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Araştırma Makalesi

Almanya'ya Göç Eden Üç Nesil Türk Göçmenlerin Dini Algılarındaki Değişimler: Münih Örneği[1]

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Öz

1961 yılında Türkiye ile Batı Almanya arasında imzalanan göç anlaşmasıyla birlikte Türkiye'den Batı Almanya'ya çok sayıda insan göç etmiştir. 1961 yılından itibaren göç edenlerin sayısı iki buçuk milyonu geçmiştir. Bu sayı üç kuşağa karşılık gelmektedir. Göçmenler hem göç ettikleri yeri etkilemiş hem de göç ettikleri yerden sosyo-ekonomik, siyasi ve kültürel olarak etkilenmişlerdir. Fakat üç kuşak bu süreçten farklı şekilde etkilenmiştir. Şöyle ki, üç kuşak arasında göçe bakış açısı, Alman kültürüne yaklaşım, Türkiye'ye dönüş, kültürel entegrasyon ve dini davranış açısından pek çok farklılık olmuştur. Bu çalışmada Almanya'ya göç eden Türklerin dini uygulamaları açısından üç kuşak arasındaki farklılıklar analiz edilmeye çalışılacaktır. Özellikle üç kuşak Türk'ün dini algıları, dinin kimlikleri üzerindeki etkileri, dinin günlük yaşam davranışları üzerindeki etkileri ve sekülerleşme konusundaki görüşleri ele alınacaktır. Din ve Kimlik, Melez Kültür ve Sekülerleşmiş Yaşam bu çalışmanın ana temalarıdır. Bu çalışmada nicel yöntem kullanılmıştır. 2020-2021 yılları arasında katılımcılara kapalı ve açık uçlu sorulardan oluşan bir anket uygulanmıştır. Araştırma alanı Almanya'dır. Araştırmanın evreni Bavyera'nın başkenti Münih'tir. Araştırmada basit tesadüfi örnekleme tekniği kullanılmıştır. Birinci ve üçüncü kuşaktan toplam 316 kişi ile yapılan anketler SPSS 22 ile analiz edilmiştir. Bazı veriler Ki-Kare Testi ile analiz edilmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Göç, Almanya göçü, din, sekülerleşme, gündelik hayat, üç kuşak türk göçmen.

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Research Article

Changes in Religious Perceptions of Turkish Immigrants of Three Generations Who Migrated to Germany: Munich Example

Abstract

With the migration agreement signed between Turkey and West Germany in 1961, many people migrated from Turkey to West Germany. Since then, the number of immigrants has exceeded two and a half million, spanning three generations. Not only have these immigrants influenced the places where they settled, but they have also been shaped socio-economically, politically, and culturally by their country of origin. Moreover, each generation has been affected differently. Specifically, there are significant differences between the three generations in terms of: Their perspectives on immigration; Their approach to German culture; Their willingness to return to Turkey; Their level of cultural integration; Their religious behavior.

Research Objectives: This study aims to analyze the differences between the three generations regarding the religious practices of Turks who immigrated to Germany. In particular, it explores: The religious perceptions of these three generations; The role of religion in shaping their identities; The influence of religion on their daily lives; Their views on secularization.

The central themes of this study include Religion and Identity, Hybrid Culture, and Secularized Life.

Methodology: A quantitative research method was employed. A questionnaire consisting of closed and open-ended questions was administered to participants between 2020 and 2021. The research was conducted in Germany, with the sample drawn from Munich, the capital of Bavaria. A simple random sampling technique was used.

Data from a total of 316 respondents from the first and third generations were analyzed using SPSS 22, with some findings examined through the Chi-Square Test.

Keywords: Migration, German immigration, religion, secularization, daily life, three generations.

Introduction

Migration is likely a phenomenon as old as human history. Today, many people, especially Syrians, migrate internationally. Additionally, many countries now implement strict measures against immigration. Migration can be briefly defined as the movement of people from one place to another, either temporarily or permanently, due to individual or social reasons. It can create challenges both for the people who migrate and for those in the destination location. It also establishes a conceptual "locals and foreigners" dichotomy in people's minds. This dichotomy can, in turn, increase economic, social, political, and societal tensions.

This study focuses on Turkish immigrants who migrated to Germany.

This migration began with the "Labor Recruitment Agreement" signed in 1961 between Turkey and what was then known as West Germany (Abadan-Unat, 2017, p.43). Despite the termination of this agreement in 1973, the migration of Turkish immigrants to Germany continued and still continues today. There have been many economic, social, cultural, and political reasons for this migration. Consequently, the number of Turkish immigrants in Germany has exceeded two and a half million, spanning three generations.

The primary objective of this study is to examine whether there has been a change in the religious attitudes and behaviors of three generations of Turks who migrated to Germany over the past sixty years. Additionally, this study seeks to identify the nature of these changes and the sociological factors that have contributed to them. Migration has influenced and transformed both the people who moved away from their usual residence and the lives of those in the destination country. Over time, political, economic, cultural, and religious differences have emerged between the first-generation and third-generation Turkish immigrants. Germans also have different approaches towards each of the three generations.

The German immigration process has introduced many concepts, such as "Alamancı" and "Gurbetçi" in Turkey, as well as "Dual citizenship," "Blue card," "Multi-culture," Euro-Islam, "Imported Bride/Groom," and "Deutsche-Türken" in Germany. Thus, immigration has written its own story. Therefore, this study utilizes Norbert Elias' theory of "process sociology."

1. The Theoretical Discussion

The main question of this study, which examines Turkish immigrants who migrated to Germany, is whether there has been a change in the religious beliefs or behaviors of these people over time. To understand this, it is necessary to explore the issue of secularization and the relationship between migration and religion, as

well as the connection between sociology and migration. It is also crucial to understand the history of Turkish immigrants' migration to Germany and the reasons behind their migration. In this context, the issues mentioned under this title will be discussed sociologically.

1.1. Secularization

To begin with, it must be acknowledged that the relationship between religion, society, and the state is complex. There are two basic reasons for this. First, secularization takes on different forms and meanings in various societies due to differing historical and social backgrounds. For instance, the phenomenon of secularization in France is different from that in England, one of the first societies where it emerged. Second, the attitudes of religions, especially monotheistic religions, towards secularization differ. For example, the demands of Islam regarding religion-state relations differ from those of Christianity.

Moreover, in societies where the Islamic faith is practiced, secularization may have different manifestations due to the unique historical experiences of those societies. These issues will not be discussed in this article, but it is important to emphasize that when examining secularization, the relevant society and religion should be taken into account.

Peter Berger (1967, p.107) defines secularization as "the process by which sectors of society and culture are removed from the domination of religious institutions and symbols." This implies the alienation of the social sphere from sacred principles. Volkan Ertit (2014, pp.120-128) states that secularization does not only mean the disappearance of religion but also signifies that common superstitious beliefs and institutional practices assumed to be related to religion are losing their influence in the modernization process. Many political and social factors accelerate the secularization process. Capitalism, modernization, and urbanization lead to secularization. According to Ertit, "modernization can make people more secular." Secularization involves placing this world at the center.

One of the important discussions on secularization is whether it is weakening or gaining strength globally. In fact, Peter Berger (1990, p.90), a prominent figure in the literature on secularization, claims that secularization is weakening and declining in today's world. He proposes the thesis that this decline is significant.

In contrast to the thesis that secularization is declining, other arguments suggest that secularization and non-religious life have become almost an ordinary and routine form of life, especially in Western societies. For example, Baker and Smith (2009, p.1251) claim that even in a country with high religiosity, such as the United

States, religious orientation is declining. Sharing a similar view, Lois Lee (2012, p.136) states: "In recent years, there has been a growing recognition of nonreligiosity, that which is defined by how it differs from religion." Similarly, David Voas (2025, pp.1-20) states the following:

"The growing share of the American population that is religiously unaffiliated—the "rise of the nones"—has inspired a mountain of popular and scholarly commentary. The phenomenon can be viewed as evidence that the United States is following the pattern of secularization seen in other highly developed countries"

Regarding the subject, nonreligion is located in people's minds, bodies, and spaces. Volkan Ertit (2024, pp.1-21) similarly claims that Turkey is becoming more secularized with each passing day. There are perspectives suggesting that the world we live in, and especially the family, has a significant impact on the decline of religion. Indeed, Bengtson (2018, p.258) expresses the strong impact of the family on rising secularization in their study. Another debate on secularization is that its classical definition is not sufficient to explain the diversifying and changing world. In other words, different versions and definitions of secularization are emerging.

1.2. Definitions of Secularization

People are experiencing changes in their relationship with religion in parallel with changes in social life. New situations encountered in today's world suggest that the classical definition of secularization may no longer be sufficient. Therefore, this necessitates a reconceptualization of the subject.

In contemporary literature on secularization, more inclusive concepts such as nonreligion, indifference, ignorance, active opposition to religion, atheism, deism, spiritual but not religious, agnosticism, disbelief, unbelief, nones, and apostasy are used (Alexander, 2021, Küçükural et al., 2023, Lee, 2012). In particular, younger generations are shaping new definitions of secularization. Alexander states the following in his study on the subject:

"Since 2000, surveys have shown substantial increases in young adults identifying as Nones."

Secularization is also defined as being non-religious or non-affiliated, as well as spiritual but not religious. Additionally, there are definitions of secularization that emphasize the religious or spiritual dimension rather than the belief dimension of religion. Nathan G. Alexander (2021, p.97) states:

"One might, for example, identify with a certain religion or follow its rituals while not believing in its doctrines. There are also those, again for example, who believe in a god but are unwilling to adopt any particular label or to practice their faith in an institutional setting. One thinks here of those who identify as 'spiritual but not religious'."

As seen, many concepts are used and proposed to define secularization. In this study, the concept of secularization is adopted in line with the definition of non-religion as described by Lois Lee and Stephen Bullivant (2020, p.88):

"Non-religion is used to indicate not the absence of something (religion) but the presence of something (else), characterized, at least in the first place, by its relation to religion but nevertheless distinct from it."

At this point, religion is losing its influence in the public and social spheres, the collective power of religion is weakening, and it is increasingly becoming a matter of individual life. Thomas Luckmann describes this phenomenon as "individual religion" (1967, p.95).

2. The Impact of Migration on Religion and Secularization

Although migration has significant effects on the beliefs of immigrants, as Nordin and Otterbeck (2023, p.12) state, the relationship between migration and religion has not been examined comprehensively or to the extent it deserves. For many, migration is deeply intertwined with religion—an aspect that frequently gets overlooked in migration studies (e.g., Straut-Eppsteiner & Hagan, 2016). Immigrants' religion can exert both positive and negative effects on their integration by providing a social network and a system of meaning.

First of all, migration is known to have different effects on religious identity. These effects may vary depending on the sociological conditions of the destination and the intensity of religious interest. The duration, timing, and location of migration also play a role in shaping the relationship between migration and religion. Regarding this subject, Nordin and Otterbeck (2023, p.9) state:

"Changes in religion may also depend on the type of international migration... Reasons for migration also most certainly affect religion; fleeing because of one's religiosity or moving between two countries with similar religious contexts and being vaguely religious, probably affect people's religiosity in different ways."

In the case of Turkish immigrants in Germany, religion has taken on the following role:

"Religion was often not seen as a sacred belief and practice among immigrant Turkish immigrants, but was used as a means of defining oneself in the society in which they lived" (Eren, 2007, p.278).

Immigrants may experience difficulties in many aspects, particularly due to cultural differences in the places they arrive. Religion can play an important role in alleviating these difficulties (Becker & Dinesh, 2005, 18-21).

For immigrants, religion can act as a safe spiritual harbor against alienation, cultural shocks, exclusion, and hostility toward immigrants. A study on Turkish immigrants living in Bulgaria found that religion holds a very important place for immigrants (Şen, 2004, p.49). Similarly, Turkish immigrants who moved to Germany sought to overcome difficulties through religion. As Dökmen (1989, p.143) states:

"The Turkish immigrants living in Germany cling more tightly to the values they brought from their country because they live as a closed community and cannot enter the culture of that country."

Solidarity networks established around religion, as well as religion itself, help migrants cope with the challenges they face during the migration process. In general, kinship solidarity plays a crucial role, especially in international migrations (Gurak & Caces, 1992, 150-162). According to Massey (1990, p.69):

"Migrant networks are sets of interpersonal ties that link together migrants, former migrants, and nonmigrants in origin and destination areas through the bonds of kinship, friendship, and shared community origin."

In particular, immigrants rely on these networks to address the challenges they encounter in the places they migrate to. Over time, these networks may take on a religious dimension. In fact, the Turkish immigrants who are the focus of this study turned to religious networks to cope with cultural differences, political pressure, and other difficulties they faced in Germany.

In some cases, migration can contribute to a revival of religious practices and beliefs. Immigrants may form their own religious communities in their new countries as a way to maintain their cultural identity and traditions. Migration can strengthen religious affiliation, increase community formation, and enhance religiosity.

Regarding this issue, Nur Vergin (1985, pp.16-17) shows in her study on Ereğli, Turkey, that urbanization increases religiosity and that religious sect-based community formation is particularly strong among migrant workers. A similar pattern has been observed among Turkish immigrants in Germany, where religious communities have become stronger. Additionally, religion has been adopted as a protective sense of belonging and identity for Turkish immigrants.

Migration can also strengthen religious networks among migrants. However, it can simultaneously lead to secularization. As migrants integrate into their host societies, they may adopt more secular attitudes and practices, reducing the influence of religion in their lives. This trend is more evident in long-term migrations, where religious tendencies may differ across migrant generations.

According to James A. Beckford (2019, p.18):

"The religion of immigrants is not shaped only by their own beliefs. The sociological factors that immigrants encounter during the process, and the 'trans-local social networks' they participate in, affect their religious lifestyles. Although the first generations expect their grandchildren to live the religion they lived, religious experiences change over time. Religious life has been in a state of 'a balance between continuity and change.' Immigrants build 'hybrid religious beliefs and hybrid identities' as a result of their integration with social values in the places they go. In brief, it can be said that people's religious beliefs change with migration."

Over time, Turkish immigrants in Germany have been able to partially integrate into German culture while still maintaining their beliefs. They have embraced cultural exchange rather than extremism. Indeed, while the perception of religion was different among the first generation of Turkish immigrants in Germany, it may differ significantly in the third generation. This point constitutes the basic assumption of this study.

3. Process Sociology and Migration

As the sociological profile of Turkish immigrants has changed throughout the migration process, Germans' views toward Turkish immigrants have also evolved. Therefore, this study adopts Norbert Elias's theory of "process sociology" as a reference framework to understand the migration story of Turkish immigrants.

Norbert Elias (1981, p.766) states the following in the context of process sociology:
"Man is a process" (Der Mensch ist ein Prozeß).

Migration is a process that involves historicity. Migration theories have diversified in parallel with the different experiences of migrants. In other words, not only do human experiences change, but migration itself and its definitions evolve over time. Every migration writes its own story. People change throughout the migration process, and migration itself also undergoes transformation. This is why a wide variety of migration theories have emerged—both migration and migrants are shaped by this process. Immigrants influence the countries they move to, just as they are influenced by them.

The first generation of Turkish immigrants did not initially intend to establish a permanent life in Germany. Their primary goal was to reach their planned economic objectives with minimal socialization before returning to Turkey. As a result, they made little effort to learn German (Gestring et al., 2004, pp.8-11).

Some members of the second generation were born in Turkey and moved to Germany between the ages of 1 and 5. Their early socialization in Turkey was interrupted, leading to adaptation challenges. Accordingly, personality disorders have been frequently observed in this group (Hill, 1990, p.102). Another segment of the second generation moved to Germany between the ages of 6 and 14, while others arrived later through marriage or illegal means, utilizing the networks established by earlier Turkish immigrants. Unlike the first generation, most second-generation immigrants lived in houses rather than in ghettos.

The third generation was entirely born and raised in Germany. Consequently, they did not face the language barriers experienced by the first and second generations. This generation grew up with Turkish culture at home and German culture in the broader society. They tend to be better educated and have benefited from increased job opportunities in Germany. According to Faist, as immigrants become more permanent in a country, they acquire rights (Faist, 2003, p.98).

The three generations hold different perspectives on migration, German society, and German culture, as well as distinct worldviews and lifestyles. Their approaches to religion, which is the focus of this study, also vary.

4. Anatomy of Turkish Migration to Germany

As is well known, Germany was divided into two after the Second World War. To meet its labor needs, West Germany signed its first employment agreement (*Anwerbeabkommen*) with Italy in 1955. Similar agreements were later signed with Spain and Greece in 1960 (Şen & Goldberg, 1995, p.9). Meanwhile, East Germany built the Berlin Wall on August 13, 1961, unilaterally banning crossings into West Germany. This affected approximately 50,000 people living in East Germany who were working in West Germany. On the morning the wall was built, 4,300 East Berliners employed at Siemens facilities in West Berlin were unable to reach their workplaces (Hunn, 2005, pp.50-51).

Following this sudden development, an employment contract was signed between the authorities of West Germany and Turkey on October 30, 1961. This agreement marked the beginning of Turkish migration to Germany. Although the agreement expired in 1973, Turkish immigration to Germany has continued through various channels, such as marriage or unauthorized migration.

The first group of Turkish immigrants was welcomed by Germans with flowers. This warm reception lasted until the late 1970s, driven by Germany's expectation that Turkish immigrants would eventually return to their homeland. In other words, this migration was initially perceived as temporary. However, as the number of Turkish immigrants in Germany grew, German attitudes toward them began to shift in the 1980s. Immigrants who had once been welcomed with flowers were now being encouraged to return to Turkey.

In 1981, a group of academics from German universities published the "Heidelberg Manifesto," which claimed that German cultural values were being dangerously altered by foreigners. The manifesto also argued that *Gastarbeiter* ("guest workers"), referring primarily to Turkish immigrants, should be sent back. Helmut Kohl, Germany's Chancellor from 1982 to 1998, expressed a similar stance in a secret meeting with British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher (revealed in the media in 2013), stating:

"Turkish immigrants are very difficult to assimilate. I intend to send half of them back to their countries."

In 1983, the German government introduced a "return incentive" (*Rückkehrprämie*), offering financial compensation for Turkish immigrants willing to return to Turkey. As a result, approximately 360,000 Turkish citizens took advantage of this allowance and left Germany.

Although the first-generation Turkish immigrants—now aged 56 and older—express satisfaction with life in Germany, the second-generation immigrants, aged 37-55, have faced several difficulties. Several factors contributed to these challenges:

1. Turkish immigrants no longer wanted to return to Turkey, which made Germans uncomfortable.
2. The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and German reunification shifted Germany's labor priorities. After reunification (*Deutsche Wiedervereinigung*), Germany began to meet its labor needs by employing East Germans, reducing its dependence on Turkish workers.
3. A rise in racist discourse led to violent attacks against Turkish immigrants. One of the most tragic incidents occurred in Solingen in 1993, where a house belonging to Turkish immigrants was set on fire, killing five Turkish residents.
4. The September 11, 2001, attacks in the United States fueled negative perceptions of Muslims and intensified Islamophobia. The attacks drastically altered the West's view of Muslims, including Turkish immigrants, and escalated racial and religious hostility in Germany and beyond.

The third-generation Turkish immigrants, now aged 18-36, have adapted more successfully to German society, developing a hybrid identity. They are fluent in German and have integrated into the labor market, with many opening businesses. These individuals are often referred to as *Deutsch-Türken* ("German-Turkish immigrants"). Today, over two and a half million Turkish immigrants live in Germany.

5. Methodological Model of the Research

Immigration and religion are the focus of this study. The main purpose of this research is to determine whether there has been a change in the religious beliefs or behaviors of three generations of Turkish immigrants over time. The key questions the study seeks to answer are as follows:

1. To what extent have the views and perceptions of religion among Turks who immigrated to Germany changed during the migration process that has lasted approximately 60 years and encompassed three generations?
2. Has there been a change in religiosity among immigrants across generations?
3. What functions has religion fulfilled in the lives of Turks who immigrated to Germany?
4. To what extent has migration influenced immigrants' construction of identity and sense of belonging?
5. How have three generations of Turkish immigrants transmitted their religion across generations?

An estimated 3 million Turkish immigrants live in different states across Germany. As is well known, Germany, the focus of this study, has a federal structure consisting of 16 states. Among these, Bavaria is a region with a high concentration of Turkish immigrants. According to 2020 data, approximately 190,000 people of Turkish origin reside in Bavaria. Munich, the capital of the state and the focus of this study, is home to approximately 37,000 people of Turkish origin.

The selection of Munich as the research site was influenced by the fact that Turkish immigrants, who are the subject of this study, live in a densely populated area. Additionally, Munich's proximity to Bayreuth, where the researcher was born and raised, made it a familiar environment for fieldwork.

This study employs a **quantitative research method**, which is based on the numerical collection and analysis of field data to test the hypotheses proposed. As Tuna (2017, p.149) states:

> *"The general feature of numerical data is that it expresses the numerical analysis of the collected data."*

The quantitative method is grounded in testing the relationship between dependent and independent variables. A questionnaire consisting of closed- and open-ended questions was administered to participants between 2020 and 2021, during the COVID-19 pandemic. The pandemic, which affected the entire world and caused significant loss of life, also disrupted the initial plan to conduct field research in Germany. Due to the risk of researchers contracting the virus or transmitting it to participants, most of the study was conducted remotely via online platforms and social media.

To ensure that the survey reached the target audience, contact was made with social media accounts relevant to Turkish immigrants in Germany. In particular, Turkey's Munich Education Attaché, Prof. Dr. Mustafa Çakır, was contacted, and the survey was shared online. Additionally, Mr. Sinan Karakaş, the administrator of the "Gurbette-Türkiye'de Hayat" (*Life in Turkey – Abroad*) social media page, which is followed by approximately 90,000 Turkish immigrants, assisted in distributing the survey. The survey was conducted via Google Forms, using email addresses obtained with Karakaş's help. Participants known to the researcher were also reached via email and phone. The surveys, which took an average of 30 minutes to complete, were administered accordingly.

The German Immigration Office estimates that approximately 2.9 million people of Turkish origin live in Germany, regardless of their citizenship status. The same source states that 21% of this population is under the age of 18, meaning that there are approximately 8,000 underage individuals of Turkish origin in the Munich sample population. Excluding these underage individuals, the study's research population consists of approximately 29,000 adults of Turkish origin in Munich.

According to the simple random sampling formula, in order to achieve a 95% confidence interval with a margin of error of 0.06, a study with a sample size of 29,000 should have at least 264 participants. Therefore, the 316 surveys conducted in this research sufficiently represent the population. The formula used for sample size calculation is given below.

$$n = \frac{N^2 pq}{d^2 (N-1) + pq}$$

n	Sample size
N	Universe size
t	Theoretical value
p	Probability of the event being examined
q	Probability of the event not being examined
d	Margin of error

Since we observed in the pilot studies that participants were reluctant to share personal data such as their names and contact information, these and similar demographic questions were removed from the survey. This adjustment allowed participants to express themselves more freely. Notably, Turkish immigrants were also hesitant to specify the names of places and neighborhoods where they lived, as they wanted to avoid any potential negative consequences for immigrants in Germany. Therefore, participants were not asked to disclose the cities, districts, or neighborhoods in which they resided.

A simple random sampling technique was used in this study. Different centers and districts of Munich were selected as samples, specifically targeting neighborhoods with a high concentration of Turkish immigrants. The

survey was distributed to individuals from a list provided by Turkey's Munich Education Attaché and to members of the "Life in Foreign Lands – Turkey" platforms.

The topics covered in the questionnaire were measured using a 5-point Likert-type scale. As is well known, the Likert scale consists of five response options: two negative, two positive, and one neutral category. Participants responded by selecting one of the following options:

1. Strongly Disagree (1)
2. Disagree (2)
3. Undecided (3)
4. Agree (4)
5. Strongly Agree (5)

The questionnaire was administered to 316 participants from the first and third generations. The collected data were analyzed using SPSS 22, and statistical significance was tested using the Chi-Square Test (X^2). The analysis was conducted under three main themes:

- **Religion and Identity**
- **Hybrid Culture**
- **Secularized Life**

This study is based on the main thesis that Turkish immigrants in Germany have become more religious despite their secularization in the public sphere. Additionally, it argues that there are differences in the religious approaches of the three generations of Turkish immigrants. Finally, it is proposed that the third generation, in particular, has developed a more individualized perception of religion.

5.Analysis of Data

5.1. Demographic Analysis

Table 1
Gender Status, Marital, Ages Status of Participants

Gender Status	F.	%	Marital Status	F.	%	Ages Status	F.	%
Female	141	44,6	**Married**	248	78,5	**18-36 age (3st Generation)**	85	26,9
Male	174	55,1	**Single**	45	14,2	**37-55 age (2nd Generation**	191	60,4
Other	1	0,3	**Other**	23	7,3	**56+age (1rd Generation)**	40	12,7
Total	316	% 100		316	% 100		316	% 100

In this study, 44.6% of the respondents were female, 55.1% were male, and 0.3% identified as other genders. Regarding marital status, 78.5% of the participants were married, 14.2% were single, and 7.3% were divorced or widowed.

In terms of generational distribution, 60.4% of the participants belonged to the second generation, 26.9% to the first generation, and 12.7% to the third generation. These findings align with previous research in the literature. For example, Sauer's (2019) study indicates that the majority of Turkish immigrants living in Germany belong to the second generation. Therefore, the findings of this study are consistent with Sauer's research.

Table 2
Age of Birth Place of Participants

	Frequency	Percent
Turkey	175	55,4
Germany	134	42,4
Other	7	2,2
Total	316	% 100

55.4% of the participants were born in Turkey, 42.4% were born in Germany, and 2.2% were born in other countries. When examining the birthplaces of Turkish immigrants, it is evident that the majority of participants were born in Turkey. This is largely due to the fact that many members of the second generation were born in Turkey before migrating to Germany.

It is important to note that Turkish migration to Germany is ongoing. However, as more children from the second and third generations are born in Germany and choose to remain there, it can be predicted that the proportion of Turkish immigrants born in Germany will continue to rise.

Table 3
Educational Status of Participants

	Frequency	Percent
Literate	5	1,6
Primary School	22	7
Inclusive School	1	0,3
Vocational	119	37,7
High School	73	23,1
High Education	96	30,4
Total	**N=316**	% 100

Turkish immigrants living in Germany generally have a high school education or lower. Among the interviewees, the proportion of those with higher education is relatively low. The first generation had a particularly low level of education, as Turkish immigrants primarily received vocational training.

From this perspective, it can be said that Turkish immigrants have predominantly worked in manual labor jobs, such as those in industry, manufacturing, and cleaning. However, the level of education has increased in subsequent generations, particularly among the third generation, where educational attainment continues to rise. Notably, the number of academics, politicians, and artists from this generation is significantly higher.

Table 4
How to Immıgrate to Germany

How to Arrive in Germany		
	Frequency	**Percent**
As a Worker	37	11,7
As a Fugitive	2	0,6
By Invitation of Acquaintance	9	2,8
I Was Born In Germany	128	40,5
By Marrying	66	20,9
By Arranged Marriage	0	0
As a Student	15	4,7
As a Refugee	1	0,3
Other	58	18,4
Total	**N=316**	**% 100**

As shown in the table, the methods used by Turkish immigrants to migrate to Germany demonstrate that each migration wave has created its own autonomous history and story. As previously mentioned, first-generation immigrants moved to Germany under an agreement and invitation from the German government. Although this agreement ended in 1973, Turkish migration to Germany has continued through various means.

Turkish immigrants have found ways to navigate German laws, creating new migration routes. Marriage migration is one of the most common methods, accounting for 20.9% of cases. In addition, some participants reported migrating to Germany through the Invitation of Acquaintance. However, the prevalence of the "Other" category, where participants marked alternative methods, is also noteworthy.

5.2. Problematic Analysis

5.2.1. Religion and Identity

This study examines the changes in the religious life of Turkish immigrants in Germany. In this context, it is first necessary to explore the role and significance of religion in the lives of Turkish immigrants.

Table 5
Being A Muslim General Values

	Frequency	***Percent***
I Strongly Disagree	32	10,1
I Disagree	17	5,4
Undecided	47	14,9
I agree	55	17,4
I Strongly Agree	165	52,2
Total	316	100,0

Values by Generation Percent (%) and Frequency (f)



1st Generation	***f***	6	2	5	4	23	40
	%	15	5	12,5	10	57,5	
2nd Generation	***f***	15	8	32	35	101	191
	%	7,85	4,19	16,75	18,32	52,88	
3rd Generation	***f***	11	7	10	16	41	85
	%	12,94	8,24	11,76	18,82	48,24	
Total						**n**	**316**

Looking at the overall picture, 69.6% of respondents stated that "Being a Muslim is the most important part of my identity." This is a notably high percentage. When analyzed by generation, the percentage of those who agreed or strongly agreed with this statement was: 67.5% in the first generation (agree: 10% + strongly agree: 57.5%), 71.2% in the second generation (agree: 18.32% + strongly agree: 52.88%), 67.06% in the third generation (agree: 18.82% + strongly agree: 48.24%).

As is well known, religion plays a significant role in shaping an individual's identity, and its influence tends to be stronger among immigrants who are far from their homeland. According to Selim Eren (2007, p.278), Turkish immigrants did not only migrate to Germany physically; they also brought their religion with them. As he states:

"Religion was not only seen as a sacred belief and practice among immigrant Turkish immigrants, but it was also used as a means of self-identification in the society in which they lived."

Similarly, Şen (2004, p.49) highlights the role of religion in protecting immigrants from cultural shocks, resisting alienation, and shaping their sense of identity and belonging.

Findings from this study confirm that Turkish immigrants in Germany also perceive religion as an important part of their identity. However, the data shows a clear downward trend in the "strongly agree" category across generations. This decline is particularly noticeable in the third generation, suggesting that being born and raised in Germany has influenced their perception of religion.

Table 6
Halal Food Preference



		1	2	3	4	5	Total
1st Generation	***f***	9	1	6	3	21	40
	%	22,5	2,5	15	7,5	52,5	
2nd Generation	***f***	15	10	20	17	129	191
	%	7,85	5,24	10,47	8,90	67,54	
3rd Generation	***f***	11	4	10	11	49	85
	%	12,94	4,71	11,76	12,94	57,65	
						n	**316**

Turkish immigrants living in Germany generally prefer halal products that do not contain substances such as pork and alcohol. As shown in the table, Turkish immigrants in Germany overwhelmingly prefer halal products. The percentage of respondents who selected "I prefer halal-certified products" was: 60% in the first generation (*agree: 7.5% + strongly agree: 52.5%*), 76.44% in the second generation (*agree: 8.90% + strongly agree: 67.54%*), 70.59% in the third generation (*agree: 12.94% + strongly agree: 57.65%*).

The percentage of those who disagreed with this statement is in line with these results. However, the data also reveals generational differences. The highest rate of halal product preference is found among the second generation, while the lowest is among the first generation.

This trend can be explained as follows: As discussed in the literature review, Elias describes migration as a process, and Turkish immigrants in Germany should not be seen as a homogeneous group. Each generation has experienced a unique migration story.

The first generation, who were invited by the German government, did not initially face significant pressure regarding religion. More precisely, religion was not a priority—neither for Germans nor for the first-generation Turkish immigrants themselves.

The second generation, however, experienced the greatest pressure regarding religion. As a result, religion became both an identity marker and a survival mechanism, taking on a strategic meaning for this generation. Additionally, religious and ethnic discrimination against Turkish immigrants has played a major role in reinforcing religious identity.

In this context, it is not surprising that Turkish immigrants perceive religion as a cultural defense against discrimination.

Table 7
Exposure to Religious and Ethnic Discrimination General Values

	Frequency	Percent
I Strongly Disagree	42	13,3
I Disagree	33	10,4
Undecided	43	13,6
IAgree	56	17,7
I Strongly Agree	142	44,9
Total	**316**	100,0

Values by Generation Percent (%) and Frequency (f)



		1	2	3	4	5	**Total**
1st Generation	**%**	30	5	20	15	30	
	f	12	2	8	6	12	40
2rd Generation	**%**	13,09	10,47	12,57	17,80	46,07	
	f	25	20	24	34	88	191
3nd Generation	**%**	5,88	12,94	12,94	18,82	49,41	
	f	5	11	11	16	42	85
						n	316
x2=17,58, df=8, p=0,02							

As shown in the general table, all three generations of Turkish immigrants report experiencing discrimination, with a total agreement rate (agree + strongly agree) of 62.9%. However, these rates vary across generations. The percentage of respondents who felt discriminated against was:

- 45% in the first generation (*agree: 15% + strongly agree: 30%*),
- 63.87% in the second generation (*agree: 17.80% + strongly agree: 46.7%*),
- 68.23% in the third generation (*agree: 18.82% + strongly agree: 49.41%*).

These figures were analyzed using cross-tabulation analysis. As a result of the Chi-Square Test, the Pearson Chi-Square p-value was < 0.05, indicating a statistically significant relationship between generation and perceived discrimination.

Factors Contributing to Perceived Discrimination

Several sociological factors have contributed to this trend.First, as previously mentioned, first-generation Turkish immigrants moved to Germany as part of an agreement between West Germany and Turkey. They were invited as laborers, and as a result, they faced limited religious and ethnic discrimination. Among the participants,

the highest percentage of those who stated they had never experienced discrimination belonged to the first generation (30%).

However, with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the reunification of Germany, the country began meeting its labor needs in East Germany, reducing the demand for Turkish workers. Politically, right-wing movements gained traction, and the Solingen massacre was a harbinger of rising hostility toward Turkish immigrants.

For the second and third generations, conditions became even more challenging. Scotson (1993) argues that as power imbalances between natives and foreigners decrease, conflicts shift from economic issues to non-economic ones, such as religion, culture, ethnicity, identity, or gender. In *The Established and the Outsiders*, Scotson explains that religion and ethnicity became the primary targets of discrimination against second- and third-generation Turkish immigrants, who had gained economic and social stability.

One of the major aspects of anti-Turkish propaganda in Germany was the Muslim identity of Turkish immigrants. Beckford (2019, p.15) highlights this issue:

"It is no exaggeration, then, to claim that a migration crisis is confronting Europe and that many of the most contentious issues center on religions and identities."

Similarly, Berger (1967) describes religion as a "sacred canopy" that provides people with a sense of security and belonging. In this context, religion serves as both an identity marker and a political shield against discrimination for Turkish immigrants in Germany. However, this strong attachment to religion can sometimes lead to a cultural dilemma, where Turkish immigrants oscillate between two cultures—struggling to fully integrate into German society while maintaining their religious and cultural heritage.

5.2.2.Hybrid Culture

Immigrants sometimes struggle to navigate between their own culture and the culture of their host country. However, over time, they may blend elements of both, creating a fusion of cultures. This phenomenon is particularly evident in long-term migrations that span multiple generations. A similar pattern can be observed among Turkish immigrants in Germany.

Table 8
Being Between Two Cultures



		1	2	3	4	5	**Total**
1st Generation	***f***	13	7	9	4	7	40
	%	%	32,5	17,5	22,5	10	17,5
2nd Generation	***f***	57	37	32	29	36	191
	%	29,84	19,37	16,75	15,18	18,85	
3rd Generation	***f***	20	14	15	15	21	85
	%	23,53	16,47	17,65	17,65	24,71	
						n=	316

The percentage of participants who stated "Sometimes I feel torn between German and Turkish culture" increases in the second and third generations. This rate was measured as:

- 34.65% in the second generation (*agree: 15.8% + strongly agree: 18.85%*),
- 42.36% in the third generation (*agree: 17.65% + strongly agree: 24.71%*).

From this perspective, it is evident that a hybrid culture, incorporating elements of both Turkish and German cultures, has emerged. The second—and especially the third—generation experiences a cultural struggle, feeling torn between two identities. However, as Şen (2004) and Duncan (1933) argue, hybridization does not necessarily mean a departure from the original culture. Rather, it signifies a blending of one's cultural origins with elements of the host society.

Thus, migration can lead to both intercultural conflict and intercultural rapprochement over time.

Moreover, Turkish immigrants in Germany are not only navigating between Turkish and German identities, but they also face perceptions and discourses created by Turkish immigrants living in Turkey about their identity and experiences. The table below provides further insight into this phenomenon.

Table 9
Views of Turkish immigrants Living in Germany About Their Islam



		1	2	3	4	5	Total
1st Generation	*f*	6	5	9	7	13	40
	%	15	12,5	22,5	17,5	32,5	
2nd Generation	*f*	53	28	55	28	27	191
	%	27,75	14,66	28,80	14,66	14,14	
3rd Generation	*f*	28	14	19	3	21	85
	%	32,94	16,47	22,35	3,53	24,71	
						n	**316**

Many discourses have emerged in Turkey regarding Turkish immigrants who migrated to Germany. İbrahim Yasa was one of the first sociologists in Turkey to examine this issue. According to Yasa (1979, pp.183-185), Turkish immigrants and their children—particularly those who returned to Turkey permanently or visited for holidays—faced various challenges.

In Turkey, these individuals were often labeled “Alamancı,” a term with pejorative connotations. Children, in particular, were perceived as different due to their clothing and behavior and were often alienated by locals. In other words, children of Turkish immigrants struggled to adapt when they returned to Turkey, feeling caught between two cultures.

Additionally, a stereotype developed about first-generation Turkish immigrants, portraying them as "flashy people"—individuals who lived under poor conditions in Germany but displayed their wealth when they visited Turkey, spending the money they had saved abroad.

Perceptions of Religiosity Across Generations

As shown in the table, the third generation is the most opposed to the statement "People born in Germany practice Islam (religion) less," with 49.41% disagreeing (*strongly disagree: 32.94% + disagree: 16.47%*). The second generation follows with 42.21% (*strongly disagree: 27.75% + disagree: 14.66%*), while the first generation is the least opposed, at 27.5% (*strongly disagree: 15% + disagree: 12.5%*).

Conversely, acceptance of this statement is highest among the first generation, with 50% agreeing (*agree: 17.5% + strongly agree: 32.5%*), compared to 28.8% in the second generation (*agree: 14.66% + strongly agree: 14.14%*) and 28.74% in the third generation (*agree: 3.53% + strongly agree: 24.71%*).

An important point to note is that the first generation also expresses concern about the religiosity of the third generation. At this stage, it is useful to recall Beckford's perspective on religion and identity in migration contexts. On the other hand, while 50% of the third generation identifies as religious, 30% of the same group agrees with the perception that they are less religious than previous generations.

Table 10
Celebrating Christmas and New Year



		1	2	3	4	5	Total
1st Generation	***f***	24	3	6	2	5	40
	%	60	7,5	15	5	12,5	
2nd Generation	***f***	136	22	15	10	8	191
	%	71,20	11,52	7,85	5,24	4,19	
3rd Generation	***f***	54	9	7	6	9	85
	%	63,53	10,59	8,24	7,06	10,59	
						n	**316**

Celebrating the New Year is considered a sin by radical Islamist groups, yet it is widely observed by many Muslims around the world. Over time, Christmas has transcended its religious origins, gaining a cultural significance centered around gift-giving and festivities. Some Turkish immigrants in Germany have embraced this cultural aspect of Christmas as a result of cultural exchange.

As shown in the table, those who celebrate Christmas and New Year's Eve according to German traditions are predominantly from the third generation, with a rate of 17.65% (agree: 7.06% + strongly agree: 10.59%). The first generation follows closely at 17.5% (agree: 5% + strongly agree: 12.5%). The second generation has the lowest rate, at 9.43% (agree: 5.24% + strongly agree: 4.19%).

For the reasons discussed earlier, the second generation is more distant from these celebrations. This pattern suggests that Turkish immigrants in Germany have incorporated certain elements of German culture, contributing to the rapid formation of a hybrid identity. As Şen (2004, p.15) and Beckford (2019, pp.15-32) argue, immigrants do not simply preserve their cultural values but also integrate elements of the society in which they grow up. Their social and religious lives are reshaped through "trans-local social networks," often leading to the emergence of a hybrid culture.

These findings also indicate that the increasing acceptance of Christmas celebrations among the third generation reflects a growing trend of secularization driven by cultural change.

5.2.3. Secularized Life

The phenomenon of migration influences people's living habits. One of the clearest examples of this can be observed in the differences in religious practices among three generations of Turkish immigrants in Germany.

Table 11
Frequency of Regular Worship (Namaz Kılmak)



		1	2	3	4	5	Total
1st Generation	*f*	8	2	5	5	20	40
	%	20	5	12,5	12,5	50	
2nd Generation	*f*	47	41	32	22	49	191
	%	24,61	21,47	16,75	11,52	25,65	
3rd Generation	*f*	26	14	20	13	12	85
	%	30,59	16,47	23,53	15,29	14,12	
						n	316
$x^2=23,11, df=8, p=0,003$							

Participants were asked whether they regularly performed their religious practices. The first question focused on prayer frequency. The data show that prayer habits vary across generations.

- 61.25% of the first generation reported praying regularly (*agree: 12.5% + strongly agree: 50%*).
- In the second generation, this rate drops to 38.18% (*agree: 11.52% + strongly agree: 25.65%*).
- The most significant decline occurs in the third generation, where only 29.41% (*agree: 15.29% + strongly agree: 14.12%*) report regular prayer—almost half the rate of the first generation.

Cross-tabulation analysis (Pearson Chi-Square, $p < 0.05$) confirms that these differences between generations are statistically significant.

Table 12
Frequency of Regular Worship (Oruç Tutmak)



		1	2	3	4	5	Total
1st Generation	***f***	8	2	1	5	24	40
	%	20	5	2,5	12,5	60	
2nd Generation	***f***	25	17	29	23	97	191
	%	13,09	8,90	15,18	12,04	50,79	
3rd Generation	***f***	11	4	15	13	42	85
	%	12,94	4,71	17,65	15,29	49,41	
						n	**316**

The decline in religious practices is also evident in fasting behavior (*oruç tutmak*) during Ramadan. These findings suggest that participants are adopting a more secular lifestyle. However, secularization does not necessarily mean becoming irreligious. On the contrary, individual religiosity may increase as the institutional framework of religion weakens.

According to Ertit (2016), several factors contribute to secularization, including:

- The rise of science and reason in society,
- The increased use of modern technology,
- The growing emphasis on individual preferences alongside higher education levels,
- The shift from institutionalized religion to personal belief,
- The decline in the frequency of religious worship.

This study reveals similar trends. From this perspective, the third-generation Turkish immigrants in Germany have a higher level of education, and individual religious preferences have become more significant for them. While the third generation still identifies as Muslim, their engagement in religious practices—such as worship and fasting—has declined.

Table 13
Religion Factor In Friend Preference



		1	2	3	4	5	Total
1st Generation	***f***	12	2	7	5	14	40
	%	30	5	17,5	12,5	35	
2nd Generation	***f***	49	17	42	33	50	191
	%	25,65	8,90	21,99	17,28	26,18	
3rd Generation	***f***	26	4	25	14	16	85
	%	30,59	4,71	29,41	16,47	18,82	
						n	**316**

Friendship and Cultural Integration Across Generations

Making friends is an essential way to both socialize and integrate into society. Since people living in a foreign country often feel uncertain about different cultures, they tend to prefer forming friendships with those from their own cultural background. This pattern is particularly evident among the first and second generations of Turkish immigrants in Germany.

However, the third generation does not consider Islam a fundamental criterion for choosing friends. Because they are more familiar with German culture, they do not see any issue in forming friendships with Germans. This generational difference is reflected in the responses to the statement: "I prefer my neighbors to be Muslims."

- 47.5% of the first generation agreed (*agree: 12.5% + strongly agree: 35%*),
- 43.46% of the second generation agreed (*agree: 17.28% + strongly agree: 26.18%*),
- 35.29% of the third generation agreed (*agree: 16.47% + strongly agree: 18.82%*).

The first-generation Turkish immigrants were more introverted, largely due to the fear of losing their cultural identity. Their primary goal was to earn money, establish a home, accumulate savings, and eventually return to Turkey (Dökmen, 1989, p.143).

In contrast, the third generation has a different mindset. They are closer to German culture, actively making cultural and economic investments in Germany. Additionally, they tend to live more openly and individually. This shift also reflects a more secular worldview among the third generation. As discussed in the theoretical framework, modernization fosters secularization (Ertit, 2014, pp.1-16). This is because:

- Modern societies are characterized by urbanization.
- Modern life exposes individuals to diverse cultures.

Unlike the previous generations, the third generation does not perceive German cultural values as threatening. Instead, they are comfortable engaging with German society, forming more social connections outside their ethnic and religious community.

This growing individualism contributes to cultural richness and naturally influences their understanding of religion.

Table 14
Drinking Alcohol



		1	2	3	4	5	Total
1st Generation	***f***	28	3	4	0	5	40
	%	70	7,5	10	0	12,5	
2nd Generation	***f***	127	14	21	12	17	191
	%	66,49	7,33	10,99	6,28	8,90	
3rd Generation	***f***	51	7	5	5	16	85
	%	60,71	8,33	5,95	5,95	19,05	
						n	**316**

Turkish immigrants in Germany generally reject alcohol consumption, as it is discouraged in Islam. However, among the third generation, the proportion of those who do not see alcohol consumption as a problem has risen to 31.1% (*agree: 12.5% + strongly agree: 19.05%*), as shown in the table.

This trend suggests that acceptance of alcohol consumption may continue to rise in future generations.

Table15
Providing Religious Education to Children



		1	2	3	4	5	**Total**
1st Generation	***f***	3	4	4	9	17	37
	%	8,1	10,8	10,8	24,3	45,9	
2nd Generation	***f***	12	10	39	51	56	168
	%	7,14	5,95	23,21	30,36	33,33	
3rd Generation	***f***	1	4	14	9	8	36
	%	2,78	11,11	38,89	25,00	22,22	
						n	241

A similar trend is observed in attitudes toward religious education for children. The percentage of respondents who agreed with the statement "I ensured that my children received an adequate religious education" is as follows:

- First generation: 71.2% (*agree: 24.3% + strongly agree: 45.9%*),
- Second generation: 63.69% (*agree: 30.36% + strongly agree: 33.3%*),
- Third generation: 47.22% (*agree: 25% + strongly agree: 22.2%*).

The highest percentage of undecided responses comes from the third generation. While Turkish immigrants continue to maintain a connection with religion, they are undergoing a rapid process of secularization. This suggests that religious education is no longer a priority, especially for the third generation.

These results indicate that traditional religious education methods are less effective for the third generation. This suggests that the third generation acquires their religious knowledge and beliefs more individually, shaped by the technological environment and cultural atmosphere in which they live. Additionally, it can be said that young people in this generation adopt a more individualized approach to religious attitudes and behaviors. These findings indicate that younger generations—particularly the third generation—are becoming increasingly secular over time.

Conclusion

Religion has played a crucial role in shaping the identity of all three generations of Turkish immigrants. For immigrants, religion is not only a sacred belief system but also a unifying force that fosters solidarity among them. Turkish immigrants have often relied on religion as a mechanism to preserve their national, cultural, and spiritual identity, particularly in response to fears of cultural assimilation in Germany.

Although religious commitment has partially evolved across the three generations of Turkish immigrants, the data indicate that, for all three generations, religious affiliation continues to serve as a safe haven—both culturally and politically—amid the economic, social, and cultural challenges they face during the migration process.

There are notable differences in the religious perspectives of the first, second, and third generations, particularly regarding identity, religious practices, and secularization:

- The first generation maintained a more traditional understanding of religion.
- The second generation demonstrates the strongest attachment to religion, shaped by their unique socio-cultural struggles.
- The third generation exhibits greater tendencies toward secularization.

At this point, Duncan's "Three-Generation Assimilation Cycle" can be applied. This concept suggests that migrant communities often develop hybrid cultures due to assimilation pressures.

As seen in this study, Turkish immigrants have a hybrid identity in the form of both remaining Turkish and Muslim and adapting to German culture over time. This situation has become more evident especially in the third generation.

Migration does not only change migrants—migrants also influence the societies they move to. Each generation of Turkish immigrants in Germany has had a distinct experience:

The First Generation

- Welcomed by Germans as part of a labor agreement.
- Worked under harsh conditions with the goal of returning to Turkey.
- Some returned, while others remained in Germany.
- Did not integrate into German culture, nor did they feel the need to learn German extensively.

The Second Generation;

- Faced a shift in German attitudes; Germans encouraged them to return to Turkey.
- Became caught between two cultures—neither fully Turkish nor fully German.
- Developed a hybrid identity, leading to cultural and identity confusion.
- Children of the second generation were particularly vulnerable to racism and discrimination.
- This generation suffered the most economically and culturally, leading them to cling to religion as a source of stability.
- As reflected in the study's findings, religiosity is highest in the second generation.

The Third Generation;

- Proficient in both German and Turkish cultures.
- Mastered the German language and established successful businesses.
- Pursued higher education and rose to prominent positions in Germany.
- Engaged in cultural integration and adopted Western values.

The data from this study indicate significant changes in the religious attitudes and values of three generations of Turkish immigrants. However, a key finding is that, while religiosity has not declined in the third generation, they prefer to practice their faith in a more individualized and secular manner. In other word maintained their religious and national identity but became more secularized under the influence of Western lifestyles. In this generation, the frequency of performing religious duties, such as praying and fasting, has begun to decline. Additionally, attitudes toward certain practices, such as alcohol consumption, have become more relaxed. At the same time, the belief that adapting to Germany's dominant cultural values is not an obstacle to being a Muslim is becoming increasingly widespread.

Thus, this study highlights that it is possible to maintain religious beliefs while simultaneously embracing secular values.

Yazar Katkı Oranı	
Hasan Şen	%60
Vedat Martin İnce	%40

Çalışmaya katılan tüm katılımcılara teşekkür ederiz.

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