

TURKISH NATIONALISM TODAY

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A Note on Nationalism: According to Kohn, "Nationalism is a political creed that underlies the cohesion of modern societies and legitimizes their claim to authority. Nationalism centers the supreme loyalty of the overwhelming majority of the people upon the nation-state, either existing or desired."¹ One must first note the element of modernity. Nationalism is a post-feudal and therefore popular ideology. In feudal society, subjects have no political rights and there is no question of a king or feudal lord trying to mobilize his subjects politically. If he has to mobilize them he will-typically- appeal to their loyalty to his person. Nationalism, then is an ideology that was born in bourgeois societies, that is to say, in Western Europe. In other, non- bourgeois societies it became the ideology of those who would modernize their countries. The function of nationalism, as Kohn points out, is to provide cohesion. Nationalism asserts the unity, the belonging to a nation -"existing or desired"- distinct from other nations, of all the people, whatever their class. For that, it has to fasten on at least one or several objective, concrete elements. Here it can be common language, there it can be common history, somewhere else it can be common religion, common territory or any combination of these and other elements. Thus it grows one or several of these elements and thus a nation born or developed. -A nation is a creation, a construct of prevalent nationalist ideology. "Classic" exceptions to the theory of nationhood like Belgium, Switzerland, the Zionist Jews seem to indicate that nations are the product of nationalism rather than the other way around. Likewise, today in Africa, first comes nationalism in a certain colonial territory that has become an independent state, and it is this nationalism, voiced by a dominant, modern-minded minority that seeks to develop

1 H. Kohn, "Nationalism", *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, 1968.

the future nation of that state by rendering nationalism prevalent among the inhabitants.

In other words, nationalism is a post-feudal, popular ideology agitating to mobilize all the different classes, especially in times of emergency, to a common "national" cause. Where a nation is as yet non-existent, it seeks to create a common identity, in other words, a nation. It binds classes, indeed, that is its *raison d'être*. Presumably, it would have no domestic function in a classless society.

Beginnings of Turkish Nationalism: It has often been pointed out that it was natural for the Turks to be the last nation in the Ottoman Empire to develop nationalism, because they were in certain respects the closest approximation to a ruling race, and for them to be nationalistic would be an open repudiation of the multi-national Ottoman Empire.² This statement is doubtless correct, but rather incomplete. The Turks were also one of the socially "retarded" elements in the Ottoman Empire in terms of the lateness in developing a bourgeoisie. It is this modern and modernizing class which developed Greek, Serbian, Roumanian, Bulgarian, Armenian nationalisms. These nations owed their early "awakening" partly to their exclusion, to a large extent, from the "ruling" professions (military, administrative) and especially to the fact that the increasingly dominating Western economic interests naturally preferred to have non-Moslem elements as their agents or even workers in the Empire. Ottoman nations which retained their feudal character, on the other hand, would naturally have nothing to do with non-aristocratic and popular ideologies such as nationalism. However, under the impact of the nation-conscious West and the example of Ottoman Christian nationalism, even Abdülhamit II. sometimes resorted to measures that seemed to exhibit national consciousness.³ It was also symptomatic that the 1876 Constitution, which was drafted at a time of great external stress, when one would expect the accent would be on Ottomanism (that nationalism which was supposed to bind

2. B. Lewis *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (London, Oxford U.P., 1968), pp. 344-5.

3. İ.H. Danişmend, *İzahlı Osmanlı Tarihi Kronolojisi*, vol. 4 (İst., Türkiye Y., 1961), p. 288-9.

all Ottomans, irrespective of creed or nationality) declared the only official language to be *Türkçe* rather than a euphemism such as *Osmanlıca* (art. 18).⁴

For the development of Turkish nationalism, it was necessary that a Turkish bourgeoisie should arise. In the middle of the 19th century however, not only was this essentially lacking, but nearly total economic domination of the West, coupled with the almost exclusive employment by Westerners or non-Moslems for *comprador* functions as well as for petty jobs, rendered it impossible for the Turks to develop a bourgeoisie. The Turks therefore accomplished in 1908 the feat of having a bourgeois revolution without a bourgeoisie to speak of. This surrogate bourgeoisie were the *mekteplis* or graduates of Western type schools. These schools were mainly the School of Medicine (1827), the War College (1834), and the Civil Service School (1859). Though these schools were founded comparatively early in the 19th century, the small number of graduates, plus the fact that for instance, the War College's first graduating class was that of 1848, postponed the impact of the *mekteplis* to the late 19th or early 20th century.

The education that the *mekteplis* received was Western and showed them irrefutably and insistently in what ways the West was superior. This "brain-washing" drove these young men to desire ardently that Ottoman society become modelled on the bourgeois West. The lifestyle and achievements of the non-Moslem bourgeoisie, who provided vivid and nearby examples of Western life, was a source both of envy and emulation. On the other hand, the fact that at least in the early echelons of the bureaucracy, they owed their position in the administration and in society not to the favour of the Sultan but rather to the objective appraisal of their schools (manifested by their diplomas) made them less patient with the "slave-institution" style and psychology of the traditional "alaturka" bureaucracy. When coupled with the critically vital failure of the Sultan to stop the downward slide of the Ottoman Empire, the increasing weight of the *mekteplis* in the bureaucracy became a revolutionary potential unseen before. 1908 was a turning point in Turkish his-

⁴ E.Z. Karal, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, vol. 8 (Ank., Türk Tarih Kurumu Y., 1962), p. 556.

tory comparable to 1789 in French history. The only-and very important difference was that this was a bourgeois revolution without a bourgeoisie, a bourgeois revolution made by a "surrogate bourgeoisie". Turkey's 1789 reached fruition on May 14, 1950, when the fledgling Turkish bourgeoisie first came to power in the person of the Democratic Party (DP), displacing the *mektepli* or modern bureaucracy, represented at this time by its political organization, the Republican People's Party (RPP).

Bernard Lewis makes a fine point about none of the five Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) founders being Turkish.⁵ Whatever the character of the CUP in 1889, there is no doubt that it quickly developed into a Turkish organization with Turkish nationalism as its basic tenet. The CUP, in a letter written to the Kızanlık branch in Bulgaria and dated 1906, declared, "Our Committee is a purely Turkish organization."⁶ But theirs was a case of wanting to eat one's cake and have it too. They were Turkish nationalists, but they were not willing to forego the multi-national Ottoman Empire. They therefore kept their nationalism, and necessarily their organization, congresses and leadership secret.⁷ All this came out into the open in the carnage of the Balkan Wars and World War I, when it became apparent that the multi-national Empire was an impossibility. The *mekteplis* or, in other words, the CUP and its sociological continuation, the RPP, stayed in power-with certain intervals-from 1908 to 1950. This was the surrogate bourgeoisie, whose ideology was nationalism⁸ and whose social program was the establishment and development of a Turkish bourgeoisie. Nationalism has continued to be a dominant current of thought in Turkey since the coming to power of the bourgeoisie in 1950.

Consciousness of Turkish Nationality The first task of nationalism was to spread the emotive consciousness of belonging to a Turkish nation among the Turks and, if possible, also among non-Turkish Muslims. Starting with the Balkan Wars and accelerating during World War I, this was first started

5 Lewis, p. 197

6 A. B. Kuran, *İnkılap Tarihimiz ve İttihat ve Terakki* (İst., 1948), p. 203.

7 S. Akşin, "İttihat ve Terakki Üzerine", *Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi*, vol. 26, no. 1, 1971, pp. 165-7.

8 K. H. Karpat, *Political and Social Thought in the Contemporary Middle East* (New York, Praeger, 1968), p. 298.

among educated adults by organizations such as *Türk ocağı* (Turkish Hearth)⁹ and various publications, and among children and youths, by the school system. The spread of national consciousness would naturally be the first task of Turkish nationalism, since for Turks, the most important extra-local ties before 1908 were mainly religious. Being a Turk would only be significant to differentiate linguistically between Muslims and would carry few, if any, emotional overtones. Success in the task of spreading the notion of national consciousness can be roughly equated with the successful spread of the primary school system in rural areas, though such things as the conscription system the rapid growth of urbanization, the spread of mass media and the development of the transportation system are naturally also important. One might venture a rough guess that by the year 1960, when total literacy was about 40 %, a third of the population lived in provincial or country (*ilçe*) centers daily newspaper circulation had risen to about 1,400,000 and the "transistor age" was about to dawn, the spread of national consciousness would have made important headway. It should be noted, however that even in the year 1977, with Turkey over the threshold of the television age, the task cannot be considered as completed. The resurgence of religious sentiment, evinced by the rise of the National Salvation Party (NSP) as the third largest political party is perhaps an indication of a loyalty still rivalling nationalism. Favoured by the very cool reaction of the West to the Turkish "Peace Operation" in Cyprus and the need for petroleum products at more reasonable prices, the NSP has actively pursued a policy of fraternal relations with Muslim countries which can easily be interpreted as demonstrating an extra-national or *ümmet*-type loyalty. One can assume that the mixed results obtained by this policy has tempered somewhat the NSP's rather naive optimism in this regard. On the other hand, the description by the NSP of its policies as the "national view" (*milli görüş*) though doubtless to a large extent merely lip-service to secular sentiment and laws, seems partly to indicate the success of nationalism in dominating the Turkish scene. Moreover, the decrease by half of the NSP's seats in the National Assembly in the June 5, 1977 elections shows that the NSP is far from enjoying the "captive"

9 T. Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler* (İst., 1952), pp. 378-86.

electorate that one might assume overriding religious sentiment could provide.

One of the intriguing aspects of the effort to instill a national identity, was the so-called sun-language theory of 1935. This theory of a Turkish Central Asia that served as cradle to nearly all peoples and civilizations has been much criticized. There is no need to discuss the fictitiousness of this theory. However, the needs that prompted it are quite open to discussion. According to one view, this was necessary to prevent the language reform from going to the extreme of doing away with every non Turkish word, however common its usage.¹⁰ Thus since all civilizations were ultimately Turkish in origin, there was no harm in retaining some of the words that were "thought" to be foreign before the advent of the sun-language theory. According to another view, this theory was put forward to increase the self-confidence of the Turkish nation, badly shaken from recent pre-Republican events. Timur is of the opinion that the failure of Republican economic development policies also dictated such a process of self-glorification.¹¹ One can further point to the fascist and national socialist vogue of glorifying the distant past for purposes of self-aggrandizement. In Turkey this was appropriate, since a glorification of Muslim and Ottoman recent history was quite out of the question for the young Republic and it was considered necessary to do some ego-building in order to offset the paralyzing inferiority complex resulting from many years of failure *vis-a-vis* the challenge of the West.

A Turkish Fatherland: Another task for Turkish nationalism was to "create" a fatherland (*vatan-yurt*)-that territory that is supposed to evoke emotional responses from the nation. Namık Kemal, the "poet of the fatherland" had established indelibly the concept of fatherland among the educated. However, just as his nationalism-if it can be called such- boiled down to Ottomanism or Pan-Islamism, his fatherland was nothing else but all of Ottoman territory. The main problem here was that nothing could be more fluid than the Ottoman frontiers du-

10 Lewis, pp. 434-5, from U. Heyd, *Language Reform in Modern Turkey* (Jerusalem, 1954), pp. 33-4.

11 T. Timur, *Türk Devrimi ve Sonrası* (Ank., Doğan Y., 1971), pp. 202-3.

ring the last quarter of the 19 th century and the first quarter of the 20 th century. Encouraged by emigrés from Russia and the Germans, the nationalism of CUP, especially during World War I, went to the extremes of Pan-Turanianism. The collapse of the Russian front after the October revolution aroused great hopes in this respect. At a time when the Ottoman armies were retreating in Iraq and Palestine, many Turks rationalized this retreat as the abandonment of Arab, i.e. alien lands¹² and found consolation in the forward march of the Ottoman army in the Turkish-speaking areas of the Caucasus and Northern Iran. The outcome of the war dashed these hopes. Even after the Mudros Armistice, however, the possibility of retaining Iraq and Syria under an American mandate dazzled the eyes of many nationalists and made them advocated of this cause. Recent research suggests that the National Pact (*Misak-ı Milli*) was initially far from being the complete renunciation of Arab territories that it is commonly supposed to be.¹³ Since 1923 however, Turkish frontiers have been stable (except for the addition of Hatay) and for more than half a century Turkey has a fixed fatherland. There may be some who, together with the NSP, would like to see in the Cyprus Peace Operation the re-awakening of the Ottoman territorial appetite. I think this is rather far-fetched. Cyprus was a very special case. Britain was about to relinquish the island and the question of who-if anybody-would own the island became a moot point. The Zurich and London agreements that gave Turkey and Greece the right of intervention and the right to maintain garrisons were the result of hard bargaining between the parties. I think many international lawyers would agree that there are strong arguments for the case that in reality Cyprus was a non-state.

Nationalism and Security: In the definition of nationalism given above, nationalism was presented as an ideology seeking to mobilize, aspecially in times of emergency, differnt classes to a common cause. It would seem that in spite of the Lausanne Treaty, Turkey's republican regime lived through somewhat of an emergency until about 1950. In the pre-1914 world, all

12 For instance, Kazım Karabekir's views in İ. Selçuk, *Yüzbaşı Salahattin'in Romanı* (İst., Remzi, 1973), pp. 287-8.

13 M. Tunçay, "Misak-ı Milli'nin 1. maddesi Üstüne", *Birikim*, Ağustos-Eylül 1976, no. 18/19.

non-European and/or non-capitalist societies were subject to colonial subjugation.¹⁴ The three important exceptions, China, Iran and the Ottoman Empire were only nominally independent and only because there was more than one Great Power laying claim to them. In other words, they were in most respects *de facto* colonies held in common. In spite of Woodrow Wilson and the League of Nations, the situation did not change after 1918, except for the emancipation of Eastern Europe. The mandate system was obviously a euphemism for the colonial system. The pre-1914 exceptions, however, had given a more concrete reality to their independence. China, Iran Turkey had shaken off partly, or completely the capitulations and had established more or less forward-looking regimes. In most cases, these promising beginnings were crushed by invading armies. In 1931, Japan attacked and started to invade China. In 1935 Italy occupied and annexed Ethiopia. In 1941 Britain and the Soviet Union occupied and divided Iran. Under these circumstances it would seem that it was a great achievement or great luck for Turkey to go unscathed. The leaders of the new Turkey must have been terribly aware of their precarious position. Rebellions in Eastern Turkey and sabre-rattling by the Italians gave ample cause for alarm.

It is in this light that the Atatürk reforms should be evaluated. For many Westerners the more formalistic reforms smack of blind imitation and seem quite unintelligible except as indications of the will to Westernize. A good number of the younger generation in Turkey are of the same opinion and tend to derisively label some of these reforms as "*gardrop devrimleri*" (wardrobe reforms). If one examines these reforms within the context of the international inter-war climate, one sees that they are intelligible mainly as defensive measures. They are defensive in the sense of completely disclaiming, through concrete action, the exercise of Pan-Islamic influence—that bugbear of the Great Powers with Muslim subjects. They are also defensive in the sense that to the extent that they Europeanized Turkey, they would presumably give her immunity against colonial subjugation. Of course this would raise many questions, such as whether or not Christianity would be considered one of the *sine qua non* condi-

14 Latin America would be non-capitalist, but European.

tions of "becoming" European. However, with the non-European world rapidly attaining independence after World War II, it was no longer necessary to be so much on the defensive. Indeed, these new states frequently tried to underscore their originality *vis-à-vis* the European world, especially from the "wardrobe" angle.¹⁵

After 1945, Turkey continued to live in a state of emergency. This time the danger came from Stalin's desire to recuperate the Tsarist frontiers of 1914 and to achieve preponderant influence in the Straits. The Truman doctrine in 1947 appeared to provide the security that the 1938 treaty with Britain and France had provided for a very short while. Turkey's participation and services in the Korean War seemed to assuage to a large extent the fears of Stalinist policy. The effusion of optimism generated by this armed comradeship with the United States was in many respects comparable to a similar state of mind during the Crimean War.¹⁶ Turkey's admission into NATO in 1952 capped this trend. Turkey at last could feel reasonably secure. Stalin's death in 1953 and the repudiation soon after of his demands by his successors (May 30, 1953), naturally increased this sense of security. This Soviet move did not at that time receive a very favourable response in Turkey. However, with the unwinding of the cold war and progress in the direction of *detente*, Turco-Soviet relations slowly progressed in the direction of normalcy. After 1965, and especially after the March 25, 1967 Economic Aid Agreement, relations became quite friendly.

In 1959, Turkey applied to the EEC for membership. Negotiations resulted in the signature on September 12, 1963 of the agreement making Turkey an associate member of the EEC. The additional protocol of November 23, 1970, started the "count down" of Turkish customs duties *vis-à-vis* Europe. Two lists of products were drawn up, one with a schedule of customs reductions extending over a period of 12 years, the other extending over a period of 22 years. At the end of the respective periods, customs duties for the products in question will have reached zero. Ever since 1963, there has been a growing debate about the

15 S. Akşin, "Atatürk'ü Anlamak İçin", *Milliyet*, 10 November 1975.

16 S. Akşin, *İstanbul Hükümetleri ve Milli Mücadele* (İst., Cem, 1976), pp. 44, 60.

wisdom of this move. A significant section of the Turkish Left is against joining the EEC, maintaining that this will completely spoil Turkey's chances of becoming an industrial country and that Europe will dominate and exploit Turkey completely. The Turkish Right, including the NSP and the Nationalist Movement Party (NMP) are also against joining the EEC, the first stressing Turkey's religious incompatibility with Europe, while the second puts the accent on the industrialization issue. It is generally conceded, however, that Turkey's association with the EEC has on the whole, been politically, rather than economically motivated. In other words, the economic pro and cons have not been properly weighed and association with the EEC has been regarded as an insurance against communism and a natural culmination of the process of Westernization.¹⁷ With the progress of customs reductions, difficulties have arisen which appear to be the result of lack of proper studies. It is to be noticed, however, that though the Koç Holding Company rather recently voiced some doubts about the EEC association, it seems lately to have overcome them. The other major holding company, Sabancı, appears to have been favourable to the EEC relationship throughout. Of course, the effects on the public sector and on smaller establishments, and the attitudes to result therefrom remain to be seen.

The problem of Turkey's security, which had been more or less solved since the early fifties has been revived lately, though not in such an acute form. This has been the result of the Cyprus Peace Operation. Partly under the influence of Greek propaganda and perhaps partly through the revival of ancient prejudice (what the NSP would call the "Crusader spirit"), West European and American public opinion has been according a distinctly frigid treatment to Turkey. Most notably, this has resulted in the US arms embargo. Armenian agitation, which had been more or less dormant until recent years, has now flared up. The recent assassination of three ambassadors and other Turkish diplomats, allegedly by the Armenians, has given rise—rather ironically—to anti-Turkish reactions in Western media. How events will develop is anybody's guess. One thing, however, seems clear. The

17 *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası* (Ank., Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi., 1974), pp. 520-5, 563-8.

longer this new question mark on Turkey's security remains, the more will it evoke a defence mechanism, namely, nationalism.

Nationalism versus Marxism: It has become commonplace nowadays to oppose nationalism to Marxism and to leftism generally. Süleyman Demirel, leader of the Justice Party, declares these days (June 1977) that the division in Turkey is between nationalists and leftists, the RPP being leftist, and therefore, not nationalistic. In China, Chiang Kai Shek's men were called Nationalists and to this day Formosa styles itself Nationalist China. In Turkey, Bülent Ecevit, leader of the RPP, repudiates Demirel's claim to nationalism and claims it is his side that is really nationalistic. If Ecevit were a true Marxist, I doubt if he would dare to contradict Demirel, even if he felt like it. For Marxism, like its opposite number, has, as far as I know, generally assiduously cultivated the notion that it is not nationalistic. In the 19th century, when nation-states were in the making, Marxist internationalism tried to de-emphasize the dictates of nationalism in order to establish the primacy of proletarian revolutions.¹⁸ This is perhaps natural because nationalism had then been wielded only by the bourgeoisie. World War I, however, definitely showed that the working class would respond to the call of nationalism. It is interesting to note, moreover, that the successful and indigenous Communist revolutions of our century have established themselves under circumstances of resistance to foreign invasion—witness the Russian, Chinese, Vietnamese, Yugoslav, Albanian, Cuban revolutions. There is no doubt that foreign invasion is the ideal breeding ground of nationalism, the emergency situation *par excellence*. Even if the communist parties or organizations did not explicitly resort to nationalist propaganda, the situation of invasion would in itself inspire all other classes with a sense of nationalist solidarity. And there is no doubt that, for instance, the Chinese Communists, with their emphasis on national democratic revolution, did to a large extent practice nationalist propaganda.

The Communist Manifesto in 1848 placed the responsibility for the proletariat "having no country" on the development of

18 Some would even suggest that behind Marxists internationalism sometimes lies the wish to perpetuate the revolutionary primacy of a more well-established nation, like the German or Russian nations *vis-a-vis* East European or Asiatic Nations.

capitalism and predicted that national differences and antagonisms between peoples would vanish still faster with the supremacy of the proletariat.¹⁹ At the moment, this prediction does not seem to have been realized exactly as expected. It was after World War II that the multinational corporation became a sort of supranational phenomenon transcending frontiers and national allegiances²⁰. On the other hand, the internationalism generated by COMECON hardly appears to approach that of the multinational corporations.²¹ In Turkey, a great deal of propaganda capital has been made of the RPP's recent adhesion to the Socialist International, which has been denounced as an act contrary to nationalism. On the other hand, it is the Turkish bourgeoisie which seems to be running towards the adventure of the Common Market with little hesitation. Also worthy of note is the fact that the extreme right wing Nationalist Movement Party, which formerly was called the Republican Peasant Nation Party, went out of its way to change its name (8-9 February 1969)²² which happens now to be almost the same name as that of the Falangist Party in Spain (*Partido de Movimiento Nacional*) and many more or less fascist parties elsewhere. Since 1960, it has been the Turkish Left which has criticized what it considered to be too liberal foreign investment policies (in industry and minerals) as well as investment policies which unduly increased Turkey's dependence on imported oil. This sort of economic criticism would have been impossible in the 1946-1960 period, when Russian salad, out of fear or hostility, was re-named American salad and the lightest sentence for communist propaganda started (it still does, but the application is much more liberal now) from 7 1/2 years of prison. On the other hand, many, if not most, of doctrinaire Turkish Marxists did their utmost in order not to appear to support the Cyprus Peace Operation, since to them, this would be a nationalistic attitude. The myth of the incompa-

19 K. Marx, "The Communist Manifesto", *The Political Philosophers*, S. Commins, R. N. Linscott, eds. (N. Y., Random House, 1947), pp. 499, 507-8.

20 See, for instance, C. Tugendhat, *The Multinationals*, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1974).

21 A. Nove, "East-West Trade", *International Economic Relations*, P. A. Samuelson, ed. (London, Mac Millan, 1969), pp. 104-10.

22 F. and B. T. Ahmad, *Türkiye'de Tek Partili Politikanın Açıklamalı Kronolojisi, 1945-1971* (Ank., Bilgi, 1976), p. 362.

tibility of Marxism with nationalism will die hard, since both Marxists and anti-Marxists struggle so hard to uphold it.

Nationalism and Economic Development: An important aspect of nationalism was economic development. The CUP had had a very clear-cut conception of this necessity. It had also accepted the idea that the motor of economic development was the creation of a Turkish bourgeoisie. After 1908, there was a rapid increase in the hitherto insignificant number of Turkish companies. With World War I and the abolition of the capitulations (9/9/1914), the CUP government had an immeasurably freer hand to do as it pleased. War conditions of scarcity made it so much easier to "create" rich men.²³ The İzmir Economic Congress and the Republic more or less followed in outline the CUP's economic policies. The only important difference was the government's policy, championed by İsmet Paşa, of building railroads. By 1932, the Turkish bourgeoisie that had come into being, was far from adopting the role of "captains of industry" that was expected of it. Foreign investments were also not filling this gap. On the other hand, the 1930 Free Party (Serbest Fırka) experiment in pluralistic democracy had revealed the great discontent of the people, in large measure resulting from the Great Depression²⁴. The political future of the regime demanded a more dynamic pace of development. A third element in this picture was the Soviet example of industrialization. Thus was born the policy of statism, the setting up of state enterprises, many of them industrial, as a complement to private enterprise.²⁵ Statism, from 1933 to 1939 was a singularly noteworthy and successful example of economic development with pre-Keynesian orthodox policies and very little foreign aid²⁶. The war interrupted a good part of these efforts. After the war, economic development became a process that was to a large extent supported by foreign aid. Since then, the original policy of statism may have changed beyond recognition, but the public sector continues to exist and

23 Ahmed Emin, *Turkey in the World War* (New Haven, 1930); H. Kivilımcılı, *Türkiye'de Kapitalizmin Gelişimi* (İst., 1965).

24 W. F. Weiker, *Political Tutelage and Democracy in Turkey* (Leiden, 1973).

25 K. Boratav, *Türkiye'de Devletçilik* (İst., Gerçek, 1974).

26 K. Boratav, "Büyük Dünya Bunalımı İçinde Türkiye'nin Sanayileşme ve Gelişme Sorunları: 1929-1939", paper submitted to Makine Mühendisleri Odası Sanayi Kongresi, 1976 (Ank.).

grow and has a vital role in the economy. Whatever the policies chosen to implement it, economic development is a very basic and vital part of Turkish nationalism. As soon as war ceased to be in the forefront of Turkey's attention, economic development became a dominant issue. Before statism, railroad building was a major concern of the İsmet Paşa governments. After the beginning of statism, industrial achievements became a great source of pride for Turkey. With the end of World War II, we find the RPP and then the Democratic Party devoting great attention to economic development. President Celal Bayar himself made a point of being present at many opening ceremonies and giving long speeches. After the 1960 Revolution, the setting up of the State Planning Organization seemed to lend a sort of "scientific" and rather "cold" aura to economic investments, instead of the "inspirational" investment activities of the Menderes era. Undaunted, Demirel in 1965 returned to the previous style of grand opening ceremonies and speech making, thus reviving economic development as the central propaganda issue. The Bosphorus bridge figured prominently in the Justice Party's election posters, as did the slogan of "Great Turkey". However, in the National Front government which was in power before the June 1977 elections, the NSP occupied most of the economic ministries. They seemed to outdo the Justice Party on the economic issue, calling in their turn for massive investments in heavy industry to build "factories that make factories" and transform Turkey into a "leading, rather than satellite country". I believe this must have made an impact on the rightist electorate, or they would not have won as many seats as they did. The fate of Ferruh Bozbeyli's Democratic Party which only won one seat, may be cited to partly support this view. Again, the failure of the RPP to win an absolute majority, in spite of the crucial security of life issue in the elections, may be partly explained by the persistence of the JP's image as a "party that builds".

Conclusion: Turkish nationalism found its medium with the Young Turk revolution of 1908. The calamities that soon enveloped the Ottoman Empire placed not only the existence of the multi-national Empire, but the very existence of a Turkish homeland in jeopardy. This was the emergency situation that would quickly spread the ideology of nationalism. Since then,

Turkey has had to face many emergency situations. Some of these it appears to have more or less solved. With the solution of each problem, the intensity of nationalism in Turkey will decrease. We saw that the question of a Turkish identity, a well-defined fatherland seem to have been solved, that the question of international security has lost much of its earlier acuteness. There still remains the long-term problem of catching up with the "level of contemporary civilization", in other words, economic development. This problem will probably be with us for some time. However, Turkey is developing and appears to be able to solve her economic problems.

One other problem facing Turkey is the question of international identity. Turkey is a member of NATO, OECD and the European Council. She appears to desire to be a full member of the EEC. However, she has a non-European past, a different religious and cultural heritage. Will and can Turkey be a European country in spite of these differences? The alternative is to become a country of the Third World, more specifically, a member of the Islamic Middle East. A third alternative is the Socialist World, but at least for today this alternative appears to be academic. Perhaps Turkey has a Euro-Asiatic role to fulfill, in line with her geography. The transit trade between East and West, moribund for centuries since the Age of Discovery, shows signs of a vigorous revival and this will doubtless put its stamp on Turkey. Nevertheless, there will still be the question of a *dominant* identity. Only time can decide which way Turkey will go. There is no doubt, however, that in the evolution of this process, nationalism will have its say.