IDEOLOGY IN TURKEY AFTER THE REVOLUTION OF 1960: NATIONALISM AND SOCIALISM

Kemal H. KARPAT

1) Introduction: the relation of ideology to social change

The military revolution of May 27, 1960, marked the turning point in the ideological development of Turkey. It undermined the social bases of the political balance established in the first three decades of Republic and helped liquidate the last vestiges of traditional concepts of social organization and government authority. It brought to surface economic and social conflicts and helped crystallize the thoughts on these issues. The initial aim of the revolution was to restore the rule of law based on democratic parliamentary principles and protect them through adequate constitutional safeguards. These purposes were formally achieved through the Constitution of 1961. However, the effect of the revolution in the realm of social thought and the movement of social groups is probably more important in the long run than its institutional achievement. The revolution speeded up two social-political processes of vital importance in Turkish politics. The first process concerned the power struggle between two middle class groups; one associated with the bureaucratic elite of the early days of Republic, and the other, a new rising large group rooted in economic occupations and liberal professions. The second process consisted of the rise of a labor class, structural changes among rural groups and their search for recognition and power based on economic interest.

The ideological developments in Turkey after 1960 reflected the above social process, and were at the same time, an effort to interpret and direct it through some sort of political action. Consequently, the source and role of ideology in Turkey appear to be intimately connected with social transformation and are both its cause and effect.

Before dealing further with the questions outlined above it is necessary to relate them to the ideological developments. elsewhere in the Middle East and other developing countries. Turkey has reached the point where the ruling groups associated with early modernization have been successfully challenged by other groups from below created by the very political and economic forces of modernization. The conflict among upper social groups may appear as a struggle between conservatism and modernism. Yet the terms of reference of both groups became so drastically altered after 1960 as to make both conservatism and modernization appear in a new modern context rather than a struggle between the old and new. This was indeed the basic aspect of the ideological development in Turkey after 1960. Social and political transformation made imperative a change in the former understanding of conservatism and modernism. and ideology became the media for achieving an intellectual change from within. Thus, during the initial phase of transformation in a new country ideology may be used to justify the change in traditional institutions and mode of life, whereas in the second phase it may be used to achieve internal adjustment to a new way of social and political life. Therefore in the serons phase the terms "modern" and "traditional" might lose considerably their original meaning. Often what used to be considered "modern" may turn to be a conservative force whereas the "traditional" may acquire a dynamic progressive aspect.

The ulema group may be a conservative force in the initial phase of change. But if it presses for political rights and turns into an entrepreneurial group interested in industrialization it may well be "modern", whereas the reformist intelligentsia looking at the problem from the formal viewpoint of authority may resist this economics oriented group and appear itself as a conservative force. During this process the ulema outwardly may preserve its garb, attachment to religion and habits but its thinking about society man and government may be so drastically changed as to make its formal attachment to tradition a matter of ritual. This in itself is a fundamental change since economic motivation is likely to create a chain of reactions among social groups completely different from the past when ulema's role was mainly religious. (The above idea stems from this writer's finding that most of the ulema and their descendents in Turkey

became during the last twenty years landowners, merchants and craftsmen or identified themselves closely with these groups).

It seems to us that the Arab countries are presently reaching the end of their first phase of change. Turkey meanwhile has entered into the second phase. Consequently the problems of secularism, religious reformation, emancipation of women etc., which constituted the backbone of the Turkish reform appear today not as the dividing line between traditionalism and modernism but normal issues on which there are individual differences of opinion and interpretations intended not to challenge the modern set up but to adapt fully it.

The changes in the understanding of nationalism as well as the new ethics sought in Islam dealt with later in this study illustrate the above points. The ideological developments in Turkey after 1960 appear meaningful only if studied in relation to the social political change, and especially to power shifts among the ruling middle class groups which occurred in 1946–60.

The civil and military bureaucracies and the intelligentsia (men with formal medium or high education) formed the bulk of middle classes which ruled Turkey until the late 1940ies. This was originally a revolutionary, nationalist middle class which secured national independence, put an end to Western economic domination and established the Republican regime by ousting the Ottoman dynasty and destroying the political power of its supporting groups; the traditionalist ulema and imperial bureaucracy. Internally, the group consolidated its power by associating itself with agrarian and commercial groups in the countryside or by creating economic groups of its own through the state enterprises.

This bureaucratic middle class derived its social and political outlook essentially from its association with the state and less from affiliation with a particular social group. Theoretically the state represented the entire nation, even though the population had not yet become fully aware of its own national identity. In fact it was the state which strived to create a Turkish nation according to a secularist-nationalist philosophy that was alien to the folk culture. This was the nationalist ideology of the period

¹ See Kemal H. Karpat, "Society, economics and politics in Contemporary Turkey," *World Politics*, October 1964, pp. 55-64.

and had limited interest in social matters. Without emotionally binding ties between rulers and the ruled, and without an integrative social and economic process and limited popular participation in public life, the bureaucratic middle class found itself separated from the bulk of society. The nationalism of this class eventually acquired conservative tendencies and manifested itself in form of opposition to the upward mobility of lower social groups, rejection of class differences and conflict of economic interests. It emphasized the utmost superiority of the nation and state over individual and drew considerable strength from the glories of history.

The main goal of the ruling group was the establishment and consolidation of a modern political structure, namely, the national state. The need for such a state was not the result of philosophical speculation but rather the outcome of international conditions, the Turks need for self preservation as an ethic group and the power interests of the ruling groups. The establishment of a national state, completed in early 1930ies was a major achievement if considered in the light of Turkey's background rooted in the universalist traditions of Islam and multi-national Ottoman state. Moreover, the political authority exercised on behalf of the national state had a determining impact on future social developments. It provided a modern political framework in which internal developments were contained and eventually regulated in the light of problems, interests and aspirations of social groups living within Turkey's well defined territorial limits. The national state gradually created a way of life in addition to being a form of political rule. Consequently, the political struggle following the liberalization policy initiated after 1945, must be regarded as a movement directed not against the Republican regime but chiefly against the power of an elite in the ruling Republican Party². It was also a social struggle in the sense that it aimed at securing recognition of the power and interests of social groups active within the national state. The formal opposition to the Republican Party leadership appeared first among its ranks during the debate on land reform in 1945. The rebels eventually formed their own party, the Democratic Party, in 1946 and then won power in 1950.

² Kemal H. Karpat, Turkey's Politics, Princeton 1959. Chap. 4-8.

The Democrats claimed that the basic justification for strong rule in the past was the preservation of modern reforms concerning the political system. They claimed that the basic reforms were accepted, that no organized group challenged them since most of the population became familiar with this new way of life. Consequently the justification for holding power as "guardians of reform" by a self appointed elite had disappeared.

The alternative to strong rule proposed by Democrats was democracy. The clue to future ideological developments is indeed in the meaning attached to democracy. This meant individual political rights, respect for property and safeguards to protect it against seizure by government. Democracy also implied freedom of enterprise (freedom to acquire and enjoy wealth). The rebellion against state controls occurred beginning in 1945 during a period when statism was reinterpreted with the purpose of orienting it towards social welfare and achieving broader popular participation.

The leadership in the Democratic Party was assumed by landed groups, business and commercial interests and professionals whose views on democracy and government were closely related to their own economic status and sanctity of private property. The legal system adopted in Republic, chiefly the Civil Code, regulated property relations in the greatest detail but without being supplemented by political institutions capable of checking the government's sporadic violations of private ownership as it happened in 1942 when a Capital Tax was introduced.

The lower urban groups, workers and peasants suffering from various restrictions and controls imposed as a result of economic statism in 1930–45, favored a liberalization. Moreover, there was a commonly shared desire for economic development or activity, and at this stage few were interested in debating its means. Consequently the reaction to the statist policies enforced in the past made a liberal economic approach the most likely policy of the future. A few scattered apologists for socialism found no acceptance especially after the relations with Soviet Union worsened in 1946 as a result of the latter's demands for territory in Northern Turkey and bases on the Bosphorus. The second major foreign influence came from the West and especially the United States through NATO and foreign aid.

The United States favored private enterprise and a general economic policy to enhance the rapid growth of entrepreneurial groups. This policy had considerable political impact on ideological developments after 1960 since the rise to power of a middle class was viewed by socialist groups as a Western scheme intended to dominate Turkey from inside. The Democrats' economic policy after coming to power in 1950 followed a course determined by the conditions described above3. It created social mobility and facilitated the rapid expansion of a new entrepreneurial middle class from among professionals, the entrepreneurial groups, the upper ranks of the peasantry and the services. In mentality and method of work this new entrepreneurial middle class relied on individual initiative, accepted somewhat reluctantly competition, and thus differed from the commercial and industrial groups created at the beginning of the Republic through state backing. Eventually the entrepreneurs and the landowning group came to from the upper layer (now referred to as capitalists) of the new order. However, despite this "liberal" economic policy the state's role in economy increased rather than diminish. The state invested heavily in public works (dams, roads) but also in industry apparently hoping to stimulate economic activity and capital accumulation in the private sector. The etatism of Democrats increased further the size of the public sector but used it to enhance capital accumulation and increase the power of the private sector.

The new economic policy and the growing association of politics with economic interest facilitated the emergence of a series of interest groups which exercised growing pressure on political parties in order to secure economic benefits. The pressure groups were formed initially in the cities as professional organizations among the service groups, craftsmen and a variety of other occupational groups; bus and car drivers (over 200 .000 members) shoemakers, butchers, breadmakers, etc. Meanwhile the Industrial and Commercial Chambers representing the bigger enterprises became a truly powerful interest group.

³ The economic expectations from and the far reaching social meaning of Democrats' victory at polls was dramatically illustrated by the publication of several books which hailed the change of government in 1950 as a White Revolution. Turgut Omay: Beyaz İhtilal, Ankara 1950. Recep Dengin: Beyaz İhtilal, Ankara 1950. M. Cavit Ersen: Hürriyet Mücadelesi, Beyaz İhtilal, Adana 1953.

The activities of these groups, steadily increasing since 1950, have caused chain reactions. For instance the building owners' group was able to free the rent controls in 1954, (Law 6084) after some intensive pressure on the government. The tenants in turn organized the *Türkiye Kiracılar Cemiyeti* (Tenants Association of Turkey) and with moral support from the press reamended the law to their own advantage⁴. (The pressure groups acquired further importance after the revolution of 1960. In fact the Constituent Assembly, which drafted the Constitution of 1961, was organized on the basis of professional representation and thus symbolized Turkey's internal change). It must be noted that the peasantry, though lacking organization has acquired the mentality of an interest group by using its vote power to secure material benefits from political parties³.

The emergence of voluntary associations based on a modern notion of economic interest is certainly an important development not only for Turkey but for the entire Muslim world. It indicates that a new identification, and new motives for seeking association with groups larger than one's own family are affecting political behavior. A new understanding of community and civic responsibilities is also developing.

The new economic orientation of Turkey was accompanied by a slow change in the meaning attached to education. Literacy and knowledge ceased being the monopoly of a few groups, and the distinct mark for status. A pragmatic utilitarian approach to education was evident as expressed in a report according to which the purpose of schools was to train the "individual to be

⁴ Rona Aybay, "Baskı Grupları," İstanbul Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Mecmuası, 1–4 (1961) pp. 3–16. Dünya, January 28, 1961. Yavuz Abadan, "Türki-ye'de Siyasi Partiler ve Tazyik Grupları," Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi 100. Yıl Armağanı, Ankara 1959, pp. 77–118.

⁵ I have witnessed several cases which give a fair idea of the manner in which the peasantry exercised pressure on politicians. In the province of Diyarbakır, the Republican Party candidate, hard pressed for votes in one district, signed a check authorizing the purchase of water pipes for a village well. He tried to convince the village representative that he would build the well after he won the elections but the villager insisted on prompt delivery saying that it was the decision of his village mates. He had his way.

⁶ On the relation of education to social status see Frederick W. Fry, *Turkish Political Elites*, Cambridge (Mass) 1964.

productive, alert, adaptable and at the same time mastering a skill useful to society".

The rise of a new middle class in Turkey based on economic power was a fact as ackowledged even by its bitterest critics. One of them in a devastating attack on Westernism and Turkey's foreign policy stated that the most evident aspect of Turkish developments in the last fifteen years was the emergence of a burgeoisie living far above the economic capabilities of the masses. This class attached itself to foreign interests and became its spokesmen*. The new middle class group lacked polish and appeared avid of wealth and utterly deprived at the beginning of social consciousness and responsibility. Without a broad cultural horizon, vision and ideals, it indulged in all the material pleasure that money could bring. It seemed that the man's acquisitive instincts had their way in an environment in which inner traditional regulatory forces had broken down, and the new had not been devised yet. But this middle clase instinctively felt the need for some moral, ethical precepts to control this spreading materialism. It could not adopt overnight the values, manner and outlook of Western middle classes, and had to rely on its own cultural resources. True, some of the urbanite members of this class did adopt a modern outlook, evident especially among their children. But the majority turned to Islam hoping to find there the force capable of restraining the society's material expectations which they unwittingly stimulated. The intelligentsia regarded the return to Islam as a reaction against secularism, whereas in reality this was a search for new meaning and regulatory function in religion. There was no discussion to change the regime's political framework (except among few powerless reactionary groups) but about using religion to replenish moral ethical and spiritual needs. In any case the social reeducation of this middle class and the broadening of its cultural and professional horizon was the first condition for its survival.

Meanwhile after 1952 inflation hit hard the salaried groups especially the civil and military bureaucracies and deteriorated their living standards. The ascendancy of economic groups to

⁷ Türkiye Eğitim Milli Komisyonu Raporu, İstanbul, 1960, p. 14.

⁸ Niyazi Berkes, *Batıcılık*, *Ulusculuk ve Toplumsal Devrimler*, İstanbul, (Yön publications) 1965, pp. 3–5 ff.

power changed considerably the old system of values. Wealth seemed to have become the chief factor in determining one's social status. Thus the former ruling elite groups were subjected in addition to economic hardship to a painful social downgrading. There was a rather intimate relationship between the rise of social minded intelligentsia and socialist literature and the downgrading of the bureaucracies. The new school of social thought which acquired gradually a leftist doctrinaire view was promoted by intellectuals belonging to the lower ranks of bureaucracy, teachers and some marginal groups. Consequently faced with economic hardship and deterioration of social status the intelligentsia and bureaucracy, apathetic to social ideas until the 1950ies, began to show an interest in social justice, economic development and planned economy. In fact the idea of creating a new and just social order became the driving force behind the promoters of socialism.

The revolution of May 27, 1960 occurred amidst this process of social transformation. We shall leave aside the political struggle between the opposition and government parties which precipiated the military's action and concentrate on its social aspects. The military claimed that the revolution was not directed against any group but aimed at reinstating the democratic order on a firmer basis. Politically speaking this contention was correct. But socially speaking many of the measures undertaken by the military pointed out distinctly that the revolution was directed against a group, namely against those who had acquired economic and political power under the Democrats⁹. Some junta members openly declared that the Democrats had "taken all kinds of measures in order to destroy the army's place in national cultural life" and "treated officers worse than a step child"10 and had boasted that their policies created fifteen millionaires in each city district. The arrest of landlords who had supported the Democrats, the establishment of wealth inquiring committees (later disbanded), the heavy taxes imposed on land and real estate etc., were aimed at the new middle class. A document issued in order to legitimize the revolution, pointedly stressed

⁹ Cumhuriyet, August 28, 1960 (Ecvet Güresin).

¹⁰ Cumhuriyet, July 20, 1960; August 8, 1960 (Orhan Erkanlı and Turhan Yavşın).

the fact that the State under the Democrats had taken the form of physical force and was used to serve the interest of some special interest groups. The State became consequently hostile to other groups, such as the army (the real basis of State) universities, bar associations, the press etc., " all of which were in fact part of the ruling group until 1950.

The contributions by various commercial enterprises to the Democratic Party chest showed indeed that money had become an important instrument in Turkish politics and that organized enterprises used financial power to further their own interests¹². The revolution had also constitutional aspects. The fact that the military took over the government by force and exercised authority on behalf of the armed forces with some well defined social motivations was a total departure from the historical precedents. Power in the past changed hands several times but always with some justification barrowed from traditional concepts of authority.¹³

^{11 27} Mayis, (n.d.) pp. 24-27, News From Turkey, May 30, 1960, pp. 6-9. 12 The funds deposited to the Democratic Party account in the Yeni Cami branch of İş Bank alone between March Ist 1960, and April 13, 1960 amounted to T.L. 3.385.000. The total was estimated to be over T.L. 25 million (9 T.L. to a dollar). The donation ranged from T.L. 10.000 to 500.000, among the donors there was Yapı Kredi Bank and Vehbi Koç's fourteen major enterprises, even though Koc was a member of the Republican Party until March 1960. The Democratic Party collected from 42 banks and enterprises alone T.L. 3.000.000 for the elections of 1957, and distributed T.L. 2.047.000 to provinces in one month. Some of the contributing firms were Yakup Soyugenc, relative of the Finance Minister Hasan Polatkan (50,000) Bozkurt (100,000) Unilever (150,000) Dümeks(200,000 Ottoman Bank (200.000) Eczacibaşı (50.000) Transtürk (250.000) Antalya (500.000) The Republican Party was also the recipient of large sums, which were not made public. But it can be assumed that their receipts were not less than the Democrats' since the percentage of wealth among Republicans was greater than among Democrats, particularly in the countryside organizations.

¹³ The Ottoman concepts of government and authority, strongly influenced by classical Islamic thought had been devised in conformity with the requirements of power. The Ottoman rulers seemed to have had a realistic understanding of power and of the role of human groups. The Muslim citizen was loyal to the state for it was synonymous with his faith. His readiness to follow state commands certainly were basic assets in maintaining political authority. Throughout the reformist era beginning with Selim III and ending with Atatürk, governments in Turkey were extremely careful not to tamper with those essential bonds which tied the Muslim citizen to the state. The durability of Ottoman Empire, aside of international conditions, was largely due to a continuous acceptance of state authority.

Even Atatürk, while enforcing truly revolutionary principles during the War of Independence, and later in the Republic was extremely careful to justify them with tranditionalist arguments as in the case of his speech advocating the abolition of the Sultanate¹⁴. Mustafa Kemal's own rise to power and the establishment of Republic and even some of the reforms were not carried out ruthlessly but were often explained, justified and legitimized through popularly acceptable arguments rooted in traditional concepts of authority. The masses therefore, preserved the idea that despite changes in leadership the harmony between the state and fundamental principles persisted.

But in 1960 the revolutionary officers ignored all the traditionalist concepts legitimizing their assumption of power. First, they were unaware of such concepts and, second, the present conflict was generated by economic forces and a social transformation which had no parallel in the traditionalist era. The State henceforth appeared not as the embodyment of divine will but as a worldly institution. Consequently, after the revolution, many of the political symbols and myths surviving from the traditionalist era were discarded as incompatible with Turkey's true needs. Even the old poetical and often incoherent talk full of allegories. metaphores and appeal to human situations began to be replaced by a more logical, positive and rational argumentation. For a student of Turkish politics the political developments in Turkey in 1946-60 and from 1960 onwards appear different in nature and orientation. There was now an earnest intellectual effort to establish a rational relationship between the basic concepts on society government and nation whereas in the past such concepts were accepted without critical analysis despite their traditional content.

The preceding introduction makes it abundantly clear that the revolution had a unique social and political background and that this background was bound to reflect itself in politics in form of new ideas, that is to say ideology. The ideological discussions in Turkey after 1960 seem to fall in two distinctive categories: the first consisted of nationalist concepts which had been in force during the past decades, whereas the second category contained social ideas born from the economic and political realities of a diversified social order. It is important to note that

¹⁴ Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri, İstanbul, 1945, pp. 261-271.

after the revolution even the military gradually changed into a kind of interest group as evidenced by their efforts to raise the salaries and the retirement pensions, and to provide housing credits for officers, etc. Economic motivation, be it for individuals or groups was accepted as legitimate and worthy of legal protection. This development in turn had profound impact on allowing the workers the rights for collective bargaining and strike. It provided also an incepient argument for the entrepreneurial groups to defend the profit motive as a legitimate reason for economic activity. Some of the extremist nationalist concepts such as racialism were discarded, whereas other nationalist concepts were gradually reinterpreted and adapted to new conditions. Socialism appeared also in several shades ranging from Islamic socialism to marxism. Moreover, for the first time in Turkish politics there were two clearly defined extremes, the right and left making thus possible for the emergence of a third moderate position which became in fact the backbone of the political system after 196115. The currents of thought to be discussed later in detail, developing amidst these circumstances, were promoted by individuals identified with social groups. The thoughts, although superficial in many instances, reflected no longer a passing whim or the echo of half assimilated foreign slogans, but a deeply felt individual's desire to understand, explain and justify events and harmonize them with Turkey's realities. There was the need for a new set of values and beliefs which would give a meaning and direction but also security to man. This was in fact the ultimate goal of ideology.

2) Turkish Nationalism between conservatism and social change

Nationalism in Turkey if studied in relation to social change and power politics would mirror faithfully the evolution of Tur-

¹⁵ The 38 members of National Unity Committee the military junta epitomized well the existing ideological groupings; one group of about five people defended militant nationalism, another group of about seven leaned towards socialism, whereas the rest, although socially minded, preferred a parliamentary democracy. Recently the first group headed by Col. Alparslan Türkeş took control of the National Peasant Party and gave it a nationalist orientation, the second joined the Republican Party whereas the rest remained relatively uncommitted.

See Kemal H. Karpat, "Die Geschichte der ideologischen Strömungen und seine Vertreter," *Bustan*, January 1962, pp. 17–26. A historical analysis of Turkish nationalism by the same author is in the forthcoming *Cambridge History of Islam*.

key's internal regime from a narrowly based elite rule to a broader social representation.

Nationalism developed initially in 1908-1930, among intellectuals through free discussions and was instrumental in mobilizing all social groups from left to right around common goals in the war of Liberation. It embraced all tendencies from extreme leftism to Islamism by uniting them around the idea of establishing a state for Turks, where each group hoped to make supreme its own creed. The Republican Party eventually decided to make nationalism a party principle in 1931, and then in 1934 it incorporated it in the Constitution and dogmatized it. Thus the scope of nationalism was narrowed considerably to include secular modernist ideas and reforms associated with the establishment of modern Turkey. The nation was regarded as a community of individuals living within well defined territorial limits. The uniting link among people were past memories, future aspirations and the desire to live as Turks in a political state with a national culture based on people's own language and traditions. Nationalism sought national pride not in Islamic history, but wherever in the past Turks displayed the distinctive characteristics of a national group.

The search for achievement in national history created an unusual interest in the history and the heritage of Central Asia and weakened considerably the relation of nationalism to the realities of contemporary Turkey. The republican government interested in promoting a secular concept of nationhood purposely ignored and downgraded the cultural heritage of Ottoman Empire chiefly because of the latter's intimate association with Islam and its universalist aims. Political expediency however led the government to maintain the traditions of loyalty to the state and respect for authority inherited from the Ottoman Empire. The Republic became an accepted political reality in the people's minds but the Ottoman heritage also embracing the entire fabric of society, continued to live in the people's hearts.

Meanwhile the bureaucracy inherited from the Empire and the civil service grew further in size and power and eventually absorbed the off-springs of Ottoman ruling families and conservative groups. The regime's need for survival led to a rather paradoxical alliance between the conservatives and the power conscious bureaucracy supposedly serving a secular and socially progressive state. The Republican Party in turn discarded by 1935, all pretentions of democracy and became synonymous with the nation and state. The government insisted on implementing secularism, but socially it became arch conservative conforming thus to the tendencies of the groups in control of power. Much of the ancient social conservatism promoted in the past on behalf of Islamic orthodoxy was preserved even under secularism in the guise of nationalism. The culture of the small town eventually permeated the upper structure, even though the regime's outward form was modern. Consequently, the original broad cultural orientation supposedly based on Western values was perverted into a limited self centered concept of nationalism. The government's decision to transform nationalism into a state ideology and define it according to the needs of narrow educational and cultural policy degenerated further its content. On the other hand, a group of progressive minded nationalists in the government and Republican Party fought to preserve the secular aspects of nationalism. They stressed the material aspects of culture and raised positivist thinking to the level of a creed by ignoring totally the natural influences of tradition. Thus nationalism harbored two opposite schools of thought, positivism and traditionalism whose conflict broke out repeatedly under various forms.

The policy of liberalization implemented after 1946 gradually brought into the open the contradictions between the secularistpositivist and traditionalist understandings of nationalism. The ensuing conflict was best epitomized by two institutions representing the dual understanding of nationalism: the People's Houses (Halk Evleri) and the Turkish Hearths (Türk Ocakları).

The People's Houses (est. 1931-2) aimed at creating a Turkish national identity based on the folklore, life and experience of contemporary individuals and communities. They searched for historical roots in the experience of Turks as an ethnic group and became the dedicated supporters of secularism. The Türk Ocakları abolished in 1932 were re-established privately in 1949. They began to receive government support after 1950, and eventually replaced the People's Houses which were forced to close in 1951. The Ocaks, faithful to their original ideas (they were the promoters of Turkish nationalism after 1911) claimed that between Ottoman history, Islam and Republican Turkey there was an organic, cultural and emotional continuity and that the denial of this relationship could undermine the very existence of state. They accepted as motto the definition of identity forformulated by Ziya Gökalp: belongingness to the Turkish *millet* (nation) to the *umma* of Islam and to contemporary civilization.

The neo-nationalist review Türk Yurdu republished in 1954, with government support, insisted that the cultural foundations of Turkey were rooted in historical experience. Remzi Oğuz Arık, Osman Turan, Mümtaz Turhan, Cezmi Türk, just to mention a few names, agreed that Turkey's modernization (technological development) was a basic necessity but this did not imply a rejection of the Ottoman-Islamic past. They did not exclude the ancient pre-Islamic history of Turks but insisted that the real identity of Turks emerged after their conversion to Islam, and especially after the establishment of political states (Selçuk, Ottoman) which inevitably embodied the cultural characteristics of Turks. The conquest of Anatolia, after the victory over Byzantines at Malzigert in 1071, appeared to them as a new period of Islamic Turkish history, a 900 hundred-year process which shaped a Turkish community. The "conscience of history", binding the Turks together consisted of recollections of bravery, victory and sacrifice on the battlefields for the sake of a homeland and collective ideals. The nation, according to this nationalism was not confined only to territory but comprised also groups which felt a historical and cultural affinity towards Turks living in Turkey. They placed emphasis on "soy" (family and group lineage) and less on language or folk culture in order to differentiate the Turks from other Muslim who shared common history and culture16.

The state represented national ideas, hence it was desirable that it coincide with the nation. The two were compatible as long as they preserved the original spirit that conceived both of them. Therefore the Republican regime had to confirm to this spirit. According to neo-nationalists the technological modernization

¹⁶ See Remzi Oğuz Arık, *Türk İnkilâbı ve Milliyetçiliğimiz*, Ankara. 1958, pp. 6 ff. Cahit Okurer, *İdeal Milliyetçilik*, İstanbul, 1961.

of Turkey was to be entrusted to an elite educated in the modern science of the West¹⁷. Neo-nationalism includes mystics inspired by Sufi teachings such as Nurettin Topçu, as well as liberals such as Ali Fuad Başgil, who reject racialism¹⁸.

It must be pointed out that presently the leaders of this nationalism are university professors, writers, with considerable influen ce. Their writings appearing in reviews, such as Türk Yurdu (Turkish Homeland), Türk Kültürü, (Turkish Culture) Tohum, (Seed) etc. are relatively well organized, logical and occasionally persuasive. The nationalism oriented towards Ottomanism has also a militant reactionary wing represented in the main by Riza Nur's (1879–1942) ideas. Born in the conservative town of Sinop, Nur was a close associate of Atatürk but turned against him and left Turkey. His five writings on nationalism donated to the British Museum became available to public only in 196019. Nur's piecemeal writings, however, were known and read by his disciples, for in addition to a philosophy he furnished also the blueprint for a nationalist organization; the Party for Turkey's Resurrection. Riza Nur accepted a Republican form of government but also Islam as official religion. The old alphabet was

¹⁷ Mümtaz Turhan, Garbhlasmann Neresindeyiz? Istanbul, 1958. Turhan, appearing outwardly as a modernist gave a series of lectures in the Aydınlar Klübü (Intellectuals' Club) in 1962, on the modernization of Turkey and Japan. His basic idea was that Japan achieved rapid modernization by maintaining her national identity. Turhan's lecture were supposed to be a refutation of my articles published in Milliyet, January-February 1962. These were based on the papers presented to the SSRC conference on the modernization of Turkey and Japan held in New York in 1962. See Robert E. Ward and Dankwart A. Rustow, Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey, Princeton 1964.

¹⁸ Başgil wrote that "we (Turks) are not Central Asiatics, either by spirit or body structure, even though linguistically we are related to Central Asia. On the contrary we are a special nation, a synthesis of races, living a life of its own in a country ringed by Islam." Başgil was considered for Presidency by the Justice Party in 1961 but was opposed by the military. In a recent article Başgil declared that Islam and nationalism are identified with each other since both form a "united front against a common enemy: communism, atheism or godlessness and cosmopolitanism or soysuzluk" (without a lineage). Yeni Istanbul, November 30, 1963. Presently Başgil is a deputy from İstanbul but his popularity has diminished since a new wing of moderates took control of that party.

¹⁹ Cavit Orhan Tütengil, *Doktor Rıza Nur Üzerine*, Ankara, 1965, also *Cumhuriyet*, March 9, 1964, *Kitap Belleten*, Oct. 1, 1964 pp. 3–5. Also Ziya Yücel İlhan, *Sevenlerin Kalemiyle Dr. Rıza Nur*, Istanbul, 1962.

to be restored and used together with the latin one. The sects were to be reestablished as missionary organizations to disseminate Turkism. The Caliphate was to be reinstated. Nur opposed industrialization fearing its disruptive effects on social organization but advocated a modernized agriculture. The women were to be returned to home life. A dedicated racialist. Nur advocated reunion of all Turks into a confederation in which the Anatolian Turks would hold key position. Bitterly opposed to Atatürk he made a special point of proposing to limit the positions occupied by Turks from Rumelia (born in Balkan countries) proportionate to their number²⁰. Although theoretically not opposed to a multi-party system, he proposed to dissolve the Republican Party and replace it with a fascist type of nationalist organization which would assume supreme power. Nur has been hailed by nationalists as having expressed the true feelings of Anatolian Turks. These ideas, including his denunciation of Atatürk (he proposed to destroy his statues) have become today the chief source of inspiration for a variety of nationalist militant currents.

The nationalism oriented towards Ottoman past (the racialist wing had little appeal) found wide support among the upper and middle classes dealing in economic occupations. It appealed emotionally to them but also strengthened implicitely their social position by upholding the traditional belief in the immutability of the social order. In practice, however, as mentioned before this new middle class was the main cause disrupting the old social organization while trying to maintain its cultural symbols and values.

The first reaction in the earlier 1950ies to the rise of traditionalist nationalism and its conservative orientation came from secularists. These began to search for deeper meanings in *Atatürkçülük*, (Atatürkism) and shaped it into a movement seeking to reassert Turkey's initial secularist nationalist principles. The secularist nationalists organized eventually the Türk Devrim

²⁰ In the late 1950 ies another militant group publishing the *Serdengeçti* and a variety of tracts repeatedly attacked the "unfaithful" Rumelians from Salonica (e.g. Atatürk) for having imposed secularist ideas which undermined the spiritual purity of Anatolian towns. These would go as far as to demand the rehabilitation of the Ottoman dynasty. See M. Raif Ogan, *Sultan Abdülhamid II ve Bugünkü Muarızları*, İstanbul, 1956.

Ocakları (Turkish Reform Hearth) early in the 1950ies which attracted various liberal and social minded groups, including the graduates of Village Institutes. It opened branches in a few cities and exercised considerable influence among university students. The rise of new middle classes coupled with the Democrats liberal economic policies compelled the secular nationalists to take position on economic and social problems. The immediate outcome of these developments was the emergence of social consciousness which began to manifest itself, in a variety of literary works published in Varlık (Existence), Dost (Friend) Yeni Ufuklar, (New Horizons) and Yedi Tepe (Seven Hills). These reviews sponsored the publication of original books, and Western translations which formed a sizable percentage of the total number of books published in Turkey. Dailies, such as Dünya (World) and Cumhuriyet (Republic) supported this group. Meanwhile the Devrim Ocakları (their number remained limited) gradually turned into cultural clubs where discussions on secularism expanded into economic and social fields. The Ocaks leaned towards the Republican Party since many of their members came from the youth branches of this party.

Two groups began to emerge among secular nationalists. The first moderate group contented itself with defending a return to original nationalism under a democratic form of government. The second and younger group sought to give a social interpretation to Atatürk's reforms. It regarded the cultural reforms to remain effectless if not supported by profound social change, and a political regime dedicated to this goal. Some intellectuals in this group eventually became the promoters of socialism²¹.

The military revolution of 1960 speeded up and completed the evolution of Turkish nationalism. The revolution was, in a way, a victory for the secular nationalists. Their former opposition to the Democrats, and the officer's secular orientation

²¹ For instance many of contributors to the socialist review Yön were the members of the Devrim Ocağı in Ankara. The Research Office of the Republican Party was already manned by members of this group. Various publications on Turkey's social problems issued by this office mainly after 1957 clearly point out to the social dimension acquired by secularist-nationalist thought. See CHP Araşturma ve Dökümantasyony Bürosu Yayınları (PRP Research and Documentation Office) on Workers, Economic Development, Civil Service Personnel, Social Problems, etc.

seemed to bring them together especially with regard to Democrats' supposedly anti-reformist policies. Consequently, they found themselves opposed to the conservative Islamist nationalists who received support from the Democratic government²².

Thus, the significant formal break between the two groups of nationalists, long in the making, had taken place.

The secularists gradually became identified with the revolution of May 27, and its reforms and supported the military government. The others sympathized with the opposition and identified themselves with the cause of the ousted Democrats. However, for sometime after the revolution the outcome of nationalism was not clear yet. The nationalist wing of the junta under Col. Alparslan Türkes seemed to lean towards the Ottoman nationalism (he insisted on secularism) chiefly because of its historical appeal deemed necessary to foster national unity. It was reliably reported that Mümtaz Turhan, the conservative nationalist professor, had been seriously considered for an appointment as Minister of Education, probably to direct the Kültür ve Ülkü Birliği (Union of Ideal and Culture) supposed to replace the Ministry of Education²³. Meanwhile, the People's Houses were restored under a new name Kültür Birliği (Union of Culture) and only later in 1963, reverted to their old name.

In an interview with some of the social minded members of NUC this writer asked their opinion about the nationalistic measures planned while in power. They rejected racialism but defended the other measures since these were intended to enhance the sense of national unity and rejuvenate society. (The attitude of military towards nationalism is conditioned by a veriety of historical, social and educational factors beyond the scope of this work.)

²² The Democratic Party supported some nationalist publications with subscriptions and secret subsidies. Immediately after the revolution this was made public and contributed to loss of prestige for these publications and their editors, including the poet Fazil Kısakürek who published the conservative Büyük Doğu (Great Orient).

²³ See details in Öncü, October 27, November 9-11, 1960 Türkeş's memoirs began to appear in *Yeni İstanbul* February 10-17, 1962 but were supressed for attacks on İnönü.

In any case the nationalist policies of the military coupled with a general freedom of press encouraged the conservative nationalists to reorganize themselves further and make full use of their existing associations and publications. The main organization of this nationalist group was the Milliyetçiler Derneği (Society of Nationalists) established in 1953 with the purpose of "preserving and promoting the values which make up our nation, and bring up Turkish nationalists in a model fashion imbued with the consciousness of history, scientific mentality, spirit of sacrifice, abnegation, justice and virtue" (art 2 of by-laws). The society originally had only a few branches. After 1960 it opened new branches in the main cities of Turkey in order to fight the spread of socialist ideas24. The members of country branches were professionals, lawyers, doctors, some teachers and a variety of other groups associated in one way or other either with the town "intelligentsia" or with the entrepreneurial middle class. The Türk Milli Talebe Birliği (National Union of Turkish Students, originally established by nationalist students in the 1930ies, was fused later through government pressure into the larger student union but was separated again in 1947) represented this current among university students. (Türkiye Milli Talebe Federasyonu -Turkish National Student Federation- is the main student body presently adopting a left of center position.) The National Union has chauvinistic tendencies displayed on occasions (but it participated in the April 1960 demonstrations against Menderes) such as the antiforeign campaign Vatandas Türkçe Konuş, (Citizen speak Turkish) of August-September 1960.

In addition to these two organizations several other clubs and groups were organized to defend similar nationalist ideas. For instance the purpose of *Türk Gençlik Derneği* (Turkish Youth Association) established in 1963 was to "protect... the national values, fight subversive ideologies, especially communism, spread knowledge about great Turks and train youth as true nationalists" (by-laws art. 2). The more recent organization *Komünizmle Mücadele Derneği* (Society for Struggle against

²⁴ Milliyetçiler Derneği Ana Nizamnamesi ve On Yıllık Faaliyetleri, İstanbul, 1963. The association publishes books, organizes conferences and seminars; 19 publications, 150 seminars by 1963. Several publishing enterprises were controlled by these nationalists. Sönmez Matbaacılık Anonim Ortaklığı, İlim Yayma Cemiyeti, Türkiye Anıtlar Derneği and especially Türkeli Anonim Şirketi.

Communism) which has more than forty branches represents the militants of these nationalist organizations. The latter has been actively engaged in violent demonstrations against the leftists, especially the marxist oriented Labor Party. The basic cause for the resurgence of this nationalism after the revolution is opposition to social currents. It is defensive and conservative in character. Hence it is prone to oppose social ideas as being communistic and subversive and exalt traditional virtues found in history and religion²⁵.

It tends to defend economic liberalism in absolute from. It supports a parliamentary democracy in the belief that it can control the public vote and oppose the reforms proposed by social minded groups. Bent on preserving intact the social structure, it idealizes the parochial town mentality and traditional family values as the true foundations of Turkish society. It hails Atatürk as a liberator, but privately some extemists belonging to the Anatolian supremacist current denounce him as ignorant of the spiritual aspects of Anatolian society. In fact, some go as far as to say mistakenly that he was a "dönme" (converted Jew) from Salonica where he was born. At times the foreign policy aims of this nationalism draws some inspiration from Pan Turkism in hoping to liberate and unite the Turks living abroad in one single country26. On balance, however, their preoccupation with internal problems, and their conservative social and economic outlook outweighs by far their interest in foreign affairs.

This conservative wing of traditionalist nationalism can be regarded also as a psychological reaction to the disintegration of traditional mode of life and value system²⁷. There is fear of

²⁵ Fethi Tevetoğlu, Faşist Yok Komünist Var, Ankara, 1962. Hikmet Tanyu, Niçin Komünist Oluyorlar, Ankara, 1958. The anti-communist literature is quite abundant in this group. See İlhan E. Darendelioğlu, Türkiye'de Komünist Hareketleri, 2 vols, Istanbul, 1961–64.

²⁶ Cumhuriyet, January 19, 1964. A. Nurullah Barıman: Bizim Milli Ülkümüz Turancılık Nedir? İstanbul, (n.d.) p. 15.

²⁷ The overwhelming majority of these nationalists were trained in modern schools in the semi-racialist nationalism which prevailed in the educational system in 1935–45. During the Democrats' rule this nationalism acquired the religious ingredient, which although present in the past in a variety of forms, was not openly acknowledged. The teachers of history, language and literature, indoctrinated with the idea of Central Asian heritage and all the myths associated with it, played the main role in imparting this nationalism to the youth in the conservative towns of Anatolia. Today the strongest supporters of this nationalism are İmam-Hatip (clergy) schools which were established to train a modern minded clergy, but became in fact a politically minded militant conservative group.

the common man's awakening, the sharpening of individual's sense of existence and responsibility, and the shattering of their own self created image of social perfection and leadership mission in life. (The same fear of the commoner's rise is evident also among the other wing of the elite; the etatist socialists who would like to control the individual through some modern collectivist ideology)²⁸.

The conservative nationalists appeal to the commoner's mysticism to his surviving sense of Islamic mission in order to preserve his loyalty to collective values rooted in his faith²⁰. Consequently they stress dedication to Islam, respect for ancestral ways of life, veneration of traditions, high morality, love of kin and one's race, mistrust of foreigners as the best ways to preserve national identity³⁰.

The intensive activities and abundant publications promoting conservative nationalism after the revolution of 1960 were basically of a defensive character³¹. For the first time in the

²⁸ In 1962 one of the most extremist defenders of statist socialism told this writer that he, a married man with a house, car, and children was afraid of his own fate, when the masses awakened to life by economic changes could no longer be controlled by the existing authority. Socialim was the new control method.

²⁹ See Cahit Okurer, "Ben Niye İnanıyorum," *Büyük Zafer*, March 6, 1962. The best examples of this thought can be found in the daily letters published in the *Son Havadis* (1962–64) in the column "Corner of University Student," and in the essays sent to *Yeni İstanbul* for the competition entitled "The Turkish Youth How Should it Be? (1962) See the first three prize winning essays- *Yeni İstanbul* November 15–17, 1962 and summary in November 24, 1962

³⁰ Some quotations from militant conservative nationalist writings may give a better opinion about their ideas. One youth wrote: "If the nobel Turkish youth were to regard history with the deepest respect and enthusiasm, he will find out that the power that secured endless victories, and made the Turks masters of the world... was the dedication to God, the attachment to religion and readiness to sacrifice life for these truths." Another urged the Turkish youth to "remain loyal to Islam, fulfill its commands and recognize God and His Prophet. This nation achieved one victory after the other as long as it remained loyal to Islam and its commands... Turkish youth must remain loyal to its traditions, for if a nation deserts its own customs and traditions it is bound to disappear." See letters sent to Son Havadis and Yeni Istanbul.

³¹ Several of these publications, some appearing sporadically provide good insight into the content of conservative nationalism. See the weekly Düşünen Adam (Thinking Man) the literary Toprak (Earth) Yol (Road) and the rabid sensational tracts, such as Birlik (Unity) Yeni İstiklâl (New Independence) Hür Adam (Free Man) Milli Yol (National Path) etc.

history of Republican Turkey this militant, conservative nationalism was subjected to severe criticism by secular nationalists and especially socialists. These attached a different meaning to the concept of nation, Turkish youth and had new ideas on economic and social policy. "The Turkish Youth" according to secular nationalists comprised "millions of young men, town people, villagers, schooled and unschooled workers, rich and poor farmers, government officials and professionals with millions of different personalities and interests, expectations and tendencies"32 They ridiculed the conservatives' slogan "beware of currents with roots abroad" since nationalism itself was of Western origin, and Islam was taken from the Arabs. Even Ziva Gökalp, the father of Turkish nationalism, was rejected as being out of date, and criticized as having erred in his definition of nation, culture and civilization. Already as early as 1958, Emin Erişirgil, identified once with elitism and extreme nationalism, declared that Turkish nationalism had entered a humanist phase33. The search for foreign writings praising the Turks was criticized, as was the reluctance to accept outside criticism, and to abandon the idea that the world was a great admirer of Turks34. The minorities, including Greeks and Jews, were described as being loyal to Turkey and as deserving equal treatment and consideration35. The ideas and myths of Islamist racialist nationalists were attacked by secular or social minded dailies such as Cumhuriyet Milliyet, Dünya and Vatan. Falih Rıfkı Atay, the publisher of Dünya coined the much used term Kara Milliyetçilik (black nationalism) to condemn the religious minded nationalists. The Vatan, in a series of articles described the love of country as a natural feeling common to all human beings. Extremist nationalism on the other hand was a reaction to the downfall of an empire and disintegration of feudalism. It was mystical, racialist, unethical, intolerant, anti-modernist and uncreative; it produced no major work of art or a truly great man36. Secula-

³² Cumhuriyet, August 19, 1960.

³³ Emin Erişirgil, Türkçülük Devri, Milliyetçilik Devri, İnsanlık Devri, Ankara, 1958.

³⁴ Melih Cevdet Anday "Kendi Kendimizi Eleştirme," Cumhuriyet, June 3, 1961.

³⁵ Ulus, January 10, 1961 (Bülent Ecevit)

³⁶ A. N. Kırmacı "Türkiye'de Aşırı Cereyanlar: Milliyetçilik-Irkçılık-Turancılık," *Vatan*. November 24–27, 1960. The paper was at the time under Yalman's editorship, he left later and the paper leaned to the left.

rists claimed that Atatürk wanted to use nationalism within national boundaries as a means of modernization, whereas now it deviated from Atatürk's concepts by becoming chauvinistic and aristocratic, and fed itself upon self-invented tales of past grandeur³⁷. In reality, Kemalist Turkey was the first true Turkish state, whereas in the past Turks established states under a different identity and served universalist goals.

The socialists, particularly Çetin Altan in his column in the *Milliyet* led the attacks on racialist nationalists. These were accused of ignoring the poverty stricken masses of Anatolia and indulged in utopian dreams about the land of Turan in Central Asia³⁸. "True nationalism" for Yaşar Kemal, the socialist novelist, "consisted of preventing a minority from exploiting a majority."³⁹.

The secular, social minded nationalists reinterpreted Ottoman history. The Ottoman rulers according to them consisted of a group of cosmopolitans who felt no identification with any social group or national culture and used even Islam as a justification for holding power. (This theory which originated in the early nationalist movement in the 19th century has acquired a social orientation and exercises far more influence on Turkish mind than this brief reference may indicate).

In conclusion it may be said that nationalism, whatever its forms and shortcomings achieved its mission in creating a national state and sense of Turkish national identity. However, its mysticism and subjectivity proved unable to face the challenge of social change, and eventually became an obstacle to further modernization. A modern and complex society needs new ideas and horizons, a new vision of man and society, which the old form of nationalism could not provide. The secularist thought itself needed a drastic revision for its rejection of religion amounted to ignoring man's spiritual needs, while its idealization of Atatürk created a personality cult of vast proportions.

³⁷ See essays in Atatürkçülük Nedir? İstanbul, 1963.

³⁸ The conservative nationalists answered by saying that the foes of Turanism hesitated to show the same sympathy for the Turkic peoples of Soviet Union as they did for the leaders (Lumumba) of former colonial peoples of Africa, *Yeni İstanbul*, May 6, 1963.

³⁹ Cumhuriyet, August 21, 1960.

In any case the diverse ideas on nationalism indicated that Turkish intellectual life was ready to enter a new phase based on a pluralist system of thought and acceptance of other cultures on equal footing. The Turkish man had evolved to the point where he was no longer satisfied with the political slogans and the isolationist mentality of old nationalism which prevented him from joining the mankind not only in name but also in spirit.

The constitution of 1961 gave a clear indication of the stage reached by nationalism in Turkey. The preamble stated that "... the spirit of Turkish nationalism... aims always to exalt our nation in a spirit of national unity as a respected member of the world community of nations enjoying equel rights and privileges".

However, the operative article 2. defining the characteristics of the Republic refers to the State as being national⁴⁰, democratic, secular, and social. The term "national" in the article 2 was subject to a long heated debate. The military and some politicians in the Constituent Assembly wanted to define the state as nationalistic. They were opposed by secularists and socialists who thought that nationalism had achieved its mission and if inserted in the Constitution as a principle it would, besides creating division and restriction, perpetuate the old parochial philosophy. "National" on the other hand would include any ethnic group and permit the birth of other currents of thought. A compromise was reached by inserting nationalism in the preamble and keeping it out of the text.

The latter developments speeded up the synthesis in the concept of nationalism and clarified the atmosphere. The extremist nationalists seemed to have abandoned their total rejection of social reform. Their opposition to socialism and communism has acquired new organizational forms and a more realistic understanding of the forces which generate extreme social currents. They seem to accept a diluted form of land reform, economic planning, workers' rights and a variety of other social

⁴⁰ Milli (national) in the Turkish version of the Constitution appears wrongly as "nationalistic" in official English translation of 1961. I remember very distinctly that being in the translating committee I corrected it to read national.

⁴¹ These developments occurred after the original version of this paper was prepared.

measures. Moreover, they discarded also much of the mystical militant approach. The extreme nationalists attempted to take control of the Justice Party but failed and left this party to moderate minded professionals from the middle classes. Meanwhile Col. Alparslan Türkeş, the leader of the nationalist wing in the junta returned from his assignment abroad and joined the National Peasant Party¹². He became chairman of this party and together with several of his former officer followers entered the National Assembly. His party holds now eleven seats in the 450 member Assembly elected on October 10, 1965.

Several of the critics of conservative nationalism went further to the left and joined the Labor Party. Secular nationalism presently seems to be grouped chiefly around the Republican Party although the program of this party is leaning heavily towards a moderate form of welfare socialism. The other emerging characteristics of nationalism are evident in foreign policy and in the new attitude towards Westernization. The failure of the West to support the Turkish cause in Cyprus has led to a reconsideration of the alignment with and the total commitment to a Western policy. Consequently the need to chart a new independent foreign policy is considered essential for a better protection of national interests and for acquiring a clearer understanding of Turkey's internal life, This is a development of capital importance for it conforms to a line of thought long in the making, namely the desire to judge and appraise Turkey's internal problems in the light of her own conditions, and to establish goals accordingly. There is also the desire to end imitation of foreign models and assert the Turk's own personality. This idea of independence is the new facet of Turkish nationalism and it may well symbolize the fact that Turkey has reached a mature stage in her development as a national state where she can take a new critical view of her modernization. But there is also the mounting leftist effort to turn this sense of independence into a movement against the West under the guise of anti-imperialism and anti-capitalism and thus change radically Turkey's foreign policy, parliamentary democracy and Western cultural orientation.

⁴² Türkeş was backed by Gökhan Evliyaoğlu, the militant nationalist organizer but Türkeş failed to support him for a seat in the Parliament.

3) Socialism: a means for Development or Power?

Socialism in Turkey, as in the rest of the Middle East is part of the general movement of modernization. It appears often associated with nationalism and expresses its economic and social aims. Social ideas, incorporated in the national goals at the beginning of Republic were gradually ignored, and eventually replaced by purely nationalist ideas. The group in power, preoccupied primarily with political matters had not grasped the full complexity of economic and social aspects of modernization. After the revolution of 1960, socialism emerged as a distinctive ideology rejecting culturally the Islamic racialist and Ottomanist facets of nationalism. It also opposed the rise of the middle classes and proposed central planning based on state authority as a rapid means of development.

The beginning of modern social thought in Turkey may be traced to the Young Ottomans in the 1860ies, then to Prince Sabahaddin's ideas, to the socialist party and clubs in the Young Turks period, and to a variety of marxist and socialist organizations in the Republic. However, it was only after the revolution of 1960, that socialism appeared as a major current of thought and attracted large following among intellectuals. Moreover, it was partly legitimized by the emergence and acceptance of socialist political organizations.

Socialism in Turkey appears concerned with economic development, social justice, taxation, industrialization, workers' rights, education and a variety of welfare problems. It is a modern current as far as its goals are concerned. There are, however, two aspects of socialism both, in Turkey and the Middle East which require closer scrutiny. The first aspect concerns the ethical and philosophical sources inspiring this socialism and these cannot be divorced from the movement itself. Socialism seems to derive at the first sight from some Western ideas. However, it seems to this writer that socialist ideas in Turkey similar to nationalist concepts borrowed previously from the West, have lost much, if not all of their Western essence. Hence one is inclined to deduce that while the term was borrowed from the West, much of its spirit came from traditional cultural sources, including the social ethics of Islam. (The deep ideological gap between

a sheik Khalid M. Khalid and a "modern" socialist in Egypt is considerably narrowed when one leaves aside the terminology and considers the essence of their thoughts.) The second problem raised by socialism concerns the method to carry it out. The overwhelming majority of socialists in Turkey, as elsewhere in the Middle East are statists, that is to say they accept chiefly an authoritarian form of socialism based on state supremacy. Obviously the present economic and social conditions in the developing areas impose great responsibilities on the government; the only agency which has the organization and the skills capable of coping with the technical and financial aspects of large scale development. Yet, the classical Western socialism, even in its extreme forms recognized a role to voluntary associations and regarded the state as the tool of dominating classes. Marx and Engel's idea of the state "withering away" has not been mentioned by Middle Eastern socialists. These have pinned their hopes on the state to materialize their social aspirations and have not bothered to deal further with theories concerning the implications of state intervention in society's life. Their first expectation from the state is social justice, and the achievement of "justice" has been the basic goal of traditional Islamic governments. The problems posed by modern life seemed to have consolidated with the practical arguments the supremacy recognized to state on moral grounds in the traditional era.

The socialists in countries like Egypt and Turkey with a continuous tradition of organized government are definitely more statist than those in Muslim countries which for one reason or other did not have such governments. However, overriding all these background influences there are pressing problems arising from the need to modernize the production apparatus, introduce new methods of social organization, raise the living standards and achieve general material welfare. The problem therefore, is to determine whether these goals can be reached through institutions which have preserved much of their traditional outlook including the very government expected to modernize society.

The question of leadership is intimately connected with statism and socialism for both rely on elitist concept. The elitist philosophy is still powerful in the Middle East, and is manifest largely in the relations between government and subjects. Elitism ignores man's self born ability to grasp issues and learn how to govern himself by associating freely with his fellowmen. The Middle East socialist finds in social justice the necessary ethical arguments to justify his elitist claim to absolute state power but does not possess the in-built philosophical conviction capable of limiting this power. Some vague Western liberal ideas have lost their influence along with liberation from the political rule of the West. The traditional Islamic idea of opposition to tyranny, which had liberating effect on occasions, has lost its force partly because of secularism but chiefly because the state's socialist policy was described as conforming to Islam's social commands43. Consequently once the use of state power is thus justified there are no grounds to oppose it. Unavoidably one comes to the conclusion that the state power in the Middle East can be limited only when and if other power groups can emerge and oppose the ruling group (It seems that each major political change in the modern Middle East was followed by the rule of the elite leading the movement for change). The subsequent phase of political life seems to consist of a struggle against the ruling group and this involves gradually other segments of the population. This process may lead to a stage whereby all government relations may be visualized as power relations and thus conform to the nature of national power state. A socialist government may in the long run create individual self-consciousness by means other than formal political indoctrination, and against its own wishes. Presently, however, the Middle Eastern socialism does not seem concerned with such problems. If the government were to achieve some success in establishing a measure of welfare it could thus justify on behalf of modernism, the perpetual rule of the bureaucratic elite which controls its fate.

Turkey, however different from other Middle Eastern countries witnessed the birth of socialism after 1960 in form of a current of thought in a relative freedom of discussion, group organization, interest conflict and political activity. This atmosphere permitted the influx of new ideas into the "socialist" thought and broadened its scope. Moreover, the new Turkish

⁴³ See the lengthy article by the late Mahmut Shaltut, the head of Al Azhar, who described Nasser's socialism and use of state power as conforming to Islam-Al Ghoumhuriya, December 22, 1961.

socialism was born after a period of state capitalism which was often dubbed as socialism or statism. The material achievements of this system in 1930-1945, were rather insignificant in relation to its cost and the bitter popular opposition it created. Consequently, Turkish socialism, despite some theoretical aberrations in favor of totalitarianism, was forced to conform to the democratic yearnings of the population if it wanted any popular following at all. Consequently, the idea that the individual's relations with the state and government were not based on authority but also on the satisfaction of material needs of everyday life became the cornerstone of socialism. The intense debates on social and economic issues stimulated by the emergence of socialism in Turkey have diluted the extremist aspects of statism and have also given to the individual new ideas as to his role. For instance the five-year development plan has received considerable popular support after a government sponsored campaign to explain its potential benefits to the populace. Even villagers have realized that the government would be unable to satisfy all their demands, and have begun to use their own initiative and ability to better their own lives. Some sections of the population at least, have begun to regard the government as an association born from their consent and need and developed their political philosophies accordingly.

We have implied throughout this study that socialist and nationalist ideologies in the Middle East are linked to the political and cul tural traditions of their respective society even though their aims may be modernistic. This attitude may stem from practical considerations, such as the necessity of building a bridge between the past traditions and the future goals in order to achieve popular acceptance. It may also derive from the simple fact that the promoters of change share to some extent the very traditions and habits they want to change and that continuity in society is a force as strong as change. Ideology, being a system of values with deep psychological roots, is bound to reflect the struggle between the old habits of mind and beliefs surviving in the subconscious and the ideas consciously borrowed from outside. A Middle Eastern man may exalt the virtues of modernism and change and in the next moment proudly prove with factual data his nation's ability to preserve its personality and traditions This attitude is not a contradiction as some short sighted students tend to believe but a rather basic law of society which makes change possible without destroying one's group or national personality.

The case of change and continuity is evident in the relationship between socialism and religion in Turkey. Secularism has been successfully applied for more than forty years. The modern social forces have overwhelmed the vestiges of the past. Yet, even in Turkey there were serious efforts to link socialism to Islam. The powerful Islamic socialism defended by the review İştirak during the Young Turks era apparently left its impact, for even the Yön, the main spokesman for socialism, published articles linking Islam to its own doctrine. Aside from this calculated appeal to religious-social ideas there were in Turkey genuine Muslim socialists who upheld the egalitarian commandments of Islam and specifically referred to the social measures undertaken by the Prophet, and especially by Omar, in land legislation and taxation. One wrote:

"Socialism is one of the modern political forces which strives to change the world... by abolishing inequality.... The unjust actions by capitalists in some countries have compelled people to rebel. Without effective measures to cope with this situation it would be impossible to preserve order and stability and prevent revolutions. Everyone can be satisfied by recognizing as sacred and implementing properly the Islamic laws concerning participation (iştirak-derived from Arabic iştirakyun or socialism) justice and equity.... Islam has sternly prohibited the exploitation of man by man, and the use of others through the force of capital. The Koran has described all property as being emanetullah or in custody. Since property is given by God in custody Ito man leveryone has a right to it. The exploitation of property and its use for everyone's benefit through the state, is accepted as an essential principle.... If the revolutionary socialists have taken position against religion they do not actually aim at the faith proper but at the use of religion as a means by ruling groups to exploit the masses.... between the human purposes of Islam and the claims of socialism there is an almost perfect resemblance."44

Another work dealing primarily with contemporary socialism in Turkey begins by describing Islam's inception (Omar and

⁴⁴ Faik Bercai, *Islamda Sosyalizm*, İstanbul, 1946, pp. 3–4, 49–51. The author according to his bibliography has read works by western socialists along with the works of Arabs. He seems to rely, however, on social works written in Turkish some thirty or forty years earlier such as Kilisli İsmail Hakkı, (*Hakikat-ı Islam*) and Musa Kâzım (*Külliyat-ı Şeyhülislam*) See also A. Cerrahoğlu, *Islamiyet ve Osmanlı Sosyalistleri*, İstanbul, 1964.,

Ali) as a social struggle against the upper classes⁴⁵. Eventually he ties this struggle with the popular social movements in Anatolia and with their leaders, particularly with the important Simavnalı Şeh Bedreddin's materialistic-social teachings⁴⁶.

Any study of socialism in Turkey must devote some attention to Islamic social ideas which have survived in customs, folklore and traditions, and have indirectly prepared an atmosphere for egalitarian "modern" socialism. Egalitarianism seems to be the strongest feature of Turkish socialism⁴⁷.

The rise of a socialist current in Turkey after the revolution of 1960 was preceded by the development of a strong current of social realism in literature⁴⁸. (The basic structure and power changes have been considered in the introduction). Indeed late in the 1940ies and early in the 1950ies Turkey witnessed the growth of literary writings dealing with the plight of peasantry. These stimulated interest in the fate of the villagers and helped broaden the intellectual's social horizon.

The Democratic Party which showed unrelating opposition to socialist doctrines reacted rather mildly to the village literature for it helped justify the party's rural policy in bettering the peasants' lot even though the Democrats' interest in villagers was inspired by practical rather than ideological reasons.

⁴⁵ Hilmi Özgen, (Halim Köylü) *Türk Sosyalizmi Üzerine Denemeler*, Ankara 1963, pp. 12–13 also *Türk Sosyalizminin İlkeleri*, Ankara, 1962. This work although of limited significance was described by a recent Soviet article as being the beginning of socialist current in Turkey.

⁴⁶ The teachings of Sımavnalı Bedrettin provided Nazım Hikmet, the communist poet who died recently in USRR, with material for one of his most powerful epic poems.

⁴⁷ But the Islamist-nationalists, who idealize Islam's concepts of political and social organization have ignored the ideas of Muslim socialists. They are prepared to support at most the Islamic principle of charity but reject violently any discussion regarding property. In fact they use arguments drawn from Islamic literature to support the concept of immutability of the social order. See for instance the tract *Hakkaniyet* (Equity) by M. Raif Ogan and İzzet Mühürdaroğlu. There are others who reject, based on the Kotan, the supremacy of landlords and chieftains, see Mehmet Emin Bozarslan (Mufti of Kulp-Diyarbakır) *Islamiyet Açısından Şeyh-lik-Ağalık*, Ankara, 1964.

⁴⁸ See Kemal H. Karpat "Social Themes in Contemporary Turkish Literature" MEJ. Winter, 1961.

The attitude of the Republican Party to social ideas on the other hand was affected by the same literature and came out in part as a reaction to the Democrats' economic policy. The Republicans gradually broadened their narrow social outlook and accepted even the workers' right to strike (in 1936 they had passed the most rigid anti-labor legislation). At the same they began to sponsor the cause of groups affected by inflation and unplanned economic development, such as the salary and wage earners, as well as peasants even though their popularity with the latter group did not increase much. The Republican Party's new social and economic outlook seemed to have emerged by the time elections were held in 1957, when it attempted to formulate a platform corresponding to the needs of social groups it proposed to defend. The elections more than tripled the number of Republican deputies in the Assembly, despite the Democrats' frantic appeals to voters to eliminate completely the Republican represent ation in the Parliament49. This encouraged the Republican Party to devote full attention to social and economic problems. Consequently the Research and Documentation Office of the Party manned by young intellectuals, some of whom became later the defenders of socialism, began to publish a series of studies on civil service, workers, economic development and a variety of other social problems.

The bi-monthly review *Forum* (est. 1955) meanwhile became one of the most influential publications of the period. It was a democratic minded review interested in social problems. It appeared under the direction of Aydın Yalçın, Osman Okyar and several other intellectuals leaning basicaly towards English social thought. Many of the members in the Republicans' Research Office contributed to the *Forum*. The review was one of the most serious publications ever published in Turkey. Presently it is less influential. The *Forum*, although critical of Democrats, did not propose radical social or economic changes but defended the idea of a systematic economy and the broadening of the political

⁴⁹ Kemal H. Karpat: "The Turkish Elections of 1957," Western Political Quarterly, June 1961, pp. 436–459. The Republican success was also the outcome of dissatisfaction among the lower ranks of Democratic Party who were instrumental in establishing the first organizations of this party in 1946. The "reassertion of the spirit of 1946" became their slogan in the sense of opposing the rise of a new power elite.

democracy into the social field. Meanwhile Cemil Sait Barlas ex-Minister of Trade and influential member of the Republican Party, began to discuss openly in 1958-59 in his review. Pazar Postasi (Sunday Mail) the question of socialism. He translated socialist articles from European publications and published a variety of letters and short stories with social content⁵⁰. (Other literary reviews were doing the same). Social tendencies in the Republican Party seemed to be so evident that Ismet İnönü, the leader, was accused publicly of having reverted to his old socialist views as expressed some twenty five years earlier⁵¹. In reality both the socialism in the Republican Party and that of Barlas were slightly amended forms of statism. It placed emphasis on production and social justice but avoided reference to a change of social structure. However, the word "socialism" coming from a trusted man like Barlas helped dispel some of the pathological fear it radiated in the post⁵². Consequently by 1959, the younger generation of secular nationalists in the Republican Party began to lean definitively towards socialism. These came closer at the same time to the intellectuals graduated from the Village Institutes and labor groups. The social gap between village and city or the higher and lower class of intellectuals narrowed in proportion to their identification with the national-social problems of Turkey. The period between 1957-60, may be rightly considered as the sentimentalist, universalist and humanist phase of Turkish socialism. It appeared during this period as a search for a means to achieve general social mobilization for economic development, welfare and progress rather than a proposal for a new political regime. Soon afterwards the younger generation manning the press, which became the most powerful intellectual force, moved rapidly to the left not through any overt defense of socialism but stories, headlines, omission and commission of news as the case might have been. (The new evidence concerning the opposi-

⁵⁰ Cemil Sait Barlas, Sosyalistik Yolları ve Türkiye Gerçekleri, İstanbul, 1962.

⁵¹ See the session of Republican Peasant National Party convention of January 18, 1959, (İnönü had an article in the statist-socialist *Kadro* in the 1930 ies).

⁵² It was reliably reported that the police was so shocked by the open advocacy of socialism that they thought of taking some measures against Barlas. However, the relative stature of the man and the Democrats' hope that this would discredit his party in public eye prevented any action against him.

tion of the press and intelligentsia to Democrats' dictatorial policies in early in 1960 point out that the newly rising socialist groups played a leading part in it).

The revolution of 1960 brought the first official recognition of this thought defined as socialism. Speeches by some revolutionary officers indicated that they had definite social aspirations. Finally General Cemal Gürsel, the late head of State, alluding to a newly formed small socialist party declared:

"There is a socialist party in Turkey. I have allowed it to activate.

I am of the opinion that a socialist party is not harmful but could be very beneficial as long as it does not have malicious intentions" 53

Encouraged by this statement the accumulated social resentment against the Democrats, already evident in the press, came out violently in form of criticism of landlords, and of the groups enriched during the Democrats' term. The peasantry's plight was dramatized, although the villagers were criticized also for their support of Menderes. (Some intellectuals openly advocated a voting system which would give each citizen three or four votes according to the level of his education and thus balance the peasantry's numerical superiority and prevent it from committing further political errors.) However, the peasant, as a junta member described it, while retaining his religious outlook had developed new "modern" wants. The peasant according to him expected the government to respect his religious feelings and traditions, but also to satisfy his economic needs and establish an impartial bureaucracy: "This was" he declared:

"The (basic) yardstick in Atatürk's time and has remained the same since. But now, in addition, people want to study, to receive better care for the sick, to have real shoes... to sleep in a real house rather than together with their beasts, to listen to the radio, to have electricity, roads, employment and income. In resumé they want those things which an European peasant possessed (sic) 150 years ago"54

On the other hand some officers and intellectuals lamented the disintegration of the middle class (they meant the old ruling bureaucratic group) and proposed to revive it and make it the the foundation of the forthcoming democratic regime.

⁵³ Akşam, August 10, 1960.

⁵⁴ Milliyet, June 24, 1962, (Orhan Erkanlı's memoirs).

The discussions of social problems were clearly converging towards the idea of social classes and particularly class struggle. The full establishment of freedom of press immediately after the revolution enabled the marxists to express their own opinion often in form of oversimplified social slogans but definitely aiming at causing class conflicts. This was evident in the conflict caused by an amendment press law issued by the military 55. The law was definitely favoring the employees. Subsequently nine major newspapers protested the law as interference with freedom of press and suspended publication for three days 56. Their action produced the first social clash between newspaper owners and their employees. The latter organized meetings and published their own paper Basin (Press) protesting the press ağas (landlords) and their unscrupulous exploitation of employees.

Large number of city intellectuals sent as teachers in villages during their military duty discovered the rural problems of their country and brought tales of poverty, ignorance and exploitation in villages. The desire to combat backwardness found its expression in the press under the cry of socialism. Newspapers and reviews such as Ülke (1960) İmece (1961) (Imece is a traditional form of collective voluntary work for developing or improving public works in villages) began to disseminate systematically socialist ideas and propose a social-political regime. The daily Milliyet chose as title for essay competition in 1962 "The Realities of Turkey". Writers devoted serious thought to discovering the social causes of Turkey's economic backwardness. Aziz Nesin the social satirist attributed the economic instability and the weakness of the entire social structure to the lack of a modern concept of property. "The main security in life" he wrote, "is property. If this security disappears, individuals would seek security elsewhere, and thus became kapıkulu (slave servant of state). We all, and all our classes are kapıkulus. When a peasant clothes himself with the gendarme's (village police) uniform he butts first with his rifle his village fellows, knowing too well that one day he will be at

⁵⁵ The formal title is "Law... Concerning the Regulation of Relations Between Employees and Employers in the Profession of Journalism"-(Law 212 of January 4, 1961), Official Gazette, number 10703.

⁵⁶ Akşam, Cumhuriyet, Dünya, Hürriyet, Milliyet, Tercüman, Vatan, Yeni İstanbul, Yeni Sabah, January 10, 1961. Of these at least four became later the supporters of socialism.

the receiving end . . . the uniform transforms him into a kapıkulu. This is still a valuable currency today. Look at the press. As soon as the government takes a decision they praise it"57. Actually the term kapıkulu was put forth originally by Ahmet Hamdi Başar, who claimed that Turkey was ruled by the same groups, (bureaucrats, merchants and professionals) who had power in the Ottoman Empire and relied on state for a living. The criticism of kapıkulu mentality actually stressed the need for moral courage and integrity to stand by one's own convictions regardless of government's policy58. Gradually the rich middle classes became the main target for attack for their wealth which was deemed to have been unjustly accumulated. The investigation committees established by the military in order to discover the manner of enrichment had alarmed some of the rich in the middle class as to make them think of leaving the country altogether to escape from "enmity of wealth." 59 The wealth inquiry committees were eventually disbanded since economic life had come to standstill, and after the entrepreneurial middle classes eventually regained power through political parties. But the middle classes preserved the agonizing fear of expropriation which came so close to being a reality in 1960. This attitude was basic later not only in determining their search for formal legal safeguards against leftism but also in thinking of new economic and social methods to combat it from within.

The demands for agrarian reform, literacy campaign, social security continued to mount without a definite program to materialize them, especially since the re-establishment of a parliamentary system seemed to turn things back where they were on eve of revolution. Vedat Nedim Tör, a former marxist and member of the statist review *Kadro* summarized the situation:

"A poor and backward nation like us, has neither the time nor the energy to play the game of European democracy. We are yearning for the regime which will take us to social, economic and cultural development by the shortest and fastest road." 50

⁵⁷ Akşam, March 13, 1961. Aziz Nesin was building his case in favor of collective property.

⁵⁸ Ahmet Hamdi Başar, Yaşadığımız Devrin İçyüzü, Ankara, 1960 pp. 39-40.

⁵⁹ Milliyet stated: "we are not the enemies of property but of wealth accumulated unjustly. We are the enemies of thieves not of property" Nevember 24, 1960.

⁶⁰ Vedat Nedim Tör, "Rejim Buhranından Kurtulabilecek miyiz? Forum, August 15, 1960, pp. 7–8. For similar views see also Nihat Türel "Toplumsal Gerçekler ve Beklenen Reformlar," Vatan, Oct. 7, 1960 Ceyhun Atıf Kansu, "Halk Devleti," Ülke, Oct. 1960.

The question was to find a social group capable of leading the nation towards rapid economic development. The leadership as expected befell again on the intelligentsia. Consequently, the old theory of elites was gradually reshaped in the light of new socialist-statist ideas. The guiding light on elite theory came from some members of the School of Political Science (est, 1853–) in Ankara, the backbone of the bureaucratic elite order which ruled Turkey for a century. It was asserted that Turkey needed to entrust her fate to a brain trust or a new elite with expert knowledge of government affairs, technology, and having the values of modern age⁶¹. This elite was to replace the old one consisting of simple bureaucrats, military and landlords (this elite was already replaced by the new middle classes).

The publisher of *Dünya*, disappointed that the revolutionaries did not bring to power a secular elite group but seemed interested instead in parliamentary regime, found it necessary to translate and publish in installments Ortega y Gasset's *Revolt of the masses*. The point was that the masses had no creative or leadership ability and had to be led; a rather commonly shared belief among intellectuals.⁶² The Republican Party meanwhile, following the lead of its younger social minded members declared through the Secretary General, Ismail Rüştü Aksal that the party would devote closer attention to social problems since it was already social minded, but refused to openly adopt socialism as party ideology in order to placate the conservatives⁶³. The Republican

⁶¹ See Mümtaz Soysal "Plânlama ve Demokrasi", *Planlama*, Autumn 1961. p. 65. Bülent Daver "Siyasi Elit ve Reformlar," *Cumhuriyet*, January 33, 1964. Ziya Gökalp's famous article *Güzideler ve Halk*, (Elites and People) became popular again.

⁶² A socialist book found it necessary to allude to Ortega y Gasset in discussing the question of social balance. See Mehmet Altın, *Türkiye'de Siyasi Hareketler ve Sosyal Yapı*, Ankara, 1961. Incidentally the foreword to this book was writtent by Cihad Baban who only a few years earlier declared in *Tasviri Efkâr* that socialism was materialism and preoccupation with food.

⁶³ Vatan, August 30, 1960. The newspaper Vatan, which after ousting its liberal editor A.E. Yalman openly embraced the cause of socialism commented: "the PRP with most of its leaders, deputies and a powerful organization all over the country, is the party of the rich and the notables. The deputies who won the elections in 1957, were mostly landlords. Many of these were sons of deputies... a deputy seat in PRP, based on land ownership and personal influence, is transferred from father to son. Despite its statist principles, the structure and ideas of its leaders are such that PRP cannot become socialistic" Vatan, August 1, 1960, see also Tanin, August 12, 1960.

Party's social orientation resulted in part from conviction but also from a desire to win over the intellectuals and the military by assuring them that their aspirations will be met if the Republican Party came to power. The promise of social reform aimed also at undermining the efforts of a small group in the junta, who advocated a strong regime in order to carry out such reforms. The ousting of fourteen members of Junta on November 13, 1960, eliminated eventually the danger of strong regime. It also opened the way for return to civilian rule, most likely, as it appeared at the time, under the Republican Party.

The recognition accorded to labor and the establishment of a State Planning Organization are two other major developments which affected the development of socialism in Turkey. The military recognized labor as a social group and lifted various restrictions imposed upon their freedom of organization. By 1964 the trade unions' membership rose to about 400,000 people organized in a national Labor Confederation: Türk İş Konfederasyonu. Labor was interested in welfare legislation but refused to associate itself en masse with any of the existing parties. (The Republican Party passed many labor laws but the majority of workers as individuals still tended to support the Justice Party as they backed the Democrats in the past. The explanation for this attitude must be sought not only in the ill memories of the old statism enforced by Republicans, but also in certain belief among workers that they could not talk and bargain with the authority minded Republicans.)

The recognition accorded to labor as a social group created interest among politicians and the socialists. The first regarded it as a source of votes, and the latter as a potential vehicle to power through revolution. However, labor, although politically minded, showed little sympathy for statist socialism. The relative lack of information and education on social problems, the fear of repression, the bad public repute of socialism, the superficial character of most of past socialist parties, and the commoner's mistrust of state may explain partly the labor's apathy towards socialism.

The State Planning Organization was established in September 1960 (laws 91, 99, 340) with the initial purpose of assisting the government to locate resources, determine economic and

social objectives, achieve economic cooperation and prepare plans for economic development. Intellectually, the SPO represented a major effort towards rationalization, systematization and scientific approach to economic problems. However soon some members of the High Planning Committees of SPO asked for extensive political authority. The planners, mostly unknown people from the lower ranks of academia were described by their own supporters as capable of turning Turkev into a bountiful country if given full power to enforce their magic economic know-how. But the reactivation of political parties led to a series of pressure on SPO. The statist-socialist group resigned and joined the swelling ranks of socialists but not before rooting the idea that government planning was the great discovery of the age. Eventually SPO assumed a middle of road philosophy and continued to exercise a very healthy and much needed influence on Turkish economy in general and ideas in particular. The productive groups originally distrustful of authoritarian planning gradually came to regard general democratic planning in a more objective fashion and accepted it.

The period between 1960–61, analyzed above prepared the ground for the second organized phase of socialism. The reinstatement of freedom of activity for political parties in the summer of 1961, undermined completely the hopes for a strong social regime. The forthcoming elections of October 15, 1961, confronted the Republican Party, the Justice Party and New Turkey Party (the latter two were successors of the banned Democratic Party) with the vital problem of securing a majority of votes at polls.

The latter two parties favored liberal views and capitalized on the discontent paused by the rather inefficient military rule, and on the fear of strong regime. The Republicans, however, faced great difficulties. They had adopted the social ideas born of the revolution of 1960, and took leading part in electing the Constituent Assembly which drafted the Constitution of 1961. It seemed certain that the Republicans would succeed the military to power. The statist-socialists in the Republican Party remained loyal to the organization hoping for an election victory so as to have a legitimate basis for enforcing a social program⁶⁴. These,

⁶⁴ CHP XV. Kurultayına Sunulan Parti Meclisi Raporu, Ankara, 1961.

Bülent Ecevit, Turhan Güneş, Turhan Feyzioğlu, etc., at the time had influence in the party's central organization and enjoyed İnönü's backing. Some of the country organizations, however, advocated a more realistic and pragmatic approach and opposed an extreme statist socialist orientation lest of frightening away the voters. The party convention held in Ankara on August 21, 1961, resulted in the defeat of the second group represented by Kasım Gülek. But at the polls on October 15, 1961, the Republican Party failed to receive a majority of votes and was forced subsequently to form, first, a coalition government with the Justice Party and then two other coalitions with minor parties with liberal views. Consequently the Republicans had to amend considerably their social program and eventually agreed to limit the authority of State Planning Organization. The statist socialists' hopes for power were dashed. Many of those not involved in party leadership eventually resigned and combined forces with groups at large and embarked on an ambitious project of organizing a socialist movement. An immediate outcome was the publication of the review Yön (direction) on December 11, 196065. The publication had the purpose of welding together various socialist ideas, into a coherent theory and of giving them a practical orientation. The declaration published in the first issue of Yön and signed by several hundred intellectuals defined the new statist-socialist philosophy66. It stated that democracy and modernization which were the goal of Atatürk's reforms could be achieved through rapid economic development, and that full modernization was possible only by reaching the West's level of economic development. Poverty was the main obstacle to democracy and this called for the unity of all social groups around a development philosophy. The groups in power had no such philosophy, and despite the pressing economic needs felt by people, these refused to undertake serious social reforms. Lasting

⁶⁵ The founders were Cemal Reşit Eyüboğlu, Mümtaz Soysal and Doğan Avcıoğlu.

⁶⁶ Yön, Dec. 1, 1961, pp. 12–13. An English translation by Frank Tachau appears in *Middle Eastern Affairs*, March 1963, pp. 75–78. See also the *Socialist International Information*, Vol XIII, p. 17. A rough breakdown of the first several hundred signatories shows over 100 writers, newspapermen and intellectuals at large, 60 members of the academia, 75 educators, 35 engineers, 25 doctors, 30 lawyers, 25 trade unionists, 25 officers, 10 judges, 20 economists, 4 life time senators, (ex-members of the NUC) and 4 deputies. Özgen, *op*, *cit.*, p. 41.

results could be achieved through overall planning by the State Planning Organization. There were also voices which defended openly an economic development based on freedom and democracy and offered a new definition of statism⁶⁷.

The "development philosophy" proposed by Yön called for "mobilizing all economic resources, intensifying investments, planning of economic life in its entirety, achieving social justice among masses, abolishing exploitation and bringing democracy to the masses". Yön proposed to preserve the mixed economy but placed main emphasis on state sector since private enterprise was wasteful, slow and unable to achieve social justice. The new statism proposed by Yön would plan all investments and create large units of production. Statism was also the means to eliminate social injustice and to bring about true democracy.

The signatories condemned the system which allowed speculators and middle men to earn more than high government officials, scientists and scholars. Trivial, as it may appear, this last idea epitomized the basic motive of this statist socialism: reinstatement to power and income of the old ruling groups on behalf of social justice and economic development. As usual there was no allusion to the ways and means to assure popular participation in the economic process. Yön was reminded that the review Kadro in the early 1930ies, had defended the idea of classless society led by an elite and that this scheme was actually implemented but without effect. Yön answered dogmatically that since its basic social philosophy was different it would not commit the errors of Kadro⁶⁸. The socialist doctrine proposed by Yön reinterpreted the three principles of Kemalism; reformism. populism and statism and described Atatürk as a socialistes. In reality Yön took these ideas out of their historical context

⁶⁷ The *Barış Dünyası* (World of Peace) April 1962, pp. 18–22 published by Ahmet Hamdi Başar, issued its own declaration but was superficially abused as defending capitalist viewpoint. Aydın Yalçın was branded as a pseudo-socialist friend of capitalists, and *Forum* which fried to maintain a balanced view was described as a follower of Mc Carthy, the US senator.

⁶⁸ Melih Cevdet Anday, "Açıklığa Doğru," Cumhuriyet, July 7, 1962.

⁶⁹ See Fernand-Wilhelm Fernau "Courants Sociaux Dans la Deuxieme Republique Turque," *Orient*, November 33, pp. 17–19. A very popular book on the socialist ideas of Atatürk is Çetin Altan's, *Atatürk'ün Sosyal Görüşleri*, Ankara, 1965. The book is quite superficial and biased.

and arbitrarily adapted them to its own doctrine without paying attention to the completely different conditions prevailing in 1962. Yön gradually rejected the parliamentary regime based on a party system and capitalized on state supremacy. It advocated implicitely revolutionary methods to reach power and rejected the West as model for Turkey's modernization70. It attacked vehemently the United States as an imperialistic power exploiting Turkey and condemned everything associated with the West while publicizing the achievements of Eastern Europe under socialism. Yön abandoned its objectivity and like many other reviews in Turkish history lost its usefulness. It showed a regrettable hurry to solve Turkey's problems through solutions imposed from above and therefore ignored the actual social and historical forces which conditioned the birth of social thought. Yet one cannot ignore Yön's influence on thousands of intellectuals, teachers, army officers, university students. It came at turning point in Turkish political history and shaped their social viewpoint71. It also helped crystalize social issues and forced groups to formulate their own social views. The socialists established also early in 1963, the Sosyalist Kültür Derneği (The Socialist Cultural Society) with the purpose of providing socialist education to intellectuals and workers within the framework of "nationalistic -patriotic democratic and libertarian ideas"72.

Socialism according to the society was "a method of thought and action based on scientific study of social and economic relations in society, and a search for their regulation in accordance with the laws of reason". Socialism started from a world

⁷⁰ For a lengthy analysis of Yön's views in the light of Turkey's social background see Kemal H. Karpat "Yön ve Devletçilik Üzerine," Forum, December 15, 1962, January 1, 1963.

⁷¹ Influential newspapers such as *Milliyet* and *Cumhuriyet* originally supported the socialists. The latter in fact chose socialism as topic for its essay competition in 1962–63. Eventually these popers adopted a more liberal-social democratic attitude and deserted Yön. However, other publications, *Sosyal Adalet* (Social Justice) *Eylem* (Deed) came out defending socialist views.

⁷² The head of the society was Osman Nuri Torun, the former head of the State Planning Organization. Other members were Sadun Aren, Türkkaya Ataöv, Doğan Avcıoğlu, Nejat Erder, İlhami Soysal, Reşit Eyüboğlu, Şükrü Koç, Mümtaz Soysal and several others, some of whom had been associated with SPO and Yön, and later with Labor Party. The society had two main branches in Ankara and İstanbul.

view above individual and group interests and relied on people to achieve a social order for the people⁷³.

The formal emergence of socialism caused violent reaction among conservative groups who assaulted it in their own publications, and in the Parliament, as being communistic and subversive in purpose?4. The controversy between the secularists and socialists on one hand and the conservatives and the Islamist racialists nationalists on the other, involved various groups in every field of endeavor?5. The *Türk Devrim Ocakları*, The Village Institute graduates, and the Teacher's Federation sided with the first groups in debating publicly various social issues. The university students also divided and often fought each other on ideological issues. The state security organization alarmed by these debates issued a report in 1963, calling attention to the fact that confused ideological atmosphere bred extremist currents, such as communism, Islamism and Kurdish nationalism.

Meanwhile, the new middle classes reacted to socialism, partly siding with the conservative nationalists but mostly by informing the public and especially the working classes of the complexities of production and distribution which the socialists ignored. The private banks and entrepreneurs, in an effort to counteract the socialists organized research institutes and conferences, with the purpose of presenting the problems of economic and social development in more objective and balanced fashion. The idea of associating greater number of people in economic activities and enabling them to benefit from increased production seemed to have replaced their old fashioned concept of *laissez-faire* economy.

The growth of socialism as expected helped clarify the stand of political parties on economic and social policy. The Republican Party gradually shifted to the left in order to capture the leader-

⁷³ See Socialist International Information, vol. XIII, June 1, 1963. Cahit Tanyol "Bir Bildiri," Cumhuriyet, Feb. §, 1963.

⁷⁴ See a good account in Julien Le Moyen "Les Difficultés de la Turquie," Le Monde, (the Weekly edition) February 7-13, 14-20, 1963.

⁷⁵ The İmam Hatip (clergy) schools and the students of High Islamic Institute proved to be the militant supporters of the latter group.

⁷⁶ Namık Zeki Aral "Memlekette Sosyalist Cereyanı," reproduced in Yeni İstanbul, February 7, 1963.

ship of the social movement. After intensive discussions it decided that its ideological stand was "left of the center" as stated by İsmet İnönü, the party leader, during the election campaign of 1965. The party has clearly indicated that it does not accept any dogmatic social ideology but remains faithful to Atatürk's ideas. The Justice Party, the main opponent of the Republicans and the chief spokesmen for the middle classes, also adopted a moderate social viewpoint as response to pressure from socialists. It accepted land reform, economic planning, welfare measures but without relying on extensive government authority. The social and economic views of these two parties are best expressed by their interpretation of Karma Ekonomi (mixed economy) which is a constitutional principle defining Turkey's economic and hence social policy. The Republicans proposed to expand the state sector to achieve public welfare, whereas the Justice Party regarded the government as an institution of public service and as supplementing and supporting the private enterpriese.

In fact the Justice Party program adopted on November 1964, and its election platform of 1965, indicated clearly that this party's ideological stand conforms to the social philosophy and economic aspirations of the middle classes which control the party. It draws its main support now not only from rural areas but chiefly from cities and towns as the representative of the small businesses and manufacturing interests, crafts, shop keepers, etc.

Thus, both the Republican and the Justice parties have accepted the idea of increased social welfare and economic development but differ with regard to the scope and role of the government. Both accept private property and enterprise and qualify basically as middle of the road parties.

The development of socialism in Turkey was analyzed above in a generic fashion without dealing with marxist groups which played a major role behind the scene. Marxist socialists made common cause with secularist nationalists, and social minded groups, then with socialist publications and organizations. Several of them were also influential in the Republican Party. Acting at the beginning as democratic minded social reformers, they gradually revealed their true identity under the guarantee offered by constitutional freedoms, and the hope of success rooted in the

growth of social consciousness. Marxist thought in Turkey has developed sporadically in the last fifty years taking advantage of short periods of liberalization⁷⁷. The two socialist parties, the Socialist Party of Turkey of Esat Adil Mustecaplioğlu and the truly marxist Turkish Workers' and Peasant Party of Sefik Hüsnü Değmer established in 1946 were closed the same year. Several underground organizations were discovered during the following decade and their leaders and members jailed since communism was outlawed⁷⁸.

Yet, underground activity supported by various organizations abroad continued. The revolution created new conditions. The articles 140–142 of the Criminal code prohibiting the organizations and propaganda designated to promote class struggle (the supremacy of one class over the other) were rendered inoperative by the outburst of social currents which confused further the already vague differences between social domocracy, socialism and marxism. Moreover, the leftist intelligentsia's and bureaucracy's opposition to the entrepreneurial middle classes and to capitalists, coupled with the spread of interest consciousness destroyed all criteria for distinguishing marxist thought from democratic socialism. Moreover, it seemed that without a strong directional command the developing social thought could strengthen the ideological position of a political party, possibly the Republicans, and thus help consolidate the social democratic order rather than create a truly marxist regime79.

⁷⁷ The scattered works on Marxism in Turkey consist mainly of translations from popularized versions in the West. But Turkey had marxists, and at one time there were even societies aiming at popularizing marxist ideas. The contemporary socialists have read Marx from foreign sources and probably the second or third hand interpretations. Actually marxist ideas in Turkey seem to have spread by word of mouth more than by writing. Hence some socialist writings seem to be an elaboration of marxist slogans rather than an analysis of Marx's works. Marxist ideas acquire dogmatic forms in the intellectual thinking and make a travesty of democracy and economic development.

⁷⁸ Karpat, Turkey's Politics, pp. 357 ff.

⁷⁹ The favorable political atmosphere brought about a proliferation of "socialist" parties. Alaettin Tiridoğlu's party established in 1959, to combat communism through some social reforms, proposed to expand its activities. A Labor Party (Çalışma) established in 1961 combined with that of Tiridoğlu but showed little activity. Meanwhile the leaders of Socialist Party of Turkey (closed in 1946, reissted after acquittal in 1952, and then closed once more by the government) were acquitted after eight years of trial. The news concerning these socialist parties are in *Vatan*, January 12, 1959, *Akşam*, October 3, 1960, *Cumhuriyet*, March 4, 1961.

These background developments were probably instrumental in the establishment of the *Türkiye İşçi Partisi* (Labor Party of Turkey) on February 13, 1961. Apologists for the party claimed that it was established by trade union leaders. In reality it was founded and supported by well to do leftist intellectuals and a variety of marginal urban elements. Despite strenuous efforts, the overwhelming majority of workers did not support the Labor Party. The Confederation of Labor rejected formal affiliation with any political party and its leaders were called in true marxist tradition "traitors to the labor cause". Actually the law on collective bargain and strikes of July 7, 1963, which recognized extensive rights to the workers turned their attention to securing economic gains and strengthened their tendency of becoming an interest group.

The party program condemned imperialism and described the party as belonging to the labor class, and to those groups who followed the industrial workers' leadership: agricultural workers, (ırgat) small farmers, salary earners, craftsmen, small merchants, low income professionals, progressive youth and social minded intellectuals. The working masses were considered the source of all production and the sole cause of social development. The workers' full acquisition of rights and of proper living means, and the full modernization of Turkey were regarded as being two related and mutually dependent problems. The party condemned the landlords, capitalists and all other groups who opposed development.

The method for achieving development was statism which consisted of participation by all working groups in administration and production. The party program did not reject openly private enterprise but proposed that all industry be slowly appropriated by the state. The Labor Party wanted to eliminate the differences between village and city, manual and intellectual workers, to provide employment for everyone, and to end forever the system based "on the exploitation of man by man". It also advocated an anti-imperialist foreign policy in accordance with the principles of War of Liberation, and respectful of the United Nations Charter. It accepted a parliamentary system and proposes to

⁸⁰ See Türkiye İşçi Partisi Kimlerin Partisidir? İstanbul, 1962. The current party program was adopted at party convention held in İzmir on February 10, 1964. See Türkiye İşçi Partisi Programı, İstanbul, 1964.

assume and leave power by popular will. The party evaluated events in Turkey and abroad from the viewpoint of the labor class and the masses. It denounced the government coalitions, opposed Turkey's acceptance into the Common Market, and launched an unsuccessful campaign to delete articles 141 and 142 from the criminal code81. The Labor Party leaders did not associate themselves with the Republican statist socialists at the beginning. In fact there was mutual distrust between them 82. Mehmet Ali Aybar, when interviewed by this writer in 1962, dismissed Yön and its leaders as being dilettants concerned only with power, who had borrowed socialist techniques in order to achieve their ambitions. In 1966–67 the relations between Yön and Labor Party deteriorated further. However, in 1962 and 1963 Yön, found that it had no support among any social group and began to show increased sympathy for the Labor Party. Later, several of the statist socialists associated with Yön and the Socialist Cultural Society have joined the Labor Party along with members of the Parliament, students and university professors. Thus, the party became the symbol of intellectuals' social aspirations, as well as their potential vehicle for power. This reliance on the intellectual elite curtailed the party's popular appeal, as indicated by results obtained in the municipal elections on November 17, 1963, despite an extensive pre-election propaganda. It received barely 34.301 votes, whereas the Republican and Justice parties' total was over 7.5 million votes.

The failure of Labor Party to attract the workers and arouse popular interest led to a change of tactics and philosophy. The dogmatic narrow class view was replaced by a more general approach intended to appeal to all classes and to all men "siding with Labor". The party program of 1964 stressed the economic backwardness of Turkey and proposed a total scientific planning for the welfare of everyone and proposed to end exploitation. It capitalized further on nationalist feelings aroused by the failure of the West to back fully Turkish stand on Cyprus. It concentrated

⁸¹ See declaration of July 8, 1962, September 15, 1963.

⁸² The leaders elected in the convention of August 20, 1962 consisted of chairman, Mehmet Ali Aybar, Secretaries: Rüştü Güneri, Orhan Arsal, central executive board İbrahim Denizciler, Kemal Türkler, Ismail Topkar, Rıza Kuas, Cemal Hakkı Selek, and Kemal Sülker, (the executive board is made up mostly of trade unionists) Some of these resigned from the party.

its attacks on the Justice Party which was described as the tool of the West and the spokesman for the vested interests of Turkey. The NATO was denounced while the friendship with the Soviets greatly praised. The Republican Party, on the other hand, assuming that the Labor Party propaganda would undermine the popular appeal of the Justice Party, its main rival, in the forthcoming elections, appeared to condone the Laborites' ideas. Moreover, the Republicans' definition of their ideological stand as being left of the center strengthened the conviction that they shared the Labor Party's views and may form together a united social front. Consequently, the Labor Party as an extreme and militant leftist party appeared as the leader of this front, and, therefore, was able to attract the Republican Party's younger, dynamic and social minded elements. During the election campaign of 1965 the Labor Party chose to make Turkey's foreign policy a main issue. It entered the election of October 10, 1965, in a majority of provinces but elected only two deputies, although at the end, the number of its deputies went up to 15 due to the cumulative election system. It received 276.101 votes or 3 per cent of the total votes cast. The Republicans received 2.675.785 votes, a drastic loss in comparison with past elections. The Justice Party which denounced communism and defended private enterprise won 4.921.235 votes or 52.87 percent of the total vote, and enough to form a government by itself. The workers seemed to have backed overwhelmingly the Justice Party, whereas the Labor Party's votes, aside from about 59 .000 received in Istanbul, were spread thinly throughout the country. The votes cast for the Labor Party came from such varied groups as to make the party appear as the least homogeneous political organization of Turkey. The election nevertheless led to an important political alignment in the Assembly. It created one small extreme left (Labor Party), one small extreme right (Alparslan Türkeş's National Peasant Party with 11 seats), and a large number of middle class groups (Justice 239, Republicans 134, National 31, New Turkey 19).

The elections of 1965, thus resulted in the victory of the new middle classes, clarified substantially the stand of political parties and concluded an important phase of social and idea logical development in Turkey. It isolated extreme socialism while the social demands of the population have been steadily rising along with a firm determination to maintain political freedom.

4) Conclusion with the Charles and the Charles

Ideological development in Turkey since 1960 has followed the diversification and stratification in the social structure. It was therefore a direct product of forces within society rather than being imposed from the top. The absence of a government committed firmly to an ideological stand permitted a natural growth of ideas related to conditions in society.

The ideological monopoly of nationalism was terminated through the emergence of social ideas attesting to the birth of a pluralist social and intellectual order. It is quite possible that the presently interlapping and conflicting ideas on nationalism and socialism may become further compartimentalized and narrowed in scope so as to permit the growth of other ideas which may not fit into either category. Political and economic development presently are rationalized and explained rather than being passively accepted as the product of forces beyond the control of the human being. A rational and systematic way of thinking linking social cause to its political effects is gradually spreading to the masses. Thus, the elites are losing their exclusive monopoly of ideas and education, and together with it their basic claim to leadership. Economic and social forces intensify mobility and create new aspirations and loyalties centered around large, integrated and impersonal organizational units. The older forms of organization tend to disintegrate leaving men earnestly in need of a new rationale of organization in society and government.

Ideology explains the role and place of authority in rapport to these new conditions and organizations and tries to legitimize their observance. In terms of modernization, this second endeavour is vitally important not only in preserving but also in perpetuating material achievement. Consequently a result of ideological development, Turkey has acquired a clearer understanding of her social and economic goals and gained the confidence that she can reach them. Turkish ideological development certainly have not arrived at a final synthesis. It has, however, concluded the first and most difficult phase in giving expression to social thoughts, resentments and hope accumulated during fifty years of change.

If the democratic process had broken down in 1960-65 as it often threatened to do, and if one single social group acquired

absolute control of power instead of having power in several mutually balancing social groups, the expression of accumulated social resentment would have easily resulted in the establishment of a strong extremist regime not of the left but the right.

The future ideological developments of any significance would come about not from the right or left extremes but from the actions of the entrepreneurial middle classes.

of overlainers on rend to elightic grate, leaving meaning menty, in meet

hart min arrange and male synthesis links, howevery boucluded

mountained by the security of the property of