The European Union Foreign Policy System and the Extent of Europeanization after the Common Foreign and Security Policy

Ortak Dış ve Güvenlik Politikası Sonrası Avrupa Birliği Dış Politika Sistemi ve Avrupalılaşma Kapsamı

Abstract

This study aims to comprehensively address the foreign policy cooperation processes shaped at the European Union (EU) level, especially in the context of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), through the concept of Europeanization. In-depth analysis of the effects of the EU's integration and cooperation processes in the field of foreign policy on the national foreign policies of the member states is of great importance in understanding how this interaction is shaped both at the European and national levels. In this framework, it will be analyzed in detail how the EU's common foreign policy practices, which have been developed to increase its global influence, have harmonized with national interests and how they have sometimes come into conflict with these interests. Thus, it will be revealed how the EU's foreign policy strategies and national foreign policy dynamics interact. In this context, this study aims to examine the challenges faced by the EU in the foreign policy-making process and the historical, theoretical and practical obstacles in solving these challenges within the framework of the concept of Europeanization. It aims to analyze the development of foreign policy cooperation within the EU, especially in the period starting with the Maastricht Treaty, and the balance between the member states' desire to protect their national sovereignty and their efforts to establish a common foreign policy. In doing so, the scope and dimensions of the Europeanization process of national foreign policies in the context of the Common Foreign and Security Policy will be discussed and the formation process of the EU foreign policy and the important turning points in this process will be analyzed.

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Özet

Bu çalışma, Avrupa Birliği (AB) düzeyinde şekillenen dış politika işbirliği süreçlerini, özellikle Ortak Dış ve Güvenlik Politikası (ODGP) bağlamında, Avrupalılaşma kavramı üzerinden kapsamlı bir şekilde ele almayı amaçlamaktadır. AB'nin dış politika alanındaki entegrasyon ve işbirliği süreçlerinin, üye ülkelerin ulusal dış politikaları üzerindeki etkilerini derinlemesine analiz etmek, bu etkileşimin hem Avrupa düzeyinde hem de ulusal düzeyde nasıl şekillendiğini anlamak açısından büyük bir önem taşımaktadır. Bu çerçevede, AB'nin küresel etkinliğini artırmaya yönelik geliştirdiği ortak dış politika uygulamalarının, ulusal çıkarlarla nasıl uyum sağladığı ve zaman zaman bu çıkarlarla nasıl çatışmaya düştüğü detaylı bir şekilde ele alınacaktır. Böylece, AB'nin dış politika stratejilerinin ve ulusal dış politika dinamiklerinin nasıl bir etkileşim içinde olduğu ortaya konulacaktır. Bu bağlamda, bu çalışma AB'nin dış politika oluşturma sürecinde karşılaştığı zorlukları ve bu zorlukların çözülmesindeki tarihsel, teorik ve pratik engelleri Avrupalılaşma kavramı çerçevesinde incelemektedir. Özellikle Maastricht Antlaşması ile başlayan dönemde, AB içindeki dış politika işbirliğinin gelişimini ve üye ülkelerin ulusal egemenliklerini koruma arzusu ile ortak dış politika oluşturma çabaları arasındaki dengeyi analiz etmek hedeflenmektedir. Bunu yaparken, Ortak Dış ve Güvenlik Politikası kapsamında ulusal dış politikaların Avrupalılaşma sürecinin kapsamı ve boyutları ele alınarak, AB dış politikasının oluşum süreci ve bu süreçteki önemli dönüm noktaları analiz edilecektir.

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ISR Journal

Introduction

The desire to develop a common foreign policy at the European level represents one of the most complex and intractable issues in the European integration process. As in other nation states, foreign policy is still considered an indispensable part of national sovereignty for the member states of the European Union. For this reason, until the Maastricht Treaty, they prevented foreign policy issues from being included in European integration processes. The fact that NATO also played a role in the defense and security of Europe ensured that the member states completely distanced themselves from the idea of political integration and remained as actors acting independently and pursuing their own interests in international politics. However, in the chaotic international conjuncture with the end of the Bipolar System, it did not seem possible for the member states to realize their national interests by acting unilaterally. This situation paved the way for foreign policy cooperation at the EU level by member states seeking to maximize their national interests in international politics. As a matter of fact, with the Maastricht Treaty, foreign policy became one of the common policies within the institutional structure of the EU for the first time. This study aims to examine the challenges faced by the EU in the process of foreign policy making and the historical, theoretical and practical obstacles in solving these challenges within the framework of the concept of Europeanization. It is aimed to analyze the development of foreign policy cooperation within the EU, especially in the period starting with the Maastricht Treaty, and the balance between the member states' desire to protect their national sovereignty and their efforts to establish a common foreign policy. In doing so, the scope and dimensions of the Europeanization process of national foreign policies in the context of the Common Foreign and Security Policy will be discussed, and the formation process of EU foreign policy and the important milestones in this process will be analyzed.

1. Key Factors in the Formation of the Common Foreign Policy of the European Union after the Cold War

The disappearance of the ideological conflicts, polarizations and even limitations that led to European integration during the Cold War period has allowed for the revitalization and deepening of European integration (Miskimmon, 2007: 33-36). The key development that led to this revitalization and deepening was related to Germany (Soutou, 2014: 340). The justified concerns of European countries about how European integration would be affected following the reunification of East and West Germany contributed to the creation of perhaps one of the most important milestones of the European integration process initiated after the Second World War (M. E. Smith, 2004: 178). The possibility that Germany's excessive power following the unification could jeopardize the collective security system that Europe had built up during the Cold War brought to the fore the desire of the member states of the European Communities (EC) - later the European Union (EU) - and France in particular, "to accelerate the European integration process and to take concrete steps for integration in the economic and political spheres in order to balance and contain Germany's excessive power" (Telatar, 2008: 269). "In order to eliminate these concerns of the European countries, Germany, together with France, played a leading role in the initiation of the political union process in European integration and showed that Germany would continue to be involved in the European integration process in the post-Cold War period" (Miskimmon, 2007: 34).

While these developments were taking place in European integration, with the end of the Cold War, new security problems and threats began to emerge in the geographies near the EC, making it necessary for European foreign policy to be more comprehensive (Keukeleire and Delreux, 2014: 46). With the end of the Cold War, there were no military threats to Western European countries, but issues such as terrorism, smuggling, mass migration, ethnic tensions and the control of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, continued to have the potential to negatively affect the European integration process. These threats usually stemmed from political, economic and social instability in the Eastern European countries neighboring the EC and in the Mediterranean and North African countries (Baykal, 2006: 146). Therefore, it became clear that the EC should take more responsibility for stabilizing these countries in order to prevent these threats, which was also the expectation of the international community (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006: 158). Ultimately, the

imperative for European foreign policy cooperation to have a more comprehensive, coherent and institutionalized vision in order for the EC to be an effective actor and to meet expectations on international issues has enabled the beginning of a new era in the foreign policy process (McCormick, 2013: 318).

1.1. Maastricht Treaty and Common Foreign and Security Policy

The Maastricht Treaty on European Union - hereafter referred to as the Maastricht Treaty - represents one of the most important developments in the institutionalization of European foreign policy (Bretherton and Vogler 2006; Tonra and Kristiansen 2004; White, 2001). (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006; Tonra and Kristiansen, 2004; White, 2001). In the face of the challenges they faced in the aftermath of the Cold War, the EC - and later the EU - member states realized that European Political Cooperation (EPC), which was established outside the EU's institutional structure to address foreign policy issues, was inadequate. This necessitated a 'qualitative leap' towards establishing a foreign policy within the institutional framework of the EU (A. Spence and D. Spence, 1998: 44). Indeed, the Maastricht Treaty created a three-pillar structure of European integration, making European foreign policy one of the common policies of the EU for the first time.

With the Maastricht Treaty, the emergence of distinct governance structures and levels at the EU level in the field of foreign policy was marked by the placement of the CFSP under the institutional umbrella of the EU, unlike the EPC (Bindi, 2010: 27). Despite this development, the preservation of the intergovernmental character of the EPC process in the CFSP, as emphasized by Knill and Lehmkuhl (2002), prevented the emergence of concrete, rigid and specific institutional requirements to trigger change at the national level. Even though the CFSP did not set such rigid and specific requirements, the EU member states were able to keep the scope of EU foreign policy quite broad by drawing the final framework of an all-encompassing common foreign and security policy and a defense policy that could lead to the emergence of a common defense policy in the future.

Before the CFSP, EU countries could take non-legally binding decisions on foreign policy, such as consultations and joint declarations, but with the Maastricht Treaty, they introduced two new decision-making mechanisms, namely 'common positions' and 'common actions' (Dover, 2010: 244-245). According to the Maastricht Treaty, although common positions do not involve joint action, member states are obliged to align their national policies with the common positions, while 'joint actions' "involve joint action in specific situations where the EU deems it necessary to take action of an operational character" (Mahncke, 2004: 30). Both mechanisms play an important role in enabling the EEAS to go beyond its advisory role and produce regular foreign policy outputs under the CFSP (M. E. Smith, 2004: 182). This more systematization of EU foreign policy has led to the creation of new institutional structures at the European level or the articulation of previous formations and institutions at the EU level.

The military dimension of security was excluded from the scope of the CFSP, although it included many foreign policy issues and institution building at the EU level (Sjursen, 1998: 101). The Maastricht Treaty did not include a common defense policy and defense issues. However, the questioning of the capabilities of the existing defense and security organizations of the EU member states, especially with the Yugoslavia Crisis, led the Western European Union (WEU) to become active again in the field of defense and security at the European level. This cooperation in the military sphere facilitated the EU member states to address defense issues at the European level without making any commitments by keeping them outside the institutional structure of the EU, as in the Cold War-era foreign policy practices, and provided the opportunity to cooperate with the US and the NATO alliance in the field of defense. Thus, on the one hand, the CAB formed the military arm of the EU as an integral part of the EU, and on the other hand, it started to play a bridge role in Atlantic relations as an institution fulfilling the role of NATO's European arm (Miskimmon, 2007: 40).

The EU member states' initiation of a rational policy process with the CFSP - at least in terms of producing foreign policy outputs at the EU level - has formed the basic building block for the EU to ensure unity, coherence and effectiveness in its external activities in terms of security, economy,

defense, diplomacy and development policies (Tonra and Chirstiansen, 2004). However, unlike other policy areas, the EU has laid the foundation for the institutionalization process according to a two-tier structure involving intergovernmental negotiations (Soetendorp, 2014: 7). While national decision-making processes remain important in foreign policy-making as a policy area, a foreign policy-making process has emerged in which there is a mutual interaction between the national level and the EU level. Since the characteristics of EU foreign policy are a product of the interaction between the national and EU levels, it is not possible to separate the national and EU levels. As a natural consequence of this, as Nuttall emphasizes, "EU foreign policy has neither been entirely intergovernmental nor has it become a full-fledged policy arm of the EU" (Nuttall, 2000: 275).

1.2. Post-Maastricht reform: From Amsterdam to Lisbon

With the CFSP, which was established under the Maastricht Treaty, EU foreign policy acquired a much more sophisticated institutional structure and started to produce more common external actions. However, shortly after the entry into force of the CFSP, the lack of success in the procedural elements and concrete outputs of EU foreign policy led to the need to reconsider the CFSP (Francia and Abellan, 2006: 137). The decisions taken by the Maastricht Treaty at both the institutional and operational level to deepen the EU foreign policy within the CFSP and to increase its procedural coherence in this sense triggered a reform process that started with the Amsterdam Treaty and finally became what it is today with the Lisbon Treaty.

1.2.1. Treaty of Amsterdam

The idea of reforming the CFSP has been on the agenda since the beginning of the Yugoslavia Crisis as a result of the failure of the member states to adopt a decisive and common position at the European level. The Treaty of Amsterdam further broadened the main objectives of the CFSP and laid the groundwork for reforms in the Nice and Lisbon Treaties, especially in the area of defense and security. Apart from the general provisions expanding coherence and common interests, the Amsterdam Treaty also pioneered reforms in three other areas of the CFSP. These reforms include decision-making processes, decision implementation and finally defense and security (Francia and Abellan, 2006: 137).

With the Treaty of Amsterdam, which entered into force on 1 May 1999, "the types of CFSP-related acts were also specified more clearly, thus clarifying the distinction between joint actions and common positions, empowering the European Council to take decisions on joint actions and common positions, and adopting systematic cooperation between member states" (Özdal, 2013: 145). Regarding the decision-making process, the Treaty of Amsterdam, while preserving the principle of unanimity in the Maastricht Treaty, established the principle of 'constructive abstention', which makes this rule flexible in practice. The flexibility introduced by constructive abstention in the CFSP decision-making process allows member states that resist the adoption of a decision to choose to participate in the implementation of the relevant issue so as not to prevent the adoption of the decision (Francia and Abellan, 2006: 140). In this way, the decision can be taken by willing countries even if the member state(s) abstained.

Another innovation that the Treaty of Amsterdam brought to the CFSP was the creation of the position of Secretary General/High Representative of the CFSP for the implementation and international representation of the CFSP (Bindi, 2010: 34). This was the first time that the CFSP was represented by a permanent actor and Henry Kissinger knew 'who to call when he wanted to talk to Europe' (McCormick, 2013: 318). On the other hand, the provisions of the Maastricht Treaty on the EU were extended by the Amsterdam Treaty, strengthening the relations between the EU and the EU (Keukeleire and Delreux, 2014: 52). In the Treaty of Amsterdam, the balance between the 'Europeans' and the 'Atlanticists' was taken into consideration and the step-by-step development of cooperation in the field of defense was prioritized. It was agreed that this new formation "should be structured in a way that shows that there is no possibility of giving up NATO, but that the EU does not give up its own defense identity" (Tangör, 2009: 108). Although the Treaty of Amsterdam did not create an independent defense capacity for the EU, it "allowed the EU to use military means in operations covering the Petersberg missions - humanitarian and rescue missions, peacekeeping

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missions, crisis management missions including peacemaking - that the Council of Ministers of the EU had defined in June 1992" (Tangör, 2009: 112).

1.2.2. Nice Treaty and European Security and Defense Policy

The inclusion of the Petersberg missions in the CFSP was an important step forward in strengthening the EU's military security identity (Ginsberg and Penska, 2012). However, the conflicts in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo revealed that the EU's inadequacy in defense and security, especially its military capacity and capabilities, prevented it from taking more responsibility even in its own geography. The ineffectiveness of the EU in solving the crisis and the fact that Europe was once again overshadowed by the US in terms of providing security after the events in Bosnia led to the formation of a political will in the member states to provide the EU with military capacity (M. E. Smith, 2004). "At the St. Malo Summit held on December 4, 1998, the British and French Governments of the time agreed to increase the EU's capabilities and capabilities as a security actor under the CFSP" (Özdal, 2013: 146).

After the St. Malo Summit between France and Britain, more intensive discussions on ESDP were held at the Cologne Summit in June 1999, the Helsinki Summit in December 1999 and the Feria Summit in June 2000. These summits focused on the creation of a European military force, the integration of the PABSEC with the EU and the armament components of the EU (M. E. Smith, 2004: 233). During the Nice Summit in December 2000, the issue of ESDP became the focal point of the negotiations. This summit officially declared that the CSDP was an extension of the CFSP (Keukeleire and Delreux, 2014: 53). In this way, the EU's military cooperation, which was considered a taboo, was officially institutionalized at the EU level (Keukeleire, 2010: 56). One of the most important provisions related to CFSP in terms of the decision-making process at the Nice Summit was the development of the principle of flexibility in the Amsterdam Treaty. The principle of flexibility was taken further with the adoption of 'enhanced cooperation'. In order to implement the principle of enhanced cooperation, if the member states wishing to cooperate reach an agreement among themselves, they are allowed to start cooperation without waiting for other countries (Ülger, 2002: 100).

1.2.3. Lisbon Treaty: CFSP Reform

The Treaties of Amsterdam and Nice made significant contributions to the institutional development of the CFSP. However, the structure of the CFSP was finally regulated by the Lisbon Treaty. The 2004 enlargement wave, as well as the shock waves caused by 9/11 and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, brought great pressure to strengthen the EU's foreign policy capacity (Keukeleire and Delreux, 2014; K. Smith, 2014). In order to meet the need for change in the dynamic structure of the EU, an EU constitution was drafted and adopted by the heads of state and government of the member states in Rome on November 29, 2004. However, this constitution could not enter into force due to the negative results of the referendums held in France and the Netherlands during the ratification process envisaged in the domestic law of the member states. In order to find a new solution as a result of the failure of the EU constitution to enter into force, the Council of the EU revisited the Constitutional Treaty and as a result of the removal of all elements evoking federalism, the Lisbon Treaty, also known as the Reform Treaty, was signed by the member states on December 13, 2007 and entered into force on January 1, 2009.

The most important innovation that the Lisbon Treaty brought to the institutional structure of the EU and CFSP is undoubtedly the formal abolition of the EU pillar system (K. Smith, 2014: 38). The abolition of the three-pillar structure of Maastricht made it possible to establish the EU as a legal entity (Article 47 TEU). The recognition of the legal personality of the EU in Article 47 TEU (L) simplified the status of the European Union on the one hand, and took an important step towards legal recognition on the other. By granting the legal personality of the EC to the EU as a whole, there is no longer any obstacle for the EU to be recognized as an international actor under international law (Koehler, 2010: 59). Nevertheless, the Lisbon Treaty did not bring any changes to the second and third pillars of the EU, the character of intergovernmental cooperation and the principle of unanimity (Keukeleire and Delreux, 2014: 57). The Lisbon Treaty tried to alleviate the continuity crisis created by the six-month rotating Council Presidency system in relation to the EU's foreign

policy by introducing a Presidency of the Council appointed for two and a half years. Thus, by electing a different country to represent the EU every six months, it was aimed to prevent polyphony and to create a 'speak with one voice' among the member states (K. E. Smith, 2014: 38).

The Lisbon Treaty established the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Policy and Security as responsible for conducting foreign and security policy (Keukeleire and Delreux, 2014). The High Representative of the EU for Foreign Policy and Security has become a powerful political figure in the field of foreign policy through her role as Vice-President of the Commission on the one hand and as President of the Council of Foreign Ministers on the other. "By combining supranational and intergovernmental elements in a position such as the High Representative, both the Commission - supranational - and the Council - intergovernmental - have become influential" (Koehler, 2010: 66). Accordingly, direct interaction with EU-level actors and member states has become possible, increasing the horizontal and vertical coherence of European foreign policy (Keukeleire and Delreux, 2014: 76). Indeed, this 'double hat' of the High Representative, i.e. representing the interests of the member states on the one hand and defending the interests of the EU on the other, has created an important opportunity structure for bringing together the interests of the EU and the member states (Pernice, 2009: 399).

A new institution, the European External Action Service (EEAS), has been established in connection with the establishment of the post of High Representative of the EU for Foreign Policy and Security. The establishment of the EEAS is crucial for ensuring the coherence of the EU's external relations and strengthening its role as an international actor (Cameron, 2012). Given the scope of the High Representative's tasks and responsibilities, the creation of the EEAS was a necessary step in strengthening systematic coordination and cooperation between the EU institutions and national actors (Karaman, 2011: 151). "The EEAS not only affects the effectiveness and continuity of the EU as a foreign policy actor, but also acts as a counterweight both within the EU institutions and between member states" (Keukeleire and Delreux, 2014: 83). The EEAS has created an important platform for the Europeanization of national foreign policies at the European level. This is because it was decided that this service would be composed of the staff of the competent services of the Commission and the Council, including the staff of national foreign policy institutions (K. Smith, 2014: 39). This helps to accelerate the institutionalization process of European foreign policy by triggering interaction, cooperation, socialization and learning dynamics between the European and national levels in the field of foreign policy (Kahraman, 2011: 152).

The Lisbon Treaty also envisaged a number of changes in military matters. The Treaty not only renamed the European Defence and Security Policy (ESDP) as the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) but also formalized initiatives that had been established until then and which had developed outside the EU treaties (Keukeleire and Delreux, 2014: 57). The CSDP was recast to include the progressive framework of a common defense and security policy and, in the event of a future unanimous decision of the Council, to provide for the common defense of the Union. However, the member states in no way conceived of the CFSP as competing either with their national defense and security policies or with NATO. The Lisbon Treaty focused on the formation of a defense and security policy through the Petersberg tasks in the context of the CSDP. In this context, the previously adopted "extended list of Petersberg tasks was included for the first time in the EU Founding Treaty (TFEU)" (Özdal, 2013: 192). In this expanded list, 'solidarity' and 'mutual assistance' mechanisms are emphasized. Although member states continued to have reservations about the creation of a comprehensive military force, the structuring of a military force specifically to support civilian and economic power, even if limited to the Petersberg missions, was approved.

In conclusion, the Lisbon Treaty has enabled many reforms in the CFSP for the institutionalization of European foreign policy. In this process, which has been ongoing since the Maastricht Treaty, many institutions related to foreign policy have been established at the EU level and foreign policy objectives have been set accordingly. Despite these developments, expectations about the impact of potential dynamics on the EU's foreign policy have partially declined since the Lisbon Treaty entered into force. Even if the Lisbon Treaty perpetuated the EU's foreign policy leadership, it was not enough to reduce the incoherence of foreign policy. There are still multiple

'voices' in EU foreign policy. The President of the European Council, the High Representative and the President of the Commission continue to constitute institutions with specific roles in representing the EU in international relations. Moreover, the Eurozone financial crisis, the Arab Spring, international economic and political developments after the signing of the Lisbon Treaty have hindered the effective implementation of EU foreign policy.

2. Europeanization of National Foreign Policies under the CFSP

The CFSP, which gained a legal dimension with the Maastricht Treaty, constituted an important policy area for the harmonization and convergence of the foreign policies of the member states with the common foreign policies established at the EU level (Wong and Hill, 2011: 14). This convergence and harmonization is seen as a process of change in which both the political unity among member states and the policies of member states become European policies (Wong and Hill, 2011: 4). In contrast to the one-way process in the EPC, in the CFSP, member states have created a two-way process in which they are both shapers and takers of EU foreign policy.

2.1. Dimensions of Europeanization of Foreign Policy in the Changing Cooperation Process

EU foreign policy, which was formalized with the Maastricht Treaty, gained an institutional identity with the CFSP and turned into an official policy area in which member states are the shapers and implementers. With the emergence of such a policy area at the EU level, member states have made Brussels the center of foreign policy in order to shape EU foreign policy in line with their national interests and foreign policy arrangements, unlike the EPC process. The fact that the CFSP was included in the founding treaties of the EU and was binding on the member states made it necessary to transfer national preferences to Brussels in order for them to become an EU provision. As White (2001) argues, the greater involvement of member states in the foreign policy-making process at the EU level in order to convey their preferences has led to the Europeanization of national foreign policies and elevated Brussels to a prominent position in foreign policy-making.

2.1.1. CFSP's Influence on the National Foreign Policies of Member States

The establishment of the CFSP by the EU member states within the framework of the Maastricht Treaty allowed the limited foreign policy coordination of the 1970s and 1980s to be rationalized and EU institutions to play important roles in foreign policy at certain stages (Bindi, 2010). The CFSP process still lacks the supranational character of the European single market. However, by establishing a multitude of competent decision-making processes at the EU level, it has created a situation of legal commitment for member states (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006: 163). While Maastricht explicitly emphasized the principle of unanimity for CFSP, the introduction of the 'constructive abstention' rule in Amsterdam and the adoption of the principle of 'enhanced cooperation' in Nice paved the way for the application of the qualified majority principle in EU foreign policy.

The fact that the EU member states created the CFSP to include limited compliance mechanisms and to be under their control - as evidenced by the fact that they have the power to veto decisions - did not limit the influence of EU foreign policy on the member states, but increased it over time (M. E. Smith, 2004). In fact, the strengthening of the EU's position in world politics with the CFSP and the fact that many activities usually managed by the member states have started to be carried out in Brussels have gradually reduced the obstructive or controlling role of the member states (Tonra and Christiansen, 2004: 2). Although member states have the power to veto the process as they are the main actors in the European Council in determining EU foreign policy, this power has been limited by the fact that the Maastricht Treaty sets a number of broad agenda items and basic norms within the institutional framework of the EU. The adoption of fundamental principles such as democracy, human rights and the rule of law as common values of the EU at the Copenhagen Summit has prevented member states from acting according to their national preferences and interests in making decisions on these issues in EU foreign policy (M. E. Smith, 2004a: 7). However, the increasing interconnectedness of European Communities policies and CFSP activities weakens the role of member states and increases the powers of EU institutions.

In this context, the institutionalization and development of EU foreign policy under the CFSP regime made it necessary for member states to make legal, institutional and political changes at the national level to meet the requirements of membership. For example, with the creation of the CSDP and the EU's Petersberg missions, Germany was under pressure from the EU to adapt to problem-solving methods that prioritized diplomatic means as well as methods that addressed the negative effects of military crises (Gross, 2009). Therefore, the constitutional provision on the German army (bunderswehr) undertaking operational missions outside Germany was amended due to the requirements of EU membership to harmonize German foreign policy with the European level (Miskimmon, 2007: 97). The EU's reciprocal military relations with NATO through the CAB - such as conducting multilateral operations - helped France to abandon its unilateral stance towards NATO for many years and to return to NATO's military wing in 2009 (Charillon and Wong, 2011: 24). By remaining outside NATO, France was isolated from the EU's joint actions with NATO, which weakened its role in European security. France's unwillingness to remain outside European security has led it to act in harmony with the EU and to rejoin the NATO alliance.

The fact that the EU foreign policy has set policies and objectives on many issues and for different geographies of the world has had repercussions on the national foreign policies of the member states (Keukeleire and Delreux, 2014: 131). Accordingly, objectives and priorities that were not previously included in the national foreign policy agenda of the member states or that were completely different from the EU level have become the priorities and objectives of their national foreign policies thanks to the EU foreign policy (Larsen, 2011). Indeed, after the establishment of the CFSP, the national foreign policies of small member states and new member states in particular have been reshaped according to the priorities of the European level, both in terms of geography and specific foreign policy issues and approach. During the Cold War, Finland, which preferred to remain neutral and was only concerned with the issues of the region and Northern Europe, added Mediterranean and Middle East policies to its national foreign policy agenda in the context of CFSP with its accession to the EU (Haukkala and Ojanen, 2011: 153). As a natural consequence, the Finnish foreign ministry was restructured and "the previously issue-based organization of the Finnish foreign ministry - for example, trade and arms control - was reorganized into a region-based organization - such as the Mediterranean, the Middle East or the Far East regions - as a result of Europeanization" (Haukkala and Ojanen, 2011: 153).

The EU and EU member states' desire to pursue an effective foreign policy in the post-Cold War international system has led to an ever-expanding and growing scope of the CFSP. In particular, the fact that member states have moved their foreign policy-making to Brussels has led to the fact that the national foreign policies of member states are more influenced by the EU level. However, it should not be forgotten that EU foreign policy is still intergovernmental and in this sense controlled by the member states. Therefore, anything that is not agreed upon by the member states cannot initiate a process(es) that will lead to any change or transformation in the foreign policies of the EU member states.

2.1.1.1.1. Transfer of Preferences from the National Level to the CFSP

The increasing importance of the European political agenda, as well as the emergence of common policy obligations on national policies, has led to the necessity for member states to harmonise with the common objectives set at the European level. However, in order not to lose control over EU foreign policy and to minimise the pressure for harmonisation, member states have moved their foreign policy preferences to the European level (Gross, 2009). Because, while the ESI did not impose any binding conditions for the member states, the CFSP emphasised the commitment of the member states to common objectives. Therefore, each country has endeavoured to ensure that the CFSP is formed within the framework of its own national foreign policy.

After the EPC experience, EU member states have tried to influence the structure of the CFSP with their national preferences in the political integration process initiated at the European level. This influence was first seen during the establishment of the CFSP. While some member states advocated a supranational foreign policy co-operation at the EU level in line with their national interests and objectives, others wanted it to be intergovernmental in nature due to concerns that a

supranational foreign policy would limit national sovereignty and national interests (K. Smith, 2014). France and Britain adopted the intergovernmental approach to ensure that EU foreign policy is under the control of member states. Germany, on the other hand, argued that the EU could not play an important role in international politics without compromising national sovereignty and favoured a supranational EU foreign policy (Miskimmon, 2007: 47). These debates are also encountered in the ASEAN period. However, there has been a significant change in national preferences after the Cold War. Member states now accepted foreign policy cooperation at the EU level in order to achieve greater 'speak with one voice' among them and greater cooperation in the field of defence and security (Tonra and Christianse, 2004: 2).

Of course, since CFSP is a common policy of the EU, it is inevitable that member states will be affected by this process. But it also offers new opportunities for them to take advantage of the opportunities that exist in the international system. The potential benefit for a member state is to increase its national influence in the international system and to benefit from the EU's strong presence in the international arena without incurring the costs of risk in the face of controversial international problems (Ginsberg, 2001: 27). For example, Germany has been one of the countries that played the most important role in the development of the CFSP's multilateral co-operation, conflict prevention approach and civilian crisis resolution instruments. Thus, Germany has further strengthened the normative and civilian power-based foreign policy it pursued in the international system during the Cold War with the EU foreign policy. In addition, in the process of the formation of the European Security and Defence Identity, it prevented the high costs that arise in international crises by influencing the formation of this policy according to the instruments that include civilian dimensions (Gross, 2009).

The CFSP process has become an important tool especially for member states with a colonial past (Charillon and Wong, 2011). By establishing relations with countries with strong historical and cultural ties, members have benefited from the EU foreign policy and realised their national interests without too much obligation and risk. Although such a situation may seem to serve the purpose of a single country, it has actually enabled other member states to establish new economic and commercial relations. France's historical and cultural ties and relations with sub-Saharan Africa, North Africa and the Middle East; Britain's with African, Caribbean and Pacific countries; and Spain's with Latin American countries have helped to make these geographies an important part of EU foreign policy (Bache and Jordan, 2008). Member states have played an influential role in enabling the countries with which they interact to benefit from the important privileges provided by the EU and to mobilise the EU in the face of their problems. For example, during the Lebanon War in 2006, France, due to its cultural ties with Lebanon, called on EU member states to end the crisis there and was instrumental in channelling EU financial resources for the reconstruction of the country (Charillon and Wong, 2011).

Similarly, Spain has utilised its historical and cultural ties with Latin America to influence the geographical expansion of EU foreign policy. The fact that Spain was the only EU member state with a regional policy on Latin America made it unrivalled in guiding other member states in this regard (Barbé, 2011: 144). Until Spain became an EU member, the EU did not have any initiative or agenda on Latin America (Grugel, 1996). For this reason, Spain played the most important role in setting the Latin American agenda of EU foreign policy and had the opportunity to both bring its national preferences to the EU and to lead other member states (Barbé, 2011: 145). This opened the door for EU member states to develop new economic and trade relations through EU foreign policy.

On the other hand, other EU member states, especially small member states, prefer to use EU foreign policy as a tool to transfer EU norms, values and standards to problematic regions in terms of world stability (S. Østergaard, 2011). These countries pursue a foreign policy within the framework of normative values in world politics and aim to develop EU foreign policy in the same direction. Denmark and Sweden are opposed to the EU becoming a military actor in the international system and are more in favour of the EU acting as a model for many other countries and regions in the world 'as a peace project' (Larsen, 2011: 94). These countries have played an important role in guiding EU foreign policy on issues such as democracy, human rights and climate change. In fact,

Sweden and Denmark actively supported the EU's normative approach in its relations with China in international politics, advocating the deepening of the human rights dialogue and the freezing of bilateral relations and the suspension of foreign aid in the face of human rights violations (Michalski, 2013: 890). Thus, the economic damages and risk costs that these countries would incur as a result of unilateral sanctions against China for human rights violations were reduced, while their national effectiveness was increased (Michalski, 2013; Larsen, 2011).

It is seen that EU member states, as well as being influential actors in the formulation of EU foreign policy, have also worked hard to determine new preferences and political priorities at the national level in the face of adaptation requests from the EU level in the later process. By transferring these preferences and priorities to the EU level, it was ensured that national interests were defended more effectively in the international system and that national interests that could not be realised unilaterally under normal conditions were gathered under the umbrella of the EU. As the member states have become more involved in the foreign policy-making process at the EU level over time, the scope of EU foreign policy has significantly expanded and the Europeanisation of national foreign policies has become possible.

2.1.2. The Transformation Process of Member States' Foreign Policies after the CFSP

The effects of the CFSP on national foreign policies following the Maastricht Treaty are evident. However, when these are compared with other policy areas at the EU level, the Europeanisation of national foreign policies follows a very different path. This is mainly due to the intergovernmental character of EU foreign policy under the CFSP, as in the case of EPC. Socialisation of foreign policy elites and learning mechanisms have therefore played an important role in the Europeanisation of national foreign policies. However, with the CFSP becoming one of the common policies of the EU, the degree of cohesion has been added as another mechanism affecting the Europeanisation of national foreign policies.

2.1.2.1. Pressure for Adaptation Created by the CFSP

The inclusion of political union in the European integration process with the Maastricht Treaty made the CFSP a binding policy of the EU, and this created the problem of adaptation of the EU member states with the decisions taken at the EU level (Tsardanidis and Stavridis, 2007). However, it should be noted that the pressure for adaptation and the change in national policies are not as effective in the Europeanisation of member states' policies as economic and social policies, due to the fact that CFSP is under the control of states (Gross, 2007: 7). In the event that member states take joint decisions on foreign policy at the EU level, it is observed that changes in their foreign policies are experienced through cohesion pressure. The adaptation problem occurs as a result of the continuation of the incompatibility between the foreign policies and institutions at the EU and national levels within the framework of the joint decisions taken by the member states at the EU level. This creates a pressure for adaptation from the EU level to the national levels and initiates processes that will bring about a change in national foreign policies towards allign with with the European level (Major, 2008; Juncos and Pomorska, 2006).

As emphasised by Börzel and Risse, the main reason driving the EU member states to such a change is that there is a misfit/mismatch between policies and institutions at EU and national levels (Börzel and Risse, 2003). In the absence of such a mismatch, there is no need for member states to change their national policies (Caporaso and Jupille, 2001: 23). For example, the adoption of the ESDP and the EU's acquisition of military capabilities against international crises, especially around the Petersberg missions, did not cause any adaptation pressure on many countries, while it caused significant adaptation pressures on others. In terms of military capacity, capability and their mobilisation, Britain and France, which have been involved in such missions before, did not experience any adaptation pressure and did not need to make any changes in terms of adaptation with the EU (Aktipis and Oliver, 2011). Germany, which has prioritised normative and diplomatic instruments due to constitutional limitations since the Second World War and therefore has insufficient military capacity and capability, faced a high degree of adaptation with the formation of the ESDP. In the face of this adaptation pressure resulting from the high degree of incompatibility

at the EU level, Germany had to make a constitutional amendment both to remove these limitations and to strengthen its military capability (Miskimmon, 2007: 97).

The problem of adaptation between the EU level and national levels is mostly encountered in the enlargement processes of the EU (Irondelle, 2003: 223). This is because some EU member states have border problems, foreign policy disputes and practices that are in conflict with the EU foreign policy. Within the framework of this disagreement, a high degree of adaptation has emerged between the EU and both member states and candidate countries. Especially after the Copenhagen Summit in 1993, the EU candidacy perspective was offered to the Central and Eastern European countries, which added new ones to the border problems and political disputes between the candidate countries and the existing countries and caused them to reach the EU level (Keukeleire and Delreux, 2014: 207-210). Indeed, the addition of Cyprus' candidacy to the long-standing disputes between Greece and Turkey has created a high level of incompatibility between these countries and the EU level (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006: 137). In this context, the EU has put pressure on Greece, as a member state, and Turkey, as a candidate country, to adapt, thus ending their hostile attitude towards each other and forcing them to pursue a normalised foreign policy (Tsardanidis and Stavridis, 2007). Greece has abandoned the 'veto policy' that it had applied to Turkey since the 1980s and has turned towards re-establishing its relations with Turkey within the framework of EU norms and policies. Turkey, on the other hand, accepted the proposal to resolve all bilateral problems with Greece through the International Court of Justice (ICJ) (Akşit et al. 2009: 80). The pressure for adaptation from the EU brought about significant changes in the foreign policies of these two countries and the Europeanisation of national policies in exchange for the EU's membership requirements.

Even if candidate countries do not have any problems with EU member states, the fact that their foreign policies are not in line with the EU foreign policy exposes them to a high degree of adaptation (Tsardanidis and Stavridis, 2007). For example, Slovenia experienced such a adaptation problem during its EU accession process. Although Slovenia stated that it would act jointly with the EU in many areas ranging from terrorism to the Middle East peace process, from the problems in the Balkans to the security of Europe, Slovenia tried to exempt the EU's flight ban against Montenegrin airlines due to its economic interests in Montenegro (Kajnc, 2011: 195). However, this foreign policy objective pursued by Slovenia led to a change in its national foreign policy towards alignment with the EU, as it would lead to the inconsistency of the common positions and common actions of the CFSP.

The fact that the CFSP is included in the institutional framework of the EU creates a adaptation pressure on member states and candidate countries (Gross, 2009). The fact that EU member states are involved in the decision-making processes of the CFSP causes them to be affected to a limited extent by the adaptation pressure created by Europeanisation, but since this is not the case for candidate countries, it is seen that these countries are highly affected by the adaptation pressure created by Europeanisation (Papadimitriou, 2002: 4). Whatever the degree and limits of adaptation pressure at the EU level, especially with the CFSP process, the level of Europeanisation of the foreign policies of the member states has increased.

2.1.2.2. Socialisation of Foreign Policy Elites through the CFSP

The socialisation of member states' foreign policy-making elites in the CFSP has played an important role in the Europeanisation of national foreign policies (Pomorska, 2008). Although the CFSP is the common policy of the EU, the fact that the main actors of the EU foreign policy are the member states directly affects the degree of adaptation explained above. Because the degree of adaptation required for a change at the national level depends on the joint decisions to be taken by the member states at the EU level (Keukeleire and Delreux, 2014: 95). These decisions are made by the representatives of the member states interacting with a central authority and a continuous bureaucratic structure formed in Brussels as a result of the CFSP process. The ability of the representatives of the EU member states in Brussels to have a long-term interaction with the EU institutions through the CFSP and to participate in policy-making processes ensures the transfer of

national preferences to the European level and the internalisation of EU norms at national levels (Oliver and Allen, 2008: 198).

The process of constructing common values and norms, which started with the EPC, entered into a process of diffusion and theorisation with the CFSP and institutional structures were created to help national foreign policy elites internalise these norms and values (Flers and Müller, 2009). The incorporation of the ESI secretariat into the institutional structure of the EU with the Treaty of Maastricht, the establishment of the Secretary General/High Representative of the CFSP with the Treaty of Amsterdam, and finally the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS) with the Treaty of Lisbon have reinforced the institutional structures in Brussels. Through these institutions, the foreign policy elites of the member states have been able to play important roles in presenting many foreign policy issues to the Council and determining their content and scope, even if they do not have any decision-making influence (Keukeleire and Delreux, 2014: 95). The consensus-based mutual trust and problem-solving methods of national foreign policy elites in the EPC process have been maintained within these institutional structures created at the EU level, preventing the EU foreign policy from becoming a policy area based on bargaining. As a matter of fact, the fact that national foreign policy elites interact through these institutions, see which areas are problematic and which areas are suitable for co-operation, and determine the content and scope of the foreign policy issue accordingly, limits the member states from entering into any bargaining (M. E. Smith, 2004).

The institutionalisation of EU foreign policy norms and values through the CFSP and the transfer of these norms and values to the national level by the national foreign policy elites through the institutions created at the European level have been achieved through the strategic socialisation and the change in the identity and preferences of the elites as stated by Checkel (2005). The foreign policy elites of the EU member states internalised the norms and values created in the CFSP process and thus Europeanised their national policies in two ways. These are: promoting their own preferences and interests by taking into account normative values at the EU level, and promoting common European goals and norms where they are believed to be appropriate. For instance, the changes in identity and preferences of foreign policy elites during the EPC process played an important role in the transformation of CFSP into one of the common policies of the EU in the Maastricht Treaty. In fact, the fact that national actors saw that 'speak with one voice' among themselves in the post-Cold War period and greater cooperation in the field of defence and security would be possible through the EU changed their preferences for foreign policy cooperation, which they had been trying to keep outside the European Community for a long time, and made CFSP a common policy of the EU.

The internalisation by national foreign policy elites of EU-level norms and values according to the logic of conformity has not only made CFSP the common policy of the EU, but also made many foreign policy issues no longer taboo. For example, during the Maastricht Treaty, the military dimension of CFSP was not accepted by many countries. The idea of establishing a civilian military force to support the EU's peacekeeping missions, democracy and human rights led to the structuring of the CSDP under the EU umbrella. This was fuelled by the problems faced by national foreign policy elites in Brussels during the Bosnia and Kosovo crises. The realisation that even the most basic civilian elements of CFSP, such as peacekeeping missions and crisis management including peacemaking, which the EU advocated, could not be fulfilled without a military force triggered a search for solutions. Countries such as Britain, Finland and Sweden, which were initially opposed to a military force, changed their minds and approved the establishment of the ASGP in response to the adverse developments.

It would not be sufficient to say that the internalisation of EU norms and values by national foreign policy elites was driven solely by the logic of conformity. Strategic socialisation, another type of socialisation pointed out by Checkel (2005), is also an important factor. The internalisation of the norms constructed at the EU level took place in line with the overlap of these norms with the goals set by the elites at the national level in their own countries. Many member states have abstained from the development of CSDP. However, Poland became one of the biggest supporters of the CSDP

after becoming an EU member. This is because Polish foreign policy elites in Brussels recognised the benefits that Poland could gain from the CSDP (Pomorska, 2011). EU-level defence and security policy, supported by NATO and the US, contributed to Poland's security and helped modernise the Polish army, which had lagged behind European standards during the Cold War. Thus, Polish foreign policy elites triggered a transformation at the national level (Pomorska, 2011: 173).

The strategic socialisation emphasised by Checkel (2005) has been used by the foreign policy elites of the member states in many processes of the CFSP. Seeing that France's ability to continue to play an influential role in the formation of a European defence identity depended on its abandonment of anti-US positions, French foreign policy elites in Brussels persuaded Nicolas Sarkozy to help France return to NATO membership (Charillon and Wong, 2011: 22). Member states, through their national foreign policy elites, transfer their foreign policy preferences to CFSP institutions in order to realise their national preferences and interests without any change. For example, Greece has transferred its problems with Turkey to the EU level and emphasised European normative values in solving the problem. Thus, Greece has strengthened its national preferences and interests. By unconditionally lifting its veto against Turkey, Greece made the foreign policy elites at the EU level realise that Turkey's adaptation to the EU's criteria and norms is a more appropriate way of realising its national interests.

As foreign policy elites interacted and exchanged information under continuous and authorised institutional structures at the CFSP and EU level, trust was built and common perspectives emerged, leading to foreign policy cooperation in more areas under the CFSP umbrella. In this process, the internalisation of EU norms and values by foreign policy elites emerged both through strategic socialisation and the logic of conformity, and the Europeanisation of national foreign policies became possible.

2.1.2.3. The Impact of International Crises on the Europeanisation of Foreign Policy and Learning

The Europeanisation of foreign policies at the national level is not only a result of adaptation pressures or the socialisation of foreign policy elites, but also of the success or failure of CFSP in the face of international challenges. In order to increase the coherence of EU foreign policy in the face of international crises and to strengthen the 'speak with one voice', acting together against uncertainties, collecting and utilising information and building new structures, as opposed to traditional approaches such as the clash of national interests, have been the methods frequently used by member states in the CFSP process. After the Maastricht Treaty, a number of decisions were taken at both institutional and operational level in order to deepen the EU foreign policy within the CFSP and to increase its procedural coherence. The EU's actor behaviour in the international system has been effective in the continuation of the process. During the Bosnian War, the inability of the member states to organise at the EU level and to take any initiative in the face of the crisis encouraged the EU to take steps towards further institutionalisation and foreign policy cooperation in the field of foreign policy (Flers and Müller, 2012: 28).

The experiences of the member states as a result of international crises, such as the Bosnian War, led to a significant change in their beliefs and preferences. This made it possible to make some changes in the CFSP in order to ensure more coherence in foreign policy at the EU level. In the face of the failures in the Bosnian War, the enhanced effectiveness of the PABSEC to improve military crisis management envisaged in the Amsterdam Treaty has significantly changed the national beliefs, preferences and values of the member states, which had significant reservations about military cooperation. As Müller and Alecu de Flers (2012) have argued, the differentiation in the organisational structure and decision-making processes of the CFSP brought about by the Amsterdam Treaty shows that member states have been able to make institutional, administrative and procedural changes to better defend their national interests at the European level by learning from lessons learned in the face of unexpected challenges. 'The practice of 'constructive abstention' adopted in Amsterdam aims to prevent the adoption of a decision on the CFSP by one or more states that disagree or abstain' (Özdal, 2013: 142), leading to a change in the principle of unanimity, which is the basic decision-making approach of the CFSP.

The international crises that occurred in the 2000s also had a significant impact on the changes in the structure of the CFSP and the further Europeanisation of national foreign policies. Although in the Treaty of Nice the member states agreed on decisions to act jointly in many areas and to ensure 'speak with one voice', the shock waves caused by 11 September and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the different attitudes of the members caused the EU's coherence in the international system to be questioned. The experiences of the member states, especially as a result of the Iraq War, led the CFSP to a radical reform process with the Lisbon Treaty. In order to make the coordination of EU foreign policy with other policy areas more coherent, it was decided to abolish the Maastricht pillar system and to appoint a 'double-hatted' High Representative of the EU for Foreign Policy and Security with significant powers in both the Council and the Commission to reconcile supranational and intergovernmental interests. Such changes in EU foreign policy have of course had a significant impact on the member states. However, the important point is why the member states felt the need for a change that would have such an impact. The answer to this question is that in order to pursue their interests more effectively, member states need to harmonise their institutions, administrative processes and procedures with the foreign policy formulated at the EU level. This was made possible by a change in the beliefs of national actors or the development of new beliefs, skills and procedures as a result of the interpretation of the experiences of the member states from the crises they faced in world politics.

Conclusion: The Future of EU Foreign Policy and the Limits of Europeanisation

During the Cold War, it was not possible for the EU, as a non-state actor, to pursue an active foreign policy in international relations due to the constraints imposed by the bipolarity of the world system (Hill and Smith, 2011). However, after the end of the Cold War, the winds of change started to blow both within the EU and in international relations. The expectation for the EU to take more responsibility in the field of foreign policy reached a very high level in the early 1990s, partly due to the new geopolitical position in Europe and partly due to the aspirations of member states and institutions (Hill, 1998: 19). Moreover, with the dissolution of the bipolar system, there was an expectation in the international community that the EU should take more responsibility in international relations and contribute to stability, prosperity and security in the world (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006: 158). This created an important opportunity structure for the EU, which Ginsberg (1999) characterised as 'neither a nation state nor a non-state actor', to be accepted as an actor in international relations (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006: 23). By initiating a more active common foreign policy process, the EU showed that it was ready to take its responsibilities after the Cold War (Tonra and Christiansen, 2004: 12).

However, the Maastricht Treaty only provided the EU foreign policy with 'presence' and 'actorness' in international relations. Member states perceived the EU as an institution that would represent them in international relations in the context of specific issues and circumstances. As a natural consequence, the EU's foreign policy capacity has lacked the integrity of traditional instruments, namely diplomacy, economy, military power, population, technology, human resources and political stability (Hill, 1998: 23). In contrast, high expectations have emerged within and outside the EU for the EU to solve problems in third countries, to provide economic assistance to these countries in the form of trade facilitation and even access to the single market, and to create a new European order or an alternative identity to the US (Hill, 1998: 23-24). The negative correlation between these high expectations and capacities - at least post-Maastricht - became evident in the first international crisis the EU faced - the Balkan Crisis. In the words of Bretherton and Vogler (2006), the 'opportunity' structure that would have emerged in the international system and strengthened the EU's actorness could not be exploited due to the member states' unwillingness to fully relinquish their sovereignty rights and their limited involvement in defence and security issues at the EU level. In fact, despite the inability to formulate a coherent common foreign policy, the expectations that the EU would play an important role in world politics and the failure to respond to these expectations have led to the questioning of the EU's presence in international relations.

In order to close or reduce the capacity-expectation gap and to maintain the EU's presence as an effective actor in international relations, member states have made some innovations in the CFSP. As mentioned above, although there have been significant developments in EU foreign policy after the Maastricht Treaty, significant problems have continued to be experienced in the EU's effectiveness in international crises. The most striking examples of this situation were the Iraq War in 2003 and the Libya crisis in 2011. Although the member states took important decisions to increase the coherence of the EU foreign policy before these crises, no coherent policies could be formulated at the EU level against the crises. This situation stemmed from the high expectations of the member states towards the EU foreign policy. For example, the launch of military initiatives at the EU level with the Treaty of Nice led to the perception of the EU as a military power. In fact, the EU was expected to intervene as a military power in the Iraq Crisis. Likewise, with the Lisbon Treaty, the EU was considered to have evolved into a more effective military power and was requested by member states such as France to use this power in the Libyan Crisis. However, the EU has never been a military power throughout its history. Although military perspectives were put on the agenda at the EU level with the Treaties of Nice and Lisbon, the member states created this force to support the EU's traditional civilian and economic power. Therefore, in the Iraq and Libya Crises, member states were torn between military and civilian power approaches, which prevented the EU from making coherent foreign policy decisions. On the contrary, it has been observed that member states have managed to take decisions on these issues by supporting economic sanctions, peacekeeping and diplomatic processes. In this context, the member states have enabled the Europeanisation of their national foreign policies through joint foreign policy decisions within the framework of economic and civilian power elements at the EU level.

The EU's capacity and coherence have been established within the framework of the instruments it has at its disposal, thus avoiding high expectations (Hill, 1998: 29). However, international expectations are still very high. For example, the US expects the EU to take more responsibility for defense and security issues - in cooperation with NATO - and thus share its own responsibility, even though this has failed before. Developing countries are demanding more financial and technical assistance from the EU; more neighboring countries want to complete the accession process. Many countries also want the EU to be seen as a balancing force vis-à-vis Russia, the US and China. In the face of these expectations, the EU's capacity under the CFSP does not seem sufficient. Although there is an atmosphere in the international environment that would enable the EU to become an effective power as an international actor, the EU's own dynamics prevent it from doing so.

With its resources, the EU has the potential to be an influential actor in international relations. However, the desire of member states to protect national sovereignty against the desire to act collectively in world politics creates a tension. This has shaped the institutional structure of EU foreign policy. First and foremost, the intergovernmental nature of EU foreign policy limits the EU's influence in international affairs. Although the principle of qualified majority voting has been extended, the unanimity of the first decision-making stage does not bring about a significant change in the EU foreign policy. The lack of a radical change in the principle of unanimity due to the increase in the number of members - considering that there are 27 member states - makes it more difficult for the EU to take decisions in the field of foreign policy. In addition, despite the establishment of the CSDP and CSDP, limited cooperation between member states on defense and security issues has led to the EU's lack of military competence in responding to international crises. Still being dependent on NATO, and therefore on the US, for defense and security, reduces the EU's effectiveness in international crises. As a result, both the favorable international environment and the reluctance of member states to formulate an effective foreign policy despite the EU's capacity and resources often prevent the EU from becoming a coherent and sustainable international actor in international relations.

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