

RELIGIOUS PLURALISM IN TURKEY*

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Religion and its organized forms: church, congregation or religious community such as "ümme't" can be studied under many aspects. For a very long time the philosophical problem of the meaning of religion, the historical evolution of its organizational forms have been the center of scholarly attention. More recently, especially in connection with the changes produced by the emergence of industrial societies, social science has attempted to define the functions of religion from a different angle. Indeed the rise of industrial societies has been associated with a significant shift in the content of religious thought. This shift from a personal to an impersonal theology, may be as Lenski attempts to show, in part a reflection of the changing character of society itself and especially of its dominant institutions. In agrarian societies the dominant political and economic institutions were operated on a highly personal patrimonial basis; in industrial societies they are on an impersonal bureaucratic basis.

The rise of industrial societies seems to have affected the religious scene in yet another way. Alliances between state and church are much less common in industrial societies than in agrarian ones. The major reason being the fact that in democratic or republican nations, governments are more so dependent on the legitimizing functions that religious groups are capable of performing.

The impact of this change has deeply influenced research in social sciences. Recently anthropologists and sociologists have

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attempted to trace down the effects of religion on the behaviour of collectivities and the ways in which religious institutions condition the behaviour of individuals. Parallel to this functionalist approach, which attempts to prove that religion is some kind of inherent "functional requisite", fulfilling specific "functions", sociologists and political scientists have also helped to build the bridge between religious affiliation and social stratification. In countries like Canada, USA, Australia, the struggle between religious status groups is important enough to serve as a major determinant of voting behaviour.¹ Similar processes can be observed in developing countries with universal suffrage such as India, where cleavages based upon religious affiliation lead to essential political choices.

These differences in voting behaviour do not simply reflect some basic difference in political philosophy and ideals, on the contrary all empirical data indicates that there is also a distributive problem involving status groups struggling for power, privilege and prestige.² Thus, what has sometimes been thought to be merely a struggle between economic classes proves on closer inspection to be a struggle between religious status groups as well.

At this point the degree of institutionalization of a given religion, its loose or strict affiliatory system becomes important. Gellner in his brilliant article on the pendulum swing theory of Islam.³ showed that the fragmented tribal "church", embracing saints, holy men, etc. though deviant and dissident, makes the greatest concessions to the requirements of a worldly order, thus keeping "folk" Islam vivid, while the central tradition manages to make the least concession despite being identified with the larger community.

Starting from these considerations in regard of all major religions a distinction has to be made between its formal and institutionalized versus informal and associational aspect. The

1 Robert Alford, *Party and Society: The Anglo-American Democracies*, Chicago 1963, Table 6-3, 7-4, 8-4, 9-5.

2 Gerhard E. LENSKI, *Power and Privilege, A Theory of Social Stratification* McGraw-Hill 1966, P. 425.

3 E. GELLNER, A Pendulum Swing Theory of Islam, *Annales de Sociologie*, 1968, P. 5-14.

formal and institutionalized function of each major religion has to be put in direct relationship to the distributive system of society. Charles Y. Glock and R. Stark have eloquently pointed out that economic as well as other motivated forms of deprivation have implications for the development of religious and even secular movements. According their classification economic deprivation which led to the establishment of a sect is based on expectations leading to the extinction or transformation of factors provoking economic deprivation ^{3a} Thus in agrarian societies a formal and institutionalized religion retains a monopoly or near monopoly of religious surveillance, while some aspects of it might flourish outside of such as "folk Islam".

On the contrary industrialized societies, due to changes in the distributive system and the spreading of secular thought facilitate a higher participation of social groups in social and political issues. Such a system is characterized by a combination of religious pluralism and loss of religious control.

The purpose of this paper is to indicate the dimensions of the newly emerged religious pluralism in Turkey, to determine the major factors which lead to this multifaceted development and to establish a relationship between the various types of clientele of religious associations and status groups.

Before dealing with the empirical data however a short comparison between organized religion in Christianity and Islam as well as a historical evaluation of the concept secularism seems necessary for the better understanding of the matter raised.

Organized Religion in Christianity and Islam

In Christianity the Church after eliminating increasingly smaller congregations, tended to become more and more centralized and authoritarian. With time the Church became an integrating instrument of society, even a substitute for the state. Within Islam this development needed not to take place since the dual characteristic of church/state became evident from the very beginning on. More than any other medieval Islamic polity, the Turkish one headed by the Ottoman dynasty characterized that combination of temporal and religious attributes implied in the fusion of the words "Sultanate" and "Caliphate". In Turkish history, the concept of unity of state and religion (Din-ü-devlet) was applied through an imperial system, which gave unity and order to a great multiplicity of religious sects, profes-

^{3a} Charles Y. Glock and R. Stark *Religion and Society in Tension*, Rand Mc Nally, 1965, pp.242 - 59.

sions and social classes. However this system reflected a different understanding of the unity between religion and government than implied in the classical Islamic theory of Imamah, which simply meant, leadership of the community of believers.

Within the Christian Churches, the Reformation brought an institutional innovation, which produced intensive reflections on the individual level of behaviour and a strong personification of belief. The transition from feudalism not only caused the decay of a God-like state such as the Holy Roman Empire, but brought with the founding of national states also the possibility of highly differentiated church forms. Thus the emergence of capitalism led to the emancipation of traditionally bound groups and their social mobilisation. This tendency which stemming from a loss of tradition led to group pluralism was the major cause for the Church losing its central social privileged position. Since state and society were no more identical, church and society also had to part from each other. With the disappearance of state churches such as for inst. in Germany with the adoption of the Weimar Constitution in 1919, the Church retained rather an intermediary role. This evolution has produced, what F. Fürstenberg calls within the Christian Church, especially in regard of the Anglosaxon countries, the appearance of the "associational Church" (*Verbandskirche*).⁴

In Islamic countries developments took a quite different way. This latecomer among the major five universal religions, established itself unlike Christianity not with symbols of suffering, but with military conquest thus becoming a religion of triumph.

Islam wherever it took root, usually followed a two-sided process. On the one hand it has consisted of an effort to adapt a universal, in theory standardized, and essentially unchangeable, unusually well integrated system of ritual and belief to the realities of local, even individual, moral and metaphysical perception. On the other hand, it has consisted of a struggle to maintain in the face of this adaptive flexibility, the identity of Islam as the particular directives communicated by God to mankind by his prophet Muhammad.⁵

Due to its structural characteristics, Islam was first deeply linked with the Arab empire. Following its decline, one impor-

4 FÜRSTENBERG, Friedrich, Hrgb. *Religionssoziologie*, Neuwied + Berlin 1964, Luchterhand Verlag, S. 261.

5 GEERTS, Clifford, *Islam Observed*, Religious Development in Morocco and Indonesia, New Haven 1968, S. 14.

tant innovation attempted to modify the strictly legalized code of behaviour. This was Sufism, which in brief meant bringing orthodox Islam into effective relationship with the world. In the Middle East this seems mainly to have meant reconciling Arabian pantheism with Koranic legalism; in Indonesia restating Indian illuminationism in Arabic phrases; in West Africa, defining sacrifice, possession, exorcism and curing as Muslim rituals.⁶

But this attempt remained a mediaval experiment without consequences. The reinforcement of the dual character of the Ottoman empire retarded any kind of innovating process. Some sharp challenge from outside had to come in order to start any reconsideration of such a necessity.

According to W.C. Smith, the Turks, once European armies began to defeat theirs on the battlefield, did a quite remarkable thing.⁷ They set about asking within a spirit of stern realism what were the reasons of the weaknesses apparent. This marks the beginning of Turkish secularism.

Secularism in Turkey During the XIX and XX Centuries

Although recognizing the necessity of changing the Islamic mode of thinking can be traced as far as to 1718 in a document representing a record between a Muslim and an unnamed Christian officer.⁸ The first real breakthrough came with the intensive efforts of Mahmud II especially orientated toward the secularisation of higher military educational institutions. This was followed by a series of reforms, labelled under the Tanzimat movement. The charter of Gülhane, which was proclaimed in 1839 and guaranteed equal rights to all Ottoman subjects, irrespective of their religious affiliation gave shape to a policy of secularism in the sense of bringing forth a differentiation between the "temporal" and the "religious" in the Turkish-Islamic context. This might be considered as the starting point of the dichotomy between "orthodox" (official, elite) and "folk" Islam.⁹

6 GEERTZ, Clifford, *op. cit.*, S. 15.

7 SMITH, Wilfred Canwell, *Islam in Modern History*, Princeton University Press, 1957, S. 171.

8 BERKES, Niyazi, *Development of Secularism in Turkey*, S. 30.

9 ŞERİF A. MARDİN, *Religion as Ideology in Y. ABADAN'a Armağan*, Ankara, 1969 S.B.F. Yayını, S. 199.

But neither the quest for modernization through westernization, nor secularizing reforms through Turkist influence following the revolution of 1908 such as the elaboration of a new family code, the removing of the religious authority from legislation, etc. represented a real and complete separation of religion and state, such as it would have been anticipated within the framework of absolute secularism. All these attempts remained a series of compromises.

The relentless efforts of various intellectual groups and the main currents of ideas prior to the Turkish revolution, such as Pan-Ottomanism, Pan-Turanism, all carry one common trait: they are nothing more than compromises for retaining the traditional form of monarchy and caliphate, yet striving to achieve some degree of westernization.

It remained as a fundamental task for Atatürk to solve the role of religion in such a way as to eliminate theocracy definitely. By approaching religion through a rationalist point of view, Atatürk was able to eliminate Islam as a state religion from the Constitution in 1928 by amending Art. 2. After having experimented with certain attempts to transform Islam in a more viable form during the years 1923-33, the secularist efforts of the Turkish republic - realizing the futile results of such undertakings - concentrated their efforts on formalizing and legalizing all secularist moves. It was agreed upon that the religious question would become a matter of free discussion. It should be relinquished in the realm of the individual's conscience. The state itself would provide the most intensive efforts of education in order to equip the new generation with sounder and more rational ideas. Such was the situation in the 1930's when a well-known sociologist was writing "the most important factor in the secularisation of the state is the evolution of science, morals and law autonomously from the religious *doğmas*... The modern state should punish those who would exploit religious sentiments for mundane purpose..... democratic Turkey necessarily means a secular Turkey...."¹⁰

Together with these basic ideas, Kemalist secularism placed three important legal limitations upon religion. The first is exp-

10 SADAK, Necmeddin, *Sosyoloji*, Ankara, S. 94-97.

ressed in Art. 11 of the Law of Associations of 1938 and concerns the foundations of associations on the basis of sects and orders (mezhep ve tarikat). This meant the prohibition to form a society of Sunnis or Alevis or Ticani or Bektasi, but it did not limit the right to form religious societies of a non-sectarian and non-exclusive nature such as collecting funds for mosque building, religious literature and clerical education.¹¹ The much more comprehensive catalogue of fundamental rights of the new constitution of 1961¹² enlarged these possibilities; thus a mushrooming of all kinds of associations occurred among which the religious one achieved. Within a short period the most significant position.

The second restriction was the prohibition of political associations or parties seeking particularist religious support. Thus a Muslim Party or Pan-Islamic association was impermissible. This prohibition was also valid in regard of the regularly constituted political parties. Although the new Constitution of 1961 as well as the very detailed law for political parties reinforces these prohibitions, legally admitted deviations are encouraging today more than ever religious undertones in political action. While from 1932 until 1946 the single party of the Kemalist regime shunned from playing on religious sentiments and rather preferred to reformulate social and educational problems in a rather unifying way, especially after 1965 and more explicitly prior to the general elections of 1969 religious themes were rather strongly exploited, especially by the Union Party and the Justice Party.¹³

The third restriction concerned provisions of the Penal Code; Art. 169 of this Code, states that acts "contrary of the principle of secularism enunciated in the Constitution and aiming to adapt as the basic social or economic orders of the State, religious fundamentals and beliefs" provides punishment.

11 BERKES, Niyazi, op. cit., S. 498.

12 ABADAN, Yavuz, "Die türkische Verfassung von 1961", in *Jahrbuch des Öffentlichen Rechts der Gegenwart*, Neue Folge, Bd. 13, 1964, S. 362-364.

13 According W.F. WEIKER, the newly formed Unity Party (Birlik Partisi) is largely Alevi (Turkish branch of Shi'ites) with enough concentrated strength in north Central Anatolia to elect eight deputies so that the problems of the Alevis and Eastern Turkey in general will receive more vocal attention, W.F. WEIKER, "Turkey's Elections" May Nodel 11 s, *Mid East*, December 1969, P. 34.

Thus it clearly appears that until the advent of multiparty democracy, the major ambition of Turkish secularism after the proclamation of the Republic, much in contradiction to the compromising westernisation efforts of the late Ottoman empire-, was understood as the disassociation of the fundamental institutions of the state from religious principles. Religion was guaranteed freedom and protection so long as and in so far it was not utilized to promote any social or political ideology having institutional implications. Since however Turkish secularism lacks even today a doctrinal basis, the Kemalist approach was both attacked by chauvinist nationalists as well as pro-Islamists. From 1945 on the religious, national and civilizational principles of the secular régime were overwhelmed by a wave of reaction. The governments of 1950-60 as well as their successors, the Justice Party (A.P.) from 1965 on, were more than tolerant toward to all sorts of obscurantism.

Religious Pluralism Since 1960

The new Constitution of 1961 contains a very extensive catalogue of fundamental rights. One of its major goal was to set up the legal framework for a pluralistic society.¹⁴ With it came an astonishing proliferation of associations, a majority of them serving the extreme right parties and their ideology by supporting a vigilant anticommunism and undisguised preference for a return to the caliphate and theocracy.

These associations are, as it will be further on indicated-, most active on the field of building mosques and setting up Koran courses which compete with regular primary schools. All these efforts can also be interpreted as the reinforcement of the islamic self-sustaining community, the "cemaat".

The first systematic analysis of this religious renaissance, reveals astonishing trends. It becomes evident when locating the position of religious associations among all other associations of Turkey, the increase in absolute figures of religious associations in comparison to all other associational activities permits no comparison.

14 ESEN, Bülent, Nuri, *La Turquie*, Paris 1969, S. 160-161. Collection sous la direction de Georges Burdeau "Comment ils sont gouvernés".

TABLE 1
Distribution of Various Associations in Turkey

	1950		1960		1968	
		%		%		%
Religious	154	7.1	5104	29.7	10730	28.4
Social Welfare	208	9.6	635	3.6	1520	4.1
Sports	699	32.1	3376	19.6	5334	14.2
Foreign	75	3.5	218	1.3	290	0.7
Agriculture	49	2.3	272	1.5	683	1.8
Cultural	285	13.1	2511	14.6	6327	16.7
Labour	91	4.2	408	2.3	995	2.6
Others	36	1.6	230	1.3	668	1.7
Liberal Professions	53	2.3	189	1.1	259	0.8
Civil Service	166	7.7	665	3.8	2355	6.2
Small Businessmen	253	11.6	2745	16	3670	9.7
Local	102	4.7	853	5	4644	12.4
Employer	-	-	23	0.2	190	0.5

* All the figures in this and the following tables have been collected by Dr. Ahmet N. Yücekök as a part of his doctoral dissertation: "Türkiye'de Örgürlenmiş Dinin Sosyo-Ekonomik Tabanı", (The Socio-economic Basis of Organized Religion in Turkey), Sevinç Matbaası, Ankara, 1971.

Although the liberation and permissiveness by encouraging individual, local and regional initiative reveals itself significant in regard of cultural and sport associations, they still are far from having grown as fast as religious associations.

The term here covers both all associations dealing with mosque building as well as religious teaching. It is not exaggerated to state that the building of mosques by community initiative are almost parallel to the school building activity in the villages. Wellknown scholars such as Bernard Lewis, Kazamias qualify this development as "dramatic".¹⁵ They also agree that the persistence of traditional Islamic attitudes and values slows the pace of modernity. Since Islam from its structural set-up does not require the creation of a specially trained clerical staff, the spreading and reinforcement of religious associations are actually taking the place of decentralized Church in the Western meaning. This revival of course serves much less in regard of critical approach to social questions. Its major purpose becomes the obtaining of an other-worldly-orientated, submissive, fervent mass of believers.

In order to receive a better insight into this development the sequence followed in the course of the years should be carefully noticed. (Table 2)

Scrutinizing this table it becomes evident that in spite the relentless efforts to maintain secularism as an indestructable basic principle of the Turkish Republic, the transition toward a multiparty system and the extension of franchise and mobilisation of masses open the door to new ventures in the field of exploiting religious feelings and beliefs. This becomes even more serious in the case of Islam which represent not only a moral code and a rigid set of beliefs but also a way of life, which especially in the case of villagers is practically fused with their traditional mores.

Glancing over the years specific dates, so to speak "historical thresholds" are revealing themselves extremely interesting. The modest starting figures of 1946 are indices of the situation

15 LEWIS, Bernard, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, London 1961, P. 410; KAZAMIAS, A.M. *Education and Quest for Modernity in Turkey*, University of Chicago 1966, P. 190.

TABLE 2
Increase of Religious Associations in Turkey from 1946 to 1968

Year	Mosque Building associations	Associations dealing with various religious activities, mostly Koran teaching	Total amount of religions associations	Their percentage in all associations
1946	8	3	11	1.3
1947	23	4	27	2.5
1948	53	5	58	4.1
1949	88	7	95	5.5
1950	142	12	154	7.1
1951	226	25	251	10.0
1952	361	45	406	12.1
1953	538	60	598	13.6
1954	740	69	809	14.9
1955	1003	85	1088	15.8
1956	2199	98	2297	26.7
1957	2803	122	2925	28.9
1958	3483	156	3639	30.4
1959	4098	236	4334	31.9
1960	4821	283	5104	29.7
1961	4993	305	5298	28.6
1962	5220	384	5604	27.9
1963	5677	533	6210	28.2
1964	6133	668	6801	28.1
1965	6370	863	7233	27.1
1966	7259	1328	8587	27.7
1967	7856	1889	9745	28.2
1968	8419	2311	10730	28.4

prior to the "return to religion".¹⁶ At the end of this very year the CHP government decided to reintroduce Islamic instruction in the public schools, in 1948 secondary schools for the training of religious leaders (Imam Hatip okulları) were re-established with a six years course following the elementary schools.

In 1949 a Faculty of Divinity was opened at the University of Ankara. Starting from 1947 on Turks were given permission and currency to make a pilgrimage to Mekka, religious programmes on the state radio were instituted, the visitation of tombs of sultans and saints were permitted again. All these modifications, carried out by the same party, which under Atatürk's leadership most vigorously defended secularism in its widest sense, are reflected in the figures of the following years. But the real breakthrough comes with the landslide victory of the Democratic Party in 1950. The Moslem call to prayer was again read in Arabic, there was even relaxation in the wearing of religious costume. Accordingly both mosque building and organized religious activities suddenly doubled their coverage.

With the return to mystical and popular orders (tarikāt), "folk" Islam, designed by Ş.A. Mardin as a "soft" ideology, gets a reinforcement. Although some political scientists welcome the modification of strict secularism by interpreting this shift as a move from urban interest to rural interests,¹⁷ in reality the policy of using religion as a political vehicle for obtaining votes partly blocks the spreading of scientific and rational thought. It also is used by minority groups, whose interests are threatened, as a defensive ideology. All these developments can be traced through the figures prior to the military revolution in 1960.

16 For further and earlier sources see A.L. TIBAWI, "Islam and Secularism in Turkey Today", *Quarterly Review*, 609: 325-37 (1956); Howard A REED, "New Imam Hatip Schools", *Die Welt des Islams*, 4: 150-163 (1955) and "Revival of Islam in Secular Turkey", *The Middle East Journal*, Washington 8: 267-82 (1954); Lewis V. THOMAS, "Turkish Islam", *The Muslim World*, Hartford 44: 181-185 and "Recent Developments in Turkish Islam: "The Middle East Journal, Washington 6: 22-40 (1952) Bernard LEWIS, "Islamic Revival in Turkey", *International Affairs*, London 28: 38-48 (1952) and the important symposium published by Richard N. FRYE, *Islam and the West*, Gravenhagen, 1957 in which the most remarkable article is of Dankwart A. RUSTOW, "Politics and Islam in Turkey", 1920-55.

17 HUNTINGTON, Samuel P., *Political Order in Changing Societies*, New Haven, 1968, P. 543.

Where as religious activities came to a relative stillstand during the interim period, after the victory of Justice Party in 1965 the increase, both of mosque building and setting up of Koran courses, becomes stupifying. Further more in addition to government sponsored religious education, there has been a continuing purpose of initiative for the founding of associations with the flow of private setting up Koran courses. These centers very often serve as citadels against the fight for compulsory education. (Table 3)

Similarly to those in the second table, the figures of Table 3 reveal a rather reluctant and cautious start, way back in the 1950's, which increased its volume toward the end of the Menderes era. It then stagnated during the first two years following the Revolution of 1960, but gained weight with the emergence of the first coalition government. After the important electoral gains of the Justice Party in 1965, the amount of schools for religious personnel registered incredible high increase, in spite of of the opposite recommendations of the second Five Year Plan. There is only one plausible explanation for this process: to obtain through the liberalisation of religion successful political slogans for vote getting.

Another important recent development in this regard is the equation of graduates of this type of schools, where the curricula is heavily imbued with non-scientific, rigidly formulated theological material, with all other lycee graduates, thus opening the door to the university entrance examinations. The political impact of this evolution can be traced down to the introduction of heavily dogmatically indoctrinated anti-secular students.

Already during the Democratic Party government there were many ugly elements in the political exploitation of religious conservatism. As Kemal H. Karpat states quite correctly, secularism in Turkey, despite its limited success in the cultural field, had partly achieved, by the end of the second World War one of its major political objectives. People in general realized and accepted the fact that lay matters could be conducted better and more profitably by the government. With the entering into a competitive party system, the situation turned just the opposite way round: political parties continued seeking votes by promising additional religious freedom; governments were inclined to sacrifice secularism to maintain popularity; and politicians were

TABLE 3
Official and Private Sponsored Religious Educational Institutions.

Year	Secondary schools for religious leaders (Imam Hatip Okulu)	Voluntary associations initiating Koran courses
1950	-	237
1951	7	358
1952	7	492
1953	15	543
1954	16	649
1955	16	724
1956	17	805
1957	18	893
1958	19	997
1959	19	1117
1960	19	1196
1961	19	1330
1962	26	1548
1963	26	1748
1964	26	1869
1965	26	2327
1966	26	2462
1967	40	2510
1968	58	

ready to go to the extreme.¹⁸ Thus one observes that conservative and religious groups are out doing each other in attempting to undermine the modernist reforms and the regime itself.

In this regard one can say, that the increasing amount of *organized religious groups* are performing partly the function of strengthening conservative opposition centers.

Despite of some optimistic expectation on behalf of the reformist capacity of Turkish Islam¹⁹, the increasing participation of the masses at general elections produced a reinforcement of parochial orientation and peasant conservatism. The effect of religious pluralism can be traced down in this respect to a clearcut dichotomy:²⁰

a) In economically fast developing areas proliferation of religious associations are serving openly the obtainment of of staunch political resistance against deep entrenched economic changes such as the emergence of new industries, which inevitably leads to the erosion of small business and crafts. In these areas religious pluralism even touches upon discussions related to the existing political system. The membership carries a militant character.

b) In less developed areas, the same type of religious associations, founded mostly by representants of the landowning class as well as liberal professions, acts less outspoken; their endeavours lies mostly in the upholding of the "status quo".

In between these two types of economic development one can trace down areas with predominantly transitional character as far as industrialisation and urbanisation goes. Here the role of religious associations is mostly linked up with the preservation of conservative value systems and institutions.

The Role of Petit Bourgeois in Religious Activity

It must not be forgotten that Turkey is no longer the Turkey of 1950's. Development through foreign capital, the corner-

18 Kemal H. KARPAT, *Turkey's Politics, The Transition to a Multiparty System*, Princeton, 1959, P. 289.

19 GARDET, L., *La Cité Musulmane*, Paris, Vrin 1953, P. 26.

20 YÜCEKÖK, Ahmet, Naki, *Türkiye'de Örgütlenmiş Din'in Sosyo-Ekonomik Tabanı* S.B.F. yayını Ankara, 1971. Sevinç Matbaası

stone of J.P.'s economic philosophy, has created a large number of small industrial units. These units of which the majority were assembly industry have strengthened the industrial bourgeoisie within the frame of the coalition of dominant classes and crushed the dominance of the land and small trade bourgeoisie. It becomes clear that the latter classes will not benefit from capitalist industrialization if we were to take into account the examples of the establishment of an aluminium factory forcing many copper workshops out of business and such large super markets as Gima and Tarko playing with the "daily bread" of petty bourgeoisie.

On the other hand, it is clear that large capital has started to crush small business. In 1963 the worth of production per workshop was 1, 131, 298 TL. In 1967 this sum has increased to 2,272,253 TL. Value-added of workshops employing more than ten workers has increased from 100 to 220 between 1963-1967. The common increase of value added of small and large scale production, on the other hand, has increased from 100 to 169 during the same period. Taking into consideration that in this average the place of large scale business was 220, it becomes clear that small business has gained very little under the J.P. rule.

A rapid development of the bourgeoisie was witnessed in 1950's. In this period there had never been a clash of interests between the big business and petty bourgeoisie. On the contrary they were in a power union. But developing industrialization has inevitably broken this coalition and the land bourgeoisie joined the rank of petty bourgeoisie against the big industrial and commercial bourgeoisie rightly realizing that industrialization could only be realized at their expense. Consequently, this coalition of dominant classes is now undergoing rapid disintegration. The first symptom of this process was the so-called 41's voting against the budget within the J.P. And the fundamental reason for this uneasiness within the ranks of the J.P. is the revolt of the petty bourgeoisie against finance capital's crushing dominance.

The revolt of the petit bourgeois against rapid capitalist expansion is not carried out solely within the democratic framework of the Turkish political process. A minority within the petit bourgeoisie until recently were openly in favor of the strict and

static economic and social principles of Islam to be used as the political ideology of the Turkish state. The political role of the MNP (National Order Party) which was closed by the constitutional court shortly after the military intervention of 12 th March 1971 was to raise and organize militants for the oncoming Islamic order under the leadership of a part of the petit bourgeoisie, who were ardent defenders of "Allah's justice against the diabolical capitalist expansion as well as the infidel left."

In 1970's the close relation between the petit bourgeoisie and the Islamic movement can be traced by looking at the correlation of religious and small business men associations in developed provinces of Turkey. In those developed provinces the small tradesman, shopkeepers and handicraft people are highly organised in various numbers of associations. At the same time those developed provinces, where small businessmen associations are powerfully organised, are the provinces with the highest number of religious associations. (Table 4)

As we can see from Table 4, in 1968 Ankara, Balıkesir, Bursa, Çanakkale, Denizli, Edirne, Eskişehir, İçel, Isparta, İzmir, Kayseri, Kırklareli, Kocaeli, Konya, Manisa, Sakarya, Samsun and Zonguldak are the most developed Turkish provinces with the highest ratio of religious and small businessmen associations. These provinces are well above the national average of 4295 people per religious and 13459 people per small businessmen association. This close relation between the religious and petit bourgeois associations in developed provinces with expansionist economies may be a strong indicator that the status loosing small business constitutes an important role in the development of religious activity.

To strengthen the assumption and the typology presented one can give an example concerning Kocaeli, one of the most developed and differentiated provinces of Turkey. (Table 5)

As one can see, the founders of religious associations whose aim is to spread the ideology of Islam, come 82 % from the background of petit bourgeois professions such as small businessmen, small farmers, small civil servants and religious personnel, who hold a low clerical position within the state bureaucracy.

TABLE 4
Religious and Small Businessmen Associations in Developed Provinces (1968)

Developed Provinces	Number of people per Religious Association in the province. National average (4295)	Number of people per business- men association in the province. National average (13459)
Adana	4877	6226
Ankara	3476	8888
Aydın	4886*	6730
Balıkesir	2180	4118
Bursa	2718	5139
Çanakkale	2551	7962
Denizli	1723	9859
Edirne	2757	4813
Eskişehir	2611	7547
Gaziantep	5110*	6012
İçel	3007	10225
İsparta	1799	5433
İstanbul	14704*	8020
İzmir	3478	5797
Kayseri	1719	10514
Kırklareli	2151	6800
Kocaeli	1518	5991
Konya	1346	9355
Manisa	2182	6398
Sakarya	1897	7347
Samsun	2537	8689
Zonguldak	2454	8027

* Those provinces are below the national average.

TABLE 5
Religious Associations Other Than Mosque Building Associations in Kocaeli, 1968)

	Professional backgrounds of founders					
	Small Tradesmen and Handicraft people	Liberal Professions	Religious Personnel	Small Farmer	Labourer	Small Civil Servants
Persons	135	11	59	84	38	18
%	39	3	17	21	11	5

Adana, Aydın, Gaziantep and İstanbul according to Table 4 seems to fall out of this typology. Those four provinces, especially İstanbul, have highly developed and socially differentiated social and economic structures but at the same time, although they have a large number of strong small businessmen associations, unlike other developed provinces, they are very poor in respect of religious associations.

The main reason for the weakness of organised religion can be the different nature of small business in those provinces. As we have assumed, small business, when it was under the heavy stress of capitalist development and started to loose its social and economic status, a part of this petit bourgeoisie had no option but to fight against rapidly social change. In doing this, they used the static economic and social dogmas of Islam in order to keep society at a traditional level to prolong their economic and social interests. But in those four provinces, especially in İstanbul the small business people suffer no harm from capitalist expansion. Because instead of being crushed by the process of modernization as it happens in other developed provinces, the small business people here, can renew their professions in a changing society that can offer them new lives, opportunities and trades. So the element of bitter, economically crushed petit bourgeois we find in other developed provinces that constitute the backbone of the religious crusade against modernization cannot be traced in those four developed provinces of Turkey. (Table 6)

In Table 6 we see the underdeveloped provinces of Turkey and the density of religious and small businessmen associations in those provinces. In most of those provinces both religious and petit bourgeois associations are very much below the national average level. This is mainly the result of the undifferentiated, traditional and underdeveloped society. In provinces where modernization process is so low it is neither possible to find reactionary religious associations nor their originators and defenders, the embittered petit bourgeoisie. As the lack of division of labour, and a static society permits no associational activity it is no suprise in provinces like Adıyaman, Bingöl, Diyarbakır, Hakkari, Mardin, Tunceli, Urfa and Van that the associational process should be so weak.

TABLE 6
Religious and Small Businessmen Associations in Underdeveloped Provinces (1968)

Underdeveloped Provinces	Number of People per Religious Association in the Province (National average 4295)	Number of people per Small Businessmen Association in the Province (National average 13459)
Adıyaman	12149	14368
Afyon	1714*	8659*
Artvin	1945*	16159
Ağrı	14594	17823
Bingöl	6021	50174
Bolu	2064*	7528*
Bitlis	8018	38517
Çankırı	1331*	6776*
Çorum	3153*	11007*
Diyarbakır	10126	14422
Elazığ	4990	15368
Erzurum	2921*	10552*
Giresun	4920	30573
Gümüşhane	2246*	10511*
Hakkâri	13990	83937
Kastamonu	1929*	7123*
Kırşehir	3407*	49209
Mardin	28420	23405
Muş	5520	22080
Nevşehir	1203*	7530*
Tunceli	14283	25696
Urfa	10733	14802
Van	17848	19060
Yozgat	2406*	9317*

* Provinces above the national average.

But the ratio of religious and small businessmen associations in some of those underdeveloped provinces are above the national average for religious and small businessmen associations. But this is something quite different than the typology drawn for the developed provinces where reactionary religious activity is assumed to be fed by the reactionary petit bourgeoisie. Because most of the religious associations in those underdeveloped provinces are the mosque building associations which are quite distinct from the religious associations we find mostly in developed provinces, whose aims are the spread of Islamic thought and ideology. We can see this clearly by looking at Table 7.

In those underdeveloped provinces with mainly rural structures and poor populations the presence of mosque building associations in vast numbers are due to the fact that those provinces have very many villages where at least the building of one mosque is essential and also that the poor villagers can afford to build a mosque only when they gather their means within the legal structure of an association.

In other words the underdeveloped provinces with religious associations above the national average do not owe this situation to the reactionary petit bourgeoisie that we find in developed and modernising provinces of Turkey, but rather to a social need that has nothing against capitalist expansion.

Conclusion

Kemalism managed to solve legal aspect of state religion by abolishing theocracy and taking religion under control. As a "Weltanschauung" it did not espouse an open anti-Islamic approach. It endeavoured to modify religion in such a way as to able Islam to answer contemporary problems in a rational way. When it became evident, that this attempt was doomed to failure, Kemalism preferred to ignore the religious issues and push it in the sphere of the individual conscience.

Since however Turkey's social structure did not undergo a speedy industrialization, both folk religion and some of the legally abolished orders retained all their vitality. They were held under tutelage during the one-party period, but regained their strength after the transition to multiparty politics.²¹

21 İlhan ARSEL, Ortaçağ'a dönüş. *Cumhuriyet*, 16.7.1970.

TABLE 7

Distribution of Religious Associations in Underdeveloped Provinces. (1968)

Provinces	Total Amount of Religious Associations	Number of Mosque Building Associations	Percentage of Mosque Building Associations
Afyon	293	242	83%
Artvin	128	89	70%
Bolu	186	132	66%
Çankırı	191	162	85%
Çorum	154	121	79%
Erzurum	215	186	87%
Gümüşhane	117	98	84%
Kastamonu	229	200	89%
Kırşehir	56	40	72%
Nevşehir	169	143	85%
Yozgat	182	154	85%

Islamic revival in Turkey nowadays is not solely confined to blocked and predetermined voting patterns. It seeks its political solution beyond local options too. Dissidents inside and outside the government party, critical towards international collaboration, foreign investment, etc. are producing political leaders seeking the elimination of secularism from the constitution.²² A wellknown Turkish professor of economics, Sabahattin Zaim, stated at a lecture in İzmir, where the speaker was received with religious chants as follows: "The entrance of Turkey in the Common Market is contradictory to the structure of Turkish-Islamic society, to Turkish nationalism and economic development".²³

As S.P. Huntington rightly points out, political modernization involves 1) rationalization of authority, 2) the differentiation of structure and 3) the expansion of political participation. In many developing countries intensified electoral competition brings with it the tendency of devolution of power. Local forces become strong, parochial orientation tends to be decisive. Thus pluralism operates by pushing traditional forces in new frame of references.

This tendency is reinforced by an inherent element of Islam in society. Just to the contrary of the West, where legitimate corporate entities with autonomous political power were able to create a sense of belonging, this was not possible within the highly centralized Ottoman empire. Thus the "cemaat" feeling among Moslems served functionally speaking as an intermediary instrument for social intercourse.

But as development and modernisation changed Turkish society and as national goals took an important place in politics, this distinctive feature lost its importance. It regained it however immediately when political participation grew, social organisations mushroomed all over the country, grassroot politics spread and political priorities were rather assigned on the basis of parochial interests.

On the whole, looking at this growing pluralism and religious associations among Turkish provinces we may forward two

22 At the anti-communist meeting in Ankara, organized by the Tradesmen and Artisans Guild July 1970, transparencies and posters carried "Moslem Turkey", "God is with us", "The cause of all evils is the Constitution", *Cumhuriyet*, 17.7.1970.

23 *Cumhuriyet*, 13.4.1970.

main hypothesis and say that the religious movements in Turkey are the products of two distinct socio-economic sources:

a) In the developed parts of Turkey, the Islamic religion is the "status-quo ante" ideology of a part of the petit bourgeoisie, directed against the capitalist development and expansion.

b) Islamic religion in the underdeveloped parts of Turkey is a "Conservative" ideology in the hands of the classes that benefit from underdevelopment.

Both of these "hypothesis" are based on empirical data and also confirmed by a field research.²⁴

It has been made clear by empirical evidence that most of the religious associations are located in provinces which have benefited most from capitalist development. It has also been shown by empirical evidence that most of the founders of those associations come from a petit-bourgeois background. In a modernizing society it is understandable that some of the petit bourgeois elements could no longer hold the position to compete with the flourishing industrial and commercial bourgeois. The loss of status and income have influenced some of those petit-bourgeois elements to search the reasons for their social and economic deprivations in a socio-economic system that has created contrary values and principles to Islam. The static economic and legal principles of Islam are identical with the economic and social interests of these classes and to bring them back will open the way to the good old days, as it will completely destroy the capitalist expansion and its sinful value system.

In short, the Turkish Islamic crusaders of 1970's are a section of the petite-bourgeois, who are trying to freeze a swiftly changing society with a static religious ideology and in this sense it can be claimed that they are in full realization of their economic interests as the "frozen" society will only help to secure their benefits. As they are trying to change a society that has covered a lot of way in a capitalist frame of development, their political and economical aims in bringing back the Islamic order can only be labelled as to be "Status-quo ante".

It was stated that in the underdeveloped regions of Turkey the associations, including the religious ones were very few in num-

24 Yücekök, *Op. Cit.* P. 193 - 229.

bers. This explains the reason why the religious activity in those parts are run through the institutions of "Tarikat", and "Şeyhs". In a society where the division of labour is minimal and the social and economic life is under the stress of primitive modes of production, the institutions of "Tarikat" and "Şeyh" serve for the citizens as the only buffer that exists between themselves and the state. In other words these institutions, in a non-pluralistic society, are the only places where people can seek homage. The loyalty to the institutions, which are the results of underdevelopment, prolongs and conserves the state of underdevelopment. For this reason the "Şeyhs" and the big land owners can make full use of this "loyalty" and use Islamic religion as a means to protect their social and economic interests. In this sense Islam in underdeveloped parts of Turkey is a "Conservative" ideology, protecting the static state of society.²⁵

One can firmly believe that Turkey cannot solve the problem of religious activity only by means of applying the strict principles of laicism. Only when Turkey reaches the state of a modern industrial society with everybody having secure jobs and tomorrow, religion then will cease to be an important social and political problem and will take its natural and real place only in the consciences of the people.

25 Jacob M. Landau, while stressing that the rural areas remain to be the fortress of Islamic sentiment in Turkey, attempts not to analyze the spreading of religious organizations according structural differences. He focusses more upon the political program of various sects as well as about the spheres of influence of the meanwhile abolished Party of National Order. For further information see: Jacob M. Landau, *Political Involvement of Religious Groups in Modern Turkey, Some Observations*, Report submitted to the Meeting of Islamologists, Sweden, August 1972 (unpublished).