



All Necessary Measures? The United Nations and International Intervention in Libya

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In his book, Ian Martin, former head of United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), analyzes the decision-making process behind United Nations's (UN) military intervention in Libya by presenting every UN Security Council member's aspect. Although he states in the introduction that he shared the view that military action was justified to protect civilians, he examines whether this intervention crossed the line and what the results were. Martin focuses on international actors as United States of America (USA), United Kingdom (UK), Russia, France and the UN rather than to analyze the internal dynamics among Libyans. His research questions are based on how the international actors effect Libya within the framework the pragmatism.

Martin advocates that with the Resolution 1973, which includes the phrase "*all necessary measures*", Western countries aimed not only to prevent humanitarian catastrophe but also to provide Gaddafi's downfall in Libya. However, they also had experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan and therefore would not want to be responsible post-conflict role. The author indicates that post-conflict process was undermined by the interveners state which pursued "light footprint" policy and left the responsibility to the UN. According to him, while the UN intervention in conflict would take time, states which were effective in military intervention and had communication with the rebels, could provide the security in post-Gaddafi Libya. However, he adds the possibility that international military deployment could backlash. Its presence could complicate rather than facilitate the creation of national security forces as well as once established as a vital guarantor of stability on the ground, it would also be virtually impossible to withdraw. He also states that effective foreign states triggered the Libyan civil war by supporting different groups in post-conflict.

This book embodies six parts and the introduction. In these parts, the author treats foreign intervention to Libya and situation of post-intervene Libya by starting to cite Libya's uprising, in chronological order. Preferring a chronological narration makes this book more understandable. Just as Martin mentions his personal experience, he also refers to the speeches of state officials. So that, he able to provide first-hand account of the Libya crisis process.

First part, headed of "The case for intervention and the Security Council mandate", Martin sheds light on the turmoil in Libya during the Arab Uprising. As a human rights activist, Martin states details Gaddafi's disproportionation interference against the rebels. By starting Arab countries, he reveals perspectives on the uprising in Libya of permanent and non-permanent members of the UN Security Council and other countries from the region. He examines the decision-making process not only of the Obama Administration but also of Russia under President Medvedev's leadership by compiling speeches

of international actors and officials. In this section, he also draws attention to the different aspect of Arab states to Arab uprisings in the region, with the example of Bahrain. The second part begins with military intervention. The author shows how foreign intervention exceeds gradually, its unclear limits and presents every state's confusion related to aims of the Resolution 1973. In this section the reader can see that "Four Amigos - France, UK, United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Qatar" influential actors in the foreign intervention in Libya. In the first two parts, Martin reflects the course of events by quoting politicians' narratives rather than discussing the underlying reasons. In the same way, the question is answered in the third part that "was it possible to negotiate with Gaddafi during intervene?". Martin presents both the African Union (AU) and Western countries approach for the negotiated transition and accordingly the AU's approach was extenuated by Western countries especially UK - France, and plausible transit couldn't have been happened because Cameron and Sarkozy's attitude was not open for diplomatic negotiate with the regime's actors. He also highlights that there was reason to doubt whether Gaddafi would ever have been willing to give up power and share it. So, he abstains from the real critique about Western actors by presenting counterargument.

Even when one side is defeated and the conflict appears to have ended, chaos persists until order is fully restored. Therefore, the process of post-conflict reconstruction is just as important as conflict resolution itself. Martin discusses this issue on the third section headed: The day after: post-conflict planning. Here the author's main argument is that despite the Western states made various plans, these were thought falsely by assuming Libya is a small country. Also, they were not willing to prolong the multi-national military mission in Libya due to their experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan. Another point that the author highlights is there are Libya's tribes which plays a decisive role. Also, Libyan's were not willing for a foreign intervention during post-conflict process. In the fifth part contains that process of constitution-making was not well managed with these reasons; the security problem was caused by rebels who remained with weapons after their uprising, frozen accounts during the Gaddafi's attacks, efforts of revitalizing the economy and political factionalism are the factors on Libya's post-conflict agenda.

This book points out the span of 2011-2012, queries the basis of Libyan civil war as well. According to Martin, the foreign actors exacerbated the divisions among Libyans rather than overcoming them. Therefore, it can be concluded that the interventionist states ignited the civil war in Libya. The handicap of this book related to post-conflict chaos is that it is directed criticism to Qatar and the UAE for supporting Islamist groups though Western states criticized for neglecting Libya. This aspect minimizes the negative role of Western states.

As Martin highlights, Resolution 1973 has constituted an example for the UN Security Council resolutions. In the future, it is unlikely that a resolution including the phrase "all necessary measures" will be made again. Because this vague expression leads to exceed mandate, to cancel the transparency and accountability for the sake of state's national interest. A distinctive feature of this book is that it is based on the issue of foreign intervention to Libya, contains the authors experience and thoughts who was a UN official. Additionally, he presents a retrospective assessment related to his mission of UNSMIL and criticizes himself.

This book is more interested in Libya policies of intervener states rather than presenting a deep analysis. While it may not be sufficient for those who seek comprehensive understanding of Libya crisis, it establishes general framework for process of foreign intervention to Libya in terms of every single global and regional power. Martin effectively captures a snapshot of the Libya's crisis and foreign intervention during 2011-2012.