

THE ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR: 1945—1949

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I. A MYTH TO CONCEAL THE OPEN DOOR POLICY

All wars create myths, which in turn perpetuate and renew them. The "Cold War" is also dominated by such legends, employed to justify the plans to overwhelm the undeveloped areas in the name of freedom and to invent conflicts in the name of peace.

The U.S. interpretation of the Cold War can be found in many speeches, statements and documents. This interpretation, which is actually an attempt to justify the American course of action, can best be seen in the former President John F. Kennedy's speech on October 22, 1962, or in Adlai Stevenson's address to the U.N. on October 23, 1962.¹ In their view, the Soviet Union was solely responsible for the dimmed hopes of peace since the end of the Second World War. The majority of the Americans -and until recently most Turks- believed in the truth of the version of the Cold War. It was erroneously asserted that the Soviet military power would have overrun the defenseless Western Europe had it not been for the timeliness of the Truman Doctrine, the generosity of the Marshall Plan and the toughness of NATO. As Prof. A.J.P. Taylor noted in 1966, "the detailed records... destroy the accepted legend completely. They show perhaps almost too emphatically that the Cold War was deliberately started by Truman and his advisers."² For decades, U.S. (and Western) policy has operated in a labyrinth of misconceptions. We have reached the time to reevaluate the costs of the illusions of the Cold War, and to search for the party to blame for this long and deceiving venture. What is interesting about the Western-created myths was that very few responsible

1 *Keessing's Contemporary Archives: 1961-1962*, pp. 19060-19065.

2 David Horowitz, *From Yalta to Vietnam*, Middlesex, Penguin, 1967, s.21.

Americans really believed them when they were conceived. This point is well illustrated by quite a number of Western historians and public figures. D.F.Fleming,³ William A. Williams,⁴ David Horowitz,⁵ Gar Alperovitz⁶ and John Lukacs⁷ argue that there was no Soviet threat to Western Europe after 1945. In the words of Elliot Roosevelt, it seems that "it was the U.S. and Great Britain who *first* shook the mailed fist."⁸ As historian Toynbee noted, America was "the leader of world-wide anti-revolutionary movement in defence of vested interests. She now stands for what Rome stood for. Rome consistently supported the rich against the poor in all foreign communities that fell under her sway; and, since the poor, so far, have always and everywhere been far more numerous than the rich, Rome's policy made for inequality, for injustice, and for the least happiness of the greatest number. America's decision to adopt Rome's role has been deliberate."⁹

However, the U.S. pretended that the world's difficulties were due to the Soviet Union, and its "agents" or "fellow travellers." It seldom considered whether or not most of it was its own Open Door Policy. It has to be realized that the conflict between the U.S. and the Soviet Union is not one between good and evil. A cardinal truth of our century is that American leadership is still enhancing the traditional objective of the 1890's.¹⁰ We know that there was a time in American history when expansion and imperialism were freely expounded and debated.

3 D.F. Fleming, *The Cold War and Its Origins: 1917-1960*, 2 Vols., New York, Doubleday, 1961.

4 William A. Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, New York, Delta, 1962.

5 Horowitz, *op. cit.*; ———, *The Free World Colossus: a Critique of American Foreign Policy in the Cold War*, New York, Hill and Wang, 1965.

6 Gar Alperovitz, *Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam*, New York, Simon and Schuster, 1965.

7 John Lukacs, *A History of the Cold War*, New York, Doubleday, 1961.

8 Horowitz, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

9 Arnold J. Toynbee, *America and the World Revolution*, London, Oxford University Press, 1963, pp. 16-17.

10 For a study on the great turning point of expansion in the 1890's, the conditions under which the United States became a World Power and the ramifications of that great leap forward, see: Türkaya Ataöv, "The Origins of U.S. Expansion," *Milletlerarası Münasebetler Türk Yılığ* (*The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations*): 1965, Ankara, Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, 1968, pp. 16-67.

The home market fallacy had disappeared with the inadequacy of the home market. For decades nothing satisfied the U.S. but free access to foreign markets. Expansion overseas was thought of as the solution to the recurring economic crises. Production had increased so enormously that new markets were needed to dispose of the surplus. The Open Door Policy has enabled the U.S. to "stabilize" the world in favor of the American metropolis and establish a new empire. American economic, political and finally military influence dominated the places forcibly evacuated by the British, French and the Dutch. Since the 1890's, it was thought that America's overwhelming economic power would mould the weaker countries in a pro-American pattern. American power had become supreme in many undeveloped regions and even in some developed areas within a few decades. A generation ago the "moral" of expansion was to save "the heathens of Hawaii. Now it was to prevent "the infidels of the Kremlin" from overrunning the poor countries, which were in Secretary of Commerce Henry A. Wallace's frank words, "unlimited new frontiers of opportunities."¹¹

Expansion, certainly, had to be integrated into a doctrine or a set of responsibilities; it had to be tied to an "American duty" or a "free world ideology." The "duty" comprised the re-making of the "aided" country, to make it strong enough to resist the common foe. In actuality, economic expansion required that the tradition-bound undeveloped countries be reorganized to function as a supporting unit of modern industry. Stripped of all rhetoric, the "modernization" of the undeveloped country really meant ability to buy more and more industrial goods. A well-functioning economic imperialism needed certain limited changes. U.S. Administrations have so far seen the vital interconnection between economic expansion and "reforms" in friendly countries. Likewise, Turkey knows from its own Ottoman history that certain reforms were imposed from without to create favorable conditions for exploitation by a stronger industrialized power, and that such limited reforms were drafted by foreign representatives to ensure security of property and "equality" of opportunity to trade. The protection of all religions, exemptions from certain taxes and precautions to repress "subversive" ac-

11 Williams, *op. cit.*, p. 237.

tivities are parts of these changes which are initiated by all expanding U.S. Administrations, including that of Theodore Roosevelt, but they all knew to stop when most favourable to American interests. Woodrow Wilson, too, was praised in 1914, as a man who had "opened the doors of all the weaker countries to an invasion of American capital and American enterprise."¹² Wilson's reluctance to abide by the choice of American firms which favored Victoriano Huerta in Mexico falls rather short of the ideal it pretends to symbolize when it is considered that Huerta wanted to open Mexico to other foreign powers, notably Germany, as well. For Wilson, Germany was the most dangerous rival in economic competition and drive to seize foreign markets. His Third of the Fourteen Points, calling for the abandonment of all economic barriers, was based on the expectation of dominating economic life once the protective measures of other countries were upheld. Likewise, when the U.S. Government turned to the idea of international financial agencies or consortia (initially for the Far East and later for the other regions as well), this did not mean that the American business world and the political circles abandoned the Open Door strategy; it merely hoped to overwhelm such arrangements. The reorganization loans or the small development loans, all seemed economic expansion. Wilson's understanding of democracy, as he expounded it after the First World War, reflected the liberal conception of society, composed of individuals acting in their own self-interest, with the profit motive creating the maximum benefit for all. The liberal state pursues expansion and rules over others in one way or another. Thus, the Open Door Policy was the American version of imperialism. Had Wilson been successful in bringing the U.S. into the League of Nations, this international organization as well would have been effectively utilized to preserve peace through such a classical competition. The League would enforce the rules of the liberal state at a higher, international level.

One nightmare that destroyed this cheerful image was the Bolshevik Revolution. Although it had given impetus to many other feelings of revolt, one may assume that there would have been changes even if the Bolsheviks had never come to power in Russia. But America was opposed to all changes, except those

12 *Ibid.*, p. 62.

it had itself sanctioned to remove handicaps for business enterprise, and therefore identified all discontent and revolt with the Bolshevik Revolution. There had been radical changes from Turkey to China, and the imperialist countries tried in vain to frustrate various kinds of revolutionary ferment. It was the same with the U.S. It, too, tried to meet the wave of fundamental awakenings with the old strategy of Open-Door expansion to preserve the American way of life and prosperity. Therefore, the conflict between President Wilson and Senator Lodge was basically on how to preserve and enhance American supremacy in an age of sweeping changes in the form of uprisings, revolutions, coups d'état and counter-revolutions. In spite of scholarly-devised and prize-winning efforts to prove that the U.S. did not intervene in Russia to unseat the Bolsheviks¹³, the U.S. employed men, guns and economic measures to support the anti-Bolsheviks in Russia.¹⁴ The "idealist" Wilson denied the much-needed food to the Hungarian people as long as Bela Kun was in power. Senators R.M. La Follette and William E. Borah and Representative Fiorello La Guardia were opposed to the dollar diplomacy, which in La Follette's words had "reduced our State Department... into a trading outpost for Wall Street interests."¹⁵ If the American Open Door Policy supporters did not employ force as a *sine qua non*, it was because their expansionist objectives could be attained without recourse to war, not that they were pacifists by any means. The U.S. simply wanted a system based upon the Open Door Policy and sanctioned by the other leading capitalist states as well. They would all then join hands in opposing all national changes, which in the opinion of the U.S., were instigated by the "base of the world revolution," the Soviet Union. Likewise, they could also arrest the development of the non-industrialized societies. The United States was all-powerful to lead this whole scheme of economic domination.

13 George F. Kennan, *Soviet-American Relations: 1917-1920*, 2 Vols., Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1956; 1958.

14 Williams, *op. cit.*, p. 121. For the "anti-empire" views of Senator William E. Borah, see: R. Ferrell, *Peace in Their Time*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1957; M.C. McKenna, *Borah*, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1961; O.S. Pinckney, "William E. Borah: Critique of American Foreign Policy," *Studies on the Left* (1960).

15 Williams, *op. cit.*, p. 121.

Harding, Coolidge and Hoover were all bent on conquering the world economy to prevent social upheavals at home. Labour was told that they had great areas of mutual interest with capitalism, and that labour and capital were not classes-but something else. Labour was expected to support overseas expansion, just as it had done during the Spanish-American War or intervention in Mexico.

As to the Soviet Union, Hoover hoped to take the lead in the "reconstruction of Russia when the proper moment arrives."¹⁶ He hoped to install "American technology in Russian industries." These were his written remarks to Secretary Hughes at the end of 1921. The Fordney-McCumber Tariff Act of September 19, 1922¹⁷, which represented a clear-cut victory for the Farm-Bloc and provided protection for the rapidly increasing chemical industry from the competition of the German dye trust, was in fact much more than just a protection of some American manufactures; more importantly, its Section 317 specified that the principle of Open Door was to be written into all the agreements made with the foreign states.

Furthermore, U.S. eagerness to keep Germany away from leftist development was instrumental behind the Dawes and Young plans of 1924 and 1929. Trying to help Germany recover mainly as a bulwark against possible leftist leanings, Hughes had tied the reduction of Allied debts to the United States to a similar cut in Germany's reparations to Britain and France. Likewise, the U.S. supported the Locarno Pact of 1925, which guaranteed Germany's western boundaries, leaving the eastern ones facing the Soviet Union intact. It was this state of affairs that was conducive to U.S. loans to Germany. American economy and influence was felt in the Eastern European countries, who were reminded of the virtues of the Open Door Policy, in the event of restrictive legislation or competition from Britain, France, or Germany. If the Dawes and the Young plans as well as the Locarno Pact, in fact, represented the combined interests of the industrialized capitalist countries in the Atlantic area, the Four- and Nine- Power Treaties signed in

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 138.

¹⁷ Arthur Cecil Bining, *The Rise of American Economic Life*, 3rd ed., New York, Scribner's, 1955, pp. 584-585.

Washington in 1922 meant the implementation of the same policy for Asia. In Washington, the parties agreed to a balanced naval power in the Pacific as well as to an Open Door Policy. No matter what the percentages of battleships might be, the U.S. hoped to control life in the Pacific in the long run. American predominance in China and elsewhere would be established through the rewarded cooperation of conservative elements in the countries in question. In Latin America, the Middle East and Africa, the U.S. was applying the same policy of exporting American finished products, controlling raw materials and expanding private investments. The Western Hemisphere was a laboratory for future U.S. action in respect to undeveloped areas all over the world. American Marines entered Honduras in 1924 and Nicaragua in 1926. Lawyers and businessmen, close to corporate interests, roamed from one capital to another to keep these states as "good neighbours" as possible.

Hoover, who had reorganized the U.S. Department of Commerce to suit the policy of economic expansion much better, faced depression, not as a result of his failures, but of a general crisis of American and world capitalism. After all, in spite of the banking legislation and gold, silver and relief policy, the New Deal itself has failed to create prosperity until the big armament order of 1940. F.D. Roosevelt relied on overseas expansion as certainly as any of his predecessors.

Even the reason for the long over-due recognition of the Soviet Union in 1933 was not just to exert indirect pressure on an expansionist Japan or to counter-balance the renascent Germany, but the result of the persistence of business interests to enlarge U.S. export of goods and capital. In contrast to the long ensuing period between 1917 and 1933 in the case of recognition of the Soviet régime, it will be remembered that when Franco captured Madrid on March 28, 1939, it took the United States only two days to recognize his government.

Recovery from depression was to be affected mainly in the traditional way, namely, expanding penetration into undeveloped markets and competition with the developed ones. The failure to enlarge the Latin American market and develop others would increase surpluses and unemployment. American statesmen and businessmen were pursuing the same analysis made

in the 1890's. The American unofficial empire was being broadened at the expense of the undeveloped areas, which opened their doors wider to American exports, at the same time strengthening the position of the not-so-democratic pro-American groups in those poor countries, whose personal profits mounted as the internal economy remained an appendage of the wealthy foreign metropolis. The New Deal policy of subtle expansion had helped to further reinforce the conservative and reactionary elements in the undeveloped regions. Overseas economic, and consequently political, expansion was believed to be essential for the continuation of the American system and prosperity. If this entailed the arrest of development or modernization elsewhere, so be it—let them lose control of their economies. Mexico's attempt to control American business on Mexican soil began to worry American statesmen for fear of imitation in the other Latin American countries that were pumping raw materials and wealth into the United States.

It was the threat to the same Open Door Policy, coupled with the Depression and the increasing expansion of others, that had led to America's entry into the Second World War. Although it was Japan that dragged the United States into armed hostilities after the Pearl Harbor attack, many responsible and influential Americans had concluded on the need to enter the war, after first trying to compromise with the Axis. As Hull's political adviser Stanley K. Hornbeck put it, "our people and our Government had, from the very beginning of their national life, asserted that in the commercial relations of sovereign states there should *not* be a 'closed door' anywhere."¹⁸ Not only was Japan trying to dominate China, long in the U.S. sphere of influence, but also Germany was becoming a competitor in Latin America. The fascist régimes, which had not met much opposition from the U.S., were fast becoming rivals. Men representing large corporations—Averell Harriman, Dean Acheson, Edward Stettinius, John Foster Dulles, Adolf A. Berle, Jr., James Forrestal, Donald M. Nelson—dominated Roosevelt's environment. To them, open-door expansion was a self-evident premise. In their view, the United States could not have prosperity with-

¹⁸ Paul W. Schroeder, *The Axis Alliance and Japanese-American Relations: 1941*, Ithaca, New York, Cornell University Press for the American Historical Association, 1963, p. 170.

out free access to foreign markets. To doubt the validity of this statement was improper and erroneous, the doubter classified as "maladjusted."

The Open Door strategy had been rewarding for such a long time. It was reasserted at the end of the Second World War. Even during the war, Dr. Virgil Jordan, the President of the National Industrial Conference Board, said on December 10, 1940:

"Whatever the outcome of the war, America has embarked upon a career of imperialism, both in world affairs and in every aspect of her life... Even though, by our aid, England should emerge from this struggle without defeat, she will be so impoverished economically and crippled in prestige that it is improbable she will be able to resume or maintain the dominant position in world affairs which she has occupied so long. At best, England will become a junior partner in a new Anglo-Saxon imperialism, in which the economic resources and the military and naval strength of the United States will be the center of gravity."¹⁹

Similarly, Dean Acheson had uttered: "...We cannot have full employment and prosperity in the United States without the foreign markets."²⁰

II. THE WAR: U.S.S.R. FACING GERMANY

Many roots of the Cold War, of course, lie in the war years²¹. First of all, the European war was really a Soviet-German struggle. American and British action took place on the periphery only. It was in the summer of 1944 that strategic bombing of German "industry and scientific structure"²² had significant effect. Britain lacked modern bombers and long-range fighter protection and the German air defence system was strong throughout 1941-1943. German war munitions grew and oil production increased. British and American success much later in the air could not have affected the outcome of the war, which was decided on the Eastern Front. The R.A.F.'s contribution had been

¹⁹ *The Monthly Review*, New York, Vol. XVIII, No. 6 (November 1966), p. 9.

²⁰ Williams, *op. cit.*, p. 203.

²¹ John Bagguley, "The World War and the Cold War," David Horowitz, ed., *Containment and Revolution*, London, Anthony Blond, 1967, pp. 76-124.

²² Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War: Vol II, Their Finest Hour*, London, pp. 405-406.

too late, representing nothing much more than the finishing touches.

Also rather late had been the opening of the second front in Europe. While the Soviet Union was left to cope with the mighty German war machine, Roosevelt and Churchill were agreeing on the Atlantic Charter, which called, among other things, for the forcible disarmament of those nations that had threatened the peace. Such disarmament, however, was to be carried out by the United States and Britain –with no mention of the Soviet Union. Apparently, not much role was to be bestowed upon the Soviet Union after the war.

The Allied landing in Africa in December 1942 had prevented a major second front in Europe. Eisenhower, in charge of the North African and European commands, believed that a new front in Africa would delay the crossing of the Channel and would not assist the Soviets “in time to save them.”²³ General Marshall and Admiral King threatened to resign;²⁴ the landings in Northern Africa would mean failure to act in Europe and honour commitment to the Soviet Union. Militarily speaking, victory over the Axis in Africa would inflict no fatal blow on the enemy. The Allied presence only in Africa, however, would persuade the Germans to divert some of their divisions from the West to the Eastern Front. What is more, the equipment necessary for this newly-opened theatre was far below what could be demanded for France. Hence, war production was reduced. The political decision to postpone the opening of a second front in Europe and the effects of limitation of armaments contributed to the straining of Soviet-Western relations. The opening of a second front in Europe had first been suggested by Litvinov on July 8, 1941, repeated by Molotov on May 29, 1942, on his visit to Washington, and Roosevelt had put his signature on a statement promising the creation of a “Second Front in Europe in 1942.”²⁵ Although Churchill, too, had assured Molotov that the plans for 1943 included the landing of a Western force on the Continent, this statement, which contra-

23 H.C. Butcher, *Three Years with Eisenhower*, London, 1946, p. 9.

24 Baggeley, *op. cit.*, p. 92.

25 Robert E. Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, Vol. II, New York, Bantam, 1950, p. 147.

dicts his argument that no such promise had been made in 1943, seems to have been removed from the American edition of Churchill's *The Hinge of Fate*.²⁶ Nevertheless, it was the Prime Minister again, who wrote the following to General Ismay on March 4, 1943: "I feel so very conscious of the poor contribution the British and American armies are making in only engaging perhaps a dozen German divisions during the greater part of this year while Stalin is facing 185."²⁷ From 1941 until the Normandy landings on June 6, 1944, Britain engaged only two-to-eight German divisions, while the Soviet Union resisted and repulsed about 185.

Moreover, neither the fall of Northern Africa, nor the other Axis ally, Italy, offered ideal bases for offensive. Nor did they offer strategic raw materials or industry. The conquest of Europe through the Alps was next to impossible. In Eisenhower's words: "The difficulty of attacking Germany through the mountainous areas on her southern and south-western flanks was obvious."²⁸ If the German armies in Italy had surrendered to the Allies, it was mainly on account of the general retreat of the bulk of the Nazi forces elsewhere, i.e. on the Soviet front. Even if the collapse of the Italian forces had occurred prior to Soviet victories, its contribution to the over-all result would have been almost insignificant. Thus, the little role that Britain and the United States were willing to play in the defeat of Germany on the Continent and the political decision to leave the defeat of the Axis on land mainly to the Soviet Union was bound to have a significant effect on the thinking of Soviet planners after the war.

Even the change of government in the former Axis partner Italy was far from being satisfactory. Mussolini's place was taken by one of his generals (Badoglio), who had conquered Ethiopia for the Fascist *Duce*. The Soviet Union was not asked to participate in the surrender talks. The Advisory Council, set up in Moscow in October at the meeting of the Foreign Minis-

²⁶ See: Trumbull Higgins, "The Hinge of Fate," *The New York Times*, October 21, 1950. Also see the bound American version of *The Hinge of Fate*, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1950, pp. 335-342. Also: *Winston Churchill and the Second Front: 1940-1943*, New York, 1957, p. 234.

²⁷ Churchill, *The Hinge of Fate*, *op. cit.*, p. 935.

²⁸ Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe*, London, 1948, p. 51.

ters and which included a Soviet representative had no powers, but the right to observe. The Allied Military Government, dominated solely by the Americans and the British and which had real authority, saw to it that Italy retain its monarchy for two more years, that it was headed by a right-wing government and that plans of the Committees of National Liberation were frustrated under Allied control. Although it would have been natural to expect some kind of a reformatory—or even a revolutionary—government with the fall of Fascism that had reigned since 1922, the Western occupation authorities prevented the discussion of even the question of the notorious monarchy. With such rather free acts of the two leading Western countries, the Soviet Union did not intervene; but sought to recognize the new government. Even more than that, Togliatti, returning from exile (Moscow), accepted the Western-chartered *status quo* and offered his support to the King and Badoglio.

The West was now concerned, however, that the practice employed in Italy might be a rehearsal for what was to come in Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Yugoslavia and Greece. To guarantee at least some of these countries for the Western sphere of influence, Churchill proposed to Stalin in Moscow in October, 1944 that the Soviet influence in Rumania be 90 % and in Yugoslavia 50 %. Greece was to be 90 % in the Western sphere of influence.²⁹ Averell Harriman was also present. When the British ordered the disbandment of the antifascist military organization ELAS, fought the resistance forces which had opposed the Germans, crushed EAM, which controlled almost all of the resistance forces, jailing and shooting its members, and reinforcing instead the National Guard with its Nazi-trained officers, the Soviet Union did not react in any way, Stalin apparently keeping his word.

And after Vyshinsky's well-known visit to King Michael on February 27 and the instalment of a new government on March 2, Churchill, although deeply disturbed, reasoned as follows: "If I pressed him too much he might say, 'I did not

29 Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War: Vol. VI, Triumph and Tragedy*, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1953, pp. 226–243; L. Woodward, *British Foreign Policy in the Second World War*, London, 1962, pp. 307–308; Sherwood, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 825–826; Cordell Hull, *Memoirs*, Vol. II, New York, Macmillan, 1948, pp. 1455–1458.

interfere with your action in Greece; why do you not give me the same latitude in Rumania?" This would lead to comparison between his aims and ours. Neither side would convince the other... I was sure it would be a mistake to embark on such an argument."³⁰ As to Soviet interest in Poland, the same statesman wrote: "Throughout history Poland had been a corridor through which Russia's enemies had passed to attack her. During the last thirty years, the Germans had twice passed through Poland. They passed through because Poland had been weak. Russia wanted to see a strong and powerful Poland, so that she would be able to shut this corridor of her own strength. Russia could not shut it from the outside. It could only be shut from the inside by Poland herself, and it was for this reason that Poland must be free, independent and powerful. This was a matter of life and death for the Soviet State. Their policy differed greatly from that of the Czarist Government. The Czars had wanted to suppress and assimilate Poland. Soviet Russia had started a policy of friendship, and friendship moreover with an independent Poland. That was the whole basis of the Soviet attitude, namely, that they wanted to see Poland independent, free, and strong."³¹ The Yalta agreements were not wholly supported in the United States. Those who opposed them wished to keep Eastern and South-Eastern Europe within the Western sphere of influence.

The U.S. and British governments had also created the suspicion that they were conducting in Switzerland separate surrender terms with the Germans commanding the North Italian forces. On March 16, 1945, the Soviet People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs sent a letter to the U.S. Ambassador, which read as follows:

"...On March 12 last you informed me that the German General Wolff, and Dolmann and Simmer who were accompanying him, had arrived in Berne on March 9 to discuss with United States and British Army representatives the surrender of the German armed forces in Northern Italy... On the same day...I informed you that the Soviet Government had no objections to negotiations with General Wolff at Berne, provided Soviet officers representing the Soviet Military Command took part... Today, March 16, I am in receipt of a letter from you which shows that the United States Government is barring the Soviet representatives from the Berne negotiations...

30 Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy*, op. cit., p. 420.

31 *Ibid.*, p. 369.

The Soviet Government insists... that henceforward separate negotiations by one or two of the Allied Powers with German representatives without the participation of the third Allied Power be precluded."

Another Soviet dispatch on March 22, 1945, to the U.S. Ambassador read as follows: "...What we have in this case is not an erroneous notion of the purpose of the contact nor a misunderstanding, but something worse... Negotiations have been going on for two weeks at Berne, behind the back of the Soviet Union which is bearing the brunt of the war against Germany..."³²

President Roosevelt denied the Soviet charges.

The circumstances created by the ending of the war called for limitations on the traditional objectives of U.S. interests. First of all, there was a need to agree with the other major nations. Secondly, the socialist world had come to stretch from the Elbe in the West to the shores of the Pacific in the East. They were bound to exercise a strong influence on world development. Thirdly, the old colonial system was bound to break up. The plunder of Asia, Africa and Latin America had been an essential source of enrichment for Western capitalism. A challenge to the monopolies, which had reaped profits by controlling the finance, economy, domestic and foreign policy and which had for years used colonial resources and manpower in their fights against revolutionary or national liberation movements, seemed to commence. Though not yet an independent country, India was getting ready to fill a place of her own in the international conferences. A powerful wave of national liberation movement was sweeping away the colonial system. In the past, only a handful political leaders and the most conscious sections of societies were opposing the colonial system. The end of the Second World War indicated that entire nations were preparing decisive attacks on their oppressors. As time showed, the struggle was to engulf whole continents. Empires were falling and nations rising to take their place.³³

32 U.S.S.R., Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Correspondence Between the Chairman of the U.S.S.R. and the Presidents of the U.S.A. and the Prime Ministers of Great Britain During the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945*, Vol. II, Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1957, pp. 296-296.

33 Rupert Emerson, *From Empire to Nation: The Rise to Self-Assertion of Asian and African Peoples*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1962, p. 3.

Such were basically the war circumstances to which traditional "solutions" could not be applied. However, there is not much evidence that F.D. Roosevelt had seriously entertained the thought of reevaluating the changing world and America's position in it. And those who succeeded Roosevelt show no sign of having understood the character of the new epoch. On the contrary, they saw no reason to alter their basic outlook. Given its social and economic set-up, the U.S. had for decades believed in the necessity of open door expansion as a premise. For the American leaders the only view of the world at all times could be open-door expansion. What is more, the allied class in the undeveloped areas were in more ways than one made to think alike and open the doors for American expansion from the inside. Those who did not share this American premise were accused at least of thinking incorrectly.

The U.S. had always relied on its preponderance of power and had utilized it in different ways in different times, whether in Versailles, China, Nicaragua or Liberia. At the end of the war, however, the traditional strategy of relying on actual power found its expression in "negotiation from strength." It has already been indicated that even prior to formally entering into the Second World War, influential Americans, who in fact symbolized the dominant interests, had assumed that the U.S. would emerge from this encounter in a position to expand her empire.³⁴

President Roosevelt had died on April 12, 1945. The new President learned of the state of the world, each morning from Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, who loathed the Russians.³⁵ It was perhaps the latter's influence on President Truman that led him to scold the Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov on the afternoon of April 23, 1945, when the Soviet representative had come to see the new President on his way to the San Francisco Conference. During the first meeting on April 22nd, Truman brought up the Polish question. Molotov contended that the

³⁴ *Supra.*, fn. 19.

³⁵ Truman's own attitude towards the Soviet Union may be understood from his remark in July 1941, at the time of Nazi attack on Russia: "If we see that Germany is winning the war, we ought to help Russia, and if Russia is winning, we ought to help Germany, and in that way let them kill as many as possible." *The New York Times*, July 24, 1941.

subject was even more important for the Soviet Union. Poland, which was far from the United States, but bordered on the Soviet Union, was vital to them.

When Molotov left with the Secretary of State Stettinius to join Eden in talks at the State Department, Truman had an important conference on April 23rd, with his chief diplomatic and military advisers.³⁶ When Truman said that agreements with the Soviet Union had so far been "a one-way street," Secretary Stimson, who was the most experienced statesman in the room, having been a cabinet member in four administrations since 1911, either as Secretary of War or as Secretary of State, said that, "in the big military matters, the Soviet Government had kept its word and the military authorities of the United States had come to count on it." In fact, he said, they had often done better than they had promised. It was his belief that without fully understanding how seriously the Russians took this Poland question we might be heading into very dangerous waters. He thought that the Soviets perhaps were being more realistic than we were in regard to their own security. Secretary of the Navy Forrestal suggested a "showdown with them now rather than later."

Ambassador Harriman, too, remarked, that the Soviets had not lived up to their commitments. "For example," he said, "over a year ago they had agreed to start on preparations for collaboration in the Far Eastern war, but none of these had been carried out." It is a surprise that Harriman should use the Soviet's "delay" in preparing for entry into war in the Far East as grounds for a generalization. Despite historical truth, Harriman was referring to the Soviet position in the Far East as conclusive evidence. The Soviets committed themselves to enter the Pacific War at Yalta. At first, Stalin had estimated that it would take six months to transfer some thirty divisions from the German front to Manchuria, a distance of 6,000 miles. At Yalta, however, he re-estimated and shortened the period to three months and "made it a pledge."³⁷ Germany was defeated on May 8, 1945. On August 8—three months to the day, as pledged—the

³⁶ Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs: Vol. I, Year of Decisions*, New York, Doubleday, 1955, p. 77.

³⁷ Fleming, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 196.

Soviets declared war on Japan. Hence, precisely the example that Harriman had seized upon as conclusive evidence showed that the Soviets had fulfilled their commitments *and to the letter*. Nevertheless, Harriman's views were important, for he was not only the U.S. Ambassador to Moscow at that time, but had also been at Teheran and Yalta.

Coming once more to the topic of fulfilling military commitments, one may cite a parallel case, with the roles of the United States and the Soviet Union reversed. As stated earlier, it was on July 8, 1941, that Litvinov had demanded a second front in Western Europe. When Molotov had come to Washington on May 29, 1942, he was assured that the U.S. would open a second front in 1942. Similarly, when Molotov came to London, a joint communiqué issued on June 11, read as follows: "In the course of conversations full understanding was reached with regard to the urgent task of creating a second front in Europe in 1942."³⁸ Yet, it was not opened until June 6, 1944, long after Soviets had repulsed the Nazi invasion at tremendous cost. What is more, the opening of the second front was a much more important matter than Soviet entry into the Pacific War.

Just before Molotov was due to be received a second time President Truman came down heavily on the side of Harriman, Forrestal and General Deane. Corporate leaders like Harriman and Forrestal, who were in the Administration, had deep anti-Soviet views. Men of this type were supported by State Department experts such as George F. Kennan. As noted above, he believed that agreements with the Soviet Union "had so far been a one-way street and that this could not continue." One may, however, briefly inquire as to the truthfulness of this assertion. Stettinius, who accompanied Roosevelt to Yalta had this to say about the agreement reached there that Truman had so often referred to: "Many...statements have been made in recent criticism of the Yalta Conference. Some of them have been based on misunderstanding, others on prejudice. The following pages of this book reveal how unjust they are. The Yalta record, in spite of these attacks, reveals that the Soviet Union made more concessions to the United States and Great Britain than were made to the Soviet Union by either the United States

³⁸ Churchill, *The Hinge of Fate*, *op. cit.*, p. 341.

or Great Britain.”³⁹ This opinion was shared by Churchill (who had not made his dislike of the Soviet régime a secret even in his speech after the Nazi attack on Russia)⁴⁰ in his report to the House of Commons on February 27, 1945, on the inner meaning of Yalta: “The impression I brought back from the Crimea, and from all my other contacts, is that Marshall Stalin and the Soviet leaders wish to live in honorable friendship and equity with the Western democracies. I feel also that their word is their bond. I know of no government which stands to its obligations, even in its own despite, more solidly than the Russian Soviet Government.”⁴¹

Nevertheless, when Molotov arrived, Truman told him that agreements should be “on a basis of mutual observation... not on the basis of a one-way street.”⁴² “I have never been talked to like that in my life,” Molotov said. Truman reacted: “carry out your agreements and you won’t get talked to like that.” Truman’s “blunt language unadorned by the polite verbiage of diplomacy”⁴³ seemed as if he was addressing a Central American Minister. Charles Bohlen, who was the interpreter there, told Byrnes later that “he had never heard a top official get such a scolding.”⁴⁴ Stalin had refused to send Molotov to the San Francisco Conference until after Roosevelt’s death; he had acceded to Truman’s request as a gesture of good will toward him.⁴⁵

Truman’s ‘tough policy’ was warmly supported by Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg, one of the most important members of the U.S. delegation to San Francisco. On being told of the Truman-Molotov meeting, such was his reaction as recorded in his diary: “Tuesday, April 24, 1945 (San Francisco): Stettinius reached here from Washington this morning... He imme-

39 Edward R. Stettinius, *Roosevelt and the Russians: the Yalta Conference*, New York, Doubleday, 1949, s. 6.

40 On June 22: “No one has been a more consistent opponent of Communism than I have for the last twenty-five years. I will unsay no word that I have spoken about it...” Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War: Vol. III, The Grand Alliance*, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1950, p. 371.

41 Fleming, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 207.

42 Truman, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 82.

43 William F. Leahy, *I Was There*, London, Gollancz, 1950, pp. 351–352.

44 Fleming, *op. cit.*, p. 268.

45 *Ibid.*, p. 266; Sherwood, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 532.

diately met our delegation and gave us a *thrilling* message... This is the best news in months. F.D.R.'s appeasement of Russia is over... Stettinius does not know what the result will be... But crisis will come when Stalin's answer arrives. Russia may withdraw. If it does, the conference *will proceed without Russia*. Now we are getting somewhere!"⁴⁶ Vandenberg, who had been one of the two Senators voting against the recognition of the Soviet Union and who had urged the breaking of relations in 1939, was fast becoming a key figure in shaping American policy. His selection to the U.S. delegation at San Francisco was most unfortunate, if not intentional. It was he who commanded the support of the isolationist vote for Truman's important cold war legislation. He had also played a role in the framing of the Marshall Plan, so much so that Marshall suggested calling it "The Marshall-Vandenberg Plan."

A month before Roosevelt's death and a month-and-a-half before the Truman-Molotov meeting, Vandenberg had written in his diary: "I could get no greater personal satisfaction out of anything more than joining -aye, in leading- a public denunciation of Yalta... But... I am forced from the circumstances to believe that we cannot get result by trying to totally combat decisions which are supported by our own American Administration and by the British Parliament... We must find some other way... I must primarily work... through the San Francisco Conference and not in a public campaign of denunciation."⁴⁷ Vandenberg was, then, going to San Francisco to undo the Yalta decisions -*something that Truman was preparing to accuse the Soviets of having violated*.

At the Dumbarton Oaks Conference which had met on August 21, 1944, to prepare for San Francisco, the Soviet representatives, in the words of Hull, had "shown an admirable cooperation from the first day of the conference."⁴⁸ Gromyko had once suggested that the sixteen Soviet republics should be the original members of the U.N., but did not press the point. It is also true that the Soviets insisted there on the veto right of the

46 Emphasis by Senator Vandenberg. Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr., and J.A. Morris, eds., *The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg*, Boston, 1953, pp. 175-176.

47 Horowitz, *From Yalta to Vietnam*, op. cit., p. 37.

48 Hull, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 1681.

Great Powers. That is understandable in an international organization, dominated by the United States chiefly through the twenty Latin American countries. But, Britain was also in favour of the veto power; so was the United States. Without it, the U.S. Senate would have probably rejected the U.N. Charter. Moreover, if the Soviets had shown eagerness to abolish the veto right, the U.S. would most certainly have defended it.

III. SAN FRANCISCO: ARGENTINA RATHER THAN POLAND

On the other hand, the San Francisco Conference showed -so wrote James Reston in the *New York Times* on June 12, 1945- "ten concessions by Russia which have contributed greatly to the liberalizing of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals." However, the United States was not willing to consider Soviet susceptibilities toward any Latin American country. Argentina was suggested as a U.N. member and went sailing into that organization in spite of Soviet opposition. Argentina had taken the lead in the Soviet Union's expulsion from the League of Nations, which had thus isolated and humiliated that country even if it was to be its last act. Argentina had gone Fascist and had given great comfort to the Germans and Italians throughout the war. Many Argentina radio station and newspapers were controlled by the Nazis as propaganda tools for the whole of Latin America. The German Embassy in Buenos Aires was the center of such espionage. The German traders among the tribes, the German storekeepers on the pampas and the Germans working in the banks and companies became potential Nazi agents. After Pearl Harbor, only Argentina and Chile failed to break with the Axis.⁴⁹ At Yalta, Roosevelt had promised Stalin that the U.S. would not support Argentina's entry into the United Nations.⁵⁰ However, when the U.S. Delegation in San Francisco tried to push through Argentina's admission, the U.S. and the Soviet Union clashed seriously. Molotov protested against her admission and when the steering committee of the Conference overrode his protests, he held a press conference. What he asked was me-

49 Helen Miller Bailey and Abraham P. Nasatir, *Latin America: the Development of Its Civilization*, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall, 1960, p. 728. *Herald Tribune*, May 2 and 13, 1945 from Horowitz, *From Yalta to Berlin*, 221.

50 Hull, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 1408.

rely a few day's delay in voting on Argentina's admission. When he at last appealed to the Conference Assembly, he was outvoted. On April 30, 1945, Molotov said⁵¹ that the question of inviting Argentina to this Conference was only brought up before the delegates that very day and it had never been discussed previously by representatives of the four sponsoring powers. It seemed quite natural to him that the Soviet Delegation, desiring to acquaint themselves with the question, and to let all the other members of this Conference do likewise, suggest that its discussion be postponed for a few days. He reminded the Assembly that in the Second World War against the common enemy "Argentina held a special place" and that "neither the foreign, nor the domestic policies of the Argentina régime has met with the the other United Nation's approval." Mr. Hull, a former U.S. Secretary of State had "branded Argentina as headquarters for a Fascist movement in the [Western] hemisphere and a potential source of infection for the rest of America."⁵² Molotov also referred to Roosevelt's following statement on October 1, 1944: "I have been following closely and with increasing concern the development of the Argentine situation in recent months. This situation presents the extraordinary paradox of the growth of Nazi-Fascist influence and the increasing application of Nazi-Fascist methods in a country of this hemisphere at the very time that those forces of oppression and aggression are drawing ever closer to the hour of final defeat in Europe and elsewhere in the world." Molotov added:

"I consider both statements authoritative and reliable. But they were made several months ago. The situation in Argentina may have changed since then. I understand that certain representatives of American countries hold the view that the situation has changed for the better there. All I should like to ask of you is that the Soviet as well as other delegations be given a chance to acquaint themselves at length with the facts and to satisfy themselves that the situation in Argentina has really improved and that statements like the above correspond to the facts. But this takes time, or at least, a few days..."

It is difficult to disagree with Molotov on the consequences of rashly inviting Argentina to San Francisco, although in the Second World War she had been assisting the Fascists and fail-

51 U.N., *Documents of the U.N. Conference on International Organization, San Francisco, 1945, Vol. I, General*, New York, 1945, pp. 345-348; Vol. V, pp. 155, 376-382.

52 Hull, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 1405, 1419.

ing to invite Poland, an ally, which had devoted so much effort to the common struggle and made innumerable sacrifices. "It may be argued," he said, "that Argentina has sinned, but that her sins may be forgotten. This may be true, perhaps we should really forget Argentina's sins. But let me ask you: If certain sins committed by Argentina may be forgotten, why should we forget Poland's services..." There was at this Conference, an Indian delegation, although India's status was equivocal. There was also a delegation from the Philippines, which was not at that time an independent country.

The Belgian Foreign Minister Henry Spaak stated that the Soviet Delegation had merely asked the postponement of this question "for a few days so as to enable the Soviet Delegation to confer with the representatives of the other three Great Powers in an effort to arrive at a decision that shall express their unanimity." He thought that it would be "wise for the Assembly to grant this request because [it was] reasonable and legitimate."⁵³ Molotov's request was voted down 28-7, then 31-4, and Argentina was speeded into the U.N. Hull, also a member of the U.S. Delegation, was too ill to attend the Conference. He called up Stettinius and told him that "irreparable harm had been done" and added: "If the American delegation were not careful we should get Russia into such a state of mind that she might decide that United Nations organization was not going to furnish adequate security to her in the future." She might decide to rely on the acquisition of outposts, buffer territory, warm water harbors and build up "a federation of nations close to her."⁵⁴ Walter Lippman, too, warned that we "had adopted a line of conduct which, if it becomes our regular line, will have the most disastrous consequences." In a later article, he referred to this action as "riding rough shod through a world conference with a bloc of twenty votes [the Latin American countries]."⁵⁵ On account of her control of the Latin American governments, the United States could always guarantee an anti-Soviet majority in the United Nations. The Soviet fears that this international organization would lose its value as an organ of compro-

53 *Documents of the U.N. Conference, op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 353-354.

54 Hull, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 1722-1723.

55 *Herald Tribune*, May 2 and 15, 1945 from Horowitz, *From Yalta to Vietnam, op. cit.*, p. 39.

mise and cooperation, and become a public agency of attacks on the Soviet Union seemed grounded. Had not the League, which had taken no determined steps against Fascist Italy, Nazi Germany and Spain, expelled the Soviet Union? Similarly, in its first decade, the U.N. functioned as if it was an instrument of U.S. foreign policy. In 1946-1953 the General Assembly adopted over 800 resolutions. Almost all of these resolutions were either supported by the U.S. or in any case coincided with the interest of that country. Within the the same eight years, only two U.S. supported resolutions were not adopted. The majority of the U.N. members, -whether Nicaragua, Thailand, or Turkey, voted with the U.S. 90 % of the time or more on non-colonial issues. The Soviet Union was being pushed into a state of insecurity. "She might decide," in Hull's words, "that... she ought... to go back home and establish outposts, bases, and warm water harbors in many areas and add buffer territory and prepare her own outward defenses just as fully as if the United Nations were not in existence."⁵⁶

Senator Vandenberg, on the other hand, was suggesting that the Soviet Union entrust her security to the protection of the United States.⁵⁷ Rather than insisting on a friendly Polish Government, Vandenberg had proposed on January 10, 1945, a treaty of guarantee. How realistic were such arrangements could be well understood from a precedent in 1919. At the Paris Peace Conference, the French concern for military security had led her to demand the disarmament of Germany, a strategic frontier on the Rhine and crippling indemnities. As a means of satisfying French fears and need for security, the United States and Britain signed a tripartite agreement by which these two promised to come to the aid of France if she should again be attacked by Germany. This "entangling" American treaty was sent to the Senate but never reported out of the committee, while the U.S. made a separate treaty of peace with Germany. The U.S. and Britain rearmed Germany, and left France without the security of the supposedly guarantee treaty, the possession of the strategic Rhineland and an effective League. Abandoning France had caused not only the downfall of that country, but

⁵⁶ Hull, *op. cit.*, p. 1722.

⁵⁷ Fleming, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 276.

had also led to the shedding of Russian blood. Senator Vandenberg's similar generous-sounding proposal to the Soviet Union in 1945 had to be evaluated against this historical background.

Nevertheless, the Soviets were cooperative at the San Francisco Conference, where the war time allies had some trouble on the veto question or the seating of the Lublin Poles. To delay a showdown with the Soviet Union until the U.S. explosion of the atomic bomb⁵⁸ on May 4th, Truman asked Harry Hopkins, who had been an important man in implementing Roosevelt's policy towards the Soviets, to undertake a mission to Moscow.

Just three weeks before the Stalin-Hopkins talks, the Lend-Lease Aid to the Soviet Union was stopped abruptly. Germany had surrendered on May 7, 1954. The famous stoppage of this aid came a day after the surrender. The ships were turned back for unloading. Truman later claimed: "They asked me to sign it [the order to cut back the Lend-Lease supplies]. I reached for my pen and, without reading the document, I signed it . . . The manner in which the order was executed was unfortunate. Crowley [Leo Crowley, the Foreign Economic Administrator] interpreted the order literally and placed an embargo on all shipments to Russia."⁵⁹ It seems that the order was designed to apply pressure on Moscow over the Polish problem.

When Hopkins met Stalin on May 26,⁶⁰ the latter indicated that the reason for the failure on the Polish question was that the Soviet Union desired to have a friendly Poland, but Britain wanted to revive the system of a *cordon sanitaire* on the Soviet borders. The next day, Stalin said that the Soviet governmental circles felt a certain alarm in regard to the attitude of the U. S. Government. The American attitude toward the Soviet Union had cooled once Germany seemed defeated. He gave the following reasons: (a) It was not understood in the Soviet Union why Argentina could not have asked to wait three months or so before joining the United Nations. The agreement had been ended "in a scornful and abrupt manner." A warning was important since their economy was based on plans. (b) At Yalta it had been

58 For this interpretation, see Alperovitz, *op. cit.*, p. 68 f.

59 Truman, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 228.

60 Sherwood, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 536-564.

agreed that the existing Polish government was to be reconstructed. Stalin maintained: "Anyone with common sense could see that this meant that the present government was to form the basis of the new." The Russians were simple people, but they "should not be regarded as fools . . . nor were they blind... [They were] patient . . . but their patience had its limits." The Soviet Government wished a friendly Poland. In the course of twenty-five years the Germans had twice invaded Russia via Poland. Germany had been able to do this because Poland had been regarded as a part of the *cordon sanitaire* around the Soviet Union and previous European policy had been that Polish Governments must be hostile to Russia. Either Poland had been too weak to oppose Germany or had let the Germans come through. Thus, Poland had served as a corridor for the German attacks on Russia. It was therefore in Russia's vital interest that Poland should be "both strong and friendly." Stalin pointed out that Soviet action in Poland had been more successful than British action in Greece and at no time had they been compelled to undertake the measures which the British had done in Greece. (c) The manner in which Lend-Lease had been curtailed was "unfortunate and even brutal." If the refusal to continue Lend-Lease was designed as pressure on the Russians in order to soften them up, then it was a fundamental mistake. The other questions concerned (d) the composition of the Reparations Commission and (e) the disposition of the German Navy and merchant fleet which surrendered to the Allies. Following the last meeting, Hopkins cabled Truman that Marshall Stalin agreed to accept the United States position regarding voting procedure in the Council. "This was the real news that the San Francisco Conference had been saved."⁶¹

IV. POTSDAM: "GET TOUGH WITH RUSSIA"

Stalin had agreed to meet Truman and Churchill somewhere near Berlin. In the period before the meeting, Truman made changes in the Cabinet. Of the ten members of the Roosevelt cabinet, six either resigned or were replaced before the Potsdam Conference. (Of the remaining four, two had left the Cabinet

61 *Ibid.*, p. 564.

before the end of 1945 and the other two by the end of 1946). The new-comers were more to the right.

It now seems that in consenting to the Potsdam Conference, the U. S. Government intended to start negotiations from a position of strength. Apparently, that country had pinned its hopes on its monopoly over the atom bomb. It will be remembered that the first atomic bomb test was to take place at Alamogordo on July 15. It is no mere coincidence that the U.S. Government insisted that the Potsdam Conference open on that very day. Churchill had not been informed of the American plans and hence wondered why they were insisting on that date. He had expressed his bewilderment to the U.S. and Soviet governments on June 1, 1945, in the following terms, which need no further interpretation: "I have proposed June 15, repeat June, the month before July, but if that is not possible, why not July 1, July 2, or July 3?"⁶² Churchill, however, also agreed on July 15 once having learned the reason.

Truman recalls in his *Memoirs* the following words of the U. S. Secretary of State Byrnes: "That bomb might well put us in a position to *dictate our own terms* at the end of the war."⁶³ Secretary of War Stimson commented that "the atomic bomb would be certain to have a decisive influence on our relations with other countries."⁶⁴

When the Big Three met on July 17 at the Cecilienhof Palace, which had been the country estate of the former Crown Prince Wilhelm, Stalin suggested that the American President serve as the presiding officer. Truman proposed the establishment of a Council of Foreign Ministers (with the inclusion of China), a Control Council for Germany, the "immediate reorganization" of the present governments of Rumania and Bulgaria and a revision of Allied policy toward Italy.⁶⁵ All

62 *Correspondence... op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 362.

63 *Italics mine. Truman, op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 87.

64 *Ibid.*

65 Truman, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 345. The following episode is indicative of what Admiral Leahy, the President's close advisor knew about the Soviet system: "It was necessary for us to drive through various parts of the Russian zone. Admiral Leahy and Secretary Byrnes were with me, and at one of the crossings our car was stopped by a Russian lieutenant. The delay was no more than a matter of

this seemed to Churchill "somewhat premature." He added: "I feared a dissolution of the Grand Alliance."⁶⁶

When the Foreign Secretaries then produced their plan for drafting the European peace treaties, Churchill asked what was meant by Germany. "What she has become after the war," said Stalin. "The Germany of 1937," said Truman. Although it was difficult to get away from the war, there being no definite frontiers, but merely four occupation zones, the three agreed to take the Germany of 1937 as a starting point. When they all turned to Poland, Truman accused the Soviet Government of giving the Poles a zone of their own without consulting the other allies. Stalin denied this. He said that the German population had retreated westward with the German armies. Only the Poles remained. Someone had to administer the rear areas. He added that the Soviet armies did not want to fight and set up their own administration at the same time. Why not let the Poles do it? When Truman asserted that they all had to keep to the zones agreed at Yalta, Stalin said, "Nothing definite was fixed at Yalta about the Western frontier." Churchill agreed that "this was true."⁶⁷

At the sixth meeting, Molotov brought up the subject of trusteeships and said that the San Francisco Conference had settled, in principle, a trusteeship system, and there was now the question of the disposition of specific territories, such as Italy's colonies.⁶⁸ He had learned from the foreign press that Italy had lost its colonies. Molotov inquired who had received them. Churchill replied by referring to the heavy losses which the British had suffered and the victories they had achieved by her conquering alone of the Italian colonies. Molotov interjected that Berlin had been conquered by the Red Army. Churchill agreed that the trusteeship question be referred to the foreign ministers.

minutes, for we were quickly identified by other Russian officers arriving on the scene. Those officers proceeded to scare the life out of the lieutenant for making such a blunder. Leahy turned to me and said, 'I'll bet that lieutenant is shot in the morning.'" *Ibid.*, p. 351.

⁶⁶ Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy*, *op. cit.*, p. 649.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 655.

⁶⁸ Truman, *op. cit.*, Vol. I. pp. 323-374.

Churchill then turned the attention of all to the Turkish Straits. He said that there was an admitted need to modify the old Montreux Convention. He expressed his readiness to welcome an arrangement for the free movement of Russian ships through the Black Sea and back. But he wished to impress on Stalin the importance of not alarming Turkey. That country had been alarmed after conversations between the Turkish Ambassador Selim Sarper and Molotov on June 7, 1945, during which modification of Turkey's eastern frontier as well as a Soviet base on the Straits were mentioned.⁶⁹ Churchill challenged the right of the Soviets to consider the matter of the Black Sea Straits as one in which no one had a voice except Russia and Turkey. Molotov replied that similar treaties had existed between the two countries; he cited the treaties of 1805 and 1833.⁷⁰ Stalin held that a rectification of the Turco-Soviet frontier could not have been brought up if the Turks had not suggested an alliance with Russia. An alliance connoted the defence of the mutually agreed frontiers. If this was not agreeable to the Turks, Stalin said, the question of an alliance would be dropped. As to the Straits, both Truman⁷¹ and Churchill⁷² agreed on the question of revising the Montreux Convention. Churchill added that Russia should be able to move freely in and out of the Black Sea and that his government was prepared to join on a guarantee with other nations and was prepared to press it on Turkey.⁷³

When Truman asked for the reorganization of the Rumanian, Bulgarian and Hungarian governments, Stalin objected to the words "responsible and democratic governments" in the American draft, saying that they served to discredit these countries. When Truman pointed out that this language was necessary to show that the only way in which they could obtain U.S. support for entry into the U.N. was for them to have democratic governments, Stalin said that they were not fascist govern-

69 Joseph M. Jones, *The Fifteen Weeks: February 21-June 5, 1947*, New York, the Viking Press, 1955, p. 60.

70 Nihat Erim, *Devletlerarası Hukuku ve Siyasî Tarih Metinleri*, Vol. I, Ankara, Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1953, pp. 195-204, 219, 219-240, 293-299.

71 Truman, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 378.

72 Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy*, *op. cit.*, p. 635.

73 Truman, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 386.

ments, and that there was a far less democratic government in Argentina, which in spite of this had been admitted to the United Nations.

One may say that after the war the U. S. was preferring to negotiate from strength, derived from atomic monopoly. At Truman's request Stimson wrote in Potsdam a paper entitled "Reflections on the Basic Problems Which Confront Us."⁷⁴ In this paper Stimson urges using the atomic bomb without delay in combating the Soviet Union. Elsewhere he wrote: "No permanently safe international relations can be established between such two fundamentally different national systems. With the best of efforts we cannot understand each other."⁷⁵ Stimson suggested using the atomic secret to "win concessions from the Russian leaders."⁷⁶

The Potsdam Conference had opened on July 17, 1945, with the last of its nine sittings ending on July 25. A recess was made in view of the British elections, subsequently won by the Labor Party. The British Delegation was no longer headed by Churchill, but by Clement R. Attlee. This change, however, brought no alteration in British policy. In the words of Mr. Attlee's biographer, "Churchill had few closer and no more loyal colleagues than the leaders of the Labor Party."⁷⁷ Attlee seemed to differ so little from Churchill.⁷⁸

The Conference had instituted a Foreign Ministers' Council and assigned it to draft peace treaties with the defeated countries. An agreement was signed at Potsdam on the Political and Economic Principles to Govern the Treatment of Germany in the Initial Control Period. It was a broad program for the *denazification*, *democratisation* and *demilitarisation* of Germany. However, "there was secretly circulated among the

74 G. Deborin, *The Second World War*, Moscow, Progress Publishers, (n.d.), p. 475.

75 Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, *On Active Service in Peace and War*, New York, 1948, p. 639.

76 *Ibid.*, p. 641.

77 Roy Jenkins, *Mister Attlee: An Interim Biography*, London, Heinemann, 1948, p. 230.

78 C.R. Attlee, *As It Happened*, New York, the Viking Press, 1954, pp. 205, 208. Also see: Francis Williams, *Ernest Bevin*, London, Hutchinson, 1952, s. 241.

top leaders of the British and American delegations. a memorandum prepared by certain top officials in the United States Government, saying in effect that the whole approach [in Potsdam] was wrong and that our real interest lay in rebuilding Germany as quickly as possible "as a bulwark against Communism."⁷⁹

While a number of agreements had been reached at Potsdam, they were overshadowed by the actually hostile spirit among the Allies. Sumner Welles, F. D. R.'s Under-Secretary of State, formulated the change as follows: "[With the death of Roosevelt,] the direction of American policy passed into other hands. The due change this brought about in Soviet-American relations was apparent to every objective observer present at the meeting at Potsdam."⁸⁰

Shortly after the Potsdam decisions, U.S. atomic bombs fell on Japanese cities. Truman had "made the decision."⁸¹ Hiroshima and Nagasaki were chosen as targets "because of their concentration of activities and population."⁸² On August 6 came the news that shook the world. When Truman had received it, he announced to the officers of the *Augusta* that "the Pacific war might now be brought to a speedy end."⁸³ However, the U.S. Government knew that Japan was suing for peace. The Japanese Ambassador in Moscow had made such a plea a month before the dropping of the bomb. Forrestal writes: "The first real evidence of a Japanese desire to get out of the war came today through intercepted message from Togo... to Sato, Jap [anese] Ambassador to Moscow, instructing the latter to see Molotov if possible before his departure for the Big Three meeting...to lay before him the Emperor's strong desire to secure a termination of the war... Togo said further that the unconditional surrender terms of the Allies was about the only thing in the way of termination."⁸⁴ On May 28, Harry Hopkins had cabled to Truman: "Japan is doomed and the Japanese know it."⁸⁵

79 Josiah E. Dubois, *The Devil's Chemists*, Boston, the Beacon Press, 1952, p. 361.

80 Sumner Welles, *Where Are We Heading?* New York, Harper, 1946, pp. 375-379.

81 Truman, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 421.

82 P.M.S. Blackett, *Military and Political Consequences of Atomic Energy*, London, 1948, p. 127.

83 Truman, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 421-422.

84 *Forrestal Diaries*, entry of July 13.

85 Sherwood, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 553-554.

On July 26 the United States, Britain and China had issued a joint proclamation. This ultimatum, which came to be known as the Potsdam Declaration, called upon the Government of Japan to proclaim the unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed forces. There was no hint in the declaration that a new and previously inconceivable weapon was about to be used. What is more, the Soviet Union was informed after the release of the declaration. When a copy was sent to Molotov by special messenger, the former telephoned in the evening asking that the declaration be held up two or three days. "When he was told that it already had been released, he seemed disturbed."⁸⁶ The next day Byrnes explained that it had not been submitted to him before release "because we did not want to embarrass the Soviet Union by presenting it with a declaration affecting a country with which it was not yet at war." While the U.S. Government seemed so particular about international courtesy, she was preparing to atomize about half a million inhabitants of two Japanese cities when their government was suing for peace. Moreover, there is a clue to U.S. action of not informing the Soviets in Forrestal's diary: "Byrnes said he was most anxious to get the Japanese affair over with before the Russians get in, with particular reference to Dairen and Port Arthur."⁸⁷ However, the Yalta agreement had recognized Soviet rights both in Dairen and Port Arthur. Dairen was to be internationalized and Port Arthur to be leased to the Soviets as a naval base. Thus, American sensitivity over keeping the Soviet Union out of the Pacific war was not Russia's violation of the Yalta decisions, but rather U.S. interest in doing the same herself. There was a haste on the side of the United States to use the atom bomb as early as possible. The U.S. dropped the second bomb on August 10, the very day the Soviet troops entered Manchuria. She could have very well awaited the effect of the wave into Manchuria rather than picking up another atomic target only three days after the bombing of Hiroshima and without a second ultimatum. The dropping of the atom bomb had been a political decision, not a military one.

⁸⁶ James F. Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly*, New York, Harper, 1947, p. 207.

⁸⁷ Horowitz, *From Yalta to Vietnam*, *op. cit.*, p. 55.

In Churchill's words, the Western "outlook on the future was transformed"⁸⁸ when Japan signed terms of unconditional surrender on the battleship *Missouri* on September 2. The Western sources always refer to the two super-Powers emerging from the war, and that the second of these two giants, namely the Soviet Union, threatening the life of the first and the peace of the world. What the governments usually keep from the public is that the United States finished the war as the only Great Power which was not exhausted but on the contrary prosperous, energetic and with monopoly over the atom bomb. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, had lost about 20 million people. The post-war population census showed only 31 million men over 18, and most of them were wounded or crippled. The Nazis and their allies, who had occupied Soviet territory in which 80 million Soviet people were living, had destroyed 15 large cities, 1710 towns, 70,000 villages, 98,000 collective farms, 31,850 industrial enterprises, 2890 machine-tractor stations, 40,000 hospitals, 84,000 schools and 90,000 bridges.⁸⁹ The war-devastated condition of the country, first of all, overrules the possibility of planning aggression. In European Russia, as Edward Crankshaw had noted, "there was no machinery... no stations, no watertowers... not a solitary telegraph pole..."⁹⁰ Such was the condition of the country that was supposed to conquer the Western Europe and the rest of the world.

Following Potsdam, the Council of Foreign Ministers met in London, Moscow, Paris and New York. At London, Secretary of State Byrnes "adopted a position of intransigence". It was "one of the most disastrous international conferences of modern times."⁹¹ During the discussions Bevin referred to one of Molotov's statements as "the nearest thing to the Hitler theory I have ever heard."⁹² Molotov rose and started angrily toward the door. He returned when the Briton withdrew his statement. Later debates on Eastern Europe were more heated since these areas had gained additional importance with U.S. monopoly over the atom. At the beginning of the negotiations,

88 *The New York Times*, August 17, 1945 from *ibid.*, p. 58.

89 Fleming, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 252.

90 *Observer*, April 3, 1966.

91 Willes, *op. cit.*, pp. 67, 380.

92 Byrnes, *op. cit.*, p. 105.

Byrnes had said: "far from opposing, we have sympathized with...the effort of the Soviet Union to draw into closer and more friendly association with the central and eastern European neighbors. We are fully aware of her special security interests in those countries."⁹³ Molotov insisted that refusal to recognize the governments in Bulgaria and Rumania could only mean that the U.S. wanted governments hostile to the Soviet Union.⁹⁴ The agreements reached, however, concerned, *inter alia*, the "liberalization" of the régimes in Eastern Europe and draft treaties.

Nevertheless, when Byrnes returned home, he was disappointed to find a portion of the press criticizing the agreements as "appeasement." Byrnes indicates: "But much of the criticism, unfortunately, came from people so unreasonably anti-Soviet in their views that they would regard any agreement with Russia on any subject as appeasement."⁹⁵ While Cordell Hull was congratulating Byrnes for his success at Moscow, Truman was thinking of removing him.⁹⁶

After the defeat of Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union feared a new Anglo American coalition this time aiming at herself. When Walter Bedell Smith had submitted his credentials to Shvernik as the new U.S. Ambassador, he inquired from Stalin whether in his opinion Washington and London were forming an anti-Soviet coalition. Stalin said that they were.⁹⁷

V. SECURITY AND SUSPICION

Some Western governments considered Soviet influence in Eastern Europe, which was one of the results of the war, as an indication that Russia was preparing to conquer the world. The change of régimes in that part of the world was due to a reaction to the experience of fascism, as much as it was due to the outcome of the war of aggression against the Soviet Union.

⁹³ Redvers Opie *et al.*, *The Search for Peace Settlements*, Washington, D.C., the Brookings Institution, 1951, p. 144.

⁹⁴ Byrnes, *op. cit.*, pp. 97-100.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 122.

⁹⁶ Truman, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 548-552.

⁹⁷ Walter Bedell Smith, *Moscow Mission: 1946-1949*, London, Heinemann, 1950, p. 41.

The Balkan countries had fallen under fascist dictatorship one after the other. Besides the general reasons prompting the ruling classes in these countries to abandon bourgeois democracy and apply fascist methods, there were historical, economic and political reasons, particular to the Balkans, which pushed these countries in that direction. The bourgeoisie in the Balkans allied itself with international capital from the very beginning of its rule. It was acting merely as an agent. As a result of bourgeois revolutions against the feudal landowners, the peasants did not obtain land, as it had been the case, say in France or other Western countries. The bourgeoisie had seen in the peasant merely an object of ruthless exploitation. There was, thus, a deep abyss between the ruling classes and the peasant masses. Nor had the national question found a solution. The oppressed nations and minorities were also impelled towards an irreconcilable struggle against the bourgeoisie.

Primarily agricultural and industrially weak, the Balkan countries were semi-colonies of international capital. The possibilities of capitalist stabilization were indeed very limited. On account of the growing poverty of the masses, the home market was in a very poor condition. The foreign markets, on the other hand, were almost inaccessible to the Balkan bourgeoisie. It was up against the competition of the highly industrialized Western countries. It seemed obliged to over-exploit the masses. This still further deepened the abyss between the ruling classes and the people. This partly explains the revolutionary spirit of the proletariat and their growing will to struggle against the bourgeoisie.

The Balkan bourgeoisie was no longer able to maintain its rule through the bourgeois democratic methods. In alliance with international imperialism, it had to resort to fascist methods. Although temporary, its salvation seemed to lie on the road to a fascist dictatorship. The particular features of the Balkan states, moreover, had given it a character of its own. In contrast to what had happened in Italy, Balkan fascism sprang up not from a mass movement to seize power, but it came from above, as a result of an alliance between the bourgeoisie, its military power, the big landlords, the wealthy peasants, the top crust of the petty bourgeoisie, and part of the bureaucracy. This

alliance was very closely linked with international capital. The Balkan history showed that this link was not momentary and that final liquidation of fascism depended on the overthrow of the bourgeoisie itself. The bourgeoisie had a direct stake in the furtherance of fascist dictatorship.

Coming to the individual countries of Eastern Europe and the Balkans, before the war, Poland had been a scene of struggle between Pilsudski, an aristocrat and Dmowski, a reactionary to the core, whose anti-Semitic "Etdeks" Party, supported by the propertied classes, was hardly distinguishable from fascism.⁹⁸ Having entered into agreements with General Wrangel and the Ukrainian Petlyura, under the patronage of France, Pilsudski had led his legions into actions against the Soviets within the framework of a concerted war aimed against the new régime. In Rumania, General Antonescu, with the backing of the Iron Guards, had become the real ruler of the country, opening it to the German soldiers, placing the oil fields under German management and joining the Tripartite Pact of Germany, Italy and Japan. Rumania was finally forced to open war against the Soviet Union. Bulgaria, too, had turned towards fascism, with the murder of Alexander Stanbulisky on June 9, 1923, and especially after the coup d'état on May 19, 1934. Bulgaria joined the Tripartite Pact on March 1, 1941, and participated in the war against the Soviet Union. Likewise, Yugoslavia, under the Regency of Prince Paul, had been drawing Axisward. On March, 25, 1941, the Yugoslav Government adhered to the Tripartite Pact. It was after the revolt of the Yugoslav patriots and the flight of Prince Paul that the Soviet Union had concluded with the new government of Yugoslavia a pact of friendship and non-aggression. In Albania, the bourgeois democratic government of Fan Noli was brought down and a reactionary régime set up, with feudal chieftain Ahmed Zogu as President, who in 1928 had proclaimed himself the King. Italy, which had already made Albania a semi-colony, with various concessions as well as an Agreement of Friendship and Security (1926) and a Defence Treaty (1927), finally launched an open attack on April

98 Frank P. Chambers, Christina Phelps Harris and Charles C. Bayley, *This Age of Conflict: A Contemporary World History*, New York, Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1950, pp. 171, 668, 669.

7, 1939, and occupied it. Hungary, where Admiral Horthy and Major Gömbös ruled with the support of the fascist "Awakening Magyars" and the "Defenders of the Race," joined the Tripartite Pact.

At Potsdam, Stalin declared that Hungary had sent 26 divisions against the Soviet Union, the Rumanians 22 and the Finns 24.⁹⁹ Italy had also sent several divisions, so had fascist Spain. They all added considerable weight to the giant attack and contributed to the devastation of Soviet land. The Rumanians had massacred 200,000 Soviet citizens in Odessa alone and had fought all the way to Stalingrad. After the turn of the tide in favor of the Soviets, the victors often passed through their home towns, finding their families killed and dwellings burned down. Still they obeyed their superior's orders, leaving Rumanians alone.¹⁰⁰ The Hungarians boasted that they had killed a million Soviet citizens.

The Eastern European fascist régimes had not only failed to destroy the Soviet Union, but were themselves blotted out. One may remember, however, that Soviet appearance in Eastern Europe and the Balkans was met with Western approval. The Western allies had feared that the Soviet forces would stop once having reached the original Soviet border. An editorial in the *New York Times* of March 29, 1944, declared that the last unjustified suspicion that the Russians would stop at their own frontiers was now disposed of. The possibility that the Soviet Union might engage in a *sitzkrieg* on the border was a nightmare in the minds of the Western statesmen. Such an alternative would place on the shoulders of the Western Allies the difficult task of defeating the Axis on the Continent.

Hence, the Soviet Union, which was in a way invited to Eastern Europe, was after *security* in that part of the world. It seems impossible to make a correct diagnosis of the origins of the Cold War unless this overwhelming factor is properly weighted. If the Soviet experience during the Second World War is appropriately evaluated, the security motive emerges as an outstanding fact. The Soviet security complex is the starting point of all considerations in the post-war world. Unless this security

99 Truman, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 364.

100 Fleming, *op. cit.*, p. 251.

factor is given proper attention, Soviet presence in Eastern Europe, her feelings about Germany and the other important issues of the Cold War cannot be understood.

The Soviet Union felt justified in closing the traditional invasion gate. It seems that this motive was well appreciated before the issues of the Cold War gripped the minds of the leaders and the public of the Western countries. For instance, when the Soviet Union had made her position known in relation to the Polish boundary, the *New York Times* of January 12, 1944, described it as a policy of "self-protection." It does not seem conceivable to think that the Soviet Union, still suffering from serious wounds and herself in need of protection, would turn against the rest of the world with a view to conquering it. A realistic estimate is one of General Eisenhower's: "Russia has not the slightest thing to gain by a war with the United States. There is in Russia a desperate and continuing concern for the lot of the common man and they want to be friends with the United States."¹⁰¹

To transform Eastern Europe from an invasion corridor into a security belt necessitated the shattering of big landlordism, which had been the natural ally of fascism. It was these landed aristocrats who had teamed up with Hitler, facilitating his assault on the Soviet Union. The estates of these feudal magnates had to be broken up. Likewise, large industries and banking were nationalized. Although nationalization is an important communist goal, not only industry and banking was nationalized after the war all over Europe, including Britain, but also the war itself had made nationalization inescapable. The Germans having seized great properties, the newly-formed governments were compelled to take them over. Small industry, however, continued to function under private enterprise. What the Western Great Powers seem to have dreaded was the elimination of Eastern Europe from their list of "colonies." This part of Europe had been long dominated by the industrial West. Western capital had always been present in Rumania's oil or Yugoslavia's copper. Eastern Europe had traditionally been a bread-basket of the industrialized West. It had always provided food and

¹⁰¹ In an answer to the Red-baiting Republican Representative from New Jersey on November 15, 1944. Quoted in Fleming, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 256.

raw materials. Likewise, it had always remained poor and agrarian.

All of a sudden, Eastern Europe as a whole was slipping away from the grasp of the Western economic interests. It was becoming oriented towards a state-controlled industrialization. The old pattern of exploitation had suddenly come to an end in a world, where the Western industrial magnates were about to face retreat elsewhere as well. The general area of exploitation was being reduced drastically when all means of production in the West were still functioning at full speed. There was an explosion of anger and a call to bear arms "for the third and last time"¹⁰² when Cardinal Mindszenty was sentenced to imprisonment for opposing the virtual confiscation of Church estates and the law ending compulsory religious education in all schools, save those which taught religion exclusively. After the Second World War, the Soviet Union, in cooperation with the Eastern European governments and people who had gained considerable experience with fascism, turned the *cordon sanitaire* back upon the West. Even today, the capitalist West is trying to reverse this. Any real test, however, the Germans acting as the spearhead or not, is bound to find a united Slav socialist bloc determined to resist a return to the old order. They will certainly be supported by the giant industrial and military might of the Soviet Union.

Towards the end of 1945, not only the speeches made at the U.S. Congress, but also several public statements indicate that many responsible individuals in the United States considered the Soviet Union as an aggressor just as hideous as Hitler and made plans to deal with her by force. For instance, on November 27, 1945, Montana Senator Burton K. Wheeler urged quitting a policy of appeasement towards Russia. On October 30, General George S. Patton suggested staying armed and prepared for the "inevitable" Third World War.¹⁰³ Such pronouncements were made at a time when the United States had the monopoly over the atom bomb. Although most Americans might have thought otherwise, Professor Harold Urey, a top atomic scien-

102 Preaching at St. Patrick's Cathedral on February 6, 1949, Cardinal Spellman of New York demanded the destruction of Communism. This reference to bear arms a "third time" apparently connoted a Third World War. *Ibid.*, p. 20.

103 *Ibid.*, pp. 334-335, 323.

tist accused the United States Government of making bombs and beginning the arms race.¹⁰⁴ Asked whether the armaments race had begun, Truman replied: "Yes, but I think we will stay ahead."¹⁰⁵ Hence, when the Three Nation Declaration on atomic energy, issued in Washington on November 15, 1945, made reference to the exchange of scientific information, it was interpreted as a way to find out where the Soviets stood in terms of atomic research. The Western governments considering themselves as "trustworthy", expected "the Reds" to open up to capitalist eyes whatever they had, just to prove their goodwill. The Declaration of the U.S., Britain and Canada further demanded "full knowledge" on raw materials. In plain language, they wanted to know what deposits of uranium or thorium the Soviet Union possessed. On November 18 1945, the *New Times* (Moscow) retorted that the atomic bomb was a signal for all reactionaries to agitate "for a new crusade against the Soviet Union." The article saw in Western statements a frank appeal to attack her.

The year 1946 is noteworthy for attempts to control atomic energy. An advisory committee, appointed by Secretary of State Byrnes, suggested the creation of an Atomic Development Authority, which would control all supplies of uranium and thorium and all the plants. The Soviet Union was unlikely to permit foreigners to enter its territory to control aspects of Soviet life vital to her interests. The Soviets would consider them to be camouflaged spies, as at least some certainly would be. The Acheson-Lilienthal report was a masterpiece, preserving U.S. monopoly over the atom until it had to be turned over to an international authority, which would be under the control of the United States and Britain. The Soviet reply to the Acheson-Lilienthal plan, delivered on June 19, 1945 at the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission meeting at Hunter College, New York, proposed a treaty forbidding the production and use of atomic weapons and demanding their destruction within three months.

The American position, as expressed by Bernard M. Baruch, was that the United States would continue making bombs until the Atomic Development Authority would take over full con-

¹⁰⁴ *The New York Times*, November 30, 1945.

¹⁰⁵ Fleming, *op. cit.*, p. 322.

trol. The Soviet Union was expected to place confidence in the United States, which the Americans felt was the surest way to peace and a "democratic" world. As illustrated by the Baruch plan, the Americans, on the other hand, did not trust the Soviets. The first stage of the plan envisaged the location and cataloguing of all the known sources of uranium and thorium. Most of the Atomic Development Authority officials would probably be from the West simply because these countries had the greatest number of available experts and the West was overwhelmingly represented in the organs that were to do the selection. This plan would provide the United States with considerable information on the potential atomic and military capabilities of the Soviet Union. The United States would stop manufacturing bombs and destroy the stocks only as the requirements of the last stage.

Although the Carnegie plan would also be rejected by the Soviet Union for having been based on international inspection as well as essentially on the same stages as the Baruch plan, it, nevertheless, was published too late to effect the course of events. The Baruch plan was already accepted by American public opinion. Although the U.S. atomic scientists and American public opinion favoured civilian control over atomic energy, rumours were spread that the scientists were all Communists. Representative Andrew May, advised by General Groves, introduced enough amendments to the McMahon bill to give domestic control of atomic energy to the military. It was under these circumstances that Generals Spaatz¹⁰⁶ and Kenney¹⁰⁷, the former a retired Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force and the latter the Commander of the Strategic Air Command, made public statements concerning the atomic bombing of Soviet industrial centers and cities.

Responsible Americans seemed to be overwhelmed by such a picture: The U.S. could control numerous military bases constructed in friendly countries around the Soviet Union. The American planes could take off from these bases and convert the main Soviet centers into radioactive ruins within a matter of hours. And the so far "enslaved" Soviet people would throw

¹⁰⁶ *Life*, July 5, 1948.

¹⁰⁷ *Newsweek*, May 17, 1948.

off the "Bolshevik yoke" and embrace free enterprise as a longed-for lover. The Western countries would get rid of the "Red nightmare" once and forever. How realistic this picture can be is certainly debatable. Even the total destruction of all the important Soviet centers would not be felt immediately in the military field, giving enough time to the Soviet fighting forces to occupy major Western European establishments. Unless the U.S. continued to drop atomic bombs all over Western Europe as well, such a scheme fell short of real applicability. Just as Germany had started almost unequalled in 1939 but was halted and finally smashed within six years, the outcome for the U.S. in such a new venture might also be unexpected. All considered, however, the U.S. still enjoyed monopoly over the atom, possessed considerable amount of such bombs and felt herself in a position to encircle the Soviet Union and negotiate from strength.

There was also a hardly questionable belief in the United States that if the Soviets had possessed enough atomic bombs, they would at once destroy American cities. Yet, it was the United States that employed the atom bomb on two Japanese cities immediately after having possessed it. Later events proved that the Soviet Union did not use it after ending American monopoly over the atom. Furthermore, when Germany had offered during the Second World War to stop bombing cities, it was Britain that refused it. Also, the German *blitz* on London had started after the British example of RAF attacks on German cities.

This approach to the Soviet problem certainly had repercussions on domestic life and institutions. A "Red hysteria" took over in all parts of the United States. Unsubstantiated charges followed one after another. Many "liberal-minded" Americans were deprived of their jobs, whole families were filed as "subversive." An F.B.I. hunt of many "suspected" individuals over the loss of a bottle from an uranium laboratory reached scandalous proportions when it was found in the laboratory's own grave yard. Nevertheless, loyalty oaths followed, freedom of thought and speech were further curtailed. It was that Red hysteria in the international and the domestic scene that led Henry Wallace, U.S. Vice-President during F.D.R.'s third term and Secretary of Commerce in Truman's Cabinet, to call for a halt to tough policy. When Truman named General Walter Be-

dell Smith to be the U.S. Ambassador to Moscow in March 1946, Wallace spoke to Truman about what he called a "new approach" towards the Soviet Union and followed this up with a memorandum, dated March 14.¹⁰⁸ Wallace stated in the letter that much of the recent Soviet behaviour had been the result of their dire economic needs and of their disturbed sense of security. The events of the past months had thrown the Soviets back to their pre-1939 fears of "encirclement". He suggested a new start by a new group in the American Embassy in Moscow, and seemed ready to make suggestions regarding the composition of this mission. Truman's reaction, as recorded in his *Memoirs*, is as follows: "I ignored this letter of Wallace's."¹⁰⁹

On July 23 Wallace wrote another letter on U.S. relations with the Soviet Union. In twelve pages he analyzed the problem and listed things that he thought should be done. This letter later burst into the headlines. Wallace recited the size of the U.S. defense budget, the testing of atomic bombs in the Pacific, the manufacture of long range bombers and efforts to obtain bases abroad. He said that these facts made it appear either that the U.S. was preparing to win the war which it regarded as inevitable or that it was trying to build up a preponderance of force to intimidate the rest of mankind. Wallace could see many reasons why the Soviets would or should distrust the American Government. His speech in New York on September 12, was an all-out attack on U.S. foreign policy. When he returned to Washington four days later, he made a public statement that he intended to go on fighting for what he conceived to be the right way toward peace. The following day he released to the press the text of his July 23 letter to Truman. When Truman called Wallace to the White House on September 18, the latter proceeded to elaborate on his ideas at great length, stressing that the peoples of all nations had no desire but to have peace and that Russia also wanted peace but was afraid of American intentions. Two days later, Truman asked for Wallace's resignation. To fill the post of Secretary of Commerce, Truman deci-

¹⁰⁸ Truman, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 555-556; Royal Institute of International Affairs, *Survey of International Affairs: 1947-1948*, London, Oxford University Press, 1952, p. 44.

¹⁰⁹ Truman, *op. cit.*, p. 556.

ded on W. Averell Harriman, who had started to support the President on the Cold War issues. At that time, not only the socialist British weekly *New Statesman and Nation*, but also the liberal *Economist* endorsed the views of Henry A. Wallace, who was not a Communist, but was in fact an example of the New Deal version of Woodrow Wilson's reforming expansionism. He also believed that private enterprise in the United States could survive only if it expanded and grew. He had referred to the undeveloped, poor countries as "this unlimited new frontier of opportunities."¹¹⁰

Truman's vehement attitude can be explained by an official strategy that finds its expression in the militant statement of Senator Arthur K. Vandenberg. In order to win the support of public opinion to energetic anti-Soviet policy, he believed it necessary "to scare the hell out of the American people."¹¹¹

While the American Government was magnifying the Soviet danger essentially to advocate America's supremacy in the world, to mould all nations in its own pattern and to be assured of unrestricted economic access, the Soviets were withdrawing from Iran, an admittedly weak country, leaving the Western powers in an even more predominant strategic and economic position. In 1941, the British and the Soviets had occupied Iran, which had entered into a treaty with the two powers, granting them all facilities for the prosecution of the war, but also guaranteeing that all foreign armed forces would leave Iranian soil within six months of the termination of hostilities. In 1945, a revolt broke out in Iranian Azerbaijan, with a new government set up in Tabriz. The Iranian Kurds also issued a declaration of autonomy. The Soviets were expected to evacuate certain areas of Iran on March 2, 1946, the date set by the Anglo-Soviet Treaty of 1942. Iran complained to the U.S. Security Council. In 1907 another Anglo-Russian Treaty had divided Iran into British and Russian "spheres of influence", with a neutral buffer zone between. If Tsarist Russia had emerged as one of the victorious powers from the First World War, she would most certainly hold northern Iran. The 1917 Bolshevik Revolution brought a new type of relations with that small southern neighbor. The

¹¹⁰ Williams, *op. cit.*, p. 237.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 240.

southern British sphere, however, continued to be the special preserve of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. Britain was even interested in the Caucasian oil fields, and during the Second World War, there had been rumours that the Western countries would bomb Baku, an oil city.¹¹² The Soviet Union desired an oil concession in northern Iran, partly because it feared that Soviet oil fields in the neighborhood were being drained by wells south of the border. The Iranian delegate to the U.N. brought up the problem of Soviet presence in northern Iran at a time when the British troops were in Greece and Indonesia and when the Lebanese representative charged that the British and French troops in Syria and Lebanon constituted a dangerous threat to peace.¹¹³

An agreement between the Soviet Union and Iran had been signed giving the former an oil concession in northern Iran on a 51 to 49 division of the profits, a percentage rather embarrassing for the British who turned over to the Iranian crown and its feudal lords only 20 % of the oil gains. The Soviet oil concession, however, had to wait for the approval of the Iranian *Majlis* (Parliament), which had forbidden concessions while foreign troops remained on Iranian soil. While the Iranian Government broke the revolt in Azerbaijan, the *Majlis*, by a vote of 102 to 2, declined to approve the Soviet concession, with the help of public encouragement from the American Ambassador in Teheran. Premier Ahmed Qavam resigned, leaving his place to the pro-British Haqimi.¹¹⁴ In short, the Soviet Union, that "base of the World Revolution", which in the eyes of the West, was out to conquer the rest of Europe and the world, was forced to withdraw from this tiny kingdom and got no oil, although her conditions of payment were much better than those of Britain. The Soviets were being expelled from the neighboring areas while American and British troops remained unmolested in faraway places. These two Western countries could secure foreign

112 Türkkiye Ataöv, *Turkish Foreign Policy: 1939-1945*, Ankara, Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, 1965, pp. 75-78.

113 United Nations, *The Yearbook of the United Nations: 1946-1947*, New York, Department of Public Information, 1947, pp. 327-336.

114 For a view most sympathetic to Western oil and strategic interests, see: George Lenczowski, *The Middle East in World Affairs*, 3rd ed., Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1962, pp. 194, 201.

oil on even scandalous conditions while the Soviets were denied a better deal. Finally, the Western-dominated United Nations was being used to discomfit the Soviet Union. The Iranian problem was of the first things that the Security Council took up.

On the other hand, on March, 5, 1946, President Truman was applauding as the British Opposition Leader Winston Churchill delivered his extremely violent anti-Soviet "Iron Curtain" speech at Westminster College (Fulton, Missouri).¹¹⁵ Churchill's famous Missouri speech may be an important document explaining the origins of the Cold War. Calling for a new and a bigger *cordon sanitaire* around the Soviet Union, and a great alliance of powers against that country, he proposed encircling her. It is strange that Truman refers to such an important event with two simple sentences in the second volume of his *Memoirs*.¹¹⁶ There seems no doubt that the President knew the contents of the speech beforehand and had approved of it. Churchill had called for a general mobilization, (a) in the presence of Truman, applauding from the platform, (b) on the soil of the United States and (c) when the Soviets had already started to fear an encirclement aimed at them. The effect of Churchill's talk upon the Soviets was profound. When the *Pravda* editorial entitled "Churchill Rattles the Sword" is reread now, at a time when the emotional fervor has subsided, one feels that the Soviets must have harbored then a serious anxiety, a real fear of encirclement.¹¹⁷ Churchill's words had convinced the Soviets of the danger that was lying ahead of them. After two further speeches of the same order, Churchill left for Europe where he continued the campaign.

On the other hand, when Marshall Stalin received Eliot Roosevelt on December 21, 1946, he acknowledged the deterioration in relations between the former Allies, but insisted that there should be no war. The Soviet and American societies could very well exist in time and space. They had done so in war and must do so again. There could be more trade and cultural exchanges. Stalin favored the idea of having an international police force under the control of the U.N. to step in case of a threat

¹¹⁵ The text in *The New York Times*, February 10, 1946.

¹¹⁶ Truman, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 95.

¹¹⁷ *Keessing's Contemporary Archives*, Vol. VI, p. 7793.

of war. He urged for several more meetings of the Big Three.¹¹⁸ In contrast, George H. Earle, a former American Minister to Bulgaria, was publicly urging that the Soviet Union be given an ultimatum to get back to her own territory. "And if they refused," he added, "I would use the atomic bomb on them while we have it and before they get it."¹¹⁹

Speaking at Princeton University on February 22, 1947, General Marshall dwelled on the "special position that the United States now occupies in the world, geographically, financially, militarily and scientifically, and the implications involved."¹²⁰ Marshall was urging the United States to participate in world affairs commensurate with American strength. However, the dominant idea immediately after the Second World War was a new world system in which the powers would work together, no one power asserting a primacy, or spheres of influence. The principal objective of the Truman Administration, on the other hand, seemed to be the reverse. The role which the U.S. Government now assumed was opposition to the Soviet Union and to all possible changes, rather than solving the problems of a distressed world or to feed and shelter the hungry. The first important pronouncement of this approach was the Truman Doctrine of March 12, 1947.

VI. EXPANSION THROUGH CONTAINMENT

On February 3 a cable to the State Department from Ambassador MacVeagh in Athens had reported rumors that the British would withdraw their troops from Greece.¹²¹ On February 21, the British Ambassador asked to see General Marshall, who was out of town, attending the bicentennial celebration of Princeton University. The State Department obtained from the British Embassy a copy of the note which the Ambassador would deliver to the Secretary. The note informed that Britain would pull out of Greece no later than April 1. On February 24

118 *Survey: 1947-1948*, *op. cit.*, p. 27. An article by Eliot Roosevelt about this interview appeared in the American magazine *Look*, dated January 21, 1947.

119 Quoted in Fleming, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 357.

120 U.S., Department of State, *Bulletin*, Vol. XVI, No. 400 (March 2, 1947), pp. 390-391.

121 Truman, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 99.

the official copy of the note was received. On March 12, Truman stepped to the rostrum in the hall of the House of Representatives and addressed a joint session of the Congress. His speech was virtually a declaration of war on the international Communist movement. Truman had come to fear that some Republicans were fabricating the rumor that the Democrats were soft on Communists. In November 1946, the Republicans had won the Congressional elections for the first time since 1928. The cry of communism raised by the Republicans all over the U.S. had probably played an important role in the GOP victory. Truman seemed determined to steal the Republican thunder. He had decided on such a policy long ago, but was waiting for a suitable opportunity to propagate it. The message, which asked for four-hundred million dollars for Greece and Turkey, made a general pronouncement that wherever a revolution developed, the United States would suppress it. That country had become a world policeman arresting all revolutionary activities. The American Revolution having been finished long ago, everything was to stay put. Behind the surface of the message, Truman was speaking for conservatism in his own country and allying himself with reaction all over the world. He was condemning his government and his people to the hopeless mission of striving to prevent inevitable social changes everywhere. He delivered into his opponent's hands all initiative and dynamism and seemed satisfied defending the out-going established orders. The United States was ready to support any régime in Greece -or elsewhere- no matter how oligarchical it might be. Churchill was jubilant, but the British Labor Party circles were uneasy. Many Britons feared that their island would be wiped out in a show-down with the Soviet Union. There was anxiety in France, Italy, the Low Countries and Scandinavia. But the President's motivation was not even veiled. He said: "Well, that should take the Communist smear off the Democratic Party!"¹²² Thirteen days after his speech in the Congress he issued an order requiring millions of government employees to undergo a security check. The former assertion that American citizens were loyal was destroyed within a fortnight. All of a sudden, the government servants had become second class citizens, living

122 Horowitz, *From Yalta to Vietnam*, *op. cit.*, p. 97.

under the shadow of the F.B.I. Truman had taken the first bold, but blind step towards "McCarthyism."

When Henry A. Wallace opposed the military aspects of the Truman Doctrine in several speeches delivered in Britain, France and Scandinavia, there were demands that his passport be revoked. The timing of the message to Congress is also open to interpretation. The Foreign Minister's Moscow Conference had opened on March 10, 1947. The Truman Doctrine, militantly dividing the world into two hostile camps, was announced only two days after the conference had started. The suspicion created gave birth to further acts which seemed defensive to the party that took them as they seemed provocatively offensive from the point of view of the other party.

The Soviet press interpreted the Truman Doctrine as interference in other country's internal affairs. *Izvestia*, dated March 13, 1947, inquired: "What will be left of Greek sovereignty when the 'American military and civilian personnel' gets to work in Greece by means of the 250 million dollars brought into that country?"¹²³ The cited American responsibility was actually a smokescreen for expansion.

Truman's grandiose declaration of opposition to those not prepared to accept the 'American way of life' was in a way the immediate result of the controversial Civil War in Greece. It is controversial because later publications bringing out sober truths indicate that Greece was actually the Vietnam of the late 1940's and that the nature of the National Liberation Front there was clouded by slanted arguments calculated to present an ostensible aggression from the North.¹²⁴ *Both Greece and Vietnam reveal the emptiness and the triviality with which the American ideologues attempt to clothe the brutal reality of intervention.* In both cases, a Western power occupied a country to suppress movements that had become popular during wartime resistance. In both countries, the United States came to the aid of repressive

123 Royal Institute of International Affairs, *Documents on International Affairs: 1947-1948*, Margaret Carlyle, ed., London, Oxford University Press, 1952, pp. 7-10.

124 Todd Gitlin, "Counter-Insurgency: Myths and Reality in Greece," *Containment and Revolution*, David Horowitz, ed., London, Anthony Blond, 1967, pp. 140-181.

governments and did not back the people. In both cases, myths were created to obscure the truth about events. The central myth was Truman's declaration that his doctrine was intended to support "free peoples who are resisting subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures." Truman had charged "a militant minority" with political chaos and the impossibility of economic recovery. Over twenty years have passed and Greece is still in political chaos and has not recovered economically. And the blame should be laid on the militant minority, clustered around the monarchy or a handful of right-wing military rulers, both supported by the United States. It is instructive here to recall some statements of President Truman he had made in the afternoon of March 12 :

"...Preliminary reports from the American Economic Mission now in Greece and reports from the American Ambassador in Greece corroborate the statement of the Greek Government that assistance is imperative if Greece is to survive as a free nation... A militant minority, exploiting human want and misery, was able to create political chaos which, until now, has made economic recovery impossible... The very existence of the Greek state is today threatened by the terrorist activities of several thousand armed men, led by Communists, who defy the government's authority at a number of points, particularly along the northern boundaries... The Greek Government is unable to cope with the situation... Greece must have assistance if it is to become a self-supporting and self-respecting democracy... The British Government, which has been helping Greece, can give no further financial or economic aid after March 21... The situation is an urgent one requiring immediate action... It is the utmost importance that we supervise the use of any funds made available to Greece... The government of Greece... [was] chosen in an election last year. Foreign observers, including 692 Americans, considered this election to be a fair expression of the views of the Greek people... Greece's neighbor Turkey, also deserves our attention... Turkey now needs our support... I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures..."¹²⁵

One of the myths used in support of the Truman message but had falsified history was that the Greek guerillas were all communists under Stalin's control. In fact, the National Liberation Front (EAM), founded in September 1941, excluded no one as long as he seemed determined to fight the invading Nazis.

¹²⁵ Harry S. Truman, *Recommendations on Greece and Turkey: the President's Message to the Congress*, March 12, 1947, Washington, D.C., Department of State Publication 2785, Near Eastern Series 6.

The Greek guerillas were already active when EAM established the National Liberation Army (ELAS) in December 1942. When liberation came, the EAM numbered two million, out of a population of seven million.¹²⁶ It had a fine record of resisting the occupying forces and those who collaborated with the enemy. They had raised the people's morale, and had protected them from hunger and sickness. After the liberation, they were looking forward to the establishment of a government not from those who had collaborated with the enemy, but from the leaders of the National Liberation Struggle. They also stood for the establishment of all popular liberties and a general amnesty. No other force in the country was entitled to represent the Greek people. They had won the support of the masses, having allowed women to vote for the first time, conducted fair public trials, carried the benefits of civilization to the mountains for the first time, introduced the idea of cooperatives, agricultural schools and free hospitals. They never molested peasants' houses, except in cases of collaboration. Even the passionately anti-Communist Dimitrios G. Kousoulas had the following to say about the EAM: "In the desperate hours of the occupation, the proclamations of EAM served as a brilliant beacon of hope piercing the darkness, bringing solace and courage to an enslaved people."¹²⁷ The EAM had practised more democracy in the liberated areas than any other movement before or since.

Churchill, however, branded the EAM as terrorists—as all anti-imperialists are so indentified. What he actually feared was the possibility of a popular government in Greece. Although the British had opened fire in Athens on December 3, 1944, as early as August 29, Churchill had written down: "It is most desirable to strike out of the blue without any preliminary crisis. It is the best way to forestall the EAM."¹²⁸ In a letter to the Foreign Secretary on November 7, he wrote: "I fully expect a clash with EAM, and we must not shrink from it, provided the ground is well chosen."¹²⁹ And on December 3, he ordered Ge-

126 W.H. McNeill, *The Greek Dilemma: War and Aftermath*, Philadelphia, 1947, p. 99.

127 Dimitrios G. Kousoulas, *Revolution and Defeat: the Story of the Greek Communist Party*, London, Oxford University Press, 1965, p. 193.

128 Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy*, op. cit., p. 284.

129 *Ibid.*, p. 287.

neral Scobie to fire upon them. Churchill had not even called the Cabinet. He drafted the following telegram himself:

"...You are responsible for neutralising or destroying all EAM-ELAS bands approaching the city. You may make any regulations you like for the strict control of the streets or for the rounding up of any number of truculent persons... Do not hesitate to fire at any armed male in Athens who assails the British authority or Greek authority with which we are working... Do not... hesitate to act as if you were in a conquered city where a local rebellion is in progress... We have to hold and dominate Athens..."¹³⁰

And to Sir Reginald Leeper, the British Ambassador in Athens, he wrote: "Henceforward you and Papandreou will conform to his [General Scobie's] directions... You should both support Scobie..."¹³¹ On December 8, he informed the General that the clear objective was the defeat of the EAM. He had already ordered large reinforcements to come to Athens. Later, he admitted in his *Memoirs*: "Stalin, however, adhered strictly and faithfully to our agreement of October, and during all the long weeks of fighting the Communists in the streets of Athens not one word of reproach came from *Pravda* or *Izvestia*."¹³² But in the British House of Commons there was a great stir. The charge was that the government was using His Majesty's forces to disarm the friends of democracy in Greece and in other parts of the world and to suppress those popular movements which had so valorously assisted in the defeat of fascism.

As to the Churchillian allegation that the EAM supporters had started a reign of terror, Leland Grove in the *New York Post* of February 17, 1945, documented exactly the opposite:

"In Athens I met half a dozen British and American correspondents whose integrity I can vouch for over a period of years. Since mid-October they had travelled from one end of Greece to the other. These experienced reporters have never encountered anything remotely resembling a reign of 'terror'—until the shooting began (by the British) in Athens... Gervasi [of *Collier's*] and Fodor [of the *Chicago Sun*] did not encounter any pillaging or 'massacres'... They went, trying to verify atrocity stories—and couldn't find any..."

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 288–289.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 290.

¹³² *Ibid.*, p. 293.

As to the further implication that Stalin was behind the "aggressive" policy of the EAM, Churchill's own statement has been quoted above. The truth seems that Stalin or the Soviet Union did not even exist as far as the EAM was concerned. The Soviet leaders were interested in stabilizing their war-torn economy. And when Stalin commented on the Greek situation, he reasoned that the Americans and the British would not leave that Mediterranean country and made clear that he was bound by the October 1944 agreement.¹³³ The EAM, apparently, received neither advice, nor pressure from the Soviet Union, but could see for itself that the British did not harbor the best of intentions for the people of Greece. The British had supported the return of the King as well as the Rightist refusal to disband the Royalist armed forces between liberation and December shootings. When the EAM and the other resistance groups went to Cairo in 1943 to bargain with the British, the Greeks seemed to be in agreement on the dynasty question. It was Churchill again who backed the Throne. While the British tried to grasp and support the reactionary and the corrupt, calling the EAM "silly Communists", a Western writer described the latter in the following words: "[The EAM] was neither a chess play directed from Moscow nor foray of bandits from the hills-but a genuine popular movement which had recruited almost all that was generous, courageous and enlightened in Greece; the most spirited among the young, the most clear-sighted among the mature."¹³⁴ Had the British Prime Minister reached a similar evaluation of the situation, the outcome would have been a popular and an honorable Greek Government that would put the interests of its people above all else. That was exactly what British Government seemed to disdain. And the results was the Civil War in Greece. Let us be fair and not blame others for the

133 Milovan Djilas, *Conversations with Stalin*, New York, Harcourt, Brace and World, 1962, pp. 181-182. At Yalta, Stalin casually mentioned that he would like to know what was going on in Greece. He was not criticizing the British there, he declared, but merely seeking for information. Stettinius, *op. cit.*, p. 217. What is more, when a certain Col. Popov had visited the ELAS headquarters on July 26, 1944, he apparently tried to convince to retreat some of the EAM demands and join supporting the British-sponsored government. This stems out as the only contact between the ELAS and a Soviet citizen. L.S. Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1953*, New York, 1958, p. 816.

134 Fleming, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 185.

expansionist tactics of the West. And let us not condemn movements of democratic origin as 'terroristic', for the intrigues of imperialism may sooner or later be exposed.

When ELAS controlled all of Greece -except a patch of land in the center of Athens, along the Bay of Phaleron and in Salonika and Patras- British divisions were flown in American troop transport planes. The former ELAS men were arrested, beaten up and tried on trumped-up charges when the Greek Left had accepted the Varkiza agreement. Thus, it was a popular belief that the elections to follow were to be fraudulent. It was for this reason that the EAM and many other non-Communist parties boycotted the polls. The British-supported Royalists won under such scandalous conditions. And the plebiscite for the return of the King was held when the people's will could not be freely expressed. Guerillas drifted to the hills and Civil War was thrust on the Greek Left, which was not prepared for it.

As it is also true in the case of Vietnam, the Communists in Greece did not start the Civil War. It was certainly not fomented from the North. Armed bands of peasants took to the hills long before the Communists were left no other choice but armed resistance. They were forced to join at a desperate point. Armed men were already engaged in action despite years' longing for a return to peace. The report of the British parliamentary delegation that visited Greece in August 1946 was not much different from the program of the EAM. It called for a restoration of constitutional liberties, new elections and the formation of an All-Party Government and seemed to condemn the tax-free rich and the armed Rightists. It was not acted upon, nor was it published until 1947. The British and the Americans were not interested in such suggestions no matter how fair; they aimed at the destruction of the guerillas and the total elimination of the popular Left. Truman certainly knew what he was supporting when he announced his doctrine. It was one of the worst governments any people could possible have. Under no circumstances could it reform. Neither did it, as later events proved. Hence, the false propaganda that the Leftists could not bear their program being stolen away from them did not apply in Greece. Neither did it apply in Diem's Vietnam, nor in the Alliance for Progress program in Latin America. The Royalist

government in Athens could not steal away progressive platforms of other parties, but only the wealth created by the people of Greece; they could not even borrow the good name that the EAM had deserved through armed resistance against the enemy while their present adversaries had either collaborated or had left the country.

Also, the assertion that the Greek Left had perpetuated the Civil War does not hold water. Although it is true that the Royalist government offered an amnesty, the period of rightist vengeance after the Varkiza agreement and the mere promise of amnesty without important political changes necessarily could not earn the approval of the guerillas.

In fact, it was not the Soviet Union that had assisted the Greek rebels. The British, and later the Americans, were the only two foreign powers that interfered in the Greek Civil War. And it was not mere interference, but military intervention that determined the outcome of the armed clash. The arms that the guerillas used were mostly captured German, Italian, British or American weapons, just as the NLF in Vietnam has heavily relied on French and American arms. The Greek guerillas were active not only in the north, but also in the inlands and elsewhere, where assistance from the north could hardly reach. Similarly, the NLF in Vietnam is affectively active in the Mekong Delta, which is the farthest point removed from North Vietnam. Hence, Truman, in his speech on March 12, could not even hint that foreign assistance was contributing to the success of the guerillas. Indeed, if there was an intervention in the Greek Civil War, it was that of Britain and the United States. American supplies followed those of the British. A mass of 197,000 Royalist troops, 'advised' and equipped by American and British missions, was hurled on the 17,000 guerillas on the last offensive. No matter what Truman's message might have promised, Greece has reached nowhere since the civil war. It is still a semi-colony, with the Western-sponsored governments representing the irresponsible rich and capitalist interests. This is because the Western intervention brought nothing better, but worse. The police force in Greece was largely the one that had served the Nazis.¹³⁵ The British troops helped to pacify the country. Excesses were such

¹³⁵ McNeill, *op. cit.*, p. 150.

that even Prime Minister Attlee issued a public protest.¹³⁶ Amidst boycotts and objections, only 49% of the registered voters cast ballots in the 1946 elections. It was thus the monarchists won in Greece. The new Tsaldaris Government emphasized the restoration of the King, passed over lightly the economic recovery and appointed Foties Makris, a notorious union leader who had collaborated with the wartime Quisling government, as chief of the newly-created Greek Confederation of Labor. In the words of Howard K. Smith, there were "few modern parallels for government this bad."¹³⁷ In his 'Doctrine' speech, President Truman had referred to Greece as "free peoples" the United States Government was going to support. The President had actually declared that it was in the interest of the United States to interfere anywhere in the world.

Similarly, General Marshall's Harvard speech on June 5, 1947, was not a bolt from the blue. Aiming to complement the Truman Doctrine, it affected the birth of the Cold War, intensified the split in Europe and led to government changes in the Eastern as well as the Western parts of the Continent. The Communist Ministers in the French and Italian Governments were excluded from the Cabinets *after* the declaration of the Truman Doctrine. For instance, Signor De Gaspari's fourth administration, formed on February 1, 1947, was a coalition which included communists and socialists. His fifth government, however, consisted of members of his own party together with some independents, such as Count Sforza. The Christian Democrats had excluded the socialists and communists.¹³⁸ Similarly, on May 4, 1947, Ramadier dismissed the Communists from the French Cabinet. It will be remembered that the French Communists had agreed to take their cue from General De Gaulle at a time when they were the chief driving force behind the French Resistance. And the Italian Communists had made peace with the House of Savoy. Likewise, in Luxemburg, a government was formed without Communists on March 1, 1947. In Belgium, the Communist Ministers had to resign on March 11, 1947. The role that the American Embassies played in these expulsions, dis-

¹³⁶ Horowitz, *From Yalta to Vietnam*, *op. cit.*, p. 64.

¹³⁷ Howard K. Smith, *The State of Europe*, New York, Knopf, 1949, p. 336.

¹³⁸ *Survey: 1947-1948*, *op. cit.*, pp. 3, 117-118.

missals and resignations is public knowledge¹³⁹. If one studies the post-war history of Europe, one sees that the Communists sat as partners in the clerical, conservative governments of Western Europe, urging the workers to behave moderately, and helping capitalism in its reconstruction. It was only when the Communists were ejected from the Western European governments that the anti-Communists were ejected from the Eastern European governments.

It was Marshall Stalin who was harping on the fraternal note during interviews with the American representatives. While the Moscow Conference was still in session, he received Stassen on April 9, 1947.¹⁴⁰ He wanted to cooperate with the United States. All he seemed to ask was a reciprocal wish. He added: "As to the possibility of cooperation, I adhere to Lenin who expressed both the possibility and the desire of cooperation." As for the merits of the rival systems, he seemed to leave that question to history. On the other hand, only twenty-seven days before, Truman had declared himself the world's number one anti-Communist.

The U.S. policy of containment was to be supplemented by stress on the need for economic expansion. Western Europe had to take its place in the American scheme of things. The open-door system had to continue and englobe the whole world. Russia had to be coerced. The Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan were the two sides of the same coin. The U.S. was out to pursue its traditional policy of economic expansion. The open-door system was to be the only reality, and all revolutionary radicalism was to stop. Under-Secretary of State Dean Acheson's speech at Cleveland, Mississippi on May 8, 1947, concentrated on promoting human freedom and democratic institutions. But it was clear after the Moscow Conference that these terms meant different things for different countries. However, Acheson's speech lacked the anti-Communist crusading spirit of the President.¹⁴¹

139 Horowitz, *Containment and Revolution*, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

140 *Survey: 1947-1948*, *op. cit.*, pp. 27-28; Raymond Dennett and Robert K. Turner, ed., *Documents on American Foreign Relations: 1947*, Vermont, Gildreth, 1949, pp. 613-618; *Documents: 1947-1948*, *op. cit.*, pp. 116-121.

141 W.W. Rostow, *The United States in the World Arena*, New York, Harper, 1960, pp. 201-210.

Secretary Marshall's famous speech at Harvard on June 5, 1947, was moderate compared again to the President's singular outburst. But it contained a warning to the Soviet Union and the communist parties, by stating that governments, political parties or groups which sought "to perpetuate human misery" would encounter the opposition of the United States. The United Nations was again by-passed. The U.N. Economic Commission for Europe, of which the Soviet Union was also a member, was not even tried. Earlier, on April 29, the day after his report to the nation on the failure of the Moscow Conference, Secretary Marshall had instructed his staff to prepare an aid program for the "reconstruction of *Western Europe*." The National Association of Manufacturers, a powerful pressure group in the U.S., demanded that aid be extended to private competitive enterprises.¹⁴² The U.S. decision to intensify the Cold War was not taken as a result of the failure of the Moscow Conference. It was Truman who had raised the "war cry"¹⁴³ two days after the start of the Conference. Howard K. Smith notes that in the first days of the conference the Soviets assumed that "all was well." But "right on top of the conference, two days after it opened, burst the bombshell of the Truman Doctrine. President said, 'nearly every nation must choose between' the two worlds; it sounded like an ultimatum to the rest of Europe to be with us or to be counted against us. That wiped the smiles off the Russians' faces."¹⁴⁴

At home, Marshall and his supporters defended the 'aid' program in the traditional terms as a way to avoid loss of "democracy" and wealth at home. If the plan was not adopted it would cause the loss of foreign markets and supplies and would have a depressing influence on the domestic economy.¹⁴⁵ Actually, as Secretary of the Interior Julius A. Krug had explicitly admitted, it was essential "for continued productivity and prosperity."¹⁴⁶

142 James Paul Warburg, *Put Yourself in Marshall's Place*, New York, Simon and Schuster, 1948, p. 76.

143 Louis J. Halle, *American Foreign Policy*, London, Allen, 1960, pp. 296-297.

144 Smith, *op. cit.*, pp. 118-123.

145 Williams, *op. cit.*, p. 271.

146 *Ibid.*, p. 272.

In spite of the *Pravda* denunciation on June 16 of the Marshall proposal, Molotov arrived, ten days later, in Paris with an entourage of 89 experts, evidently prepared to do business. He was presented with a plan drawn up by Bevin and Bidault based on the principle of integrating national economies. This meant that each nation would produce what it produced best. This was asking the Eastern European countries to give up their plans for industrialization and represented an interference in the internal affairs of the European nations. Molotov replied¹⁴⁷ by saying that European reconstruction would be much facilitated if the United States assisted, and it was also to the interest of the United States to make use of the possibilities of their credit to enlarge their foreign markets, especially in view of the approaching crisis. The Soviet Government had accepted the invitation, "in spite of the fact that the Soviet socialist economy guaranteed immunity from the impending crisis." Opposing Bidault's proposal to draw up a general program for the countries of Europe, Molotov wanted each country to decide for itself what it wanted by way of credits or supplies, basing its assessment on its own economic plan. An attempt to produce a general European program could not be a basis for collaboration. This was a matter concerning the sovereignty of each state. The Western proposal would make the Eastern European countries the agricultural granary of the West. Tied to a capitalist industrial nation, an agricultural nation would always become the weak dependent sister. The Soviet Union could not risk opening up Eastern Europe to Western capitalist control. The Eastern European countries themselves wanted to end the colonial relationship to Western Europe and Western capitalist investment. The West was still after receiving raw materials and food products from Eastern Europe, supplying it with manufactured goods in return. American credits would make use of some European countries against other European countries in whatever way certain strong powers seeking to establish their domination should find it profitable to do so. For the Soviet Union, the Marshall Plan was a real threat.

When Molotov rejected the plan, it seemed to the average people in the Western world that his purposes were sinister. In

147 *Survey: 1947-1948, op. cit.*, pp. 35-36.

their evaluation, he had rejected a generous offer. Those who had seen the Marshall proposal as a step towards the restoration of European unity were stunned. Molotov had departed brusquely. The world was now really divided into two parts. Having consulted Moscow on every occasion, he had decided nothing by himself, and his departure was more meaningful. Molotov's departure also enabled Bevin and Bidault to invite all European countries -except the Soviet Union and fascist Spain- to attend a conference on July 12. When the conference duly convened, eight of those invited did not attend: Finland, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Albania.

Molotov had left the Paris Conference on July 2. The Soviet Union signed new trade treaties with the Eastern European countries within a month. On July 10, a trade agreement was concluded between the Soviet Union and Bulgaria, on July 11 with Czechoslovakia, on July 14 with Hungary, on July 25 with Yugoslavia, on August 4 with Poland and on August 26 with Rumania. The European continent was being consolidated economically; its political division was to follow. In Western Europe, too, criticism of the Marshall Plan had already started. The French Premier Ramadier said: "A little of our independence is departing from us with each loan we obtain."¹⁴⁸

VII. CZECHOSLOVAKIA, GERMANY AND NATO

Moreover, the United States was heading towards the containment of the Soviet Union. George F. Kennan, the Chief of the Policy Planning Staff in the U.S. State Department and formerly Minister-Counsellor at the American Embassy in Moscow, published an article, entitled "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," in the American magazine *Foreign Affairs*.¹⁴⁹ The author argued that the Soviets should be kept under constant pressure, patiently but firmly contained.

¹⁴⁸ Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 157.

¹⁴⁹ X [George F. Kennan], "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. XXV, No. 4 (July 1949), pp. 566-582. Kennan's thesis was severely criticized by many, notably by Walter Lippmann in a series of articles in *The New Herald Tribune*, September 2-October 2, 1947. Also see: George F. Kennan, *Memoirs: 1925-1950*, Boston, Little, Brown and Co., 1967, pp. 354-368.

On October 5, 1947, the formation of a new international organization of communist parties was announced. Many Westerners thought that the Cominform was out to create chaos. Just because chaos in bourgeois societies had in the past led to communists régimes, it did not mean that chaos was a standard communist tactic. Likewise, chaos in Germany prior to 1933 had brought Fascism instead. The representatives of the nine Communist parties that had assembled together at Wiliza Gora in Silesia had agreed to establish for their mutual advantage an information bureau, with the exchange of views and the production of a multi-lingual journal, entitled *For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy*. It is also important to note that the Cominform was established three months after the Soviets realized that they could not stop the Marshall Plan. The Communist parties of Europe began a campaign opposing the Plan by all means available to them.

A Cominform declaration, based on a report by Gomulka¹⁵⁰, presented the Marshall Plan as a means of American expansion in Europe behind a veil of liberalism and pacifism. On September 18, 1947, Vishinsky attacked the whole capitalist system for the first time in a U.N. General Assembly speech.¹⁵¹ Similarly, in the course of the celebrations of the thirtieth anniversary of the October Revolution, Molotov reviewed Western hostility towards the Soviet Union since 1917 and said that many in the West had hoped in 1941 that Russia and Germany would bleed each other white. The American policy of "assistance" was not built on a desire for peace, as was evident from the establishment of new military bases all over the world.¹⁵² When the Council of Foreign Ministers met in London on November 25, 1947, nothing was achieved in terms of peace for Germany and Austria.

In the meantime, the developments in Czechoslovakia and the interpretation the West attached to it furthered the schism between the two sides. First, it should be remembered that, in accordance with the Teheran and Yalta decisions, the Soviet

150 *Documents: 1947-1948, op. cit.*, pp. 122-125.

151 U.N., *The Yearbook of the United Nations: 1947-1948*, New York, Department of Public Information, 1949, pp. 88-89.

152 *Documents: 1947-1948, op. cit.*, pp. 141-146.

armies were to liberate Prague. It was for this reason that General Patton held his army outside the Czech capital until the arrival of the Soviet forces. Secondly, the large property-owners were not strong enough to oppose communism. To save their own property the Czech capitalists had collaborated with the Nazis; they had duly lost their belongings with the victory of the Allies. The Jewish capitalists had been killed by the Germans during the war. The German capitalists themselves had either fled or were on the losing side anyway. A practical way of utilizing all these properties was to nationalize them. Many Czechs agreed that this was the best solution. Furthermore, about three million Sudeten Germans were to be expelled to Germany; their property, too, fell into the hands of the state. After the war, the Communist Party became the largest party and received the heaviest vote. Its leader was entitled to the post of Prime Minister. While the Socialists worked with the Communists the two leftist parties together represented more than the half of the people. As had happened in France and Italy after the announcement of the Marshall Plan, the rightists sought ways to put the Communists out of office. Apart from the strategic importance of Bohemia, the Premier in that country was a Communist and his party was the largest in the government. A change in the rightist direction can, therefore, be properly named a "coup d'état," or a "revolution," not the consolidation of the *status quo*.¹⁵³ The entry of the Soviet troops into Prague, the elections and the formation of the government had all taken place beforehand and with the knowledge of the West.

The crisis developed when the non-Communist members in the Cabinet condemned the ousting in February 1948 of eight notorious police officials in Prague. When Premier Gottwald refused this demand, they resigned. The government, fearing a plot by the resigned Cabinet members to disturb the land reform and denationalize the factories, called for a giant demonstration of workers. Fifty leading non-Communist deputies rushed to Gottwald and offered their support. Zdenek Fierlinger, one of the leaders of the Socialist Party who was being pushed to the back rows for working closely with the Communists, was imme-

¹⁵³ Sir Robert Lockhart, "The Czechoslovakian Revolution," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. XXVI, No. 4 (July 1948), p. 635; Joseph Korbel, *The Communist Subversion of Czechoslovakia*, Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1959.

diately reinstated. Benes accepted the resignation of the non-Communist Cabinet members. The government was now completely in the hands of the Communists with no non-Communists participating in the Cabinet.

The change, which certainly did not alter the *status quo* basically, was not actively opposed by President Benes or Foreign Minister Masaryk, both "respected democrats." There was no bloodshed, no executions. The Soviet occupation troops had long left the country. The workers, in great numbers, filled the streets and paraded. Benes and Masaryk seemed overwhelmed by the evidence of popular support for the government. Western observers have written that they walked the streets of Prague for days in vain, to try and find a single person weeping or showing anger.¹⁵⁴ In contrast, when the Germans had occupied Czechoslovakia, the people had showed an unrestrained hostile reaction.

The Communist power in Czechoslovakia would have been consolidated no matter what the Soviet contribution to it might have been. Czechoslovakia had been lost to the West long before February 1948. The West, which had closed its eyes to the Nazi rape of that small country in 1938, suddenly dramatized its "loss" after the Second World War. Although the death of Masaryk might have contributed to this dramatization, no similar consolidation could even be imagined for a Western European country short of a civil war. The cry raised was certainly out of proportion to what had actually happened. Amidst cries to save what was left of "world freedom," a conservative such as Senator Robert A. Taft stated the following on March 12, 1948: "I do not understand the statements made by Secretary Marshall and President Truman... The Communists are merely consolidating their position in Czechoslovakia; but there has been no military aggression, since the end of the war."¹⁵⁵ Senator Taft's view did not prevail, and the U.S. Government utilized the event to mobilize Western military and economic power against the Soviet bloc. It might be argued that there had been an anxiety to avoid appeasement, but this was a quite false analogy. The West had sold out Czechoslovakia in 1938 and the psychological

154 Smith, *op. cit.*, pp. 344-347.

155 Horowitz, *From Yalta to Vietnam*, *op. cit.*, p. 76.

effect of that deal was being whipped up to command remobilization for another purpose. Truman's speech on March 17 called for universal military service. American high-ranking officers were studying how atom bombs could be dropped on Soviet cities and industrial centres. The Russians would use it within a matter of seconds, they thought, once they had it. It may be helpful to remember at this point that the Soviets manufactured the atom and hydrogen bombs but did not use them, and also that it was the United States which had actually employed it against defenseless cities, that possessed no ways of retaliating.

While the U.S. Government was pushing through aid bills to corrupt régimes such as the one under Chiang Kai-shek, on March 17 five Western European countries came together to sign the fifty-year Western European Union treaty. Although it is asserted that this treaty was signed in response to the Czechoslovakian affair, the first proposal was made by Britain in January—that is before the Czech crisis.¹⁵⁶ Similarly, on March 15, sixteen European nations formed the Organization for European Economic Cooperation to facilitate the administration of the Marshall Plan.

It was in this atmosphere that the general elections in Italy were held on April 18, 1948. The Communist Party of Italy was expected to win. However, the U.S. had openly entered the campaign. The first American aid ships were unloaded ceremonially, with the U.S. Ambassador making appropriate speeches. The U.S. State Department announced that those voting for the Communist Party would be denied right of emigration into the United States. U.S. and British warships anchored off the Italian ports during the campaign. The U.S. Government presented Italy with 29 merchant ships, and together with Britain and France proposed the return of Trieste to Italy. President Truman must have had his tongue in his cheek when he had referred in his famous "doctrinal" speech to assistance to "free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way."

By this time, the United States and the Soviet Union were heading towards a new impasse over Germany. The latter more

¹⁵⁶ William Reitzel, Morton A. Kaplan and Constance G. Coblenz, *United States Foreign Policy: 1945-1955*, Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution, 1956, p. 124

and more feared a hostile Anglo-Saxon coalition. When early in 1948 General Walter Bedell Smith had his first interview with Stalin, he asked the Marshall whether he really believed that Washington and London were forming an anti-Soviet alliance. Stalin's reply was that they were.¹⁵⁷ Although Germany had existed as a single state for about three-quarters of a century, she was now divided. National unity was certainly an inalienable right of the German people. But the German problem itself was doubtless a complex one. Even if all the interested parties had shared the same world outlook or pursued similar policies elsewhere, their agreement on Germany could still have been difficult. The Potsdam decisions were particularly emphatic in stating that, despite her division into four zones of occupation, she should from the outset be regarded as one economic unit. The military authorities were to act jointly on all matters affecting Germany as a whole. From the very start, the Western Powers did not seem sympathetic towards establishing German central administrative departments for the main branches of the economy, which were to function under the Control Commission. As early as 1945, the Western Powers set about establishing separate administrative agencies for their zones. On December 2, 1946, the U.S. and British Governments signed an agreement on the unification of their two zones. Consequently, that portion of Germany was severed from the rest of Germany. On May 29, 1947, a separate Anglo-American agreement was made which established separate administrative agencies for "Bizonia." In September 1947, the U.S. and Britain concluded a new agreement on joint Anglo-American control of the Ruhr collieries. They had established for Bizonia a separate economic council, an executive committee, a special Supreme Court, and a *Bank Deutscher Lander*. In 1948, the French zone was incorporated into Bizonia.

The crisis came into the open on June 20, 1948, when the Western Powers effected in their occupation zones a separate currency reform. The single German currency was withdrawn from circulation and a special currency introduced for the Western zones only. Normal economic relations between Germany's

¹⁵⁷ Walter Bedell Smith, *Moscow Mission: 1946-1949*, London, Heinemann 1950, p. 41.

different parts were thus disrupted. Trade between the East and the West became in effect trade between two separate countries. There was perhaps a need for a new currency in Germany, which would strike a heavy blow at inflation. But its implementation should not have virtually isolated the whole of West Germany from East Germany. The Western Powers also adopted a decision to establish a separate state in the Western zones of Germany. In September 1948, the U.S., British and French Military Governors in Germany held a meeting of sixty-five people picked from the U.S., British and French zones. This meeting, referred to as the "Parliamentary Council," drafted the Constitution of a separate West German state. This is how the Bonn Constitution, approved by the U.S., British and French Military Governments on May 12, 1949, came into existence. And the *first* government of the separate West German state, that is, the Federal Republic of Germany, was formed in Western Germany on September 20, 1949. It should also be remembered that the German Democratic Republic was proclaimed later, that is, on October 7, 1949.

Similarly, the Berlin problem seemed subordinated to plans of splitting Germany. As is well known, Berlin's status was defined by a number of agreements signed by the Allies. The administration of Greater Berlin would be headed by an Inter-Allied Kommandantur functioning under the guidance of the Control Commission. The agreements in Berlin are not isolated and are a logical sequel to the general agreements signed by the Four Powers with regard to the treatment of the whole of Germany. However, the establishment of separate economic bodies, employer's unions, courts and police force as well as the handing back of their property to the dissolved Nazi economic groups, raised doubts as to the proper application of the Potsdam decisions. Such doubts gain rightful proportions when compared with the following statement of a man no other than the former Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany Dr. Konrad Adenauer: "Bismarck spoke of his nightmare of an anti-German coalition. I, too, have a nightmare of my own: it is called Potsdam."¹⁵⁸ Further, the Western Powers vetoed the Law On the Transfer of Concerns and Other Economic Enter-

¹⁵⁸ *Bulletin des Presse und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung*, June 13, 1953, Bonn.

prises to Public Ownership that had been passed by the Berlin City Council on February 13, 1947, and another Law pertaining to the confiscation of the property of war criminals and active Nazis, passed by the same body on March 27, 1947.

The Control Commission stopped functioning in March 1948. The Berlin crisis came to the fore when the separate currency reform, carried out in West Germany, was also extended to West Berlin.¹⁵⁹ The Soviets demanded inspection of Western military trains passing through the Soviet zone to Berlin. When inspection was refused, the Soviets stopped all traffic and tightened road blockades. In reply, the U.S. began the famous air lift to Berlin on June 28. A Soviet offer to feed the whole population of Berlin was rejected. The Western officials in Berlin also tried a show of force, such as running an armored train through. Early in 1949 there were repeated signs that the Soviets would like to end the blockade. It may have been for this reason that Molotov was relieved of his post on March 4, to be succeeded by Vishinsky. The Western Powers seemed ready to jointly examine the Berlin problem at a meeting of the Foreign Minister's Council only after the North Atlantic Treaty was signed.

The four "d"s -democratization, decartelization, demilitarization and denazification- were the four pillars of the Potsdam Agreement made by those who fought Nazism for six years. The decision to eliminate the excessive economic power of certain German monopolies in the form of trusts, cartels or other similar arrangements was the cornerstone of the Potsdam Agreement. Knowing well what such arrangements led to before and after 1933,¹⁶⁰ the actual purpose of the agreement was to destroy the economic foundation of militarism that might erupt once again in Germany. The Potsdam Agreement is very clear on the elimination of the excessive concentration of such power. It was in pursuance of this decision that the Control Commission issued important directives, requiring the establishment of a Four-Power decartelization commission.

159 Lucius D. Clay, *Decision in Germany*, Melbourne, William Heinemann, 1950, p. 31; *Documents: 1947-1948, op. cit.*, pp. 575-576; Wolfgang Heidelberg and Guenther Hindricks, eds., *Documents on Berlin*, München, R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1969.

160 Arthur Schweitzer, *Big Business in the Third Reich*, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1964.

One has to admit from factual material that the Potsdam decisions to decartelize the German economy were implemented in the Eastern zone. As specifically mentioned in the Potsdam Agreement, "cartels, syndicates, trusts and other monopolistic arrangements" were liquidated. The companies belonging to the war criminals were taken away from them. The plants of the Hermann Göring Werke, the belongings of the war criminal Flick, the concerns of the I.G. Farbenindustrie, Mannesmann, Kontinentale Gas AG, and Siemens were all decartelized. The German economic monopolies, that had fed fascism in Germany and had pushed Europe and the world into a blood-bath of so many years, were deprived of power to influence the life and state in East Germany once more in the direction.

To say the least, however, one frankly fails to observe the same punctiliousness in the Western zones. Although a law on the "Prohibition of Excessive Concentration of German Economic Might" was issued by the Americans on February 12, 1947, a similar law by the British the same day and a corresponding directive by the French on June 9, 1947, what actually happened shows that they were very poorly executed. These laws contained no specific instructions relating to implementation. They did not list the firms liable to decentralization. And when certain mining works were taken away from the control of the trusts, they were placed under a special administration, this time headed by the former director of another heavy industry concern, the Vereinigte Stahlwerke.

The monopolies in Western Germany were first *preserved*, later *restored* and finally *strengthened*. In spite of the "Law for the Seizure of Property Owned by I.G. Farbenindustrie and the Control Thereof," dated November 30, 1933, the Western Powers set up three successive companies-Badische Anilin und Sodafabrik, Farbenfabriken Bayer and Farbenwerke Höchst. Similarly, the Deutsche Bank, the Dresdner Bank and the Commerzbank were not really de-concentrated because thirty local banks established as their agents were re-united into three banking groups.

The Potsdam Agreement also envisaged measures for the disbandment of the Nazi Party, the repeal of fascist laws, the removal of Nazis from responsible positions, the banning of fascist, militarist and revanchist propaganda, the prevention of

the revival of fascist and militarist organizations and the reorganization of the judicial and public education systems. In the words of Harold Zink, denazification in the American zone was "unsatisfactory and even scandalous... [and was] brought to an end shortly."¹⁶¹ He further disclosed that minor Nazis sometimes incurred heavier penalties than the most active Nazi leaders. Similarly, General Lucius D. Clay, the Deputy U.S. Military Governor in Germany, made the following admission: "The denazification law has been used to return as many persons as possible to their former vocations, rather than to punish the guilty."¹⁶² The seriousness of this statement stands out when one remembers that the reference is to the persons who had shaped numerous fascist-military organizations.

There was also the important Potsdam decision to demilitarize Germany. The concrete measures envisaged in the agreement were that all German land, naval and air forces, the S.S., S.A., S.D. and Gestapo, the General Staff, the Officers' Corps, Reserve Corps, military schools and the like were to be abolished with a view to permanently prevent the revival of German militarism and Nazism, and also all arms, ammunition and other implements of war were to be destroyed, their production to be prevented. Although the Control Commission in Germany adopted a number of laws or directives (such as the directive "For Disbandment and Dissolution of the German Armed Forces" on November 12, 1945, the Law on "Prohibition and Elimination of Military Training" on November 30, 1945, directive on the "Clearance of Minefields and Destruction of Fortifications, Underground Installations and Military Installations in Germany" on December 6, 1945 and the Law on the "Dissolution of the Wehrmacht" on August 20, 1946), implementation fell far short. This point is certainly most important for those who suffered unprecedented losses on account of German aggression. The people of Europe would naturally want to prevent a resurgence of an aggressive German war machine. Nevertheless, not only were the organized units of the former German Army not completely abolished, but they were formally reorganized in numerous "guard companies," "service units," "labor bat-

¹⁶¹ Harold Zink, *The United States in Germany: 1944-1955*, New York, 1957, pp. 163-164.

¹⁶² *The New York Times*, November 6, 1946.

talions" and "industrial police." Not all underground factories, work-shops, fortifications, and other installations were destroyed. Finally, and most importantly, not all Hitlerite marshals and generals were convicted. A large group of such officers were assigned to draw up military plans. One may-or rather one ought to- imagine the frightening and puzzling effect of the following admission of Aneurin Bevan, the deceased British Labor leader, on the Soviet Union:

"Adenauer and those who are backing him, including the NATO Powers, are deep in their heart laughing at German unification, and are again playing an old game, which consists in setting against the Soviet Union all that part of Germany which finds itself under their influence. It is the policy which Chamberlain expected from Hitler, and we all know what it led to."¹⁶³

As to the Soviet intentions in the midst of this turmoil, the U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union General Walter Bedell Smith said only two months after the Berlin blockade had begun that "the Russians do not want war."¹⁶⁴

The United States, on the other hand, was trying to weld the North Atlantic nations into an alliance. It has already been stated that Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg had signed an alliance on March 17, 1948 and that the first proposal concerning it was made before the Czech crisis.¹⁶⁵ A statement issued by the U.S. State Department on January 14, 1949,¹⁶⁶ argued that the Vandenberg Resolution,¹⁶⁷ adopted by the Senate on June 11, 1948, by a vote of 64 to 4, marked a new departure in American foreign policy. The Soviet reply of January 29¹⁶⁸ questioned the allegation that the Western Union, concluded in Brussels in March 1948, had been formed to unite the peace-loving countries of Europe. The establishment of the Union signified, in the first place, a change in the British and French policy regarding Germany. The anti-Hitler coalition during the Second World War was united not only by the will to

¹⁶³ *Le Monde*, February 17, 1955.

¹⁶⁴ Horowitz, *From Yalta to Vietnam*, *op. cit.*, p. 80.

¹⁶⁵ *Supra.*, p. 90.

¹⁶⁶ Royal Institute of International Affairs, *Documents on International Affairs: 1949-1950*, Margaret Carlyle, ed., London, Oxford University Press, 1953, pp. 4-14; *The New York Times*, January 15, 1949.

¹⁶⁷ *Documents: 1947-1948*, *op. cit.*, pp. 233-234.

¹⁶⁸ *Documents: 1949-1950*, *op. cit.*, pp. 14-33.

win victory, but also to prevent, in the future as well, the German aggression that had unleashed two world wars within the past decades. These aspirations had found expression in the Yalta and Potsdam decisions. The Treaties of Friendship and Mutual Assistance, concluded by the Soviet Union with Britain in 1942 and with France in 1944 for twenty years, expressed the same policy of preventing a resurgence of aggressive Germany. However, the formation of the Western Union meant that Britain and France had embarked upon a new policy, including the employment of yesterday's aggressor. There was only a passing mention of a desire to prevent a resurgence of an aggressive policy on Germany's part. On the other hand, Britain and France, together with the U.S., was striving to enlist and utilise for their own purposes Western Germany, where old militaristic elements of German reaction were more and more deeply entrenching themselves in all sections of the administration. The military alliance of the five Western States had been set up not so much in regard to Germany as with a view to employing the group of Western Powers they had formed against the States which were their allies during the war. The Western Union had come into existence after the appearance of numerous statements in the Western countries to the effect that an anti-Soviet coalition was being formed.

The Western Union had launched quite a number of measures to give itself structural shape. Apart from a Consultative Council set up in London, a Military Committee and a Western Union Defense Staff was also formed. The haste in taking these organizational measures, including the institution of a Military Staff, served to foment alarm and war hysteria. Apart from this new group in Europe, the United States was engaged in setting up a larger North Atlantic Alliance, comprising the same Western European countries as well as Canada and the U.S. A Treaty signed in Rio de Janeiro on September 2, 1947, by the countries of North and South America had come into force at the end of 1948.¹⁶⁹ The Western Union in Europe and the Inter-American Pact in the Western Hemisphere were important prerequisites

169 Türkkiye Ataöv, "Savaşın ve Barışın Düzenlenmesinde Dört Yeni Gelişme," *Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi*, Vol. XXII, No. 4 (Aralık 1967), pp. 240-242; Subrata Roy Chowdhury, *Military Alliances and Neutrality in War and Peace*, Bombay, Orient Logmans, 1966, pp. 22-29.

for the creation of military blocs. The North Atlantic Alliance was later to become the chief instrument of this policy. The formation of a Mediterranean Union or an East Mediterranean Pact as an auxiliary instrument of the North Atlantic grouping was also being discussed. This, too, later materialized as the Baghdad Pact or CENTO. There was also a mention of a project for establishing a grouping of the countries of South Eastern Asia. This came to be known as SEATO in 1954. Such plans for creating more and more groupings of States under the aegis of the United States embodied the claim of that country to dominate different parts of the globe.

The United States was trying to bring into this scheme as many states as possible, with a promise to improve their economic situations. While these states were heading increasingly into fresh economic difficulties as a result of "dollar diplomacy," more and more of them were bound to be deprived of the right to pursue independent domestic and foreign policies. However, such a grouping was being attempted in the face of contradictions among the chief partners of the Western bloc and the tremendous upsurge of the national liberation movement that had already started. The growth of the democratic forces and national liberation all over the world was certainly "dangerous," only for those who wanted to subdue them. Furthermore, it was difficult for the Soviet Union to consider the growing number of U.S. military bases in both the Atlantic and in the Pacific, as well as on many remote seas, including areas located thousands and thousands of miles from the United States' boundaries, as essential for the defense of that country. Entire states were being "adjusted" to provide convenient bridgeheads. American troops still remained on the territories of a number of states, including United Nations members. There was also a flow of arms to these states. There were signs of including Western Germany and Japan in these plans. These suspicions later materialised in Germany's membership of NATO in 1955 and a U.S. Japanese Treaty in 1951. All these undertakings actually helped to undermine the United Nations, and encouraged countries to seek solutions outside that Organization and within military blocs.

While the official American was trying to show the proposal to create a North Atlantic Alliance as necessary to oppose

"Soviet aggressiveness", some notable Americans made statements to the contrary: In March 1949, none other than John Foster Dulles declared: "The Soviet Government, under conditions now prevailing, does not contemplate the use of war as an instrument of its policy. I do not know any responsible official, military or civilian in this Government or any Government who believes that the Soviet Government now plans conquest by open military aggression."¹⁷⁰ Senator Taft, a conservative, maintained that the Atlantic Pact would lessen the chances of peace: "I cannot vote for a treaty which, in my opinion, will do far more to bring about a third world war than it will ever maintain the peace of the world."¹⁷¹

On March 18, 1949, the U.S. State Department published the text of the North Atlantic Treaty which a number of Western countries intended to sign within the next few days. The only Great Power notably absent was the Soviet Union. The treaties that the Soviet Union had signed so far with her Eastern European neighbors were basically aimed against a possible repetition of German aggression, which no European nation could undermine. The Warsaw Pact¹⁷² was, of course, signed on May 14, 1955, in consequence of the admission of Germany into NATO after the Paris Treaty of October 23, 1954.

CONCLUSIONS

First of all, one must note with certainty that the popularized idea that the Soviet Union emerged from the Second World War ready to conduct an aggressive battle principally against the United States is simply not borne out by the facts. Granted the Marxist doctrine that Communism will triumph universally, the origins of the Cold War should be sought elsewhere. Open-door expansion has been a cardinal point in U.S. foreign policy. It has been so principally since 1898. During World War II

170 Frederick L. Schuman, *Russia Since 1917*, New York, Knopf, 1957, p. 394.

171 Harry W. Berger, "A Conservative Critique of Containment: Senator Taft on the Cold War Program," Horowitz, *Containment and Revolution*, *op. cit.*, p. 133.

172 *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 49 (1955), Suppl., pp. 194-199; *New Times*, Moscow, No. 21 (1955), Suppl., pp. 65-70.

American industry swelled rapidly and yielded enormous profits. And after the war there were plenty of war boom lovers. The United States emerged from the war strong, immensely wealthy and in possession of the atomic bomb. The Soviet Union, which had actually suffered enormous losses, was assumed to threaten an invasion of Europe and the world. This is a colossal misjudgement of the post-war power relations.

Secondly, it was the United States that pursued a policy from a position of strength. Among the Great Powers, she was the only one that possessed and had actually used the atom bomb. She was also eager to tell the Soviet Union that the United States was now an atomic power. The Potsdam Conference was postponed twice to enable Truman to sit at the negotiating table backed by the most powerful weapon in history. He did so, when word came of the first successful atomic test.

Thirdly, the U.S. policy, thus based on the utilization of power, aimed at the idea of containment. In order to let the Germans and the Soviets bleed each other white, the Western countries had yielded Eastern Europe to their class enemy. After the war, however, they wanted to get this large and important area back. Truman kept accusing the Soviet Union of failing to observe the Yalta decisions. Examples of breaches on the American side were mentioned above. The Soviet Government, on the other hand, stuck to the letter to the war-time agreements. While the Communists were sitting as partners in the conservative, clerical governments in France and Italy, disarming their own, much-respected resistance forces, behaving moderately and in a way helping capitalism to be reconstructed in the major centers of Western Europe, the U.S. Government sought ways to effect changes in the administrative structure of Rumania and Bulgaria. Upon American initiative many topics were postponed at Potsdam. The Soviet Government was thought to be more willing to come to terms with the West once the power of the developed atomic bomb became apparent. The United States would, then, get whatever it wanted. That is why the use of the atom bomb on Japan reveals itself not as a military necessity, but a political weapon of coercion, a means to dictate the post-war scene, a superiority to extend American influence and solutions to every corner of the world.

Fourthly, the American governing class and its leaders educated the people, through the use of mass media, in an extensive "hate the enemy" campaign, creating images that suited best the creators' intentions. Senator Arthur K. Vandenberg was not alone in his tactic that necessitated "to scare hell out of the American people" in order to win their vigorous support for the kind of policies that the government intended to follow. Similarly, General Douglas MacArthur had admitted much later on: "Our government has kept us in a perpetual state of fear... with the cry of a great national emergency... Yet, in retrospect, these disasters seem never to have happened, seem never to have been quite real."¹⁷³

A fifth much-related point was that it was the United States whose presence was felt in areas situated so far away from home. For instance, while the Soviet Union had abandoned Iran, it was the U.S. that entered with "experts," civilian and military missions and finally with dollars to preserve the "*status quo*" in that country. One has to measure the effect of American bases, created 6,000 miles away from American soil but close to the Caspian, on the Soviet people and leaders. The Truman Doctrine and what followed afterwards were acts not only by-passing the United Nations and applying a continuing policy of containment, but also invoked the "domino theory", that meant American interference anywhere. The admission of Joseph M. Jones, the author of *The Fifteen Weeks*¹⁷⁴ who played a major role in the drafting of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, reveals his inner thought in the following terms in a letter to William Benton, the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs: "... The world is approaching... the greatest crisis... It is primarily an economic crisis centered in Britain and Empire, France, Greece and China... If these areas are allowed to spiral downwards into economic anarchy, then at best they will drop out of the United States orbit and try an *independent nationalistic policy*... What will be the cost?... I do not see how we could possibly avoid a depression far greater than that of 1929-1932."¹⁷⁵ Many Americans took issue with the world-wide commitment

¹⁷³ Williams, *op. cit.*, pp. 240, 273.

¹⁷⁴ Joseph M. Jones, *The Fifteen Weeks: February 21-June 5, 1947*, New York, the Viking Press, 1955.

¹⁷⁵ Quoted in Berger, *op. cit.*, pp. 126-127.

that the Truman Doctrine had represented. Columnists Walter Lippmann and Marquis Childs, journalists Stewart Alsop and A.O. McCormick, Congressmen Claude Popper, George Malone, Harry Byrd, Edwin Johnson, George Bender, Chet Holifield, J.A. Blatnik, John Folger, Adam Clayton and Robert A. Taft were among those who expressed doubts from within. As to the President's request to send military missions and weapons abroad Senator Taft said that this might be an attempt to "secure a special domination over the affairs of these countries."¹⁷⁶ He feared that the U.S. would entertain the idea that "we know what is good for other people better than they know themselves." He prophesied that war would, then, become an instrument of public policy. And Harry Hopkins had written the following shortly before his death: "Our Russian policy must not be dictated by people who have already made up their minds that... our interests are bound to... lead to war... That is an untenable position and can but lead to disaster."¹⁷⁷

Lastly, the United States is now the leader of all conservative and reactionary forces; it tries to uphold anti-revolution or mere change everywhere. She has failed to understand revolutions in economics and politics. She is not only ignoring them, but also asserting that they are wrong. She still believes in the need of an Open Door Policy to protect "democracy" and sustain wealth at home. She fails to appreciate that most of the difficulties in world politics stem from this traditional support of a policy of expansion. The more she thinks that the world's problems are caused by the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China or their "agents," the more she finds herself embroiled in chaos whose cause lies elsewhere. The United States is indeed the leader of a world-wide anti-revolutionary movement.¹⁷⁸ The ruling class in the United States has assumed the role of an international gendarme with a mission to preserve the *status quo*. This is actually the root of world problems. Just as Metternich sought to suppress the inevitable new tides and was finally overthrown in 1848, the United States, too, is engaged in a losing battle.

176 *Ibid.*, pp. 129, 132.

177 Sherwood, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 576.

178 *Supra.*, n. 9.

Although economic aid is presented to the undeveloped countries in terms of "generosity," or as a means of struggle against "subversion," it is now common knowledge that the minimum objective is to freeze the *status quo* of domestic feudal or Western capitalist supremacy and the optimum goal is to realize American expansion. Vietnam is an illustration of the dimensions the aid can reach if the people involved do not respond to U.S. gestures as expected. Even the countries of Western Europe are responding to the U.S. in a manner so different from the immediate post-war years, when bourgeois Europe prayed for American presence on the Continent.

The misconceptions of the Cold War are being eliminated one after another. And American policies have almost reached a dead end. It is time to draw up a balance sheet of this long adventure of illusions and identify the unchanging nature of the traditional foreign policy of that capitalist colossus which has formed an unofficial empire, controlling markets, leading the armaments race and applying the Open Door strategy everywhere, to sustain wealth and political institutions at home.