THE ORIGINS OF U.S. EXPANSION

THE CRISIS OF THE 1890's, THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR AND ITS FAR-REACHING CONSEQUENCES

Cassius:
"The fault, dear Brutus, is not
in our stars,
But in ourselves..."
W. Shakespeare, *Julius Caesar*, Act I, Sc. 2.

Türkkaya ATAÖV

I. *Introduction*

U.S. House Representative Edward Everett's (1794–1865) judgment that expansion was the "principle" of American institutions[1] is likely to surprise many students of American affairs accustomed to a traditional view of the United States, that she has been anti-imperialist throughout her histo:y, that Great Power status has been thrust upon her, initially to save Cuba in 1898 and then to save the world in 1917 and in 1941 and now to restrain the Communist bloc from overpowering the Western and the "Third" blocs, without creating an empire of her own in the process. This traditional view is open to challenge by the decisions, acts, treaties and official statements of the American Government as well as by the pronouncements of influential Americans throughout her history and in the considered judgments of their comtemporary countrymen. Although the Americans may very well know that there was a time in their own history when expansion and imperialism were freely expounded and debated, this fact is much less known, if any, in the undeveloped countries

1 William Appleman Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, New York, Delta Books, 1962, p. 20. Professor Williams, also the author of *American-Russian Relations:* 1781–1947, *the Shaping of American Diplomacy*, 1950–1955 and *the Contours of American History*, is in the front rank of those who make profound studies of the underlying causes of America's failure to prevent economic depressions at home and keep the peace abroad. The author is indebted to him for showing how traditional solutions in American foreign policy fail to meet contemporary realities.

where such literature has not adequately reached. While a U.S. Senator feared that unless the United States had new markets, there would be a "revolution,"[2] another declared that "the trade of the world must and shall be ours,"[3] to the delight of a journalist's cry: "The taste of empire is in the mouth of the people even as the taste of blood in the jungle."[4] While a strategist described the annexation of a group of islands in the Pacific as "not a particular act, but a principle",[5] still another Senator called his colleagues to resist this principle "to death."[6]

It is certain that some of this traditional view referred to above is correct. The United States did not come into the arena of international politics as a World Power with the Revolutionary generation. She has pursued anti-imperialistic policies at certain times in certain cases, and in exercising power, she has occasionally put limitations on it. However, evidence suggests that such partial truths fall far short of indicating the guiding ideas explaining the dynamism of American foreign policy. Research done *solely through American sources* convinces one that the United States believed in overseas expansion as a precondition for continued democracy *a l'Americaine* as well as for prosperity. Not clothing his arguments in the rhetoric of philantrophy or some acceptable "ism', Richard Olney, Foreign Secretary during Cleveland's Administration, captured the essence of the relationship between expansion on the one hand and democracy and prosperity on the other. He wrote in an article in the *Atlantic Monthly* (1900): "The position we have assumed in the world . . .enables us to greatly influence the industrial development of the American people. 'The home market' fallacy disappears with the inadequacy of the home market. Nothing will satisfy us in the future but free access to foreign markets."[7] The same relationship is suggested in the well-known "frontier-thesis" of the American historian Frederick Jackson Turner (1861–1932).[8] To attain.

2 *Infra.*, n. 81.

3 *Infra.*, n. 122.

4 *Infra.*, n. 76.

5 *Infra.*, n. 98.

6 *Infra.*, n. 136.

7 Richard Olney, "Growth of Our Foreign Policy," *Atlantic Monthly*, LXXXV (March 1900), p. 290–301 from Albert Bushnell Hart, *American History Told by Contemporaries*, Vol. IV, New York, Macmillan, 1929, pp. 612–616.

8 F.J. Turner, *The Frontier in American History*, New York, 1920.

democracy and prosperity at home by preventing economic crises through overseas expansion has been the cornerstone of American diplomacy for many decades. The main focus of the debates in different periods was on the type of expansion, not its principle. American sources themselves clearly indicate that somehow there had to be an expansion of some kind. The Spanish-American War of 1898 forced the issue; the die was cast. As A. B. Lowell, Professor of Government at Harvard, noted, "if the war with Spain had not broken out, the question of expansion would have arisen in some concrete form before many decades had passed and ... it would ultimately have been answered in the affirmative."[9] This paper intends -especially for those to whom such American material is not available- to dwell on the great turning point of expansion in the 1890's, the conditions under which the United States became a world power and the ramifications of that great leap forward. In doing this, the events leading to the present legal frontiers of the United States will be touched upon briefly, with additional emphasis on the forces activated by industrialization and over-production as well as the fruits of the 1898 War. The crisis of the 1890's may be accepted as a major turning point in American and world history.

II. *Expansion Until the* 1890's

When the crisis of the 1890's struck, the Americans held the Atlantic coast in the East, and had reached the Pacific in the West and the Caribbean in the South. The United States had grown at the expense of her continental neighbours; and the frontiers, which she forced from time to time, were legally demarcated. But production had reached such a high pitch that it became incumbent to enlarge the sphere of influence to sustain *democracy* and *prosperity* at home. Expansion overseas was thought of as one solution to the recurring economic crises; soon, it would be confirmed as the only one.

Expansion until the 1890's is described in some American sources as the "Old Imperialism," connoting the acquisition of

9 Abbott Lawrence Lowell, "The Colonial Expansion of the United States," *Atlantic Monthly* (February 1899), pp. 145–154 from Hart, *op.cit.*, pp. 591–594.

land actually settled by those who acquired it in an era when industrialization was not in full bloom.[10] It consisted primarily of migrations into unoccupied or scarcely populated land. Professor Pratt sees the history of his country as a "continuation and maturation" of an attitude of imperialism.[11] Another American source, *The Expansionists of* 1812[12] again by Professor Pratt, reveals in that early period an ardent expansionist sentiment to annex Canada, Florida and possibly Mexico. The belief that the United States would one day annex Canada had continually existed from the early days of Independence, and the South was almost unanimous in its demand for the Floridas, at the same time entertaining a lively interest in Mexico. It will be remembered that the area of the United States in 1800 was 892,135 square miles, "sufficient in the belief of most men to accommodate the needs of its population for an indefinite period."[13] But the land hunger of the pioneer led to the Louisiana Purchase (of 885,000 sq.m.) only three years later. Florida (59,600 sq.m.) was taken from Spain in 1819, Texas (389,000 sq.m.) annexed in 1845, Oregon (285,000 sq.m.) secured a year later, Alaska purchased in 1867. The Americans predicted that it would be the destiny of their country to extend its rule over the entire continent, and the Mexicans regarded the Texan rebellion as "part of a plan of expansion concocted by the United States Government."[14] The Mexican War signified the combat of unequals in which the stronger party wrested away huge bulks of land from the weaker one. The American historian Elson states that no true American is proud of the Mexican War.[15]

The Monroe Doctrine of December 2, 1823,[16] had originally sought to limit the nation's political and military commitments

10 Harold Underwood Faulkner, *American Economic History*, Eighth Edition, New York, Harper, 1960, pp. 553–554.

11 *Idem.*

12 Julius W. Pratt, *Expansionists of* 1812, Gloucester, Mass., Peter Smith, 1957.

13 Faulkner, *op. cit.*, pp. 553–554.

14 Henry Bamford Parkes, *A History of Mexico*, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1938, p. 211.

15 Henry William Elson, *History of the United States of America*, New York, Macmillan, 1916, pp. 529 and 535.

16 Norman A. Graebner, ed., *Ideas and Diplomacy: Readings in the Intellectual Tradition of American Foreign Policy*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1964, pp. 141–144.

to Europe while guaranteeing American predominance in the Western hemisphere. But later the meaning of this doctrine was construed to represent solely the interests of the United States. This conviction also stems from the similar assurance of Gustave Koerner, the noted political leader of Illinois. He wrote: "The true Monroe Doctrine is the interest of our country; and what that interest is, and how it is to be protected, and whether it is to be asserted or not, is to be judged by the circumstances existing at the time such judgment is to be exercised, unfettered by any traditions, or programmes, or doctrines, or precedents. Practically, we have always so acted, and ... we shall continue so to act, whether our action squares with the Monroe or any other doctrine or not."[17] Richard Olney claimed that the United States Government had the right to intervene in any question which might be termed "American."[18] Although Washington, in the solemn admonitions of the Farewell Address, had explicitly warned his countrymen against entanglements with the controversies of the European Powers, Olney noted how the lately born nation had greatly increased in resources and power and had demonstrated her strength. What Olney said in connection with the Venezuela-British Guiana boundary dispute[19] is instructive in ascertaining the reasons for America's supremacy in the Western Hemisphere: "The United States is practically sovereign on this continent and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition. Why? ... In addition to all other grounds, its infinite resources combined with its isolated position render it master of the situation and practically invulnerable against any or all other powers."[20] When Lord Salisbury had refused to submit the boundary dispute to international arbitration, President Cleveland's message of 17 December 1895, reflected a preparation for war in its outlook. A conciliatory atmosphere was recovered only when Britain accepted the arbit-

17 Gustave Koerner, "The True Monroe Doctrine," *The Nation*, XXXIV (January 5, 1882), pp. 9–11 from Graebner, *op. cit.*, pp. 247–251.

18 *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1895, Part I, Washington, 1896, pp. 553–562 from *ibid.*, pp. 251–255.

19 Julius W. Pratt, *A History of the United States Foreign Policy*, New York, Prentice-Hall, 1955, pp. 347–352; Thomas A. Bailey, *A Diplomatic History of the American People*, 5th ed., New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1955, pp. 479–493.

20 Charles A. Beard, *Contemporary American History:* 1877–1913, New York, Macmillan, 1918, p. 200.

ral tribunal. One may notice in passing that the committee was composed of two Americans, two British and, as a neutral, a Russian lawyer-with no Venezuelan.

The acquisition of California and Alaska had made the United States a Pacific state. Although she had appointed a consular agent to China in 1786, the first official diplomatic mission to the Far East was that of Edmund Roberts in 1832. He negotiated treaties with Siam, but not with China. Following the Opium War and the British success there, the U.S. Government sent Caleb Cushing to China. The outcome was the Treaty of July 3, 1844, which permitted U.S. citizens to frequent the five ports of Kwangchow, Amoy, Fuchow, Ningpo and Shanghai and to engage in commerce there. Commodore Matthew C. Perry, provided with a strong naval force, concluded a Treaty with Japan on March 31, 1854. Four years later, while Townsend Harris negotiated a new treaty with Japan, the Treaty of July 18, 1858 was further developing commerce with China.[21]

When Alaska was purchased, many Americans hoped to annex Canada or parts of it. A dispute emerged from the interpretation and descriptions of the original 1825 British-Russian Treaty demarcating the Canada-Alaska border. Moreover, Canada had grain wealth, rich forests, copper (north of Lake Superior), coal (in Nova Scotia), gold (near the Alaskan border) and minerals (in the Rocky Mountains). The dispute dragged on until 1903.

The United States had also an outpost in Africa: Liberia. In 1820 a band of negroes sent by the American Colonization Society formed themselves into a commonwealth in 1837 on this west African coast, assuming the title of a sovereign state ten years later. Their flag with red, white and blue resembled that of the United States while Monrovia, their capital, was named after President Monroe.[22] Secretary Frelinghuysen, in 1884, used the phrase "a quasi-parental relationship"[23] to describe the ties of

21 Ruth J. Bartlett, *The Record of American Diplomacy*, New York, Knopf, 1954, pp. 257–275.

22 Herbert Adams Gibbons, *The New Map of Africa:* 1900–1916, *a History of European Colonial Expansion and Colonial Diplomacy*, New York, the Century Co., 1918, pp. 93–96.

23 Archibald Cary Coolidge, *The United States as a World Power*, New York, Macmillan, 1916, p. 139.

the United States with that African state, whose rubber is now most valuable to the Firestone Company and the United States.

A less well-known episode is the influence of businessmen on the Cleveland Administration to intervene in the 1893 Brazilian Revolution.[24] In order to safeguard and expand favorable trade with Brazil, Cleveland deployed the U.S. Navy to subdue the insurrectionists who were opposed to the policy of "unequal economic relations with America."

As this short introduction also indicates the United States had not really isolated herself from world affairs even before the 1890's: She was absorbed with the events in Latin America, concerned with European reaction to her Civil War and interested in far away places such as China, Japan and Liberia. But her active participation in all world problems came later. She acquired Great Power status in 1898. War with Spain, the acquisition of Hawaii, the Philippines, Cuba, Porto Rico, Guam and Wake, the opening of the Panama Canal, the Open Door Policy in China, participation in the imperialist war against the Boxers, good offices between Russia and Japan in 1905 –these were all manifestations of the new Great Power status.

III. *America's Economic Structure*

Two points of view developed concerning the opinion that acquisition of colonies contradicted traditional American policy: either such notions did not coincide with historical truth, the United States having pursued an expansionist policy since the Revolution, or if there had been such a contradiction, the traditional policy had to change from now on. Those who favored the first alternative reminded one that each American generation saw some kind of expansion. Since places like Florida, New Mexico and California were inhabited with people originally French or Spanish, if Tsarist Russia's conquest of Central Asia or Siberia was colonialism, so was the annexation of these territories by the United States. As the Russians expanded towards the East and reached Vladivostok, the Americans moved West and arrived at the Pacific shores.

24 Williams, *op. cit.*, pp. 22–23.

But the new wave of expansion, which actually swept the entire world after 1870, brought far-reaching developments. The "New Imperialism" was, in the words of Professor Faulkner, the "direct result of the Industrial Revolution," its causes being "principally economic." The new inventions and the application of steam and electricity to machines had increased production so enormously that new markets were needed to dispose of the surplus. With the colossal increase in manufacturing and transportation, capital, which had accumulated, sought investment overseas. According to Mr. Faulkner, the New Imperialism "was in in reality financial imperialism." The following important statement also derives from the same Professor Emeritus of History at Smith College: "As in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries the homeland sent out settlers to conquer and occupy, so now the capitalists of the nineteenth century sent out manufactured products and money."[25] And according to Charles A. Beard, former Professor of Politics at Columbia University, this new imperialism did not rest primarily upon a desire for more territory, but rather "upon the necessity for markets in which to sell manufactured goods and for opportunities to invest surplus accumulations of capital."[26] It began in a search for trade, was transformed into intervention for the interests involved, advanced to protectorates and finally to annexation. The tendency was naturally in the direction of the economically backward areas. It was the considered opinion of Professor Beard that "economic necessity thus overrides American isolation and drives the United States into world politics." Although the United States had not neglected such distant places as China, Japan or the west coast of Africa, sending Custing to China to demand an open door, or Perry to Japon to destroy her exclusiveness or to create a "quasi-parental" relations with Liberia, her world operations were still limited until industrial manufacturing gained ascendancy. The event which led to this outburst was the Spanish-American War of 1898. Professor Coolidge relates that early in 1901 a foreign ambassador at Washington remarked in the course of conversation that although he had been to America only a short time, he had seen two different countries—the United States

25 All quotations from Faulkner, *op. cit.*, pp. 554–555.

26 Beard, *op. cit.*, pp. 202–203.

before the war with Spain, and the United States after the war with Spain.[27]

In the years 1865–1900 no other nation had grown as rapidly as the United States in terms of population, wealth and power. The United States became a great manufacturing nation because of her rich agricultural products such as livestock and cotton (forming the basis of some of her most important manufacturing industries) as well as iron, coal, oil, copper and other minerals in large quantities; labor secured by the natural rapid increase of population and millions of immigrants; high tariffs which stimulated manufacturing both by the profits allowed to well-established industries as well as protecting infant industries; technological inventions; and transportation facilities.

In the export of cotton the United States was supreme for many generations; in that of wheat and oil her sole rival was Russia; in the number of cattle, she was ahead of Argentina. Her manufactures had developed with even more rapidity: her iron and steel led the world; her silk industry was second to none but the French; her cotton inferior to that of Britain only.[28] While the population from 1850 to 1900 trebled (from 23, 192,000 to 75,995,000) and the agricultural products nearly trebled ($1,600 million to $4,717 million), the value of manufactures increased eleven-fold ($1,019 million to $11,406 million).[29] The 1890 McKinley and the 1897 Dingley Tariff Acts were precautions to protect American products. In 1897 her foreign investments had reached $684,500,000 million.[30]

Inventions had greatly stimulated industrial development. In the decade 1860–1869, the Patent Office granted 77,355 patents; during 1890–1899, this number reached 234,749.[31] These inventions made possible many new manufacturing industries, among which may be mentioned the manufacture of transportation equipment, electrical supplies used for telephone, telegraph, lighting

27 Coolidge, *op. cit.*, p. 121.

28 *Ibid.*, p. 175.

29 Faulkner, *op. cit.*, p. 392. From 1859 to 1919 the value of American manufactures increased thirty-three fold.

30 Faulkner, *op. cit.*, p. 556.

31 Arthur Cecil Bining, *The Rise of American Economic Life*, 3rd ed., New York, Scribner, 1955, p. 356.

and household equipment and motor vehicles.[32] More important among them were the loading coil for long-distance telegraphy and telephone (Michael Pupin), high-speed tool steel (F.W. Taylor and J.M. White), tungsten filament light (W.D. Coolidge), alternating current motor (Nicola Tesla), the loom (J.M. Northrop and G.A. Draper) and several other inventions by Thomas A. Edison, George Westinghouse, Elihu Thompson and the like. Prior to independence Franklin had conceived of the lightning rod, and before the Civil War, Morse had invented an electric telegraph, Edison the electric lamp. Perhaps more important for the industrial development had been Westinghouse's application of electricity to industry and transportation. Led by the Bell Telephone System, the Du Pont Company and the General Electric, the companies tried to systematize industrial research. Industry developed steadily as petroleum came to be used, but its epochal expansion awaited the invention of internal combustion and Diesel engines. John D. Rockefeller in oil refining, J. P. Morgan in finance, Andrew Carnegie in steel and Philip D. Armour in meat-packing were the leaders of American industry.

Transportation facilities made manufactured production available in every part of the country.[32] The 26,000 miles of navigable rivers, the Great Lakes, the roads and the canals were useful in the early part of industrialization. Railways in America expanded with a speed unknown in any other part of the world. The importance of railroad expansion in American history after 1860 can hardly be exaggerated. The Union Pacific Railroad from coast to coast was completed in 1883. Four other transcontinental railroads were added to this. The increase in railroad mileage far exceeded that of the population. Short railroad lines were abandoned in favor of big companies, which were in the hands of Cornelius Vanderbilt, James J. Hill and J.P. Morgan. Internal transportation had enlarged the home market bringing it greater profits. A Massachusetts shoe shop, a Rhode Island textile factory-owner or an Illinois butcher could now reach the American consumer whereever he might be. The factory which could previously sell its products only on the local market had grown

32 John W. Oliver, *History of American Technology*, New York, Ronald Press, 1956, *passim*; H.J. Habakkuk, *American and British Technology in the Nineteenth Century*, Cambridge, University Press, 1962, pp. 4–11, 91–132; Faulkner, *op. cit.*, p. 399.

bigger, its owner had become richer, and this concentration of capital had led to monopolies. There came into existence industrialists who fixed the production as well as the price. Rockefeller in oil and Carnegie in steel were left without competition. Monopolies were discernible in every branch: the Duke family in tobacco, Henry O. Havemeyer in sugar and Guggenheim in copper.[34] The United States had at once become a continent where the businessmen were supreme. While high tariffs were applied to the outside world, *laissez-faire* economy inside the country had created industrial units like dinosaurs, that stalked over the nation, dwarfing the common man. Rather than intervening in liberal economy, the State regulated its free operation.

Many assert that after the Industrial Revolution, small industrial units inevitably became parts of the big ones. Leaving aside the general "debate" whether or not this has been the case in Europe, such evolution has been inevitable in American economic history. Under the influence of her developing industry, the United States Government committed herself in 1861 to a system of high protective tariffs which seems to have aided in the formation of big bosses, monopolies and trusts. The United States might have still experienced an extraordinary development of manufacture without a protective tariff, but there is no reason to doubt that the high tariff walls speeded up the growth of industry. The American business group made use of many forms such as the corporation, pool, trust and the holding companies. In a corporation, the number of stockholders is large and scattered, and they cannot exercise real control over their delegated agents. Pools, which appeared after the panic of 1873, were organizations of business units whose members sought to control prices. This form, especially popular among the railroads, was declared illegal in 1887 by the Interstate Commerce Act, and again in 1897 by the Supreme Court in the case against the

33 Ernest Ludlow Bogart, *The Economic History of the United States*, 3rd ed., New York, Longmans, Green and Co., 1918, pp. 362–382.

34 The statesman of the new capitalism was Marcus A. Hanna. Refusing to be overwhelmed by the enthusiasm that impelled young men of his age to join the Union army, he remained with his business, making the beginnings of his estate in coal, iron, oil and merchandising. Like many of the northern businessmen, he was an ardent Republican. In 1895 he devoted himself to getting McKinley elected President. Beard, *op. cit.*, pp. 239–241.

Trans-Missouri Freight Association.[35] A new form was found, which appeared to be legal and efficient. After 1887 the trust was the most favored form of combination. In a trust the stockholders deposit with a board of trustees a controlling portion of their trust and receive trust certificates in return. It was first introduced in 1879 by Rockefeller's Standard Oil Company,[36] followed by the whiskey, distillers' and cattle feeders', sugar, lead and the cotton oil trusts. The trust, which gave so much power to the trustees, created such a monopoly that opposition to it produced the federal Sherman Anti-trust Act in 1890, whose futility seemed indisputable when in 1895 the Supreme Court refused to dissolve the American Sugar Refining Company. The anti-trust legislation led to the adoption of a new form of consolidation, namely, the holding company, devised to dominate other corporations by owning or controlling a portion of their stocks. The holding company was the dominant form used during the greatest period of business consolidation (1897–1904). Although this form was used before this time by two other companies, it was the Standard Oil again which took the lead, after which it was adopted rapidly. By 1904 Standard Oil controlled about 85% of the domestic and 90% of the export trade in oil.[37]

In 1890 industrial laws in the United States were far behind those in Western Europe. The United States, once a shelter for the "rebels" who searched the newer, the better and the more individualistic, was fast becoming a conservative community. Having attained political democracy, she was falling behind in social reforms. Together with the Industrial Revolution a laboring class had come into existence. In 1881, ninety-five trade unions were federated on a national scale; this society was reorganized as the American Federation of Labor in 1886.[38] Unlike British and German trade unionists, the A.F. of L. refused to go into politics as separate party contesting at the polls for the election of labor representatives. The first serious railroad strike on a nation-wide scale took place in 1887, followed by the famous

35 Faulkner, *op. cit.*, pp. 426–448.

36 Allan Nevins, *John D. Rockefeller: the Heroic Age of American Enterprise*, New York, Scribner, 1940, pp. 603–622.

37 Faulkner, *op. cit.*, pp. 432–433.

38 V.O. Key, Jr., *Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups*, New York, Thomas, Y. Crowell, 1952, pp. 60-63.

Chicago strike. The Pennsylvania steel workers' strike against Carnegie in 1892 had been unsuccessful. Although Samuel Gompers, the most famous of the labor leaders of this period, fought for and got certain rights, he had accepted the capitalist system, just like Millerand, Bernstein or the Fabians in Europe. The American labor leaders had also joined the industrialists in demanding the expansion of the United States. While the labor leader Gompers observed: "The great storehouses are glutted," the farm leader "Sockless" Jerry Simpson argued: "The surplus must seek foreign markets."[39]

The half-century from 1860 also witnessed an agricultural revolution in the sense of scientific and mechanized farming. Although the period after the Civil War was one of agricultural revolution in the sense of scientific and mechanized farming. Although the period after the Civil War was one of agricultural expansion, prosperity was not uninterrupted. During the war when prices soared resulting from the demand for more foodstuffs, farmers increased their holdings and equipment. But usually the land was mortgaged to purchase needed machinery. Crisis was inevitable when the inflated war prices collapsed. The farmer had the option of becoming a factory worker, a tenant farmer or agricultural laborer. Those who remained on the land faced hardships, while the industrialists in the East deprived them of the benefits of their labor. It is generally accepted that a few decades after the Civil War the agrarian sections were in continuous revolt, organizing the Greenback Party to bring about inflation by fiat paper money and the Populist Party to accomplish the same by restoring unlimited coinage of gold and silver at 16 to 1. But new machinery such as John F. Appleby's invention in 1878 of a "twine binder," which increased eightfold the speed in harvesting, enlarged the volume of agricultural products, helping to bring about the great overproduction of agricultural commodities characteristic of the later period and releasing men for other work.

Among those calling attention to the serious defects of the economic system, Henry George advocated in *Progress and Poverty* (1879) a single tax on land values to solve the monopoly

39 Williams, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

problem;[40] Edward Bellamy praised the "socialist state" in *Looking Backward* (1887);[41] Henry Demarest Lloyd made the ablest attack on the trusts in *Wealth Against Commonwealth* (1894)[42] while John Roger Commons in his *Distribution of Wealth* analyzed the lack of balance between wealth and luxury on the one hand and unemployment and poverty on the other.[43]

Those who held economic and political power, on the other hand, chose as a solution a policy of expansion into and acquisition of overseas territories. For the businessmen what had been caution fifty years before had become cowardice. In Professor Coolidge's words, the country "was bursting with a consciousness of strength."[44] The 1876 Centennial Fair and the 1893 Chicago World Fair demonstrated the superiority of American manufactured products.[45] According to Gibbons, although the United States had asked the world to celebrate with her, the invitation was really given to demonstrate American self-sufficiency.[46]

Richard Olney was one of those who protested against the interpretation of the Farewell Address as an absolute and unchanging dictum of policy. In the opinion of influential leaders like Olney, considerations which justified Washington's advice no longer held true and a policy of isolation would be detrimental to national interest in the twentieth century just as entanglements would have been in the eighteenth.[47]

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40 Henry George, *Progress and Poverty*, New York, Doubleday, Page and Co., 1879.

41 Edward Bellamy, *Looking Backward*, Chicago, M.A. Donahue, 1915.

42 Henry Demarest Lloyd, *Wealth Against Commonwealth*, New York, Harper, 1894. "Nature is rich; but everywhere man, the heir of nature, is poor... They assert the right, for their private profit, to regulate the consumption by the people of the necessaries of life, and to control production, not by the needs of humanity, but by the desires of a few for dividends..." (pp. 1–2.)

43 John R. Commons, *The Distribution of Wealth* (1893), Reprints of Economic Classics, New York, Augustus M. Kelley, 1963.

44 Coolidge, *op. cit.*, p. 176.

45 Oliver, *op. cit.*, p. 298, 300–304.

46 Herbert Adams Gibbons, *An Introduction to World Politics*, New York, the Century Co., 1922, pp. 328–329.

47 Robert Endicott Osgood, *Ideals and Self-Interest in America's Foreign Relations: the Great Transformation of the Twentieth Century*, Chicago, the University of Chicago Press, 1953, p. 63.

Although J.M. Rhodes declared categorically that "the financial and business interests of the country were opposed to war,"[48] Professor Pratt found that almost at the moment when the war began, a large section of American business had been converted to the belief that expansion would serve its purposes[49]. Business has pressed hard for the retention of the Spanish islands, the annexation of Hawaii and the opening of an isthmian canal. Andrew Carnegie, Jacob H. Schiff and James J. Hill seemed to be anti-war, whereas John Wanamaker supported war and raised a regiment for it.

The intimate relationship between the business group and the official circles is an important characteristics of American Government. Among the public men who defended expansion in the interest of business had been James G. Blaine, Secretary of State during Harrison's Administration.[50] He contemplated the eventual dominance of the United States in the Caribbean, believed in an isthmian canal under American control and concentrated his efforts to modify the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. He thought it essential that Cuba never be permitted to pass out of the American system. He believed that the United States might in the future annex Cuba, Porto Rico and perhaps all the West Indies. Nor did he show less interest in the Pacific. A strong fleet in Hawaii could dominate that area. John W. Foster, who succeeded Blaine, had also adopted an expansionist policy. Secretary of the Navy B.F. Tracy and the owner of the New York *Tribune* W. Reid, two men whose intimacy with President Harrison was well-known, were also expansionists.

IV. *The "Philosophical," "Moral" and Geopolitical Aspects of Expansion*

Although expansionist ideas were challenged by history, the political heritage and America's geographical position, imperialism was victorious in its clash with the older tendencies. There appeared "philosophical," "moral," and strategic reasons supporting expansion. These three seem to be rationalizations

48 James Ford Rhodes, *The McKinley and Roosevelt Administrations*, New York, 1922, p. 55.

49 Pratt, *op. cit.*, pp. 230–278.

50 *Ibid.*, p. 22.

strengthening expansionist tendencies which actually resulted from economic necessities. When rivalry among the European Powers reached the stage of imperialism and the division of China, Africa and the Pacific, the United States could not stay away from ideas that dominated Western Europe. John Louis O'Sullivan, one-time diplomat and journalist, had enriched the political dictionary of the nation by a new phrase as early as 1845: "Manifest Destiny." As a close friend of Presidents Polk, Pierce and Buchanan, he had urged for a policy of expansion.

However, the expansionist mood of the 1840's was mostly sensational; in the 1890's, it also acquired a philosophical content, the most notable instance of which was "Social Darwinism."[52] That the authority of Darwin was invoked to support rugged individualism in a country whose only contribution to the history of political thought had been "pragmatism" could not have been mere coincidence. According to the Social Darwinists, inequality being the order of the universe, no one could change it. Competition was good for the race as well as for the individual, since it ensured the survival of the fittest. If the stronger individual or nation won, there was to be no explanation, nor pardons. To lessen inequalities would merely penalize the more energetic in favor of the weak and lazy. The race possessing the necessary high qualities was the Anglo-Saxons, especially its North American branch, thought the Social Darwinists. They cited not only Darwin, but Spencer as well. An imposing group of other authorities were also referred to in support of social struggle and the survival of the fittest. Among their philosophical fathers was Sir Henry Maine who in *Popular Government* spoke of the struggle for existence as "that beneficent private war" which made one climb on the shoulders of another and stay there.[53] Ludwig Gumplowitz, a Polish sociologist who supported the conception of a "war of races" *(Rassenkampf)*,[54] John Ruskin, Thomas

51 *Ibid.*, p. 1.

52 Richard Hofstadter, *Social Darwinism in American Thought*, Rev. ed., Boston, Beacon Press, 1955.

53 Merle Curti, *The Growth of American Thought*, New York, Harper, 1943, p. 576.

54 Cf. his book by that title. Also, see: Ludwig Gumplowicz, *The Outline of Sociology*, trans. Frederick W. Moore, Philadelphia, American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1899.

Carlyle and even Nietzsche, who romanticized "will to power" and "the cult of force," appealed to the American Social Darwinists. Although Malthus, who had perceived in war and famine nature's means for eliminating living organisms eternally competing for limited resources, had influenced Darwin, it seems that he himself had not felt free to apply sweepingly his doctrine to social realities. Those who linked up *laissez-faire* practices of current business with the struggle for existence seemed to utilize the ideas of this great English naturalist. For instance, Andrew Carnegie, the multi-millionaire, wrote that the natural law of competition was best for the race and that it brought wealth to the individual with superior ability and kept it from the incompetent.[55] Also, William Graham Sumner had declared that inequality was rooted in human nature, and that no one was responsible for it.[56] G.S. Hall and E.L. Thorndike were two psychologists who supported the idea that success or failure in economic competition among individuals was a matter of heredity.[57]

Among those who helped most to develop Social Darwinism in the United States was the historian John Fiske, who stressed the superiority of the Anglo-Saxons in an essay entitled "Manifest Destiny" that appeared in *Harper's Magazine* in 1885. He wrote: "... The work which the English race began when it colonized North America is destined to go on until every land on the earth's surface that is not already the seat of an old civilization shall become English in its language, in its religion, in its political habits and traditions, and to a prominent extent in the blood of its people."[58] As the two keys for such conquest Fiske cited the keeping of the "sovereignty of the sea" and "commercial supremacy."

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55 Andrew Carnegie, *The Empire of Business*, New York, Doubleday and Page, 1902; ———, *The Gospel of Wealth and Other Timely Essays*, Century Co. 1900 (new printing: Cambridge, Mass., Belknap Press, 1962).

56 W. G. Sumner, *What Social Classes Owe to Each Other*, New York, Harper, 1883; ——— and A.G. Keller, *The Science of Society*, 4 vols., New Haven, Yale University Press, 1927–1928.

57 G. Stanley Hall, *Life and Confessions of a Psychologist*, New York, D. Appleton, 1923; ———, *Adolescence*, London, S. Appleton, 1905; ———, *Foundations of Modern Psychology*, New York, D. Appleton, 1912.

58 Quoted in Pratt, *loc. cit.*, pp. 4–5.

Another writer who influenced his contemporaries was Josiah Strong. In *Our Country*, this Congregational clergyman assumed that God was training the Anglo-Saxon race for the final competition of races. This race of "unequalled energy . . . having developed peculiarly aggressive traits calculated to impress its institutions upon mankind, will spread itself over the earth."[59] He predicted that this powerful race would move down upon Mexico, Central and South America, the islands of the sea, "upon Africa and beyond." Strong's *Our Country* sold 170,000 copies in English. The same author in *The New or the Coming Kingdom* found the Hebrew, Greek and the Roman pillars in the temple of Christian civilization uniting "in the one Anglo-Saxon race." As the Hebrew carried his monotheism around the Mediterranean, so the Anglo-Saxon was carrying "a spiritual Christianity around the world." Crediting the Anglo-Saxon race with the greatest cluster of poets, the greatest modern philosopher and the greatest scientists, he considered the inventive genius, "which especially characterizes Anglo-Saxons," as sure evidence of intellectual power. He considered the American Constitution as "the highest example of constructive statesmanship in history." Quoting the praises of men like Dr. Schaff, Alphonse de Candolle and Dr. John A. Weisse with the hope that their blood and birth would preclude the suspicion of bias in favor of the English language, he expounded that English was "better fitted than any other language" to become a common medium of international intercourse. "As the restless Greek carried his language and civilization around the Mediterranean, so the more restless Anglo-Saxon is carrying his language and civilization around the globe."[60] According to Strong, the Anglo-Saxon has no rival in triumph over nature and control of the physical conditions of life. More than all other races taken together the Anglo-Saxons controlled the world's communications. Fifty-eight percent of all railway mileage was in lands governed by them, and they owned and controlled a much larger percentage. Of every hundred miles of railway lines in the world forty-one were in the United States; and that country had thirty percent of all the telegraph lines. Strong declared Britain the richest

59 *Ibid.*, p. 6.

60 Josiah Strong, *The New Era or the Coming Kingdom*, New York, Baker and Taylor, 1893, pp. 54–80.

nation in Europe, and the United States "richer than Great Britain." He concluded: "*Now for the first time in the record of history the greatest race occupies the greatest home. What a conjunction, big with universal blessings: the greatest race, the greatest civilization, the greatest numbers, the greatest wealth, the greatest physical basis for empire.*"[61] In his mind, the time had not yet come when nations would consent to be controlled wholly by considerations of right and reason; the argument was still "on the side of the heaviest battalions." He believed that the Anglo-Saxon race was destined to dispossess many weaker ones, assimilate others and mould the remainder, "until it has Anglo-Saxonized mankind." He noted the importance of guarding against the deterioration of the Anglo-Saxon stock in the United States by immigration. He sadly complained that "a large amount of inferior blood" was being injected into the veins of the nation every day of every year.

Professor J. W. Burgess (died 1931), who took part in founding the School of Political Science at Columbia, assigned world leadership to Germans and the Anglo-Saxons in his *Political Science and Comparative Constitutional Law*.[62] Another addition to the new expansionist writers was Benjamin Kidd, who in *Social Evolution* explained the partition of the richest regions in the tropical countries by the four great sea powers of Western Europe—Spain, Holland, France and England.[63]

The philosophical content of expansionist policy was supported by another aspect of organized American life: the Church, too, upheld expansion. Missionary activity had already started in the Pacific islands, the pioneering missionaries having reached the Ponafe and the Kusoi in the Carolines in 1852. Only the Quakers and the Unitarians who stood against war and the use of force in general, seemed to oppose expansion. As noted earlier, Josiah Strong said that the Anglo-Saxon race, which possessed "pure spiritual Christianity," would Anglo-Saxonize mankind.[64] J.R. Mott, who stated later (1908) that

61 *Ibid.*, p. 74.

62 Pratt, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

63 Benjamin Kidd, *Social Evolution*, New York, Macmillan, 1894, pp. 303–329.

64 Pratt, *op. cit.*, p. 279.

there was no work comparable to the Christian ministry,[65] considered the placing of a Christian America between the oceans as something that God had done purposely.[66] Also, J.H. Barrows, the President of Oberlin College (in 1899) and Lecturer on Comparative Religion at the University of Chicago, noted in *The Christian Conquest of Asia* that the time of America's moral and political isolation had passed away, that America had a place in the Christianizing of the world and that American commerce would develop in the Pacific hand in hand with American Christianity.[67] When war with Spain started, the Americans compared Dewey's victories to the battles of David and Joshua and the defeat of the Spanish navy to the fall of the calls of Jericho.

The expansionist policy was further strengthened by jeopolitical considerations. Basing world dominance on the control of the seas, Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan launched his life's campaign to educate the public as well as its influential leaders on greatness, expansion and imperialism. In *the Influence of Sea Power upon History:* 1660–1783,[68] *the Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire* and other writings he was chiefly concerned with naval power as the means to achieve national greatness through mercantile imperialism. Adopting the thesis that growing industrial production demanded new foreign markets to maintain economic prosperity and political institutions at home, he insisted that the United States possess a powerful navy to defend the merchant marine and keep the trade routes open. Although the volumes referred to above as well as others that followed seem to be chronicles of naval events, their actual significance was economic. "Of many naval doctrinaires of the 90's, certainly the most influential was Mahan."[69] Mahan was not satisfied with building up naval strength only. Stressing the neces-

65 John R. Mott, *The Future Leadership of the Church*, New York, Young Men's Christian Association, 1908, p. 17.

66 John R. Mott, *Strategic Points in the World's Conquest*, New York, 1897, pp. 206–207.

67 John Hanry Borrows, *The Christian Conquest of Asia*, New York, Scribner's, 1899, pp. 237–239.

68 Alfred Thayer Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power upon History: 1660-1783*, 12th p., Boston, Little, Brown and Co., 1890.

69 Carlton J. H. Hayes, *A Generation of Materialism:* 1871–1900, New York, Harper, 1941, p. 240.

sity of breaking radically with past foreign policy, he advocated conquest of outlying positions that would confer mastery over the important sea routes, control of the Caribbean and the opening of an isthmian canal. Also concerned with the Pacific, he supported the principle of control over Samoa and Hawaii. Certainly, the emergence of such a geopolitician in the United States in the crucial decade of the 1890's was not a coincidence. His arguments based on naval strategy persuasively defended a policy of emergent imperialism and won influential converts such as Lodge in Congress, T. Roosevelt in the Navy and McKinley in the White House. He became a high priest of expansionism among statesmen, politicians, scholars and diplomats. With the aid of two apostles, Roosevelt and Lodge, he left his mark on American and world history.

In the 1890's there was indeed a growing trade, but American products were carried in ships flying alien flags, and the navy was inadequate for the defense of the merchant marine and the coasts. Neither the construction of a dozen light cruisers and two second-class battleships *(Maine* and *Texas)*, nor the Congressional authorization to build three first-class battleships in the year of publication of *the Influence of Sea Power upon History* impressed Mahan. He sensed restlessness in the world at large which was deeply significant, if not ominous. The great seaboard powers not only stood on guard against their continental rivals, but also cherished aspirations "for commercial extension, for colonies, and for influence in distant regions" which brought them into collision with the United States.[70] The Caribbean Sea, which was now a comparatively deserted nook of the ocean would become, like the Red Sea, a great thoroughfare of shipping, and would attract the ambition of maritime value; and the canal to be opened in Central America would be a most important strategic focal point. In Mahan's opinion, however, the United States was woefully unready, not only in fact, but in purpose to assert in the Caribbean and Central America a weight of influence proportional to her interests. The United States yet had neither the navy, nor the willingness to have one, he believed.

Whereever Mahan looked he saw strife; conflict was the condition of life. The struggle for markets and colonies, then, was

70 A.T. Mahan, "The Interest of America in Sea Power" 1897 from Henry Steele Commager, *Living Ideas in America*, New York, Harper, 1951, pp. 661–664.

a manifestation of the Darwinian law of nature. He maintained that a nation's essential duty was an unending search for world markets. His policy of *defense* of merchant shipping and the strategic outposts which this search contemplated was nearer to expansion than mere self-preservation. He contended that an isthmian canal was essential for the defense of America's coasts and trade routes. He also believed that America needed Caribbean bases, since the construction of a canal would increase commercial activity in this area. He argued that the increased value of the Pacific trade routes necessitated the annexation of Hawaii, bringing American interests closer to the Chinese mainland. And if this was growth, "growth is a property of healthful life," recorded Mahan.[71] Neither did he forget to point out that American expansion was more than a matter of national interest; it was a moral duty. The extension of American commerce, navy, flag and soldiers would enlighten backward nations and bestow upon them the blessings of their genius. Mahan's articles in such periodicals as the *Atlantic Monthly*, *Harper's Magazine*, the *Forum* and the *North American Review* was oil to the burning flame of expansion. His ideas were restated in influential circles, frequently voiced on the floors in Congress. The disposition of the Americans were gradually changing. Mahan recorded the new mood in the following words:

> "The interesting and the significant feature of this changing attitude is the turning of the eyes outward, instead of inward only. To affirm the importance of the distant markets, and the relation to them of our own immense powers of production, implies logically the recognition of the link that joins the products and the markets-that is, the carrying trade."[72]

The views of three other theorists may be briefly mentioned here. For Henry Adams international relations was force; there was little room for morality. He coined the term "McKinleyism" by which he meant "the system of combinations, consolidations, trusts, realized at home, and realizable abroad."[73] The core of

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71 A.T. Mahan, *The Problem of Asia and Its Effect upon International Politics*, Boston, 1900, pp. 29–30.

72 See n. 70.

73 Osgood, *op. cit.*, pp. 63–64. Also see: Henry Adams, *The Education of Henry Adams*, Boston, 1918, pp. 423–427; Vernon Louis Parrington, *Main Currents in American Thought*, Vol. III, New York, Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1903, pp. 214–227.

this favorable world order was to be an Atlantic system formed by the United States and Britain, France and Germany to be incorporated later. His brother Brooks Adams, also a close friend of Secretary of State Hay,[74] feared that the American economy would be thrown into chaos if the United did not dispose of its surplus. He advocated the seizure of the sources of power, singling out the Chinese market, and upheld the Open Door.[75] In the view of H.H. Powers, a professor of economics, power again was the reality of international relations, and the survival of the strongest was a natural consequence that did not concern morality. None of these three, however, were as widely read as Mahan.

Whether the explanations found in support of expansionism, were "philosophical," "moral" or geopolitical or whether the drive for markets and colonies was openly admitted, as it was by many American politicians and writers, the imperial instincts of an industrialized America as well as the thoughts and feelings that accompanied them were realistically described by the *Washington Post:*

> "A new consciousness seems to have come upon us -the consciousness of strength- and with it a new appetite, the yearning to show our strength... Ambition, interest, land hunger, pride, the mere joy of fighting, whatever it may be, we are animated by a new sensation... *The taste of empire is in the mouth of the people even as the taste of blood in the jungle. It means an imperial policy.*"[76]

The United States of the nineties based her *Weltanschaung* on economic criteria. The Americans were resolved to protect their democracy and prosperity. They also believed that domestic economic depressions threatened both. The decade of the nineties opened up with the nation entering a new business cycle. By 1893 a Treasury deficit was expected. When Cleveland was inaugurated in 1892 the reserve was $100,982,410; in November 1893 it fell to $59,000,000. During 1893 over 600 banking institutions failed; the production of iron and coal declined.[77] This period encompassed the Pullman strike in Chicago.[78] In

74 Williams, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

75 Osgood, *op. cit.*, pp. 64–65. Also see Parrington, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, pp. 227–236.

76 Osgood, *op. cit.*, pp. 47–48.

77 Faulkner, *American Economic History*, *op. cit.*, pp. 519–520.

78 Samuel Gompers, *Seventy Years of Life and Labor*, New York, E.P. Dutton, 1925, Vol. I, pp. 407 and 446; Vol. II, p. 134.

1894, there were four million unemployed.[79] The National Association of Manufacturers (N.A.M.), organized in 1895, saw no alternative than to seek foreign markets. Articles in magazines such as the *Scientific American*, *Iron Age* and the *Engineering Magazine* supported the same answer to the question of how to avoid domestic crises. There was a brief reference above to Turner's frontier thesis. Although he had first presented his views in 1893, three years later he published an article along the same lines in the *Atlantic Monthly*, where he stated:

> "For nearly three centuries the dominant fact of American life has been expansion... The demands for a vigorous foreign policy, for an interoceanic canal, for a revival of our power upon the seas, and for the extension of American influence to outlying islands and adjoining countries, are indications that the movement will continue."[80]

There was a general fear of domestic economic crisis and a belief that expansion was a way to solve such problems. Senator William Frye's statement reflects the dimensions of the mood: "*We must have the market (of China) or we shall have revolution.*"[81]

The same mood was bound to appear in the 1896 Presidential Elections. The monetary issue, on which the events seemed to revolve, was not really the actual conflict. As Professor Beard observed, "deep, underlying class feeling" found expression in the Democratic and Republican conventions.[82] It was particularly the Democratic Party that drew the public attention to the conflict between the rich and the poor. Sectional cleavage was cut by class lines. Its Chicago Convention in 1896 was vibrant with class feeling. The first speaker began by denouncing the Republican Party as a "great class maker." The Democratic Platform, accepted on July 8, 1896, was full of the same expressions of class feeling.[83] William Jennings Bryan, who was elected the Presidential Candidate at the Convention, described the

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79 Williams, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

80 *Ibid.*, p. 24.

81 *Ibid.*, p. 26.

82 Charles A. Beard, *Contemporary American History:* 1877–1913, New York, Macmillan, 1918, p. 164.

83 H.S. Commager, *Documents of American History*, 3rd pr., Vol. II, New York, Crofts, 1945, pp. 178–179.

delegates to the Convention as the representatives of the industrial and producing classes who defended the state and its security against the combined attacks of Anglosized American millionaires who meddled with the exchange of foreign money. There was no doubt that the financial circles would stand against Bryan. The Republican Platform (1896) on the other hand, cited "protection" and "reciprocity" as twin measures of American policy, going hand in hand. Protection built up domestic industry and trade while reciprocity built up foreign trade and found an outlet of U.S. surplus. The Platform also stated that the Hawaiian Islands be controlled by the United States, no power to be permitted to interfere with them, that the canal be built, owned and operated by the United States and that the Danish Islands be purchased.[84] The solid East and the Middle West overwhelmed the Democratic candidate giving McKinley 7,111,607 votes, as against Bryan's 6,509,052.[85]

In 1897, T.C. Search conveyed the feelings of business in the following words: "Many of our manufacturers have outgrown or are outgrowing their home markets, and the expansion of our foreign trade is their only promise of relief."[86] In the same year the Department of State began to print daily consular reports planned "for the benefit of American industries seeking foreign outlets."[87] From the beginning economic organizations had close ties with influential politicians. McKinley, for instance, was present at the founding convention of the N.A.M.

V. *The Need for War and the Hawaii Coup*

The level of economic development and industrialization, domestic crisis and the increase of unemployment, the problem of surplus, the need for markets, and organized business pressure groups were sufficient to cause serious suspicion that the Spanish -American War was not a crusade to save the Cubans from the Spanish yoke. Various pressure groups in the United States saw in such a war an opportunity to solve their own problems. The

84 *Ibid.*, pp. 173–174.
85 Beard, *op. cit.*, p. 197.
86 Williams, *op. cit.*, p. 27.
87 *Ibid.*, p. 23.

business world would seem to benefit largely from the fruits of such a war. For some labor groups it would mean the easing of immediate hardships. For some agrarians it would mean an expansion of their exports. Theodore Roosevelt's following statement strengthens this view: "I have been hoping and working ardently to bring about our interference in Cuba.[88]" It is generally accepted that businessmen were convinced that economic expansion overseas would cause recovery from depressions, and Theodore Roosevelt represented business interests. The United States was interested in renewed hostilities in the Far East for the same reason. The New York State Chamber of Commerce asked for intervention in Asia in February 1898 just as thirty-five leading New York businessmen in January 1898 had requested McKinley to take "efficient measures" in Cuba or as over 300 signers describing themselves "citizens of the United States doing business as bankers, merchants, manufacturers, steamship owners and agents in the cities of Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Savannah, Charleston, Jacksonville, New Orleans and other places" in May 1897 demanded interference in Cuba from Secretary of State John Sherman.[89] At the annual convention of the N.A.M. held in New York in January 1898 the discussion of how to extend trade was almost the only theme of the delegates.[90] American industry was preparing to explode into new markets as events moved in the direction of interference in Cuba.

American capital was beginning, in the words of an eminent American economic historian, "to move aggressively outside the continental boundary lines."[91] War with Spain was to be the spark that would set off this economic explosion. But before the end of the Spanish war and the reaping of its fruits there is the example of Hawaii's annexation. The relations between the United States and Hawaii had become especially close after the reciprocity treaty of 1875.[92] Most of Hawaii's imports came from

88 *Ibid.*, p. 34.

89 *Ibid.*, p. 36; Pratt, *op. cit.*, p. 248.

90 Pratt, *op. cit.*, p. 253.

91 Harold U. Faulkner, *The Decline of Laissez Faire:* 1897–1917, New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1961, p. 68.

92 W.M. Malloy, ed., *Treaties, Conventions, International Acts, Protocols and Agreements between the United States of America and Other Powers:* 1776–1909, Vol. I, Washington, 1910, pp. 915–917.

the United States, and almost all of its exports went to that country. The better lands in Hawaii had passed into the hands of the investors who were of American birth or descend.[93] United States Minister Stevens was assisted by a number of citizens who favored annexation. Among them Lorrin A. Thurston came to Washington as the representative of a secret annexation Club. Before leaving he left Secretary Blaine a memorandum exposing plans to dispose of Hawaii's Queen Liliuokalani and secure annexation to the United States. Minister Stevens felt that the time for annexation was approaching. The *Post* published parts of a confidental report on the value of Pearl Harbor prepared by General J.M. Schofield and Lt. Col. B.S. Alexander in 1873. Upon invitation by circles friendly to Minister Stevens, 154 marines with ten officers and two light cannons landed ashore to throw their weight in the midst of constitutional crisis. The detachment was distributed to Arion Hall, just across the Government Building and the American legation and consulate. Under the circumstances it became much less risky for an annexationist to read from the steps of the Government Building a proclamation announcing the abrogation of the monarchy and the dismissal of the Queen who led those opposing annexation. Minister Stevens extended prompt recognition to the newly formed Provisional Government. At home, the Republicans defended Stevens' conduct while the Democrats denounced it. The annexationists treated Stevens as their most trusted friend. S.B.Dole, the President-elect, L.A. Thurston and W.C. Wilder, all annexationists, paid frequent visits to the U.S. Minister shortly before and after the revolution in Hawaii. In the words of Professor Pratt, "there is nothing... in the code of international amenities to justify a minister in holding such confidential relations with men seeking to overthrow the government to which he is accredited."[94] There had been a change in government although the new one could control the capital city only with the support of alien forces stationed in a building, far from the U.S. legation but close to the Government Building, to overawe the Queen and her followers. Such circumstances contradict the U.S. claim of effective

93 The story of the acquisition of Hawaii is told in great detail by Pratt in *The Expansionists of* 1898, on which this part of the research is largely based.

94 *Ibid.*, p. 99.

control as a condition for recognition. On February 14, Secretary Foster signed, with the Hawaiian commissioners, who lost no time in promptly visiting Washington, a treaty for the annexation of the islands to the United States. The message of President Harrison transmitting the Treaty of Annexation to the Senate on February 15, 1893, stated that the restoration of Queen Liliuokalani to her throne was undesirable, and unless actively supported by the United States would be accompanied by the disorganization of business interests. Harrison underlined: "The influence and interest in the islands must be increased and not diminished." According to him, only two courses were now open -the establishment of a protectorate by the United States, and the other full annexation. Harrison thought that the latter course would be "highly promotive of the best interests of the Hawaiian people" and was also "the only one that will adequately secure the interests of the United States."[95] The treaty also provided the payment of an anuity of $20,000 to Liliuokalani for life and a lump sum of $150,000 to the ex-heir presumptive. Hawaiian affairs had taken a prominent place in the press and in Congress. The journals of finance and religious publications considered Hawaii a ripe apple, a commercial and a strategic outpost giving the United States the command of the Pacific.

Cleveland came of office while the treaty was still pending in the Senate. In a private letter to the new President, Hawaii's Queen had informed him that her special representative would explain to him the circumstances of the revolution.[96] Thereupon Cleveland wanted to ascertain the part played by Stevens in the overthrow of the Monarchy and whether annexation was desired by a large group of the natives. He appointed James H. Blount, whose report showed that the leaders of the revolution would have never undertaken it but for Stevens' encouragement and promise to protect them, and that the native opinion towards annexation was adverse. In a speech to Congress on December 18, 1893, Cleveland stated that a candid and thorough examination of the facts would force the conviction that the Provisional Government owed its existence "to an armed invasion by the

95 Commager, *Documents of American History*, *op. cit.*, pp. 152–153.

96 Robert McElroy, *Grover Cleveland: the Man and the Statesman*, Vol. II, New York, Harper, 1923, pp. 54–55.

United States." If it had not been for the "lawless occupation of Honolulu under false pretexts, by the United States forces" and for "Minister Stevens' recognition of the Provisional Government when the United States forces were its sole support and constituted its only military strength, the Queen and her Government would never have yielded to the Provisional Government."[97] Senators Platt, Teller, Draper, Van Voorhis and certainly Lodge were in the front row of the annexationists. At last, the Senate had spoken. There was to be no annexation. But this resolution could in no way signify the last word on the issue. Annexationist trends were becoming dominant in every walk of life. As stated above, the annexationists had carried the 1896 Presidential elections. When McKinley won the Presidency, friends of Hawaiian annexation embarked on converting him to that cause. The former Secretary of State J.W. Foster, who had negotiated the annexation treaty three years earlier, and Senator Frye had spoken to the new President and received encouragement. McKinley consented to the negotiation of a new Treaty of Annexation with Hawaii. It was signed on June 16, 1897 that is, prior to the outbreak of hostilities with Spain. The Treaty resembled that of 1893, the principal difference being omission of any reference to compensation for the former Queen and the heir presumptive. The islands were annexed by joint resolution to avoid the danger of rejection by one-third of the Senate. The flag of the United States was raised at Honolulu on August 12, 1897. Thus, even before the close of the Spanish war, the government had pursued a policy of imperialism, that is, sovereignty over distant territory inhabited by an alien people. The Hawaiian annexation was important not only in terms of the methods involved, but also as an example for post-war annexations. Mahan anticipated that the American public would not view the opportunity in Hawaii narrowly: "This is no mere question of a particular act... but of a principle, a policy, fruitful of many future acts." The annexation of Hawaii would be no mere sporadic effort, "but a first fruit and a token that the nation in its evolution has aroused itself to the necessity of carrying its life."[98]

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97 Commager, *loc. cit.*, pp. 153–154.

98 A.T. Mahan, *The Interest of America in Sea Power*, pp. 32–55 from Commager, *Living Ideas in America*, *op. cit.*, pp. 661–664.

VI. *War with Spain*

In fact, consecutive events proved that the cession of Hawaii was not a single effort disconnected from an adequate motive. The first milestone of the new era was the Spanish-American War whose results Professor Bruun considered "a turning point for American and world history."[99] At first sight America's interest in the war with Spain seems to be assistance to Cuba in her struggle for liberation, but historical events and economic realities show that this war could not have started, in opposition to what Mr. Kennan seems to suggest,[100] on account of diplomatic correspondence of the sinking of a ship. This is not to say that a public clamor after the sinking of the *Maine* was insignificant, nor that the Spanish Ambassador's letter had not infuriated anyone. The fact is that the United States went to war with Spain as part of a general policy of seeking opportunities in overseas economic expansion in favor of domestic welfare. The hope that Cuba would one day become a part of the United States was entertained by every American statesman and politician from Jefferson down to McKinley, who finally got it. With some exceptions, Presidents and Secretaries of State may be cited showing that "the United States had imperialistic ambitions against that Island."[101] Referring to the importance of possessing strategic points, Mahan drew attention to the benefit of acquiring advanced positions such as the Island of Cuba and to the effect it exercised upon the control of the Gulf of Mexico.[102] The attitude of the United States towards Cuba in the early part of the nineteenth century was that it would eventually become a part of the country. Even a conservative statesman as Jefferson had always "looked on Cuba as the most interesting addition which could ever be made to our system of states."[103] Of all the European Powers

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99 Geoffrey Bruun, *Nineteenth Century European Civilization*, 1815–1914, London, Oxford University Press, 1959, p. 179.

100 George F. Kennan, *American Diplomacy:* 1900–1950, New York, Mentor Books, 1955, p. 15.

101 Frank Tannenbaum, *The American Tradition in Foreign Policy*, Norman, University of Oklahoma Press, 1955, p. 73.

102 A.T. Mahan, *Naval Strategy Compared and Contrasted With the Principles and Practice of Military Operations on Land*, Boston, Little, Brown and Co., 1911, p. 127.

103 Coolidge, *op. cit.*, p. 124.

the United States had preferred war with Spain, because its government was incompetent. There should either be Spanish sovereignty in Cuba or it should become a part of the United States. U.S. policy resembled that then pursued by Britain towards the Ottoman Empire. In a letter to the American Minister in Spain on April 28, 1823, John Quincy Adams had written that there were laws of political as well as of physical gravitation, and that if an apple, severed by the tempest from its tree was bound to fall, Cuba could "gravitate only toward the North American Union," which could not cast her off from its bosom.[104] The transfer of Cuba to Britain would be an "event unpropitious to the interests of the Union," wrote Adams the same year.[105] President Polk had attempted to buy the island in 1848 for $100 million, but it had brought a retort from Spain that it would rather see it sunk in the Atlantic than sold to the United States.[106] The United States, thus, gradually became a champion of autonomy. In any case, as a U.S. Consular Report had admitted in 1881, Cuba had become "commercially a dependency of the United States, while still remaining a political dependency of Spain."[107] As the nineteenth century advanced, the Southern slaveholders gazed at this island as a fresh supply of slaves. Down to the eighties the relations between the United States and Cuba had been chiefly of two ways: either the Americans had gone to Cuba to develop estates for themselves and grow sugar, coffee, cocoa, and tobacco, or they had filled towns and ports as agents, ship-owners and bankers. In 1895, Americans had more than fifty million dollars invested in Cuban business, and commerce had risen to double of that amount annually.[108] Nineteen sugar refineries were combined in 1888 under the leadership of Henry O. Havemeyer, the combination being refered to as the "Sugar Trust."[109] The mines of iron ore were controlled jointly by the Pennsylvania Steel Company and the Bethlehem Iron Works.

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104 Leland Hamilton Jenks, *Our Cuban Colony: a Study in Sugar*, New York, Vanguard Press, 1928, p. 7.

105 *Ibid.*, p. 10.

106 Bining, *op. cit.*, p. 533.

107 Jenks, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

108 Beard, *Contemporary American History*, *op. cit.*, p. 204.

109 Jenks, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

This is not the place to give an account of Cuban insurrections, or the progress of the 1895 rebellion.[110] We may only cite that the one in 1895 was different in method from any which preceded it and better supported by the Cubans. To repress the rebels the Queen Regent had sent General Valeriano Weyler, who gathered the suspect population into huge concentration camps. "Exaggerated tales of brutality were circulated by the newspapers. The evidence was one-sided, incomplete and often dishonest, but it was effective in steering a rising public opinion toward ultimate intervention."[111] W.R. Hearst's New York *Journal* and J. Pulitzer's New York *World* reached the highest point in sensationalism through heedless liberties with the truth.[112] In the Spring of 1896 both houses joined in a resolution favoring the recognition of Cuban belligerency, but Cleveland kept his control over the situation until he left office. In the Winter of 1897 the Spanish Government was endeavoring to give no excuse for American intervention. President McKinley had succeeded in obtaining from Spain a concession upon every ground which he had asked. She had released every American prisoner; she recalled Weyler; she recalled Ambassador De Lôme from Washington, whose description of President McKinley as "weak" and "bad politician" in a private letter was made public on February 9,1898; and she had ordered an armistice. And in spite of American Consul General Fitzhugh Lee's opposition,[113] the battleship *Maine* was sent to Havana, where it blew up killing two officers and 264 of the crew. There was no evidence connecting the destruction of the *Maine* with the Spanish, but the American press made capital out of this, using the phrase "Remember the *Maine*." The Spanish Government announced that no responsibility for the disaster rested on Spain. Although succeeding years have yielded very little evidence to support the view that the Spanish were responsible for the sinking, the United States was not in a mood for weighing evidence at that time.

Although it is evident that regarding Cuba American feelings were inflamed to war pitch, the attitude of the business groups

110 The Cuban Economic Research Project, *A Study on Cuba*, Florida, University of Miami Press, 1965, pp. 1–5.

111 Frederic L. Paxson, *The New Nation*, William E. Dodd, ed., *The Riverside History of the United States*, Vol. IV, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1915, p. 261.

112 Bailey, *op. cit.*, p. 497.

113 *A Study on Cuba*, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

are evaluated differently by various American sources. Professor Beard cites that Gomez, the leader of the revolt, laid waste the land to starve the Spanish, destroyed plantation buildings and railway connections and closed sugar factories everywhere, paralyzing business. Americans had filed against Spain claims amounting to sixteen million dollars for property destroyed in the revolution."[114] While Frank Tannenbaum accepts that a policy of imperialism was the result -though not the purpose- of the Spanish-American War,[115] Professor Pratt asserts that although the business group were not at first consciously enthusiastic about everseas expansion, the United States had utilized the war with Spain to acquire an island empire in the Caribbean and the Pacific. The latter accepts that business interests in the United States were generally opposed to expansion, or indifferent to it, until after May 1, 1898.[116] Those businessmen who opposed war did so out of self-interest. For example, E.F. Atkins, an American citizen who had connections in Boston and sugar plantations in Cuba, was able to protect his land in the island through assistance received from the Spanish authorities as well as guards paid by himself. He frequented Washington and worked against measures that could incite war.[117]

Although not much was done on the Cuban issue during Cleveland's presidency, protests were showered on Spain immediately after McKinley took office. Those who surrounded him were doing their best to precipitate a crisis. For instance, Theodore Roosevelt wrote H.S. von Sternburg on January 17, 1898: "Between ourselves I have been hoping and working ardently to bring about our interference in Cuba."[118] These belligerent words were written twenty-one days prior to Ambassador De Lôme's letter and thirty-two days before the *Maine* disaster occurred. Although Woodford, the American Minister at Madrid, had cabled McKinley seeking patience on the ground that the Spanish Ministry was doing everything possible to satisfy the demands of the United States,[119] the President, in a message to Congress on April

114 Beard, *op. cit.*, p. 205.
115 Tannenbaum, *op. cit.*, p. 74.
116 Pratt, *op. cit.*, p. 22.
117 *Ibid.*, p. 250.
118 Quoted in Osgood, *op. cit.*, p. 45.
119 Bining, *op. cit.*, p. 535.

11, 1898, recounted the events which in his opinion justified intervention in Cuba.[120] When he asked Congress for authorization to use armed force to compel Spanish evacuation of Cuba, he did not mention the *Maine* disaster in his message. The Joint Resolution of April 20 authorized the use of the army and the navy to effect Cuban independence; formal declaration of war followed on April 25. Although there could have been other alternatives than war, it was the latter course that was adopted. The reason was frankly admitted by Senator Thurston (Republican) of Nebraska: "*War with Spain would increase the business and the earnings of every American railroad, it would increase the output of every American factory, it would stimulate every branch of industry and domestic commerce, it would greatly increase the demand for American labor.*"[121] The most important part of the Joint Resolution was the fourth, known as the Teller Amendment, which announced that the United States disclaimed any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction or control over the island and asserted its determination, when pacification was accomplished, "to leave the government and control of the island to its people." The resolution meant war. Probably no member of the House or Senator doubted that when he voted for it. Only ten minutes after the President signed the Joint Resolution Senor Polo y Bernabe, the Spanish Minister, demanded his passport. The Resolution was cabled to Minister Woodford in Madrid, together with an ultimatum, allowing three days for Spain to accede. War began.

Senator Albert J. Beveridge's oration at the Middlesex Club in Boston only two days after the existence of a state of war reminds one of, say, an "imperialist manifesto." He said:

> "*American factories are making more than the American people can use; American soil is producing more than they can consume. Fate has written our policy for us; the trade of the world must and shall be ours. And we will get it as our mother (England) has told us how. We will establish trading posts throughout the world as distributing points for American products. We will cover the ocean with our merchant marine. We will built a navy to the measure of our greatness. Great colonies governing themselves, flying our flag and trading with us, will grow about our posts of trade. Our institutions will follow our flag on the wings of commerce.*"[122]

120 *Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, Vol. X, Washington, 1899, pp. 139–150 from Graebner, *op. cit.*, pp. 350–356; Commager, *loc, cit.*, p. p. 184; Bartlett, *op. cit.*, pp. 379–381.

121 Italics mine. Jenks, *op. cit.*, p. 54.

122 Italics mine. Quoted in Pratt, *op. cit.*, p. 228; Osgood, *op. cit.*, p. 46; Curti, *op. cit.*, p. 668.

Jubilant that the American flag would float over an isthmian canal, Hawaii and Cuba, he pointed at the Philippines as "logically" America's "first target."

This is not the place to give an account of the hostilities. We may only mention that a feeling was at last obtained in the United States when the South seemed equally ardent for the fight and Commodore (later Admiral) Dewey steamed into Manila Bay by reducing the Spanish fleet to old junk while Admiral Sampson smashed Cervera's fleet in Cuban waters with the loss of a single American sailor. Within a matter of ten weeks, the United States had wrested away from Spain a huge empire.

Negotiations for the restoration of peace with Spain were opened on July 26 by the French Minister in Washington at the instance of the Spanish Government. Although the President had initially instructed the commissioners that they were to demand the Island of Luzon only, he later authorized them to require the cession of the entire Philippine islands. He had stated: "*Incidental to our tenure in the Philippines is the commercial opportunity to which American statesmanship cannot be indifferent.*"[123] The decision to acquire the whole of the Philippines was a momentous one, effecting American Government and its foreign policy as well as the future of the alien people living in those more than 3,000 islands. President McKinley confided to a delegation of the Methodist Episcopal Church how he arrived at the decision that affected American and world history: "I went down on my knees and prayed Almighty God for light and guidance more than one night. And one night it came to me . . .that there was nothing left for us to do but to take them all, and to educate the Filipinos, and uplift and civilize and Christianize them."[124] Some members of the U.S. negotiating commission suggested that Spain be permitted to retain the islands of Mindanao and Sulu, if a resumption of hostilities was to be avoided. The President and his Secretary of State Hay, whom the *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* describes as "the suave escort of American imperial expansion,"[125] insisted on the cession of

123 Italics mine. Beard, *op. cit.*, p. 213.

124 Tannenbaum, *op. cit.*, p. 88.

125 Frederick L. Schuman, "John Hay," *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, Vol. VII, New York, Macmillan, 1930–1934, p. 284.

all the islands. Both advised Dewey that should the negotiations be broken off, he should at once occupy the Carolines. The acquisition of the Philippines was an important step, for in countries adjacent to the Philippines lived 850,000,000 people, who annually purchased over one billion dollars worth of American manufactured goods.[126] As Professor Osgood noted, the acquisition of the Philippines "raised great hopes of new markets."[127] While the government obstinately demanded the acquisition of thousands of islands inhabited by alien people speaking various languages and situated thousands of miles away from the nearest American port, the feeling of the American people about them at the time was described by a writer with the following words: "They didn't know whether they were islands or canned goods."[128]

With the Treaty of Peace with Spain on December 10, 1898, Spain relinquished all claim over Cuba, ceded to the United States the island of Porto Rico and the other islands under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies, the Island of Guam in the Marianas or Ladrones as well as the Philippine Islands. The United States was to pay Spain the sum of twenty million dollars.[129]

In short, the United States had participated in a war with the announced intention of assisting a liberation movement in Cuba, but had ended it herself becoming a colonial power, possessing more than 3,000 overseas islands at a distance of 7,000 miles from San Francisco, more islands and bases in the Pacific, and others in the Caribbean. Although a protectorate for the Philippines was frequently suggested, "with the country so imperialist-minded it had little popular support and no appeal for the President."[130] Annexation was preferred. The victories of American arms had caused imperialist sentiment to flare up, so that it "spread like wildfire."[131] For the first time in a treaty

126 Pratt, *op. cit.*, p. 269.

127 Osgood, *op. cit.*, p. 44.

128 Quoted in Coolidge, *op. cit.*, p. 149.

129 Commager, *op. cit.*, pp. 188–189.

130 Foster Rhea Dulles, *America's Rise to World Power:* 1898–1954, New York, Harper, 1955, p. 52.

131 Samuel Flagg Bemis, *A Diplomatic History of the United States*, 3rd ed., New York, Henry Holt, 1950, p. 469.

adding territory to the United States, there was no mention of citizenship, no promise of statehood. The United States had become, in the words of Professor Pratt, an "imperial power."[132] In 1899 the United States annexed the Wake Islands between Guam and Hawaii. The new place that country had gained in world politics could be judged from the role it played at the 1899 Hague Conference. The United States still avoided entangling alliances, but leaned heavily on acquiring colonies although the war with Spain had been described early in June 1898 as "not a war of conquest."[133] The year of 1898 was a turning point, a beginning.

VII. *Debate over Imperialism and Consequences*

Certainly a diversion of such dimensions did not go unopposed. Leaving aside for the moment the resistance of the Cubans and the Pilipinos against the newcomers, we may turn briefly to the anti-imperialist argument whose chief tenets were the following: the imperialist enterprise would not benefit the nation, since it would promote militarism and war and violate the natural right of all peoples to self-determination; the American Declaration of Independence and Lincoln's Gettysburg Address had stated that no government should rule people without their consent; the American Government could not permit itself to rule over some remote, alien and vigorously resisting people; if the United States had undertaken the war as a liberator and not as a conqueror, the achievement of her mission of reforming the world could be done with the power of righteousness and example and not the might of arms. The anti-imperialists repeated those ideas in their conventions, declarations, pamphlets, articles, poems and other writings. Included in the anti-imperialist camp were Senator G.F. Hoar and Carl Schurz, Republicans; Democrats such as ex-President Cleveland and W.J. Bryan; social worker Jane Addams, men of letters such as Hamlin Garland, William Dean Howells, Mark Twain, Henry Blake Fuller, Thomas Wentworth Higginson, Charles Eliot Norton and William Vaughn Moody; the industrialist Andrew Carnegie and trade

132 Julius W. Pratt, *A History of the United States Foreign Policy*, New York, Prentice-Hall, 1955, pp. 388–389.

133 Hart, *op. cit.*, pp. 573–575.

unionist Samuel Gompers as well as well-known journalists, especially E.L. Godkin from *The Nation* and Samuel Bowles from the *Springfield Republican.* These men were as determined to resist imperialism as the *Washington Post* was to accept the responsibilities of "an imperial policy."[134] A number of newly-formed anti-imperialist leagues were now drawn into a national association. The determined campaign of this peace movement, supported by the Democratic Party under William Jenning Bryan's leadership in the 1900 Presidential Election aroused the promise that there might be a return to the older conceptions.

Senator George Frisbie Hoar, although a Republican, had not agreed with his party as to the acquisition of the Philippines. He declared that Spain had no rightful sovereignty over them and that the United States could not rightfully buy them from Spain. The Monroe Doctrine, he believed, was not applicable either in terms or in principle to a distant Asiatic territory. He felt that there lied at the bottom of this the thing called "*imperialism, a doctrine which, if adopted, is to revolutionize the world in favor of despotism.*" He maintained that it conflicted directly with and contradicted the doctrine on which the American revolution was founded. He inquired:

> "*What kind of Americanism, what kind of patriotism, what kind of love of liberty is it to say that we are to turn our guns on that patriot people and wrest from them the freedom that was almost within their grasp and hold these islands for our own purposes in subjection and by right of conquest because the American flag ought not to be hauled down where it has once floated, or, for the baser and viler motive still, that we can make a few dollars a year out of their trade?*"[135]

It was not partisan politics that led him to say: "Let us resist this thing in the beginning, and let us resist it to death."[136] For Senator George G. Vest (Missouri) colonialism was "incompatible with American law," was "destructive of free institutions" and uprooted "the basis of all republican institutions, that governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed."[137] W.G. Sumner was equally opposed to the acquisition

134 Dulles, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

135 Italics mine. Congressional Record, 56th Congress, Ist Session, Washington, XXXIII (April 17, 1900), 4303–4305 from Hart, *op. cit.*, pp. 608–611.

136 Tannenbaum, *op. cit.*, p. 75.

137 *Ibid.*, p. 91.

of the Philippines. He warned that the nation would ultimately pay a heavy price for departing from a policy of limited commitment abroad, especially when the American society had failed to solve many of its own political and economic problems.[138] He wrote that the Americans could not even govern a city of one-hundred-thousand inhabitants without jobbery, could not abolish the rotten borough system in Connecticut, could not reform the pension list and could not assure suffrage to Negroes. The *Dred Scott v. Stanford* case was also cited in support of the argument that colonialism was not compatible with the U.S. Constitution.[139]

If Morgan, Guggenheim, Stillman, Baker, Ryan, Doheney, Harriman and Sinclair did not express their opinions, they certainly seized opportunities to serve their interests in distant lands and expected, and got, government aid. Among the leading capitalists, Andrew Carnegie, in his article entitled "Americanism versus Imperialism," regarded possessions in the Far East as fraught with nothing but disaster to the Republic. It was on the protection of Britain that the U.S. was to rely- "a slender thread indeed," he said. The Republic could not feel strong on the shifting sands of alliances; she had to do as other imperial powers did - create a navy equal to the navy of any other power.[140]

It has been stated above that anti-imperialist leagues were formed. The platform adopted at the Anti-imperialist Congress in Chicago on October 17, 1899, held that the policy known as imperialism was "hostile to liberty and tends toward militarism." Insisting that subjugation of any people was "criminal aggression" and "open disloyalty" to the principles of the U.S. Government, it condemned the policy of the Administration in the Philippines. It denounced the slaughter of the Filipinos as a "needless horror," and protested the "extension of American sovereignty by Spanish methods."[141] The Convention of the Social Democratic Party, held at Rochester, New York in Janu-

138 William Graham Sumner, "The Conquest of the United States by Spain," *Yale Law Journal*, Vol. VIII (January 1899), pp. 168–193 from Graebner, *op. cit.*, pp. 365–369.

139 Tannenbaum, *op. cit.*, p. 90.

140 Carnegie, *The Gospel of Wealth*, *op. cit.*, pp. 135-165.

141 Quoted in Commager, *loc. cit.*, pp. 192–193 and Bartlett, *op. cit.*, pp. 388–390.

ary 1900, adopted the thesis that wars were fomented between nations, indiscriminate slaughter encouraged and the destruction of whole races sanctioned "in order that the capitalist class may extend its commercial dominion abroad and enhance its supremacy at home."[142] And the Fourth Annual Session of the Supreme Council of the Farmers' Alliance and Industrial Union, held at Washington on February 6–9, 1900, demanded that the inhabitants of all territory coming to the United States as a result of the War with Spain "be as speedily as possible permitted to organize a free government of their own, based upon the consent of the governed."[143] The Populist Party Convention on August 8, 1900, denounced the administration for "changing a war for humanity into a war of conquest." The action in the Philippines conflicted with all the precedents of American life, was at war with the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution and the plain precepts of humanity. The Convention noted: "Murder and arson have been our response to the appeals of the people, who asked only to establish a free government in their own land."[144]

However, the Republican National Convention that met at Philadelphia on June 19, approved McKinley's foreign policy and openly admitted that new markets were "necessary for the increasing surplus" of the farm products. It favored the construction, ownership, control and protection of an isthmian canal by the United States and endorsed all annexations. William McKinley, of Ohio, was nominated for President and Theodore Roosevelt, of New York, for Vice-President. The Democratic National Convention that met at Kansas City on the 4th of July, on the other hand, demanded the prompt fulfilment of the American pledge to the Cuban people that the United States had no disposition, nor intention to exercise sovereignty over Cuba, denounced the Philippine policy of the Administration as dictated by "greedy commercialism" and regarded the burning issue of imperialism as the "paramount issue of the campaign." The Convention noted that when trade was extended at the expense of liberty, the price was always too high. Militarism meant

142 Stanwood, *op. cit.*, p. 35.
143 *Ibid.*, p. 34.
144 *Ibid.*, p. 41.

"conquest abroad and intimidation and oppression at home."[145] W.J. Bryan was unanimously nominated as a candidate for President. The Anti-Imperialist League accepted the nomination of Bryan in the Convention at Indianapolis on August 16. It criticized the President's foreign policy as the use of "arbitrary power." Its verdict was: "this is imperialism... We demand that the censorship in the Philippines, which keeps from the American people the knowledge of what is done in their name, be abolished... Until now the policy which has turned the Filipinos from warm friends to bitter enemies... has been the policy of the President. After the next election it becomes the policy of every man who votes to reelect him, and who thus becomes with him responsible for every drop of blood thereafter shed."[146] The election of 1900 involved other issues than imperialism, but the verdict of the people favored the new course. When the inauguration took place on March 4, 1901, McKinley was escorted to and from the Capitol by the "Rough Riders," Roosevelt's regiment during the Spanish War and a battalion of Porto Rican soldiers.

Rudyard Kipling's call to take up the "White Man's burden" was now falling on understanding ears. When this poem was first published in *Mc Clure's Magazine*, Roosevelt had commented: "Rather poor poetry, but good sense from the expansionist standpoint."[147] In that poem the British imperialist had displayed hostility to the brown-skinned people, who, in his opinion, could never develop ability for self-government. Senator Beveridge of Indiana affirmed this doctrine:

> "God has not been preparing the English-speaking and Teutonic peoples for a thousand years for nothing but vain and idle self-contemplation and self-admiration... He has marked the American people as His chosen nation to finally lead in the regeneration of the world."[148]

Senator O.H.Platt, of Connecticut, expounded the gospel of "Manifest Destiny": "Every expansion of our territory has been in accordance with the irresistable law of growth... The history of territorial expansion is the history of our nation's progress

145 *Ibid.*, pp. 56–63.
146 *Ibid.*, pp. 69–71.
147 Dulles, *op. cit.*, p. 48.
148 Graebner, *op. cit.*, pp. 370–373; Curti, *op. cit.*, p. 675.

and glory. It is a matter to be proud of, not to lament."[149] Insisting that the right of self-government was a conceded and a limited privilege which need not to be considered as an inherent right, he was very close, in Professor Tannenbaum's words, "to denying the original American proposition that government to be just must be derived from the consent of the governed."[150] Challenging the assertion that the recent annexations represented the first attempt the nation had made to acquire colonies, A.L. Lowell, former Professor of Government at Harvard, maintained that the United States had been one of the greatest and most successful colonizing power the world has ever known. He suggested the creation of a permanent and highly paid colonial administrative service, which would offer a career for young men of ability.[151]

It was stated above that the stars and stripes was hoisted over Cuba and the Philippines after resistance by the people of these islands. The revolt against American preponderance could have been expected, for the conduct of Generals Anderson and Merritt at Manila had invited agitation. Prior to the Spanish War, there had been a revolt under Aguinaldo who was later invited to join ranks with Dewey. Although he brought along a large insurgent army, Aguinaldo was made to accept a subordinate position and did not receive much respect from the American commanders.[152] The insurgents, who resented American sovereignty over the islands, attacked the forces of occupation on February 4, 1899. A long and bloody struggle, which ended with the subjection of an alien people, who initially took arms to fight for self-determination, had likewise started. American reasoning, according to Professor Coolidge, had followed the conception that the Filipinos belonged to a race which had no capacity for independent civilization, but which under American sovereignty would enjoy limitless benefits, and "if they show themselves ungrateful for this, it is merely one more proof of their incapacity."[153] Senator Beveridge expressed the attitude

149 Beard, *op. cit.*, p. 216.

150 Tannenbaum, *op. cit.*,p. 92.

151 Abbott Lawrence Lowell, "The Colonial Expansion of the United States," *Atlantic Monthly*, February 1899, pp. 145–154 from Hart, *op. cit.*, pp. 591–594.

152 Beard, *op. cit.*, p. 217.

153 Coolidge, *op. cit.*, p. 160.

of the imperialists in more realistic terms: "The Philippines are ours forever... And just beyond... are China's illimitable markets. We will not retreat from either. We will not repudiate our duty in the archipelago. We will not abandon our opportunity in the Orient."[154] It was in 1946 that the *Ang Ulalin Watawat*, the "Orphan Flag," was raised in the Philippines, and the American flag lowered leaving behind a "friendly" government.

The Cuban resistance also was not easy to smash. "The new Cuba," said McKinley in his message of December 5, 1899, "must needs be bound to us by ties of singular intimacy."[155] The nature of the new Cuban Government was discernible in a letter written by Estrada Palma, the Cuban "delegate" to the United States and later its President, to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. The letter suggested that Cuba inspire sufficient confidence among foreign capitalists to encourage them to invest in the country.[156] The committee, formed on February 12, 1901, to regulate relations with the United States, discussed possibilities of a monetary union, lease of bases, priviliges to American capital and the like while in the minds of Cubans their independence was won through patriotic fighting over thirty years.[157] Nothing was left untried: in order to disarm Cuban soldiers, each was given $75 upon the surrender of his firearms.[158] Cuban relations with the United States were regulated with the Platt Amendment, which was debated only for two hours on February 27, 1898. The Cubans could secure their independence under the Platt Amendment or continue under the military administration. The provisions, added as an appendix to their Constitution, provided that Cuba should never make a treaty with any foreign power that might impair its independence, should grant to the United States the right to intervene at any time to preserve Cuban independence, ratify all acts of the military authorities and sell or lease to the United States lands for coaling or naval stations. A cartoon of the time published in the Cuban *La Discussion*

154 Faulkner, *American Economic History*, *op. cit.*, p. 559.

155 Jenks, *op. cit.*, p. 72.

156 *Idem.*

157 Helen Miller Bailey and Abraham P. Nasatir, *Latin America: the Development of Its Civilization*, New Jersey, Prentice Hall, 1960, p. 462.

158 Bining, *op, cit.*, p. 537.

depicted Cuba nailed to the cross, flanked by McKinley and General Wood as the thieves, Senator Platt presenting the Amendment upon a spear as a Roman centurion.[159] Article III of the Amendment recognized the American right to decide when independence was menaced. This was tantamount to surrendering the keys of one's house so that others could enter at all hours with any intention. In spite of the Teller Amendment, the U.S. forces had stayed in Cuba until 1902, to return again only four years and four months later, following an insurrection against Palma, whom the out-going Americans had thought indispensable. First, Secretary of War Taft and later, C.E.Magoon, became provincial governor of Cuba, appointing American advisers to each department. Cuba became a paradise for contractors and such a familiar place for the average American that a Washington official thought that Havana was a seaport of the United States. When the country was turned over once more to friendly Cubans in 1909, special interest in the island reached such dimensions that, as in the case of Japan's interest in Manchuria, Tsarist Russia's in Central Asia or Italy's in Ethiopia, it could only be called "imperialism." The United States had declared war on Spain on April 21, 1898. During the subsequent sixty-three years she dominated every walk of Cuban life. She defined the country's political and economic system and selected the men who would run it - and in the meantime improve their own welfare. Neither were the Soviet troops involved in the 1959 Cuban Revolution, nor did the local Communists support itopenly until after its success. Just as the Americans in 1776 could not feel secure unless the economic might of their former masters were eliminated from their territory, the Cuban regime went to the inevitable extreme to remove supremacy rooted in the past decades.

The annexation of overseas territories had brought forth constitutional problems. It was finally decided that insular possessions were dependencies of, but not part of the United States. Thus, the Administration could go on expanding territorially, yet preserve the tariff wall against insular products such as tobacco and sugar. And the inhabitants on the possessions were "nationals," not "citizens" of the United States. In cases involving the freedom of the press in the Philippines and trial by jury in

159 Jenks, *op. cit.*, p. 80.

Hawaii, the Supreme Court upheld that the Constitution could be divided into two classifications, "fundamental" and "formal." Sometimes, the Court went so far as to hold that trial by jury was merely a matter of "procedure." In Porto Rico the Organic Act of 1900 set up a government embracing a governor, appointed by the President and Senate of the United States, six executive secretaries appointed in the same manner and a bi-cameral legislature.[160]

Acquisitions in the Pacific meant that the United States needed to be able to move her fleet between the Pacific and the Atlantic; indeed, all other powers, including England, recognized American supremacy in the isthmian canal area. The story of the moves and the counter-moves of the two powers is intricate and unnecessary here. The Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1850 had provided that neither should have control over the waterway or built fortifications on the coasts. With the organization of the French Panama Company by Ferdinand de Lesseps, who had succeeded in Egypt, the United States turned back to the dormant policy of a canal under American control. When President Theodore Roosevelt decided in 1903 that the United States must construct a canal without delay, Panama was part of the South American republic of Columbia. The Columbian Government refused to lease to the United States the strip of land that she demanded. A revolt broke out in Panama City; the U.S. battleships prevented the landing of Columbian troops to suppress the insurgents, and Washington at once recognized the independence of Panama, which signed a treaty granting to the United States rights over a corridor, ten miles in width. In return, the United States undertook to pay ten million dollars in gold and an annuity of $250,000. All Latin American countries were affronted at the rape of Panama. The Republic of Panama, thus, owed its existence to the canal and to American military support during the controversial insurrection. With the growth of nationalism even in that small canal state, the United States was obliged to make concessions from time to time. But treaty arrangements gave the United States the right to intervene to preserve Panama's independence -a right exercised rather freely.[161]

160 Beard, *op. cit.*, pp. 219–222.

161 Edwin Lieuwen, *Arms and Politics in Latin America*, New York, Praeger, 1961, pp. 182–183.

The control of the approaches to the Panama Canal was also a matter of vital importance to the United States. Although Rear Admiral Gherardi's and Minister Frederick Douglass' pressure on Haiti for a lease of Mole St. Nicholas had failed, and similar attempts to infringe Dominican sovereignty had been unsuccessful, these two countries soon fell under American influence through other means.[162] Haitian and Dominican possessions were not the only possible naval bases in the Caribbean. Secretary of State Seward had broached the purchase project of the Danish Islands to the Danish Minister in Washington as early as January 1865. When a new treaty was negotiated in 1902, it was the Danish Senate that withheld approval - due to German influence. The islands passed under American sovereignty on January 17, 1917, with Rear-Admiral James H. Oliver as the first American governor.[163] In 1902 the Danish Senate also defeated a treaty ceding Greenland to the United States, an idea repeatedly suggested by Senator Lodge.[164] Also in 1899, the tripartite arrangement with England and Germany on the Samoan islands was dissolved[165] and the United States obtained outright possession of Tutuila with its harbor of Pago Pago. American Samoa has remained the outpost of the United States in the southwest Pacific.

The real reason for American interest in the Pacific was the fact that every year the United States was confronted with an increasing surplus of manufactured goods for sale in foreign markets. The increase of foreign consumption of factory products had become a momentous political problem for statesmen. Government officials were cooperating with private companies to prevent other industrial powers monopolizing the under-developed areas of the world. Sensing that China was of great interest to the United States, Secretary of State Day had initiated in 1898 a study of the conditions in that remote country. The United States had sent its first diplomatic mission (Edmund Roberts) to

162 Pratt, *Expansionists of* 1898, *op. cit.*, pp. 29–33.

163 Waldemar Westergaard, *The Danish West Indies Under Company Rule* (1671–1754) *with a Supplementary Chapter*, 1755–1917, New York, Macmillan, 1917, pp. 257–262.

164 Karl Schriftgiesser, *The Gentleman from Massachusetts: Henry Cabot Lodge*, Boston, Little, Brown, 1945, p. 151.

165 Bartlett, *op. cit.*, pp. 367–368.

the Far East in 1832. Spurred to action by the British success in China after the Opium War, the American Government sent Caleb Cushing to China to demand commercial privileges which resulted in the Treaty of 1844. The treaty negotiated by W.B. Reed in 1858 remained the basis of American policy in China for some years. It was after 1898 that American interest in China gained momentum. The American Asiatic Association and the National Association of Manufacturers brought pressure on the government with their recommendations. John Hay was appointed Secretary of State in the Fall of 1898, which gave the expansionist group additional influence. Hay promulgated the famous Open Door Notes[166] which asserted the proposition that American entrepreneurs shall enjoy equality of treatment for their commerce and navigation in China, including the spheres of interest held by other powers. Hay made it clear that loans were an inherent part of commerce. Hay's achievements seemed to be the visible signs of Mahan's teachings. Mahan's *The Problem of Asia*,[167] which included his views on the Far Eastern situation, reflected the reasoning that led to the Open Door policy which was destined to be as important for China as the Monroe Doctrine had been for the Americas. Referring to this policy years later, Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson noted that these principles were not new in American foreign policy. He wrote: "They had been the principles upon which it rested for many years."[168] No matter how it was understood in theory by the popular mind, the Open Door policy in China, as Professor Beard observed, was in practice a cloak for imperialist intrigues." Recognizing only nominally the territorial integrity of China, it was "a shield for constant interference" in Far Eastern affairs. Although the Great Powers ruthlessly competed among themselves, they joined hands in keeping China powerless.[169]

166 Commager, *op. cit.*, pp. 190–192; Malloy, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 246, 260.

167 A.T. Mahan, *The Problem of Asia*, Boston, 1900, pp. 11–18, 47–48, 106–107, 179–181, 187–191, 201–202.

168 Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, *On Active Service in Peace and War*, New York, Harper, 1947, pp. 249–250.

169 Charles A Beard and Mary R. Beard, *America in Midpassage*, New York, Macmillan, 1946, p. 441.

VIII. *Conclusions*

In the words of Richard Olney, who was responsible for some time for the conduct of America's foreign relations, the international policy suitable to America's infancy and weakness was unworthy of her maturity and strength; and the rules regulating her relations to Europe, a necessity of the conditions prevailing a century ago, were inapplicable to the changed conditions of later years. "Duty" and "interest" required the United States to take her "true" position in the family of nations. The "home market" fallacy was fast disappearing with the proved inadequacy of the home market. He maintained: "*Nothing will satisfy us in the future but free access to foreign markets.*"[170] To seize especially the markets in the East which were for the first time beginning to fully open themselves to the Western nations, he suggested "alliances" which would not be entangling, "but wholly advantageous." Evidence suggests that American expansion in the nineties was the outward reflection of an internal problem. As Professor Beard accepts, the official business of the United States referred to as "foreign" is in no way separate from domestic transactions. The foreign and domestic policies of the United States, as is true with all nations, are parts of the same thing. Policies termed "foreign" are merely the reflection of interests dominant in a particular economy. American prosperity had depended on operations outside the country. Since agricultural and industrial surpluses could not be used by domestic consumers, profitable outlets had to be found "through colonial expansion, sea power and diplomatic pressures abroad."[171] What is more, such expansion would preserve the established domestic order and prevent changes in power structure, in favor of what an American Congressman termed as the "anarchistic, socialistic and populist boil."[172]

One has to accept as a guiding beacon this statement of John D. Rockefeller made in 1899: "*Dependent solely upon local*

170 Italics mine. Richard Olney, "Growth of Our Foreign Policy," *Atlantic Monthly*, LXXXV (March 1900), pp. 290–310 from Hart, *op. cit.*, Vol. IV, pp. 612–616.

171 Beard and Beard, *op. cit.*, pp. 381–382.

172 Charles A. Beard, *The Open Door at Home*, New York, Macmillan, 1934, p. 101.

business we should have failed long ago. We were forced to extend our markets and to seek for export trade."[173] The outcome of such a policy is accurately described by another American – Senator Lodge: "*We have a record of conquest, colonization, and territorial expansion ... unequalled by any people in the 19th Century.*"[174] One misleading evaluation that may be brought again to mind in passing is the assertion that American overseas expansion respresented a small percentage of its national product and was therefore unimportant. That percentage often might be enough to prevent a slip into bankruptcy. Moreover, investment and loans of the United States beginning with the nineties are rather impressive.[175] The geopolitical rationalizations of that expansion were again put forth by Mahan who prophesied that the British navy would probably decline in relative strength, so that it would not venture to withstand the German on any broad lines of policy, but only in the narrowest of immediate British interests. American power had to be found primarily upon the sea to sustain an expansionist external policy. The war with Spain had left the United States in political possession of strategic bases in the Caribbean and the Pacific. Mahan thought it wise to secure remote points in probable distant theaters of war.[176] The Spanish War had brought the United States into the concerns of the European family of nations to a degree never anticipated by the earlier generations.

When American manufactured products began to flood the world markets, some European statesmen began to worry over the new competition which they felt to be the greatest phenomenon of the time. American influence through commerce, occupation, machinery, invention and commodities was rapidly penetrating the world. The Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister Count Goluchowski's address, in which he complained of the "destructive competition" of the United States and warned that the European nations "must close their ranks in order successfully

173 Italics mine. Williams, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

174 Italics mine. Schriftgiesser, *op. cit.*, p. 135.

175 Williams, *op. cit.*, p. 46; Faulkner, *The Decline of Laissez Faire*, *op. cit.*, p. 73; I. Mintz, *American Exports During Business Cycles:* 1879–1958, *Occasional Paper* 76, New York, National Bureau of Economic Research, 1961.

176 Mahan, *Naval Strategy*, *op. cit.*, pp. 111–112, 314, 345, 447.

to defend their existence"[177], reminds one of similar cries repeated by some leading contemporary European statesmen. In the midst of such calls for security against economic preponderance, the twentieth century was fast becoming the era of economic war between industrial giants. Theodore Roosevelt, who succeeded McKinley, shot six months after his second inauguration, seemed to be the leader of these giants. The "Roosevelt Corollary" of the Monroe Doctrine that he pursued meant that any country in the Western Hemisphere whose people conducted themselves in harmony with American interests need fear no interference from the United States. A deviation attempting to alter the basic relationship with the powerful northern neighbour, however, would mean that the United States would exercise police power. American dominance in the Western Hemisphere since the Second American Conference in October 22, 1901, is generally accepted. The United States, which had prevented the Columbian soldiers from penetrating into the canal area, is still the master of that waterway. An executive arrangement in 1904 had enabled Roosevelt to take over the control of the customs of the Dominican Republic, invaded by U.S. marines in 1916 to force the resignation of the Dominican President.[178] Dollar diplomacy became vigorous in Nicaragua, when Washington supported a *coup* against the government; actual occupation came in 1910 and continued until 1934 except for few months' interlude in 1925. Beginning with the nineties, American capital began to pour into Mexican railroads, copper mines and oil. American businessmen had obtained control of most Mexico's production, under the liberal policy of Diaz. We learn from Professor Faulkner that it was his beginning to encourage British oil groups that led American oilmen to help finance the overdue revolution of Madero.[179] This dominance in the Western Hemisphere has even included Canada, whose attempts to resist are perceivable even today.[180]

As to American intentions in Asia, Mahan defined Hay's Open Door Notes as "essentially commercial," for the age, he

177 Pratt, *op. cit.*, p. 259.

178 Melvin M. Knight, *The Americans in Santo Domingo*, New York, Vanguard Press, 1928.

179 Faulkner, *The Decline of Laissez Faire*, *op. cit.*, p. 77.

180 Richard P. Stebbins, *The United States in World Affairs:* 1963, New York, Harper, 1964, pp. 123–129.

thought, was "above all commercial in spirit."[181] This is a great understatement of what the United States was preparing to do in the Far East. Even if we accept the argument that what she actually wanted was an open market in accordance with the principles of *laissez-faire*, it should have been known that even under much better circumstances in the United States that system had produced giant entrepreneurs in the form of pools, trusts or holdings squeezing the minor operator out of existence. Moreover, it is common knowledge that in the Asian scene powerful industrialized countries stood shoulder to shoulder with weak agrarian and feudal societies that possess rich raw materials and a consumer population. As truthfully put by Professor Williams:

> *"When an advanced industrial nation plays, or tries to play, a controlling and one-sided role in the development of a weaker economy, then the policy of the more powerful country can with accuracy and candor only be described as imperial.*
>
> *"The empire that results may well be informal in the sense that the weaker country is not ruled on a day-to-day basis by resident administrators... but it is nevertheless an empire. The poorer and weaker nation makes its choices within limits set, either directly or indirectly, by the powerful society."*[182]

In the nineties and the coming decades in Latin America, China or elsewhere in the under-developed world, not only were the industrialized foreign powers themselves giants, but they also worked in cooperation with the ruling classes in those backward societies. Such circumstances lead to anything but a balanced relationship between the two nations in question or between the economic classes in a particular under-developed nation. As to "investment" or "aid" to flow from the American metropolis or the allegation that the United States herself developed by foreign capital, Professor Coolidge replies that "there is a distinction between the poor man who has to ask for a loan from a well-to-do neighbour in order to set his business going, and the wealthy financier who invites others to take share in a profitable enterprise."[183]

The seeds of today's maladjustments were thus placed at the root of America's relations with the under-developed world

181 A.T. Mahan, *The Interest of America in International Conditions*, Boston, Little, Brown and Co., 1915, p. 189.

182 Italics mine. Williams, *op. cit.*, pp. 47–48.

183 Coolidge, *op. cit.*, p. 176.

and the other industrialized nations. It was through such a relationship that, say, Venezuela's oil, Liberia's rubber or Bolivia's tin were tied to America's oil, rubber and tin interests. But the further cementing of this relationship required certain "reforms" to eliminate traditions which handicapped business. Therefore, "limited reforms" became a part and parcel of the Open Door policy. It was thus that American goods, commerce, flag, soldiers and power flowed into the under-developed areas within a few decades, pouring even into the industrialized nations as well as their colonies, until American economic and political expansion embraced about two-thirds of the globe.