

THE SHIFT OF GERMANY IN SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICIES: AN ANALYSIS IN FRAME OF NEOCLASSICAL REALISM*

ESRA AĞRALI**

Abstract

After the Second World War, Germany underwent a period of profound transformation as it sought to rebuild its identity and political structure. The country's post-war reorientation was driven by an aspiration for enhanced integration with the Western world. In the immediate post-war period, Germany's primary objective was to regain its legitimacy and participate in the Western European security architecture with a period of initial proximity with the Atlanticist wing. However; with the unification of East and West Germany, its foreign policy identity and discourses underwent a period of significant change; moreover, over time, Germany experienced a policy shift from Atlanticism to Europeanism. In Germany, normative concerns are among the most important factors in determining national foreign policy. The country's policy of non-support for unilateral military operations, its advocacy of a conciliatory response to international crises, and its inclination towards greater integration within the contexts of CFSP and CSDP indicate a strategic culture that values civilian power. This article aims to elucidate Germany's Europeanist approach to the CSDP by examining the factors that shape it from a neoclassical realist perspective. The impact of leadership on policy formulation, coupled with the influence of domestic dynamics on the decisions of policymakers, highlights the neoclassical realism approach as a more appropriate framework for interpreting Germany's actions. This perspective facilitates a comprehensive analysis of Germany's strategic culture and its effects on the CSDP, while also elucidating the factors driving the shift from its traditionally Atlanticist orientation toward the CSDP to a more Europeanist stance.

Keywords: EU, Germany, Neoclassical realism, CSDP, Civilian Power

* This article is based on a part of the author's PhD dissertation titled "The Atlanticist-Europeanist Divide in Common Security and Defence Policy from A Neoclassical Realist Perspective: The Cases of Germany, France and Poland".

** Assistant Professor in Istanbul Medipol University, Department of Political Science and International Relations, esraagrالی@medipol.edu.tr, ORCID: 0000-0003-2421-4153.

ALMANYA'NIN GÜVENLİK VE SAVUNMA POLİTİKALARINDAKİ DEĞİŞİMİ: NEOKLASİK REALİZM ÇERÇEVESİNDE BİR ANALİZ

Öz

İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nın ardından Almanya, kimliğini ve siyasi yapısını yeniden inşa etmeye çalıştığı derin bir dönüşüm sürecinden geçmiştir. Savaş sonrası dönemde Almanya'nın öncelikli hedefi meşruiyetini yeniden kazanmak ve Atlantikçi kanada yakınlaşarak Batı Avrupa güvenlik mimarisine dahil olmaktır. Ancak Doğu ve Batı Almanya'nın birleşmesiyle birlikte dış politika kimliği ve söylemleri önemli bir değişim sürecine girmiş; dahası Almanya zaman içinde Atlantikçilikten Avrupalılığa doğru bir politika kayması yaşamıştır. Almanya'da normatif kaygular ulusal dış politikanın belirlenmesinde en önemli faktörler arasında yer almaktadır. Ülkenin tek taraflı askeri operasyonları desteklememe politikası, uluslararası krizlere uzlaşmacı bir yanıt verilmesini savunması ve ODGP ve OGSP bağlamında daha fazla entegrasyona yönelmesi, sivil güce değer veren bir stratejik kültüre işaret etmektedir. Bu makale, Almanya'nın OGSP'ye yönelik Avrupalı yaklaşımını neoklasik realist bir perspektiften şekillendiren faktörleri inceleyerek aydınlatmayı amaçlamaktadır. Liderliğin politika formülasyonu üzerindeki etkisi ve iç dinamiklerin politika yapıcılarının kararları üzerindeki etkisi, neoklasik realizm yaklaşımının Almanya'nın eylemlerini yorumlamak için daha uygun bir çerçeve olduğunu vurgulamaktadır. Bu bakış açısı, Almanya'nın stratejik kültürünün ve bunun OGSP üzerindeki etkilerinin kapsamlı bir analizini kolaylaştırırken, OGSP'ye yönelik geleneksel Atlantikçi yöneliminden daha Avrupalı bir duruşa kaymasına neden olan faktörleri de aydınlatmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: AB, Almanya, Neoklasik Realizm, OGSP, Sivil Güç.

Introduction

Neoclassical Realism has been referred to in many different ways in the international relations literature; for example, some authors such as Stephen G. Brooks and Michiel Foulon conceptualized the theory as "post-classical realism" (Brooks, 1997: 446-447; Foulon, 2015: 635). However, the theory commonly conceptualized as "neoclassical realism" was first put forward by Gideon Rose, a former member of the United States (US) Council on Foreign Relations, in his 1998 article titled "Neoclassical Realism and Foreign Policy Theories" (Rose, 1998). With the end of the Cold War, the arguments of neo-realism began to weaken and were subjected to many criticisms (Smith, 2018: 742). In this context, neoclassical realism emerged as an approach both criticizes and

complements neo-realism. In contrast to neo-realism, neoclassical realists rejected the view that concepts such as the actions and attitudes of states, equilibrium politics, the anarchic nature of the system and the relative distribution of power can be explained independently of states and statesmen. In other words, neoclassical realism opposes the neo-realist view that the "invisible hand in an anarchic system" is the determinant of order (Akgül-Açıkmeşe, 2011: 53-54). However, this opposition does not mean that neoclassical realism completely rejects the arguments of neo-realism or that it is close to classical realism. The theory has been influenced by both approaches and to produce clearer results, it has added issues such as perceptions of political leaders and strategic culture to its analysis that the other two do not cover.

Rose argues that the foreign policy behavior of states is influenced by their position in the system and especially their relative power capacities and therefore his theory belongs to the realist family (Rose, 1998: 146). Emphasizing the importance of states' position in the system and their relative power shows that neoclassical realism is influenced by neo-realism. However, according to Rose, power does not directly and significantly affect foreign policy, and system pressure needs to evolve to the unit level through intervening variables; therefore, he claims that his theory is "neoclassical" (Rose, 1998: 146). He argues that all other varieties of realism emphasize state behavior and the international system, but neoclassical realism creates a new school by considering both internal and external variables (Rose, 1998: 146). According to Rose, systemic pressures determine the basic parameters and direction of a state's foreign policy behavior, but a comprehensive analysis is not possible as it would be insufficient to hold the system alone responsible (Rose, 1998: 146-147).

In its security and defence mechanisms, Germany has mostly emphasized its civilian power identity and has not been willing to use military force. Both during and after the Cold War, it pursued strategies that sought to balance between East and West. On the other hand, it can be said that the coming to power of parties with predominantly more peaceful policies shaped its strategic culture in this direction (Müller-Hennig, 2020: 10). Moreover, Germany has tried to act by questioning the legitimacy and legality of the decisions taken and policies implemented in transatlantic relations rather than directly accepting them, and the development of the *Bundeswehr*, the German military forces, with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) membership, has acknowledged that NATO is an important indicator in the security structure in Europe, even though it supports Europe's own security and defence structure (Müller-Hennig, 2020: 10).

Germany is the most powerful member state of the European Union (EU) in terms of both economic and foreign policy. Due to its policies during the Second

World War, Germany was militarily restricted during the Cold War and approached cautiously by the Western Bloc countries. The country was divided into two regions, East and West, with the east of the country under the Eastern Bloc led by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the west under the Western Bloc led by the US. Despite this economically, politically and militarily weak structure, it recovered rapidly in the post-Cold War period, united and gained a stronger structure in every field, and reached its current position (Kıratlı, 2016: 213). Germany has always maintained its position as a critical country for both the European continent and the EU. As a founding member of the European Communities (EC) during the Cold War, West Germany played an important role in the development of its economic and political policies during and after the war and continues to do so today. Germany plays a central role in crisis management and the development of general EU policies such as the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). On the other hand, it leads the EU in the international system in its relations with countries such as Russia, Türkiye, and the US (Büyükbay, 2016: 59). Despite divergent views within the EU on issues such as Libya and Ukraine crises, Germany has tried to preserve and strengthen the unity and integrity of the EU. Germany's overall foreign policy is based on economic instruments and civilian power based on international influence (Krotz, 2001). This orientation towards civilian instruments in foreign policy can be attributed to its abstention from the military and political sphere and its support for multinationalism (Baumann and Hellmann, 2001: 61).

One of the most important developments that shaped Germany's strategic culture today is its attempt to reassert itself to the world due to the Nazi policies during the Second World War. The post-war backlash against its old strategic culture can be considered as a critical turning point for Germany. The country emerged from the war divided during the Cold War and the Western Allies aimed to demilitarize, de-industrialize and democratize Germany to prevent it from starting a new war in Europe (Münch, 1996: 68). For Germany, its defeat in the war led it to adopt an anti-militarist approach to avoid a similar process and outcome. This approach led to Germany's initial refusal to rearm with the phrase "*ohne mich*" (don't count me out) (Chappell, 2012: 50). This led the country to reject the old Nazi strategic culture and ideology and move away from a nationalist basis and instead towards a strategic culture that embraced demilitarization, disarmament and multiculturalism (Longhurst, 2004: 26-27). In this article, the process leading to Germany's shift from a more Atlanticist approach with its emphasis on cooperation with the US and NATO before the Cold War to a more Europeanist approach with its increased emphasis on European security and defence after the end of the war and the reasons for this policy shift will be analyzed within the framework of neoclassical realism's unit-level variables of strategic culture and political leader factors.

The objective of this article is to elucidate Germany's Europeanist approach to the CSDP by examining the factors that shape it from a neoclassical realist perspective. This framework allows for a detailed analysis of Germany's strategic culture and leadership approaches, as well as an explanation of the reasons behind the transformation of the country's previously Atlanticist approach to CSDP into a Europeanist one. The study employs a case study methodology, applying neoclassical realism to the selected case. The study makes use of a variety of primary sources, including the official websites of the EU, Germany's national strategy documents, and other official documents. In addition to the academic literature on the development of German and EU policies, which form the subject of the case study, the research is also consulted think tank reports and publications of reputable media organisations, and statements by German political leaders, were used as secondary sources. The incorporation of these secondary sources permits a comprehensive analysis of the impact of Germany's strategic culture, based on civilian power and leader approaches, on its foreign policies and the developments within the framework of CSDP, as predicted by neoclassical realism.

In this context, the study seeks to answer two questions: firstly, how Germany's foreign policy transformation from Atlanticism to Europeanism evolves; and secondly, how neoclassical realism explains this transformation. The study's findings indicate that internal dynamics are as decisive as the system itself in Germany's approach to CSDP and the policy transformation in this approach, as advocated by neoclassical realism.

Neoclassical Realism and the Role of Strategic Culture and Political Leaders

Neoclassical realism begins to explain state behavior by considering system pressures but argues that the effects of these pressures at the unit level should also be examined. This approach refers to the coincidental relationship established by the theory. On the other hand, neoclassical realism did not completely break away from the general principles of realism (Rathbun, 2008: 313). It can be said to have a unifying approach since it accepts arguments from both classical realism and neo-realism and does not put forward counterarguments. It does not reject the constant struggle for power and security where anarchy exists, as both realist approaches argue (Lobell, Ripsman and Taliaferro, 2009: 4). Therefore, it can be said that neoclassical realism has ties with previous realist theories. Moreover, proponents of neoclassical realism describe it as a theory that does not falsify other realist theories, but only makes them more comprehensive (Ripsman, Taliaferro and Lobell, 2016: 16; Romanova, 2012). Waltz argues that international politics can be better analyzed if national and international politics are separated (Waltz, 1996: 57). However, some scholars oppose Waltz and argue that this is the main reason for the

emergence of neoclassical realism since neo-realism emphasizes the system and does not add an interpretation to international politics (Elman and Elman, 2003: 316-317). Neoclassical realism, which aims to explain the sudden policy shifts of states in foreign policy, investigates the domestic policy effects of systemic pressures through intervening variables such as leader perceptions and tries to analyze which of them cause unexpected changes in states' international policies (Rose, 1998: 148). On the other hand, since the strategic cultures of states also differ, a study including this intervening variable would allow for a more coherent explanation of states' foreign policy behavior. Since the determinist approach is rejected in neoclassical realism, intervening variables are included in the scope of studies, foreign policy is analyzed through these intervening variables, and the reasons for the different behavior of states are investigated (Becker et al., 2015: 5). At this point, neoclassical realism differs from other realist theories; while Morgenthau claims that the perceptions and decisions of leaders are misleading and unimportant (Morgenthau, 1947: 5), neoclassical realism argues that studies independent of these factors are not possible.

Neoclassical realism combines neo-realism's emphasis on the survival motivation of states with classical realism's emphasis on the dependence of political leaders on their societies to support their foreign and defence policy objectives (Dyson, 2010: 120). According to the theory, states will seek to maximize their international influence, power and security in the long run according to their relative power and the opportunities and constraints presented by the international system; state power is the central unit-level intervention variable that explains short- and medium-term deviations from these principles of international structure (Rose, 1998: 152; Taliaferro, 2006: 487). This approach is contrary to neo-realism, which argues that states face few constraints in maximizing their resources to achieve their foreign, security and defence policy objectives due to the predominance of the security dilemma (Waltz, 1979: 96). The most important feature of neoclassical realism that distinguishes it from other realist theories in security studies is its inclusion of strategic culture and political leader influence in its analysis (Foulon, 2015: 637).

Strategic Culture

"The concept of "Strategic Culture" was first introduced in 1977 by Jack Snyder in his report "Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations" (1977). Jeannie L. Johnson (2009: 11) identifies identity, values, norms, and perception as the key variables of strategic culture and emphasizes that their interaction constitutes the concept itself, shaping shared identity and relations with other societies and determining the appropriate means to achieve security objectives. It can be said that the main reason for including strategic culture in the analysis stems from the need to explain why states with different strategic cultures or structures make different choices in similar situations.

Although strategic culture consists of concepts such as identity, norms and values that are included in the discourse of constructionist theories, they consider the variables of strategic culture as the main actor, and neoclassical realism differs by adopting the state as the main actor and accepts strategic culture as an important and influential factor in analyzing the foreign policy of the state (Ripsman, Taliaferro and Lobell, 2016: 69). Strategic culture provides a state's policymakers with beliefs, attitudes and norms about what actions are appropriate, and tends to emphasize continuity over change (Gray, 1999: 51; Chappell, 2010: 226). Change is only possible when external factors challenge two or more aspects of a state's strategic culture or roles and cause conflict between them (Chappell, 2012: 9). Ken Booth, one of the empirical realist authors, points out that strategic culture is an important factor in explaining the state's behavior that can be described as rational irrational (Booth, 1979: 126). On the other hand, he states that a state's strategic culture represents the total of its geopolitical position, history, political culture, and behavioral patterns; it helps shape its behavior on issues such as the use of force, sensitivity to external threats, civil-military relations, and strategic doctrine (Booth, 1990: 121). According to Lentis (2015: 7), the elements reflecting a country's strategic culture can be shown as features embedded in its character, such as its military power, diplomacy method and civilian power capabilities.

Strategic culture is also an important factor that determines the roles of countries and allows to explain the effects of these roles on their foreign policies (Chappell, 2012: 3). On the other hand, strategic culture directly influences the use of power or foreign policy decisions of states' decision-makers and plays a key role in understanding their past attitudes, following their current policies and guiding them on how these factors may approach in the future (Körpe, 2016: 149). Alastair Johnston, who has done significant work on strategic culture, states that neoclassical realism differs from neo-realism in that it takes into account the past experiences of states (Johnston, 1995: 35). States' geopolitical position, national resources, defence institutions and political structures can be stated as factors that determine strategic culture (Lentis, 2015: 7). Neoclassical realism argues that state behavior is influenced by their strategic culture rather than the international system (Ripsman, Taliaferro, Lobell, 2016: 33).

According to neoclassical realism, the ideology adopted by states, their tendency to resort to force and their nationalism are also seen as components of strategic culture (Ripsman, Taliaferro and Lobell, 2016: 69). However, it should be noted that in neoclassical realism, strategic culture is not used to demonstrate the rationality of the state, but only to explain the reasons for its behavior. The perception factor, which is excluded in classical realism and neo-realism, has an important place among the issues of neoclassical realism. This is because the theory argues that it is not possible to understand the decisions and policies of

decision-makers without taking their perceptions into account (Jervis, 2017: 28). On the other hand, according to neoclassical realism, the first point to be considered when examining the behavior of states is to find out who determines the foreign policy of the state in question (Ripsman, Taliaferro and Lobell, 2016: 123). The reason behind the theory's emphasis on perception is that it is due to this factor that states facing similar situations do not always react similarly (Christensen, 1997: 31).

Adrian Hyde-Price's neo-realist account of post-Cold War European security supports the neoclassical realism approach. He argues that it is not linear to attribute changes in the distribution of power in the international security environment to changes in state policies and that in exceptional cases, unit-level variables can play an important, sometimes critical, role in determining strategies and national roles (Hyde-Price, 2007: 47). This contrasts with the materialist perspective of realist thinking, where cultural and normative factors, alongside economic resources and productive capacity, constitute important intervening variables that determine systemic imperatives and differentiation (Hyde-Price, 2007: 47). According to Duffield, the concept of culture incorporates many of the key features attributed to nationalism and ideology, focusing on a broader concept of culture that includes elements of national identity, historical memory and ideology (Duffield, 1998: 769).

Influence of Political Leaders

According to neoclassical realism, unit-level variables affect the foreign policy preferences of states and one of the most important of these variables is political leaders. The perceptions and objectives of political leaders in decision-making positions may lead them to implement different policies in similar situations. On the other hand, although other factors such as a country's strategic location, domestic politics and culture shape state behavior, political leaders can overcome these factors, use them against each other, or otherwise have a direct and decisive influence on state behavior (Byman and Pollack, 2001: 134). Decisions made by political leaders cannot be separated from the strategic culture of their state; strategic culture emphasizes continuity, but this does not mean that a state's behavior is predictable. Rather than presenting a list of preferences, strategic culture is considered as a factor that shapes the perceptions of the state's policymakers on security and defence issues (Chappell, 2012: 9).

In the realm of realist theories, the state is widely accepted as the preeminent actor, with other actors often marginalised in both domestic and foreign policy contexts. Classical realism is predicated on the notion of human nature, positing that the fundamental nature of states is informed by it. In contrast, structural realism posits that the anarchic nature of the international system exerts a profound influence on the policies of states. Neoclassical realism, by contrast,

synthesises these two approaches, asserting that domestic politics and the influence of state decision-makers must also be incorporated into an inclusive analysis. Its objective is to elucidate the underlying factors that precipitate sudden shifts in the foreign policies of states. According to neoclassical realism, political leaders of states can be constrained and their decisions on security issues are influenced by both international and domestic politics (Rose, 1998: 152).

In his book *"Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power"*, Randall L. Schweller puts forward the argument that variations in the manner in which states respond to analogous changes in their external environment are contingent on the preferences of the political and social actors involved, as well as the particular structural characteristics of society and government that establish constraints and opportunities for these actors (Schweller, 2008: 46). According to Schweller (2008: 46), this interaction between actors' preferences and the environmental structures in which they operate leads to a political outcome, and the reason why states react less than others to structural incentives can be explained by considering the strategies of various actors. Schweller's (2008) proposed model of domestic politics is based on the leader factor, a unit of analysis employed in neoclassical realism. The model sheds light on the reasons why states often fail to respond and adapt to changes in their strategic environment when threatened by political elites. It emphasises the impact of elite consensus/disagreement and social consensus/disagreement on coherent and incoherent states. According to Schweller (2008: 68), incoherent and fragmented states are potentially unwilling and unable to pursue a balancing policy against threats. The reason for this is that political elites perceive the internal risks as too high and that they will not find the necessary resources and support from a divided society. Consequently, inconsistent states, irrespective of their size or status, often face limitations in their capacity to counterbalance threats, as postulated by the theory, due to constraints imposed by domestic political considerations (Schweller, 2008: 68).

Robert Keohane, a neo-realist author, argues that the link between system structure and actor behavior affects how leaders respond to incentives and constraints imposed by their environment and that differences in state behavior are due to various features of the international system (Keohane, 1989: 167). Rose argues that unit-level variables such as national material power and strategic leadership can most rationally explain inter-state convergence or divergence in security and defence policies (Rose, 1998: 152). Fareed Zakaria argues that the government, not the nation, makes foreign policy as a whole, so it is the power of the state, not national power, that matters, and that state power facilitates central decision-makers to achieve their goals (Zakaria, 1998: 9). Taliaferro argues that when faced with similar threats, states differ in their ability

to mobilize and mobilize resources from their national societies due to unit-level variables such as state institutions, ideology and nationalism (Taliaferro, 2006: 465).

The convergence and divergence of states can be explained by looking at the strength of the international power shift and the ability of political leaders to successfully manage these three aspects. A shift in national power can trigger policy change only after decision-makers at the centre have structured the reform process and articulated a new dogmatic plan that can gain significant domestic support (Rynning, 2001: 104). Rynning (2001: 104) emphasises the interventionist role played by political leadership in managing dogmatic change, while Taliaferro (2006: 487) points out that national power relations influence the disagreements of state leaders in implementing security and defence policies. Conversely, Gideon Rose contends that when analysing power, it is imperative to consider the strength and structure of states' societies, as these factors influence the proportion of national resources that can be allocated to foreign policy. This suggests that states with comparable capabilities but divergent structures are likely to exhibit divergent behaviours (Rose, 1998: 147). Consequently, while political leadership is recognised as a significant variable by neoclassical realists, it is deemed inadequate to explain divergent perspectives and behaviours in isolation. Instead, the institutional structure of the state, the formal constitutional powers of the central government over defence policy, and the intertwined and interdependent policy systems are the determining variables in balancing domestic power (Dyson, 2010: 125-126). In consideration of the aforementioned assumptions of the theory, the present study commences with a comprehensive overview of the CSDP and different approaches in the EU member states, thereby establishing its relevance to the argument of the study. Subsequent to this, Germany's foreign policy on security and defence issues is analysed.

The CSDP and Different Approaches

In the aftermath of the Second World War, Europe aspired to foster collaboration in the domains of security and defence, both during and following the Cold War era. This initiative was driven by a concerted effort to forestall the emergence of new conflicts and to safeguard regional stability. While NATO assumed a pivotal role in the defence of Europe during the Cold War, cooperation on the continent was sustained through institutions such as the Western European Union (WEU). However, a contentious debate persists among the members of the EU regarding the optimal approach to ensure the security of the continent: whether this should be accomplished through NATO or the establishment of an autonomous European organisation. This ongoing discussion has been termed the 'Atlanticist-Europeanist Divide' in the extant literature and has been a fundamental issue for the CSDP.

Significant events, including the Soviet Union's threats and the Berlin blockade in 1948, contributed to the acceleration of West Germany's normalisation process, leading to the establishment of initiatives such as the European Defence Community (EDC). The proposal by French Prime Minister Plevin in 1950, which advocated for the establishment of a unified European army (CVCE.EU, 1950), exemplifies the ongoing Atlanticist and Europeanist divide. However, the EDC ultimately proved unsuccessful due to concerns regarding French national sovereignty and ongoing anti-colonial conflicts (Irving, 2002: 120). Consequently, the WEU was established in 1954, and Germany joined NATO (U.S. Office of the Historian, 1954; Duke, 1996: 168). The WEU is significant as it represents the first institutional structure in the field of security and defence in Europe.

Following the unification of Germany in the aftermath of the Cold War, a shift in the strategic landscape of Europe ensued, prompting a re-evaluation of NATO's role on the continent. The Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) held in Dublin in 1990 brought the concept for European security and defence to the agenda, thus highlighting the enduring divide between Atlanticist and Europeanist perspectives (Cebeci, 2018: 155). The 1991 publication of NATO's New Strategic Concept (NATO, 1991) underscored the necessity for Europe to assume greater security responsibility while concurrently seeking to reduce the presence of the United States in the region. Nevertheless, initiatives such as the North Atlantic Co-operation Council (NATO, 1994), whilst favoring an Atlanticist approach by certain members of the European Union, gave rise to concerns in countries such as France.

The 1992 Maastricht Treaty established the legal basis for the CSDP, envisaging its development as a defence policy over time (European Union, 1992: 4-58). The EU's commitment to NATO was emphasised, and the European Defence Identity was defined as part of the Atlantic Alliance (European Union, 1992: 105). Nevertheless, the CSDP encountered profound divisions among EU members concerning matters such as the establishment of an autonomous entity from NATO and the consolidation of a distinct European security identity. Subsequent years witnessed the emergence of the Balkan conflicts and Europe's inability to assume an active role, underscoring the EU's necessity for a more autonomous security policy. The emergence of new security threats, including the Arab Spring, the civil war in Syria, and the refugee crisis, has compelled the EU to implement comprehensive measures (Koenig & Walter-Franke, 2017: 3-18; Guerzoni, 2017: 2). US criticism of NATO burden-sharing (Şahin, 2017: 27-28) and the UK's Brexit decision have both encouraged and challenged the development of CSDP (Martill and Sus, 2018: 858).

In 2016, Germany and France adopted a common position on the CSDP and supported the institutionalisation of defence policies within the framework

provided by the Lisbon Treaty (Koenig and Walter-Franke, 2017: 3). The following year, Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) was officially established with the participation of 25 EU members (European Council, 2017), thus marking a significant advancement in the consolidation of European defence. The establishment of PESCO enabled the EU to develop its security policies in collaboration with the Atlantic Alliance, while concurrently pursuing its quest for independence. In conclusion, the CSDP is regarded as a pivotal stride towards fortifying Europe's security and defence policies. Nevertheless, the Atlanticist-Europeanist divide remains, stemming from the differing historical backgrounds and interests of member states. Despite the EU's substantial progress in establishing an autonomous security and defence mechanism, its reliance on NATO and internal discord hinder this process. Notwithstanding, the CSDP exemplifies Europe's dedication to cultivating its own defence identity and redefining its role in the global security landscape.

Following the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU set its sights on fortifying the defence dimension of the CSDP and resolving contentious issues through the PESCO initiative. Nevertheless, the historical, political and cultural divergences amongst member states have resulted in incompatibilities in the implementation of this policy, a phenomenon that can be explained by the neoclassical realist theory. Germany, conversely, has undergone a substantial transformation by moving away from its Atlanticist approach and adopting Europeanist policies in the 2000s.

The Shift in Germany's Security and Defence Policy

Germany's foreign policy during the Cold War was shaped by efforts to overcome the negative legacy of the Nazi era, achieve economic and political recovery, and establish itself as a credible actor in the international arena (Lee, 2002: 315). Max Otte identifies three main pillars of German foreign policy during this period: European integration, rapprochement with the East (*Ostpolitik*), and eventual German unification (Otte and Greve, 1999: 15). Under Chancellor Konrad Adenauer (1949–1963), the emphasis was on “full integration with the West” (Westbindung). This strategy redefined Germany's identity, aligning its interests with Western values and institutions, particularly through its role as a “civilian power” within the EU. Adenauer's policies aimed to integrate Germany into NATO and the ECSC, laying the groundwork for European integration and securing Germany's defense within the Western alliance. These developments strengthened Germany's position as a key player in the emerging European order.

The construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961 heightened Cold War tensions and led to debates within Germany about its strategic orientation. Two factions emerged: the Europeanists, who favored balancing relations between the United

States and France to create a “third power,” and the Atlanticists, who prioritized partnership with the U.S. (Merkl, 1975: 803). While Adenauer focused on Western integration, his successor, Willy Brandt, introduced Ostpolitik in 1969. This policy aimed to normalize relations with the Eastern Bloc, recognizing the geopolitical realities of East Germany while maintaining West Germany’s security and solidarity. Brandt’s approach marked a significant shift, emphasizing dialogue and cooperation with Eastern Europe, which later facilitated the fall of the Berlin Wall and German reunification (Şahin and Aksu, 2021: 241).

In the 1980s, Chancellor Helmut Kohl further consolidated Germany’s dual-track foreign policy, strengthening ties with both Western and Eastern partners. His balanced approach, which aligned with U.S. policies while fostering economic cooperation with the Eastern Bloc, contributed to the eventual reunification of Germany and the stabilization of Europe after the Cold War. Following reunification, Germany’s foreign policy adapted to new global challenges, including the Gulf Crisis and the Yugoslav Wars. These crises highlighted the limitations of Germany’s antimilitarist constitution, prompting debates about the use of military forces in international operations. The Federal Constitutional Court’s 1994 decision to permit German participation in NATO and EU peacekeeping missions marked a turning point, signaling Germany’s willingness to engage in collective security efforts (The Federal Constitutional Court, 1994).

The 1990s also witnessed Germany’s increasing role in European integration. Adrian Hyde-Price described Germany as a driving force behind European unity, balancing its commitments to NATO with a growing emphasis on European defense and security cooperation (Hyde-Price, 2000: 46). This period saw Germany advocate for the inclusion of Central and Eastern European countries in EU structures, furthering its vision of a unified and stable Europe.

Post-Cold War Challenges and Shifts

Germany’s foreign policy faced new tests in the post-Cold War era, particularly during the Iraq Crisis in 2003. Chancellor Gerhard Schröder’s opposition to U.S. military intervention underscored Germany’s evolving identity as a “self-confident country” capable of pursuing independent security policies within NATO and the EU (Kamp, 2003: 3). This stance, while reflecting Germany’s civilian power principles, drew criticism from both Eastern European states and the U.S., revealing tensions within the transatlantic alliance. The Libya Crisis in 2011 further illustrated Germany’s cautious approach to military engagement. Initially, Germany refrained from military intervention, emphasizing economic sanctions and humanitarian aid (Gotkowska, 2011). However, the growing security threats posed by the Arab Spring and the Ukraine

Crisis prompted Germany to adopt a more proactive role in international crisis management, reflecting its evolving foreign policy priorities (Aydın, 2020).

Germany's approach to European defense evolved significantly in the 2010s, particularly after Brexit and Donald Trump's presidency. Germany's 2016 White Paper¹ emphasized its opposition to fully separating EU security and defense from NATO. While French President Macron described NATO as "brain dead" in 2019 (The Economist, 2019), Merkel disagreed, affirming her commitment to NATO (Euractiv, 2019). However, Germany's perspective on NATO began to shift after 2016, influenced by Brexit and Donald Trump's election as U.S. President. Brexit removed the EU's strongest opponent to an independent European defense system, reviving discussions on previously unsuccessful initiatives (Şahin, 2017: 6). Concurrently, Trump's insistence on greater responsibility from European NATO allies and conditional U.S. support reinforced the necessity for EU self-reliance in defense (Şahin, 2017: 7). Reflecting this change, Merkel later advocated for Europe to "take its destiny into its own hands" and secure its future independently (Reuters, 2017). These developments highlight how international dynamics and leadership decisions can reshape policy approaches. Moreover, Germany collaborated with France to advance the PESCO framework, playing a leading role in numerous projects aimed at enhancing European defense capabilities (Koenig and Walter-Franke, 2017: 12).

Furthermore, Chancellor Olaf Scholz, who took the office in 2021, Germany introduced its first National Security Strategy Document.² This document, shaped by the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, identifies Russia as the primary threat to European security and emphasizes Germany's support for Ukraine within a broader European defense strategy (The Federal Government, 2023: 5). While reaffirming Germany's commitment to NATO, the strategy also underscores the need to strengthen the Bundeswehr and bolster military presence on NATO's eastern flank. However, critics have highlighted the lack of concrete funding plans for defense initiatives, which could limit the strategy's effectiveness (Schreer, 2023). Germany's foreign policy under Scholz continues to reflect the dual imperatives of adapting to global security challenges and maintaining its Europeanist identity. The National Security Strategy seeks to balance Germany's commitments to NATO and the EU while addressing internal constraints and external pressures. Despite resource limitations and debates over the Bundeswehr's modernization, the strategy represents an important step in defining Germany's role in the evolving European security architecture.

¹ See. German Federal Ministry of Defence (2016).

² See. The Federal Government (2023).

Germany's foreign policy has undergone significant transformations since the Cold War, shaped by its historical experiences, economic recovery, and evolving security challenges. From Adenauer's focus on Western integration to Brandt's Ostpolitik and Merkel's pragmatic Europeanism, Germany has sought to balance its civilian power identity with the demands of a changing international order. Under Scholz, Germany faces the dual challenge of reinforcing its Europeanist identity while addressing the uncertainties of global geopolitics, including the Russian threat and the complexities of EU-NATO relations. These dynamics highlight the interplay between national and systemic factors in shaping Germany's foreign policy trajectory.

Germany's Policy Shift in Framework of Neoclassical Realism

A nation's distinct strategic culture plays a pivotal role in shaping its contributions to international security and defence. She further asserts that this role delineation can be regarded as a catalyst for the evolution of its foreign policy (Chappell, 2012: 4). During the 1990s, Germany experienced a shift in its strategic culture, driven by changes in the international environment and heightened expectations from its allies. This prompted a need to reinforce the defence capabilities of its armed forces (Chappell, 2012: 58). However, the inability of the relevant elites to develop this structure, coupled with the challenges encountered in the defence budget, led to the failure of this initiative. Consequently, Germany was compelled to realign its military capabilities in accordance with the post-Cold War system. Germany's post-Cold War roles encompass the civilian power 'Zivilmacht' (Harnsich and Maull, 2001: 44), the role of regional defender, leader and pioneer of the EU, and the promotion of self-determination (Hyde-Price and Jeffrey, 2001: 707). In accordance with the neoclassical realist perspective, it can be posited that developments in the international system, in conjunction with domestic level factors, influence Germany's foreign policy.

The influence of political leaders, a factor emphasised by neoclassical realism, has similarly shaped Germany's foreign policy in a manner analogous to strategic culture. In general, German political leaders sought to cultivate their country's reputation as a predictable and reliable partner on the international stage. However, Germany's failure to fulfil its international obligations and expectations could potentially compromise its credibility in the eyes of its allies (Duffield, 1994: 181). According to German political leaders, as long as the allies continued to regard the country as a reliable partner, its influence in economic and political decision-making processes in Europe would increase and it could play a central role (Chappell, 2012: 56). During his tenure, Konrad Adenauer sought to legitimize Germany by emphasizing the nation's efforts to integrate with the West, while concurrently severing ties with both the USSR and East Germany under his authority. This was done to avoid being perceived

as a threat and to gain acceptance within the Western Bloc. In order to support this new strategic culture, the country took the initiative and became a founding member of the EC and a member of NATO. The adoption of Western norms and values was a key aspect of this process, with the country developing its own strategic culture in accordance with these external models. Willy Brandt, who succeeded Adenauer as Chancellor, sought to revitalise relations with the East, aiming to foster economic and commercial growth without compromising ties with the West. A notable aspect of his tenure was the fostering of close ties with East Germany, a development that ultimately contributed to the dissolution of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent unification of the nation. This process underscores the pivotal role of German political leaders in shaping the nation's strategic culture and determining its policies, thereby substantiating the tenets of neoclassical realism.

In a similar manner, multilateralism, as an element of Germany's strategic culture, exerted its influence on the policies of political leaders during the Cold War period. While Adenauer pursued a strategy of integration with the West through EC and NATO membership, Brandt aimed to strengthen the country economically. At this juncture, it becomes evident to discern the impact of the strategic culture and leader factor as postulated by neoclassical realism on Germany's foreign policy, and to elucidate the underlying rationales for the divergent policies exhibited by the two leaders. It is evident that both policies represent significant developments, determining Germany's role within the international system and the EU. Conversely, foreign and security policies were to be pursued through peaceful and legal means, encompassing diplomacy and economic incentives, with a view to ensuring credibility and predictability, and with a focus on strengthening partnerships without the necessity of choosing between the EC and NATO (Chappell, 2012: 58). Germany's strategic culture of rejecting nationalism and eschewing military force persisted until the end of the Cold War.

After the Cold War, Germany's strategic culture remained largely unaltered, though it did come under pressure from the expectations of its allies. The reform of the armed forces, which would have united with East Germany, was postponed, while the failure of NATO in the Yugoslav Civil War demonstrated the need to strengthen European integration and defence identity (Young, 1994: 6-7). The Bosnian conflict presented an opportunity for Germany to make internal adjustments, but as a civilian power, it hesitated to participate in military intervention. In the 1994 elections, Kohl stated that joining NATO would entail the acceptance of new international responsibilities, rather than a deviation from the civilian identity (Gutjahr, 1995: 304). This shift in discourse can be attributed to Kohl's apprehension that his reserved stance towards NATO might erode

Germany's credibility with its Western allies (Berenskoetter and Giegerich, 2010: 437).

Despite Germany's subsequent expression of commitment to NATO in the aftermath of the Cold War, the Alliance's unsuccessful peace initiatives began to compromise its capacity to forestall conflict. Gerhard Schröder, who succeeded Kohl, supported efforts towards an alternative force in Europe, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Drawing on his triple presidency of the EU, the WEU and the G8, Schröder contributed to the restructuring and institutionalisation of ESDP. Following the Malo incident, France and the United Kingdom undertook initiatives to bolster the dynamics of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and sought to establish Europe as the primary centre for crisis management (Howorth, 2006: 224). However, in response to the concerns of the UK and neutral countries, it was emphasised that the CSDP was not a rival initiative to NATO, that the CSDP would have the capability to intervene in crises without harming NATO activities, that there was a division of labour between the two structures and that its purpose was to improve coordination between the EU and NATO (Chappell, 2012: 442-443). It is evident that Germany's strategic culture has undergone a shift in the post-Cold War era, leading it to adopt the role of Europe's locomotive not only in the economic and political domains but also in the realms of security and defence. In 2003, Schröder voiced criticism of the US intervention in Iraq, labelling it as a military conflict resulting in civilian casualties, a stance that stood in contrast to Germany's prevailing strategic culture (Hooper, 2002). This shift in perception was further solidified by the rhetoric of Donald Trump, who was elected US President in 2016, and which further reinforced the notion that Europe was not a priority for the US. During Schröder's tenure, the CSDP commenced its inaugural activities, and the effects of the German-led investments and institutionalisation were tested. In this context, it can be argued that the foreign policy shift in Germany after the war was influenced by both developments in the international system and domestic dynamics, such as strategic culture and the approach of political leaders, as espoused by neoclassical realism. This shift can be seen as a result of these influences, leading to the adoption of a pro-NATO Atlanticist approach, which was in place prior to the Cold War.

Although Merkel, who assumed office after Schröder, had indeed criticised her predecessor for her reaction to the Iraq intervention, it can be argued that the war in Afghanistan led to a shift in this perception. In a manner similar to Schröder, the incompatibility between the strategic culture adopted by Germany and the actions of the US began to become more clearly discernible. Merkel, who had initially supported NATO when she first took office, stated at the 60th Anniversary Summit of the NATO in 2009 that the ESDP was of equal importance to NATO and that the two organisations were not rivals (Die

Bundesregierung, 2009). Following the Summit, Merkel, together with Nicolas Sarkozy, sought to elevate the ESDP to a new level that would defend European values and identity. However, Donald Trump's statements that Europe should assume more responsibility within NATO, his criticism of the Union with regard to burden-sharing, and his claims that Europe was no longer a priority changed Merkel's perception and led her, in collaboration with France, to increase her efforts to establish and rapidly operationalise CFSP. Similarly, Olaf Scholz has continued the legacy of Merkel; however, the national strategy document prepared in his term has also been criticised as inadequate. It is in line with Schweller's (2008) argument, based on the leader factor, a unit of analysis in neoclassical realism, that the interaction between actors' preferences and the environmental structures in which they operate leads to a political outcome and that the reason for states' underreaction can be explained by considering the strategies of various actors.

It is evident that Trump's approach has been a pivotal factor in the shift in Germany's policies, which prior to his presidency, were aimed at maintaining transatlantic relations. The United States' withdrawal from the Paris Agreement on climate change, the Iran Nuclear Deal and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which jeopardised transatlantic free trade, resulted in additional costs and obstacles for German companies. This course of action was at odds with both security and commercial interests (Janning, 2019). The civilian character of Germany's strategic culture has led it to oppose US attempts to expand its military power on a global scale. Conversely, Germany's role as a regional defender has led it to fear that such a military build-up would pose new threats to both itself and its neighbours. This position has been further articulated by German political elites in their opposition to US military interventions in regions such as Iraq, Libya and Syria (Heidenkamp, 2013). In this context, the statement by French President Macron on post-Brexit policies, 'Europe can move forward if France and Germany speak with one voice' (France24, 2009), demonstrates the openness of the two countries to ideas and cooperation on strengthening Europe in the field of security and defence. Germany's shift in foreign policy, from an Atlanticist approach during the Cold War to a Europeanist stance, can be attributed to its support for an autonomous security and defence force. In this context, it can be posited that developments in the international system, including the Arab Spring, regional instability in the Middle East, and a decline in trust in the United States, as well as Germany's strategic culture, underpinned by civilian power and the policy approaches of its political leaders, who are both influenced by and nourished by this culture, have contributed to the country's shift from the Atlanticist approach adopted during the Cold War to Europeanism in the post-war period. Consequently, in contrast to other realist theories, this transformation in Germany's foreign policy can be explained by neoclassical

realism, which posits that both the international system and domestic dynamics influence the policies of states.

Conclusion

Neoclassical realism finds the assumption that the international system influences the policies of states, which neo-realism incorporates into its analysis, insufficient for a comprehensive analysis and argues that the international system itself as well as the influences at the national level cause change. The theory emphasizes the influence of strategic culture and political leaders, who are the policymakers of states, in the decision-making processes at the national level. Neoclassical realism does not completely reject the assumptions of classical realism and neo-realism but rather complements them. In this article, the reasons for the changing policy and approach of Germany, the most influential country in the EU, in the field of security and defence policy since the Second World War and after the Cold War are examined within the framework of the international system itself as well as the strategic culture and political leader factors at the national level.

Germany's foreign and security policy during the Cold War period has progressed with different practices periodically. In the early stages of the war, the traumas of the Second World War, the desire to improve its image in the world and to secure itself against the USSR led Germany towards policies of rapprochement with the West, and at this point, NATO membership and European integration efforts came to the agenda. However, especially in the 1980s, when the Cold War was in the detente period and came to an end, Germany's policy evolved into a policy of balance between East and West due to its economic and security interests, and at this point, it tried to cooperate with Eastern Bloc countries and France. With the fall of the Berlin Wall, the unification of Germany, which was its ultimate goal, was realized and it started to see the positive results of this balance policy which was implemented in the 1980s. Konrad Adenauer pursued a pro-Western policy and prioritized integration with the West as an attempt to repair the image damaged by the war. As a result of these policies, Germany became a founding member of the EU and strengthened its cooperation with NATO. Adenauer's successor Willy Brandt, on the other hand, pursued the opposite policy, bringing his country closer to the East and strengthening economic and trade relations with both East Germany and the USSR, thus laying the foundations for a painless process of unification after the Cold War. Although these two leaders and other leaders of the Cold War adopted different policies, none of them attempted to weaken transatlantic relations. However, the changes in both the world order and international relations in the aftermath of the war transformed Germany's strategic culture of civilian power, which it had adopted from the beginning, and led the country to turn towards Europe in the face of changing US strategies and

hard power policies in the world and to take an active role in strengthening both continental and EU security and defence structures.

It can be said that the reason for the policy change in Germany from the post-Cold War period to the present is the effects of the international system, such as adapting to the changing international system, responding to the expectations of the allies to prove its credibility, and protecting the interests of Europe, which is assigned a leading role in addition to national interests. At the same time, developments at the national level, such as the unification with East Germany and the formation of opposition to the Alliance in German domestic politics due to the failed peace initiatives of the US, starting with the crisis in the Balkans and continuing with the Iraq War, also had an impact on the foreign policy decisions of political leaders. As predicted by neoclassical realism, both national and international factors seem to have influenced German strategic culture and it is possible to explain the reason for this policy shift. On the other hand, the civilian power character of Germany's strategic culture can be considered as the main reason why it has left behind its previous Atlanticist approach and become more pro-European. In this context, it can be argued that as predicted by neoclassical realism, the reasons for Germany's policy shift are not solely due to the international system, but also the country's civilian power culture and the approaches of its leaders are decisive.

References

- Akgül-Açıkmeşe, S. (2011) “Algı mı, Söylem mi? Kopenhag Okulu ve Yeni-Klasik Gerçekçilikte Güvenlik Tehditleri”, *Uluslararası İlişkiler*, 8(30):43-73.
- Aydın, Y. (2020) “Almanya’nın Dünya Siyasetinde Yeni Rol Arayışları”, 1 May, <<https://www.perspektif.online/almanyanin-dunya-siyasetinde-yeni-rol-arayislari/>> (12.10.2020). Baev, P. K. (2006) “Thucydides’ Three Security Dilemmas in Post-Soviet Strife”, *Journal of Military Ethics*, 5(4):334-352.
- Baumann, R. and Hellmann, G. (2001) “Germany and the Use of Military Force: ‘Total War’, the ‘Culture of Restraint’ and the Quest for Normality”, *German Politics*, 10(1):61-82.
- Becker, M. E., Cohen, M.S., Kushi, S. and McManus, I.P. (2015) “Reviving the Russian Empire: The Crimean Intervention Through a Neoclassical Realist Lens”, *European Security*, 25(1):112-133.
- Berenskoetter, F. and Giegerich, B. (2010) “From NATO to ESDP: a Constructivist Analysis of German Strategic Adjustment after the End of the Cold War”, *Security Studies*, 19:407-452.
- Booth, K. (1990) “The Concept of Strategic Culture Affirmed”, C.J. Jacobsen (ed.), in *Strategic Power: USA/USSR*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan), s.121-128.
- Booth, K. (1979) *Strategy and Ethnocentrism*, (New York: Holmes and Meier).
- Brooks, S.G. (1997) “Dueling Realisms”, *International Organization*, 51(3): 445-477.
- Büyükbay, C. (2016) *Avrupa Birliği, Almanya ve Türkiye: İlişkilerde Temel Değerler ve Dönüşen Stratejiler*, (İstanbul:İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları).
- Byman, D.L. and Pollack, K.M. (2001) “Let Us Now Praise Great Men: Bringing the Statesman Back In”, *International Security*, 25(4):107-146.
- Cebeci, E.M. (2018) “AB’nin Güvenlik ve Savunma Politikalarında Güncel Tartışmalar”, S. Baykal, S. Akgül Açıkmeşe, B. Akçay and Ç. Erhan (der.), in *Hukuki, Siyasi ve İktisadi Yönleriyle Avrupa Bütünleşmesinde Son Gelişmeler Ve Türkiye-AB İlişkileri*, (Ankara: ATAUM), s.151-178.
- Chappell, L. (2012) *Germany, Poland and the Common Security and Defence Policy: Converging Security and Defence Perspectives in an Enlarged EU*, (Cambridge: Palgrave Macmillan).

- Chappell, L. (2010) "Poland in Transition: Implications for a European Security and Defence Policy", *Contemporary Security Policy*, 31(2):225-248.
- Christensen, T. J. (1997) "Perceptions and Alliances in Europe, 1865-1940", *International Organization*, 51(1):65-97.
- Die Bundesregierung (2009) "Angela Merkel advocates a New Strategy for NATO",
 <https://www.bundesregierung.de/statisch/nato/nn_690014/Webs/Breg/nato/Content/EN/Artikel/2009-02-07-merkel-sicherheitskonferenz-muenchen__en_page-3.html>, (2 January 2024)
- Duffield, J.S. (1998) *World Power Forsaken: Political Culture, International Institutions and German Security Policy after Unification*. (Stanford: Stanford University Press).
- Duffield, J.S. (1994) "German Security Policy After Unification: Sources of Continuity and Restraint", *Contemporary Security Policy*, 15(3):170-198.
- Duke, S. (1996) "The Second Death (or the Second Coming?) of the WEU", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 34(2): 167-190.
- Dyson, T. (2010) *Neoclassical Realism and Defence Reform in Post-Cold War Europe*, (UK:Palgrave Macmillan).
- Elman, C. and Elman, M. F. (ed.) (2003) *Progress in International Relations Theory: Appraising the Field*, (Cambridge:MIT Press).
- Euractive (2019) "Merkel Rallies Round NATO Following Macron 'Brain Dead' Claims", 8 November
 <<https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/merkel-rallies-round-nato-following-macron-brain-dead-claims/>>, (20 October 2022).
- European Council (2017) "Conclusions", EUCO 19/1/17, 14 December, <<https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/32204/14-final-conclusions-rev1-en.pdf>>, (2 October 2022).
- European Union (1992) "Treaty on European Union (TEU)", *Official Journal of the European Communities*, 92/C/01, 29 July, <<https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:11992M/TXT>>, (20 July 2022).
- Foulon, M. (2015) "Neoclassical Realism: Challengers and Bridging Identities", *International Studies Review*, 17(4):635-661.
- France24 (2009) "Sarkozy Unveils Plans for French Return to NATO Command", 11 March, <<https://www.france24.com/en/20090311-sarkozy-unveils-plans-french-return-nato-command->>, (15 February 2024).

- German Federal Ministry of Defence (2016) “White Paper 2016: On German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr”, <<https://www.bundeswehr.de/resource/blob/4800140/fe103a80d8576b2cd7a135a5a8a86dde/download-white-paper-2016-data.pdf>>, (3 February 2024).
- Gotkowska, J. (2011) “Germany’s Stance on the Libyan Crisis as a Function of German Internal policy”, (*OSW Analyses*, 23 March 2011, Center for Eastern Studies, Varşova, <<https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2011-03-23/germanys-stance-libyan-crisis-a-function-german-internal-policy>>, (05 January 2024).
- Gray, C. S. (1999) “Strategic Culture as Context: The First Generation of Theory Strikes Back”, *Review of International Studies*, 25: 49-69.
- Guerzoni, F. (2017) “A European Integrated Force for an Ambitious Permanent Structured Cooperation”, *Reflection Paper*, Union of European Federalists, <https://old.federalists.eu/fileadmin/files_uf/Publications/Reflection_Paper/2017_Nov_Reflection_Paper_Francesco_Guerzoni.pdf >, (30 September 2022).
- Gutjahr, L. (1995) “Stability, Intergration and Global Responsibility: Germany’s Changing Perspectives on National Interests”, *Review of International Studies*, 21(3): 301-317.
- Harnsich, S. and Maull, H. W. (2001) *Germany as an Civilian Power? The Foreign Policy of the Berlin Republic*, (Manchester:Manchester University Press).
- Heidenkamp, H. (2013) “Germany’s Syria Policy: The Art of the Possible”, 3 September, The Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, London, <<https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/germanys-syria-policy-art-possible>>, (9 January 2024).
- Hooper, J. (2002) “German Leader Says No to Iraq War”, *The Guardian*, 6 August, <<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/aug/06/iraq.johnhooper>>, (20 January 2024).
- Howorth, J. (2006) “Discourse, Ideas and Epistemic Communities in European Security and Defence Policy”, *West European Politics*, 27(2): 211-234.
- Hyde-Price, A. (2007) *European Security in the 21st Century: The Challenge of Multi-Polarity*, (Abingdon: Routledge).

- Hyde-Price, A. and Jeffrey, C. (2001) "Germany in the European Union: Constructing Normality", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 39(4): 581-800.
- Hyde-Price, A. (2000) *Germany and the European Order: Enlarging NATO and The European Union*, (Manchester: Manchester University Press).
- Irving, R. (2002) *Adenauer*, (London: Longman).
- Janning, J. (2019) "Germany and the Crisis of Atlanticism", *Commentary*, European Council on Foreign Relations, 11 June, <https://ecfr.eu/article/commentary_germany_and_the_crisis_of_atlanticism/>, (9 January 2024).
- Jervis, R. (2017) *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press).
- Johnson, J.L. (2009) "Conclusion: Toward a Standard Methodological Approach", J.L. Johnson, J.A. Larsen and K. Kartchner (ed.) in *Strategic Culture and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Culturally Based Insights into Comparative National Security Policymaking*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan), p. 243-257.
- Johnston, A. I. (1995) "Thinking about Strategic Culture", *International Security*, 19(4): 32-64.
- Kamp, K.H. (2003) "Germany and the United States: Anatomy of a Crisis", *Note du Cerfa* 4, Institut français des relations internationales (Ifri), Paris, <<https://www.ifri.org/en/publications/notes-de-lifri/notes-cerfa/germany-and-united-states-anatomy-crisis>>, (5 October 2022).
- Keohane, R.O. (1989) "Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond", R.O. Keohane (ed.), in *International Institutions and State Policy: Essays In International Relations Theory*, (New York: Routledge), p. 35-73.
- Kıratlı, O.S. (2016) "Avrupa Dış İlişkiler ve Güvenlik Politikası ve Üç Büyükler: Almanya, Fransa ve İngiltere", *Akademik İncelemeler Dergisi*, 11(1): 207-224.
- Koenig, N. and Walter-Franke, M. (2017) "France and Germany: Spreadheading a European Security and Defence Union?", *Policy Paper* 202, Jacques Delors Institut, Berlin.
- Körpe, Ö. (2016) "Stratejik Kültür ve Güncel Kuramsal Tartışmalar", *Güvenlik Stratejileri*, 12(24): 147-183.

- Krotz, U. (2001) "National Role Conceptions and Foreign Policies: France and Germany Compared", *Working Paper 2.1*, Harvard University, Cambridge M.A.
- Lee, S. (2002) *Avrupa Tarihinden Kesitler 1789-1980*, S. Aktur (çev.) (Ankara: Dost Kitabevi Yayınları).
- Lentis, J. S. (2015) "Strategic Cultures and Security Policies in the Asia-Pacific", J.S. Lentis (ed.) in *Strategic Cultures and Security Policies in the Asia-Pacific*, (New York: Routledge), p. 166-186.
- Lobell, S. E. and Ripsman, N. M. and Taliaferro J.W. (ed.) (2009) *Neoclassical Realism, the State and Foreign Policy*, (New York: Cambridge University Press).
- Longhurst, K. (2004) *Germany and the Use of Force*, (Manchester: Manchester University Press).
- Martill, B. and Sus, M. (2018) "Post-Brexit EU/UK Security Cooperation: NATO, CSDP+, or 'French Connection'?", *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations*. 20(4): 846-863.
- Merkel, P.H. (1975) "The German Janus: From Westpolitik to Ostpolitik", *Political Science Quarterly*, 89(4): 803-824.
- Morgenthau, H. J. (1947) *Scientific Man vs. Power Politics*, (Londra: Latimer House Limited).
- Müller-Hennig, M. (2020) "Germany and the Future of European Security", J.P. Maulny, M. Müller-Hennig, N. Melvin and M. Cahlmers, (ed.), in *European Security After Brexit: A British, French and German Perspective*, Analysis, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Almanya, p.10-15.
- Münch, R. (1996) "German Nation and German Identity: Continuity and Change from the 1770s to the 1990s", B. Heurlin, (ed.), in *Germany in Europe in the Nineties*, (London: Palgrave Macmillan), p.13-43.
- NATO (1994) "Declaration of the Heads of State and Government, participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council", 11 January, <https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_24470.htm?mode=press_release> (21 December 2022).
- NATO (1991) "The Alliance's New Strategic Concept, agreed by the Heads of State and Government participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council", <https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_23847.htm>, (21 December 2022).

- Otte, M. and Greve, J. (1999) *A Rising Middle Power?: German Foreign Policy in Transformation, 1989-1999*, (New York: St. Martin's Press).
- Rathbun, B. (2008) "A Rose by Any Other Name: Neoclassical Realism as the Logical and Necessary Extension of Structural Realism", *Security Studies*, 17(2): 294–321.
- Reuters (2017) "After Summits with Trump, Merkel Says Europe Must Take Fate into Own Hands", 28 May, < <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-politics-merkel-idUSKBN1800JK> > (20 January 2024).
- Ripsman, N. M., Taliaferro, J. W. and Lobell, S.E. (2016) *Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics*, (New York: Oxford University Press).
- Romanova, T. (2012) "Neoclassical Realism and Today's Russia", *Russia in Global Affairs*, 3. <<https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/articles/neoclassical-realism-and-todays-russia/>>, (15 February 2024).
- Rose, G. (1998) "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy", *World Politics*, 51(1): 144-172.
- Schreer, B. (2023) "Germany's First-Ever National Security Strategy", *Analysis*, The International Institute for Strategic Studies-ISS, Berlin, <<https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/online-analysis/2023/06/germanys-first-ever-national-security-strategy/>>, (1 June 2024).
- Schweller, R.L. (2008) *Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press).
- Smith, N. R. (2018) "Can Neoclassical Realism Become a Genuine Theory of International Relations", *The Journal of Politics*, 80(2): 742-749.
- Snyder, J.L. (1977) "The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations", *Report R-2154-AF*, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, <<https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/reports/2005/R2154.pdf> >, (5 January 2024).
- Şahin, Y. (2017) "Brexit ve Trump Çağında AB Güvenlik ve Savunma Politikaları", *Değerlendirme Notu*, İktisadi Kalkınma Vakfı, İstanbul.
- Şahin, G. and Aksu, E.B. (2021) "Almanya'nın Doğu'ya Açılım Politikaları: Ostpolitik", *Düzce Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi*, 11(2): 240-252.
- Taliaferro, J. (2006) "State Building for Future Wars: Neoclassical Realism and the Resource-Extractive State", *Security Studies* 15(3): 464-495.
- The Centre virtuel de la connaissance sur l'Europe-CVCE.EU (1950) "Statement by René Pleven on the establishment of a European army", 24

October, <https://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/1997/10/13/4a3f4499-daf1-44c1-b313-212b31cad878/publishable_en.pdf> (22 December 2024).

The Economist (2019) “Emmanuel Macron Warns Europe: NATO is Becoming Brain-dead”, 7 November, <<https://www.economist.com/europe/2019/11/07/emmanuel-macron-warns-europe-nato-isbecoming-brain-dead>>, (12 February 2022).

The Federal Government (2023). “National Security Strategy: Integrated Security for Germany”, 14 June, <<https://www.nationalesicherheitsstrategie.de/National-Security-Strategy-EN.pdf>>, (25 December 2024).

U.S Office of the Historian (1954) “Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954. Western European Security, 5(2), 197, <<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v05p2/d197>>, (21 December 2024).

Waltz, K. N. (1996) “International Politics is not Foreign Policy”, *Security Studies*, 6(1): 54-57.

Waltz, K. N. (1979) *Theory of International Politics*, (California: Addison-Wesley).

Young, T.D. (1994) “Trends in German Defense Policy: The Defense Policy Guidelines and the Centralization of Operational Control”, *The Royal Institute of International Affairs*, <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/109681/Trends_German_Defense_Policy.pdf> (13 January 2024).

Zakaria, F. (1998) *From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press).