkey	30.1	23.0	—	623.9	—	53.8	—	20.7
Yugoslavia	120.9	3.1	—	367.0	0.6	6.8	24.0	30.7
Other — EEC	12.2	81.5	49.4	149.8	21.9	55.0	37.8	83.7
Countries — non-EEC	18.6	40.0	194.2	306.1	2.2	33.9	56.7	38.4
TOTAL	184.1	332.7	1,591.9	2,168.8	51.9	211.0	234.1	501.2

Notes: Where no figure is given the nationality in question is not identified separately.

Austria : Based on number of current work permits. Unemployed included.

Belgium : Estimate by the Department of Labour at 31.12.1980. Includes unemployed but not self-employed.

France : Estimate of the active population, unemployed and self-employed included, at October 1979.

Germany : Foreign workers, including commuters and the unemployed but not the self-employed, at 30th June, 1980.

Luxembourg : The figures for Algeria, Austria and Finland do not include the unemployed.

Netherlands : Official figures of occupied foreign workers. Includes 0.6 Italian and 11.2 other EEC frontier workers.

Switzerland : Estimate, based on work permits issued where applicable. Includes employed but not self-employed.

Switzerland : Foreign residents, i.e. excluding commuters and seasonal workers, at 31st December, 1980 holding annual or established permits «with gainful activity».

**STOCKS OF FOREIGN RESIDENTS IN CERTAIN COUNTRIES
OF IMMIGRATION 1980**

(thousands)

	France	Germany	Netherlands	Sweden	Switzerland
Algeria	808.2	5.0	0.4	0.6	—
Austria	—	172.6	—	3.3	31.7
Finland	—	9.9	—	181.5	—
Greece	—	297.5	4.1	15.5	8.8
Italy	469.2	617.8	21.6	4.8	420.7
Morocco	421.3	35.9	85.1	1.4	—
Portugal	857.3	112.3	9.5	1.6	10.7
Spain	424.7	180.0	23.8	33.8	97.2
Tunisia	181.6	22.6	2.5	1.0	—
Turkey	103.9	1,462.4	140.2	18.3	38.1
Yugoslavia	68.2	631.8	14.6	39.2	43.9
Other — EEC	168.9	293.7	118.2	56.9	159.6
Countries — non-EEC	644.6	611.8	96.2	63.8	82.1
TOTAL	4,147.9	4,453.3	537.8	421.7	892.8

Notes : Where no figure is given the nationality in question is not identified separately.

France : Figures of the Ministry of the Interior : Current residence permits.

Germany : At 30th December, 1980. Figures of the Federal Statistical Office

Netherlands : Estimate of the correspondent.

Sweden : As recorded in the national population register at 31st December, 1980.

Switzerland : Holders of annual and established permits at 31st December, 1980.

Source : OECD. Continuous Reporting System on Migration SOPEMI (Système d'Observation Permanente de Migrations) 1981, Paris 1982, p. 3, 4.

It is interesting to look into two smaller migration phenomena around 1970. Firstly, there was migration from developed countries like Germany or Austria to the two European countries with the highest standard of living : Switzerland and Sweden. 46.000 Germans were working in Sweden even in 1980, and 42.000 French and 17.000 German commuters were working in Switzerland.¹ On the

(1) OECD, 1 oc. cit., p. 86, 91.

other hand, some emigration countries north of the Mediterranean Sea became immigration countries, too. When labour shortages emerged, Spain received workers from Morocco, Italy from Eritrea and Tunisia, and Greece from Egypt. Inside the countries, of course also vivid migration processes took place: from southern Italy to the northwestern industrial triangle around Milan - Torino - Genova, migration from all Portuguese regions to the Lisbon and Porto regions, migration from Andalusia and Galicia to Madrid, Catalonia, and the Basque country, migration from northern Greece and the islands to Greater Athens and Salonika, and the big migrations from the Turkish countryside to Ankara, Izmir, Adana, and particularly Istanbul.

All these migration streams flowed between poorer and richer economies. National policies can hinder or further these processes, but in liberal societies it will be difficult to keep people outside or inside. The inability of the United States to close her borders against Mexican immigration and the failure of the Portuguese dictatorship before 1974 to control emigration are clear indications for this.

The preambles of international migration treaties, the political and economic actors as well as the migrant workers themselves expected a lot of beneficial migration results: vocational qualification, work discipline, wider democratic and social horizons, take-off impulses for backward economies.²

With the world-wide economic crisis came disillusionment with such hopes. And research indicates that these hopes were mostly false from the beginning. In many cases the gaps between developed and «developing» countries have widened. And the import of foreign work forces made it possible to fill shortages during the boom periods. So there was less need to invest in «periphery» countries.

Only one myth is still alive, as Kayser³ concludes: that of return. The governments of both the emigration and the immig-

(2) Bernard Kayser, *Zyklisch bedingte Heimkehr von Arbeitsmigranten*, Marburg 1975, p. 7 (German edition of the French original by C. B. Hyams and H. - U. Peter). For the official Turkish expectations see Nermin Abadan-Ünat et al., *Migration and Development*, Ankara 1976, p. 39.

(3) Loc. cit.

ration countries as well as the «foreign workers» and their families maintain their belief in the eventual return of the migrants to their home countries. Experience shows that the migration rate, as a percentage of the stock of foreign workers in the host countries, is declining from year to year, and that there are only three reasons for return: expulsion by host nation authorities, long times of unemployment without adequate insurance, and for some migrants, growing old. For some reasons, in the case of «German Turks» the myth of return seems to be comparatively strong.

2. German Immigration Traditions and the Labeling of Migrants

As stated above, Germany has an old tradition of migration. On the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries Germany was an emigration society. Seven million Germans emigrated to the US, every third American has some German ancestor. German colonists have been the most important group of immigrants in large parts of the American Middle West, and the Lutherans, one of the bigger Protestant groups, are mostly of German descent. Large-scale emigration accompanied the period of industrialization, and at the time the German population grew rapidly.⁴ Since the boom period of the early 1870s immigration grew steadily, and this continued in the time of the «great depression» between 1875 and 1895. So there was emigration and immigration at the same time. The immigrants —mostly Poles— concentrated in the coal mining industry («Ruhrpolen») and —as seasonal labour— in the Eastern agrarian provinces.⁵ In 1871 Germany had only 207.000 foreigners, in 1912 there were 1.260.000. Additionally, the Polish citizens of imperial Germany were moving. In eastern Germany, as Max Weber warned, they replaced more and more German agricultural workers.⁶

(4) An overview in Klaus J. Bade, *Vom Auswanderungsland zum Einwanderungsland? Deutschland 1880-1980*, Berlin 1983. A special study is Mack Walker, *Germany and the Emigration, 1816-1885*, Cambridge Mass. 1964.

(5) Cf. Christoph Kießmann, *Polnische Bergarbeiter im Ruhrgebiet 1880-1945. Soziale Integration und nationale Subkultur einer Minderheit in der deutschen Industriegesellschaft*, Göttingen 1978.

(6) Max Weber, *Der Nationalstaat und die Volkswirtschaftspolitik*, in: *Gesammelte Politische Schriften*, ed. by Johannes Winckelmann, Tübingen 1958².

Polish was not allowed as a language in school and even in public association or union discussions. After the First World War Polish workers had to opt for German or Polish nationality. In the beginning economic crisis many of them were fired. So a lot of them returned to the new Polish national state or they crossed the border into Belgium or France to work in the heavy industry there.

The second period of «Fremdarbeiter» in Germany was the time of World War II. Some recruitment had begun as early as 1936, as the German industry needed a larger workforce, preparing for the war. At the culmination of World War II, more than seven million foreigners worked in German factories and agriculture, most of them in a system of forced labour. Particularly the Polish and the Russian workers were badly treated, millions of them died of starvation. After 1945 some returned to Poland or Russia, a lot of them eventually went to emigration countries like the US, Canada, or Israel. Whereas mass murder against the Jews has been widely discussed in West Germany in the last decades, and restitution has taken place as far as possible, the fate of forced workers has largely been ignored. Only in the last years some scholarly studies appeared, but they are known to specialists only.⁷

So there is no feeling of a continuity of immigration in Germany. On the contrary German officials have always been stressing that Germany is no immigration country, «kein Einwanderungsland». Of course in fact it was, it is, and to a certain extent will be. The undisputed German policies of founding, fostering and enlarging the European Community with its central concept of free movement of manpower and goods will guarantee immigration, at least if Germany continues to be a comparatively rich and developed country, which of course is also widely accepted. Germany now depends on this economic concept of international capitalist integration; more than one quarter of her goods services are exported.

This political doctrine of «kein Einwanderungsland», this feeling of a consolidated national state (although split in two), without desire for new disturbing minorities, is an underlying

(7) Edward L. Homze, *Foreign Labour in Nazi Germany*, Princeton N. J. 1967.

mental restriction for a sound immigration or minority policy. It goes together with a perception of disponibility of the immigrants: «What shall we do with the Turks (in Germany)?» was a characteristic title in a serious German weekly.

German political culture has no feeling of «mission civilizatrice» as the French have, nor the implicit prestige of the worldwide success of the «American way of life», no missionary zeal. In some respects that may be quite positive. In presentday German political culture you can find much tolerance, desire to learn from other people, interest in other cultures, sympathy with the suppressed (one example: the German section of amnesty international is now by far the biggest in the world).

There is understandable and reasonable mistrust in nationalistic forms and symbols. But on the other hand this corresponds with a rather low desire for integration of new populations into the own cultural sphere.

A British author has put her finger to á characteristic labeling fact. The black and coloured people in Britain are usually named «immigrants», even if they have been born and brought up in England and carry the British nationality. This is in contrast to the labeling of, say, an Australian or a continental European, who would be more easily accepted. So «immigrant» in England is a way to identify people as different, as alien.⁸

In Germany similar characteristic labelings can be observed. In the fifties the term *Fremdarbeiter* (alien, strange worker), which is still common in German speaking Switzerland, was no longer used. It recalled the time before 1945. Instead, *Gastarbeiter* (guest-worker) was the new name, popular up to now. It is euphemistic. You would not expect a guest doing the most undesirable work, live in shabby rooms, et cetera, as it was characteristic particularly of the first «*Gastarbeiter*» years.

The public, too, felt that *Gastarbeiter* was an unsatisfying word. So officials looked for a better term. The West German Radio (WDR) even made a contest to find one. Eventually the

(8) Ann Dummett, A. Portrait of English Racism, Harmondsworth 1973.

rather administrative - technical term «ausländische Arbeitnehmer» (foreign work - taker) came into use. This again stressed the different, alien character of the migrants. It added, even if «Arbeitnehmer» is the current German term for employee, some more confusion. Of course almost all of the migrants are workers. If their problems are discussed, no one would think of Japanese managers or American directors in Germany. So «ausländische Arbeitnehmer» added an unrealistic touch of classless society. And it seemed too technical. In the last years, well - meaning people created a new term : ausländische Mitbürger. The inventors, most of them people of religiously based civic responsibility,⁹ bound the term to a reformistic conception of integration, including for instance the right to vote in local elections. As it often goes, the term succeeded, the cause not. The word became a new euphemism. And so Helmut Kohl, in one of his last public speeches before he became Chancellor, put it classically : «The number of ausländische Mitbürger», he told an applauding mass of supporters in the unemployment - burdened city of Dortmund, «must be reduced».¹⁰ Euphemism can cover strangeness and a lack of understanding.

3. Migration Policies : a Stable Contradiction

The migration treaties and the first conceptions on all sides contained a lot of illusions. Both governments stressed the temporary character of the employment of workers. At first everything seemed provisional : there were only workers, living in dormitories, not their families. But after some years families came, children were born. As a Swiss author, Max Frisch,¹¹ put it : «Man hat Arbeitskräfte gerufen, und es kamen Menschen.» (We called for labour hands, and there came human beings).

The migration treaties were stressing the temporary character of migration. But as the need for non-German workers continued, there was soon a vested interest of German employers in their workers with foreign identity cards. If their work was considered

(9) Cf. an early version of this conception in : René Leudesdorff/Horst Zillesen (Ed.), *Gastarbeiter = Mitbürger. Bilder, Fakten Gründe, Chancen, Modelle, Dokumente*, Gelnhausen 1971.

(10) *Frankfurter Rundschau* 203, 3.9.1982.

(11) Cf. Max Frisch, *Öffentlichkeit als Partner*, Frankfurt 1967, s. 100.

MIGRATION REGULATIONS :

mode of residence	border crossing labour	seasonal labour	rotation model
practicing country or historic period	GDR (most), other countries supplementary Israel (for Arabs)	Germany before 1914 (agricultural workers), Switzerland, with about 1/4 of all «Foreign-workers»	FRG (planned at first), practiced in Bavaria, Schleswig-Holstein for years. GDR (some). Arab oil countries (non arabs), western european countries (some)
duration of residence	no residential permission, back on a daily or weekly basis	under one year, some weeks of waiting time per year	1 or 2 years, prolongation possible
freedom of economic activity	no, restricted working permis-sions	no, restricted working permission	no, restrictions possible
can families follow?	no	no	yes (in some countries only after some years)
special social programs	no	no	no
social and economic equality?	no	no	in most aspects
participation rights (socio-economic)	no	no	few
political rights	no	no	no
naturalization possible	not intended	not intended	not intended

A COMPARATIVE SCHEME

tolerated immigration with minimal security (FRG : «Social Integration»)	European Community status	planned immigration
FRG today, most other West European countries, Arab countries (Arabs)	EC citizens in EC countries (mostly Italians, Greeks)	Sweden, Great Britain (mostly), USA and other classic immigration countries, Israel (for Jews)
undefined. Prolongation from time to time. Or unlimited, but confined to certain jobs	right of residence when working	unlimited and unrestricted
yes, in general. Limitations especially to independent business	yes. Including independent business	yes, unrestricted
yes (core family)	yes	yes
scarcely	scarcely	planned programs
yes	yes, entitled by law	yes, entitled by law
yes (in Germany since new Betriebsverfassungsgesetz 1972, workers committees)	yes	yes
no, local level : Holland	no	yes, after a certain time of residence
not intended	not intended	yes, after a certain time of residence

to be satisfactory, most employers were keen in keeping them in their factories. As employers kept close cooperation with local employment agencies and local residence authorities, the authorized officials would prolong the permissions of residence and labour. After some years of temporary existence, migrants would feel more and more accustomed to the new situation. Without having immigrant status or immigrant consciousness, they would begin to settle down somehow.

The German authorities followed these tendencies. They did not only accept European Common Market regulations, giving Italians free access to all economic activities in Germany. From 1988 this will apply towards all Greeks, too. The German public and government are also committed to the entry of Spain and Portugal. The existing association treaties between Turkey and the EC also provide for free residence and working possibilities for Turkish workers in Germany after 1987. As the economic situation in Turkey became more and more difficult, Turks in Germany were not inclined to return. After 1973 new migration came to a halt. Only family unification and new births added to the existing Turkish population in Germany. So the rates of migration became lower and lower. Turks became a large stable minority in Germany.

This situation was not planned. It was not expected in the liberal economic models that led to the acceptance of the common market and association agreements. So provisions in Germany were not adequate, particularly housing was scarce. The schools were not prepared for large numbers of students from foreign countries. Only in the 80s most German states provided for special teacher training in regard of foreign students.

4. The European Extremes : Swiss and Swedish Migration Policies

In Europe, there are two systematic approaches to the problems of migrant labour : the Swedish and the Swiss. Sweden provided for immigration. The government, in accordance with the trade union council, did not accept too large numbers of migrants. In the boom periods around 1970, migration was limited. On the other hand, Sweden planned an immigration program. Language courses

and introductions into the legal and social systems were provided. Immigrants would have the right to vote after five years (now after three years). After seven years (now five) they could opt for citizenship. Meanwhile, half of the foreign-born population in Sweden have obtained citizenship. Legally, they are Swedes in the full sense of the word. In spite of the working class situation of the immigrants and factual discriminations socially and economically, politically immigrants can articulate themselves. Immigration cannot be reversed. So there is hope that the immigrants can become Swedes in every sense, although they will stick to some of their cultural traditions for the next generation. Sweden does not require full assimilation, the care for cultural traditions is encouraged by state subsidies. But there is no doubt that assimilation will be the eventual outcome.¹²

Switzerland on the other hand has opted for a rotation system for a long time. Border crossing labour is highly important. Seasonal labour was even more central. It is not only used in agriculture and tourism, but also in other industries. «Saisonniers» and border crossing workers are not allowed to bring their families in. So Switzerland did not carry the costs for schools, kindergardens, housing, infrastructure, etc. for the families. When workers were ill or when they were old, they went back to their homeland. In case of economic crisis and unemployment, as it is now, the number of work permissions can be reduced without difficulty. Nobody has to be expelled, Switzerland only reduces the numbers of permits for the next years. So even in 1982 Switzerland was still an island of full employment. The unemployment rate was only 0,5 %. The rest had been exported.¹³

5. The Legal Situation

German legal policies did not follow such consistent patterns. They rather evolved along provisional terms. Residence permissions and work permissions were given for one or two years, prolongation took place regularly. Even when the migrants stayed for

(12) An informative introduction and discussion is Heinrich Pehle, Die schwedische Ausländerpolitik und ihre kommunalpolitischen Aspekte, in: Informationsdienst zur Ausländerarbeit, 3/1982

(13) Cf. Süddeutsche Zeitung, No. 236, 13.10.1982.

a long time, their legal situation would be on a short-term basis. So they could not be sure about their situation, they could not settle down easily. When social scientists interviewed them about their perspectives, they would say: another eight years in Germany, and after that time another eight years. It was by initiative of the former Minister of the Interior, Gerhard Baum, in 1978 that new legal prescriptions were made. Following the text migrants should have the possibility to get an «unbefristete Aufenthaltserlaubnis» (unlimited permission to stay) after five years under certain circumstances (some knowledge of the language, attendance of children in school, adequate housing). After eight years they should get the possibility of Aufenthaltsberechtigung (unlimited right to stay) under similar conditions. That would include the right to enter all sorts of occupation and business, whereas limited or unlimited Aufenthaltserlaubnis allows only for dependent occupations in German firms.¹⁴

Most migrants would fall under these clauses, considering the fact that since 1973 Germany has stopped recruiting workers in foreign countries.

But up to now most cities and countries, responsible for foreigners' status, did not implement these regulations. In 1982 only 1.5 % of the foreigners in Germany had the Aufenthaltsberechtigung, about 30 % the unbefristete Aufenthaltserlaubnis. Migrants continue to stay, expulsions are extremely rare, there is a certain protection by the courts which more and more tend to apply constitutional human rights and to take into account the long-term social situation of the migrants. But migrants lack security. So they cannot develop an adequate perception of their new situation as immigrants.

6. Economic Situation

The economic situation of the migrants is not as precarious as their legal position. «Aliens» constitute an important part of

(14) For an overview of the legal situation, particularly the Ausländergesetz and the Allgemeine Verwaltungsvorschrift zur Ausführung des Ausländergesetzes see Hans Heinz Heldmann, Ausländerrecht. Textsammlung mit alphabetischem Wegweiser..., Köln 1980². W. Kanein, Ausländergesetz mit den übrigen Vorschriften des Fremdenrechts und den einschlägigen arbeitsrechtlichen Bestimmungen, München 1980³.

the German workforce. All observers recognize the fact that their jobs could not be easily taken over by German workers. The hardest test for this assumption is today's unemployment: in 1983 the number of unemployed will exceed that of migrant workers.

Most of the «aliens», and particularly the Turks, are employed at places with hard or otherwise undesirable work conditions: e. g. mining, steel plants, assembly lines in automobile or electronic factories, fish industry, cleaning sector, or hotels and restaurants. Great parts of the unemployed German work force are not fit for these jobs: they may be too old, they may be disabled, they may be looking for part-time jobs (the unemployment rate of women, as of aliens, is higher than the average). And of course qualified people, like unemployed teachers, are not eager to get such jobs. So, whatever the German government may declare to the German public: it would not be easy to replace a lot of the migrants, it would be impossible to replace all of them, given democratic conditions. And, given the legal system of today, existing international agreements, including EC-Turkey treaties, and German court verdicts, it would be impossible to expell all or even most of them.

7. Turks and Germans

For Turkey, migrants to Germany also constitute an important factor, Economically, their remittances bring a large part of Turkey's foreign exchange. Even now, after the stabilization program, Turkey's balance of payments could not be settled without them. This may constitute a permanent interest from the Turkish side. Also, they are important as they disseminate cultural and social change, down to the most remote villages. They are developing their own demands and markets. For instance, even in Germany, they are more advanced in Video-TV than the rest of the population.

Considering the badly constructed legal framework, and the neglect of the day-to-day problems by the officials, migrants have arranged themselves comparatively well. Most of them have adapted to the new and different conditions of life. This is particularly impressive if one takes into account the housing situation in some urban centress, e. g. in Berlin.

Most Germans have only little knowledge of the situation, mentality, and thinking of «German Turks». Gettoization tendencies are more important with the Turks than with the other migrant nationalities.

This can also be seen in the Turkish associations in Germany. A large part of them is rather extremist : «Grey Wolves» are well known to German newspaper readers. Religious sectarians and extreme leftists also have an importance among the Turkish associations in Germany that exceeds the importance they ever had in Turkey in the last decades. Successful integration, on the other hand, is not so spectacular. But it succeeds more often than one may notice in the press. And it is important to point out one positive fact : the German public is quite aware of dangerous tendencies. Xenophobia has been met by a lot of protests of civic action groups, leftist parties, and churches. The Hitler era is a warning to the Germans in this respect. Remembrance constitutes awareness of present dangers.

8. Education of Turkish Children in Germany

There are many socialization agencies for Turkish youth in Germany. They comprise not only parents and schools, but also peer groups, the surrounding German culture, the modern international youth culture, commercial and non-commercial, and the cultural climate of the minority group. All these influences mix in various forms, and the results are manifold. The emerging feelings of personal identity are not always the same. Whereas some youngsters see themselves as rather German-like, others seek refuge in the national or religious heritage of their parents or in political radicalization.

German states have found different organizational solutions for «foreign» children. Bavaria sticks to the doctrine of special schools or classes for them. The concept is reminiscent of the «separate but equal» - approach in the American South before 1955. Clearly, the concept is intended to strengthen «ability for return», it stands for separation, not for integration. It does not suit the majority of children who will remain in Germany, and it hinders access to university and secondary school (Gymnasium). On the other hand, the rather integrative or assimilative approach of the

other German states (particularly the Social Democratic governments) produces difficulties, too. The idea of integration and equal treatment of foreign and German born children is unrealistic. German schools depend heavily on parent cooperation for homeworks, which foreign parents cannot provide. As the German school system is highly selective, German parents are getting nervous if they think that children with special problems hinder the progress of their own ones. And so there are a lot of pressures, fears, and misunderstandings (from both sides), all limiting the integrative quality of school education for migrant children. Migrants have only few possibilities to exert pressure for their own interests. And, more important, they lack training and pressure resources to participate successfully in the decision making process inside schools and in school politics. They often miss their chances, and there are misunderstandings even with school people who try to cooperate. Teachers are not adequately prepared to teach migrant children, they lack knowledge of the countries of origin, and also of the actual migrant situation.

So success depends on local initiatives, on the interest of teachers, on school heads, on German and migrant parents. Success and failure differ from town to town, from school to school. There are many idealistic actions of German teachers, parents, university students, and the like for integration. But in most German states problems are not handled in a coordinated, systematic way. And of course, education cannot achieve what society is not willing to be about: planned and successful integration. If there is no central political will, no political plan, no political priority, the handling of all problems, including education, will be difficult. If, for instance, vocational training on the labour market is not available because of special clauses of the foreigners' law, school education, however well done, will make only limited sense. Educational perspectives, then, have no further consequences. And that is symptomatic of migrant integration in West Germany, as in most Western European nations.

