

SOME NOTES ON SOCIAL PLANNING OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGIES IN THIRD FIVE-YEAR PLAN OF TURKEY

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In retrospect we see that in Turkey the social planning efforts of the early 1960's have had a major impact on both official and academic circles with regard to social problems and the possibility of finding solutions to them through social research. Since the major concern of underdeveloped countries is development, this to say the transformation of an underdeveloped economic structure into a developed one, it has become evident during the first planning attempts that social structural change also is an important goal. Despite this fact, even though the First Five Year Plan paid lipservice to the goal of structural change, as far as chosen objectives and strategies were concerned, it remained within a framework reminiscent of yearly budget allocations and oriented towards romantic goals such as community development.¹ As for the social planning of the Second Five Year Plan, it remained at the level of analysis and could not raise itself to the level of strategy.² The Third Plan, by making a careful evaluation of these experiences, has made a choice that will create genuine structural changes both in economic and social relations and decided on industrialization as its most prominent goal.

Our aim in this paper is to evaluate the social planning objective and strategies which have been selected to achieve this goal of industrialization. Having made a choice, such as industrialization, which is bound to influence all social relationships,

1 Kiray, M. B. "On Certain Aspects of the Social Planning of the First Five Year Plan" in *Planning in Turkey*. Eds. S. İlkin and E. İnanc, Middle East Technical East Technical University Publications No. 9, Ankara, 1967, (in English).

2 Kiray, M. B. "Rural Problems in the Second Five-Year Plan" M. E. T. U. Journal of Development, No. 1, Vol. 1, 1971, Ankara (in Turkish)

it is essential to understand whether the social planning strategies are indeed supportive of this goal, whether they work in each instance, and whether they are likely to create new bottlenecks or not.

We will give separate consideration to variables such as population, employment, manpower supply, and urbanization which constitute the social aspects of industrialization. In relation to the above problems, settlement and housing will be analyzed as well as problems related to rural areas and villages; attention will also be given to small urban entrepreneurs. The contribution of all the above factors to industrialization will receive analytical treatment.

Having defined structural change by the concrete variable of industrialization, we shall attempt to see how the dismantling of the old (traditional) structure can be achieved at a minimum human cost by evaluating social security and social welfare policies.

The Population, Manpower Employment, Technology and Science Complex in Social Structure

As in all developing countries, the most conspicuous characteristic and major problem of development in our society lies in the characteristics of its demographic composition and its high rate of population increase. According to the Third Five Year Plan, 41.1 % of our population is younger than 15, % 54.4 is in the active age group, between 15-64, and only 4.4 % are above 65 years of age (T. F. Y. P Table 467). The natural population increase rate is 27 per thousand, and the dependency ratio is 83.6 per thousand. This demographic portrait is discouraging from the point of view of a development plan and social relationships, and the difficulty of controlling this has been pointed out at various points in the plan. Although it is accepted that the dependency ratio is most important, no attention has been paid to the place of this ratio within the basic relationships of an underdeveloped society as against those of an industrialized society; in particular the issue of how modified social relationships will influence high fertility rates, causing an increase in the rate of population growth, has been neglected.

The Third Plan, like most demographic studies has only given a quantitative account of fertility, dependency age ratios

and their relationship with education, urbanization, social status and general income level. It is important here to focus our attention on a relationship which covers almost all of these variables and influence the dependency ratio at a deeper level from a fundamental structural point of view. Although the age of 14 is generally accepted in demographic literature as being a phase of young age dependency, it is a fact that both male and female children in family-based production of non-industrialized societies do take part in the less strenuous sides of productive activity. They then learn with time through contact with adults the basic productive skills which do not require special training. For this end, neither time nor money is spent. Consequently one should not consider children of approximately 6-7 years of age as dependent in underdeveloped countries. On the other hand, for a young person of an industrialized society to become independent and join the developed agrarian sector of such a society through acquiring the necessary skills to take part in the productive process may exceed the age of 15 (the Average age for university graduation is 23). For instance, being a shepherd in an area of an underdeveloped country is a normal activity for a boy between the ages of 8 and 10. However, even in the simplest instance of commercial animal farming which may not even involve automatic milking machines, the same young man would not be productive before the ages of 18-20 because of requisite marketing skills. Another example could be the following: In connection with this year's problems about the cotton picking, the introduction of harvesting machines will reduce the need for manpower and in case such a technology were to be adopted, after a certain lapse of time, we would certainly expect a fall in the fertility rate of that section of the rural population which made their living from cotton picking. This would be due to the fact that although only adult workers are used in cotton hoeing, children older than 5 years of age, who have reached a certain biological level of motor co-ordination, work at cotton-picking and that great value is placed on their labour by their families. When the introduction of new technology removes this possibility of child labor, motivations for childbearing would decrease accordingly.

The fall in fertility rates in the West has also taken place after industrial technology could no longer make use of child

labor. England reached this stage after the 1880's; child labor was abandoned and in 1910 laws prohibiting child labor were passed. In Holland, even today the fertility rates of areas where people live on greenhouse vegetable growing and can thus still use child labor are higher than those of other rural areas.

The relationship of dependency age to social structure and the economic and technological level is much more important than the former's relationship with side factors such as income level, social status and values. In one sense, this relationship can be conceptualized as the negative correlation between labour and mechanization - automation. When families see that the dependency age of their offspring is lengthening, they decrease the number of their children through the use of traditional or modern birth control methods without necessity for interference from outside and the fertility rate drops by itself. Since different aspects of social structure are in a state of mutual interaction, the change in the technology-dependency age relationship produces changes in education, income level and values, and they reach a state of equilibrium or consistency. In other words, social structure and demographic structure correspond to one another, and population reaches a new equilibrium and tends to remain stable after the fall of fertility rates.

The simple fact of urban living does not affect fertility. If that were the case, this ratio should have dropped rapidly with Turkey's demographic urbanization. However, those children who abandoned the land and could not be absorbed into high industrial technology and formal organizations have turned to urban jobs defined as "unclassifiable" from shoeshining and apprenticeship with petty traders to peddling. Thus, they become part of the family's productive members at the age of 7-8 and leave dependency. For this young age independence to disappear, it is necessary that industrialization at an advanced technological level should take place and that rational formal organizations co-ordinating the service sector of such industrialization evolve and create a demand for qualified labor at various levels.

The implication of the relationship between dependency age and technology on the one hand and qualified, labor

for development efforts and planing strategy, on the other, is clear. If the self-equilibration of population and the drop in fertility and dependency are desired, the most efficient method in the choice of technology is to give preference to those types that require a high level of skill. Or with the same aim in mind, diffuse occupations, small enterprises and artisanal work should be eliminated from the economic structure; or, at least, should not be encouraged. If we were to consider the problem in reverse, we could say that because industry with advanced technology with a demand for skilled labor has not come, there has been no appreciable drop in fertility rates between 1963-72 despite all the attempts at family planning and education. If, in the near future, on the other hand, the technological advances necessitated by our long-term industrial planning were to take place, we could expect a much more rapid drop in fertility rates than in the past ten years with a corresponding decrease in the dependency ratio and an increase in development indices. Now by giving an open priority to industrialization and advanced technology in the Plan, a correct choice has been made in terms of this relationship and inadvertently the most important of the factors influencing population problems has been set in the direction of change.

It will now be appropriate to consider the employment analyses and strategies of the Third Plan. In this section of the Plan, it is pointed out that the increase in employment has remained below the levels suggested for the first two planning periods, but an adequate analysis of why this is so is not provided. As a reason for this lack of increase, only the following is proposed: given the underdeveloped employment characteristics, high technology creates little employment, and the population which has left the land is now employed in unproductive, diffuse activities thus changing the location of latent unemployment. It is impossible to reach satisfactory conclusions on the basis of such limited information and analysis.

A recently completed study suggests that the habitual differentiations in terms of sectors are not sufficient for an understanding of occupational and employment structures in underdeveloped societies. Structural changes in the sectors produce

characteristics which make these differentiations meaningless. For instance, there is no comparability between the service sector of highly industrialized societies with its wide spread banking, managerial and similar organizations and the employment in underdeveloped countries of rural migrant labor in the least specialized and differentiated public services - small and disparate services such as fountain-penrepairmanship with a consequent inflation of the service sector which in no way constitutes development. The same must be said for trade. In fact, the 10.1 % increase rate in trade, which can be seen in Table 510 of the Third Five Year Plan, can only be achieved by considering peddling as trade.

The first consideration to be pointed out here is that even though high-level technology may produce lower employment at the level of actual production, the activities of an installation using such a technology, such as control, administration, transportation, and marketing, require a much higher level of employment than backward technology and especially trade. In fact employment in advanced industrial countries today takes place within these types of occupational organizations, and it is a characteristic of advanced societies to have an occupational structure involving complex organizations alongside advanced technology.

In above mentioned research, we tried to test this general proposition in the employment and occupational structure of the City of İzmir, which is at the most advanced level in Turkey in terms of industry and trade. In this city there is a group without any specialization or organization, whose number is unknown, it is referred to as peddlers or petty traders. In any classification it could pass as service, trade, manufacturing or anyone of these. Above this, there is a second group which has achieved some differentiation within itself. It has instituted some division of labor according to the branches of activity but is without any form of organization. This group, known as small traders (Esnaf), holds petty trade and petty manufacturing in its hands. It is estimated that it numbers around sixty-thousand people. Above these two categories, are concerns which have a marked differentiation, specialization and organization, and which can be defined in terms of their specifiable capital, energy resources, and worker-personnel numbers. There are over five thousand such organizations

in trade, manufacture and services. The analysis of the above three categories in terms of their numbers, degree of specialization and the complexity of organization provides important leads in comparing the occupational and employment structures of underdeveloped and developed countries for their utilization in terms of planning objectives.

The first group is by now a well-known one, but its scope and tendencies are as yet unestablished. The neglected one is the second group, and the Third Plan does not seem to have decided quite what to do with it. The artisans and traders of today are not the people who carried out the traditional jobs of the old structure. They constitute a new trade and production network which is tied to the unproductive aspects of the economy developing today. The term "smalltrader (esnaf)" does not refer to traditional types of work or transformations thereof. It is a totally new group. The esnaf is, in fact, the person who engages in trade in the pre-industrial society. He should be considered together with the craftsman (zenaatkâr) – the producer of non-agrarian goods. Today, however, the term "esnaf" has changed its meaning in business life and is a term which simply denotes the *scope of business*. Even when our laws refer to them as "esnaf", the members of this group consider themselves as "professional people", reflecting the division of labor and employment system of modern society.

The small producers considered as artisans are in the majority of cases employed in modern activities such as electrical and radio repairs, men's shirts manufacturers, taxi drivers, car repairs, men's shirts manufacturers, taxi drivers, car repairs etc... From the point of view of relationships, they sometimes refer to themselves as owners of their own own business and sometimes as employed people. Thus, they have an awareness of forming a middle group, the identity of which is uncertain. Another contradiction comes from the fact that their vested interests and wishes are in constant conflict with those of more organized and specialized traders and industrialists. Within the context of plan if the latter are to develop, the former must be left to their own resources. If it is undesirable for production to remain limited and of low quality, and if employment is to be created within organizations, a lot of thought must be given to whether it is correct

to encourage "esnaf" production and activities. This group is conspicuously causing waste in the utilization of resources. For instance, according to the calculations of the Regional Planning Office in 1965, 70 % of the total added value in İzmir as been created in organized industry and 30 % of it in unorganized industry, that is to say, in small manufacture. However, those working in small manufacture constitute 60 % of the total working population.³ Similar results have been assessed in the Third Year Plan, too. This occupational structure and employment order prevents the development of anonymity and the realization of a universalistic outlook in human relations, it also prevents the development of organizational and specializational potential.

Even in the city of İzmir the ratio of work places with more than twenty-five administrators, enrolled in the chamber of commerce and industry and organized in terms of employment, is only of 5.1 %. This shows that even here it is impossible to see the developed administrative structures of big western firms. It is important to point out that none of the places employing twenty-five or more administrators are involved in trade. It has been found that in the city of İzmir even those trade forms which are quite big in terms of capital and transactions never create much employment and seldom employ more than 10 people.

Financial and industrial organizations create much more employment. Another set of interesting findings in the above-mentioned research, aside from the employment of administrators, concerns the position of unskilled workers and of variously skilled workers and technicians. Trade concerns, even of considerable scope, do not employ more than 10 unskilled workers and employ no highly qualified (university graduate level) personnel. In contrast to this, industry, even of medium size, exceeds trade in terms of the number and quality of workers employed. In addition, there is a great difference in the density of communications involved in trading activities of all kinds and industrial manufacturing activities of all kinds. The average daily number of communications per work place is 44.10 in the case of export firms representing big trade; 94.46 in medium-sized manufacture; and 134, that is to say three times of the trade figure, in the case of large-scale industry. There is a similar variation of usage in the case of transportation.

3 İmar - İskan Bakanlığı Bölge Planlama Dairesi: *Ege Bölgesi* Ankara 1971

The Third Plan, as was the case with the First and Second Plans, presents the choice of advanced technology and industrialization as a sacrifice. According to the above observations, however, this choice constitutes, quite to the contrary, a rational solution in providing a more stable structure and creating the demand for a more differentiated and specialized work force. It should not be forgotten that industrial modern society is a type of society possessing complex organizations and a high level of interaction; employment possibilities increase through these channels. In view of the İzmir data, it is quite appropriate that the need has been felt in the Third Plan to collect and systematize data on the relationship between manpower and social structure, in particular on which quantitative and qualitative aspects characterize manpower under which conditions, the disappearance of small business and the rate of development of large-scale organized enterprises (paragraph 1301-5). In this manner, it will be possible to proceed from more general to more specific factors in population and manpower analyses.

The employment possibilities of an underdeveloped structure do not require that manpower should be qualified. Therefore, the problems that the plan must tackle are both manpower demand and manpower offer. Those should complement one another in terms of quantity and quality. Again, according to the above-mentioned research, only 12.8 % of İzmir's organized work places employ technical school graduates and 27.4 % employ university graduates.⁴

According to observations in Ankara, the literacy rate of the adult rural migrant population is 40 % in the first years of urban settlement, and increases to 75 % within five years.⁵ In other words, if employment possibilities are created, if there is demand, manpower is ready to acquire new qualitative skills. The unrealistically high educational aspiration levels of villagers and town-dwellers, found in almost every survey, should be interpreted as a desire for employment possibilities in a modern, organized technologically-advanced context and the wish to acquire quality and skills. It is very desirable that education

4 Kıray, M. B. *Örgütlemeyen Kent* Social Sciences Association Publications A1, 1972, Ankara, Page 83.

5 Kıray, M. B. "Squatter Housing in Underdeveloped Countries" Paper read at Seventh World Congress of Sociology, Varna 1970.

should be oriented towards organizational and technical skills, but it is also necessary that demand should be created. If the Third Plan had been able to make projections related to science, technology, industrial and organizational developments and manpower problems within the context of their reciprocal interrelations, one of the most delicate problems of social planning would have gained a certain amount of clarity.

It has been established that during the past planned period there has been a greater increase in highly qualified, highly educated technical manpower rather than in medium-skilled technical manpower. The basic reasons for this are not individual or psychological in nature. Social structure has not yet reached the level of organization to demand qualified technical manpower; thus, training alone will not be sufficient. It is necessary to encourage the development of organizations offering employment possibilities. In management and administration, the reciprocal encouragement of technical knowledge, demand, and organizational development is necessary.

It is also important to evaluate the methods put forward by the Third Plan to train the necessary manpower to be engaged in production with local technology. How useful will it be in the long run to gear universities, together with other training and co-ordination-developing institutions, towards the short-term needs of present industry and economy. For instance should we consider as normal a state of affairs which is pointed out as a deficiency in paragraph 1367, namely the fact that insufficient co-operation has been established between universities and the industrial and public sectors, and that most of the academic research is of a type that cannot find immediate application? To gear universities towards applied research framed by today's needs would mean making them perform the functions of technical or vocational schools. Science, a research-oriented outlook and and long-term creativity, must be given incentive if one really wants the country to create its own technology. The natural medium for this are universities where fundamental research which need not find immediate application can take place. If such a restrictive attitude and mentality were to find acceptance, our universities which are, as it is, not very productive from the point of view of generating original knowled-

ge would fall at least one or two decades behing in terms of fundamental research, creativity and scientific outlook. This, in turn, would render impossible training of technical personnell at various levels as proposed by the plan. As a result, as can be seen today, our Technical University graduates will get to the point of working simply as foremen in large-scale organized industrial concerns.⁶

We must keep in mind that "a mill wil not turn for a long time with transported water", and give a higher premium to fundamental research, creativity and scientific curiosity in our universities rather than to immediate application. While trying to analyze and plan the complex relationships between education, technology, the quantity and quality of manpower and the socioeconomic structure, we must take special pains not to blunt scientific creativity which is one of the major criteria of true development.

The Structure of Underdeveloped Society, Urbanization, Settlement and Residential Planning:

The Third Plan concisely and cold-bloodedly puts forward an estimation which will greatly affect the near and distant future of our country. It does not, however, consider its causes, consequences, problems, relationships with other areas and the solutions of emerging problems. Thereof, it has been estimated that in twenty years 75 % of the Turkish population will be living in cities. Today this ratio is 36 %; it was 20 % only 10 years ago. It is insufficient to mention this reversal in ratios between rural and urban populations simply in the abstract, without expressing concretely why such a large number of people will migrate to towns, to what sorts of towns they will migrate, what occupations they will hold, where they will reside and what the consequent interrelationships and interactions among different towns in Turkey will be.

Cities, like all phenomena, do not exist in a vacuum but within the context of a specific social structure and specific social relations. In preindustrial societies there are integrated regional units, though small in physical size, surrounding some central area and

⁶ It is a fact that engineers having graduated from the İstanbul Technical University are being employed as foremen in installations such as the Mersin Refinery. Such examples can be multiplied.

evolving specialized non-agrarian production and co-ordination as well as the functions of administration and control. In post industrial society this integration takes place around a metropolis, the influence of which is felt in a surrounding metropolitan area. It is seen that when society is in a state of relative equilibrium these settlements have a one-to-one correspondance with units of public administration. The "sancak" centers in the Ottoman Empire represent such control centers.

In industrialized societies integration again takes place around the metropolis where the administration and co-ordination functions are concentrated. In the settlements surrounding the metropolis a variety of industries, wholesaling in smaller settlements, and agricultural production in villages take place in an order which cannot be elaborated in detail here. Among the determinants of this order are factors such as transportation, communications, other infrastructural facilities, the rate of industrialization and the rate at which the population is moving away from the land.

In underdeveloped countries which are beginning to industrialize this order is in a state of total upset due to the speed and fluctuations of change. If, for instance, 40% of the Turkish rural population is to leave the land and change its place of residence, it is imperative to analyze such a dramatic instance of social change correctly, to put forward certain alternatives and to make a choice among them.

The Third Plan has mentioned this large phenomenon but has left it at that without any consistent discussion of the issue. Under what conditions will this population leave the land? Of course population explosion is neither the only nor the most important reason for this. Farm mechanization, the polarization of land ownership, the introduction of new cash crops are more fundamental reasons. Thus, it should have been possible to estimate to which settlement areas the population leaving the land would migrate. It should also have been possible to forecast administrative and coordinative metropolitan organizations, new manpower employment needs, the location of developing industrial concerns and the possibilities of employment created by these. Furthermore, it should have been clearly pointed out how these phenomena could be started even in non-industrialized,

nonmodern areas and what types of metropolitan relationships could be established. The present expression in the form of a simple migration rate estimation is not very meaningful.

What occupations will this population hold in the areas where it is newly settled? The problem here is different from that of manpower surplus due to population increase. As our experiences since 1945 demonstrate, can employment in disparate, unproductive, unclassifiable, low-income and low-security jobs continue to exist? The physical manifestation of this typical characteristic of underdevelopment is pseudo-urbanization and poor housing.

We should now consider these problems and concerns openly and realistically without "pulling the wool over our eyes", especially the problems of urbanization and settlement which are the most conspicuous aspects of underdevelopment. Yet, the Third Plan lacks the physical dimension with regards to the problems of settlement and realistic occupations. No link has been established between socioeconomic investment decisions and settlement policies. Possibly this lack is due to the fact that no answer is known to the question of how these links are formed and decisions are made.

The most exciting job of a planner in a developing country ought to be looking for an answer to this question. The planner in a underdeveloped country can and ought to be creative. In both the second and the third plans it is repeatedly mentioned that agrarian change, industrialization, urbanization and consequently development are linked to one another. However, nothing is said about exactly how these three factors interact with one another, what configurations they adopt in a situation of underdevelopment, what alternatives have been proposed to deal with this situation and which of these alternatives has been chosen for. In another five years' time, this situation will become even more intricate.

The Third Five Year Plan has made no concrete attempt relating urbanization and settlement to other sectors; and from a sociologist's point of view this constitutes a deplorable state of affairs. No attention has been paid in the plan to changing settlement patterns.

The metropolization, which accompanies industrialization, with its new settlement structure and relationships has now gone beyond the Sancak organization of the Ottoman Empire. Even the most casual observation today shows that especially non-rural interactions are taking place outside "il" boundaries. One of the best examples of this are radio broadcasting stations. Our communication units are not "il"s but clusters of "il"s within a regional unit. To talk of "il"-level planning as the first step of national planning shows that we have lost touch with our present-day level of development, let alone future developments. In a sense, this is to make an attempt at understanding and ordering spatial units, which have become integrated by electronic communications and combustion engine transportation. In terms of a medieval unit, that of "il", this is only a very small part of the real phenomenon. There is absolutely no way of planning the counties of Aydın or Manisa, for instance, before understanding and planning the İzmir metropolitan area and integration of the Aegean region.

The Plan seems to have closed its eyes to such facts. Possibly the fundamental reason for the lack of a settlement policy is the fact that a wrong analysis of how a new settlement pattern evolves has been made. Paragraph 1867 is as follows: "Both rural population concentrations and urban development are seen in fertile areas with land and irrigation possibilities. Thus, in Trakya, Marmara, the Aegean and Çukurova we can see a network of agrarian-based urbanization along the littoral. In contrast to this, in Central and Eastern Anatolia where climatic and topographic conditions produce low agricultural yields, population density drops, and one sees towns of limited population only at the cross-roads of traditional trade routes.

To use the term "agrarian-based network of urbanization" is reality unintelligible, since urbanization means non-agricultural production and more importantly the development of control and co-ordination functions. In fact, the above declaration is contradicted by the plan's own findings. Table 654 shows the distribution of population densities by "il". This table shows that population density drops in the Aegean and Black Sea regions and increases in Eastern Anatolia. In the 1977 the paragraph we see a very general statement rather than a choice emerging from a

systematic analysis: "The settlement system" will try to maximize the participation of individuals in change and development, and minimize with time urban rural differences. It will be essential to provide the necessary flow of goods, services, people and communications in a way that will provide for the development needs of the rural and urban networks taken as a whole."

It is not clear whether this is the result of ignorance of present-day's accumulated knowledge and of the seriousness of the matter or whether it results from some decision making principles used. In any event, it looks as though there would have been no great difference if these topics were included in the plan or excluded from it. For instance, there is reference to a hierarchy of cities in various places but the relationships among these different-sized cities and the fact that they might have undergone some differentiations in function does not seem to have been thought about. Within such a scale of urbanization, there is no study of what the employment possibilities will be in industry and formal organizations, what size of population will remain in unproductive unorganized and unclassifiable occupations, and a pairing of these with organizational and industrial sector analyses. It is unfortunate that no ideas have been proposed on strategies which link together socio-economic investment policies with regional and metropolitan development and settlement policies. Furthermore, no consideration has been given to the solution of the problems of big cities where metropolitan planning is applied.

All the data in the plan point to the great population concentrations in big cities. Here, the plan exhibits more sensitivity than it had shown in employment and especially in sector analysis, and points out clearly that the active population is concentrated in that unclassifiable, unproductive, low-income and irregular service sector; and the urban settlement pattern of that population is the shanty-town (*gecekondü*). Land speculation, housing needs, the intra-city services required by the high population density, in other words, the solution of infra-structural needs as well as the maintenance of environmental hygiene, which may constitute a menace for the whole population, are aspects that are both expensive to regulate and require high technical qualification. And yet, if the planned industrialization is to evolve in a healthy manner and keep its human problems to a minimum these as-

pects should have been given priority. The Third Plan indicates that certain precautions that would help resolve some of these problems were already proposed in the second plan but could not be effectively applied. For instance, no success has been achieved in providing consistency between city planning and development plans, in restructuring the Ministry of Reconstruction and Settlement, in giving municipalities additional income, in stocking public land to avoid land speculation and in the improvement of the standards of city services (paragraphs: 1893, 1894, 1895, 1896). Nevertheless, it is not clear by which modified strategy in this plan the above will be achieved. Furthermore the only concrete proposal, which puts forward the use of the urbanizing population through the development of organized industrial areas, involving "light" industry, as a regulatory tool of industrialization and employment, again relies upon a waste-producing aspect of unplanned development which is not based upon a thorough analysis of the situation (paragraphs: 1903, 1904).

The sections dealing with the social planning fail to distinguish between light industry with advanced technology (such as electronics industry) and small craftlike manufacturing establishments which have multiplied in numbers but have been unable to broaden their scale (such as carpenters' shops, car repair outfits etc.). If enough data had been collected on the employment conditions of these establishments, it would have become apparent that due to their low level of specialization and organization and due to the fact that they employ few workers under unfavorable conditions and no administrative personnel, their power to absorb manpower is very limited. Furthermore, as their numbers increase, they show a tendency to move more out of the city thus causing land speculation. These enterprises are characteristic of the industrialization pattern of underdeveloped countries and have nothing to do with development. In a development plan it is quite inadequate to count on this phenomenon as a solution to the urbanization problem.

Another inappropriate proposal is, to us, demographic urbanization as a driving force for industrialization. But as we have seen in our previous discussion of employment problems, as long as there is hidden unemployment, it is unimportant whether it takes place in rural or urban areas.

Proposals about the control of other aspects of urbanization cannot be understood from this macro-plan. It is worth waiting to see what can be achieved through yearly programs.

The order in which the Plan deals with settlement, urbanization and housing problems also reflects a specific and faulty approach. The urban problem of industrialized societies which have been urbanized for a long time is the renewal and increase of housing. Consequently, the housing problem is treated as an independent topic in their plans since there is no such problem as urbanization for them, and therefore no link is made between the former and the latter. The major problem of a developing country, however, is the process of urbanization and industrialization. The housing problem can only be considered and solved as a part of this process. The fact that urbanization and housing problems have been treated separately in the Third Plan, and the fact that the topic of housing is treated several sections before the topic of urbanization, has led to a considerable degree of overlap and confusions.

In our society where a very disorderly process of urbanization and industrialization is under way, the great majority of the urban population has very low purchasing power and especially low capability to make housing investments. It only has the capacity to own underdeveloped urban housing. Underdeveloped urban housing means the shanty-town. For this reason, the statement that "low income groups do not create demand" (Page 936) does not seem appropriate. First, the occupations and type of urban integration of low income groups must be clarified. In reality, the desire to own a house is probably strongest in the group that has not yet been absorbed into regular income, within the context of a stable industry and organization, and has not become completely integrated into real city life.

Even the lowest quality housing means more for this group than simple shelter. From a social-psychological point of view, it is one of the three essential security requirements (namely, land in the village, if any; help from relatives and fellow villagers; and owning a house in the city) and takes precedence over their other needs. The large areas covered by this type of housing, namely shanty settlement, and their numbers are the most obvious proof of housing demand among low income groups.

The solution lies on the one hand, in absorbing the occupational and income characteristics of shanty - town dwellers into industry and formal organizations, and on the other, in the serious and purposeful control of land speculation and quality. If a further dimension of healthy policy of settlement pattern can be added to the above, the problem can be solved along these three dimensions. Otherwise, offering public financial assistance for any type of housing would lead to a philanthropy which would remain inapplicable.

If we were to consider the housing problem within the context of market mechanisms, we would see that luxury housing has reached a saturation point in big cities. As for middle income groups with a secure income and occupation, large-scale, cooperative type of mass housing with new organizational characteristics should be able to solve most of the problems.

Because present-day housing quality does not take into account the income polarizations of underdevelopment, the average room numbers given in the Third Plan are meaninglessly high. According to the data, two and three roomed housing constitutes more than 68 % of all housing (Table 640). Although household size, that is the average number of people per household is 5.2, the average number of people per room is only 1.8 which gives a very misleading impression. In order to increase the number of rooms in mass housing and co-operative constructions, studies are needed to provide new cost and quality norms.

The problem of village housing has many aspects and comes with problems of intra-village settlement and the concentration of work-places. There is no statement in the plan about this, and time is too limited here to enter into a consideration of intra-village settlement principles.

Rural Problems

It is generally known that both agriculture and social structure in rural areas are changing much faster than urban areas and industry. The process of moving away from the land is evident from the fact that the ratio of landless families is 30.7 % and that 93.3 % of these are not really agricultural workers (Paragraph 1946). An index of mechanization, which is the most important cause for this, is the fact that the number of tractors has tripled

since tractor have reached three times their level of 1962. (S. 126). Furthermore, the infrastructural investments have been the most rapidly increasing investments, over-reaching plan objectives. All this suggests that the change in rural structure is occurring at a very fundamental level.

At this point of agrarian and rural structural change, a far-reaching rearrangement of the man-land relationships seems unavoidable. In addition to this, the Plan proposes a reorganization of agrarian credit, the creation of an adequate marketig system of co-operatives and the development of infrastructural investments. Since these measures introduce new characteristics to the interaction between villages and the outside world, villages tend to reach some integration with new surrounding settlements. These types of integration have not been touched upon in the Plan due to the fact that the section on settlement patterns is quite limited. However, through realistic observations of the rural changes, it has been noted that functional differentiation among villages is unavoidable. Thus, in order to be able to bring at least government services to the villages, the establishment of "central villages" has been proposed.

Such specialization and differentiation is inescapable in a modern rural structure. However, if these choices are not geared toward the changes in other settlements; if they are not made within the general context of a settlement strategy and policy, and if the supra-village-scale settlements where 'centrale village' relationships are to take place evolve in a different direction, then these choices may prove to be very unproductive and costly. It is important to be extremely careful when making such choices at a time when many, villages are going to experience rapid population loss and resultant modified relationships with surrounding settlements.

At this stage of rural and agrarian change some sort of agrarian or land reform is inescapable. Yet it is necessary for industry to gain somewhat more strength before this reform can have widespread application. Thus, the land and agrarian reform proposal of the plan is quite appropriate. It is not within the scope of this paper to enter into a discussion of what type of land and agrarian reform this is to be. It is pleasing to see that the Third Plan, unlike the First Plan's treatment of villages as separate units within the romantic framework of community development,

and unlike the Second Plan which remained at the level of structural analysis without strategy, has been able to evolve a land reform proposal.

Social Security and Health

I would like to discuss the topic of social security, in terms of the direction of variation it presents in pre-industrial and industrial societies and in terms of whether it has a different function in underdeveloped society.

Every social structure provides its members with security mechanism through its social institutions, types of interactions and systems of values. Preindustrial society, with its small settlements, family-based activities, face-to-face contacts and limited mobility, provides its members with this security. Mutual responsibilities between father and son, reciprocal obligations between landowners and tenants or sharecroppers, or skilled craftsman-apprentice relationships within the corporate system are so established that everyone knows how to behave and what to expect both in usual and in exceptional cases. This system is so well integrated that members of society are not even aware that this order of intergroup relations provide them with total security. It is only after changes occur and new relationships replace the old ones that they realize that this security mechanism is no longer present. Frequently this deficiency creates bottlenecks in development. The population of industrialized and truly urbanized societies are integrated into their networks of anonymous relationships and find the needed security in modern social insurance organizations. These organizations are, as is widely known, social insurance retirement funds and the social security funds of banks and insurance companies. The more these provide adequate security to the population integrated to new social structure, against the danger of losing one's income and employment possibilities, the less human problems and bottlenecks are created in the development of society

The major problem of social security planning in underdeveloped countries is not so much the organized social security of that part of the population which is integrated into urbanization and industrialization, but the choice of an adequate social security policy for members of the older order – those who have not been able to make a full transition. The problems of the former

mer group can be settled with financing policies; micro-level decisions can be effective. But the most important are the latter groups. Included in these latter, is, first of all, the population who has left the land but has not been absorbed into a modern socioeconomic structure in the city. It is impossible to include these people in a social security organization before integrating them into regular industry and formal organizations. As long as they remain in that state, they will constitute the most unsatisfied group. Another group which stands in a critical position from the point of view of planning and decision making is the group of "esnaf" (small traders) and craftsmen who have evolved out of a past structure and reached their present state but who are bound to disappear with development. The encouragement of these groups either with bank credits or social security incentives seems likely to reinforce a more backward structure and create new obstacles and bottlenecks to industrialization.

The development of such an insurance system should be considered both from the point of view of priorities and preferences (such as the pressing social security problems of those who have become agricultural wage workers) and from the point of view of making possible new integrations for this group. In other words, their absorption into large-scale industry and organization with minimum human cost. Instead of a system like Bağ-Kur, which combines the retirement system of the old bureaucracy with the social insurance of the new structure, a system could have been thought of to serve as tool in easing the mechanisms of passage into new types of security organizations and overcome the small traders' and craftsmen's resistance to join large units, rather, to encourage this. A social security organization such as Bağ-Kur with its present status will not achieve much besides creating new problems by increasing the resistance of an old structure and creating new sources of financial drainage for the state. Here again we see certain misapprehensions and mistakes in diagnosing the characteristics of an underdeveloped social structure.

Within this context, unemployment insurance will have to remain as a wish for a long time to come in our society. This is due to the fact that the population which is as yet unintegrated into industry and formal organizations, whether they have co-

me from the land or small trade and crafts-menship, will remain problematic for a long time as far as a definition of unemployment is concerned. For such an unintegrated population it might be more realistic to develop private social welfare mechanisms rather than insurance.

Beyond the scope of the problem of finding and allocating resources necessary to the planning and solution of social welfare and health problems, there is a further aspect which needs to be pointed out here. This is the relationship of communications, transportation and organization to health services. For the planning, health services to become operational in a region, communications and transportation must reach an optimum point there and must become integrated to health service organization. If the service has to be kept operational despite these deficiencies, the organization must provide communication, transportation and similar services within itself, for its own members. For example, the German entrepreneurs working in the Konya plane-Çumra at a time when there was no communication, transportation or organization in the region, instituted their own telephones, telegamme, road and community services to make the irrigation installation they had set up productive. It might be profitable to apply this principle which has been successfully used by market-oriented enterprises to the unsuccessful socialization endeavors which have been financed for a long time now. The real solution is for socialized health organization circles to achieve the changes which would provide them with these possibilities. Thus, spreading socialization to advanced regions where organizational integration is possibly would increase its chances of success and establish a new equilibrium with other health services. Big cities are the most appropriate areas from this point of view. The program put forward by the plan for shanty-town districts is thus very appropriate.

Conclusions

We have reviewed the extent to which the notion of social structural change which reached a certain degree of maturity in the Third Plan has been successfully analyzed and transformed into a strategy inducing structural change.

For instance, we have seen, despite some deficiencies, a much more consistent and clear-cut orientation than that of the

first plan to the needs of an industrializing society within a modern economy with respect to rural problems, the choice of capital intensive advanced technology, employment and the relationships between manpower supply and population. The Economic Plan has expressed structural change as the ratio differences among classic sectors. The Social Plan has unavoidably considered the changes in human relationships within each classic sector in terms of the old and the new, thus generating more valid knowledge. However, the fact that the Economic Plan remained more superficial and did not concord with the Social Plan meant that the logical conclusions of the latter's analyses could not be integrated at the level of strategy. However, the basic policies that will lead to a new social structure with a higher income level and better employment and education possibilities have been given. The issues dealt with in the reform section also indicate that the old structure and the decision making circles related to it appear to be ready for change

The Third Plan has achieved an analysis of the basic structure of preindustrial society, namely rural areas and their problems in an incomparably better manner than the previous two plans. It has immediately penetrated the fundamentals of the issue; has provided an analysis covering the necessity for change in the land situation, the credit requirement of market-oriented modern agriculture; and has proposed a strategy leading to land and agrarian reform. However, the solution of social security and settlement problems, though correct from the rural angle, might remain ineffectual because it does not tie in with the social security and settlement strategies of the plan as a whole.

The fact that the settlement and housing problems of a society going towards urbanization with a dramatic ratio such as 75 %, have not been given the attention they deserve, constitutes one of the most important deficiencies of the Third Plan. Another deficiency can be seen in the solution of the social security problem which creates serious bottlenecks in development; the social security organization of the esnaf, which is a group carrying underdeveloped socio-economic characteristics and which is bound to disappear, is given priority over that of agricultural workers who are more permanent. This will not only produce instability in the lives of the latter but will have a slo-

wing-down effect on industrialization which is the major emphasis of the plan .

Also the links between continuing the esnaf type of economic structure and the low level of dependency age on the one hand, and population increase, which is one of the major handicaps to development on the other, have not been properly evaluated.

The same deficiency could be seen in employment analyses. It is wrong to expect that manpower surplus could be absorbed by esnaf type enterprises. It is also unfortunate to have neglected the role of formal organization which accompany advanced industry and which could solve a lot of problems. Large-scale analytic research is needed to assess the characteristics of underdeveloped, occupation and employment.

However, even if forecasts and projections are incorrect, there is a strong chance that future events will go in the right directions since education is generally supportive of industrialization. The misapprehensions about the esnaf group and the deficiency in understanding the role of formal organizations somewhat weaken the family planning, employment and manpower supply complex which constitutes the backbone of the social plan. Despite all these facts, the Third Plan is much more oriented to genuine structural change than the two previous ones; it has moved away from a "yearly-budget" allocations appearance or "romantic" approaches to planning and has gained much in terms of internal consistency.

Social Planning is not a topic on which developed countries have evolved techniques. Therefore, it is up to the planners of countries like ours to be creative. It is possible for them to establish the relative place of social factors in various interaction situations through new research and to establish new planning policies built upon one another in the light of these findings. This would be a great contribution to our knowledge of techniques and social facts and would add great precision and flexibility to our plans. This should be successfully achieved.