Moral Boundaries in a Globalized World: A Critique of Nationalism

Küreselleşen Dünyada Ahlaki Sınırlar: Bir Milliyetçilik Eleştirisi

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Abstract

This article explores the moral and ethical limitations and partiality inherent in nationalism in an increasingly interconnected world, focusing on Benedict Anderson's famous definition of nationalism. Drawing on existentialist philosophy, it first focuses on the relationship between language, culture, and society, emphasizing that human subjectivity is shaped by the relationship between them. From an interdisciplinary perspective, it takes nationalism as a discourse and critiques the essentialist understanding of culture that gives soul to imagined communities and the exclusionary moral framework that this understanding entails. It draws attention to the sedantarist metaphysics that nationalist ideology establishes between the nation and the territory, and to the fact that this metaphysics draws an unbridgeable boundary between "us" and "them." Against the moral partiality of nationalism, the paper discusses cosmopolitanism as an alternative moral stance that transcends national boundaries and analyzes its applicability. The absence of a central global sovereign institution and the inequality-producing nature of capitalism are highlighted as obstacles to both a cosmopolitan morality and global justice. As a solution to these limitations, the article stresses the need for new transformative languages and narratives that transcend the limiting discourse of nationalism and give rise to a global moral and ethical consciousness.

Özet

Bu makale, Benedict Anderson'ın ünlü milliyetçilik tanımına odaklanarak, giderek birbirine daha fazla bağlanan bir dünyada milliyetçiliğin doğasında bulunan ahlaki ve etik sınırlamaları ve tarafgirliği araştırmaktadır. Makalede, varoluşçu felsefeden yola çıkarak, öncelikle dil, kültür ve toplum arasındaki ilişkiye odaklanılmakta ve insan öznelliğinin bunlar arasındaki ilişki tarafından şekillendirildiği vurgulanmaktadır. Çalışma disiplinlerarası bir bakış açısıyla, milliyetçiliği bir söylem olarak ele alıyor ve hayali topluluklara ruh veren özcü kültür anlayışını ve bu anlayışın içerdiği dışlayıcı ahlaki çerçeveyi eleştiriyor. Milliyetçi ideolojinin millet ve toprak arasında kurduğu sedantarist metafiziğe ve bu metafiziğin "biz" ve "onlar" arasında çizdiği aşılamaz sınıra dikkat çekiliyor. Çalışma, milliyetçiliğin ahlaki tarafgirliğine karşı, ulusal sınırları aşan alternatif bir ahlaki duruş olarak kozmopolitanizmi tartışmakta ve uygulanabilirliğini analiz etmektedir. Dahası, merkezi bir küresel egemen kurumun yokluğu ve kapitalizmin eşitsizlik üreten doğası, hem kozmopolit bir ahlakın hem de küresel adaletin önündeki engeller olarak vurgulanmaktadır. Bu kısıtlamalara bir çözüm olarak, milliyetçiliğin sınırlayıcı söylemini aşan ve küresel bir ahlaki ve etik bilince yol açan yeni dönüştürücü dillere ve anlatılara duyulan ihtiyaca vurgu yapılmaktadır.

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INTRODUCTION

Existential philosophy posits that existence comes before essence, yet since the ancient Greeks, there has been a prevailing belief that individuals possess a predetermined essence that defines their identity. Jean Paul Sartre claims that contrary to the widespread belief that human beings have a predetermined essence, there is no such thing. According to him, we exist first and then create our essence through our choices (Sartre, 1946). Existentialist philosophy, despite its emancipatory nature, places a great responsibility on the shoulders of human beings, there is no escaping the fact that not choosing is also choosing, and there is no ethical guide to turn to, and this is the human condition that Sartre describes as "...man is condemned to be free" (Sartre, 1956: 8). This perspective entails significant moral ramifications, particularly concerning the question of how and on what basis one should interact with other human beings.

In this article, we will address the limits of nationalist morality, particularly in the context of Benedict Anderson's definition of nationalism and the moral dilemmas it poses in today's multicultural and globalized world. To put this in context, we will first examine the relationship between language, culture, and society, then consider the concept of nationalism as a discourse, and analyze power relations within it. Finally, we will discuss whether a cosmopolitan approach is an alternative to the moral limitation underlying nationalist mindset. This article contributes to the existing debate by offering an interdisciplinary perspective. It highlights two important points. First, it highlights the metaphysical nature of the moral partiality inherent in nationalism and the potential dangers it poses in times of social crisis. Second, it underlines the inability of nationalism to adequately address the socio-economic needs of the contemporary global and multicultural world.

1.   THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN LANGUAGE, CULTURE AND SOCIETY

From an existential perspective, human beings first exist and then their essence is created by many circumstances, including their own choices. Given the circumstances in which people find themselves, it can be argued that we are all born into a world shaped by others, and we find ourselves in a particular time and place in this world. Humans are inherently social beings, as evidenced by our need for mutual support and care, which plays a pivotal role in the development of our individual subjectivity and determines the universal human condition. Regarding this aspect of humanity, Isiah Berlin, when asked what animal he identified with, once replied, "A penguin, because penguins live in colonies, they cannot survive on their own" (Tamir, 2019: 44). This tells us a lot about human nature. What makes us different from other animals is a relevant question we should be asking. The human capacity for language is what sets us apart from other species. As Lyn H. Lofland (1973) puts, language frees us from

> "…the slavery of simple reactivity, from the bondage of stimulus-response. It allows us to control and direct our relationship with an object by naming it and giving it meaning, rather than simply receiving a stimulus from it. It also liberates us by causing us to develop a sense of self among other members of our species. We thereby distinguish ourselves from our physical and biological environment" (Lofland, 1973: 13).

Perhaps this is why Martin Heidegger, one of the most important figures in 20th century philosophy, says that "language is the house of being" (Heidegger, 1993: 83). Lofland (1973) also explains another aspect of human beings in terms of their linguistic capacity. She argues that the linguistic creation of the self has some ramifications. Like other living beings, humans experience fear or anxiety in the face of physical injury or death; however, in addition to these responses, they also show a similar response to potential "nonphysical" ones. This suggests that humans prioritize not only their physical well-being, but also their sense of self. The self may take precedence over the body in cases where people commit suicide in the face of the need to maintain the integrity of it (Lofland, 1973: 13-14). This is important in the sense that it can give us insights into understanding people who sacrifice their lives for their country thanks to nationalist ideologies, which, when we think about it, are only abstract constructions. To understand the phenomenon of people destroying their physical bodies in order to preserve the integrity of the self, it is necessary to place the self in the broader context of culture and society.

The question of how society is possible has been posed by many philosophers and sociologists. One such figure is the German critic and philosopher/sociologist Georg Simmel. His definition of sociology is helpful in this regard. For Simmel, the constant interactions that take place between human beings are so crucial to the emergence of what we call society. He says,

> "That people look at one another and are jealous of one another; that they exchange letters or have dinner together; that apart from all tangible interests they strike one another as pleasant or unpleasant; that gratitude for altruistic acts makes for inseparable union; that one asks another to point out a certain street; that people dress and adorn themselves for each other—these are a few casually chosen illustrations from the whole range of relations that play between one person and another. They may be momentary or permanent, conscious or unconscious, ephemeral or of grave consequence, but they incessantly tie men together. At each moment such threads are spun, dropped, taken up again, displaced by others, interwoven with others" (Wolff, 1964: 10).

In essence, Simmel equates society with interaction. "Society ... is only the synthesis or the general term for the totality of these specific interactions" (as cited in Ritzer, 2011: 166). Simmel's theoretical framework is characterized by the principle of emergence, which posits that higher levels of social organization emerge from lower levels (Ritzer, 2011: 159). Simmel's primary concern is the fact that individuals create social structures through their interactions with other human beings and are simultaneously profoundly affected by these structures. George Ritzer, citing Simmel's ideas, points out that the mind can help people escape from enslavement by external stimuli, but at the same time, it can also reify the social reality that may eventually come to enslave them. (Ritzer, 2011: 166). This can be better understood through Simmel's discussion of the formation of a triad (group of three) from a dyad (group of two). Simmel says that the addition of a third person to a dyad causes a radical change, because in a dyadic group no meaning develops beyond the two existing members, and the group disintegrates when one of the two decides to leave the group. With the third person, however, an independent group structure emerges, and the departure of one of the group members does not lead to the dissolution of the group, so that a structure emerges that is independent of the individuals and influences them. With the addition of the third person, social roles become possible. The third person can take on different roles, such as a mediator, an arbitrator, or someone who can pit other members against each other for their own benefit (Wolff, 1964: 118-125). Society and social institutions emerge as the result of the increasing number of people entering certain groups.

Culture, which can be conceptualized as the content that shapes human interactions, matters. As the renowned cultural theorist Raymond Williams asserts, culture is "one of the two or three most complicated words in the English language" (Williams, 2008: 16). For Williams, it is "the signifying system through which necessarily (though among other means) a social order is communicated, reproduced, experienced, and explored" (as cited in Mitchell, 1995: 104). Another definition is given by Peter Jackson; cultures are "maps of meaning through which the world is made intelligible" (as cited in Mitchell, 1995: 104). As can be seen, culture stands out as a difficult concept to define, and the fact that it is difficult to define, as some have argued, has made culture a useful tool for organizing distinctions and arraying power. Yet, Williams identifies three uses of the term, which "(i) ... describes a general process of intellectual, spiritual and aesthetic development, from the eighteenth century; (ii) … indicates a particular way of life … ; (iii) ... describes the works and practices of intellectual and especially artistic activity" (Williams, 2008: 18).

The second definition of culture, culture as a way of life, is particularly relevant to the social sciences. This version of culture suggests the existence of a world made up of a multitude of different cultures, each firmly rooted in its own geographical territory, as nationalism posits: "'A culture' as the property of an identifiable collectivity, and hence cultures (plural) consisting of identifiable peoples who are carriers of that culture: 'the specificities of being Norwegian'" (Grillo, 2003: 159). This is referred to as the essentialist version of culture, characterized by its perception as fixed, bounded, and rooted. However, a review of the literature will reveal that culture is in fact fluid, dynamic, and open to change.

2. DISCOURSE, POWER, AND THE FORMATION OF SUBJECTIVITY

Culture matters because of its naturalizing power; it is culture that creates and shapes the common sense in a given society. Don Mitchell (1995) underscores the underlying power relations at play when discussing culture, asserting that it is a means by which "the other" is defined, regulated, and established. He argues that "the idea of culture has been actualized in social practice, one way in which the empty abstraction of 'culture' has been filled and solidified with social meaning and structuring impulses, one way that, while there is no such thing as culture, the idea of culture becomes very real indeed." (Mitchell, 1995: 104). In order to understand the nature of power relations naturalized by culture, it is necessary to engage with Foucault's concept of discourse. Michael Foucault is one of the most important figures in critical theory. According to Sara Mills, one of his achievements is the fact that he was able to theorize without using the concepts of the subject and the economy, despite their widespread currency in the intellectual life of his era. For Mills, this is because these terms are used in an essentialist way, and Foucault argues that despite their "self-evident nature," they are in fact unstable (Mills, 2003: 4). Their instability can be understood through the role of discourse in their creation. Foucault uses the concept of discourse to refer to "regulated practices that account for a number of statements" (Mills, 2003: 53), these regulated practices are the unwritten rules that enable, constrain and constitute us. John Storey (2015) provides a clear explanation of what discourse does,

> "Discourses work in three ways: they enable, they constrain, and they constitute. As Foucault (1989) explains, discourses are "practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak" (49). Language, for example, is a discourse: it enables me to speak, it constrains what I can say; it constitutes me as a speaking subject (i.e. it situates and produces my subjectivity: I know myself in language; I think in language; I talk to myself in language)" (Storey, 2015: 133).

Given that even our own subjectivity is produced by discourses, we can argue that it is not innate and does not possess a predetermined essence, as existentialist philosophers claim. Here, as Mills suggests, we should also focus on the notion of exclusion. A discourse exists because "a complex set of practices" keeps it in circulation at the expense of other discourses (Mills, 2003: 54). Discourses produce knowledge, and it is through this knowledge that we perceive reality. Here we see the relationship between power and knowledge because we can classify and organize the behavior of individuals and shape what

is "normal" and acceptable. Discourse produces the truths, by which we live our lives. As Storey puts "'regimes of truth' do not have to be 'true'; they have only to be thought of as 'true' and acted on as if 'true'" (Storey, 2015: 135). As Laclau and Mouffe explain, discourses even structure our understanding of the external world,

> "An earthquake or the falling of a brick is an event that certainly exists, in the sense that it occurs here and now, independently of my will. But whether their specificity as objects is constructed in terms of 'natural phenomena' or expressions of 'the wrath of God' depends on the structuring of a discursive field." (as cited in Mills, 2003: 56).

From a Foucauldian perspective, we can see culture, especially national culture, as a discourse. In this way we can understand how powerful nationalism can be in one's life and its impact on individual moral choices, as even the concept of self is a byproduct of it.

3. NATIONALISM AS A DISCOURSE, AND ETHICAL PROBLEMS

The moral implications of nationalism can now be addressed. According to Ernest Gellner, nationalism considers the national and political entity to be congruent, which refers to the assumption that there is a link between ethnicity and the state. Therefore, a nation-state is a state dominated by a specific ethnicity and its culture (Eriksen, 2010: 119). We argue that nationalism can be conceptualized as a discursive construction.

We will now examine the definition of nationalism proposed by Benedict Anderson, a leading figure in the field of nationalism studies, emphasizing its moral implications. Anderson, best known for his seminal book *Imagined Communities*, defines nationalism as follows: "…it is an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign. It is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion" (Anderson, 2006: 6). This is a good definition that reveals, so to speak, the ontology of nationalism; it is imagined as limited because, as Anderson explains, even the largest nation has a finite boundary, and beyond that boundary there are other nations. "No nation imagines itself coterminous with mankind" says Anderson (Anderson, 2006: 7). He continues his explanation by focusing on the sovereignty of the nation. It is imagined as sovereign because it was born in an age where divine authority was destroyed by the Enlightenment and Revolution, so there is no authority above it. Finally, it is imagined as a community in which each subject of the nation-state is considered equal in a "horizontal comradeship," regardless of the inequalities and exploitations that take place. Anderson concludes that it is characteristic of nationalism, namely the idea of comradeship among members, that makes people kill and willingly die for their nations. Anderson highlights the role of culture by saying "I believe that the beginnings of an answer lie in the cultural roots of nationalism" (Anderson, 2006: 7). As Thomas Hylland Eriksen says that both Anderson and Gellner emphasize that nations are an ideological construction to establish a link between a cultural group and a state (Eriksen, 2010: 120).

Viewing a nation as an imagined community that belongs to a particular territory has some serious moral implications. In this way, as Karen Wren (Wren, 2001: 145) points out, there must be some "others" who do not belong to these imagined communities and therefore do not share their "common interest" and must be excluded. The nationalist mindset sees the world through an "us" vs. "them" mentality, and in this scheme, "us" is always associated with "good" and the rest is "bad." This has something to do with the idea of viewing the nation through kinship metaphors. Eriksen also states that kinship terms are used in nationalist discourses, such as motherland, father of the nation, etc., and in this way nation is seen as a form of metaphorical kinship (Eriksen, 2010: 130). Let alone limiting morality to a limited "we", the danger here is that a perspective that privileges "us", combined with some racist discourses, is susceptible to an ideology that sees "others" as inherently evil or inferior.

The relationship between a nation and its territory plays a crucial role in nationalist metaphysics. This issue is explored by Liisa Malkki (2008), who speaks of a "sedentarist metaphysics" embedded in nationalist discourse. For Malkki, the commonsense assumption of the link between nation and territory is deeply metaphysical. She shows how this natural link between identity and place is conceived in botanical metaphors. She explains it as follows: "Motherland and fatherland, aside from their other historical connotations, suggest that each nation is a grand genealogical tree, rooted in the soil that nourishes it. By implication, it is impossible to be a part of more than one tree" (Malkki, 2008: 278). Malkki points out the moral implications of this sedentarist metaphysics. She argues that in the national discourse, rootedness is not only normal but it is also regarded as morally good and a spiritual need. Analyzing the situation of refugees from this perspective, Malkki makes the following observation, "refugees' loss of bodily connection to their national homelands came to be treated as a loss of moral bearings. Rootless, they were no longer trustworthy as 'honest citizens'" (Malkki, 2008: 280). The reaction against "the other" in nationalist discourses can be also explained by social psychology. Alfred Schuetz (1944) underlines the importance of the "cultural pattern of group life" in the group life, which represents "all the peculiar valuations, institutions, and systems of orientations and guidance (such as the folkways, mores, laws, habits, costums, etiquette, fashions)" (Schuetz, 1944: 499). According to Schuetz, for a member of the group, the cultural pattern is not the object of his or her thought, and he or she is not aware of it, but uses it because of its relevance to his or her actions. Because he or she is born into the cultural

pattern, the pattern is seen as "normal." Refugees or the "others" of a given society do not see the world through the cultural pattern of a national community, and therefore everything that is considered unquestionable by the national community can be questioned from their point of view. This subjects them to scrutiny in terms of their loyalty to the national group. In others words, using Schuetz's metaphor, they do not believe in "idols of the tribe." As Schuetz explains, "…very frequently the reproach of doubtful loyalty originates in the astonishment of the members of the in-group that the stranger does not accept the total of its cultural pattern as the natural and appropriate way of life and as the best of all possible solutions of any problem" (Schuetz, 1944: 507).

In a similar fashion, today, especially in the face of increasing migratory movements, we see the far right trying to legitimize its exclusionary policies with culture-based arguments. In this sense, Steven Vertovec underlines that migrant cultures are increasingly posed as a threat to national cultures. Therefore, we see that deeper social problems lie at the heart of debates on cultural symbols. For example, citing Bourdieu, Vertovec points out that behind the open question of whether Islamic headscarves should be worn in schools is the hidden question of whether immigrants of North African origin should be accepted in France (Vertovec, 2011). Ralph David Grillo has drawn attention to why an essentialist version of culture and anxiety about "our" culture is so prevalent in politics and media and both in majority and minority populations. He claims that this anxiety is articulated through an essentialist conception of culture due to the processes of nationalization and nation-building, which engender a sense of unique, homogeneous, and national cultural identities. He argues that cultural anxiety can be seen as a response to an expanding modernity, in the sense that the increasing uncertainties associated with globalization give rise to such anxiety (Grillo, 2003).

We can read the history of the world as the history of migration; people have always migrated for different reasons. In the world we live in today, even if we talk about a political organization based on nation-states, today's societies are in fact multicultural societies. In this sense, multiculturalism refers to the strategies and policies proposed to deal with the problem of diversity and multiplicity. Notably, Stuart Hall, a preeminent scholar in the field of cultural studies, underscores the "transruptive effects" of the multi-cultural question. One of the transruptive effects that Hall discusses challenges the foundations of the liberal constitutional state and the dominant discourse of Western political theory. It has challenged the universality of liberal, rational, and humanist Western culture, revealing that liberalism is not a culture beyond cultures, but a culture that has won the struggle for supremacy. As he points out, universal citizenship and cultural neutrality have been two cornerstones of this liberal discourse. But cultural neutrality only works if the cultural homogeneity of the governed is assumed. For example, Hall emphasizes that England is not only a political sovereign and territorial entity, but also an imagined community, and that this imagined community is where identification and belonging are determined. Therefore, Hall argues that it is only within culture that identification with this imagined community can be constructed (Hall, 2019).

We can propose that one of the transruptive effects of the multi-cultural question is its challenge to the moral partiality of nationalism. It raises moral questions and provides a starting point for philosophers to grapple with these ethical issues. In this regard, as Dan Smith highlights, the fundamental question that emerges pertains to the question of whether we should adopt an egalitarian stance towards all individuals or whether we should favor some over others. Is nationalism an acceptable basis for such favoritism? (Smith, 2000). There are studies that offer a (moral) defense of nationalism. For example, Yuel Tamir, in a recent study, proposes a liberal nationalism. According to him, globalization has failed to replace nationalism and does not satisfy modern man's need to belong, to be part of a creative community. She also recognizes that a community cannot be both meaningful and completely open. As she puts it, "the more meaningful a community is to its members the more exclusive it would be to all others," and thus she argues that "some sacrifices must be made in order to allow democratic states the ability to be politically and culturally engaging is an important political lesson" (Tamir, 2019, 157). Moreover, in another study titled "Why nationalism? Because nothing else works," she argues that nationalism is the only working system we have, as evidenced by the Covid pandemic (Y. Tamir, 2020). She draws attention to the relationship between nationalism and multiculturalism, arguing that social and political attitudes toward others distinguish types of nationalism, and that liberal nationalism demands self-determination to preserve identity but does not do so by promoting a feeling of superiority or xenophobia. In this sense, Tamir argues that the only working mechanism we have is nationalism, and therefore she proposes to reform it. Another important thinker, David Miller, suggests that we can justifiably prioritize our own compatriots over strangers. He emphasizes that ethical universalism neglects the social identities that shape people, that people are not rational abstractions but embedded beings in a social context. Even if nations are imagined communities based on certain myths or false beliefs, people whose identities are shaped by a national community will be more committed to their compatriots than to others. Therefore, it is morally justifiable to prioritize one's own compatriots over others (Miller, 1988). Both Tamir's and Miller's views are not exempt from the criticisms we have outlined above. Especially in times of crisis, nationalism (whether liberal or right-wing) can turn into or support extreme authoritarian or racist ideologies because of its inherent metaphysical partiality. The view that nationalism is the only working system neglects its historicity and contingency, and while it is true that nationalism shapes one's identity and binds one more closely to those who share the same identity, this perspective does not require us to ignore that nationalism as a discourse always reflects power relations.

4. COSMOPOLITANISM: A MORAL ALTERNATIVE?

The partiality of nationalism leads us to a global problem of justice. In a related article, renowned philosopher Thomas Nagel addresses the issue of global justice and the challenges it poses. In addressing the idea of global justice, he focuses on the relationship between justice, sovereignty, and equality. He refers to Hobbes's ideas on justice and sovereignty and points out that justice among people is only possible under the condition of a sovereign government. On the relationship between justice and equality, he draws on Rawls's ideas, emphasizing that equality is a political claim that applies to the nation-state, not to the non-political choices of people living in a given society, or to the relationship between one society and another, or to the relationship between people in different societies. According to Nagel, an individual's response to injustices in the world depends on their moral conception. In this regard, the first conception to be examined is that of cosmopolitanism (Nagel, 2017).

As Chris Durante points out, cosmopolitanism is usually perceived in contrast to nationalism, in which the term is used as an indication of loyalty to the world instead of the state (Durante, 2014: 313). Indeed, cosmopolitanism is a worldview older than nationalism. Diogenes of Sinope, a cynic philosopher in Ancient Greek, can be considered as the first cosmopolitan. When asked where he was from, Diogenes replies "I am a citizen of the world" (Warf, 2012: 276), which can also be considered the cosmopolitan motto. With globalization and advances in communication and transportation, people are now more interconnected, and these developments have led to the idea of a global world community. In particular, as Simon During points out, humanity's voyages into space and seeing the world "from above" reinforce this idea, which allows us to imagine a global community (During, 2005: 86). Barney Warf's description of cosmopolitanism can be useful here,

> "'cosmopolitanism' may be defined as an ethical, moral and political philosophy that seeks to uncouple ethics from distance, arguing that each person is bound up with, and obligated to, humanity as whole. Cosmopolitans are moral universalists and insist on the inherent worthiness and dignity of all individuals, irrespective of their place of birth. In this view, no legitimate grounds exist for maintaining that some people- fellow nationals, community members, coreligionists- are more worthy than other people are; that is, those who live far away are culturally different or not constitutive elements of one's self-defined community. The accident of where one is born is just that – an accident" (Warf, 2012: 272).

From a Marxist perspective, we can argue that the base structure that will lead to a cosmopolitan superstructure has been formed. For example, due to globalization and capitalism, the world is becoming more interconnected, and nation-states can no longer control their borders and economy, and this changing nature of the economic system undermines the nation-state. Therefore, it will eventually lead to a new type of social organization based on cosmopolitan ideals. As Gellner, Grillo, and others have argued, national ideology emerged as a reaction to industrialization that stripped people of their local communities and ties of belonging. As displaced people came to the cities for work, there was a need to organize them efficiently; religion, kinship, and feudalism were no longer an option (Eriksen, 2010: 125). Following this, cosmopolitans argue that since nationalism is a result of the changing economic structure, the new era of globalization will lead to a cosmopolitan world. Furthermore, some argue that a cosmopolitan ethos becomes a necessary condition. As Marinus Ossewaarde (2007) puts it,

> "While the cosmopolitan type of classical sociology emerged, as a national audience, with the event of the national media, Nussbaum's world citizen comes to the fore with the event of the global media, as a global audience. With a global media, corporations and governments can no longer keep atrocities secret, while people, as instant spectators, can no longer feign ignorance as if they did not know about what happens to strangers" (Ossewaarde, 2007: 376).

Cosmopolitans also point to the dangers of nationalistic mindset. Given the advances in weaponry and weapons of mass destruction, as Ulric Beck points out, the total annihilation of humanity becomes possible, and therefore the cosmopolitan ethos is necessary not only for an ethical ideal, but also for global survival (Osseewaade, 2007: 379).

Nagel's second conception of morality is what he calls the political conception, which sees the absence of a global authority as an insurmountable obstacle to the application of the cosmopolitan conception of morality for the foreseeable future. The political concept, based on Rawls's view of justice as a political value, does not see justice as existing prior to institutions and nation-states as the means of realizing it, but rather gives justice its value because the existence of these states creates a duty/bond of justice between the people living in a given state through the social, economic, and legal institutions that bind them together. Therefore, justice is an associative obligation. As Nagel says, although there is a significant difference between the two perspectives, both conceptions ultimately require global sovereignty (Nagel, 2017).

Capitalism, which plays an important role in the emergence of nationalism, is another major obstacle to global justice. Immanuel Wallerstein argues that capitalism is "a system that operates by a tense link between the right dosage of universalism and racism-sexism" (Wallerstein, 1991: 35). Here, Wallerstein claims that universalism has been fostered by a capitalist world economy. The logic is that the system is built on the endless accumulation of capital and the commodification of almost everything. By implication, commodities should be freely distributed around the world. Anything that restricts the flow of commodities goes against the logic of capitalism. Therefore, universalism against any kind of particularism is

promoted by the capitalist system. Wallerstein explains that as a result of the universal worldview, we create a meritocratic system in which occupational positions are given to the most talented. But he explains that, contrary to common sense, the meritocratic system is politically one of the least stable,

> "While privilege earned by inheritance has long been at least marginally acceptable to the oppressed on the basis of mystical or fatalistic beliefs in an eternal order, which belief at least offers them the comfort of certainty, privilege earned because one is possibly smarter and certainly better educated than someone else is extremely difficult to swallow, except by the few who are basically scrambling up the ladder" (Wallerstain, 1991: 32).

For Wallerstein, this is where racism and sexism come in to justify the inequalities in society. Racism, either biological or cultural, works best here because it provides a justification that also provides stability and helps capitalists maximize accumulation by reducing the cost of labor through unequal wages. Therefore, he put it "there are always some who are 'niggers'. If there are no Blacks or too few to play the role, one can invent 'White niggers'" (Wallerstain, 1991: 34).

5. CONCLUSION

As Ernest Gellner, a prominent figure in the study of critical nationalism, says: "Nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where they do not exist" (as cited in Eriksen, 2010: 117). We see that this social construction is invented by certain historical, economic, and psychological forces. Beginning with the famous existentialist motto "existence precedes essence," we emphasize that the burden of our moral responsibility rests entirely on our own backs and cannot be confined to the boundaries of constructed ideologies such as nationalism.

To uncover the partiality of nationalism, we examined the role of language and culture in the construction of the self. We discussed the importance of language and sociality in the creation of the self, and how humans can go so far as to sacrifice their own existence to protect the integrity of the self. We explored how society emerges from the constant interactions of individuals, and how the society we create becomes independent of us and eventually dominates us. We pointed out that culture, as a form of interaction, constitutes the content of society, and that in this sense it is both created by humans and a phenomenon that shapes the human self.

We showed how culture is commonly understood as a way of life that belongs to a particular people, "a nation," as if it were something timeless, limited, fixed, and rooted, and we pointed out how this plays an important role in power relations. To make this clearer, we have referred to Foucault's concept of discourse and the role that discourses play in the creation of human subjectivity. We pointed out that nationalism, as a discourse, derives its power from this, and that it would be a natural consequence for the self shaped by nationalist discourses to sacrifice itself for the existence of the nation, or for its sense of morality to be limited to the borders of the nation. We do not lose sight of the fact that nationalism provides psychological security by giving people's lives a context in which they can define themselves. But we also see that nationalism is inherently biased, giving moral priority to members of the nation.

We explored whether cosmopolitanism, which conflicts with the nationalist worldview because it advocates a universal morality that transcends national boundaries, might be an alternative. We did this in the context of the debate about whether global justice is possible. We pointed out that the main obstacle to both global justice and cosmopolitan morality is the lack of a centralized, sovereign global institution. But we argue that the absence of such an institution does not absolve us of moral responsibility. In the contemporary world, especially with the weapons of mass destruction that technological developments have created, it is a serious existential problem that human beings morally limit themselves with artificial boundaries and prioritize/favor those who remain within those boundaries. In conclusion, this article contributes to existing debates by highlighting the metaphysical nature of the moral partiality inherent in nationalism and the potential dangers it poses in times of social crisis, focusing on the inability of nationalism to adequately respond to the socio-economic needs of the contemporary global and multicultural world. We argue that the moral partiality of nationalist discourses will persist or remain hidden as long as we do not challenge the status quo, using the transformative effects of language and new narratives.

GENİŞLETİLMİŞ ÖZET

Benedict Anderson'ın milliyetçiliği "hayali cemaatler" olarak kavramsallaştırmasına odaklanan bu makale, giderek birbirine bağlanan bir dünyada milliyetçiliğin doğasında bulunan ahlaki sınırlamaları ve tarafgirliği araştırmaktadır. Varoluşçu felsefeden hareketle, insan öznelliği ile dil, kültür ve toplum arasındaki ilişkiyi disiplinler arası bir perspektiften analiz ederek, milliyetçi ideolojilerin dayandığı özcü kültür anlayışını ve bu anlayışın ortaya koyduğu dışlayıcı ahlaki çerçeveyi incelemektedir.

Makale, varoluşçu felsefenin varlık özden önce gelir sözü doğrultusunda, evrensel insanlık durumunu oluşturan şartlara dikkat çekmektedir. Buna göre insan kendini başkaları tarafından şekillendirilmiş bir dünyaya doğar halde bulur, bu süreçte karşılıklı destek ve bakıma ihtiyaç duyması nedeniyle sosyal bir canlı olarak ortaya çıkar. Kendisini, diğer canlılardan ayıran en önemli özelliği ise dilsel kapasitesi olarak öne çıkar. Dil, insanın nesnelere isim ve anlam vermesini sağlayarak basit tepkiselliğin esaretinden kurtarır ve onu kendi türünün diğer üyelerinden ayıran bir benlik duygusu geliştirmesine imkan sağlar. Makale benliğin dilsel inşasının bazı sonuçlarına dikkat çekmektedir. Örneğin insan diğer hayvanların aksine sadece fiziksel tehlikeler karşısında korku ve kaygı duymamakta, aynı zamanda fiziksel olmayan, bir diğer değişle sosyal ve kültürel olan, şeylere karşı da benzer duygular geliştirebilmektedir. Buna örnek olarak itibarını korumak için intihar eden kişiyi gösterebiliriz.

Makale, toplumun bireylerin sonsuz etkileşimleri sonucunda ortaya çıktığını, toplumun bir etkileşim formu olduğunu ve bu formun içeriğinin kültür tarafından doldurulduğunu, bireylerin oluşturduğu toplumun bireylerden bağımsız bir yapı kazanarak bireylere hükmedecek bir yapıya evrildiğini vurguluyor. Makalede, kültür kavramının insanların davranışlarını şekillendirmesi açısından önemli olduğu tartışılmış ve kavramın karmaşık ve tanımlanması zor yapısına dikkat çekilmiştir. Özellikle bir yaşam biçimini ifade eden kültür kavramının günümüzde siyasette ve gündelik dilde yaygınlaştığı ve bu kavramın arkasında güç ilişkilerinin olduğu savunulmuştur. Kültürün normalleştirici gücüne, diğer bir deyişle bir toplumda ortak aklın inşasındaki rolüne değinilen makalede, Foucault'nun söylem kavramına atıfta bulunularak kültür ve güç arasındaki ilişki ortaya konulmuştur. Foucaultcu bir bakış açısıyla kültürü, özellikle de milli kültürü bir söylem olarak ele alan makalede, söylemin benliğin oluşumundaki rolüne dikkat çekilerek milliyetçiliğin bireylerin hayatında, özellikle de ahlaki tercihlerin oluşumunda ne kadar etkili olabileceği ortaya konulmuştur.

Makalede, Benedict Anderson'ın ünlü milliyetçilik tanımı ele alınmaktadır. Anderson milliyetçiliği hayali bir siyasi topluluk (cemaat) olarak tanımlar. Bu hayali topluluk doğası gereği sınırlı ve egemendir çünkü en büyük ulusun bile sınırları vardır. Bir topluluk olarak tahayyül edilir çünkü bir ulus-devlette her üye, var olan tüm eşitsizliklere rağmen, yatay düzlemde bir yoldaşlık bağı içinde eşit olarak tahayyül edilir. Anderson, üyeler arasındaki bu yoldaşlık bağının, insanları ulusları için ölmeye ve öldürmeye istekli kılan şey olduğunu söylüyor ve burada kültürün rolünün altını çiziyor. Makale, ulusu belli bir toprağa ait bir hayali cemaat olarak gören anlayışın ciddi ahlaki sorunları da beraberinde getirdiğini, ulusa ait olmayan ötekilerin dışlandığını, milliyetçi anlayışın dünyayı "onlar bize karşı" zihniyeti ile görerek, "bizi" çoğu zaman "iyi" ile "onları" ise "kötü" ile bağdaştırdığını öne sürmektedir. Anavatan, ulusun babası gibi ulusu akrabalık metaforları aracılığıyla gören milliyetçi ideolojilerin buradaki rolüne de dikkat çekilmiştir. Anavatan gibi kavramların, ulus ile toprak arasındaki ilişkiyi botanik terimler üzerinden kurgulayarak bir metafiziğe yol açtığı vurgulanmıştır. Bu anlayışta ulus, kendisini besleyen toprağa kök salmış bir soy ağacı olarak görülüyor. Dolayısıyla birden fazla ağacın parçası olamayacağınız gibi, bir ulusa da sonradan ait olamazsınız. Bu metafizikte yerinden edilenler, örneğin göçmenler ve mülteciler, hoş karşılanmayan ve güvenilemeyen kişiler olarak ortaya çıkar. Makale, ahlakı sınırlı bir "biz" ile sınırlandıran bu anlayışın, bazı ırkçı söylemlerle de birleşerek, "ötekileri" doğası gereği kötü ya da aşağı gören bir zihniyete yöneldiğinin altını çizmiştir. Özellikle uluslaşma ve ulus inşası süreçlerinin bir sonucu olarak ortaya çıkan, kültürü bir ulusa ait özgün ve homojen bir şey olarak gören özcü anlayışın, günümüzde göçmenlere karşı geliştirilen dışlayıcı dilin ana kaynağı olduğu ileri sürülmüştür.

Makale, çok kültürlülük ile tanımlanan günümüz global dünyasında milliyetçiliğin ahlaki tarafgirliğinin sürdürülemeyeceğini vurgulayarak, bir alternatif olarak, sadakatin bir devlete veya millete değil, tüm insanlığa karşı olması gerektiğini savunan, ahlakı mesafeden ayıran kozmopolitanizmin uygulanabilirliğini araştırmaktadır. Makalede, kozmopolitan ahlakın uygulanmasının önündeki ciddi sistemsel engellerin varlığı vurgulanmıştır. Bunlar arasında, küresel egemen bir otoritenin olmayışı ve kapitalizmin eşitsizlik üreten yapısı öne çıkmıştır. Sonuç olarak bu makale, milliyetçiliğin doğasında var olan ahlaki tarafgirliğin metafizik doğasını ve toplumsal kriz dönemlerinde yarattığı potansiyel tehlikeleri vurgulayarak, milliyetçiliğin çok kültürlü küresel dünyamızın sosyo-ekonomik ihtiyaçlarına cevap veremediğini göstermiş ve bu anlamda ilgili literatüre katkıda bulunmuştur. Bu doğrultuda, çözüm olarak dil ve anlatının ahlaki ve etik paradigmalar üzerindeki dönüştürücü etkisine odaklanılmış, söylemsel bir inşa olan milliyetçi ahlak yerine daha kapsayıcı, daha eşitlikçi bir söylemin hem mümkün olduğu hem de kitle imha silahlarının var olduğu bir dünyada bunun bir zorunluluk olduğu tartışılmıştır.

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