

Foreign Policy Crises of Adnan Menderes Period and an Evaluation in terms of Crisis Management; The Case of Syria and Cyprus Crisis

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Research Article

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ABSTRACT

This study analyzes the Turkish foreign policy of the Adnan Menderes era, especially the Cyprus and Syria crises of the 1950s and 1960s. At the same time, this study reveals Adnan Menderes's foreign policy principles and the management strategies he pursued in the face of crises. With the transition to multi-party politics, Turkey entered a period of significant change in domestic and foreign policy. In this context, it strengthened its integration with the West with its NATO membership and developed various policies to address regional security concerns under Cold War conditions. Menderes's leadership came to the forefront in important foreign policy issues such as the Cyprus issue and the related September 6-7 events and the Syrian crisis. This study titled "Foreign Policy Crises of the Adnan Menderes Era and an Evaluation from the Perspective of Crisis Management; The Case of Syria and Cyprus Crisis" comprehensively examines the process of change in Turkish foreign policy by analyzing the strategies followed by Menderes and the leadership approach he displayed in the face of these crises.

Keywords: Adnan Menderes, Foreign Policy Strategies, Cyprus Problem, Syrian Crisis

Adnan Menderes Dönemi Dış Politika Krizleri ve Kriz Yönetimi Açısından Bir Değerlendirme; Suriye ve Kıbrıs Krizi Örneği

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ÖZ

Bu çalışma, Adnan Menderes dönemi Türk dış politikasını, özellikle 1950 ve 1960'lı yıllarda yaşanan Kıbrıs ve Suriye krizlerini analiz etmektedir. Aynı zamanda bu çalışmada Adnan Menderes'in dış politika ilkeleri ve krizler karşısında izlediği yönetim stratejileri ortaya konmaktadır. Türkiye, çok partili hayata geçişle birlikte iç ve dış politikada önemli bir değişim sürecine girmiştir. Bu bağlamda NATO üyeliği ile birlikte Batı ile entegrasyonunu güçlendirmiş ve Soğuk Savaş koşullarında bölgesel güvenlik kaygılarına gidermeye yönelik çeşitli politikalar geliştirmiştir. Menderes'in liderliği, Kıbrıs meselesi ve buna bağlı olarak gerçekleşen 6-7 Eylül olayları ile Suriye krizi gibi önemli dış politika sorunlarında ön plana çıkmıştır. "Adnan Menderes Dönemi Dış Politika Krizleri ve Kriz Yönetimi Açısından Bir Değerlendirme; Suriye ve Kıbrıs Krizi Örneği" başlıklı bu çalışma, söz konusu krizler karşısında Menderes'in izlediği stratejileri ve sergilediği liderlik yaklaşımı analiz edilerek Türk dış politikasındaki değişim sürecini kapsamlı bir şekilde incelemektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Adnan Menderes, Dış politika stratejileri, Kıbrıs Sorunu, Suriye Krizi

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Introduction

One of the most important periods in Turkish political history is the period that began with the establishment of the Democratic Party (DP) and continued with its rule. Adnan Menderes was the most prominent name among the politicians who continued their democratic journey they started in 1945 with the DP they founded in 1946. For this reason, their ten-year period from May 14, 1950, when they came to power, to May 27, 1960, when they were ousted by a coup d'état, is also called the "Adnan Menderes Period". In this period, which has an important place not only in domestic politics but also in terms of Turkish foreign policy, for the first time in Turkey, the change in the governing party in the government brought about a change in foreign policy. Of course, with the successful transition from a single-party political system to a multi-party political system, the univocality in both domestic and foreign policies began to disappear as of 1945. Therefore, it is clear that the transition to a multi-party system marked the beginning of a significant transformation process in Turkey's foreign policy. Moreover, during this period, Turkey tried to establish a balance between the Eastern and Western Blocs, the two major powers of the Cold War. As is known, between 1950 and 1960, the DP led by Adnan Menderes sought to integrate Turkey more into the West and strengthen its relations with NATO. In this framework, the First Adnan Menderes Government decided to send troops to the Korean War, which broke out in 1950, in order to pave the way for Turkey's NATO membership and increased cooperation with the West in many areas against the threat of communism. However, Turkey also faced many international crises during this period. Foreign policy crises such as the Korean War, Suez, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Cyprus and the September 6-7 events, which were the domestic reflection of Cyprus, directly affected Turkey's relations with the West and the Middle East. Turkey had to take more active and significant risks in the face of these crises. In this process, Adnan Menderes' leadership style and crisis management gained importance. Especially against the threat of communism, the Menderes administration preferred to tighten relations with NATO and the United States. Menderes's leadership style and decision-making processes were effective in Turkey's regional and international foreign policy crises.

The international crises Turkey faced during the Adnan Menderes era not only affected foreign policy but also domestic politics. Between 1950-1960, Menderes' preferences in crisis management played an important role in terms of domestic political balances, the strengthening of nationalist movements and the reshaping of public opinion. In particular, the attitude and behavior adopted by Menderes in the Cyprus issue and the September 6-7 incidents were effective in the rise of nationalist sentiments in domestic politics. Menderes's leadership style in foreign policy crises included taking an active position in Ankara's relations with the West, assuming an active role in regional and international conflicts and taking diplomatic initiatives to resolve crises. Menderes' confrontational and conciliatory attitude during the management of foreign policy crises is an important indicator for understanding Turkey's position in the international arena and how this position changed over time.

This study will reveal what kind of strategy and leadership Menderes followed in the face of the crises. In this article, which is prepared in order to fill the existing gap due to the fact that the studies on Adnan Menderes are mainly focused on domestic politics and the foreign policy issue is dealt with party-wide or through the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, official publications, research works and periodicals related to the subject will be utilized in order to analyze Menderes's attitudes and discourses during the crisis periods.

1. Adnan Menderes's Foreign Policy Principles: Active Americanism

Crises are processes that require a leader to make the right and fast decisions on behalf of his/her country. In these processes, what decision makers think, their goals, and the values and beliefs on which they base their decisions in times of crisis and conflict¹ are important factors. In crisis management, the political beliefs and strategic preferences of decision makers, the internal and external actors around them and the tools used in the process are important factors². The tools used by decision makers in crisis management may vary. For example, one decision maker may prefer soft power policy tools and negotiations, while another decision maker may prefer the use of military force within the framework of hard power policies. At this point, the characteristics and abilities of the leader/decision maker come to the fore.

After the Second World War, two new superpowers emerged after the great powers of the time such as Britain, France and Germany lost their power. Although the United States and Soviet Russia fought on the same front in the Great War, they diverged on many issues after the war. This divergence between the two superpowers divided the world into two poles. In this polarization, Western Europe and capitalism were led by the United States and liberal ideas, while in Eastern Europe, the influence of the Soviet Union and Communist ideas was strongly felt. This ideological conflict between the US and the Soviet Union led to political, economic, security and social crises in the international system.

Turkey, which turned towards the West before the end of the war, did not change its direction during the Democrat Party period, which was in power between 1950 and 1960. The crises in foreign policy that emerged immediately after the war continued throughout the rule of Prime Minister Adnan Menderes. During Menderes's term, who assumed an important role with the decisions he made in the face of these crises, Turkey did not enter into a hot conflict with any country as in previous periods. Although this foreign policy stance pursued by the Republic of Turkey, which adopted peace at home and in the world as its motto, the change in the policies pursued is also certain. In this context, how Menderes perceived crises and what kind of strategy he followed to prevent crises from escalating or turning into conflicts is something that needs to be revealed in terms of philosophy and methodology.

Adnan Menderes, who served as the Prime Minister of the Republic of Turkey between 1950 and 1960, made critical decisions in many important foreign policy crises during the decade. These decisions led to radical changes in Turkey's domestic and foreign policy. Turkey began to move away from the policy of active neutrality, which had begun to be abandoned in the second half of the 1940s, towards an "active Americanist" line. In this context, Menderes secured Turkey's NATO membership in 1952 and subsequently sought to establish close relations with the United States. With Turkey's NATO membership, Menderes tried to identify Turkey's foreign policy interests with the interests of the West in general and the US in particular. He believed that fulfilling the policies dictated by the US to the letter would serve Turkey's interests³. Therefore, during this period, there was no distinction between Turkey and the United States in terms of foreign policy, and Turkey, acting within the framework of the logic of the Cold War, turned into an outpost of the United States and the West between

¹ İbrahim Tekeş, "Çatışma ve Kriz Yönetiminde Siyasal Lider Davranışı: A. Menderes Örneği", (master's thesis, Yıldız Technical University, 2018), 23.

² Stephen G. Walker, Mark Schafer, and Michael D. Young, "Systematic Procedures for Operational Code Analysis: Measuring and Modeling Jimmy Carter's Operational Code" *International Studies Quarterly* 42, no. 1 (1998): 177.

³ Feroz Ahmad, *Demokrasi Sürecinde Türkiye 1945-1980*. Translated by Ahmet Fetti, (İstanbul: Hil Yayınları, 1996), 396.

the Middle East and the Soviet Union⁴. Turkey defined the Soviet Union as an "enemy" and positioned the US and the Western Bloc as allies. This was summarized in the statement made by then President Celal Bayar during his visit to the United States in 1954, in which he emphasized the importance of the military aid provided by the United States to Turkey, saying that "*military aid transforms a moral stepping stone of strength into a moral bastion of defense, an outpost into a front line*"⁵. In addition, this statement showed Turkey's shift from active neutrality to an active Americanist foreign policy strategy.

Menderes' approach to foreign policy decision-making reflects an ideological and strategic structure shaped in the context of Cold War dynamics and Westernization. 'Adnan Menderes' foreign policy decisions were based on (a) pro-Western/ pro-US ideological tendencies and (b) the perception of the Soviet threat and anticommunist tendencies. Menderes's foreign policy strategy was based on harmonizing Turkey's security with the West and maintaining regional balance. This approach of Menderes was influential in Turkey's NATO accession process. For Menderes, Turkey's NATO membership was an important step in ensuring the country's security. However, while Turkey's Westernization ideal was European-oriented at the founding of the Republic, this focus shifted to America in the 1950s. In this period, Menderes and the actors in his government saw the United States as the protector of Western civilization, the supporter of Turkey's modernization process and the guarantor of its security.

Another reason for the Menderes governments to pursue an active Americanist foreign policy was to ensure the continuation of the economic aid received from the United States. In an interview he gave to Canadian reporter Lawrence Henderson in November 1951, Menderes stated that the USSR threat to Turkey continued, that the biggest obstacle to Turkey's economic development was the military expenditures to which Turkey had to allocate more than half of its budget for years, and that the US aid to Turkey should continue⁷ for the security of Western democracies. As a matter of fact, Menderes's request was accepted by the US and after the Marshall Plan, Turkey was provided with aid in the form of grants or loans through the transfer of "Private Resources" until the late 1950s⁸. Menderes and the actors of the period saw this aid from the US as a tool for Turkey's economic development. Therefore, by sending troops to the Korean War, ensuring Turkey's accession to NATO and allowing the establishment of American bases in the country, the Menderes governments not only aimed to ensure Turkey's security against the Soviet Russian threat, but also aimed to ensure the continuity of economic aid from the United States⁹. Accordingly, between 1948 and 1954, Turkey received 40% of the financing it needed for its development from the United States. In late 1954, the US Congress decided to reduce this aid, first to 20-25% and then to 10%¹⁰. Towards the end of the 1950s, with the decrease in aid from the US, Turkey entered an economically troubled period. Menderes started to search for new resources in order to overcome this troubled period. In this context, he tried to rapprochement relations with the Soviet Union, which he had not been warm to before. This change in Turkish foreign policy

⁴ Ali Balcı, *Turkish Foreign Policy: Principles, Actors, Practices* (Istanbul: Etkileşim Yayınları, 2013), 79.

⁵ Celal Bayar, *Celal Bayar'ın Söylev ve Demeçleri, Dış Politika (1933-1955)*. (Istanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Yayınları, 1999), 99. See also Balcı, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, 80.

⁶ Serhat Özbey, "Demokrat Parti İktidarında Sosyalist Sol'nin İcrası: Vatan Partisi Deneyimi (1954-1957)", (master's thesis, Pamukkale University, 2020), 47.

⁷ İmren Aydın Gök, "Menderes'in USA Visits in the Context of American Economic Aid to Turkey: A Case Study on Foreign Policy Domestic Policy Interaction" *History Studies* 15, 100th Year of the Republic Special Issue (2023): 3.

⁸ *American Economic Aid to Turkey (1949-1969)*, (Ankara: Ministry of Finance Publications, 1970), 19.

⁹ State Archives Presidency Cumhuriyet Archive (BCA.) Canadian Radio Reporter Lawrence Henderson's Interview with Adnan Menderes, 30.1.0.0/ 132.855.7, 13.12.1951.

¹⁰ Niyazi Berkes, *200 Yıldır Neden Bocaluyoruz*. (Istanbul: Yenigün Haber Ajansı Basın ve Yayıncılık, 1997), 2: 124.

shows that Prime Minister Menderes was flexible in his ideological line, but more pragmatic in line with his development goals. This flexibility reveals that practical concerns such as foreign aid and economic development took precedence over foreign policy decisions. In other words, Menderes supported Turkey's positioning in the Western Bloc in the conjuncture of the period and adopted adapting to the demands of the US as a rational strategy in terms of interests. However, when pragmatic needs such as economic aid were not met, he had the flexibility to turn to alternative relations by weakening ideological commitment.

Menderes criticized the CHP governments for not giving enough importance to the region, especially to the Middle East, and brought up the need to improve regional relations.¹¹ In this context, in his speech at the Turkish Grand National Assembly on May 29, 1950, he stated that Turkey would seek a more comprehensive cooperation with the Middle East and Islamic countries. In the same speech, Menderes stated that Turkey would draw the attention of its friends and allies, namely the USA and Western countries, to the security of the Eastern Mediterranean¹². With these speeches, Adnan Menderes emphasized the foreign policy line of the First Menderes Government's program:

"Today, we do not see the need to say much about our foreign policy, which is the expression of the common opinion of the whole nation, not of any party, and to repeat our sincere commitment to the ideal of the United Nations. The pacifist nature of our foreign policy, which is based on the traditional British and French alliance and the closest friendship and cooperation with the United States of America, which is always loyal to their friendship, which always respects the independence and territorial integrity of all nations, far and near, great and small, is known to the whole world. We believe that this open and sincere policy of ours is an important factor for the democratic front and for the peace of the world, due to the importance and kindness of our geographical situation and the high spiritual power of our nation, which is manifested even under the most severe conditions. It is our greatest ambition to strengthen our political, economic and cultural relations with our great friend, the United States of America, to whom we feel sincere gratitude for supporting our pacifist policy with the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Aid, and with our great allies, Britain and France, in an atmosphere of sincerity and understanding. In the meantime, in order to protect and strengthen the security of the Eastern Mediterranean, the importance of which for the peace of the world is becoming more and more evident every day, we feel the necessity to draw the attention and interest of our great friends and allies to this issue on the one hand, and on the other hand to establish closer relations with the Near Eastern States, with which we are bound by close ties of friendship, and to create an atmosphere of sincere friendship and solidarity in these regions based on the principles of justice and understanding. In our opinion, the rapid achievement of this result is of great importance not only for the security of these regions, but also for the Middle Eastern countries and, consequently, for the security of the world.¹³"

In line with the statements of Prime Minister Menderes, President Celal Bayar made a similar speech and stated that Turkey should revive the Sadabat Pact¹⁴. In this period, the DP's goal was to maintain close relations with the West on the one hand and to assume an active role in the Middle East on the other. Accordingly, Turkey pioneered the establishment of the Baghdad Pact. However, serious problems emerged in this process. One of the main problems was that the Soviet Union reacted to the establishment of this pact and started to pursue more active policies in the region. In addition, the Baghdad Pact worried the Arab states, especially

¹¹ Hüseyin Bağcı, *1950's Years in Turkish Foreign Policy* (Ankara: ODTÜ Geliştirme Vakfı Yayınları, 2001), 43.

¹² Behçet Kemal Yeşilbursa, *Cold War and Imperialism in the Middle East* (Istanbul: IQ Yayınları, 2007), 68.

¹³ *Journal of the Minutes of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, Period 9, C. 1, 3rd Meeting, (29.05.1950), 31.

¹⁴ Uğur Matıç, "Demokrat Parti Dönemi Türk Dış Politikası Yönelik Ortadoğu Krizlerine Yönelik Demokrat Parti Dönemi Türk Dış Politikası", (PhD dissertation, Istanbul University, 2017), 121.

Egypt. On October 20, 1955, a military pact was signed between Egypt and Syria in Damascus¹⁵. Again, the Middle Eastern countries' distant stance towards the West and negative memories of the Ottoman past made Turkey's relations with the countries in the region difficult. Turkey's efforts to act together with its Western allies led to a contradictory situation, especially with its desire to create a secure bridge in the Middle East. Although some of the Menderes government's policies that emphasized religious sensitivities, such as the recitation of the call to prayer in Arabic, were welcomed by Muslim countries, Turkey's Western, especially US and NATO-oriented foreign policy affected this positive atmosphere in the long run. Therefore, Turkey's regional policies during the Menderes period, with the exception of Iraq, followed a negative course. The reason why relations with Iraq were excluded from this scope was the pro-Western stance of the Iraqi administration and Iraq's close relations with Britain. However, after the Iraqi revolution in 1958, this situation changed and Iraq and Turkey started to experience crises. Although there were problems, Menderes's foreign policy orientation was also decisive in Turkey's regional relations. His efforts to improve relations with the Middle East and the Islamic world reflected a pragmatic approach that did not contradict Menderes' goal of harmonization with the West.

2. Foreign Policy Crises of the Menderes Period

One of the most important points to be mentioned about Menderes's conflict and crisis management is that Menderes adopted a hasty and hasty attitude in the crises throughout his term. ¹⁶The most concrete indication of this is that he took the decision to send troops to the Korean War on July 18, 1950, without any discussion in the Turkish Grand National Assembly. Again, in the Syrian Crisis of 1957 and the Iraqi Crisis of 1958, he continued this attitude by overreacting to the countries¹⁷. However, it should be noted here that Menderes did not adopt the same attitude in each crisis.

2.1. Cyprus Crisis and September 6-7 Events

While Turkey was trying to realize the Balkan and Baghdad Pacts, it was faced with a crisis such as the Cyprus problem. Although this issue seems to have been resolved in 1960, Turkey has had to deal with the Cyprus problem until today. Looking at the development process of the problem, immediately after World War II, Greece started to tamper with the Cyprus issue and took action to annex the island (ENOSIS). It is noteworthy that the communists initiated the annexation attempt of Cyprus at a time when the Soviet threat was spreading in the Middle East and a civil war was being waged by the communists in Greece¹⁸. The Soviet-controlled Greek communists wanted to weaken the Western Bloc in the Eastern Mediterranean by turning the island into a base of communism and weakening the Western Bloc in the Eastern Mediterranean by removing the British from the island of Cyprus, which was dominated by the British and had a strategic importance in the Eastern Mediterranean. This desire was the

15 Murat Bürkan Serbest, "Baghdad Pact's Establishment Process and Turkey's Role in its Development" *MANAS Journal of Social Studies* 5, No: 3, (2016): 413.

16 President Celal Bayar, Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, Foreign Minister Fuat Köprülü, Defense Minister Refik Şevket İnce, Chief of General Staff Org. Nuri Yamut, Chief of the General Staff, and Army Commanders were present. Not all members of the government were present in the cabinet that convened after the decision taken here, and in the words of Minister of Public Works Fahri Belen, "docile cabinet members" were summoned and the decision was accepted and troops were sent to Korea without the approval of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey. See Selma Göktürk Çetinkaya, *Türkiye'de İktidar-Muhalefet İlişkileri (1954-1960)*. (İstanbul: Efe Akademi Yayınları, 2019), 92.

17 Tekeş, "Political Leader Behavior in Conflict and Crisis Management", 69.

18 Fahir Armaoğlu, *20th Century Political History*. (İstanbul: Alkım Yayınları, 2005), 529.

reason why the ENOSIS movements on the island started in such an environment. In this direction, when the right-wing racists in Greece started to cooperate with the communists, the popularity of the issue increased in Greek public opinion. On February 10, 1947, Italy gave the Twelve Islands to Greece with the Treaty of Paris with Greece, which was a provocative factor for the Greek Megalo Idea. After this incident, Greece and the Greek public turned their attention to the island of Cyprus and started to claim rights over the island.

During this period, Turkey only followed the ENOSIS initiative initiated by the Greeks and did not take any initiative. Because Turkey did not have a policy on the island of Cyprus at that time. Between 1947 and 1955, Turkey turned its back to the issue as it tried to implement a status quo¹⁹ policy for the island of Cyprus. The reason why first the CHP and then the DP governments were not much interested in the Cyprus Island can be explained as follows; "from the period when the problem erupted until 1952, Turkey wanted to guarantee its own security against the Soviet and Communist threat". During this period, Turkey pursued a policy of Westernization and active Americanism. Therefore, İnönü and Menderes could not implement a policy towards the Cyprus issue. However, after Turkey joined NATO on February 18, 1952, it had the opportunity to address this important issue.

After 1952, Turkey started to develop a partial policy regarding the island of Cyprus. The important reason for this is that Greece applied to the UK between 1952 and 1954 for the annexation of Cyprus Island to itself. In fact, the Greek Prime Minister Marshal Papagos threatened Britain, stating that if Britain did not withdraw from the island by August 22, 1954 at the latest, the problem would be internationalized by taking it to the UN. However, Britain rejected this threatening application of Greece on the grounds that it would not change the status of the island. The important point here is that despite the fact that Greece applied to Britain for the island to be given to them and also stated that it would internationalize the problem, the Menderes Government did nothing, but only asked Greece to refrain from this behavior²⁰. Since the realization of the Balkan alliance was important during this period, all kinds of problems that would prevent the realization of this alliance were avoided.

Finally, the Third Menderes Government signed the Treaty of Balkan Alliance with Greece on August 9, 1954. Although an alliance was established with Greece in the Balkans, Greece made an official application to the UN exactly one week later. With this application, on the one hand, Greece demanded that the island be given to them, and on the other hand, although the UN refused to discuss and decide on the issue, Athens managed to internationalize the problem. On August 24, Menderes made a statement on the issue and Turkey showed its reaction against Greece.²¹ The Menderes Government was caught unprepared on the Cyprus issue. This was a bad situation for the Menderes Government. Because the DP did not conduct any research on Cyprus. In fact, the Menderes Government wanted the problem to be closed as soon as possible. In addition, according to the government, in order to maintain the status quo on the island and to ensure calm in the Eastern Mediterranean, the island should remain under the control of Britain as before. When the UN rejected the application regarding the island, the Menderes Government was satisfied with the decision and Menderes made a

¹⁹ Süha Bölükbaşı, *Barışçı Çözumsuzlük, Ankara'nın ABD ve BMM ile Kıbrıs Macerası*. (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 2002), 66.

²⁰ Bağcı, *1950s in Turkish Foreign Policy*, 105.

²¹ Resul Babaoğlu, "The Greek Community of Turkey and the Events of September 6/7, 1955", *History Studies* 4, no. 4 (November 2012): 18.

statement on December 18, 1954: "Since this issue is completely closed, it is now time to pay attention and care not to overshadow the friendship between us and our ally Greece²²".

Although Menderes stated that the problem was closed, Greece and the Greeks on the island started to deepen their ENOSIS policies. With Greece's provocation of the Greeks on the island, the Turks on the island were massacred by the Greeks. Upon the deepening of the problems on the island of Cyprus, Britain invited Turkey and Greece to London on August 29, 1955. In this way, both Turkey became involved in the Cyprus problem and Britain showed the Ankara Government as the interlocutor against the demands of Greece. In fact, this invitation was a strategy of the UK. ²³Here, Britain did not want to be alone against Greece by showing that Turkey had the same rights on the island as London and Greece. At the conference, Greece defended the ENOSIS movement and Turkey argued that the island had been annexed by Britain between 1871 and 1878 and therefore the island should be left to Turkey. While the negotiations between the parties were continuing, a news article published in the Istanbul Express newspaper on September 6, stating that "Atatürk's house in Thessaloniki was attacked with a bomb by the Greeks and that the house was heavily damaged",²⁴ was on the agenda of the Turkish public opinion. Under the influence of this news, Turkish people rioted in Istanbul, Izmir and Ankara and the workplaces, places of worship and houses of Greek minorities were targeted in many cities, especially in Istanbul and Izmir. During the events, acts of violence such as murder, injury and looting were observed. On September 7, the government declared martial law in Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir.²⁵ Although the incidents were calmed down with the intervention of the army and police, Turkey faced serious international backlash. ²⁶In the national and international press, it was claimed that the DP Government did not intervene in time in order to "intimidate the Greeks in the Cyprus issue" and "strengthen the Turkish side's hand in the Turkish-Greek negotiations". In his speech at the Grand National Assembly of Turkey on September 12, 1955, Menderes, after mentioning that the material damages of the victims would be compensated, drew attention to the moral damage and stated that the Turkish nation had been wronged. He drew attention with these words: "I wish a speedy recovery to the victims and to the Turkish nation, which includes all of the victims and which was intended to be victimized in the first place... We will compensate for the moral side of the damages by revealing the true nature of the work and the issue and proving to the whole world that this incident is not a Turkish creation."²⁷ On the same day that this speech was delivered, the vote for the Martial Law was taken and martial law was imposed for six months in three major provinces of Turkey with the majority votes.²⁸

As a result of the events of September 6-7, the parties dispersed on September 7 without any positive outcome from the conference held in London. At this meeting, Britain offered the

²² Armaoğlu, *20th Century Political History*, 531.

²³ Bağcı, *1950s in Turkish Foreign Policy*, 109.

²⁴ *İstanbul Ekspres*, "Atamızın Evi Bomba ile Damaged", (September 6, 1955), 1-2.

²⁵ BCA. Transfer of Certain Duties to the Commander of the Exemplary Administration for the Duration of the Exemplary Administration Declared in Istanbul, Izmir and Ankara Provinces, 30.18.1.2 / 141.92.14, 08.09.1955. Ulus, "İstanbul ve İzmir'de Örfi İdare", (September 7, 1955), 1.

²⁶ For these news, see *The Economist*, "Cyprus Adagio", (03.09.1955), C CLXXVI, S 5845, p. 756. "No Progress on Cyprus", (10.09.1955), C CLXXVI, S 5846, p. 836. "The Balkan Tripod Wobbles", (17.09.1955), C CLXXVI, S 5847, p. 928. "Breaking the Cypriot Deadlock", (24.09.1955), C CLXXVI, S 5848, p. 1016, 10 cited in Taner Zorbay, "A New Perspective on the September 6/7 Events within the Framework of Parliamentary and Public Debates", *Atatürk Research Center Journal* 35, no. 99 (2019): 259.

²⁷ TGNA *Journal of Minutes*, Period 10, C. 7, 80th Meeting, (12.09.1955), 688-690.

²⁸ TGNA *Journal of Minutes*, Period 10, C. 7, 80th Assembly, (12.09.1955), 692.

parties to grant the island autonomy. However, this proposal of the UK was not accepted by Turkey on the grounds that it would disrupt the status quo of the island. The Greek side, on the other hand, made no change in its policy and insisted that the island be annexed to itself. However, the UK continued to seriously voice the idea of granting autonomy to the island and commissioned Lord Radcliffe to prepare a constitution for Cyprus. Lord Radcliffe submitted his constitutional report to the British Colonial Ministry on November 12, 1956. Radcliffe's report was accepted by the House of Commons. However, during the negotiations held in the House of Commons on December 19, 1956, it was stated that the issue of the division of the island should also be considered as a subject of negotiations. The fact that the UK accepted the existence of two separate communities in Cyprus and argued that the right to self-determination should be recognized separately for both communities and that the partition of the island could be considered as a solution led the Turkish Government to insist on the partition thesis. In this context, Lennox Boyd's statements on the partition of Cyprus were accepted by the Turkish Government as a basis that could contribute to the final solution of the problem and in this direction, the commitment to the partition thesis was reinforced²⁹.

In fact, Britain supported the idea of granting autonomy to the island of Cyprus, but after the autonomy process continued for a certain period of time, it was suggested that a permanent solution should be sought on the island and that partition could be considered among the options in this process. In this context, the Menderes Government demanded the immediate implementation of the British proposal for partition in order to solve the problem in a short time. In the meantime, the public opinion in Turkey was in favor of either keeping the island in Britain or leaving it to Turkey in line with its historical rights. By the end of 1956, the Menderes Government started to put pressure on Britain for the partition thesis. It can be stated that the basis of the Menderes Government's pressure on Britain was to get Britain and Greece to accept the partition thesis. In 1958, the Taksim thesis of the Menderes Government was supported by the Turkish public opinion and by 1958, the slogan "Either Taksim! Or Death" slogan started to rise³⁰. However, in the following periods, Turkey's partition thesis was not accepted by the UK.

In 1958, while in Turkey the slogan "Either Taksim! Or Death" slogan in Turkey in 1958, the situation on the island continued to deteriorate. This negative atmosphere strained relations between Turkey, Greece and the UK. Moreover, this situation affected NATO in the face of the threat of communism. Concerned that NATO's Eastern Mediterranean wing would be weakened, the US and NATO put pressure on Turkey and Greece, and as a result of these pressures, the prime ministers of the two countries met in Zurich on February 5-11, 1959. As a result of the negotiations of the two Prime Ministers, it was decided to establish an independent Republic of Cyprus. Turkey, Greece and Britain were recognized as guarantors of this new state. With the Treaty, the guarantor countries were authorized to restore the constitutional order that had been disrupted either together or alone. In addition, the Treaties of London and Zurich prohibited ENOSIS and partition. The Constitution of Cyprus was drafted on the principles agreed upon by the parties and the Republic of Cyprus was officially established with the entry into force of the Constitution on August 16, 1960.³¹

²⁹ Havva Eltetik, "Fatin Rüştü Zorlu", (PhD Thesis, Süleyman Demirel University, 2009), 81.

³⁰ Mehmet Özalper, "Reflections of the Cyprus Issue on the Local Press (1950-1960): Vansesi Newspaper Example" *Van Yüzüncü Yıl University Journal of Institute of Social Sciences*, Van Special Issue, (2021), 338.

³¹ Halil Akman, "ABD'nin Ortadoğu Politikaları ve Türk Dış Politikasına Etkileri (1952-1964)", (PhD Thesis, Istanbul University, 2013), 473.

Since 1952, Adnan Menderes' approach to managing the Cyprus crisis was shaped by Turkey's determination to defend its strategic and national interests. While Menderes emphasized international diplomacy to resolve the crisis, he aimed to increase Turkey's influence in the region. In response to Greece's demand for ENOSIS, Menderes put forward the thesis of the partition of Cyprus and tried to get the Turkish public to adopt this solution proposal. Under Menderes's administration, the Cyprus issue was handled within the context of Turkey's national security and historical rights, and nationalist discourses were emphasized to gain public support. Menderes' strategy included developing a harmonious relationship with Britain, which supported the partition of Cyprus as a solution, and strongly opposing Greece's demand for ENOSIS. Moreover, the Menderes governments argued that the status quo in Cyprus should be maintained unless a solution was reached that would protect Turkey's rights during the crisis.

Turkey-US Solidarity in the Syrian Crisis and Tensions with the Soviet Union

At the height of the Cold War, the Middle East was the region where international conflicts were most intense. The two superpowers of the Cold War, the US and the USSR, forced all countries to choose an ideological and political side in shaping the new world order. In this context, there have been many crises in the Middle East such as the Suez Crisis, the Syrian Crisis, the Iraqi Coup and the Lebanese events. In the face of these crises, Turkey preferred to get closer to the West as a Middle East policy. However, this situation caused Egypt and other Arab countries to distance themselves from Turkey and Turkey became isolated in the region.

In the face of the crises in the region, Prime Minister Adnan Menderes continued his traditional Westernization policy and tried to gain the support of Western countries and to weaken the Soviet influence in the region. In this framework, Turkey supported the establishment of the Baghdad Pact in the region and became a member of the pact. However, Egypt and Syria perceived the Baghdad Pact as a threat to their security and opposed the membership of other Arab countries in the pact. This was because the Arab countries believed that the Baghdad Pact was established by the United States to break the influence of the Soviet Union in the region³². Arab countries also argued that Western countries had an influence on the establishment of Israel. For these reasons, Arab countries have adopted a distant stance towards Western countries. According to the countries in the region, the West was seen as more dangerous than the Soviet Union. Therefore, the anti-Western sentiments of the Middle Eastern countries had a negative impact on their relations with Turkey and brought their relations with Ankara to a breaking point.

Looking at Turkey-Syria relations in the 1950s, some important factors affecting the relations between Ankara and Damascus stand out. These factors include Syria's refusal to recognize Hatay as Turkish territory, Turkey's recognition of Israel in the Palestinian issue instead of supporting the position of the Arab countries, Turkey's close relations with the West, Syria's suspicious approach to Turkey's Middle East policy within the framework of these relations, and the Arab nationalists in the region seeing Turkey as the heir of the Ottoman Empire³³. These factors have already had a negative impact on relations between Ankara and Damascus. Apart from these problems, Syria's rapprochement with Egypt and the Soviet Union and the transfer of Soviet weapons to Syria as a result of these relations pushed the

³² Ümrân Üçbaş Gürses, "1957 Syria Crisis" <https://www.tdpkrizleri.org/2015/12/24/2022-08-25-11-05-34-259/> (Access Date: 15.11.2024). Selma Çetinkaya, "Baghdad Pact'nın Kuruluş Sürecinde Türkiye'nin Ortadoğu ve Batı ile İlişkileri", *Vakâüvis* 1, no. Middle East Special Issue, (2016), 11. TBMM Minutes Journal, Period 10, C. 5, 50th Birleşim, S. no: 225 (26.02.1955), 1-2.

³³ Arda Baş, "1957 Syria Crisis and Turkey", *History Studies* 4, no. 1 (2012): 92.

Baghdad Pact countries, especially Turkey, into insecurity. In particular, the fact that a communist general became the chief of general staff in Syria and that the Soviet Union continued to ship arms to Damascus worried Turkey and the United States. The Soviet presence on Turkey's southern border was perceived as a Soviet encirclement especially in Turkey and created fear in the Menderes government³⁴. In this context, Menderes requested the US to strengthen the Baghdad Pact. According to Menderes; "Turkey borders Bulgaria in the West and the Soviet Union in the North, and if a pro-communist leader comes to power in Syria, Turkey will be surrounded from three sides. Moreover, in the context of the Cold War, it was unacceptable for the Soviet threat to extend to Turkey's southern borders". Therefore, Menderes felt the need to develop a balancing strategy. In this context, he tried to create a military balance of power against Syria by utilizing his close relations with the US. Menderes tried to ensure border security by increasing the number of troops on the Syrian border. In fact, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a declaration stating that Turkey would take certain measures on its border if the Soviet Union deployed troops in Syria.

The Soviet Union's troop and arms shipments to Syria also worried the United States. The US tried to mobilize neighboring countries by sending military support to the Eastern Mediterranean and Adana regions. It also sent its 6th Fleet to the Mediterranean and deployed a large number of military aircraft to the Incirlik Base³⁵. In response, on August 13, 1957, Syria expelled three US diplomats on the grounds that the US was trying to overthrow the existing regime. Thus, the US became involved in the crisis between Turkey and Syria and the Washington administration declared the Syrian ambassador to Washington "persona non grata" in response to Syria's expulsion of US diplomats. This mutual confrontation between the US and Syria not only strained US-Syrian relations but also increased tensions in the region. Upon the escalation of tensions in the region, the US sent Low H. Henderson, Assistant Secretary of State and Middle East expert, to Turkey on August 24, 1957 to discuss the situation in Syria. At the same time Henderson was in Turkey, King Faisal of Iraq and King Hussein of Jordan were also in Turkey. After discussing the Middle East, especially the situation in Syria, with King Faisal of Iraq and King Hussein of Jordan, and with Celal Bayar and Adnan Menderes on the Turkish side, Henderson left Turkey without making any statement to the press. After his diplomatic visit to Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq, Henderson returned to the US and prepared a report on the developments in Syria. In his report, he stated that the situation in the Middle East was very critical³⁶ and that large arms shipments were being made from the Soviet Union to Syria. He also claimed in the report that propaganda activities were being carried out to overthrow the governments of neighboring Arab states³⁷. Henderson's report played an important role in shaping the US policy towards Syria and led the US to adopt a harsher policy towards Syria. In this context, the US announced military aid to Syria's pro-Western neighbors such as Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon³⁸. The US stated that the purpose of this aid was to balance the instability that Syria's pro-Soviet policies could create in the region and to strengthen the security of its Western bloc allies.

³⁴ Bağcı, *1950s in Turkish Foreign Policy*, 91.

³⁵ Halil Akman, "ABD'nin Ortadoğu Politikaları ve Türk Dış Politikasına Etkileri (1952-1964)", (PhD thesis, Istanbul University, 2013), 360.

³⁶ Bağcı, *1950s in Turkish Foreign Policy*, 92.

³⁷ Akman, "US's Middle East Policies", 360.

³⁸ Oral Sander, *Türk Amerikan İlişkileri 1947-1964*, (Ankara: Ankara University Faculty of Political Sciences Publications, 1979), 160.

Despite Washington's policy, the Soviet Union responded to the Syrian crisis with the idea that the US was trying to create an environment to intervene in Damascus and asked the Arab countries not to allow the US to threaten Syria. In a statement to the New York Times, then US President Harry Truman emphasized that he was concerned about the increase in communist activities in Syria and that the US should not remain inactive in the face of this situation.³⁹ Truman also emphasized the importance of Syria for regional and global security and stated that Western countries should take a more active stance in order to maintain stability in this strategic region and eliminate communist influences.

As the US policies in the region hardened, so did the security measures taken by the Menderes government against Syria. In this context, Turkey increased the number of its military forces⁴⁰ on the Syrian border. These measures taken by Turkey were considered by the USSR and Syria as the first steps of the Ankara government to invade Syria. In fact, this initiative of Turkey was realized with the intention of sending a message to the Soviet Union rather than invading Syria. Syria's armament efforts, especially the weapons it received from the Soviet Union and the fact that Moscow had become an "arms depot" worried Turkey. These concerns led the Menderes Government to increase measures for border security. However, the measures taken by Turkey in the context of border security were speculated in the international public opinion and portrayed as Turkey was preparing to intervene in Syria. In the face of this disinformation, the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Turkey made a statement on September 14, 1957, stating that the allegations of military buildup in the border regions did not reflect the truth and that these movements were part of the previously planned NATO maneuvers. With this statement, Turkey tried to emphasize that its military preparations did not aim to create a regional crisis⁴¹. Following Turkey's statement, Khrushchev, Secretary General of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, expressed his views on the tensions in the region in an interview with New York Times correspondent James Reston on October 9, 1957. Khrushchev stated that Turkey's statements were insufficient to reduce tensions in the region and emphasized that a possible military intervention by the West in the Middle East could lead to dangerous consequences. Khrushchev also made the following statement as a message to Turkey: *"Turkey is very weak. It will not last even one day in a state of war. If war breaks out, we are close to Turkey, but you, the Americans, are far away. When the cannons start firing, rockets may start flying. Then it will be too late even to think about it"*⁴². Although Khrushchev's statements were perceived as a clear threat, it was argued that these statements were actually a message to Turkey to reconsider its US policies.

On October 9, 1957, the Government of Damascus sent a note condemning the Turkish government for the violation of Syrian airspace by Turkish aircraft crossing Syrian borders.⁴³ In response to this note, Menderes argued that Syria should evaluate the situation independently from the Soviets and criticized the Syrian administration by stating that the Soviet Union should criticize the defense position of the Soviet Union in Syria. Menderes responded to Syria's note on October 17, 1957. In his reply to Syria, Menderes stated that

³⁹ *New York Times*, "Truman Charges Inaction on Syria; Asks Vigorous Steps to Halt 'Communist Subversion' in Strategic Region", (25.08.1957), 1.

⁴⁰ Peter L. Hahn, "Securing the Middle East: The Eisenhower Doctrine of 1957", *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 36, no. 1 (March 2006): 43.

⁴¹ Üçbaş Gürses, "1957 Syria Crisis" <https://www.tdpkizleri.org/2015/12/24/2022-08-25-11-05-34-259/> (Date of Access: 15.11.2024).

⁴² Erel Tellal, *International and Regional Developments Framework USSR-Turkey Relations (1953-1964)*, (Ankara: Mülkiyeliler Birliği Vakfı Yayınları, 2000), 128.

⁴³ Esra Çavuşoğlu and Ayşenur Takkaç, "1957 Crisis to Syrian Civil War: Understanding the Change in Turkey's Syria Policy" *International Journal of Crisis and Politics* 7, no. 1 (2023): 176.

Turkish troops were kept in the region for precautionary and defense purposes within the framework of the increasing tensions in the region⁴⁴. Menderes considered Syria's note as an interference in Turkey's sovereign rights and informed Damascus that this situation was unacceptable. He also claimed that the incidents on the border were caused by smuggling activities and that Syria intended to create a crisis by dramatizing the situation⁴⁵.

In October 1957, when the possibility of Turkey's intervention in Syria was on the agenda, the United States tried to prevent Ankara's initiative, fearing that it might trigger the Soviet Union's intervention in Turkey⁴⁶. In response to the Soviet Union's loud talk of a Turkish attack on Syria, the UN and various mediators called on the parties to resolve the crisis through diplomatic means. The crisis was considered more as an effect of domestic political dynamics due to the upcoming elections in Turkey⁴⁷. This crisis between Turkey and Syria started to lose its impact after the elections of October 27, 1957 and the leader of the Soviet Union, Nikita Khrushchov, participated in the Republic celebrations on October 29 and declared that there was no crisis in the Middle East and that what happened was due to misunderstandings⁴⁸. Upon this statement, the crisis between Turkey and Syria began to soften.

Although the crisis between the parties began to soften with Nikita Khrushchov's statement, the Soviet Union's threats and accusations against Turkey continued. In his letter sent to Menderes on November 22, 1957, Nikolay Bulganin emphasized that the statement that Turkey had no intention of attacking its neighbors did not reflect the truth and that Turkey continued to build up military masses on the Syrian border. In his letter, Bulganin reiterated that the Soviet Union had no territorial claims against Turkey and called on Turkey to cooperate with the Soviet Union.⁴⁹ On November 28, 1957, Menderes responded to Bulganin's letter and stated that there were no issues to be resolved between Syria and Turkey and emphasized that the Soviet Union was still making dangerous decisions on behalf of Syria.

Under Cold War conditions, the United States established the Baghdad Pact within the framework of its strategy to contain the Soviet Union, while the Soviet Union reacted to this pact and tried to frustrate the US strategy by attracting Middle Eastern countries to its side. Thus, the crisis between Turkey and Syria was transformed from a regional one into a struggle between the US and the Soviet Union. The United States tried to prevent Turkey from intervening in Syria, fearing that Turkey's intervention in Syria would lead to a hot conflict with the Soviet Union. The crisis ended when Turkey announced that it had no plans to intervene against Syria. However, the emergence of the Iraqi crisis in 1958 caused the tension in the region to escalate again.

In the Syrian crisis, Menderes showed a serious deviation from the status quo, while maintaining the traditional Westernist line. Demonstrating a dominant leadership, Menderes was far from the conventional approach to balance of power between the East and the West and even within the West itself. In this period, Menderes, while maintaining the goal of integration with the West in Turkey's foreign policy, pursued a proactive foreign policy that

⁴⁴ Baskın Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorum 1919-1980* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2008), 631.

⁴⁵ Tellal, *International and Regional Developments*, 129. Tekeş, "Political Leader Behavior in Conflict and Crisis Management", 101.

⁴⁶ Bağcı, *1950s in Turkish Foreign Policy*, 95.

⁴⁷ Mehmet Fahri Danış, "Turkish Foreign Policy Decision Makers' Perception of the Middle East: 1957-1958 Crises", *Turkish Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 5, no. 2 (2018): 115.

⁴⁸ Akman, "US's Middle East Policies", 372.

⁴⁹ Tellal, *International and Regional Developments*, 131.

was more flexible and full of risks rather than maintaining the status quo. With this policy, he wanted to see to what extent the West in general and the US in particular could stand by Turkey. In the Syrian crisis, Menderes firstly increased measures in the context of border security and deployed troops to the southern border following the military mobilization in Syria and the Soviet Union's aid to Damascus. After this process, Menderes tried to publicize to the international community that Syria was under Soviet influence. Here, Menderes' primary goal was to get the support of the US and NATO. In this context, he presented the Syrian crisis to the West and the US as a threat of communism. In addition, Menderes prepared the national public opinion for the crisis by presenting Syria's actions, especially its close relationship with the Soviet Union, as a national security threat. Thus, he secured the support of the national public opinion. The Menderes administration's tough stance towards the Syrian crisis and its internationalization of the problem caused Syria to act more cautiously towards Turkey. However, it was possible that the crisis did not deepen to a great extent because the United States and the Soviet Union did not directly intervene in the crisis.

Conclusion

After the Second World War, a new world order was constructed. The two main actors of this order, the United States and the Soviet Union, engaged in an intense struggle with each other to dominate their political, economic and military order on a global scale. Turkey tried to determine its position in this new world order. In this process, the approaches of both the Soviet Union and the United States and other Western countries were decisive in determining Turkey's direction. In addition, the political and legal structure adopted by Turkey since its foundation was also influential in this process. During this period, the Soviet Union's attitude towards Turkey made Ankara uneasy. In particular, the Soviet Union's expansionist policies and regime exportation efforts worried Turkey. This situation caused Turkey to move away from the policy of neutrality adopted since the Atatürk period. The Turkish foreign policy pursued during the Menderes period developed within a framework that saw the Soviets as a threat and tried to take part in the Western bloc. In this context, the Menderes period has gone down in history as a period in which Turkey's foreign policy was fully integrated into the Western bloc and the regional problems brought about by this integration were intensely felt. Menderes' approach to crisis management was mostly based on a pragmatic and risk-taking strategy. Turkey's NATO membership, establishing close relations with the United States, defending the partition thesis in the Cyprus problem and taking a tough stance against the Soviet Union in the Syrian crisis constituted the main elements of Menderes' foreign policy strategy between 1950-1960.

Adnan Menderes not only made Turkey's NATO membership the most important element of the country's security, but also tried to adopt it as the most important part of the Western defense mechanism. At the same time, this initiative was used as a fundamental tool to deepen Turkey's relations with the West. Turkey's NATO membership was thus a critical step in strengthening national security against the Soviet threat. However, this initiative only strengthened Turkey's relations with the West. On the other hand, it dragged the relations between the Soviet Union and the Arab countries into a complicated process.

During his stay in power between 1950-1960, Menderes adopted a strategy that prioritized Turkey's national interests. For example, in the Cyprus crisis, he adopted the thesis of partition against the Greek and Greek Cypriot thesis of ENOSIS. With this strategy, Menderes not only defended Turkey's security interests but also aimed to gain the support of national public opinion. In this direction, rhetoric such as "either Taksim or Death" was effective in securing the support of the public and in maintaining a strong stance in foreign policy. However, these

nationalist discourses left Menderes in the middle of tragic developments such as the September 6-7 Events. This event revealed Menderes' weaknesses in crisis management.

In the Syrian crisis, which was characterized as a security crisis, Menderes adopted a harsh policy to prevent the Soviet Union's growing influence in the region. Menderes' policy in Syria almost brought the two countries to the brink of war. In this process, Menderes used the crisis as a tool to see how far the US could stand by Turkey militarily and financially. In this context, he internationalized the Syrian crisis by emphasizing that the Soviet Union was using Syria as a tool to expand/populate the Middle East and thus internationalized the problem and ensured the US involvement in the region. In addition, Menderes increased Turkey's position and importance within NATO by ensuring that Turkey was perceived as a reliable ally in the Western bloc. While this policy of Menderes made Turkey an important ally of the US and the West, on the other hand, it weakened its relations with the Arab countries in the region and isolated Turkey in the region.

Menderes' adoption of a strategy of active Americanism in foreign policy was an important strategy in terms of achieving Turkey's economic development and security goals. With this strategy, Menderes aimed to ensure the continuity of the economic and military aid provided by the US. However, this strategy also increased the country's dependence on the US. However, this dependence put Turkey in an economically difficult situation as the aid from the US decreased in the future. It has also led Turkey to seek more flexible and pragmatic solutions in foreign policy.

The Adnan Menderes period between 1950-1960 was an important turning point not only in terms of Turkey's integration into the Western bloc, but also in Turkey's increasing experience in crisis management. When Menderes's foreign policy preferences are evaluated from a crisis management perspective, they can be considered as correct/strong moves especially in terms of establishing strategic alliances, managing the process with pragmatic approaches, effective use of international diplomacy and public opinion management. Its weaknesses in terms of crisis management can be shown as its hasty decisions, thus bypassing the consultation mechanism and being caught unprepared for the crises that emerged as a result of these decisions. Again, due to some decisions, the isolation and isolation in the region and risky nationalist discourses have been subject to criticism. These factors can be expressed as weaknesses in crisis management. These experiences gained during the Menderes period provided important political, legal and diplomatic grounds for the political decision-makers who came to power in the following periods and shaped future decision-making processes.

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