ÇATIŞMA SONRASI BÖLGELERE YÖNELİK BİR ÇÖZÜM OLARAK LİBERAL BARIŞ TEORİSİ: TEORİK BİR İNCELEME

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ÖZ

Çatışma-sonrası bölgelerde, liberal market ekonomisi ve demokratik gereklilikler, yaşanan ağır çatışmalar sonucu etkisiz kalan kamu yönetim sistemlerine alternatif oluşturmaktadır. Çatışma-sonrası etkin bir devlet yapısının kaybolduğu bölgelerde yaşanmakta olan çatışma, insan hakları ihlalleri, yolsuzluk ve yoksukluk gibi olumsuzluklar, liberal devlet inşası politikalarının olduğu kadar bunların eleştirilerinin de uygulanabilir ve sürdürülebilir çözümler üretilmesi konusundaki yetersizliklerini ortaya koymaktadır. Dışarıdan müdehale ve yerel insiyatifleri buluşturan hibrit çözümler, günlük hayatta alt seviyede barış inşası ve yerel merkezli yaklaşımlar gibi eleştirel konseptler liberal barış teorisi gibi literatürde bir çeşit ortodoksi haline gelmiştir. Bu eleştirel konseptler insan merkezli çözümler öneriyor olsalar da, şiddetin yoğun olarak yaşandığı bölgelerdeki ağır sosyo-politik ve ekonomik şartlar nedeniyle bir çok çatışma-sonrası alanda uygulanabilir görünmemektedir. Bu makale, günümüz barışinşası deneyimlerinin çoğunun temel dayanağı ve liberal müdehalelerin meşrulaştırıcısı olan Liberal Barış Teorisinin kavramsal bir analizini yapmaktadır. Literatürde yer alan liberal ve eleştirel yaklaşımların örnekler üzerinden bir bütün içerisinde ele alınması, alanda yapılacak olan çalışmalara ışık tutacağı değerlendirilmektedir. Çalışma, çatışma-sonrası alanların yapısal farklılıklarını dikkate alan durumsal bir yaklaşımın gerekliliğini ortaya koymayı amaçlamaktadır. Bu durumsal yaklaşım, liberal barış terosisi ve onu meşrulaştırmaya yönelik yaklaşımlar kadar literatürde hegemonik hale gelen eleştirel yaklaşımların ortodoksisini de reddetmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Liberal Barış Teorisi, Barış inşası, Devlet inşası, Çatışma-sonrası

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THE LIBERAL PEACE THEORY AS A SOLUTION FOR POST-CONFLICT ZONES: A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS

ABSTRACT

In post-conflict places, liberal market economy and democratic necessities offer an alternative against ineffective state structures due to intensive conflicts. The current negative situations in post-conflict zones such as conflict, human rights abuses, corruption and poverty illustrate that liberal statebuilding policies as well as critical perspectives are inadequate to build sustainable and viable alternatives. Critical concepts - such as hybridity that brings external interventions and local initiatives together, everyday peacebuilding and local-centred approaches- as well as the liberal peace thesis, have become a kind of orthodoxy in the literature. Although these critical concepts offer alternative human-centric solutions, in most conflict zones they seem inapplicable due to harsh and violent socio-political and economic conditions. This article makes a theoratical analysis of the Liberal Peace Theory as the facilitator of most contemporary peacebuilding experiences and justification of the liberal interventions. Analysis of liberal and critical approaches within a structural framework through the examples can be a reference for further studies. The paper aims to illustrate the necessity of a contingency approach which considers the contextual differences of various post-conflict zones. This contingency approach rejects the orthodoxy of the liberal peace theory and its justifications as well as its criticisms having hegemonic perspectives in the literature.

Keywords: Liberal Peace Theory, Peacebuilding, Statebuilding, Post-conflict

JEL Codes: F50, F51, F52

INTRODUCTION

Since the end of the Cold War, civil wars, interstate conflicts, state failures have gradually taken place in the international political agenda. The efforts mitigating the effects of these problems have encouraged scholars and policy makers to consider the liberal peace thesis as a solution. An important assumption of the liberal thesis has been universal human dignity and national self-determination. Although this assumption prioritises the sovereignty of the states, which prevents external interventions, the concept of "responsibility to protect" (R2P) maintains a valid justification for the liberal interventions (Doyle, 2015).

As a result of this idea, humanitarian liberal internationalism has emerged as a dominant policy in the literature with the support of the United States and the United Kingdom in the early 2000s (Richmond and Franks, 2011: 1-3). According to this policy, liberal peace theory is practised as a model for state-building integrated with peace-building in post-conflict countries such as Bosnia, Iraq, Afghanistan, Kosova and Timor (Richmond and Franks, 2011). To prevent atrocities and human suffering, international interventions can be acceptable as the UN's R2P doctrine articulating since 2005 (Doyle, 2015: 49).

Although many scholars have criticised the liberal peace and liberal state-building projects from different perspectives, others have insisted on that there is no other coherent alternative to build peace in conflict zones (Richmond, 2011a: 1-4). Critical perspectives on the liberal peace thesis have been developed based on unsuccessful attempts all around the world. However, current situation in post-conflict zones illustrate that these critical perspectives are also inadequate to build sustainable and viable alternatives. Critical concepts - such as hybridity, everyday peace and local-centered - as well as the liberal peace thesis, have become a kind of orthodoxy in the literature. Although these critical concepts offer alternative human-centric solutions, in most conflict zones they seem inapplicable due to harsh and violent socio-political and economic conditions.

This theoretical paper makes an in-depth analysis of the Liberal Peace Theory as the facilitator of contemporary peacebuilding experiences and justification of the liberal interventions through the dominant ideas in the literature. The paper aims to illustrate the necessity of a contingency approach which considers the contextual differences of various post-conflict zones. This contingency approach rejects the orthodoxy of the liberal peace theory and its justifications as well as its criticisms having hegemonic perspectives in the literature.

This article as a theoretical discussion includes three sections. In the first section, the evaluation of the Liberal Peace Theory since the Kantian thinking will be presented. The second section discusses and categorizes the critical literature on the theory. In the last section, an overall assessment of the Liberal Peace Theory will be made from statebuilding and peacebuilding perspective to prove the necessity of the contingency approach which depends on different characteristics of the post-conflict zones such as demography, culture, social structure, history, geography etc. At that point, this paper offers that liberal democracy emphasising western values as a solution - as well as local-

centred perspectives - cannot be suitable for every post-conflict zones, instead of thinking through certain paradigms, contemporary literature should develop alternatives according to the unique structures of every conflict zones.

1. EVALUATION OF LIBERAL PEACE THEORY

The remnant of the Cold War with the collapse of Soviet Communism strengthened the authority of liberal theory in academic literature as well as international politics. These events were interpreted as the beginning of a new liberal world order. Regrettably, in a short time, the conflict that broke out in Yugoslavia, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the Gulf War, and the civil wars in Africa changed these expectations. The solutions, found to stabilize these war-torn countries, such as humanitarian interventions, military invasions and peace missions, were mostly motivated by the liberal theory.

The liberal peace is "the idea that certain kinds of (liberally constituted) societies will tend to be more peaceful, both in their domestic affairs and in their international relations, than illiberal states are" (Newman et al., 2009: 11). According to this assumption, liberal democracies are not prone to go to war with each other since democracies impose institutional pressures upon leaders that make declaring war against other countries more difficult. Moreover, because of the symbiotic economic structure of these liberal states, conflict oriented policy may disrupt economic/trade relations.

Official authorities mentioned the liberal theory as the most effective solution in the 1990s. In the UN Secretary-General report, "An Agenda for Peace" the Secretary General Boutros-Ghali (1992: 16) pointed out the correlation between democratic practices - such as the rule of law and transparency in decision-making - and the realization of real peace and security to maintain a stable political order. This assertion is one of the first examples, officially stating the fundamentals of the liberal peace theory of contemporary international policies since 1992. Although state sovereignty is an important priority of the international community Doyle (2015: 7) asserts that if a state fails to meet its responsibility to protect its population from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing it is legitimate to provide protection for vulnerable people through interventions including military measures.

A majority of analyses that admit the importance of the liberal peace in international politics refer to liberal internationalism and Immanuel Kant's "Perpetual Peace" (Huntley, 1996: 62). According to the common assumption of liberals, peace is the typical state of international affairs (Burchill and Linklater, 2005: 58). But, from Kant's perspective, states still live in an international anarchy that is tamed and "made subject to the law rather than to fear and threat of fear" (Doyle, 1997: 254). Kant argues that only the republican states, governed by the will of its citizens and restricted by the liberal constitution, prevent this anarchy and maintain the possibility of freedom as well as security under the rule of law (Huntley, 1996: 48). Kant also underlines the necessity of the institutionalization of peace since the state is still the core structure of the international relations. Establishing a federation

of states, going beyond an alliance, is vital for mitigating the dangers of the state of war (Doyle, 1997: 256).

By the world "republican", Kant refers to a political society that "has solved the problem by combining moral autonomy, individualism, and social order" (Doyle, 1997: 257). In this society, checks and balances of a constitutional republic make the state more pacific toward all nations. Due to the restriction of the state authority maintained by the constitution, the will of people would be needed for the declaration of war, and no one would be eager to declare war as citizens would not like to take the burden of the war costs, repair of the devastation, and a grave national debt (Spiro, 1994: 52).

From the general concepts of Kant's "Perpetual Peace", it is possible to refer these three conclusions as a synopsis: Liberal states are less prone to war against other liberal states than against illiberal states. Moreover, liberal states are less likely than illiberal states to launch conflict against other states. Lastly, liberal states are less prone to civil wars and domestic violence than illiberal states (Danilovic and Clare, 2007: 401-403). Thus, Kant's theory can be rephrased as a representative and republican government, a principled respect for non-discriminatory human rights, and social and economic interdependence (Doyle, 2011: 286-287).

After World War I, in the Paris Peace Conference, President Wilson had a similar opinion to create a new world based on the freedoms such as democratic self-determination of peoples, constitutional protection of minority rights, free trade and commerce, the opening of diplomacy to public scrutiny in newly-built European countries, and the assembly of a League of Nations to protect the peace all around the world (Paris, 2004: 40). According to Paris (2004: 41), with this opinion Wilson is the first statesman mentioning the idea of the liberal peace theory.

These liberal ideas were bitterly criticised by the scholars of realist theory, especially after World War II. E. H. Carr's, The Twenty Years' Crisis (first published in 1939) and Hans Morgenthau's Politics Among Nations (first published in 1948) are two of the most important examples. Contrary to the liberal idea, these criticisms did not accept the belief that the struggle for power could be tamed by international law. Their main argument was that the efforts, ignoring the struggle for power, would not reform the international system (Burchill and Linklater, 2005: 1). By the time, different interpretations of realism emerged after these ideas, but the state-centric perspective and struggle of power had been the most emphasized characteristic of all interpretations until the end of the Cold War.

Contrary to the dominant theory of Realism, by the 1970s a smaller group of researchers began to re-examine the relationship between market democracy and intrastate, or civil, violence. As one of the foremost supporters of the Kantian theory, Doyle published his two-part essay "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs" in 1983. In the first part, he explains the liberal theory and the Kantian interpretation. In the second part, he underscores the risks of liberal imperialism, liberal aggression and liberal appeasement (Doyle,1983a; 1983b). With this essay, Doyle became one of the most important thinkers of the liberal peace theory. In his articles and the book, Doyle discusses the

constitutional, international and cosmopolitan laws-of the hypothetical peace treaty, and also tries to explain the differences of liberalism from two other main international ideas, Realism and Marxism.

His primary argument is "no one of these constitutional, international or cosmopolitan sources is alone sufficient, but together (and only where together) they plausibly connect the characteristics of liberal policies and economies with sustained liberal peace" (Doyle, 2005: 464-465). Moreover, he tries to explain why liberal states are likely peaceful between each other, but are prone to make war with non-liberal states with three aspects of liberal republics.

First, the governments of republican democracies have a tendency to establish a liable relationship with the voters. With the help of elections, people have the right of giving punishment to the government due to its unacceptable policies. Second, maintaining the same liberal rights for individuals and having the same liberal principles make the liberal states respectful towards each other. These features create a common appreciation between them while create a rejection towards the non-liberal states. Last, "spirit of commerce" creates interdependence between liberal states. As an important feature of the liberal economic theory, a rule of law that involves property and legitimate exchange rights can hold an international labour division and free trade (Doyle, 2005: 464-465). While Doyle asserts that liberal states are prone to war against non-liberal states, he also "advocates means-sanctions or restricted interaction with non-liberal states, and extended aid and trade with liberal or transitional states-to promote liberal principles abroad" (Jahn 2005: 182).

From some aspects, there are important similarities between John Rawls' Law of Peoples and the Liberal Peace Theory. In the idea of Rawls, the Law of Peoples is a set of principles for liberal democratic societies to follow during the foreign relations (Beitz, 2000: 670). The word "people" does not mean persons; he uses that word to define a society. Hence, according to Rawls, international society is conceived as a Society of Peoples. He also states eight principles assigned to these peoples. These principles are similar to Kantian articles, but the most important of them is "Peoples have a duty to assist other peoples living under unfavourable conditions that prevent their having a just or decent political and social regime" (Rawls, 1999: 37).

Rawls' assumptions basically accept the two Kantian articles. The first is the institutionalization of peace embodied international law, in other words, a world government. The second is the idea of a ''pacific federation'' of republican states. Following Kant, Rawls believes that liberal democratic societies do not prefer to fight each other and will build up gradually increasing networks of peaceful collaboration (Beitz, 2000: 673). In this sense, according to Rawls, to intervene in illiberal states to protect suffering people is a responsibility of liberal states.

At this point, it is also possible to consider a clear similarity between Rawls' assumption and R2P doctrine discussed by Doyle (2015). Doyle states that although non-intervention is one of the key features of liberal thinking, in some certain cases intervention is a clear necessity to save human dignity. He follows Mill's assumptions that "nonintervention should be overridden both to prevent the recurrence of aggressive war and to end protracted civil war" (Doyle, 2015: 191). Doyle (2015: 12)

recognizes three basic principles to intervene: (1) humanitarian protection, (2) national self-determination, and (3) national security. The first principle means to respect the equal dignity of human beings around the world. The second principle highlights the importance of collective self-determination and sovereignty. Lastly, due to the deficiency of the international community to provide national security for all states, maintaining its own security though all available sources including the intervention is an important value (Doyle, 2015: 10-12).

Besides these three principles, Doyle (2015: 147-185) emphasizes the importance of postbellum peacebuilding, the rights and duties of the intervened and the interveners. With this perspective, he refers to the just war theory having three criteria: "jus ad bellum, jus in bello, and jus post bellum". Postbellum peacebuilding is a responsibility of interveners to build up an environment guaranteeing a genuine self-determination that prevents the recommence of aggression. Following these arguments, as an important assumption, Doyle (2015: 192) advocates a multilateral intervention rather than unilateral efforts.

Although R2P is considered as a liberal solution for atrocities by the scholars such as Doyle, it has been criticised from different perspectives. The biggest criticism for R2P is that some states could misuse the doctrine for various interests. According to Havel and Tutu (2012: xxvi), "the agreement was, without a doubt, a historic breakthrough…Yet, there are concerns about misuse, including fears that R2P will be used by powerful states to justify neo-colonial incursion into less powerful states". According to some commentators, using humanitarian arguments of the liberal theory to justify the invasions damaged the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention phenomenon (Bellamy & Wheeler: 519). In Afghanistan, post-9/11 war on terror and self-defence discourse also created concerns among scholars and statesmen about the misuse of the R2P concept as a justification for national security interests (Welsh, 2006).

Notwithstanding these strong liberal assertions, recent experiences of post-conflict statebuilding efforts following liberal peace prescriptions - such as Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya – have barely failed. Although basic characteristics of liberal peace theory rely on liberal state and its institutions and a neo-liberal economy these liberal structures are not enough to stabilize post-conflict zones as well as building peace. Thus, liberal theory driven efforts have been criticised from different intellectual and practical aspects. Based on the implementation of the theory changing into a more interventionist approach after the late 1990s, in the next section most-cited critical approaches in the literature will be analysed.

2. CONTEMPORARY CRITICAL APPROACHES TO THE LIBERAL PEACE

Except a few limited achievements (Namibia, East Timor, Sierra Leon), most of the global experiences of peace operations (Somali, Iraq, Afghanistan, DRC, Haiti) could not bring permanent solutions to the problems of war-torn states according to the Kantian liberal peace criteria (Paris, 2011a: 31-37). While the United Nations and other organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the African Union pursue to reaffirm their determination for peacebuilding and

launch new missions intended for helping countries emerging from civil wars, scholars and practitioners also try to get a better understanding of the essential tensions and disagreements of peacebuilding by using critical methodology.

Chandler (2010) suggests that it will be appropriate to classify these various critiques within two extensive, distinctive, but often interrelated, approaches; "as the radical, power-based, and the more policy orientated, ideas-based, critiques". The first approach evaluates the liberal peace with the key characteristics such as freedom discourse, democratic features and economic perspective as a justification for the interests of Western states. In the second approach, the problem is caused by the collective hypothesising of the liberal peace itself (Chandler, 2010: 139).

2.1 The Liberal Peace as a Justification of the Western Interests

A group of scholars evaluates the interventions to build liberal peace as a means of the liberal imperialism aiming to exploit or control the societies subjected to missions. Jahn (2005) discusses the imperialism as a result of the misinterpretation of the Kantian theory in her article "Kant, Mill, and Illiberal Legacies". In the current liberal thought, the relationship between theory and history in Kant's work and also the nature of moral laws are misunderstood. Hence, this contemporary thought creates false policies identified as the source of imperialism by Kant. These policies have reproduced the security dilemma between liberal and non-liberal states, which Kant tried to solve (Jahn, 2005: 186). The declaration of war on terror and the invasion of Afghanistan as a reaction against the 9/11 Attacks caused an increase of discussions on peacebuilding-as-imperialism. Furthermore, the justification of the Bush Government for an invasion that could bring democracy and freedom to oppressed people became another reason to increase these arguments (Paris, 2011a: 37).

An important critical approach tends to engage with the neo-liberal economic perspective of the liberal peace theory by evaluating the efforts of interveners as a part of a larger hegemonic project. Ideological purpose of this project is to extend the principles and norms of hegemonic states and institutions (Paris, 2009: 101). The neoliberal model is dysfunctional in maintaining social protection, decreasing unemployment and developing the daily life or society. The interveners' economic prescriptions, which diminish the role of state and privatise essential services, cause to deepen the gap between the wealthy entrepreneur elites and the grass-root level (Pugh, 2002: 49). These mostly corrupted and neo-feudal entrepreneurs, who became rich by using the opportunities of the war era, dominate the main sectors, due to uncontrolled privatisation policies. Naturally, the main purpose of these people is maximising their profits, so the social and the economic aspects of the peacebuilding efforts do not concern about the necessities of the ordinary people. He insists that liberal peace has to deal with the political economy of the grass-root levels; otherwise, it could become subjugation rather than emancipation for the intervened countries (Pugh, 2002: 25-37).

The rapid program of privatization and marketization in post-conflict states is also subjected to critiques. According to the criticisms, liberalism is not a magical dust that can prevent the disastrous human consequences of the rapid programs of liberal interventions. These programs are also related to

the bias that accepts western social, political, and economic customs as fit for purpose in non-western contexts. Liberal peace mirrors the ideological and practical interests of the western states, international organisations and financial institutions formed by these western states. In spite of all good intentions of it, liberal peace creates a negative assumption as if it is an interventionist and expansionist project (Mac Ginty, 2011a). Bosnia, Iraq and Afghanistan are a few important examples to illustrate negative effects of rapid programs of liberal interventions. For instance, in Afghanistan, elections and tradational assembly following early succes of military efforts created an expectation that democracy and liberal values could bring successful results in a short period. However, the Taliban resistance and deteriorating political and economic situation in the country destroyed these liberal expectations.

According to Mac Ginty (2011a: 39), it is not possible to find a 'typical' prescription-peacebuilding from IKEA, which includes disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration, security sector reform, state-building, civil society enhancement, economic recovery, truth recovery, and reconciliation to work for every case. He offers "hybridisation of the core pillars of liberal peacebuilding as a solution: security, economic reform, state-building and constitutional reform, governance and civil society". This hybridisation means reciprocal and ongoing harmonious relations between local and international groups (Paris, 2011b: 164). Mac Ginty (2011b: 210) defines the phenomenon as a way of "bringing the local back into peace studies". Timor-Leste experience is an important example of hybridity in statebuilding. The liberal peace project facing with important difficulties created hybrid forms created by state practices engaging with local structures and socio-political structures such as local justice systems and the utilisation of local ceremonies and practices (Wallis 2012; Çınar 2016).

Another idea criticising the liberal peace from the political economic perspective states that conflicts and wars between rich countries no longer seem (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). They have almost vanished among the middle-income countries. On the other hand, a large group of poor and unstable small countries have emerged as new threats of international politics (Collier, 2010: 7). In fact, he evaluates state-building as a solution to diminish the civil wars and these threats. Nevertheless, he criticises the general approach, forgetting that modern states built not just on collective interests, but on shared identity. Creating a shared identity also needs a difficult process and an effective leadership (Collier, 2010: 9).

A further aspect of his criticism is that in poor countries, the outcome of democracy is not the same as in rich countries to prevent violence. In rich and middle-income countries, democracy decreases the risk of violence, but in the poor countries, it cannot solve the problems (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004: 576). His examples to these poor countries are developing countries such as Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, Angola, Indonesia, Latin America and Asia where the politicians can manipulate the elections through economic instruments and coercion to some degree. Collier (2010: 225) suggests that the economic development can be the most important facet of the solution for mitigating this

dilemma. Economic development enhanced by aid and policy reform is the most realistic strategy for donors.

Consequently, seeing neo-liberal economic policies as a solution to address problems of post-conflict environment illustrates an example of the problem-solving approach. This approach finds solution just for the symptoms of the real causes, and it is not adequate to offer permanent peace. Ignoring the basic characteristics of local and context might be the weakest point of this approach. For instance, in Bosnia Herzegovina and Kosovo, this approach created class struggle in society and a possible reason for the future instability. This narrow approach taken by Western donors is also another problematic from the problem-solving perspective (Chandler, 2010: 140).

It is also possible to condemn the liberal peace theory for the ignorance of vital local concerns of identity and culture. Richmond criticises the liberal peace theory from several aspects. His basic critics are ignorance of culture, needs, and welfare of the local, lack of social welfare approaches, romanticising of the local, neoliberal components of liberal peace, and hybrid form of peace, which is a consequence of the mediation process between the interests of the local and the international actors (Richmond, 2011a: 91). According to Richmond (2011b: 240), neoliberal models are not suitable to provide social security or financial support for a population who suffer from poverty. Because, neoliberal ideologies and systems support the interests of elites who want to have a political, economic, and cultural hegemony. Therefore, neoliberal treatments isolate the grass root levels from the democratic process (Richmond, 2011a: 53).

The most important objective of liberal peace is maintaining stability in the international order between sovereign states, so it promotes a culture of governmental and securitised institutionalism. Richmond (2009) defines the methodology of liberal peace with the Foucauldian concepts such as bio-politics, the administration of life, and governmentality. In this sense, peacebuilding is a way of donors to produce political subjects or citizens appropriate to execute their policies, agendas, interests and ideologies (Richmond, 2009: 575-578).

In his opinion, liberal peace, influenced by neo-liberalism, does not provide enough support to the needs or welfare of local. He offers the welfare state as a solution, the function of which is to reallocate or balance, and provide for social justice and economic stability and efficiency. Hence, a more welfare-oriented version of peacebuilding might be able to establish stronger and more legitimate structure. On the other hand, the welfare approach requires social engineering to be carried out by enlightened officials and politicians, and a strong social contract between them and society, institutionalised within the state (Richmond, 2011b).

Richmond evaluates the liberal peace on an axis, the hyperconservative version at the one end and the emancipatory version at the other end. Additionally, he puts conservative and orthodox versions between these ends. He defines the emancipatory version as the most convenient approach to solve the fragility (Richmond, 2011a: 5-6). He also names this version as post-liberal peace. Post-liberal peace tries to find responses to the weaknesses of liberal peace. The critical policies of post-

liberal peace might cover a better apprehension of local culture, tradition, a larger participation of local in the decision making of basic political, economic, and social processes, the acceptance of peacebuilding as an empathetic, emancipatory process, focused on everyday care, human security, and a social contract between society and the polity, and an economic framework focusing on welfare (Richmond, 2009: 578). Nonetheless, the post-liberal peace is not an alternative to the liberal peace, but instead suggests a hybrid of both liberal and local processes and institutions which have different social, cultural and economic assumptions (Richmond, 2011a: 149).

2.2 The Liberal Peace as a Fallacy of the Western Internationalism

The last group of critiques is prone to "focus on the problem of Western interventionist 'ideas' or 'values' rather than on the interests or power relations" (Chandler, 2010: 142). This approach has been expended by Jack Snyder, Fareed Zakharia, Stephen Krasner, Robert Keohane, and Roland Paris, amongst others, who argue that liberal peace assumptions have undermined the effectiveness of international statebuilding (Chandler, 2010).

According to Paris (2011b: 159), although the critical perspectives seem to reject the liberal peace idea, on detailed analysis most of them are different variations of the same idea except a few critics. At that point, Paris (2002: 638) makes an interesting suggestion that peacebuilding operations the current base of liberal peace can be interpreted as a modern version of the colonial-era "mission civilisatrice" the belief that European colonial powers had an obligation to "improve" the circumstances of people living in their colonial lands. This process can be named as the Westernisation of the periphery which asserts that liberal market democracy is most appropriate model of domestic governance for war-shattered states to adopt. Paris gives important examples such as Bosnia, Somalia and Cambodia in which liberal market democracy used as a tool to stabilize the post-conflict countries (Paris, 2002).

In his economic interpretation of liberal peace, the current problems are not caused by the implementation of liberal or market-oriented policies, but rather because donors have misjudged the particular vulnerabilities of countries just emerging from conflicts. However, he thinks that the critics of liberal peace have been much exaggerated. Hence, to reform existing approaches with the help of a broadly liberal framework and avoid narrowly policy-oriented or problem-solving analyses can create a better solution to stabilize the fragile and post-conflict states (Paris, 2011b: 167).

Sovereign statehood is another core assumption of the liberal approach problematized by critical perspectives. Constructing a sovereign state is not adequate to solve the problems of post-conflict states. For instance, due to lack of capacity for good governance in fragile states, an external regulatory structure is needed to protect human rights, establish the rule of law, and reconceptualise the state as a political unit. This structure of state should be able to maintain internal order and engage in international cooperation with preserving the values traditionally associated with sovereignty (Chandler, 2010: 143). At this point, Paris (2004: 187) also offers a policy of "institutionalisation

before liberalisation" in order to emphasise the regulatory structures, which are necessary to change the post-conflict societies into liberal models of democracy.

These critics of the liberal peace theory do not discuss the liberal character of interventions, but emphasise the necessity of paying attention on the non-liberal framework of the intervened places (Chandler, 2010: 143). As noted earlier, the critical perspectives are too broad. Hence, according to the basic characteristics, just the most relevant of them have been cited in this paper. For instance, Shurke also thinks that the basic characteristic of Liberal Peace is the assumption that Western countries try to enforce their principles and models on post-war countries. She gives the attitude of NATO countries as an example. They have promoted democracy, development and human rights; on the other hand, they have given support to local warlords in Afghanistan (Chaudhary et al., 2011).

As realized from the context, critical research agendas for peace have shown that the liberal peace theory has been mostly subjected to new testing grounds of post-conflict environments (Richmond, 2011b). Although they have different assumptions and theoretic point of views, the most common feature of the critical perspectives is the limited success of external interventions considered mitigating the conflict and supporting the reconstruction of the peace through the liberal mind-set. To address the reasons of this failure, a group of thinkers blame the imperialist and hegemonic Western idealism, which ignores the locals' rights and needs; another group think that neo-liberal economic policies and features of democracy such as elections do not fit to intervened countries, ethnic and religious structure, social and political tradition of which are not ready to integrate to the liberal world order.

CONCLUSION

'Liberal peace theory' evaluates modern, pluralistic democracy and the 'invisible hand' of the market as the ultimate conflict resolution methodology (Marshall, 2010: 237; Porch, 2010). According to the theory; liberal democracies are not prone to go to war with each other because democracies impose institutional pressures upon leaders that make declaring war against other democratic countries more difficult; moreover, because of the interdependent economic structure of these liberal states, conflict oriented policy may disrupt economic/trade relations. The attitude of NATO countries can be givene as an example of this approach. They have promoted democracy, development and human rights in conflict zones such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Kosova and Bosnia (Chaudhary, Ashraf, & Suhrke, 2011). However, they have ignored that this premise of the liberal peace theory may not create the desired outcomes in a non-Western country. According to critical perspectives, peacebuilding is considered as a donor or intervener-driven bureaucratic process. With these features, it has 'a paternalistic attitude toward their "helpless recipients"' (Lee and Ozerdem, 2015: 8). In this regard, critical perspectives mostly focus on the necessity of local ownership and bottom-up approach.

However, important criticisms have been posed towards these 'post-liberal' assumptions in the literature. First, these local-based approaches neglect 'the importance of economic and social structures by locating the barriers to peace at the cognitive or ideational level' (Nadarajah and

Rampton, 2015: 50). In the social and economic structures including harsh and ambivalent hierarchies and power relations, emphasising local and bottom-up approaches at the cognitive level is not enough to offer a solid and viable solution for sustainable peace. Flawed social structures such as illiteracy, poverty, class struggle, and ethnic conflicts create crucial obstacles for local peacebuilding approaches. Additionally, local power structures - official or traditional - generally prevent local-based initiatives. To encourage these local-based initiatives making negotiations with these local power structures are inevitable in most cases.

Therefore, thinking bottom-up initiatives based on local agency by neglecting historical, social and economic context of the post-conflict zones is the most crucial critique of the post-liberal approaches. In this regard, this critique wonders how these local-based approaches could solve these deep structural problems. Although these critical concepts offer alternative human-centric solutions, in most conflict zones they seem inapplicable due to harsh and violent socio-political and economic conditions. In this regard, a contingency approach, which depends on different characteristics of the post-conflict zones such as demography, culture, social structure, history, geography etc., can create an alternative solution.

At this point, this paper offers that liberal democracy emphasising western values as a solution or local-centred perspectives cannot be suitable for every post-conflict zones, instead of thinking through certain paradigms, contemporary literature should develop alternatives according to the unique structures of the conflict zones. Additionally, more researches, using ethical, ethnographic, and active research methodologies, are needed to better understand the local, locality, context, and their interaction with and against the liberal peacebuilding architecture beside the concept of liberal interveners. These studies should be conducted without the prejudices of liberal peace theory as well as tedious critical perspectives.

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