

Türkiye's Climate Policies: "Who Will Make Sacrifices Then?"^(*)

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"Did developed countries pollute the world to this extent? Yes, they did. Are they now saying, 'Let's save this world.'? Yes, they are. Who will make sacrifices then? Türkiye or other developing countries? No. Priority lies with the developed countries."

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Abstract

The article sheds light on Türkiye's climate change politics by highlighting the steps taken so far in the fight against climate change and underscores the significant efforts still needed. It shows that Türkiye pursues a multilevel climate policy: international, European, and national. While these different levels of policy sometimes function in harmony, instances of conflict can also be observed. At the international level, Türkiye seeks to position itself as a developing country and avoids assuming greater responsibility for climate action in order to maintain its economic development. At the European level, on the other hand, Türkiye strives to align its legal framework with that of the European Union (EU), frequently adapting its climate strategy plans to comply with EU climate regulations. As a reflection of these policies, it is observed that Türkiye often aims to balance its international and EU-level climate policies at the national level.

Keywords

Climate Change, Economic Development, Türkiye.

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Türkiye’nin İklim Politikası: “Peki Fedakarlığı Kim Yapacak?”

Öz

Bu çalışma Türkiye’nin iklim değişikliği ile mücadelesinde atmış olduğu adımlara odaklanmakta ve aynı zamanda daha önemli adımların gerekliliğine işaret etmektedir. Çalışma, Türkiye’nin iklim politikasının çok aşamalı bir şekilde işlediğini tespit etmektedir: uluslararası, Avrupa ve ulusal. Bu farklı aşama ve seviyelerdeki politikaların birbirleriyle uyumlu bir şekilde yürütüldükleri gözlemlense de kimi zaman bu politikalar arasında çatışmalar ve uyumsuzluklar da ortaya çıkmaktadır. Uluslararası düzeyde Türkiye gelişmekte olan bir devlet olarak kendini konumlandırmaya gayret etmekte ve iklim alanında ekonomik gelişimini sekteye uğratabilecek herhangi bir sorumluluk almaktan kaçınmaktadır. Avrupa düzeyinde ise, Türkiye kendi mevzuatını ve içtiihadını Avrupa Birliği ile uyumlulaştırma politikası yürütmekte ve çoğunlukla Avrupa Birliği’nin iklim alanındaki düzenlemelerine uyumlu hareket etmeye çalışmaktadır. Ulusal düzeyde ise, Türkiye’nin çoğunlukla uluslararası düzeydeki ve Avrupa düzeyindeki politikaları eş anlamlı olarak dengelemeye çalıştığı gözlemlenmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler

İklim değişikliği, Ekonomik Kalkınma, Türkiye.

Introduction

Türkiye presents a good example for understanding the arguments of the developing countries since it frequently aims to utilize these arguments to pursue the goal of economic growth. Recently the country has been making hesitant strides in addressing climate change and finds itself at a juncture. Historically and since the establishment of the Republic of Türkiye in 1923, one of the country's core principles has been economic development, which often presents a perceived obstacle in the face of climate change. At this crossroads, Türkiye is pursuing various strategies that aim to balance its ongoing economic growth while recognizing the urgency of the issue. The country is aware of the urgent need to address both concerns simultaneously and is exploring ways to integrate climate change into its agenda without hindering economic progress.

Türkiye's climate politics is at the intersection of several policies. Türkiye's motivation for making commitments to tackle with the climate crisis cannot be fully comprehended without understanding the different policies on different areas (e.g. energy policy, the EU accession goal, long-standing goal of "catching up with the West"). To shed light on Türkiye's climate politics, one should be vigilant about the ongoing interactions among various political domains. By understanding the interplay between different policy areas, we can better grasp the challenges and opportunities Türkiye faces in shaping its climate strategy.

The literature on Türkiye's climate change policies is notably limited, with most existing studies focusing on broader environmental issues rather than in-depth analysis of climate change strategies. This gap highlights the need for more comprehensive research that critically examines Türkiye's specific approach to climate change. A more thorough exploration of the interplay between the country's economic and political priorities and its environmental objectives is essential to understanding the full scope of its climate policy. Türkiye's engagement with international climate agreements and its alignment with regional collaborations warrant further scrutiny. The present article aims to enrich the academic discourse on Türkiye's climate change politics and provide a more nuanced understanding of its policy dynamics.

I. Climate Change and Türkiye

The Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) shows that the Mediterranean Basin has become increasingly vulnerable to rising occurrences of extreme heat, prolonged dryness, and severe

flooding.¹ Türkiye, located in the Mediterranean Basin, is a climate vulnerable country. The country's southern and central parts are already in a semi-arid climate band and are under high risk of desertification.² Türkiye's coastal parts are affected from hydrologic drought, with consequent loss of water resources.³ The country primarily experiences a dry summer subtropical Mediterranean climate (Csa): most of its regions are significantly affected by moderate to high drought probability and risk whereas the Black Sea region has a mid-latitude temperature climate with a lower likelihood and risk of drought.⁴

According to 2020 report of the Turkish Academy of Sciences (TÜBA), an average temperature of 14.7°C was observed in 2019 in Türkiye and this value was 1.2°C higher than the average temperature between 1981-2010.⁵ The Turkish State Meteorological Service (MGM) reported that since 1991, 2023 became the third hottest year recorded with the average of 15.1°C in Türkiye (2010 first and 2018 second).⁶ The autumn season of 2023 was recorded as the warmest season of the last 53 years and November 2023 was the hottest November recorded in the last 53 years.⁷ In the period between 1 October 2024 and 31 December 2024, Türkiye received 28 percent less precipitation compared to last year's precipitation levels.⁸ According to the World Health Organiza-

¹ IPCC, 'Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability, Working group II Contribution to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change', 2007, 31, <https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/03/ar4_wg2_full_report.pdf> accessed 12 April 2025.

² Levent Kurnaz, 'Drought in Turkey', İstanbul Policy Center, Sabancı University, 2014, 3, <<https://ipc.sabanciuniv.edu/Content/Images/CKeditorImages/20200323-16034498.pdf>> accessed 12 April 2025.

³ F. Kemal Sönmez *et al.*, 'An analysis of Spatial and Temporal Dimension of Drought Vulnerability in Turkey Using the Standardized Precipitation Index', (2005) 35 *Natural Hazards* 243, 255.

⁴ Murat Turkes, 'Climate and Drought in Turkey', in Nilgun B. Harmancioglu and Dogal Altinbilek (eds), *Water Resources of Turkey: Volume 2* (Springer 2020), 85.

⁵ TÜBA, 'Climate Change and Public Health in Turkey', 2020, 14, <<https://www.tuba.gov.tr/files/yayinlar/raporlar/Climate%20Change%20and%20Public%20Health%20in%20Turkey.pdf>> accessed 12 April 2025.

⁶ MGM, '2023 Yılı İklim Değerlendirmesi', 2024, 3, <<https://www.mgm.gov.tr/FILES/iklim/yillikiklim/2023-iklim-raporu.pdf>> accessed 12 April 2025.

⁷ *ibid* 8.

⁸ MGM, '2024 2025 Su Yılı 3 Aylık Kümülatif Yağış Raporu', 2025, <<https://www.mgm.gov.tr/veridegerlendirme/yagis-raporu.aspx?b=k#sfB>> accessed 12 April 2025.

tion's country specific report, the country will face 4.9°C increase in the average annual temperature levels by the end of the century (of 2071-2100, compared to 1981-2010) under a high emissions scenario.⁹ However, if emissions decrease rapidly, the temperature rise will be limited to 1.5°C. As reported by the WHO, Türkiye's annual total precipitation under the high emissions scenario is projected to decrease by an average of 15 percent by the end of the century (of 2071-2100, compared to 1981-2010). However, if emissions reduced rapidly, there will be little change on the average precipitation in Türkiye (approximately -6 percent to +3 percent).¹⁰

In 2021, the Turkish Parliament established a special commission to investigate the potential impacts of climate change in the country and to identify the necessary measures for mitigation and adaptation. With a quite comprehensive report, the Commission identified the potential impacts of climate change on Türkiye. The Commission reported that when the temperature changes between 1971 and 2020 are examined, there has been a regular increase in average temperatures in the country since 1998, except for 2011.¹¹ The report includes various climate change projections for Türkiye. While all the projections indicate a rise in temperature, the anticipated increase in Türkiye between 2021 and 2099 is estimated to range from 1°C to 6°C.¹² The report also includes scenarios on how climate change may impact precipitation rates in Türkiye. All the projections indicate a decline in precipitation rates, with estimated reductions varying between 20 percent to 40 percent during the period from 2021 to 2099.¹³

The increasing impacts of climate on Türkiye are admitted and often reiterated in the political discourse. The current Minister of Environment, Urbanization and Climate Change, Murat Kurum in the COP25, held in Madrid in 2019,

⁹ WHO, 'Türkiye: Health and Climate Change - Country Profile 2022', 2022, 4, <<https://iris.who.int/bitstream/handle/10665/353977/WHO-HEP-ECH-CCH-22.01.05-eng.pdf?sequence=1>> accessed 12 April 2025.

¹⁰ *ibid.*

¹¹ Meclis Araştırması Komisyon Raporu, 'Küresel İklim Değişikliğinin Etkilerinin En aza İndirilmesi, Kuraklıkla Mücadele ve Su Kaynaklarının Verimli Kullanılması için Alınması Gereken Tedbirlerin Belirlenmesi Amacıyla Kurulan Meclis Araştırması Komisyon Raporu', 2021, 190, <<https://acikerisim.tbmm.gov.tr/items/103ace3d-1225-40a1-b290-b9e4815b2067>> accessed 12 April 2025.

¹² *ibid* 209.

¹³ *ibid* 211-214.

stated that the number of frequency and severity of climate-related disasters such as storms, floods, tornadoes are increasing in Türkiye.¹⁴ The Director of Türkiye's Directorate of Climate Change Halil Hasar held that as a country located in the Mediterranean Climate Basin, Türkiye very frequently encounters floods and heat waves; as a result, the country's agriculture, infrastructure, air quality and economy are seriously affected by climate-related disasters.¹⁵ President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, in the Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate in 2023, held that Türkiye strives for solutions for all environmental problems and target sustainable development and green transformation. Erdogan emphasized Türkiye's commitment to addressing climate change by highlighting the country's intention to host COP31.¹⁶ At the Forum, Erdogan also stated that Türkiye would adopt and pass its climate change law in the very near future in order to strengthen its fight against climate change.¹⁷ However, as of writing (April 2025) Türkiye has yet to enact a legislative framework specifically focusing on climate change.

II. Türkiye's Moves in the International Fora: "Growing First and Cleaning Up Later"

With the IPCC's second assessment report in 1996, the human influence on the climate crisis has been established. The report clearly stated that "[i]ncreased concentrations of greenhouse gases are the result of fossil fuel burning, deforestation, livestock raising, and other human activities."¹⁸ This has been one of the turning points in the international climate change gover-

¹⁴ Ministry of EUC (Environment, Urbanization and Climate Change), 'Bakan Kurum: "İklim Değişikliğiyle Mücadele için Şehirlerin Dönüşmesi Gerekli"', 2019, <<https://csb.gov.tr/bakan-kurum-iklim-degisikligiyle-mucadele-icin-sehirlerin-donusmesi-gerekli-bakanlik-faaliyetleri-29666>> accessed 12 April 2025.

¹⁵ İklim haber, 'İklim Değişikliği Başkanlığı: "Türkiye Tamamen Kömür Yanlısı Değil"', 2023, <<https://www.iklimhaber.org/iklim-degisikligi-baskanligi-turkiye-tamamen-komur-yanlisi-degil/>> accessed 12 April 2025.

¹⁶ AA, 'Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan: Önümüzdeki Dönemde İklim Kanunu'muzu Meclisimizden Geçirmiş Olacağız', 2023, <<https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/politika/cumhurbaskani-erdogan-onumuzdeki-donemde-iklim-kanunumuzu-meclisimizden-gecirmis-olacagiz/2877413#>> accessed 12 April 2025.

¹⁷ ibid.

¹⁸ IPCC, 'Climate Change (1995): Economic and Social Dimensions of Climate Change, Contribution of Working Group III to the 2nd Assessment Report of the IPCC', 22, <https://archive.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/sar/wg_III/ipcc_sar_wg_III_full_report.pdf> accessed 12 April 2025.

nance as the attribution of the responsibility to human beings and thus to governments has become possible. Under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) of 1992, the principle of "common but differentiated responsibilities" shaped and determined how the responsibility was going to be shared. According to the UNFCCC, developed and developing countries had common but differentiated responsibilities and as a result developed countries listed at Annex II are required to "take all practicable steps to promote, facilitate and finance, as appropriate, the transfer of, or access to, environmentally sound technologies and know-how to other Parties, particularly developing country Parties".¹⁹ The countries listed at Annex I, on the other hand, committed themselves to limit their anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases; however, they are not required to provide financial resources and facilitate technology transfer to developing countries.

Türkiye was initially listed at both Annex I and Annex II in 1992 as it was one of the founding members of the Organization for Economic and Cooperation Development (OECD). Since the initial Conference of the Parties (COP) meetings, Türkiye has consistently raised the issue of revising its position. On the 7th Conference of the Parties (COP7), held in Marrakech in 2001, as a response to Türkiye's requests, its distinct position was acknowledged, and its name was removed from the Annex II. However, Türkiye's requests persisted. While remaining on the Annex I, which entails a duty to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases for Türkiye, the country proposed to "enjoy favorable conditions within the common but differentiated responsibilities" since it is still at an early stage of industrialization in comparison to other Annex I countries.²⁰ Türkiye's this request was eventually responded in the Cancun COP16, and with the Decision 26/CP.7 it was accepted that Türkiye's "special circumstances" situate the country in a different position than the other parties included in Annex I to the UNFCCC.²¹

¹⁹ United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 1992, article 4.5, <https://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/background_publications_htmlpdf/application/pdf/conveng.pdf> accessed 12 April 2025.

²⁰ UNFCCC Proposal, 'Proposals to Amend the Lists in Annexes I and II to the Convention', COP 7th Session, FCCC/CP/2001/11, 5 October 2001, para. 10, <<https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop7/11.pdf>> accessed 12 April 2025.

²¹ UNFCCC Report, 'Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Seventh Session', Addendum. FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.4, 21 January 2002, 5, <<https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop7/13a04.pdf>> accessed 12 April 2025.

By formally being recognized of holding “special circumstances”, Türkiye gained “a sui generis position” within the scope of the UNFCCC.²² Such a position makes Türkiye a unique case in the UNFCCC COP meetings and thus the country often negotiates alone.²³ Türkiye’s current pursuit is to free itself from any responsibilities related to emission reductions. For this goal, Türkiye, in the COP meetings, requests to be a Non-Annex I party to the UNFCCC. For instance, on the 24th COP meeting, held in Katowice on 2-14 December 2018, Türkiye submitted an item to the Secretariat in which it requested itself to be recognized as a Non-Annex I country since this would help Türkiye “better contribute to combatting climate change”.²⁴ In its letter to the Secretariat, Türkiye stated that it had no historical responsibility for greenhouse gas emissions when the UNFCCC was adopted in 1992. It added that at that time, Türkiye had the lowest per capita greenhouse gas emissions among the 36 countries listed under Annex I, with a rate of 3.88 tCO₂e, significantly below the Annex I average of 14.37 tCO₂e per capita. Türkiye stated in the letter that it holds “negligible responsibility in greenhouse gas emissions” and thus its classification would have been more appropriate as a Non-Annex I Party rather than as an Annex I Party.²⁵

Whilst Türkiye’s greenhouse gas emissions were significantly lower compared to other Annex I countries in 1992, the country’s current emissions cannot easily be disregarded as “negligible”. Türkiye’s greenhouse gas emissions, excluding emissions and removals from land use, land-use change, and forestry (and including emissions and removals from these activities), were 170 million tons in 1990. By 2004, these figures had drastically increased to 297 million tons, reflecting a growth of 74.4 percent over this period.²⁶ This increase from 1990 to 2005 positioned Türkiye as the country with the highest rate of growth

²² Ethemcan Turhan *et al.*, ‘Beyond Special Circumstances: Climate Change Policy in Turkey 1992-2015’, (2016) 7(3) *WIREs Climate Change* 448, 454.

²³ Semra Cerit Mazlum, ‘Turkey and post-Paris Climate Change Politics: Still Playing Alone’, (2017) 56 *New Perspectives on Turkey* 145, 148.

²⁴ UNFCCC Proposal, ‘Proposal from Turkey to Amend the List of Parties included in Annex I to the Convention’, FCCC/CP/2018/INF.2, 15 November 2018, <<https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/inf2.pdf>> accessed 12 April 2025.

²⁵ *ibid*

²⁶ Elif Bostancı *et al.*, ‘CO₂ Emissions of Turkish Manufacturing Industry: A Decomposition Analysis’, (2011) 88(6) *Applied Energy* 2273, 2273.

in emissions among Annex I Parties.²⁷ By bringing up its 1992 emission levels, Türkiye presents an anachronistic stance in the COP meetings.

Türkiye similarly adopts a policy of maintaining its status as a developing country in international climate change agreements. The country signed the Paris Climate Agreement (2015) on 22 April 2016 as a developing country and ratified the Agreement on 7 October 2021. Türkiye delayed signing the Paris Climate Agreement due to concerns about the Agreement's potential negative impact on its economic development. While ratifying the Paris Climate Agreement, Türkiye made an official declaration and stated that the country would implement the Agreement provided that the Agreement and its mechanisms do not create an obstacle to its right to economic and social development.²⁸ The same approach can also be observed when examining Türkiye's accession to the Kyoto Protocol of 1997. In 2007, Energy and Natural Resources Minister Hilmi Güler stated that Türkiye chose not to join the Kyoto Protocol to protect its national interests.²⁹ The Minister of Environment and Forestry, Osman Pepe also said that without a \$50 billion fund it was not possible for Türkiye to harmonize with the Kyoto Protocol.³⁰ Türkiye eventually both signed and ratified the Kyoto Protocol in 2009 upon its submission to the United Nations. Türkiye was at the time under strong pressure from the EU and international environmental organizations to sign the Protocol.³¹ Even though the country eventually agreed to be a party to the Protocol, Türkiye's main policy is to take no emission reduction commitments.³² The country aims to reduce greenhouse gas emission by focusing on energy efficiency and developing renewable

²⁷ UNFCCC, 'National Greenhouse Gas Inventory Data for the Period 1990-2005', FCCC/SBI/2007/30, 24 October 2007, <<https://unfccc.int/documents/4777>> accessed 12 April 2025.

²⁸ UN Treaty Collection Paris Agreement, Paris, 12 December 2015, <https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtsg_no=XXVII-7-d&chapter=27&clang=_en#EndDec> accessed 12 April 2025.

²⁹ e-gazete, 'Bakan Güler'den Kyoto Açıklaması', 2007, <<https://egazete.anadolu.edu.tr/di-ger/10577/bakan-gulerden-kyoto-aciklamasi>> accessed 12 April 2025.

³⁰ Hürriyet, 'Pepe: Turkey needs \$50 billion to meet environmental criteria', 2005, <<https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/pepe-turkey-needs-50-billion-to-meet-environmental-criteria-38705903>> accessed 12 April 2025.

³¹ Erkan Erdogan, 'Turkish Support to Kyoto Protocol: A Reality of Just an Illusion', (2010) 14 *Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews* 1111, 1115.

³² Barış Gençer Baykan, 'What did the Turkish Climate Movement Learn from a Global Policy Failure? Frame Shift after the Copenhagen Climate Summit', (2019) 20(4) *Turkish Studies* 637, 639.

energy sources, therefore does not target direct reduction on its emission levels.³³

In the international platforms, Türkiye often underlines its status as a developing country. One of the country's main pursuits is to benefit from the Green Climate Fund, established within the scope of the 2009 Copenhagen Summit. The Director of Türkiye's Directorate of Climate Change Halil Hasar stated that as a developing country, Türkiye's green transformation is contingent on the financial support that the country receives. Hasar expressed that Türkiye hopes to benefit from such funds to finance its climate-friendly policies.³⁴ The President Erdogan, in the COP29 meeting, highlighted Türkiye's 2053 Net Zero Emission Target and added that the financial burden of this target is substantial, thus a climate funding goal should be tailored to meet the needs of developing countries.³⁵ Türkiye, in a nutshell, signs international agreements on climate change without committing to obligations that could hinder its economic development, and at the same time, it follows a policy of benefiting from the funds provided by these agreements as a developing country in order to sustain its economic growth.

Türkiye's policy aims to underline the strong asymmetry in benefits and costs of solving the climate change problem between richer and poorer countries.³⁶ According to Türkiye, main responsibility for climate action should lie with the developed countries which created the majority of anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions over the past 200 years. Türkiye's approach exemplifies the broader arguments commonly advanced by developing countries. Developing countries often express that climate change is a Northern issue since the North caused the problem.³⁷ Their interest in climate change is limited to whether the global North is genuinely com-

³³ Erdoğan (n 31) 1115.

³⁴ İklim Değişikliği Başkanlığı, 'Cumhurbaşkanı Recep Tayyip Erdoğan COP29 Dünya Liderleri İklim Eylemi Zirvesi'nde Konuştu', 2024, <<https://www.iklim.gov.tr/cumhurbaskani-recep-tayyip-erdogan-cop29-dunya-liderleri-iklim-eylemi-zirvesi-nde-konustu-haber-4351>> accessed 12 April 2025

³⁵ ibid.

³⁶ Thomas Bernauer, 'Climate Change Politics', (2013) 16 *Annual Review of Political Science* 421, 424.

³⁷ Matthew Paterson and Michael Grubb, 'The International Politics of Climate Change', (1992) 68(2) *International Affairs* 293, 297; Elena Wilson Rowe, 'Climate Science, Russian Politics, and the Framing of Climate Change', (2013) 4(5) *WIREs Climate Change* 457, 458; Jørgen Delman, 'China's "Radicalism at the Center": Regime Legitimation through Climate Politics and Climate Governance', (2011) 16 *Journal of Chinese Political Science* 183, 198.

mitted to significant financial and technological transfers that enable the global South to develop without increasing emissions.³⁸ Such differences in understanding the climate crisis between developing and developed countries intrinsically undermine the potential for global cooperation since all states' continued cooperation can be only achieved with developing and developed states' cooperation.³⁹ The challenge of bringing all actors to cooperate simultaneously creates Prisoners' Dilemma scenario in environmental negotiations.⁴⁰

Türkiye's approach can also be observed in its strategy documents. In its Climate Change Strategy Plan 2010-2023, Türkiye states that it is willing to cooperate more to tackle climate change. However, it immediately underlines that Türkiye is a developing country and thus it must benefit from "financing and technology transfer facilities available to countries with similar development levels" as itself.⁴¹ In its Climate Change Strategy Plan 2024-2030, which is considerably more systematic and comprehensive, Türkiye states that it will progress towards sustainable development in concordance with its economic development goals in a balanced way.⁴² The current Minister of Environment, Urbanization and Climate Change, Murat Kurum, in his speech in December 2024 stated that developed countries are the responsible actors for the climate change as they used the world's resources crudely. According to Kurum, the Republic of Türkiye has a very clean record in the production of greenhouse gas emissions since it did not pollute the world.⁴³ Similarly, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, in a video message that he sent to the COP15, stated that tho-

³⁸ ibid 297.

³⁹ H. Ward *et al.*, 'Marching at the Pace of the Slowest: A Model of International Climate Change Negotiations', (2001) 49 *Political Studies* 438, 440.

⁴⁰ M. S. Soroos, Global Change, Environmental Security, and the Prisoner's Dilemma', (1994) 31(3) *Journal of Peace Research* 317; Michael Taylor and Hugh Ward, 'Chickens, Whales and Lumpy Goods - Alternative Models of Public Goods Provision', (1982) 30(3) *Political Studies* 350.

⁴¹ Climate Change Strategy 2010-2023, 6, <[https://webdosya.csb.gov.tr/db/iklim/editordosya/iklim_degisikligi_stratejisi_EN\(2\).pdf](https://webdosya.csb.gov.tr/db/iklim/editordosya/iklim_degisikligi_stratejisi_EN(2).pdf)> accessed 12 April 2025.

⁴² Climate Change Mitigation Strategy and Action Plan 2024-2030, 3, <https://iklim.gov.tr/db/turkce/icerikler/files/iklim%20Değişikliğine%20Uyum%20Stratejisi%20ve%20Eylem%20Plan_%202024-2030.pdf> accessed 13 April 2025.

⁴³ Ministry of EUC (Environment, Urbanization and Climate Change), 'Minister Kurum: "We are Trying to Prevent the World from Fever"', 2024, <<https://www.csb.gov.tr/bakan-kurum-dunyanin-atesinin-cikmasina-engel-olmaya-calisiyoruz-bakanlik-faaliyetleri-40402>> accessed 13 April 2025.

se who must take first steps are those who have historical responsibility for the emergence of the problem.⁴⁴

Although these statements dismiss any historical responsibility for climate change, they neither imply a complete denial of responsibility nor a refusal to take action. For instance, in the COP29, held in Azerbaijan in November 2024, President Erdogan reiterated Türkiye's 2053 Net Zero Emission Target which was announced for the first time by the President on 27 September 2021.⁴⁵ It is often underlined that although Türkiye's contribution to the total greenhouse gas emissions is *only* 1 percent and therefore this does not make Türkiye the main culprit, the country is still ready to collaborate in tackling with the climate crisis.⁴⁶ However, compared to climate action, economic development might present a more significant item in Türkiye's agenda. The country often finds itself encountering the familiar dilemma of balancing environmental concerns with development, much like the experience of southern EU member states.⁴⁷

III. Alignment with the EU Acquis on the field of Climate Change

Türkiye's priority for economic development can be explained with its long-sustained goal "catching up with the West". Since the beginning of the establishment of the Republic of Türkiye, this goal has been the main strategy of the country in many areas.⁴⁸ In order to "catch up with the West", the country quite strictly commits to its economic development.⁴⁹ The EU accession has long been associated with economic development in the country.⁵⁰ On the other hand, Türkiye simultaneously seeks to harmonize its domestic environ-

⁴⁴ İklim haber, 'İklim Değişikliği ve Çevre Kaynaklı Sorunlarla Mücadele Sadece Belli Ülkelere Havale Edilemez', 2021, <<https://www.iklimhaber.org/iklim-degisikligi-ve-cevre-kaynakli-sorunlarla-mucadele-sadece-belli-ulkelere-havale-edilemez/>> accessed 13 April 2025.

⁴⁵ İletişim Başkanlığı, 'Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan, COP 29 Dünya Liderleri İklim Zirvesi'nde Konuştu, 2024, <<https://www.iletisim.gov.tr/turkce/haberler/detay/cumhurbaskani-erdogan-cop29-dunya-liderleri-iklim-zirvesinde-konustu>> accessed 13 April 2025.

⁴⁶ Ministry of EUC (n 43).

⁴⁷ Rana İzci, 'The Impact of the European Union on Environmental Policy', in Fikret Adaman and Murat Arsel (eds) *Environmentalism in Turkey: Between Democracy and Development?* (Routledge 2005) 87-100, 97.

⁴⁸ Begüm Özkaynak *et al.*, 'The Gezi Park Resistance from an Environmental Justice and Social Metabolism Perspective', (2015) 26(1) *Capitalism Nature Socialism* 99, 106.

⁴⁹ *ibid.*

⁵⁰ İzci (n 47) 97.

mental regulations with the European Union (EU). At the turn of the century, Türkiye, despite not being an EU member, extensively adopted the EU's environmental policies and regulations into its legal system.⁵¹

Türkiye aims to harmonize its domestic regulations on climate change with the EU too. The country as of writing (April 2025) has no climate change law. Its strategies and policies could be observed through its current Climate Change Strategy Plan 2024-2030. In the Plan 2024-2030, Türkiye states that it "closely follows EU policies and has been formulating legislation on climate change and environment in order to align with the relevant *acquis*".⁵² The Plan 2024-2030 brings together all the policy papers and action plans adopted by Türkiye in climate change area. Türkiye often underlines how each action plan is prepared with a view to aligning Türkiye with the EU. For instance, Türkiye's Green Deal Action Plan (2021), including a total of 32 goals and 81 actions under 9 headings, is developed to harmonize Türkiye's policies with the EU Green Deal and Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM).⁵³ Within the scope of its Strategy B-S.2 in the Climate Change Strategy Plan 2024-2030, to improve renewable energy sources and energy efficiency systems in buildings, the country aims to improve the cooling requirements, the net heating energy, and the energy limits in alignment with the EU levels.⁵⁴ In the Plan 2024-2030, Türkiye reports that Regulation on Monitoring of Greenhouse Gas Emissions,⁵⁵ Energy Efficiency Strategy (2012-2023),⁵⁶ Wastewater Treatment Action Plan (2017-2023)⁵⁷ are only a few of the numerous regulations and action plans adopted to comply with the EU *acquis*.

In addition to the adopted policies and regulations, Türkiye also pledges to adopt several strategies and action plans in the Plan 2024-2030 in order to harmonize its policies with the EU policies on climate change. For instance, the country states that the key legislation on national waste and wastewater management will

⁵¹ Zerrin Savaşan, 'The Development Process of Environmental Law in Turkey: The EU Impact', in Zerrin Savaşan and Vakur Sümer (eds) *Environmental Law and Policies in Turkey* (Springer 2020), 7-31; Sevim Budak, *Avrupa Birliği ve Türk Çevre Politikası* (Büke Yayınları 2000).

⁵² Climate Change Mitigation Strategy and Action Plan 2024-2030 (n 43) 19.

⁵³ *ibid* 54.

⁵⁴ *ibid* 70.

⁵⁵ *ibid* 50.

⁵⁶ *ibid* 80.

⁵⁷ *ibid* 97.

be revised in order to harmonize its legislation with the EU acquis.⁵⁸ On the issue of increasing use of waste as raw material in production processes, in the Plan 2024-2030 Türkiye pledges to prepare a strategy and an action plan by taking into consideration the principles of the EU Green Deal.⁵⁹ Within the scope of its Strategy S-S.6, Türkiye has committed to drafting a law related to digital product passport system aligned with the EU to promote circular economy and resource efficiency across manufacturing industry.⁶⁰ These steps and pledges show that Türkiye's climate change policies have been part and parcel of its EU accession strategy. In its EU accession journey, climate change has become a foreign policy item for Türkiye. As in many other areas, the EU has had a strong impact in the country's policies in the field of climate change.

However, it is debated the extent to which such steps have been internalized and deeply engrained in the Turkish politics. Existing regulations and strategy plans alone are not enough to ensure climate and environmental protection unless they are implemented effectively. The EU accession and "catching up with the West" goals have long been a matter of economic development for Türkiye. Türkiye's national vision on climate change is to integrate climate change policies and strategies within economic development policies.⁶¹ When faced with economic crisis, political and economic fluctuations, Türkiye seems unlikely to place environment and climate-related concerns at the top of its agenda.⁶² Environment and climate-related considerations might be sidelined at the expense of economic growth when these two are in conflict.

Rana İzci's research shows that when there is economic benefit, Türkiye might eventually sign a regional or an international treaty (as in the Kyoto Protocol).⁶³ However, the lack of economic gains, when coupled with security concerns, may impede the ratification of agreements in the fields of environmental protection and climate policy. For instance, Türkiye's main reasons for dec-

⁵⁸ ibid 102.

⁵⁹ ibid 103

⁶⁰ ibid 61.

⁶¹ Yasemin Guler and Prashant Kumar, 'Climate Change Policy and Performance of Türkiye in the EU Harmonization Process', (2022) 4 *Fronts in Sustainable Cities* 1, 3.

⁶² Savaşan (n 51) 24.

⁶³ Rana İzci, 'Europeanisation of Turkish Environmental Policy with Special Reference to Sustainability Discourse', in Çiğdem Nas and Yonca Özer (eds) *Turkey and the European Union: Processes of Europeanisation* (Routledge 2012), 181-203.

lining to sign the Aarhus Convention (1998) include fears that projects involving transboundary waters, such as the Southern Anatolia Project (GAP), might face obstacles, potential threats to national security, doubts about the country's technical capacity to fulfill treaty obligations, and concerns about delays in investment decisions.⁶⁴ As a result, Türkiye's national security concerns led to the neglect of the Aarhus Convention, resulting in stagnation in meeting the EU conditionality.⁶⁵ This serves as a pertinent example of how environmental and climate protection issues might be deprioritized when Türkiye's economic interests or security concerns are at stake. Despite EU conditionality, changes induced by the EU might remain limited when Türkiye's economic and security concerns conflict with the environmental regimes of the EU.⁶⁶ Therefore, Türkiye's recurring "cycles of cooperation and conflict"⁶⁷ with the EU are also reflected in its approach to harmonizing climate policies.

IV. Türkiye's Climate Politics at the National Level

Türkiye is currently preparing a climate change law. On 2 February 2025, the commission which is responsible for drafting Türkiye's climate change law stated that the draft is ready to be submitted to the Turkish Parliament for negotiation. According to the press release on the issue, with the new legislation on climate change, many issues including zero waste system, Emission Trading System (ETS), Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), and "green investment projects" will be regulated.⁶⁸ Whereas the draft has not been shared with the public, climate advocates doubt that the new law would prioritize environment over economic interests.⁶⁹ Discussions about the draft are largely shaped by the argument that it might have been drafted based on

⁶⁴ Ahmet Güneş, 'Aarhus Sözleşmesi Üzerine Bir İnceleme', (2010) 14(1) *Gazi Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi* 299, 317.

⁶⁵ İzci (n 63) 191.

⁶⁶ *ibid.*

⁶⁷ Nathalie Tocci, 'Turkey and the European Union: A Journey in the Unknown', 2014, 13, <<https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Turkey-and-the-European-Union.pdf>> accessed 13 April 2025.

⁶⁸ Kemal Karadag, 'Türkiye'nin İlk "İklim Kanunu" için Teklif Hazırlığında Sona Gelindi', AA, 1 February 2025, <<https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/gundem/turkiyenin-ilk-iklim-kanunu-icin-teklif-hazirliginda-sona-gelindi/3468494#>> accessed 13 April 2025.

⁶⁹ Özgecan Özgeçen, 'İklim Kanunu Geliyor', *Medyascope*, 2023, <<https://medyascope.tv/2023/09/07/iklim-kanunu-geliyor-av-gayretli-taslakta-ticari-faaliyetler-icin-emisyon-ticaret-sistemi-duzenleniyor-adina-da-iklim-kanunu-diyorlar/>> accessed 13 April 2025.

commercial concerns rather than with the primary aim of protecting environment and climate.⁷⁰

The formulation of a climate change law in Türkiye was not the result of a bottom-up process driven by domestic societal demands or grassroots initiatives. Rather, it was a top-down approach, primarily influenced by Türkiye's efforts to harmonize its legal framework with the EU *acquis* and this reflects external regulatory alignment rather than internal policy-driven momentum. Only a limited number of empirical studies have explored how climate change is perceived at societal level in Türkiye. In one of these empirical studies, it was indicated that there is little knowledge about climate change in the Mediterranean part of the country.⁷¹ Another study conducted in 2021 in Istanbul showed that participants have little knowledge about both international regulations on climate change and the climate action plan of the city they live in.⁷² Studies show that the media plays a significant role in increasing the public awareness about climate change and decreasing climate skepticism.⁷³ Uzelgun and Castro's research showed that in Türkiye, however, climate change-related news began appearing on the mainstream media only after 2007 and even when climate change-related news appeared, catastrophic consequences of the climate crisis were focused, and the root causes of the crisis were often left unaddressed.⁷⁴ This might be due to a lack of dedicated climate journalists, the framing of energy policy as a national security issue, and limited financial support for independent reporting, as Hanson finds.⁷⁵ Nevertheless, some alternative media outlets, such as Yeşil Gazete and İklim haber, persist in addressing

⁷⁰ Bianet, 'İklim Kanunu Taslağı Hakkında Ne Biliyoruz?', 2024, <<https://bianet.org/haber/iklim-kanunu-taslagi-hakkinda-ne-biliyoruz-295528>> accessed 13 April 2025.

⁷¹ M. Korkmaz, 'Public Awareness and Perceptions of Climate Change: Differences in Concern about Climate Change in the West Mediterranean Region of Turkey', (2018) 16(4) *Applied Ecology and Environmental Research* 4039, 4047.

⁷² Erkan Ağırılan and Uğur Sadioğlu, 'İklim Değişikliği Farkındalığı ve Toplum Bilinci: İstanbul Örneği', (2021) 21(2) *Anadolu Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi* 627, 646.

⁷³ Carmen Dayrell and John Urry, 'Mediating Climate Politics: The Surprising Case of Brazil', (2015) 18(3) *European Journal of Social Theory* 257, 257.

⁷⁴ Mehmet Ali Uzelgun and Paula Castro, 'The Voices of Science on Climate Change in the Mainstream Turkish Press', (2014) 8(3) *Environmental Communication* 326, 334.

⁷⁵ Matt A. Hanson, 'How Journalists in Turkey are Covering the Climate Crisis', 2023, <<https://ijnet.org/en/story/how-journalists-turkey-are-covering-climate-crisis>> accessed 13 April 2025.

environmental issues and highlight the ongoing efforts to counter these structural challenges.

In recent years public awareness on climate change has been drastically increasing worldwide⁷⁶ and also in Türkiye. 8th National Communication and 5th Biennial Report of Türkiye under the UNFCCC, issued in 2023, shows that "society has increasingly turned its attention towards addressing climate change and its related issues".⁷⁷ The surveys cited in this report indicate that majority of the public in Türkiye is concerned about climate change and 75 percent of 3000 participants, interviewed in around 30-31 cities, believe that climate change is the result of human activities.⁷⁸ The high level of awareness regarding climate change in Türkiye might be attributed to two key factors. First, the effects of climate change have recently become increasingly evident in daily life. Rising temperatures and declining precipitation levels are now observable across nearly all regions of the country. As a result, skepticism toward climate change has gained little traction in Türkiye.⁷⁹ Second, to increase public awareness on climate change, multiple stakeholders - including government institutions, civil society initiatives, and international and regional bodies - conduct several public information campaigns in Türkiye.⁸⁰ In addition, in 2023 the Ministry of National Education, in a collaboration with the European Commission, launched an initiative to raise climate change awareness during the elementary and second schools.⁸¹ There is an ongoing nationwide mobilization in Türkiye to raise awareness about climate change.

The role of the NGOs in awareness raising campaigns on environment is significant in the country. Environmental NGOs are one of the most significant

⁷⁶ Oliver C. Ruppel and Larissa J. Houston, 'The Human Right to Public Participation in Environmental Decision-making: Some Legal Reflections', (2023) 53 *Environmental Policy and Law* 125.

⁷⁷ UNFCCC Report of Türkiye, 2023 National Inventory Report (NIR), 2023, 275, <<https://unfccc.int/documents/627786>> accessed 13 April 2025.

⁷⁸ *ibid* 276.

⁷⁹ Barış Gençer Baykan, 'İklim Değişikliği Hakkında Ne Düşünüyoruz?', *Perspektif*, 2022, <<https://www.perspektif.online/iklim-degisikligi-hakkinda-ne-dusunuyoruz/>> accessed 13 April 2025.

⁸⁰ UNFCCC Report of Türkiye (n 77) 279-289.

⁸¹ Çalıştay Raporu, 'İklim Değişikliği Farkındalığının Temel Eğitime Entegrasyonu Çalıştay Raporu', 2023, <https://tegm.meb.gov.tr/meb_iys_dosyalar/2023_03/30111651_TAEX_Calistay_Raporu.pdf> accessed 13 April 2025.

actors which push the government to take more environment and climate-friendly steps. One of the most influential movements is TEMA (Turkish Foundation for Combating Soil Erosion). TEMA, with more than one million volunteers, works to combat erosion and to protect the country's natural assets since 1992.⁸² It also develops policies on climate change and shares them with decision makers. It carries out several significant raising awareness campaigns such as Climate Ambassadors Project, Women Leaders for Climate Project.⁸³ World Wildlife Fund (WWF)-Türkiye, Greenpeace-Türkiye, Resource Environment and Climate Association (REC) are among the most active non-profit organizations working in the field of environment and climate in Türkiye.

De facto initiatives on environment and climate have been also influential in the country. In 2007, Türkiye's Green Party (Yeşiller Partisi) launched a signature campaign called "Türkiye Kyoto'yu İmzala! (Türkiye Sign Kyoto!)" in the second year of the Kyoto Protocol's entry into force. In one month, the number of signatories exceeded one hundred thousand.⁸⁴ After the campaign ended, the signatures were submitted to the Turkish Parliament. The campaign reached thousands and raised awareness about the impacts of the climate crisis in Türkiye. "350 Ankara" is another grassroots movement carrying out awareness campaigns on the environmentally detrimental decisions made by mayors in Türkiye. In 2009, 350 Ankara organized "Yarın Çok Geç, Bugün Harekete Geç! (Tomorrow is Too Late, Act Today!)" campaign and in 2012, "İklimi Değil, Belediyeleri Değiştir! (Change the Municipality, Not the Climate!)" campaign.⁸⁵ The initiative's activities mostly focused the municipalities' decisions influencing environment and climate.

The environmental NGOs in Türkiye navigate around the country's long-standing commitment to economic development and its decades-old wait for the EU accession. Studies show that developing countries grow particular sensitivity when their sovereignty over environmental issues are limited, especi-

⁸² TEMA Foundation, 2025, <<https://www.tema.org.tr/en>> accessed 13 April 2025.

⁸³ TEMA Climate Policies, <<https://www.tema.org.tr/en/our-works/advocacy-and-environmental-policies/climate-policies>> accessed 13 April 2025.

⁸⁴ Bianet, 'Kyoto'yu İmzala Diyenler 100 Bine Ulaştı', 2007, <<https://bianet.org/haber/kyotoyu-imzala-diyenler-100-bine-ulasti-92796>> accessed 13 April 2025.

⁸⁵ 350 Ankara, 'İklimi Değil, Belediyeleri Değiştir!', 2012, <<https://350ankara.org/111112-iklimi-degil-belediyeleri-degistir/>> accessed 13 April 2025.

ally through environmentalist NGOs funded by foreign institutions.⁸⁶ Whereas the environmentalist NGOs working in Türkiye are involved in several nationally, regionally and internationally-funded projects, they may encounter difficulties in advancing their struggle, if stark divisions arise between economic development and environmental protection. In the country, consumption of resources has been closely linked to economic growth and national progress.⁸⁷ Paker *et al.*'s research shows that NGO representatives in Türkiye consider that the state is often easy to cooperate as long as the traditional priorities of the state, such as water regimes, nuclear energy, mining, are not challenged.⁸⁸ Thus, environmental NGOs in Türkiye are often compelled to carefully navigate the tension between promoting sustainable practices and aligning with national development goals to maintain their credibility and effectiveness.

At the national level several significant cases have addressed the climate crisis. In 2023, the case of *S.S. Gölmarmara ve Çevresi Su Ürünleri Kooperatifi v Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, Manisa Directorate of Provincial Agriculture and Forestry*, recognized as Türkiye's first climate change lawsuit, marked a significant victory in the field of climate change. S.S. Gölmarmara ve Çevresi Su Ürünleri Kooperatifi is a cooperative, located in the city of Manisa, whose members rely on fishing in Marmara Lake for their livelihoods.⁸⁹ However, as 98 percent of Marmara Lake has dried up due to climate change, the cooperative was unable to repay its debts to the state. Consequently, the cooperative took the matter to the court and challenged the payment order, and the administrative court ruled to annul the payment order for the cooperative's debts.⁹⁰ Whereas the case is highly important and has at-

⁸⁶ Gabe Ignatow, 'Economic Dependency and Environmental Attitudes in Turkey', (2005) 14(5) *Environmental Politics* 648, 648.

⁸⁷ S. İlgü Özler and Brian K. Obach, 'Cultural Barriers to Environmental Mobilization in the Republic of Turkey', (2019) 62(5) *Sociological Perspectives* 773, 789.

⁸⁸ H. Paker *et al.*, 'Environmental Organisations in Turkey: Engaging the State and Capital', (2013) 22(5) *Environmental Politics* 760.

⁸⁹ Joana Setzer and Catherine Higham, 'Global Trends in Climate Change Litigation: 2023 Snapshot', 2023, 17, <https://www.lse.ac.uk/granthaminstitute/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/Global_trends_in_climate_change_litigation_2023_snapshot.pdf> accessed 13 April 2025.

⁹⁰ Yeşil İş Yeşil Yaşam, 'Türkiye'nin İlk İklim Davasında Karar Verildi', 2023, <<https://www.ekoik.com/turkiyenin-ilk-iklim-davasinda-karar-verildi/>> accessed 13 April 2025.

tracted considerable public attention, due to the lack of a law on climate change in the country “a peripheral framing of climate change” persists.⁹¹

Another case related to climate change was brought by three young climate activists in 2023. In this case, the activists claimed that Türkiye’s omission to tackle with the climate crisis is inextricably linked with the country’s obligations under the Turkish Constitution, the European Convention on Human Rights, International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International Convention on the Rights of the Child. The Council of State found the case admissible and currently the case is pending before the Constitutional Court. While the case holds significance as the first legal action asserting Türkiye’s failure to fulfil its climate change commitments, its outcome is yet to be seen.⁹²

Conclusion

The article examines Türkiye’s political approach to climate change, focusing on the actions taken thus far and the significant challenges that remain. It highlights Türkiye’s multilevel climate policy, which spans international, European, and national dimensions. While these levels of policy often align and support each other, they also occasionally come into conflict. On the international front, Türkiye positions itself as a developing nation, resisting greater climate responsibilities to prioritize its economic growth. Conversely, at the European level, Türkiye works to harmonize its legal framework with the European Union, regularly adjusting its climate policies to meet EU standards. This could be explained by the fact that Türkiye cannot separate its trade policy from its climate policy. Türkiye became the EU’s 5th largest trade partner in 2023. The EU’s exports of goods to Türkiye totaled €111 billion in 2023 while the EU’s imports of goods from Türkiye amounted to €95.5 billion.⁹³ Therefore, the EU’s CBAM has significant implications for Türkiye. In addition, the Green Deal is not merely an environmental policy; it has commercial impacts as

⁹¹ Jolene Lin and Jacqueline Peel, *Litigating Climate Change in the Global South* (Oxford University Press 2024) 27.

⁹² İklim haber, ‘Türkiye’nin İlk İklim Davasını Danıştay İncelemeden Reddetti’, 2023, <<https://www.iklimhaber.org/turkiyenin-ilk-iklim-davasini-danistay-incelemeden-reddetti/>> accessed 13 April 2025.

⁹³ EU Trade and Economic Security, 2024, <https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/turkiye_en#main-content> accessed 13 April 2025.

well.⁹⁴ Taking this trade network into account, it is understandable why Türkiye seeks to align its domestic legal and political regulations with those of the EU.

Türkiye is still in the early stages of climate change awareness although there has been a notable increase in activities related to climate change. As discussed, the visibly clear effects of climate change, the incentive of joining the EU, and the fact that climate policy cannot be considered separately from foreign and trade policy have led Türkiye to take a more active role in the field of climate change. Several key NGOs, as TEMA, WWF, Greenpeace, REC, have been actively engaged in this field; however, participation in these NGOs remains significantly low.⁹⁵ This limits their ability to establish legitimacy and to act as significant drivers of bottom-up change. Consequently, the awakened process has been advancing at a sluggish pace. The driving and incentivizing forces at the international and regional levels fail to receive a corresponding response at the national level, creating a one-way street.

In Türkiye, NGOs should intensify their efforts to raise public awareness about climate change and expand their use of strategic litigation to advance environmental protection. Notably, significant cases, such as *Duarte Agostinho and others v Portugal and 32 other states* before the ECtHR and *Saachi and others v Argentina and others* before the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child - in both of which Türkiye was among the respondent states - have not garnered sufficient attention within the country. To address this, media engagement must be strengthened by ensuring that legal developments on climate issues are not confined to specialized environmental outlets (such as Yeşil Gazete, iklim haber) but are also featured in mainstream media. By doing so, public discourse on climate litigation can be broadened, fostering greater societal and institutional responsiveness.

⁹⁴ Elif Korkmaz Tümer and Josephine van Zeben, 'The Brussels Effect in Ankara: The Case of Climate Policy', (2024) *New Perspectives on Turkey* 1, 3.

⁹⁵ S. İlgü Özler and B. K. Obach, 'Polarization and the Environmental Movement in Turkey', (2018) 14(4) *Journal of Civil Society* 311, 316.

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