

OIL CRISIS AND THE VOTING PATTERNS IN THE U. N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY (1967 – 1975)

(Testing a model)

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I

Following the Arab-Israeli War, October, 1973, petroleum exporting Arab states imposed an embargo on their oil shipments to several countries. Arab states declared that they were using oil as a political weapon against states they considered "friendly to the enemy". And this, with its inevitable spillover effects, precipitated the well-known oil crisis.

The third Arab-Israeli War broke out on 6 October 1973. Prior to the war, in September 1973, the ten Foreign Ministers of the Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (O. A. P. E. C.) had met and discussed the possible use of oil as a political weapon to force the United States to apply an "impartial" policy to the Middle East¹. A day after the start of the war, on October 7, Iraq nationalized the holdings of the American oil companies in the Basrah Oil Company, declaring that Arabs must act against "American interests in the Arab nation so that Arab oil may be a weapon in [Arab] hands and not in the hands of imperialists and Zionists"². On the 17th of October, member states of O. A. P. E. C. decided upon a production cutback of at least 5 per cent progressively each month until Arab rights violated by Israel were restored.

Finally, the Arab indignation culminated in the decision of the main Arab oil exporting countries to reduce supply of oil to Europe and Japan and to impose a total embargo on the United States and the Netherlands.

1 *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, p. 26118.

2 *Ibid.*, p. 26224.

All this has coupled with the Teheran decision of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, in December, to increase the price of oil, shooting it up approximately 370 per cent. It seems that such drastic price hikes would not have been possible had it not been helped by the panic-buying and economic dislocation caused by the embargo and the production cutbacks.

We believe, whatever the implications, oil crisis should be understood as a combination of the embargo, production cutbacks, and price increases. Nature of the crisis obliges one to analyze it in its totality. Here, it is necessary to point out that the embargo triggered the oil crisis and that the oil crisis is more than the embargo, containing in itself also production cutbacks and price increases. In our opinion, consequences of the Arab use of oil as a political weapon can best be understood only by taking into account the implications of the other two dimensions of the resultant oil crisis. Though the embargo was aimed at specific target countries, the effects of the oil crisis has been felt by all the members of the international system.* Therefore, we posit that the effects of the oil crisis can only be meaningfully evaluated by looking at the world system as a whole rather than solely concentrating on the target countries.

In this article we are aiming at showing and measuring the changes in the attitudes of the third powers towards the Arab-Israeli conflict after the oil crisis in 1973. For this purpose we have looked at the voting patterns in the United Nations General Assembly on the Middle East question.

We believe that the United Nations General Assembly, with its near universal membership, can be considered as a good indicator of the developments in world politics. As Stanley Hoffmann puts it, "international institutions, in their political processes and in their functions, reflect and to some extent magnify or modify the dominant features of the international

* "Although the Arab production cutback policy was aimed at penalizing foes and rewarding friends, the drastic price hike *hurt friend and foe alike...*" (Emphasis added), George Lenczowski, "The Politics of World Oil," in Edward J. Mitchell (Ed.), *Dialogue in World Oil*, American Enterprise Inst. for Public Policy Research, Washington, D. C., 1974, p. 45.

system"³. "However warped or distorted an image of general world politics the General Assembly may convey, it remains one of our best sources of replicable information [on] policy positions [of] its 100-plus members"⁴.

We have taken one roll-call or recorded vote for each year from 1967 to 1975. Votes on drafts offering political solutions to the Middle East problem are selected. We believe the votes we considered reflect the political mood of the Assembly at the time. In all the votes we have considered Arab states have voted in favor of the drafts, whereas Israel has been on the opposing side, that is, unanimously voted resolutions were not considered. We compared the change in the voting pattern through the years and paid special attention to the changes in the voting alignments before and after the embargo. The quantitative changes in the distribution of the affirmative and negative votes of the General Assembly members, in our opinion, is a healthy indicator of the changing attitudes in the Assembly.

- II -

On 13 June 1967, the Soviet Union requested the Security Council to convene the General Assembly to consider the situation in the Middle East. The Fifth Emergency Special Session convened on 17 June 1967. The session was closed, after twenty-five meetings, on July 5. Of the five draft resolutions pertaining to the political problem in the Middle East none were adopted.

A Soviet draft condemning Israel for aggression and calling upon it to withdraw immediately and unconditionally behind the armistice demarcation line was rejected by a vote of 36 in favor, 57 against with 23 abstentions.

An Albanian draft condemning Israel for aggression; the United States and the United Kingdom for inciting Israeli aggression, while demanding, *inter alia*, immediate and uncon-

3 Stanley Hoffmann, "International Organization and the International System" *International Organization*, Vol. XXIV, No. 3 (Summer 1970), pp. 389-390.

4 Bruce Russett, "An Inductive Approach to Voting Patterns", *Readings on the International Political System*, Prentice Hall Inc., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1970, p. 294.

ditional Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories, was also rejected by a vote of 22 in favor, 71 against with 27 abstentions.

A first non-aligned draft resolution, submitted by the Yugoslav Ambassador, called for full withdrawal of Israeli forces and requested the Security Council to give consideration to the Middle East problem after Israeli withdrawal, and asked the Security Council to report to the General Assembly on Israel's compliance. Finding out that draft would not be able to muster a wide support the sponsors revised the text of their draft. The new text contained changes in favor of Israel⁵. Even then, the revised draft could not achieve the required 2/3 majority passing by a vote of 53 in favor, 46 against, with 20 abstentions.

A Latin American draft requesting Israel to withdraw its forces from occupied territories as a first step toward peace; stipulating guarantee of freedom of transport in international waterways, and political independence and territorial integrity of all states in the area, was passed by a vote of 57 in favor, 43 against (including Arab States), with 20 abstentions, failing to muster the 2/3 majority.

On the other hand, in 1975, during the Thirteenth Session of the General Assembly (corresponding to the end of the period studied in this article), the Assembly, in resolution 3376, established a committee composed of 20 members, to study and introduce a programme for the implementation of the exercise of Palestinian People's inalienable national right and self-determination, by a vote of 93 in favor, 18 against and 22 abstentions. In another resolution adopted on December 5, the Assembly declared "the acquisition of territory by force inadmissible"; condemned "Israel's continued occupation of Arab territories"; and requested "all members to desist from supplying Israel with any military or economic aid as long as it continues to occupy Arab territories and to deny inalienable national rights of the Palestinian People" by a vote of 84 in favor, 17 against with 27 abstentions.

Such obvious changes in the resolutions in favor of Arab position, both in content and numerical results, have started to occur, in a most dramatic form, after 1973.

⁵ See Arthur Lall, *The United Nations and the Middle East Crisis*, 1967, California University Press, New York, 1968, pp. 173-174.

TABLE I

The Voting Pattern on the Middle East Question in the
General Assembly (1967-1975)

Years	(1) "Yes"(*) Votes	(2) "No"(*) Votes	(3) Abstenti- ons	(4) Column (1) -Column (2)	(5) % of Co- column (1) in Total
1967	53	46	20	7	44.54
1968	60	22	30	38	53.57
1969	48	22	47	26	41.03
1970	57	16	39	41	50.89
1971	53	23	43	30	44.53
1972	67	21	37	46	53.6
1973	87	6	33	81	69.05
1974	105	4	20	101	81.40
1975	84	17	27	67	65.63

* "Yes" denotes votes cast in favor of Arab positions; "no", vice versa.

During the years 1967-1972, the average difference between the votes in favor and against the Arab position

$(\Sigma Y - \Sigma N)^*$

has been 31.33. The corresponding average after


X

1973 (i. e. 1973-1975) is 85.66. An analysis of Table I shows that the number of states voting in favor of Arab position have dramatically increased after 1973 oil embargo. An average of 56.33 members have voted with the Arab states during the years 1967-1973. On the other hand, from 1973 to 1975 this increased to 92. The average of members voting against the Arab position was 25 for the years before the embargo. This fell to 9 in the years 1973-1975.

The trend and the brake can also be illustrated graphically. Graphic I shows the indisputable changes in the Assembly attitude requiring no further comment.

* y: Affirmative votes, N: Negative votes, X: Number of years.

GRAPH I
PERCENTAGE OF AFFIRMATIVE* VOTES IN TOTAL
OVER THE YEARS, 1967-1975



* Votes in favor of Arab supported draft resolutions.

III

Which factor has contributed most to the above-illustrated attitudinal change of the national units in the Assembly after 1973? Foreign policy research is to pinpoint behavior (decisions and policies) which national units adopt and use to either induce a change in the external environment or react to "inputs" from that environment so as to limit their consequences to acceptable levels under the impact of the factors that shape these behaviors. That is, we are concerned with the interplay between the dependent (decisions and policies) and independent (the factors that condition and shape behavior) variables within certain parameters.

To understand the changing behavior of the General Assembly members we need to establish the causal strength of the most potent variable. What has been this salient variable that shaped the attitudes in the Assembly after 1973?

We are hypothesizing that the use of oil as a political weapon by the Arabs and the resultant oil crisis might be considered as a determinant factor in creating the change in the Assembly attitude. To what extent can these developments be directly attributed to the use of oil as a political influence by the Arabs is, of course, an open question. It could be argued that the already changed correlation of forces in the international system; the transformation of the structure and the composition of the Assembly; domestic developments in member states; the Arab successes in the 1973 War, etc., have all contributed to the above mentioned development. Certainly the question begs more research and investigation. We only hope to explore one feature of a seemingly many-sided problem.

We are postulating a causal relationship, at this point in time, between the foreign policy behavior of the Assembly members and their energy positions.

In contemporary societies it is a well-known fact that oil is a vital and indispensable source of energy. Since every society has a place on the production-processing - marketing-consumption chain of oil wealth, all have a stake in the process. Oil factor, therefore, is everpresent in foreign policy formulations. It is one of the independent variables that shape and condition foreign policy behavior. We shall denote it with letter (E).

Any brake in this rather complex chain, for any reason, be it in the production, processing, marketing or consumption stage, would greatly hamper smooth functioning of organized human life. This obviously, would be a crisis situation.*

Assuming "that the action of an agent (in this case an international actor) is a function of the immediate situation it confronts"⁶, we use oil crisis as a situational variable, among other variables, accounting for the foreign policy behaviors of the General Assembly members.

* For an analysis of crisis as an independent variable see: Charles F. Hermann, "International Crisis as a Situational Variable," in Rosenau (Ed.) *International Politics and Foreign Policy: a Reader in Research and Theory*, Rev. Ed., The Free Press, New York, 1969, pp. 409-421.

6 *Ibid.*, p. 409.

Also, in the crisis situation of 1973, variable (E) functioned alongside with the potent situational variable. In such an energy situation the rank position of (E), among other independent variables, changes. It becomes one of the higher ranking variables and emerges as a salient variable which we will denote as (Ep).

The energy variable functions under conditions peculiar to each and every oil consuming state. For the oil importing countries the function of (Ep) on foreign policy behavior is determined by the degree of their vulnerability. Vulnerability (V) is a function of dependence on foreign oil (D) in a particular systemic context (S). Thus, (Ep) operates under the parametric condition of $V = (f) (D, S)$.

Dependence (D) is a combination of:

- demand for oil by the national economies;
- the ratio of imports in the oil supplies;
- the ratio of oil in total energy demand;
- and in our case,
- the ratio of Arab oil in total imports of oil.

By the systemic context (S) we mean the particular ecological conditions in which the unit operates to endure external disturbances. Self-sustaining the systemic stability would depend upon:

- degree of socio-political development;
- “power position” in the international system;
- economic relationships.

In our model the share of imported oil in the balance of payments and the capacity of the economy to meet the burden of imported oil play a fundamental role in computing systemic strength and viability.

As a salient variable (Ep), under certain conditions, may function as a limiting agent. Accepting Frankel's proposition that “limitations of capabilities is the most fundamental restraint upon foreign policy”⁷, (Ep) may limit the unit's objective freedom (which is never infinite) to respond to external stimuli

7 Joseph Frankel, *International Politics: Conflict and Harmony*, Penguin Books Ltd., Middlesex, England, 1973, p. 175 .

thus jeopardizing its resistance to outside pressures. The energy variable functioning thus, will be denoted "critical energy variable" (Epc). Under the parametric condition of "critical vulnerability" (Vc), (Ep) functions as a limiting agent (Epc). That is, for the (Ep) to become (Epc) the condition of "critical vulnerability" (Vc) is required. Critical vulnerability (Vc) is to be dependent on oil to such a degree and in such a sensitive systemic context as to be susceptible to pressures, threats, coercion, etc. . Then, (Ep) operating under the condition of (Vc) = (f) (Dc, Sc) becomes (Epc).

Therefore, oil importing states can be classified according to the functional roles and parametric conditions of their energy variables as follows:

$$\text{I- } Ep \setminus (V) = (f) (D, S)$$

$$\text{II- } Ep \setminus (V) = (f) (Dc, S)$$

$$\text{III- } Ep \setminus (V) = (f) (D, Sc)$$

$$\text{IV- } Epc \setminus (Vc) = (f) (Dc, Sc)$$

Voting in the General Assembly is a foreign policy action. Obviously, for each state there are three alternatives. They are, a) voting in favor of a draft (in our case Arab supported or sponsored drafts); b) voting against; and c) abstaining (including being absent).

A state in a $Ep \setminus (V) = (f) (D, S)$ situation (Equation I) has a minimal dependence on oil imports with favorable systemic context. Therefore it operates with an insignificant vulnerability. The restraint on the national capabilities is not strong enough to limit its foreign policy alternatives. For such a state all three foreign policy options in the General Assembly are open.

In the second situation (Equation II), a state with its critical dependency (Dc) has a restraining effect on its foreign policy. Although critically dependent, such a state has strong systemic attributes (S) and is therefore not critically vulnerable which means it is not susceptible to coercion or pressure to limit its foreign policy options. Yet, it is difficult for such a state to take a stand against (negative vote) the oil suppliers,

namely the Arabs. In terms of availabilities of options, situation III is not different from situation II.

In situation IV, however, options are limited. In other words, a critically vulnerable state has limitations on its foreign policy alternatives. At best, it is highly restrained to use the option of voting against the oil suppliers for it is sensitive to coercion, pressures, and threats because of its critical vulnerability.


Situations I, II, III and IV may be presented in a nutshell as follows:

Situation I: $Ep \setminus (V) = (f) (D, S)$

Option 1 (Voting No) .. open

Option 2 (Abstaining) .. open

Option 3 (Voting Yes) .. open




Situations II and III: $Ep \setminus (V) = (f) (Dc, S); Ep \setminus (V) = (f) (D, Sc)$

Option 1 ... restrained

Option 2 ... open

Option 3 ... open




Situation IV: $Epc \setminus (Vc) = (f) (Dc, Sc)$

Option 1 .. highly restrained

Option 2 .. restrained

Option 3 .. open



- IV -

Since we are assuming a correlation between the voting patterns of states or groups of states and their energy positions, using the energy variable we will now attempt at explaining the

voting behaviors of the European Economic Community members, the United States of America, Japan and the Afro-Asian and Latin American countries. This would also give us the opportunity to test our model.

European Economic Community Members

Although the United States was the prime target of the oil embargo that precipitated the energy crisis, it has become evident that the Common Market countries were among the most vulnerable. Indeed, of the total demand for oil by Western Europe (14,200 thousand barrels per day in 1972) 99 per cent had to be imported. Imports from the Middle East and North Africa amounted to 80.4 per cent of the total imports. Imported oil constituted 59 per cent of the total energy consumption⁸. The above figures clearly show how Western Europe was dependent on Middle East oil and consequently how vulnerable their economies were. Therefore their dependency (D) can be considered as a critical one (Dc).

Two things are worth mentioning on their systemic factor. First, the absorption problem of the O. P. E. C. countries resulted in the flow of petro-dollars back to Europe and to other industrialized importers. Second, the increase in price and export of manufactured goods further eased the balance of payment problems of industrialized importers like the E. E. C. countries. In fact, most have even registered surpluses. Combining this with the degree of socio-political development the Western societies have achieved and the preponderance of power they possess in their external relations, they can be characterized as countries with non-critical systemic factor (S).

Therefore, our formula in their case would read: $Ep \setminus (V) = (f) (Dc, S)$. The implication of which is that the energy variable does have a restraining influence on their foreign policies. Yet, having an $Ep \setminus (V)$ factor (as against an $Epc \setminus (Vc)$ factor) they were not susceptible to political influence to a degree to fundamentally change their behaviors. Indeed, a comparison of the voting behaviors of the E. E. C. members before and after

8 Joel Darmstadter and Hans H. Landsberg, "The Economic Background," *Daedalus*, Vol. 104, No. 4 (Fall 1975), p. 21, Table 4.

1973 indicates no change of policy, as is seen in Table II. One is tempted to conclude that use of oil as a political weapon has not been a decisive factor of influence on the E. E. C. members except for exercising a restraint upon their foreign policies.

TABLE II
The Voting Pattern of The E. E. C. Members* on The Middle East
Question in the General Assembly (1967-1975)

Years	"YES" VOTES		"NO" VOTES		ABSTENTIONS	
1967	1	France	7	Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, England, Netherlands	0	
1968	0	—	0	—	8	All members
1969	0	—	0	—	8	All members
1970	1	France	1	Netherlands	6	Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Italy, England, Luxembourg
1971	0	—	5	Belgium, Denmark, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands	3	France, Ireland, England,
1972	0	—	5	Belgium, Denmark, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands	3	France, Ireland, England.
1973	0	—	0	—	8	All members
1974	3	France, Italy, Ireland	0	—	5	Belgium, Denmark, England, Luxembourg, Netherlands
1975	0	—	5	Denmark, Luxembourg, England, Netherlands, Belgium	3	France, Ireland, Italy

* The present members are considered as if they were all original members.

Japan

One striking facet of Japan's behavior in the General Assembly is her consistent support of Arab positions. It has voted

in favor of Arabs in 1967, 1968, 1970, 1971, 1972, 1973, 1974, and abstained in 1969 and 1975. One might have expected a change of heart by Japan after it has considerably suffered from the obviously unfavorable attitude of the Arabs. "In October 1973 when O. A. P. E. C. classified Japan unfriendly to the Arab cause, it struck Japan as a 'thunderbolt from the blue sky'—a phrase used both privately and publicly by various members of the Japanese bureaucracy, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs"⁹. But Japan's continued support of Arab case might well be explained by the restraining effect of the energy factor on her foreign policy. 73 per cent of Japan's total energy consumption is met by oil. 75 per cent of this is used for industrial purposes. Japan imports 99.6 per cent of the oil it consumes of which 78.9 per cent is supplied from the Middle East and North Africa¹⁰. Like the E. E. C. members, then, Japan too has a critical dependency (Dc) on the Middle East oil.

On the other hand, Japan succeeded in registering a surplus in its balance of trade by September 1974, after, like other industrialized countries, it "attempted to encourage its industries to export goods and services to the O. P. E. C. countries and at the same time it borrowed petro-dollars"¹¹. Also with its developed societal factors, internal stability, advanced technology, Japan should clearly be considered as systemically strong (S).

Therefore Japan would fit into the situation characterized by $Ep \setminus (V) = (f) (Dc, S)$; that is, restrained but surely not blocked, to vote against the Arabs. In other words, its energy position did not easily permit her to change its behavior radically against the Arabs which has been manifested by her voting pattern.

The United States of America

America's energy position differs her fundamentally from E. E. C. members and Japan. Although it, too, consumes huge amount of oil (15,980,000 barrels per day in 1972) unlike Japan and the E. E. C. countries it is not dependent on the Middle East oil. United States imported, in 1972, 29.7 per cent of

9 Yoshi Tsurumi, "Japan," *Daedalus*, Vol. 104, No. 4 (Fall 1975), pp. 123-124.

10 Darmstadter and Landsberg, *op. cit.*, p. 21, Table 4.

11 Tsurumi, *op. cit.*, pp. 124-125.

cent of her oil requirements. Of this Middle East and North African oil formed only 14.9 per cent which corresponded to some 6 per cent of her total energy consumption¹². Therefore, America's dependence was not as critical as of Japan's and E. E. C.'s.

This, coupling with a technology advanced enough to give realistic hopes of generating alternative sources of energy, a highly developed society and clear superiority in external relations would place her in situation I - $Ep \setminus (V) = (f)(D, S)$; where all three options are open. The United States was thus able to continue after 1973 to support Israel. A glance at her voting behavior shows that it has voted against the Arab supported or sponsored drafts all through the years 1967-1975.

Third World

Table III and Graph II show that the overall change in the the voting alignments in the General Assembly shown above has been brought about by the Afro-Asians and the Latin Americans. Indeed, significant numbers of Afro-Asian and Latin


TABLE III

The Voting Pattern of the Third World Countries on the Middle East Question in the General Assembly (1967-1975)

Years	(1) "YES" VOTES	(2) "NO" VOTES	(3) ABSTEN- TIONS	(4) Column (1)- Column (2)	(5) % of Co- lumn (1) in Total
1967	24	31	15	- 7	34.28
1968	30	19	20	+ 11	43.48
1969	19	19	28	0	28.79
1970	34	11	26	+ 23	47.88
1971	19	14	33	+ 5	28.78
1972	32	12	27	+ 20	45.07
1973	50	4	16	+ 46	71.43
1974	60	2	11	+ 58	82.19
1975	53	6	18	+ 47	68.83

12 Darsmtadter and Ladsberg, *op. cit.*, p. 21, Table 4.

GRAPH II
THE PERCENTAGE OF AFFIRMATIVE WITHIN THIRD WORLD
"BLOC" JUXTAPOSED ON GRAPH I



American countries have changed their voting behaviors after 1973. In 1967, for draft resolution A /L. 522 /Rev. 3, 24 members of this "block" have supported the Arabs, with 31 of them casting negative votes. In 1975, on the other hand, the support rendered increased to 53, whereas negative votes dropped down to 6. In the years 1967-1972 the Third World provided an average of 26.33 votes for the Arabs. After 1973 the average support they provided rose to 54.33 votes. The average negative votes fell from 17.66 to 4 for the respective periods. Between

1967-1972 for the Third World $\frac{\Sigma Y - \Sigma N}{X}$ was equal to

8.66, whereas for the years 1973-1975 this rose to 52.33.

The place of petroleum in the national economies of the developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America is

especially important for "the increasingly energy intensive character of their development, with a consequent coefficient of energy use approaching 2.0 (that is each percentage point rise in economic activities brings about a 2 per cent rise in energy use)"¹³. This is why the percentage of oil in total energy requirements has reached in 1970, 58.7 in Asia, 48.7 in Africa and 67.8 in Latin America. The great majority of the developing countries consume at least four times as much oil as they produce¹⁴ and therefore are critically dependent on foreign oil (Dc).

It is evident that import of substantial amount of oil would place great burdens on their already precarious balance of payments. The quadrupling of oil prices after the energy crisis certainly aggravated their chronic balance of payment and and foreign exchange problems.

Also most of the Third World countries are at the first stages of developing a nationhood. Tribal and parochial cleavages, multi-racial and lingual populations, and their level of economic development are all great obstacles on the way to establish the modern nation-state. Most of them are beset by socio-political and cultural problems peculiar to the first stages of nation building. They have tremendous problems with population explosion, borders they cannot safeguard, citizens they cannot feed and control. They are political systems with a very delicate equilibrium, economic systems not self-sustaining and consequently their stability is sensitive to outside disturbances. Certainly "(t)he smaller the human and material resources of a state the greater are the difficulties it must surmount if it is to maintain any political options at all..."¹⁵. Such states form "penetrated systems"¹⁶. Therefore we characterize them as systemically at a critical stage (Sc).

13 Peter R. Odell, *Oil and World Power: Background to the Oil Crisis*, Third Ed., Penguin Books Ltd., Middlesex, England, 1974, p. 142. "This coefficient may be compared with figures of only 0.7 and 0.85 for the U. S. A. and Western Europe respectively during the same period."

14 *Ibid.*, p. 66, Map 3., and Darmstadter and Ladsberg, *op. cit.*, p. 20, Table 3.

15 David Vital, *The Inequality of States*, Oxford University Press, 1967, p. 3.

16 For a theoretical analysis of "penetrated state" see: James Rosenau, "Toward the Study of National - International Linkages," in James Rosenau (Ed.), *Linkage Politics*, The Macmillan Co., New York, 1969.

We thus place them in situation IV, i. e., $Epc \setminus (Vc) = (f) (Dc, Sc)$. Their dependence (Dc) in a critical systemic context (Sc) leading to a critical vulnerability (Vc) revealed them openly susceptible to Arab political influence and severely limited their foreign policy options which manifested itself in their General Assembly votes after 1973.

It is also necessary to point out one basic characteristic of most, if not all of the developing countries—their being single primary product exporters. Apart from the Third World solidarity the O. P. E. C. also served as an example for other developing countries, for sometime raising high hopes of forming such cartels and organizing seller markets. It could well be argued that they have not wished to spoil the first such attempt. Another common characteristic can be detected in the pattern of relationships they structured with the oil exporters. Unlike the West, and perhaps out of necessity, they have opted for bilateral relationships to solve their problems. There is no counterpart of the International Energy Agency of the O. E. C. D. in the developing world. Through bilateral relations, as opposed to concerted action, they individually hoped to secure financial aid and preferential treatment from O. P. E. C. members. Naturally, support of the Arab cause would have been a logical consequence of this strategy.

V

Observable empirical data seem to support our hypothesis that in crisis situations when energy factor is a potent variable states conduct their foreign policies in consistence with their energy positions. Their foreign policy options are shaped and conditioned by the degree of vulnerability they experience at a given point in time. Of course, we have constructed a model taking into account one factor that shape state behavior. It can be combined with other models looking at foreign policy events from other vantage points to arrive at more complex theoretical conclusions.

Looking from another angle, this study might have shed a light upon the problem of exercising political influence in the

General Assembly¹⁷. That is, if power could be defined as the ability of a state or a group of states to succeed in inducing a change in the behavior of other powers, then, the successful use of natural resources as a political weapon can be hypothesized to be an effective source of influence. Its effectiveness is dependent upon the ability to impose limitations on the national capabilities of the vulnerable adversary to restrain its foreign policy. Our model is a tool to measure the degree of effectiveness in terms of restraints upon foreign policy options through an analysis of operationalized vulnerability ($V = (f) (D, S)$).

17 On this subject see Robert O. Keohane, "Political Influence in the General Assembly," *International Conciliation*, No. 557 (March 1966).