

TURKISH TREATIES IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE

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I. Introduction

This is the second study in a series of national treaty profiles. The first one concerned Canada.¹ This one is on Turkey. The next ones will treat Mexico, France, Denmark, Brazil and several other countries.

All these studies have one basic idea and one special source of information in common. The basic idea is that national treaty profiles derive their scholarly significance from comparisons. They are being compared in this series of studies with other national treaty profiles and with regional and global treaty information.

A unique source of information facilitates such comparisons. This is the computerized treaty data bank of the United Nations Treaty Series Project (UNTS Project) at the University of Washington. The UNTS Project and its data bank have been described in other publications.² It consists of a set of key information on every treaty published in the United Nations Treaty Series (UNTS), Volumes 1 to 503 inclusive. The information includes

1 Peter H. Rohn, "Canada in the United Nations Treaty Series: A Global Perspective," *Canadian Yearbook of International Law*, 1966, pp. 102-130.

2 *Ibid.*; Peter H. Rohn, "Institutionalism in the Law of Treaties: A Case of Combining Teaching and Research," *American Society of International Law, Proceedings*, 1965, pp. 93-98; Peter H. Rohn, "The United Nations Treaty Series Project as Computerized Jurisprudence," *Texas International Law Forum*, 1966, pp. 167-173; Peter H. Rohn, "War as Reflected in the U.N. Treaty Series," *San Diego Institute on World Affairs, Proceedings*, 1966, pp. 276-282; and Peter H. Rohn, "The United Nations Treaty Series Project," forthcoming in *Proceedings*, 1967 Geneva World Conference, World Peace Through Law Center, and forthcoming in revised form as an article in *International Studies Quarterly*, June 1968.

date of signature, date of registration, signatories, topic, number of articles, references to and identity of international institutions mentioned in the text, and several other items. All this information is available on electronic tape and can be correlated by computer in millions of combinatorial possibilities. The data bank constitutes the first computerized information pool on the world's treaty pattern.³

The computer saves research time but it does much more than that.⁴ By re-arranging millions of facts in new combinations it stimulates new thoughts. It permits experimentation with new questions. It allows us to look at many international phenomena, including treaties, in ways that had never been tried before.⁵

3 For a survey of various computer-oriented efforts in international law, including the UNTS Project, see Richard W. Edwards, Jr., "Electronic Data Processing and International Law Documentation," *American Journal of International Law*, 1967, pp. 87-92.

4 Hayward R. Alker, *Mathematics and Politics*, New York, Macmillan, 1965; Harold Borko, editor, *Computer Applications in the Behavioral Sciences*, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall, 1962; James C. Charlesworth, editor, *Mathematics and the Social Sciences*, Philadelphia, The American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1963; John M. Claunch, editor, *Mathematical Applications in Political Science*, Dallas, The Arnold Foundation, 1965; Edward A. Feigenbaum and Julian Feldman, editors, *Computers and Thought*, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1963; Martin Greenberger, editor, *Computers and the World of the Future*, Cambridge, Massachusetts, M.I.T. Press, 1962.

5 For other recent work involving various combinations of international law, jurisprudence, international politics, comparative law and politics, quantification and computer technology, see the following writings: Layman E. Allen and Mary E. Caldwell, editors, *Communication Sciences and Law: Reflections from the Jurimetrics Conference*, Yale Law School, 1963, Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill, 1965; the journal *M.U.L.L.* (Modern Uses of Logic in Law), also published at Yale University in collaboration with the American Bar Association; Davis B. Bobrow and Judah L. Schwartz, editors, *Computers and International Relations*, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall, forthcoming; Steven J. Brams, "Transaction Flows in the International System," *American Political Science Review*, 1966, pp. 880-898; John Diebold, "Computers, Program Management and Foreign Affairs," *Foreign Affairs*, October 1966, pp. 125-134; Fisher Howe, *The Computer and Foreign Affairs*, U.S. Department of State, Center for International Systems Research, Department of State Publication No. 8156, Washington, 1966; John H. Jackson, "The Puzzle of GATT," *Journal of World Trade Law*, 1967, pp. 131-161; Irving Kayton, "Retrieving Case Law by Computer: Fact, Fiction and Future," *George Washington Law Review*, October 1966, pp. 1-49; Charles A. McClelland, *Theory and the International System*, New York, Macmillan, 1966; Richard L. Merritt and Stein Rokkan, editors, *Comparing Nations*, New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1966; Robert C. North, et al., *Content Analysis: A Handbook with Applica-*

The traditional view of a treaty is particularistic. A treaty is a self-contained instrument creating rights and obligations among States. No treaty transcends its own limits. *Pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt*. True enough in a literal way but is the orthodox view the *only* way of looking at treaties? Can a treaty not *also* be viewed as a random piece in the larger mosaic which we call the international system? Is not each treaty *also* part of mankind's disjointed definition of the international public interest? Does not the totality of the world's treaties give a pathetically true image of the brittle texture of international society, and of its lack of purpose?

As we thus move from petty legalism to the grandeur of social theory we run the risk of becoming vague and irrelevant. How can we gain perspective without losing precision? This is where computers come in to help. Human memory is obviously incapable of handling petty facts on a planetary scale. And yet the scale itself exists. It is as much part of our environment as

tions for the Study of International Crisis, Evanston, Illinois, Northwestern University Press, 1963; Claude S. Phillips, Jr., "The Bilateral Treaty Network of Non-Western States," in David R. Deener, editor, *De Lege Pactorum*, forthcoming; Stein Rokkan, *International Conference on the Use of Quantitative Political, Social and Cultural Data in Cross-National Comparisons*, Yale University, 10-20 September 1963, Yale Papers in Political Science, No. 11, also printed in *Social Science Information*, Volume II, No. 4, December 1963.

5 (cont) Rudolph J. Rummel, "Dimensions of Conflict Behavior Within Nations, 1946-59," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 1966, pp. 65-73; J. David Singer and Melvin Small, "Formal Alliances 1815-1939: A Quantitative Description," *Journal of Peace Research*, 1966, pp. 1-32; Philip J. Stone et al., *The General Inquirer: A Computer Approach to Content Analysis*, Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England, The M.I.T. Press, 1966; Raymond Tanter, "Dimensions of Conflict Behavior Within and Between Nations 1958-60," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 1966, pp. 41-64.

6 For some similar but less radical efforts toward a more systemic view of treaties, see Georg Schwarzenberger, *The Frontiers of International Law*, London, Stevens and Sons, 1962, p. 36; Kenneth S. Carlston, *Law and Organization in World Society*, Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1962, p. 110; Morton A. Kaplan and Nicholas de B. Katzenbach, "Law in the International Community" in Falk and Mendlovitz, editors, *The Strategy of World Order*, New York, World Law Fund, 1966, Volume 2, pp. 39-41; Wolfgang Friedmann, *The Changing Structure of International Law*, London, Stevens and Sons, 1962, pp. 68-69; Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, *The Development of International Law by the International Court*, London, Stevens & Sons, 1958, pp. 377-379; Stanley Hoffmann, "International Systems and International Law," in Knorr and Verba, editors, *The International System*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1961, p. 225.

the planet itself. Man has reduced other aspects of the planet to manageable proportions. Now the computer brings similar opportunities to our knowledge of international society. We can let the computer take care of remembering millions of social facts, in international law as elsewhere. We can check each treaty before we feed it into the computer. Then we can forget it. Emancipated from deadweight knowledge our minds can then indulge in the luxury of thinking about the whole framework of the world's treaty pattern, and what it may mean, and where it may lead us. And yet, unlike previous speculations, computer-prompted thought in this field can always rely on millions of empirical facts each on instant recall for every treaty, every country, each region and for the world as a whole.

We can then begin to ask how we might build models of national treaty behavior. Are there group characteristics among certain countries? For instance, is there a typical treaty pattern of Latin American countries,⁷ Soviet Bloc countries,⁸ or other countries or international organizations?⁹ Can we determine some world-wide standards of what is normal or average and what is, in this sense, the rule rather than the exception in international law? Do the distributive meanings of "rule" and "exception" have normative analogues? Once known, do they have normative consequences? Are there regularities in how certain countries or certain types of treaties deviate from statistical normalcy? Can we learn to predict trends in treaties for countries and regions and for the world as a whole?¹⁰ Do treaty patterns

7 Pan American Union, *Inter-American Treaties and Conventions*, Washington, D.C., 1966; Pan American Union, *Bilateral Treaty Developments in Latin America, 1942-1952*, Washington, D. C., 1953.

8 Jan F. Triska and Robert M. Slusser, *The Theory, Law and Policy of Soviet Treaties*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1963.

9 Hungdah Chiu, *The Capacity of International Organizations to Conclude Treaties and the Special Legal Aspects of the Treaties so Concluded*, The Hague, Nijhoff, 1966.

10 Peter H. Rohn, *Treaty Trends*, forthcoming. Pre-publication copies of tabular computer printouts "Treaty Profiles" have been deposited at the following centers: (1) Tillar House Library of the American Society of International Law; (2) Dag Hammarskjöld Library of the United Nations Secretariat; (3) Harvard Law Library; (4) Michigan Law Library; (5) University of Pittsburgh Health Law Center; (6) University of Paris Law School; and (7) University of Washington Political Science Library.

reflect political alignments in the way in which, for instance, per capita rates of telephones and automobiles serve as indices of economic development? In sum, can jurisprudence become scientific as the behavioral sciences use this term?

Finally, and more than incidentally, can such a scientific approach make a contribution to the current professional debate on the law of treaties as prompted by the 1966 Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties of the International Law Commission?¹¹ In other words, can trend analysis feed back from long-range intellectual pursuits into the here and now of government lawyers? Does it make a difference whether the world trend in certain treaty matters is up or down, and which country ranks where? I believe it does make a difference, in theory as well as in practice, and I am submitting the following case study as evidence.

II. Turkey's Gap in the U.N. Treaty Series

Ökçün's *Guide to Turkish Treaties* (1920-1964)¹² lists 281 Turkish bilateral treaties between 1945 and 1963. The UNTS contains only 133 of them. Missing from the UNTS are 148 (53%) of Turkey's bilateral treaties since World War II. This is the UNTS gap of Turkey.

Professional knowledge about the UNTS gap of various countries is still very sketchy. There is no reliable figure for the world total. Hence, it is difficult to put any one national gap into global perspective. But there are ways of extrapolating from what is known and to arrive at some tentative estimates subject to much further research.

Some rough comparisons were made in connection with the Canadian study.¹³ In addition to Canada, tests were made

11 United Nations, Reports of the International Law Commission as reproduced in Official Documents Section, *American Journal of International Law*, 1967, pp. 255-463 and detailed documentary references cited there. See also Herbert W. Briggs, *The International Law Commission*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1965; Shabtai Rosenne, *Is the Constitution of an International Organization an International Treaty? Reflections on the Codification of the Law of Treaties*, Milan, Giuffrè, 1966; Santiago Torres-Bernárdez, *Desarrollo Progresivo y Codificación del Derecho Internacional*, Madrid, Editorial Tecnos, 1966.

12 A. Gündüz Ökçün, *A Guide to Turkish Treaties* (1920-1964), Ankara, University of Ankara, 1966.

13 Rohn, *op. cit.*, note 1 above, page 120, Table 1.

for several other countries, always comparing their national treaty series to the UNTS. Unrefined results showed the following percentages as missing from the UNTS: Canada 39%, China 33%, Guatemala 49%, U.S.S.R. 79%, and Venezuela 62%. On-going research shows a tentative 60% for Mexico and 65% for France. This would extrapolate into a global average of 55% remarkably close to the Turkish gap of 53%. If true, this would mean that Turkey runs very close to the world average. It would also mean that only one out of every two treaties published nationally (in Turkey as elsewhere) find their way into the UNTS. But most of these figures are unrefined. The only refined figure we have is for Canada. There the process of refinement worked toward a reduction of the gap, from a tentative 39% to a final revised 25%. If we assume the same rate of shrinkage in the refinement process elsewhere, we should expect a final gap of about 25% to 30% for the world as a whole. The Turkish gap will probably be close to the world average. No final and precise figure for Turkey is coming yet from the present study. We can only identify a range for the Turkish gap from a maximum of 53% to a minimum of 19%, with the best probability between 30% and 35%.¹⁴

The legal significance of the gap depends not only on how many treaties are missing from the UNTS but also, and even more so, on what kind of treaties they are. In other words, it is also important to know how the Turkish gap compares with other gaps in its composition, and not only in its overall size.

Let us assume, as Lejnicks has shown,¹⁵ that the formal title of an instrument is a rough but reasonable measure of its importance. The more formal the title, the more important is the treaty. Of course, this will not be true in every single instance but it will serve as a first approximation.

As compared with other Turkish treaties the Turkish gap shifts toward greater formality and hence, presumably, toward greater importance. This seems odd enough from intuition and common sense. Errors and omissions tend to inhabit the unim-

¹⁴ See Section IV/1 below.

¹⁵ Juris A. Lejnicks, "The Nomenclature of Treaties: A Quantitative Analysis," *Texas International Law Forum*, 1966, pp. 175-188.

portant side of the spectrum of any set of data. But we need not rely on intangibles. The Canadian study confirmed intuitive expectations and showed a clear shift away from formality. Oddly, the Turkish gap moves in the opposite direction.

Table 1 recapitulates the relevant findings. There was a two-stage shift toward informality in Canada. The first stage went from World UNTS to Canada UNTS (Col. 1 and 4), and the second stage went from Canada UNTS to Canada Gap (Cols. 4 and 5). The evidence is overwhelming in both stages. The three formal titles went down, each title in both stages. The informal title went up, also in both stages. The "Other" category remained negligible.

By contrast, the comparable two stages behave differently in Turkey. The first stage (Cols. 1 and 2) shows no shift at all. There is a 1% increase in "Treaties" and a 5% shift from "Conventions" to "Agreements." To some extent the two changes cancel each other out and the rest is negligible. The formality distribution of Turkish UNTS treaties is remarkably similar to that of the world's UNTS treaties. However, the second stage (Cols. 2 and 3) shows a clear shift toward formality from "Exchanges" (down 15% to "Agreements" (up 13%), with all other titles remaining more or less the same. Subject to further analysis the formality shift would mean that the Turkish gap probably consists of treaties which are above average in importance whereas the Canadian gap consisted of treaties whose importance was below average.

Formality, however, is only one of the indicators of importance. Another way of analyzing the Turkish gap is to look at the topics, and to compare them with the topics of the Canadian gap and with the world distribution of treaty topics in the UNTS. Table 2 summarizes some relevant information.

Let us disregard the absolute figures for the moment (Table 2, Columns 1, 2 and 3) and draw the comparative perspective from the percentages (Columns 4-8). Comparing the gap with Turkey's UNTS treaties (Columns 4 and 5), we notice immediately that the Turkish gap is concentrated in a few topics while the Turkish UNTS treaties are more evenly spread among many and varied topics. The economic group alone covers almost half

the gap (42%), and together with the next largest two groups (aid and diplomacy), most of the entire gap (89%) has been accounted for.

These groups of topics show an obvious connection with the size of the Turkish gap. Identifying the connection is one thing; explaining it, is another. Here it may be helpful to compare the earlier findings of the Canadian study. There is a clear correlation between Canada and Turkey in the top-ranking gap topic, i.e. economic treaties. In both Turkey (42%) and Canada (54%), economic treaties are by far the single largest contributor to the gap, see Columns 4 and 8. However, the similarity begins and ends with the top item. In most other topic groups there is either no correlation or even a negative correlation. Only the dominance of economic treaties is clear and significant in both gaps. In the Canadian case, it was easier to explain the economic section of the gap because it was concentrated not only in topics but also in partners (South Africa and Venezuela), and it shared two traceable extrastatistical facts in the limited duration of these particular groups of trade agreements and in Canada's policy of not registering short-term trade agreements. In the Turkish case, there is no comparable correlation with partners, as will be shown in the next section of this study, and the duration of Turkish gap treaties is not so evident from Ökçün's *Guide* as was the duration of Canadian gap treaties from the Canadian *Treaty Series*, and there is no known policy of the Turkish Government in this respect. Mere renewals and amendments have been omitted from all calculations.¹⁶ They do not show in the tabular material and cannot be used to explain the dominance of economic treaties in the Turkish gap except for three or four ambiguous or doubtful cases.

Another fact emerges from Table 2 quite clearly. The UNTS shows reasonably representative proportions of the topical concerns of Turkey's treaties. This holds true despite the large size of the gap and despite its lop-sided distribution. There are exceptions, of course. And yet, the similarities outweigh the differences, see Table 2, Columns 5 and 6. Indeed all lines except the third

¹⁶ Inclusion or exclusion depends in these calculations on whether the UNTS would normally carry a given instrument under a separate serial number or as an ancillary item in Annex A or B.

and the fifth show virtually the same percentages for Turkey's UNTS treaties and Turkey's total treaties. Even the third and fifth do not stand out so far as to upset the general impression. This means, of course, that at least for a broad topical analysis one would not go very far wrong in using the Turkish UNTS treaties as representative of all of Turkey's treaties. This is especially true if, given some prior inventory such as the present study, or the earlier Canadian study, it is possible to identify which parts can be taken straight and which need some adjustment one way or the other.

The first two tables presented a thumbnail sketch of the Turkish gap in the broader perspective of comparisons with Canadian and global figures. Now we will look at the details of the Turkish gap as such. The analysis will move through all permutations of the four main treaty characteristics: (1) Time, (2) Title, (3) Topic, and (4) Partner. The four characteristics will be combined in all six two-dimensional possibilities as shown in the Table of Contents under Tables 3-8.

The element of time is the most basic and also the clearest of the four treaty characteristics used in gap analysis. The meaning of titles can be variously interpreted. Topics raise definitional problems. Even partners are not always unambiguous, especially in multilateral treaties. But there is no doubt about time. A yearly breakdown of treaties means the same thing to everybody. In this case, as Table 3 shows, the crucial point is that there is no trend, neither overall nor in details.

The absence of a trend means several different things. First of all, it means that we are facing a genuine gap in registration and not merely a pipeline effect. If, for instance, there had been a clear increase in the gap over time, especially in the most recent years, it would probably be due to late registration rather than non-registration. And if there had been an increase in one or two of the titles only (even if offset by a decrease in other titles), it would probably mean that, for some reason, e.g. slow ratification, there is a pipeline effect in some titles but not in others. But none of these possibilities is supported by the figures of Table 3. The absence of a pipeline becomes even more likely because of the following circumstance. The first draft of Table 4 included 1964, following Ökçün's *Guide*. The last year (1964)

showed a pipeline effect. When 1964 was dropped from all computations, the distortion disappeared. There are still a few minor exceptions, to be noted later, but 1963 has proved to be the latest undistorted cut-off date for Turkey at this time.

Another way of guarding against a misleading pipeline effect is to check the speed of registration in Turkey's major treaty partners, see Table 12. Turkey's first ten partners are, in this order, U.S.A., United Kingdom, Greece, Belgium, Pakistan, Iraq, I.B.R.D., Canada, Netherlands and Norway. Their joint average time lag is 29 months between signature and registration. Not much smaller is the time lag of approximately 20 months between the end of the statistical coverage of this study (31 December 1963) and the last registrations under the present data base of the UNTS Project (Vol. 503, 4 August 1964). Therefore, the normal delay of Turkey's partners would affect these statistics only slightly if at all.¹⁷ Finally, we can check Turkey's own speed of registration. We find that at 20 months it is even faster than that of most of Turkey's major treaty partners (Table 12). Therefore, it would be even less likely to show in the statistics of the Turkish gap.

The absence of a trend also means that the Turkish Government has been consistent in its policy on treaty registration. If, for instance, policy had changed at some time during 1945-1963, it would probably show in an increase or decrease of the gap from that time on. This would also be true if the policy affected only certain types of treaties rather than all treaties. Nothing in Table 3, however, would suggest such a situation. We must therefore look elsewhere for an explanation of the gap.

Table 4 would show what difference it makes if we spread the gap's time scale over topics instead of titles. The time scale itself remains the same, of course. For instance, if we take the 8 Turkish gap treaties of 1956, they remain 8 whether we spread them over titles (5, 2, 1 in Table 3) or over topics (2, 1, 1, 2, 1, 1 in Table 4). But it may be revealing in which way the total for any given year distributes over the parts.

¹⁷ Even though the computerized data base of the UNTS Project has now the cut-off point of UNTS Volume 503, further manual research for the present study has brought the findings up to date through Volume 548, registrations through 5 November 1965, and library receipts through 18 July 1967.

The five largest gap topics are, in this order, general economic relations, visas, loans, trade, and aid. The only time clusters among gap topics are the following. Gap treaties on visas cluster between 1951 and 1956; those on general economic relations occur mostly in the first decade, 1945-1955; those on aid cluster in the last half decade with the single largest gap item in any one topic-year, 7 in 1958; and finally gap loan treaties show a sudden rise in the last two years under review, 1962-1963.

The last item rises so steeply toward the end that it suggests an isolated pipeline effect. This possibility will be confirmed shortly as a result of the analysis of partners over time. The other clusters offer no immediate explanation. They are probably the result of normal fluctuations in the overall volume of Turkish treaties. Even if the percentage of the gap were constant throughout, the absolute volume would vary along with changes in the total treaty volume over time.

At first sight there is no particular pattern in Turkey's gap partners over time, see Table 5. As in the case of topics over time above, a message begins to come through when we look at the totals. A hierarchy appears. There is a top group consisting of U.S.A., West Germany, France and Italy, in this order. Then, Finland, Iran, Spain, Austria, Yugoslavia and Belgium follow at some distance. None of the 37 other partners accounts for more than 3 gap treaties, and most of them for only one.

The American share of the Turkish gap coincides with the sudden rise in the loan category observed earlier. There were two clusters of 5 loan agreements in 1962 and 1963 each. Now we see two identical clusters of 5 treaties in the American share of the Turkish gap in 1962 and 1963. Even without knowing it for sure it would seem probable that these are the same ten treaties, and in fact Ökçün's *Guide* makes it clear that this is so. Let us view this finding in light of a few other facts. First, there appears to be a consistent 20-year practice to the effect that all Turkish-American treaties are registered by the United States (Table 11). Second, the registering speed of the United States averages 29 months (Table 12). Third, only 23 months elapsed from the end of 1963 to the cut-off date for the present data base, even as extended for Turkey. Given these facts, we are still well within a possible pipeline effect for this particular case.

Assuming this explanation to be correct, the U.S.A. would no longer account for the largest single bloc of gap treaties by Turkey's partners and would move from first to fourth place. In any case, the next largest partner is West Germany. Here is an obvious explanation. West Germany is not a U.N. Member. Hence, Article 102 of the U.N. Charter does not apply, and West Germany does not register its treaties with the U.N. Secretariat. West Germany has 229 bilateral treaties in the UNTS of which not a single one has been registered by West Germany herself, see Table 12. The only way in which a German-Turkish treaty could get into the UNTS would be via Turkish registration. But Turkey's rate of self-registration is rather low, approximately 1 out of 10 (Table 11). Probability alone would let us expect that less than 2 of the 16 treaties of the German-Turkish gap would be in the UNTS. The facts exceed probability. Not a single German-Turkish treaty has been registered. German non-membership in the U.N. is a sufficient explanation. Besides, the spread over time is so even that there is certainly no pipeline effect or any other special function of time.

Next among Turkey's gap partners is France, with 12 gap treaties and 2 in the UNTS. France is a very special case in UNTS registration. With 321 treaties, France ranks 6th in the world list of treaty makers, after U.S.A., United Kingdom, Belgium, Netherlands and the I.B.R.D. And yet it ranks only 41st in the world list of registrants, having herself registered only 9 of the 321 bilateral treaties bearing a French signature in the UNTS. A self-registration rate of less than 3% is probably by far the lowest of any major country in the world and is low even for medium and smaller countries. Some approximate rates for comparison are I.B.R.D. 99%, U.S.A. 93%, Belgium 77%, United Kingdom 72%, Netherlands 57%, Romania 48%, Ceylon 26%, Guatemala 12%, and UAR/Egypt 6%. See Table 12 for some of the raw data. Turkey herself has a relatively low registration rate, approximately 10%. The combination of France and Turkey makes it improbable that a bilateral treaty between them would be registered. Thus the French part of the Turkish gap has found an explanation.

The last one of the four major gap partners is Italy. The gap favors the first decade of the UNTS period at the proportion of

8 to 3. This lopsidedness finds a partial explanation in the fact that Italy was not a U.N. Member during the first decade. The explanation is confirmed by a look at the entire Italian registration pattern over time. From other UNTS Project material (not reproduced here),¹⁸ it appears that Italian registration of 88 correlates nicely with the mid-period change from non-membership to membership, showing 1 registration in the first decade and 87 in the second. It does not explain the entire Italo-Turkish gap but it reduces the remainder to insignificance and makes it indistinguishable from most other minor gap partners of Turkey. These other partners derive their only significance from being added up and constituting almost two thirds of the Turkish gap. Individually, they are too small to be worth analyzing in statistical terms. They are so evenly distributed that they would suggest a presumption of randomness in the Turkish gap except where clusters invite specific explanations.

Most of the explainable gap has been explained by now. The remaining permutations of the statistical information on the gap tend to confirm what has been found so far. Nevertheless, they are important. Their partial redundancy is a safeguard against premature conclusions. It so happens that they confirm the earlier findings. But this need not be so in every case. For instance, Table 6 removes most of the remaining doubts about the single biggest gap item, namely, the American loan agreements with Turkey. They showed up in Table 4 as recent and as loans; then again in Table 5 as recent and American; in Table 6 as agreements and loans; in Table 7 as American and agreements; and finally in Table 8 as American and loans. In other words, against whichever two-dimensional space the total Turkish gap is projected, there is always a conspicuous bulge in one area which, upon analysis and cross-reference, leads to the same conclusion.

But not everything is redundancy. For instance, Table 8 shows a high incidence and an almost perfectly even distribution of visa instruments among partners, 20 partners for 22 instruments, and none of them registered. This is hard to explain. First of all, the Canadian study does not alert us to visa instruments as especially gap-prone. Second, many other Turkish visa instruments did find their way into the UNTS (see Table 11, Column 9).

18 Rohn, *op. cit.*, in note 10 above.

A partial explanation comes only from a closer examination of Turkey's visa instruments in the UNTS. It turns out that none of them has been registered by Turkey. It would probably also appear that most of Turkey's gap partners in the visa section do not register any of their visa instruments, regardless of partner. If so, we would know that there seems to be a difference of interpretation among two groups of countries with regard to whether or not visa agreements are to be registered. Further research is needed before this hypothesis can be confirmed. But the case shows how multi-dimensional statistical analysis can suggest presumable high-yield topics for legal research in a matter of immediate relevance to governmental practice.

The reader may wish to test the claim for the value of redundancy in the tabular material of this article. Instead of following the arbitrary sequence of tabular permutations from Table 3 to 8, he may check the substantive findings in reverse order, or for that matter in any other order of his choice. I venture to predict that the attentive reader would end up with the same or very similar findings, no matter where he starts. Moreover, the process of discovery would be similar. There would be, at first, a statistical bulge somewhere which begs for an explanation. A person conversant with Turkey's situation and with treaties in general may have some intuitive explanation as soon as he notices a given statistical peculiarity. But he will not know for sure until he has checked it out against other statistics which show the same data base in various different alignments. It is only the multi-dimensionality of a set of data which allows the researcher to see things in relief, as it were, and to refute or confirm and re-confirm what at first may or may not have been a shrewd guess.

Before going on to the larger question of Turkey's treaties in general, rather than the gap alone, we should examine one basic problem of the gap which the discussion has avoided so far. This is the problem of the maximum and minimum gaps. There is a radical difference between the Turkish and Canadian gaps in this respect. In Turkey there is an unresolved question as to whether or not all gap treaties are now or have ever been in force. In the Canadian case, there was no doubt. The official *General Index of the Canada Treaty Series 1946-1959* included all Canadian treaties which were or had been in force at any

time between 1946 and 1949 inclusive. In the Turkish case, the matter is more complicated. One thing is certain. Unlike the "Treaties in Force" compilations of some other countries, such as France and U.S.A.,¹⁹ Ökçün's *Guide* includes treaties which at one time were but are no longer in force.²⁰ Spot checks confirm it and there is also statistical evidence to this effect. Not a single Turkish UNTS treaties is missing from Ökçün's *Guide*. Hence, Ökçün's *Guide* must include defunct treaties or else there would be a gap-in-reverse.²¹

What is more difficult to determine is whether or not Ökçün's *Guide* also includes treaties which Turkey has signed but which have not, or not yet, come into force. If so, this would be a major difference in the Turkish data base as compared with both the *Canada Treaty Series* and the UNTS. Ökçün's *Guide* indicates for some treaties that they have come into force; for others, the *Guide* is silent on this point; and there is no third type of information. What the *Guide's* silence means is therefore not quite clear. Are they, or were they, in force? Are they UNTS-registerable? So far, we have assumed they are registerable. The Canadian analogy suggests that a national treaty publication would exclude treaties that are not yet in force because they might never enter into force. However, if we assume that Ökçün's *Guide* includes at least some treaties that were signed but had not yet entered into force, then we should also look at what might be called the minimum-maximum gap problem.

The maximum gap is simply the gap as treated so far. To change the maximum gap into the minimum gap, we eliminate all those treaties about whose legal status Ökçün's *Guide* is silent. It is idle to speculate which is the better analytic tool, maximum gap or minimum gap. Either one may exist, and either one is relevant if properly defined. The important question is what

19 Pierre Duparc, *Traités et Accords en Vigueur*, Paris, Pedone, 1962; U.S. Department of State, *Treaties in Force*, (annual publication).

20 Oksun, *op.cit.*, in note 12 above, Preface, p. vii: "...all international agreements to which Turkey is or was a party."

21 A gap-in-reverse exists where the UNTS includes a treaty that is missing from a signatory's own national publication of treaties. See Rohn, *op.cit.* in note 1 above, page 120, Table 1, line 4. Neither Canada nor Turkey has a gap-in-reverse. Apparent gaps-in-reverse of other countries (China, Guatemala, Mexico, Switzerland and Venezuela) need further research before they can be confirmed.

difference it makes whether we take the one or the other. Tables 9 and 10 show some of the answers in detail. Broadly speaking, there is little difference. The minimum gap represents the maximum gap reasonably well. Table 10 in particular shows the similarity between minimum and maximum gaps where it is most relevant to our analysis, namely, in the percentage distribution.

Furthermore, minimum and maximum gaps may be (and probably are) even more similar than what is shown in Tables 9 and 10. The reason for this is that any one of the non-force treaties in the maximum gap may meanwhile have entered into force while none of the in-force treaties can possibly drop out. Defunct treaties continue to count in all gap calculations. Thus the minimum gap is probably larger than shown while the maximum gap and other relevant factors must have remained constant. Nevertheless, the minimum-maximum gap problem is an important new factor in our knowledge about national treaty profiles. It so happens that in the case of Turkey it is practically negligible in its distorting effect. But it should certainly be kept in mind for related studies elsewhere.

III. Turkey's Profile in the U.N. Treaty Series

Having identified and quantified the gap, we can now look at the Turkish UNTS profile with some confidence. Of course, the UNTS profile itself has not changed and is no more accurate now than it was before we studied the gap but we have learned where to make mental adjustments for its inaccuracies.

Our basic resource is Table 11, Turkey's UNTS profile. The present tabulation is limited generally to bilateral treaties. However, some special types of treaties are included which, though technically multilateral, are functionally bilateral.²² As bilateral treaties account for approximately 90% of all UNTS treaties, a profile such as this gives a reasonable image of the

²² For instance, in our case two agreements between Turkey on the one hand and a group of specialized agencies on the other, see Table 11, Code 713, and treaties of more doubtful laterality, e.g. two between Turkey on the one hand and the Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union on the other, (see Table 11, Code 404) and also Turkey's declaration regarding the I.C.J. optional clause (see Table 11, Code 604).

country's pattern of formal international obligation for the two decades since World War II.

There is no single dominant theme in Table 11. It brings together many varied pieces of information all drawn from the computerized data bank of the UNTS Project. It is somewhat like a set of trade statistics to an economist, or a hospital lab report to a physician. The economist may but need not know the region to which the statistics refer, and the physician may but need not know the patient personally. The figures will enable the expert to diagnose what type of trading area, or what kind of body condition may be involved in the case on hand. The physician will be able to construct for himself from the figures an abstract image of the patient and he will be able to make some significant assertions regardless of whether he has ever seen the patient. For instance, he may find that the blood pressure is abnormally high, and that this does, or does not, correlate with age and occupation. Essentially, the same process has occurred in economic analyses. Now we are building conceptual and statistical tools with which to apply this learning process also to international law and jurisprudence. It is in this spirit that the details of the Turkish UNTS profile should be viewed. The treaty profile tells the reader something about Turkish treaties that is independent of anyone's personal acquaintance with Turkey.

To start with the most obvious fact, most of Turkey's partners are States (U.S.A. through U.A.R.); some are international organizations (I.B.R.D. through U.N.S.F.); and two are special cases (bottom group). Turkey's proportion among groups of partners of 29:6:2 is typical of a Western semi-industrial country. Finland's proportion, for instance, is similar 26:4:3. On the other hand, highly industrialized Western countries tend to have relatively more States as partners; developing countries in Africa and Asia have more international organizations as partners; and Soviet Bloc countries tend to have the smallest proportion of international organizations as partners, and often none at all. Turkey's proportion is normal and typical in global perspective for a country of its size and geopolitical position.

The rank order of partners in terms of treaty frequency often reflects a country's political alignment. Both the global

and regional profiles show in the rank order of partners. The top position of the U.S.A. is neither surprising nor unique for Turkey. The U.S.A. is the top treaty partner of most Western States. A more sophisticated question is to ask by *how much* the U.S.A. outranks the second-ranking State, and which States are second and third and so forth. In Turkey, the relative priority of the U.S.A. is 39:14 over the United Kingdom. Mexico's treaty profile, for instance, has the same two top partners but it is far more lopsided toward the U.S.A., i.e. U.S.A. 58, United Kingdom 5. On the other hand, Cyprus keeps the same two top partners at an even 10:10, and Malaya is a rare exception to reverse them in favor of the United Kingdom at 8:4. Turkey, again, appears near the average mark in global perspective.

Third place in Turkey's profile is held by Greece, just barely over Belgium and Pakistan. At this point, the gap comes in again. The gap would have made no difference in the position of the U.S.A. and Britain. Gap or no gap, the two top places remain the same. The third and subsequent places, however, depend in part on whether the gap is included or excluded. With a gap adjustment the third place would go to either West Germany or France, and Greece would move further down the list. Greece also prompts a quick glance ahead at Column 5 to see whether the trend over time reflects political realities. It does. The Greco-Turkish treaty trend goes down, and more steeply so than that of any other one of Turkey's major partners.

Another perspective arises from the percentages in Columns 4 and 5. Column 4 is mainly for convenience. It contains no new information and merely shows that, for instance, the American share of Turkey's profile is about 29%. Comparable figures for the American share in other countries are (from unpublished UNTS Project sources): Panama 79%, Mexico 56%, Lebanon 28%, UAR/Egypt 23%, Pakistan 20%, Finland and Poland each 14%, Sweden 7% and U.S.S.R. 6%. Turkey, again, is near average, perhaps slightly on the high side.

Column 5 shows, conversely, what role Turkey plays within the treaty profile of the other party. Here the rank order changes immediately. In the U.S.A. and Britain, Turkey accounts for less than 2% (1.5% and 1.6%) of the American and British profiles. Turkey does not dominate any other State's profile. The highest

rates are: Belgo-Luxembourg Economic Union 13%, Iraq and I.D.A. each 7%. All others are below 4%. Between 4% and 2% in descending order are Lebanon, Jordan, Pakistan, Greece, Afghanistan and Syria. For all other partners Turkey accounts for an even smaller and hence negligible segment of the partner's treaty profile. Again, the gap might shift a few priorities here and there but it would not affect the basic structure of the relationship. Turkey again is fairly typical for a country of its size and position. Comparable Greek rates of treaty influence on others are: Belgo-Luxembourg Economic Union 13%, Lebanon 8%, Syria and Yugoslavia 5%, Iran and UAR /Egypt 4%. Both the global and regional structures of Greece's treaties are thus similar to those of Turkey, and generally typical for middle-sized and smaller countries.

Some other middle-sized countries, unlike Greece and Turkey, have a special relationship with one or several other countries where their local treaty dominance resembles that of a great power. For instance, Yugoslavia accounts for 69% of Albania's treaties; South Africa for 55% of the treaties of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland; Belgium for 24% of Luxembourg's treaties; Brazil for 22% of Paraguay's and 11% of Uruguay's; Italy for 19% of Monaco's; and Sweden for 12% of Finland's. But Turkey's case, again, is more typical of world averages. Very few country pairs other than those above and those involving either the U.S.A., the U.S.S.R. or the United Kingdom ever exceed the 10% range in each other's treaty profiles. The most frequent rates are in the 2% to 8% range in the world at large, and also in the case of Turkey.

So far this has been a static view of Turkey's treaty profile. Let us now add the factor of time. The importance of time is most obvious in cases of changes of political alignment during the 20-year period of the UNTS. The classical case is Cuba. Disregarding the time factor, Cuba would seem very much like any other small Latin American country in its heavy reliance on the U.S.A., some on international organizations and a sprinkle of other countries. Even so, the presence of Soviet Bloc countries among that sprinkle would give the analyst pause. But the moment we look at the trend over time the explanation becomes unmistakable. The reality of the Cuban Revolution shows clearly in the dynamics of Cuba's treaty profile. All Western countries

(except Japan) have a downward trend in Cuba's treaty profile, in several cases down to zero, and all Soviet Bloc countries have an upward trend, in all cases up from zero to whatever their present level is in each case.

Trends in the Turkish profile are shown in Table 11, Column 6. Turkey has no such obvious shift as Cuba. Most changes are slight or moderate. The great powers are trending up in Turkey's treaties - U.S.A., United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, and so is the Far East with Australia, New Zealand, Nationalist China and Japan. Most of the regional neighbors are trending down - Lebanon, Iraq, Pakistan, Syria, UAR/Egypt, Israel, India, Yugoslavia. Belgium and Netherlands remain constant. International organizations vary. The I.B.R.D. is trending down as sharply as the I.D.A. is trending up, and there are other minor variations. The single biggest time change concerns Greece. If we limited the data base to the first decade, Greece would be at least as high as second place in Turkey's profile, and perhaps on first. If we limit the profile to the second UNTS decade, Greece would not even appear on Turkey's list of partners at all. The Greek trend is down to zero. Except for this single peculiarity, Turkey's trends are fairly near the world average in most respects.

Another significant and measurable characteristic of treaties is their textual reliance on international institutions. In creating the data base for the UNTS Project every treaty has been checked word for word for textual references to international organizations. Not only the major existing organizations have been considered for references, e.g. U.N., F.A.O., N.A.T.O., but also minor ones, e.g. International Whaling Commission, Asian Productivity Organization, etc. Even special *ad hoc* commissions and committees created only by the treaty containing the reference, and having sometimes no function outside the purview of that particular treaty, have been included in the survey.

The sum of all these references serves as a measure of a country's reliance on international institutions. The more such references there are per treaty, the greater is the role played by institutions in the total treaty pattern of a given country.

Turkey's rate, as per Table 11, Column 7, is 144 references in 135 treaties or slightly higher than one reference per treaty. This rate of about 110% is above the world average and near that of other countries groupable with Turkey, e.g. Portugal 145%, Lebanon 130%, Greece 110%, Pakistan 105%, Iran 98%, Iraq 87%, Israel 70%. Turkey's top three partners differ sharply from each other in their reliance on institutions. Two sets of comparisons are relevant, the world average and the partner's own average. In its treaties with Turkey, the U.S.A. is below world average and near its own average with 60%; the United Kingdom is slightly above world average and farther above its own average with 125%; and Greece is far above both averages with 200%. Seemingly unusual in the Turkish profile is the case of Italy with 23 references to international institutions in only 2 treaties, a rate of over a thousand percent. This oddity, however, is partly due to the small number of Italo-Turkish treaties and partly to one treaty of friendship, conciliation and judicial settlement.²³ This single treaty accounts for most of the high rate because it establishes a permanent conciliation commission to which frequent reference is made throughout the treaty.

What may also be surprising at first sight is the low rate of institutional references in Turkey's treaties with international organizations. The explanation goes back to the coding process and to a vexatious problem of legal theory. How impartial is an international organization in a dispute between itself and one of its Member States? Coders have been instructed *not* to count references to an international organization if that organization was itself a signatory to the treaty. The purpose of this coding rule was to let institutional references measure as purely as possible the function of impartiality for which many institutions have been created under international law. This function is not quite so clear in a treaty to which the institution itself is a party, i.e. where the conciliator is also one of the actors. The problem may be unsolvable in legal theory. But it may also be harmless in practice. After all, in domestic courts the State often acts as arbitrator and litigant in the same case. This is similar in form but usually negligible in practice. The UNTS Project code leans toward caution and simply omits all self-references in treaties

23 UNTS Volume 96, page 207, Treaty No. I-1338.

with international organizations. What results is a safe minimum rate which in turn explains this segment of the Turkish profile.

Not only the number of institutional references characterizes a treaty profile but also their identity. Which are the institutions most frequently referred to? For the world as a whole, the 7 top ones and their percentages of all UNTS references are as follows: U.N. 21%, Special Commissions 15%, I.C.J. 11%, I.C.A.O. 10%, Arbitration Commissions 10%, I.L.O. 3%, O.E.C.D. 3%. For Turkey, both the rank order and the percentages are quite different from world average: I.C.A.O. 27%, Arbitration Commissions 18%, Special Commissions 15%, U.N. 10%, O.E.C.D. and I.C.J. each 7% N.A.T.O. 5 %.

If we look into further details to see what institutional references are especially frequent in Turkey's treaties with which other partners, Column 8 will give some indications. Statistical information tends to lose significance as the total numbers get smaller, and therefore Column 8 shows no figures but it simply prints out the single most frequently referenced institution in the treaties of any country pair involving Turkey. The prominence of I.C.A.O. is clear for the Turkish profile as a whole but Turkey's major partners tend to crowd I.C.A.O. into the background with their primary reliance on N.A.T.O., Arbitration Commissions and various special commissions.

In institutional references Turkey for once is not typical of an average country and has special features of its own. The reliance on I.C.A.O. and N.A.T.O., of course, is not unique but it plays a relatively larger role in Turkey than in other comparable countries. The role of the U.N. and specialized agencies, as that of the I.C.J., are below world average. This is an area that has not yet been worked out in full detail for all countries. Some of the comparative figures may yet change. Also, the gap may affect the comparison slightly.

The distribution of topics has been largely anticipated in Section II above, as prompted by the topical aspects of the gap shown in Tables 4, 6 and 8. Turkey has been found to be quite similar to the world average, with somewhat higher rates for transportation and diplomacy and a lower rate for the health-education-welfare-labor complex and slightly lower for international organizations and assorted minor matters.

The figures are not large enough to permit a meaningful subdivision of Turkey's treaty partners by mutual topics. As in the case of institutional references, this part of the inquiry is limited to the single most frequent topic in each set of treaties between Turkey and any one other party. The results appear on Table 11, Column 9. Visa, trade and air navigation dominate in most treaties between Turkey and other States whereas aid (including development projects classifiable as aid) prevail in Turkish treaties with international organizations. The single largest treaty partner, the U.S.A., is again an exception. The military theme prevails here. It should be noted, however, that the UNTS Project code for military matters is rather broad and includes military assistance, lend-lease agreements, status of missions, status of forces, installations and equipment, and even citizenship questions involving military service. The combination of Turkey's participation in N.A.T.O. with the relatively small volume of Turkey's total treaties may create an exaggerated view of Turkish-American military treaties.

The last characteristic feature of a country's treaty profile within the present data bank is the volume and speed of registration. Both would seem at first sight to correlate with the gap. And yet the two matters are different. The gap is what is *outside* the UNTS altogether. Registration concerns what is *inside* the UNTS and how it got there and when.

Despite many uncertainties and confusions about Article 102 of the U.N. Charter, and State practice under it, some findings on Turkish registration show some meaning in global perspective. Basically, Turkey's rate of registration is low but not very low at 10%, 13 out of 135. Many comparable countries have similar or even lower rates, as discussed partly in Section II above. Detailed comparisons can be made with the help of Table 12.²⁴

24 A most unusual registration practice applies to four of Turkey's treaties and to a few other treaties elsewhere but is otherwise negligible in global perspective. This is a situation where, contrary to normal U.N. Secretariat practice, registration is accepted from more than one signatory. It so happens that Turkey's four double registrations, few as they are, make Turkey the world's largest double registrant, over Iraq with three double registrations and a few other countries with two and one each. Unexplainedly, most double registrations have occurred in the Middle East. Turkey's partners in double registration are Iraq (3) and Greece (1). The UNTS serial numbers of the four treaties are: I-580, I-581, I-582, and I-5712. In all statistical computations only the first registrant has been counted. In the case of Turkey it makes a slight but noticeable difference. Turkey's registration record would improve if double registration were counted.

Turkey appears below world average in percentage of registration but near or even above the rate typical for comparable countries in the Near East. On the other hand, in speed of registration Turkey is quite fast, even in global perspective. Turkey's average time lag of 20 months compares very favorably with an estimated world average of 25 months, and compares with other national averages as follows: Brazil 87 months, Canada 52, Yugoslavia 47, France 45, Ceylon 43, Greece 38, Pakistan 29, U.S.A. 29, U.S.S.R. 25, United Kingdom 23, UAR /Egypt 19, Israel 18, Australia 12 and Finland 5.

Turkey, in sum, has a treaty profile that is thoroughly reasonable for a country of its size and general situation. It shows a healthy balance of interests among major powers, and among neighbors, and a normal diversity of topics as well as average consistency over time. There are just enough peculiarities in the Turkish profile to make it distinctively Turkish. It would be recognizable -and indeed predictable- from a good knowledge of Turkey's international position and of world treaty patterns in general. In turn it should be possible to start with nothing but a complete and detailed set of Turkish treaty information and then to arrive at a reasonable image of Turkey's position in the world. This indeed is the crucial point in case studies like this for the development of scientific jurisprudence. What counts is not this or that particular legal relationship but the fact that Turkey's treaty practice as a whole condenses *without major distortions* the vastly complex reality of Turkey's international position. What is even more important for academic research is the fact that the Turkish case study contains much that is generalizable for other countries both in substance and in methodology.

IV. Conclusion

Various conclusions emerge from the present study. Some are tentative, subject to further research. Others are reasonably definite. Some findings concern Turkey alone. Others compare Turkey with Canada because the only other national treaty study of this kind was made for Canada. Some findings show Turkish and Canadian treaties in their regional settings. Others put Turkey and Canada into global perspective.

Finally, some conclusions generalize from the Turkish and Canadian studies and other UNTS Project data toward an empirical view of the law of treaties in general. The current professional debate on the 1966 Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties has not had the benefit of a systematic tabulation of the hard facts of State practice. The International Law Commission has pooled the awe-inspiring knowledge of many of the greatest international lawyers of our age. And yet they have not had access to the basic statistical facts about the treaty practice even of their own States, let alone other States or the world at large. The present study is an attempt to show that quantitative and global treaty information can do more than put Turkey's treaties into larger perspectives of time and space, important though this is in itself. It also can contribute a new dimension to *any* discussion of the law of treaties. It can give rebirth in a modern setting to the traditional wisdom of jurisprudence which says that there is normative power in facts.

1. *Turkey's Treaty Gap.* Contrary to a wide-spread assumption underlying UNTS-based research in the law of treaties, there is in fact often a discrepancy between a national treaty list and a national segment of the UNTS. Both Turkey and Canada show such a gap. In some respects the Turkish and Canadian gaps are similar; in others, they are different. The following list is divided into such similarities and differences.

The Turkish gap, like the Canadian, exists and is large enough to be taken seriously in any study of Turkish treaties. It extends in one direction only. This is shown by the fact that the Turkish treaty list includes all (100%) of the Turkish UNTS treaties but the UNTS does not include all of the Turkish treaties in the national list. Turkey's gap does not seriously distort Turkey's overall treaty pattern. While this is true for Canada, too, it is so for different reasons in either case as will be shown below under Turkish-Canadian differences. Turkey's gap consists of a few major clusters which are easily explainable, and of a random variety of unconnected treaties here and there.

On the other hand, Turkey's gap differs from the Canadian in some important respects as follows. Turkey's gap is much larger, at least at first sight. Canada's gap is 25%, which means that approximately one out of four Canadian treaties is missing

from the UNTS. By contrast, the Turkish gap is 53%, or one out of two treaties. However, Turkey's treaty list presents a special problem of determining which treaties are in force and which are not. Unlike Canada, there is a maximum gap of 53% but also -with a different definition of treaty- a minimum gap of 19%, and the truth may be anywhere in between, probably near 30% to 35%. The distribution of maximum and minimum gaps are reasonably similar. Therefore, the analytic problem is not as serious as the percentage figures suggest. Also unlike Canada, Turkey's major gap clusters (whether minimum or maximum) seem to have nothing to do with government policy. They result from circumstances largely outside Turkey's control mainly two low-registrant partners, France and Germany, and a probable pipeline effect in American loan agreements. Otherwise, Turkey's gap spreads in random fashion over all treaty characteristics such as partners, topics, titles and time periods.

2. *Turkey's UNTS Profile.* Once the gap is known, Turkey's treaty pattern can be meaningfully analyzed on the basis of UNTS records. This has the unique advantage of using the data bank of the UNTS Project. The computer can compare each national treaty pattern to any other national treaty pattern as well as to regional and global standards and trends over time.

In bringing these resources to bear on Turkish treaties, and after making allowance for the Turkish gap, one single impression dominates the image which emerges. Turkey's treaty profile is a model case of being *average* in most respects. Turkey's profile has few extremes. Even the few conspicuous bulges in Turkey's treaty profile turn out to be typical rather than unique. For example, there is a heavy bulge under U.S.A. among Turkey's partners. But appearances deceive. This is precisely where national studies mislead in the absence of a global framework. Of course, the facts are true. But they may seem unique for Turkey only as long as comparable data for other countries are not instantly available. Then we see that Turkey is quite typical in its heavy reliance on the U.S.A. among treaty partners. Indeed, the U.S.A. is the single most important partner for most of the world's countries outside the Soviet sphere of influence. Turkey, then, is again near average in global perspective even though at first sight it seemed as if the heavy American share in Turkey's

treaty profile indicated some unique relationship. Essentially the same is true for the second place of the United Kingdom in Turkey's profile. This, too, is frequent among non-Soviet countries. It is also true for the general distribution of partners among major powers and regional neighbors, a feature that is typical of most of the world's countries. Turkey's treaties spread rather erratically over time, sometimes running ahead of the world average and then lagging behind, without a clear trend over the entire two decades of the UNTS. While odd at first sight, this, too, is quite typical of many countries. Indeed, evenness of distribution over time, or a consistent trend are the exception rather than the rule in global perspective. And so the pattern continues. Wherever we look, whether in topics or titles, or registration or reliance on international institutions, Turkey's treaties may be high or low, or even or lopsided, but they are almost always typical of many other middle-sized countries with average international activities, average economic development and, except for a noticeable effect of Turkey's linkage with N.A.T.O., average political alignments. This is what makes the Turkish treaty profile so significant for scholarly analysis. Turkish treaties behave very much like a small-scale image of the world's treaties. It is relatively safe to extrapolate from the Turkish experience to State practice in general. This is a fortunate coincidence in the present study as compared with the earlier study of Canadian treaties. Canada is unique in so many respects that its treaties do not lend themselves so easily to generalizations. Turkey, however, is typical. And on the basis of both studies together some generalizations may be attempted now about the general practice of treaty registration and its effect on our knowledge of and attitudes toward the law of treaties.

3. *Treaty Registration.* Let us first recapitulate the Canadian findings for comparison. Canada has a national treaty series of its own which is maintained and updated by the Canadian Government. This fact alone is quite rare on the global scene.²⁵ Furthermore, the Canadian Government has an explicit policy on treaty registration with the U.N. The policy aims at registering every treaty in force to which Canada is a party except secret treaties

25 United Nations, *List of Treaty Collections*, New York, 1956, U.N. Document ST/LEG/5. Also, see Rohn, *op.cit.*, note 1 above, page 106.

and certain types of short-term trade agreements²⁶ and other limited and informal engagements. Except for the extremely slow speed of Canadian registration (about as slow as France and slower than any other major western country, Canada's treaty records are clear and easily findable within and without the UNTS.

In most other countries this is not so. In fact, treaty registration is one of the most chaotic areas in the law of treaties. This chaos is all the more regrettable because it is unnecessary and because it encumbers all research in the law of treaties. On the other hand, while, regrettable and unnecessary, the chaos is also understandable. It results directly from the poor wording of Article 102 of the U.N. Charter.²⁷ The poor wording might have been given clear operational meaning subsequently by the Sixth Committee or the General Assembly or the Secretariat but this has not happened in fact.²⁸ Furthermore, Article 75 of the 1966 Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties as formulated by the International Law Commission does nothing to improve the situation.²⁹ It may in fact make it worse due to its linkage with the definition of "treaty" under Article 2 /1 /a of the I.L.C. Draft.³⁰

26 See, however, United Nations, *Repertory of Practice of United Nations Organs*, Volume, 5, New York, p. 296, Paragraph 31, item (i) regarding the obligation to register short-term commercial agreements.

27 Article 102 U.N. Charter: "1. Every treaty and every international agreement entered into by any Member of the United Nations after the present Charter comes into force shall as soon as possible be registered with the Secretariat and published by it. 2. No party to any such treaty or international agreement which has not been registered in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article may invoke that treaty or agreement before any organ of the United Nations."

28 United Nations, *Repertory*, *op. cit.*, note 26, pp. 279-312. U.N. practice under Article 102 as documented in the *Repertory* is too detailed for reproduction here and does not affect the argument made in the present study. In particular, it does not settle the three crucial points of (1) identifying the registrant, (2) setting a time limit and (3) specifying criteria for permissible nonregistration other than the obvious pre-Charter and non-Member cases, and except for certain other borderline cases on pp. 295-296.

29 Article 75 of the I.L.C. Draft: "Treaties entered into by parties to the present articles shall as soon as possible be registered with the Secretariat of the United Nations. Their registration and publication shall be governed by the regulations adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations."

30 Article 2 /1 /a of the I.L.C. Draft: "Treaty" means an international agreement concluded between states in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation.

Let us recall that, under Article 102, according to the dominant interpretation, both parties to a bilateral treaty are obligated to register it with the U.N. but the act of registration by *one* party exempts the *other* party from that same obligation. This is a most curious kind of obligation. It is as grotesque as the following hypothetical case. A owes \$10 to C, and B owes \$10 to C, but C can collect only \$10 from *either* A or B, whichever pays first. No wonder payment would be slow in such a situation. It is not so surprising, then, that the world average time lag between signature and registration is about 2 years, and that the total number of never-registered treaties is unknown and is probably in the order of 2,000 between 1645 and 1965.

But let us also recall that this is the dominant but not the only interpretation of Article 102. The other interpretation is even worse for registration. Some States interpret Article 102 as lacking any general obligation to register. These States disregard Paragraph 1 as an exhortation rather than an obligation to register. They do not consider Paragraph 2 as a sanction for failure to comply with Paragraph 1. All they see in Paragraph 2 is a point of procedure. If a treaty is to be invoked before a U.N. organ it must first be registered, they say, but it makes no difference when and by whom, and there is no intrinsic obligation for anyone to register any treaty at any particular time.

Furthermore, the question of timing is not regulated at all. Article 102 refers to the speed of registration only by the flexible phrase "as soon as possible." Lastly, there is no systematic exchange of information on the status of registration among foreign ministries or between the U.N. Secretariat and country missions. In order to determine the precise extent of his country's obligations under Article 102 (assuming the dominant interpretation to be true), any national treaty officer would have to make a gap study such as the present article.

The whole confusion is not only regrettable but also avoidable. The I.L.C. Draft gives the international community a chance to change the situation. Even though perfection is unattainable here as elsewhere,³¹ a major improvement can be achieved by

31 An unduly optimistic survey of a generation ago is worth quoting *in extenso* as a sobering reminder of the perennial nature of the problem. Denys P. Myers, *Manual of Collections of Treaties*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press,

means of a few simple changes in the understanding and wording of Articles 75 and 2/1/a in the I.L.C. Draft. The following changes would, in my opinion, improve the situation quite noticeably without putting an additional burden on Member States, and in fact easing the burden through administrative clarity. I am not presenting any particular wording but am merely suggesting some operative ideas for a new version of Article 75.

(1) The signatories' *intrinsic* obligation to register their treaties should be phrased in unambiguous terms.

(2) This obligation should be individuated by identifying the signatory-registrant and by specifying a time limit. For instance, the obligation may rest always on the State in whose territory the treaty has been signed (or, in an exchange of notes, the second signatory). The signatory-registrant has the primary obligation to register the treaty within, say, 6 months from its coming into force. If the signatory-registrant fails to comply within the stated time, the obligation automatically devolves upon the second signatory (in bilateral treaties) or the next one in alphabetical order (in multilateral treaties), again with a definite time limit.

(3) Any failure to register a treaty under the exact conditions as stated will bar the delinquent State at any time in the future from invoking that treaty before a U.N. organ even though the treaty may have subsequently been registered by another State.

(4) Any discussion of Article 2/1/a (defining "treaty" for the entire I.L.C. Draft) should take into account the effect which the definition will have on the practice under Article 75, whether as formulated by the I.L.C. or as proposed here. The key issue

1922, p. 579: "The publication of treaties has a history of more than three thousand years, extending back to the earliest extant records of governmental affairs. Within a decade from the discovery of the art of printing, treaty material was presented to the public by means of movable types, and from that time on the printing of the archives of foreign relations has steadily increased in volume and in variety of method of presentation. The printing of such documents was first a private venture with official sanction; then a wholly private venture; next largely a governmental affair; and now the League of Nations *Treaty Series* is both the official and the nearly complete repository of conventional texts of all countries, whether members of the League or not."

here is to give States legitimate reasons and clear criteria for *not* registering those instruments which are either trivial or secret. Perhaps the easiest way to accomplish both purposes would be to say that any instrument must be registered which the signatory-registrant publishes in its own national treaty series or official gazette. This will not remove all doubts in all cases but it should reduce the area of ambiguity.

Both the Turkish and the Canadian studies lead to the conclusion that some changes in the law and procedure of treaty registration are necessary and possible; that the I.L.C. Draft affords a unique opportunity to consider and to make these changes; and that both the practice of international legal activity and academic research in international law may expect significant improvements as a result of such changes.

TABLE I

Turkish Gap: Titles and Comparisons

Title	World UNTS	Turkey UNTS	Turkey Gap	Canada UNTS	Canada Gap
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Treaty	3%	4%	3%	1%	—
Convention	8%	3%	2%	7%	1%
Agreement	52%	57%	70%	25%	17%
Exchange	32%	32%	17%	66%	80%
Other	5%	4%	8%	1%	2%
TOTAL	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

TABLE 2

Turkish Gap: Topics and Comparisons

Topic Group	TURKEY ABSOLUTES			TURKEY PERCENTAGES			COMPARISONS		
	Turkey Gap	Turkey UNTS	Total	Turkey Gap	Turkey UNTS	Turkey Total	World UNTS	Canada Gap	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	
1X Diplomacy	31	26	57	21%	19%	20%	15%	5%	
2X H.E.W., Labor	9	10	19	6%	8%	7%	12%	7%	
3X Economics	63	23	86	42%	17%	30%	17%	54%	
4X Foreign Aid	38	32	70	26%	24%	25%	24%	1%	
5X Transport, PTT	3	26	29	2%	19%	10%	12%	15%	
6X Military	2	15	17	1%	11%	6%	12%	10%	
7X Int'l Organiz.	1	2	3	1%	2%	1%	5%	—	
8X Ad Hoc	1	—	1	1%	—	1%	3%	8%	
9X Other	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
TOTAL	148	134	282	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	

TABLE 3
Turkish Gap: Years and Titles

	Treaty	Conven- tion	Agree- ment	Exchange	Other	Total	Canadian Gap
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
1945			2			2	2
1946		1	5	2	1	9	14
1947			2	1		3	7
1948			8	1		9	4
1949	1		8	2	1	12	2
1950			1	1	1	3	2
1951	1		5			6	5
1952	1		7	3		11	5
1953		1	5		2	8	5
1954			9	2	1	12	4
1955			4	4	3	11	5
1956			5	2	1	8	6
1957			2	2	1	5	8
1958			10	1		11	15
1959	1		7	1		9	7
1960		1	4	1		6	*
1961			4	1		5	*
1962			6			6	*
1963			10	1	1	12	*
Total	4	3	104	25	12	148	91

* 1960-1963 not included in Canadian study.

TABLE 4
Turkish Gap: Years and Topics

TOPIC	'45	'46	'47	'48	'49	'50	'51	'52	'53	'54	'55	'56	'57	'58	'59	'60	'61	'62	'63	Total
Gen. Rel. & Amity					1			1							1					3
Frontiers & Visas							2	3	2	5	4	2			2	1			1	22
Diplomatic, Consular		1								1										2
Extradition, Deport.								1												1
Other Judic. Coop.								2					1							3
Sanitation																1				2
Culture								1				1		1	2					7
General Economics	2	3	2	6	5	1	1	2	2	2	4									31
General Trade		4		2					1					1	1	1				12
Finance & Payments			1	1	1					1									1	6
Foreign Claims						1						1								2
Trade, Commodities									3	2	1						1			8
Most-Favored Nation					1									1						2
Customs, Duties					1															2
Other Econ. Matters																		1		1
General Aid & Assist.																				1
Technical Assist.																				2
Foreign Aid						1	1	1							1				2	5
Loan & Credit																1			1	10
U.S. Agr. Assist. Act																		5		15
Atomic Energy Aid																			1	1
Non-IBRD Projects																				4
General Transport					2										2					2
Air Transport																				1
General Military																				1
Status of Forces																				1
Int'l. Organiz.																			1	1
Claims & Waivers											1									1
TOTAL	2	9	3	9	12	3	6	11	8	12	11	8	5	11	9	6	5	6	12	148

TABLE 5
Turkish Gap: Years and Partners

Partner	'45	'46	'47	'48	'49	'50	'51	'52	'53	'54	'55	'56	'57	'58	'59	'60	'61	'62	'63	T
Afganistan															1					1
Austria									1		1	1		1					1	5
Belgium				2							1			1						4
Bulgaria											1									1
Czechoslov.		2			1															3
Denmark									1	1				1						3
Dominican Republic							1													1
Finland		1		2					1	1						2				7
France		3						2	1	3				1	1			1		12
W. Germany				2	2			3	2				1	1	1		1	1	1	16
Greece												1								1
Hungary					1															1
Iceland												1								1
India									1											1
Indonesia																1				1
Iran					3		1				1	1			1					7
Ireland											1									1
Italy			1	1			2	1		1	2		1	1					1	11
Japan											1									1
Lebanon		1								1										2
Libya														1						1
Luxembourg								1												1
Monaco												1								1
Netherlands					1						1									2
Norway								1						1	1					3
Pakistan											1									1
Philippines						1														1
Poland				1	1				1											3
Portugal														1						1
Romania										1										1
Scandinavia															1					1
Spain				1			1			2		1			1					6
Sweden			1		1			1						1		1				5
Switzerland	1									1				1						3
Syria					2							1								3
Tunisia														1						1
UAR /EG									1											1
United Kingdom		1																	2	3
U.S.A.			1			1							1		2	1	3	5	5	19
Yemen							1													1
Yugoslavia				1		2						1				1				5
FAO+Bank							1													1
ILO								1												1
SACEUR (NATO)												1								1
UNSF+FAO																				1
EEC																				1
Total	2	9	3	9	12	3	6	11	8	12	11	8	5	11	9	6	5	6	12	148

TABLE 6

Turkish Gap: Titles and Topics

TOPIC	Treaty	Conven- tion	Agree- ment	Ex- change	Other	Total
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Gen. Rel. & Amity	3					3
Frontiers & Visas	1		14	7		22
Diplomatic, Consular				2		2
Extradition, Deport.				1		1
Other Judic. Coop.				3		3
Sanitation		1		1		2
Culture			7			7
General Economics			24	1	6	31
General Trade		1	8	2	1	12
Finance & Payments			5	1		6
Foreign Claims			1		1	2
Trade, Commodities		1	2	4	1	8
Most Favored Nation				2		2
Customs, Duties					1	1
Other Econ. Matters			1			1
General Aid & Assist.			2			2
Technical Assist.			3	1	1	5
Foreign Aid			10			10
Loan & Credit			15			15
U.S. Agr. Assist. Act			1			1
Atomic Energy Aid			1			1
Non-IBRD Projects			4			4
General Transport			2			2
Air Transport			1			1
General Military			1			1
Status of Forces			1			1
Int'l. Organiz.			1			1
Claims & Waivers					1	1
TOTAL	4	3	104	25	12	148

TABLE 7

Turkish Gap: Titles and Partners

PARTNER	Treaty	Conven- tion	Agree- ment	Ex- change	Other	Total
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Afganistan			1			1
Austria			2	2	1	5
Belgium			2	1	1	4
Bulgaria			1			1
Czechoslovakia			2	1		3
Denmark			3			3
Dominican Republic	1					1
Finland			6		1	7
France		1	7	2	2	12
W. Germany		1	11	4		16
Greece				1		1
Hungary			1			1
Iceland			1			1
India			1			1
Indonesia			1			1
Iran			5		2	7
Ireland				1		1
Italy			9	2		11
Japan			1			1
Lebanon				2		2
Libya			1			1
Luxembourg			1			1
Monaco			1			1
Netherlands			1		1	2
Norway			2	1		3
Pakistan				1		1
Philippines	1					1
Poland			2		1	3
Portugal			1			1
Romania			1			1
Scandinavia			1			1
Spain	1		3	2		6
Sweden			4	1		5
Switzerland			3			3
Syria			1	1	1	3
Tunisia				1		1
UAR /EG			1			1
United Kingdom			2	1		3
U.S.A.			18	1		19
Yemen	1					1
Yugoslavia		1	3		1	5
FAO + Bank			1			1
ULI			1			1
Saceur (NATO)			1			1
UNSF + FAO					1	1
EEC			1			1
Total	4	3	104	25	12	148

TABLE 8

Turkish Gap: Topics and Partners

	Gen. Rel. & Amity Frontiers & Visas Diplomatic, Consular Extradition, Deport. Other Judic. Coop. Sanitation Culture	General Economics General Trade Finance & Payment Foreign Claims Trade, Commodities Most-Favored Nation Customs, Duties Other Econ. Matters General Aid & Assist. Technical Assist. Foreign Aid	Loan & Credit U.S. Agr. Assist. Act Atomic Energy Aid Non-IBRD Projects General Transport Air Transport General Military Status of Forces Int'l. Organiz. Claims & Waivers	TOTAL
Afghanistan				1
Austria	1			1
Belgium				3
Bulgaria				1
Czechoslovakia				1
Denmark	1			1
Domin. Rep.	1			1
Finland	1			2
France	1			3
W. Germany	1			1
Greece	1			1
Hungary				1
Iceland	1			1
India				1
Indonesia				1
Iran				1
Ireland	1			1
Italy	1			4
Japan	1			1
Lebanon				2
Libya				1
Luxembourg	1			1
Monaco	1			1
Netherlands				2
Norway	2			1
Pakistan	1			1
Philippines	1			1
Poland				2
Portugal				1
Romania				1
Scandinavia	1			1
Spain	1			1
Sweden	2			1
Switzerland	1			1
Syria				1
Tunisia				1
UAR /EG				1
United Kingdom	1			1
U.S.A.				1
Yemen	1			1
Yugoslavia				1
FAO + Bank				1
ILO				1
Saceur (NATO)				1
UNSF + FAO				1
EEC				1
Total	3 22 2 1 3 2 7 31	12 6 2 8 2 1 1 2 5 10 15 1 1 4 2 1 1 1 1 1	1	148

TABLE 10
Turkish Gap: Minimum and Maximum in Percentages

Dates	Min	Max	Topics	Min	Max	Titles	Min	Max	Partners	Min	Max
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
1945-49	39	23	Diplomacy	13	21	Treaty	2	3	USA	15	13
1950-54	17	27	H.E.W.Labor	2	6	Convention	2	2	West Germany	11	11
1955-59	20	30	Economics	50	42	Agreement	77	70	France	11	8
1960-63	24	20	Foreign Aid	31	26	Exchange	15	17	Italy	9	7
			Transport PTT	2	2	Other	4	8	Other	54	61
Total	100	100	Military	2	1	Total	100	100	Total	100	100
			Int. Org.	—	1						
			Ad Hoc	—	1						
			Other	—	—						
			Total	100	100						

TABLE 11
Turkey's Profile in the U.N. Treaty Series

Code	Other Party	Number of Mutual Treaties	Percent of All Treaties		Trend	Articles		Leading Int. Org. Reference	Leading Topic	Registration	
			Profile	Other		Int. Org.	Reference			Treaties Register By Party	Average Time Lag
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	
131	U.S.A.	39	28.9	1.5	11	22	NATO	Milita	—	—	—
130	United Kingdom	14	10.4	1.6	4	18	Arbit. Com.	Visa	—	—	—
48	Greece	7	5.2	2.9	—7	14	Spec. Cm.	Trade	—	—	—
9	Pegium	6	4.4	1.6	—	5	Spec. Cm.	Visa	—	—	—
96	Pakistan	6	4.4	3.3	—4	9	U.N.	Amity	—	—	—
58	Iraq	5	3.7	7.2	—3	6	ICAO	Amity	—	—	—
19	Canada	4	3.0	1.3	—2	0	—	Visa	—	—	—
88	Netherlands	4	3.0	1.0	—	3	ICAO	Visa	1	12	12
95	Norway	4	3.0	1.5	—2	4	ICAO	Cultur	2	18	18
34	Denmark	3	2.2	1.0	—3	2	ICAO	Trade	1	24	24
42	France	2	1.5	0.6	—2	1	ICAO	Labor	2	13	13
55	India	2	1.5	1.0	—2	—	—	Amity	1	49	49
60	Israel	2	1.5	1.1	—2	4	ICAO	Favor	—	—	—
61	Italy	2	1.5	0.7	—2	23	ICJ	Amity	1	16	16
65	Jordan	2	1.5	3.5	—2	2	ICAO	Amity	2	14	14
71	Lebanon	2	1.5	3.9	—2	2	ICAO	Visas	—	—	—
128	U.S.A.R.	2	1.5	0.8	2	—	—	Transp.	—	—	—
140	Yugoslavia	2	1.5	0.6	—2	3	Spec. Cm.	Trade	1	40	40
1	Afghanistan	1	0.7	2.9	1	3	ICAO	Airnav	—	—	—
7	Australia	1	0.7	0.6	1	—	—	Visa	—	—	—
12	Brazil	1	0.7	0.7	—1	4	ICAO	Airnav	—	—	—
25	China Rep (Nat)	1	0.7	0.9	1	—	—	Cultur	—	—	—
32	Czechoslovakia	1	0.7	0.5	—1	1	ICAO	Airnav	1	13	13
64	Japan	1	0.7	0.4	1	—	—	Visa	—	—	—
90	New Zealand	1	0.7	1.1	1	—	—	Visa	—	—	—
114	Sweden	1	0.7	0.4	—1	1	ICAO	Airnav	1	20	20
115	Switzerland	1	0.7	0.7	—1	3	ICAO	Airnav	—	—	—
116	Syria	1	0.7	2.3	—1	—	—	Teleco	—	—	—
129	UAR /Eg (Syr 116)	1	0.7	0.8	—1	3	ICAO	Airnav	—	—	—
1-199	State Subtotal	119	88.1	—	—19	133	—	—	13	20	20
206	IBRD	5	3.7	1.3	—5	3	Arbit. Cm.	Projec	—	—	—
207	IDA	3	2.2	6.8	3	—	—	Develo	—	—	—
404	ELEU	2	1.5	13.3	—2	1	Spec. Cm.	Trade	—	—	—
201	UN	1	0.7	0.5	1	—	—	Privil	—	—	—
219	UNICEF	1	0.7	0.9	—1	—	—	Aid	—	—	—
221	UNSF	1	0.7	1.0	1	6	UN	Aid	—	—	—
201-599	IGO Subtotal	13	9.6	—	—3	10	—	—	—	—	—
713	ONE STA MUL IGO	2	1.5	1.9	—	—	—	Techas	—	—	—
604	UNILAT ICJ OP CL	1	0.7	2.1	—1	1	ICJ	Opt. ICJ	—	—	—
601-999	Special Cases	3	2.2	—	—1	1	—	—	—	—	—
1-999	Total	135	100.0	—	—23	144	—	—	13	20	20

TABLE 12

Turkey's Treaty Registration and Comparisons

Party	Number of Bilaterals in UNTS	Registered by Party		Time Lag Between Signature and Registration		
		Bilaterals	Multila- terals	Average	Maximum	Minimum
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Turkey	135	13	—	20	49	8
Canada	307	114	11	52	282	8
Afganistan	35	5	—	21	39	5
Belgium	387	303	40	18	372	—
Denmark	287	157	11	12	75	1
Finland	148	33	7	5	17	1
France	321	9	2	45	155	5
W. Germany	229	—	1	4	4	4
Greece	241	119	3	37	269	3
India	207	26	—	28	96	9
I.B.R.D.	376	373	3	14	96	1
Iraq	69	8	—	27	42	12
Israel	183	105	—	18	86	1
Netherlands	410	237	18	34	166	—
Pakistan	181	58	—	29	122	1
UAR /Egypt	133	8	1	19	65	—
U.S.S.R.	259	157	10	25	333	—
United Kingdom	895	648	87	23	401	—
U.S.A.	2547	2374	90	29	767	—
Yugoslavia	314	158	2	47	92	4

* In addition to most of Turkey's major treaty partners, the present list includes all the world's major registrants with more than 150 treaty registrations except the U.N. (744), the I.C.A.O. (409), the W.H.O. (172) and the I.L.O. (157). The list also includes approximately two thirds of all UNTS treaties.