

THE SCIENCE OF HADITH BETWEEN DIVINITY AND HUMANITY

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ABSTRACT

The endeavors of attributing a religious and divine character to the Science of Hadith appeared in two ways: 1) Hadith scholars (muḥaddithūn) tried to base their studies and technical terms on Qur'anic and Prophetic texts, 2) Hadith scholars considered their profession a religious duty and worship. This perception suggests that the profession of Hadith scholars was sacred, divine, dogma, and unchangeable, which meant limiting the subject of knowledge and science to God and the Prophet Muhammad. However, the fact is that the Science of Hadith and its terms were coined by man as a result of individual or social necessities and historical conditions. So, one should talk about historicity in the Science of Hadith, not about dogmatism.

Key Words: Science, Ḥadīth, Divinity, Humanity, Religious, Cultural, Ḥadīth Scholar (muḥaddith)

Introduction

I participated in an academic symposium where Islamic scholarship on sciences, methodologies and epistemology was discussed¹. I was surprised to hear, in the session in which the Methodology of *Fiqh* was being discussed, the following statement of a researcher: "Methodological rules are religious and thus unchangeable." This statement stimulated me to study the alleged unchangeability of methodological rules. Because of my research interest, I limited the study with *'ulūm al-ḥadīth* and its methodology. I saw, while I was collecting my data, as it was in the other religious sciences, that there was also such a tendency, which was, sometimes innocently expressed but some other times in a way that did not tolerate a right of objection to the opponent. The problem, as it will be seen in this study, appears in two ways: 1) to claim that *'Ulūm al-Ḥadīth (the Science of Hadīth)* and its principles were based on Qur'anic verses and prophetic ḥadīths (i.e. divinization); 2) to equate some scientific applications with religion and consider them a kind of worship (i.e. religionization). Both of them are, completely, theoretical and specula-

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tive. The third stage will highlight the cultural and anthropological dimension of *'ulūm al-hadīth*. It represents practice and reality.

In his book published some 15 years ago, a Hadīth scholar explained his opinion as the following:

“Where were the definitions and rules which played a role of a standard basis in the evaluation of the words and behavior of the Prophet Muhammad obtained? Were these the individual opinions and interpretations of the early Muslim scholars (*'ulamā*)? Why should not we, if this is the case, also establish new rules and definitions in understanding and evaluating the hadīths...etc? These are the questions directed by the scholars, who have bad intents, to new faithful Muslim generations who are left ignorant of their religion, to confuse them and then propose wrong and misleading answers. Therefore, we should possess sound information on the origin of the rules of *usūl al-hadīth*. We should add that the origin of *usūl al-hadīth* is the Qur'an and the holy tradition, like the origin of other religious sciences such as *usūl al-fiqh*, *usūl al-tafthīr* and *usūl al-dīn* and so on. Muslim scholars (*'Ulamā*) tried to base all their opinions in that matter, as much as they can, on either a clear evidence of the Qur'an and the Prophetic tradition, or an indication and guidance of the same sources. Otherwise, innumerable methodologies would appear rather than common rules.”²

The above quotation, which appeared in a chapter titled “The origin of rules of Method” posed an objective and scholarly question. However, the answer which stressed that *the science of hadīth* was designed according to the teachings of the Qur'an and *Hadīth*, deliberately excluded the human factor in the formation of *'ulūm al-hadīth*. This approach placed the issue again in the religious dogmatic platform. The following lines of the quoted passage above are quite interesting in revealing the author's point of view: “In short, without any hesitation we claim that the rules of *the science of hadīth*, eighty and ninety percent of them, have their origins in the Qur'anic verses and Hadīths and it is impossible to change them...”³ In the study of Hüseyn Kahraman which came out some sixteen years after the aforementioned book, we found a different conclusion which refutes the claim of Canan. This research points out that it is untenable to argue that the principles and methodology of *the science of hadīth* originated from the Qur'anic verses and Hadīths. In

² Ibrahim Canan, *Kutub-i sitte muhtasari tercume ve sherhi (Translation and commentary of the brief of the kutub al-sitta)*, Ankara 1988, 1, 476-477.

³ Ibid. Canan considers here nearly all of the *usūl al-hadīth* in a chapter (about 230 pages), but he can support the rules with verses and hadīths only in ten-odd parts of work. This is not ninety percent, but it means too few proportions.

fact, these principles and methodology were established on the basis of reason, logic and the accumulation of scientific knowledge, which were shaped by social and cultural changes. Furthermore, the hadiths quoted in support of this thesis were forged (*Mawdū'*) and the verses have no relevance to the issue⁴.

These two opposite views are nothing else but recent expression of an attempt, to search for some origins to *science of hadith*. In fact, the issue here is a duality such as “humanity-divinity” and “cultural-religious” in the history of Muslim thought. This is, essentially, an issue of existence, epistemology and history. Here, subject of the knowledge and the science and their characteristics which remained between the divinity and the humanity should be searched.

Divinity and Humanity in Religious Sciences

The duality of “humanity-divinity” or “culturalness-religiousness” which generally appeared in the religious sciences and especially in Hadith, gets its own identity with the answer(s) of a question such as “Who is the subject of knowledge/science?” The “owner of the religion” will be the answer, when a divine, sacred or religious concept is accepted as subject, but when a human, cultural, rational and experimental one is accepted as subject, then the answer will be the “human/cultural being”. In this fundamental point of difference (i.e. the fork of road), the owners of each answers constitute their respective point of view and scientific paradigm. Because this study considers such a problem of the Muslim community, it must be glanced at their point of view and paradigm. Although there is no homogeneity among Muslim scholars, it will be appropriate to mention some opinions so that they give some information.

The Muslims' view of “existence” and “history” is essentially God-centric and originating from religion. This also reflects their approaches to knowledge and science. Because Revelation, according to them, is the only source of knowledge, and it relates only to God. Besides, to them, the basic function of the science must lead people to God and belief.⁵ The famous scholar Shāṭibī (d. 790/1388) had an

⁴ Huseyin Kahraman, ‘Attempts to Support Hadith Methodology by Nass (Quran and Hadith)’, *The Review of Faculty of Divinity University of Uludag* (Turkey) 10/ 2, 195.

⁵ In all ancient and new works written by Muslims about epistemology, that mind has been shown. For example: “The unity of Allah (*subhānahū wa ta'ālā*) is the first principle of İslam and of everything Islamic... in Islamic thought, He is the first and ultimate cause and end, of everything. As such, his being and activity are the first constitutive and regulative principles of all knowledges. Whether the object of knowledge is the microcosm of the atom or the macrocosm of the stars, depths of self, the conduct of society and march of history, İslamic knowledge regards the object of knowledges materially caused by the antecedent constituents of the situation whence that object proceeded, but the actual discharge of causality which

approach of this kind. He argued that the purposes of sciences (*'ulūm*) were determined by divine law (*shar'*) and thus all natural sciences and philosophy which have no practical (i.e. religious) benefit and are unknown in the Arabic society must not be considered. Because Qur'an did not command to recourse to the philosophy and it was reprehended by the scholars. Thus, only the sciences which have a divine aim could be accepted.⁶ KĀtib Calabī states the Muslims' understanding of knowledge: "The goal of the knowledge, teaching and learning is to recognize God. This is the greatest goal and beginning of the all happiness." It is very interesting that Calabī related that the people those who reached this goal had destroyed their books.⁷ Formerly, Abū Hāmid al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111) didn't approve to be busy with the sciences of theology (*kalām*), medical, poetry, stars and grammar and so on, lest they take person away from recognizing the God and waste his entire life.⁸ Understandings like these had been, essentially, suggested by hadīth scholars in the earliest Islamic centuries. A hadīth scholar, Sufyān al-Thawrī (d. 161/777), for example, tells us: "The knowledge should be learned just for warding off God. It is why the knowledge has excellence that the human being wards off God through it."⁹ In his day "ilm" was tantamount to hadīth, and an understanding like these had been attributed to the Prophet Muhammad.¹⁰ For that reason, those who had been busy with non-hadīth branches, in the earliest period of Islam, were divested and accused of innovation in religion (*bid'a*). The following expressions of a famous hadīth scholar Sha'bī (d. 103/721) points to the insistence upon such approaches: "Go into the reports coming through the components wholeheartedly! And urinate on what people relate as their own opinion!"¹¹

Hadīth scholars, who made knowledge extremely religious and took it away from being humane, were not tolerant of religious sci-

brought about the object out of an infinity of other possible objects to which those same constituents might have led as the initiative of the Divine Being, issuing from a divine command. Likewise, Islamic knowledge regards every object of knowledge as fulfilling an end, willed by Allah, or serving another end which is so willed, so that the causal hierarchy of the univers is at once a hierarchy of ends at the top of which stands the divine will, willing the end of every individual being, of every series of ends, and of the hierarchy as a whole." I. Rājī al-Fārūqī, *Islamization of knowledge*, washington, 1982, 22-23.

⁶ al-Shātībī, *al-Muwāfakāt*, Beirut, 1, 46-56 (the fifth preface)

⁷ Calabī, Kātib, *Kashf al-zunūn an asāmi al-kutub wa al-funūn*, Istanbul, 1971, 1, 52.

⁸ al-Ghazālī, Abū Hāmid (d. 505/1111), 'Hulāsāt al-tasānīf fi al-tasavvuf' *Magmūat rasā'ili Imām al-Ghazālī*, Beirut, 1986, 136.

⁹ Ibn Abd al-Barr, *Gāmi' bayān al-'ilm wa fadlihi*, ed. Abū al-Asbāl al-Zuhayrī, Riyad 1414/1998, 1, 665 (n.1159).

¹⁰ Ibid., 761f (n.1407)

¹¹ Ibid., 618 (n.1067)

ences apart from hadith which was their own branch of study. For example, even though they nurtured by religious sources, the jurists (*fukahā*) censured with using *ra'y* (opinion) and the theologians were accused as zendikes. As a result, it can be said that this kind of approaches began to develop the later epistemological division of science such as “religious” and “rational”. And the rational sciences placed in a secondary position as opposed to religious one in the subsequent period.¹² Religious and non-religious point of view were effective in the formation of these classifications. While earlier philosophers and historians of the sciences were neglecting the religious field, the religious scholars were getting it under control. For example, the religious field did not take place as a problem in the Fārābī's (d. 339/950) classification.¹³ Al-Shāfī'ī (d. 204/819), however, limited science to “religious science”.¹⁴ And it has a central importance being religious (*shar'ī*) or non-religious one which placed in opposition of the former in al-Ghazālī's classification of sciences.¹⁵ The later classifications of sciences, even if there are some differences, followed, in principle, the example of Fārābī and al-Ghazālī. It should be mentioned that the conception of religious (*shar'ī*) sciences does not mean only the sciences which have a religious content, but it means what were especially inspired by religious sources. Because the “rational sciences” which stand in opposition to religious one also don't mean to me only the sciences with which the intelligence studied, but they mean what were especially formed by intelligence.

Owing to such an understanding of science, mankind which was admitted as representative (*caliph*) of the God in the earth can not be the subject of its own knowledge/science. In other words, he has been placed in a position of those people who can't produce knowledge, but to whom knowledge were granted without an effort. Of course, claiming that man has absolute knowledge is opposition to both his existence and the presence of absolute knowledge just nearby God. But it is wrong to consider man as a passive receiver because of his capability of knowing, his power of creating and his intellect. This, on the other hand, leads to suspicion about humanization of knowledge. When it is considered that God was in the focus of existence, Makka-Madīna were in the center of Earth as geographical, the seventh century (A.D.) as period of time and Prophat Muhammad as person, in the Islamic community, the charisma of these four things precede everything. These are also the only source

¹² See for more information Fazlurrahman, *Islam and modernity*, Chicago and London 1982, 31f

¹³ al-Fārābī, Muhammad, *Ihsā al-'ulūm*, ed. Ilham Mansour, Beirut, 1991, 9f.

¹⁴ al-Shāfī'ī, Muhammad, *al-Risāla*, Beirut, 357f.

¹⁵ al-Ghazālī, Muhammad, *al-Ihya*, Beirut, 1, 13 f..

of the knowledge, and a scholar gets respect just when he was nurtured by these four. Otherwise, when he wants to consider himself in the focus, he faces an extremely strong reaction: he is, then, potentially a “zindīq”, “impious”, “dissenter” and “apostate”. These qualifications are no less negative than being non-Muslim with regard to honor and they are reasons for being divested. On the other side, there is a scholar who was considered as a pious who has genuine intentions and clings to the Qur’ān and the prophetic tradition. His situation is always different from the other one. Both religious concern and religionization of knowledge are reasons to classify the people in such groups.

The Science of Hadīth and the Problem of Divinity

After these short summaries of the Muslim’s understanding of knowledge and science, we may begin to look at the problem in detail in context of *the science of hadīth*. As was mentioned above, some religious concepts were raised as subject of science in Islamic civilization. This paradigm, also raises God and His messenger as a subject of science of hadīth, and subsequently religionizes the science. For example, a belief such as “usūl al-hadīth and its principles were based on Qur’anic verses and prophetic hadīths” shows God and His messenger as the subjects of *the science of hadīth*, dragging the issue into the religious dogmatic platform. In the same quotation it had been alleged that it is not possible to change the terminology of this science, and had been aimed, in a fashion of conspiracy, that this may be suggested by just those who have unfair intentions to confuse Muslim generations. Of course, previous hadīth scholars struggled to uncover *the science of hadīth* and its principles from religious sources such as verses and prophetic tradition before the owner of these approach. It is possible to see such understandings in the books of *‘ulūm al-hadīth*. For example, an important book on this subject belongs to al-Sahawī (d. 902/1496) He included, in his *fath al-mugīth*, a great many of examples about the issue.¹⁶ If these examples are carefully studied, it will be seen that there was an image that *the science of hadīth* and its principles were just designed by God and His messenger.

Thanks to such an image, hadīth scholars believe, even if it is non-historic (i.e. anachronic) that they are located in the Qur’ān. So they interpret some concepts and expressions of the Qur’ān in favor of themselves and they consider that their occupation is lauded in

¹⁶ al-Sahāvī, Muhammad, *Fath al-Mugīth*, ed. ‘Alī Huseyn ‘Alī, 1992. It was mentioned, either in the text of *fath al-mugīth* or in the footnotes of editor, that the hadīths which used in this subject are not authentic (*sahīh*). Cf. Kahraman, *Attempts*. So I don’t go into the discussion of the authenticity of such hadīths.

the Qur'ân. For example, Hammād b. Zayd (d. 179/795) admits that those Qur'ânic words: "And the believers should not all go out to fight. Of every troop of them, a party only should go forth, that they (who are left behind) may gain sound knowledge in religion, and that they may warn their folk when they return to them so that they may beware." (Qur'ân, 9: 122)* concerns hadīth scholars who travel to collect prophetic tradition (*er-rihla fī talab al-hadīth*) and bring it to people in order to teach them.¹⁷ Hammad, with his approach like this, restricted the meaning of the verse and even dragged the sense to an irrelevant position. Besides there is an other scholarly error here: With respect to the text of the verse, the people those who should go out are not the scholars but fighters, and the scholars should stay at home town. In the interpretation, however, people those who should go out was stated as hadīth scholars. I suppose that Hammad and those who recognized him confuse the matter with "travellers" (*es-sāihūn*) located in same sura: "(Triumphant) are those who turn repentant (to Allah), those who serve (him), those who Praise (Him), those who fast*, and give glad tidings to believers.!" (Qur'ân, 9: 112) Because Hammād and his predecessor 'Ikrimah (d. 105/723), although it is so different from the content of verse, were also limiting the "*al-sāihūn*" as hadīth scholars who travel for the sake of prophetic tradition.¹⁸ I suppose that the way of understanding of the second verse is effective in the interpretation of the first one. And Kadi Iyad by establishing the necessity of learning *the science of hadīth* was pointing at another direction.¹⁹ And Bagdādī, who include these reports in his book, highlighted excellence of hadīth scholars in a chapter titled "The excellence of those who travel in order to learn hadīth".²⁰ This title which is harmonious with the name of his book (*Sharaf ashāb al-hadīth*) demonstrates what he did was not just a collection of information as an antiquarian interest but that he was raising a paradigm.

As well as searching for themselves in verses, hadīth scholars claimed that they had been, at the same time, praised by their Prophet. For example, a conversation occurs between Prophet Mu-

* The Quranic verses which was used in this article were exactly cited from *The Glorious Quran*, translated by Marmaduke Pickthall and published in Istanbul in 1996.

¹⁷ al-Nisābūrī, al-Hākim, *Ma'rifat 'ulūm al-hadīth*, Madīnah, 1977, 26-27. And the famous hadīth specialist 'Abd al-Razzāk (d. 211/826) has same opinion as well. See, al-Bagdādī, *Sharaf ashāb al-hadīth wa nasīhat ahl al-hadīth*, ed. M. Sait Hatiboglu, Ankara 1991, 59.

* Pickthall translated "as-sāihūn" with its figurative meaning. but the real meaning of the word is "those who travel on the earth"

¹⁸ al-Bagdādī, *ibid.*, 60; *al-Rihla fī talab al-hadīth*, 1975, 87-88.

¹⁹ Iyād, al-Kādī, *al-Ilmā'*, Cairo, 1978, 10f.

²⁰ al-Bagdādī, *Sharaf*, 58.

hammad and his Companions on whose beliefs were strong. Prophet is not pleased with answers of his friends and he answers the question by himself: they are, of course, those who live after him, believe in him even though they won't see him, meet written papers and act according to things laid out in those papers. It is understood from the context of the report that these people were much praised. And Bagdādī, who didn't want this praise to be given to the others, immediately states that those who were praised are only hadith scholars.²¹

Such Qur'ānic verses and prophetic reports are used in demonstrating their superiority to the others, as well as to be used for sanctification of hadith scholars. It is well known that there was, from the earliest period, a struggle of superiority among the Muslim scholars. This struggle must be the steps that are consciously or unconsciously taken for the sake of the religionization of knowledge. Kadi Iyad regards the other scholars, except for hadith specialists, as equal with the wrongdoer and damned people (i.e. fit for hell) who were mentioned in Qur'an (9:109). To him, hadith scholars are those who were praised in the Qur'ān (9: 122). Thus, they obtained a double advantage over others: they are divine men and the others are heretics.²²

Bagdādī, while he was trying to respond to those who look down on hadith scholars and mock them, says that they must be those who should be mocked. To him, the verse states their bad end: "Allah (himself) mocks them, leaving them to wander blindly on their contumacy" (Qur'ān, 2:15).²³ Because hadith scholars were made the support of the religion (i.e. Islam) by God, the bad innovations were got rid of through them and they are the representatives (i.e. the caliphs) of God among his slaves. The Prophet supports them and they are the custodians of Islam. If someone tries to harm them, God makes his life miserable. Likewise it was stated in Qur'ān that they had been given divine succour (Qur'ān, 22: 39). And a prophetic report states: "Some of my believers (i.e. *ummah*) will always be supported (by God). And none of those who forsake them, will be able to harm them forever." This group is, of course, hadith scholars who protect the religion and tradition of the Prophet. And "... They are Allah's party. Lo! Is it not Allah's party who are the successful?" (Qur'ān, 58: 22)²⁴ The sanction of missing this good credit rating belongs to hadith scholars who were as mentioned above, being impious. For example, Abū Bakr b. Ismail (378/988) who was at first a hadith scholar and later decided to give up, had been characterized

²¹ Ibid., 34.

²² Iyād, *Ilmā'*, 7-8.

²³ al-Bagdādī, *Sharaf*, 4.

²⁴ Ibid., 8-10 and 25-27. Cf. al-Nisābūrī, *Ma'rifa*, 2f.

as “Abū Thamūd”. And what “Abū Thamūd” means was expressed in the Qur’ān: “And as for Thamūd, we gave them guidance, but they preferred blindness to the guidance...” (Qur’ān, 41:17)²⁵ This was clearly exploiting the verse and its usage as a tool of religious pressure.

Another way of sanctification of hadīth specialists is to believe that they defend the community from the tribulations and evils. Abraham b. Atham (d. 162/778) was one of the believers that the Muslim community had been saved from tribulations thanks to journeys of hadīth scholars.²⁶ This also means imputing them a mysterious attribute. And such a class of scholars are counted by Muslims as a divine kindness which had never been offered to any community except for them and as a means of taking pride.²⁷

It is easier for hadīth scholars, after they were based upon Qur’anic verses and prophetic hadīths, to prove that their activities are founded upon some religious principles as well. And it is, of course, possible to find lots of examples about the relationship of the basic concepts and technical words, which were designed by hadīth scholars, to this divinity as well. But I want to look at that question through a finite number of examples. It will be appropriate to begin with the concept of “narrator” (i.e. narrator). Because the most important concept, after hadīth scholar, is “narrator” in the evaluation of the prophetic reports. The narrators are placed in hadīth science in comparison with their trustworthiness, or it is believed by Muslims that it was practiced such. Hadīth scholar, consequently, had to establish the idea of the narrator’s trustworthiness and their divinity like himself. The way to achieve this goal was the usage of the Qur’anic verses and Prophetic reports in accordance with the Muslim tradition. The Companions (*Sahāba*) are the first people in the classification of narrators and considered by Muslims as excellent. Followers (*Tabi’in*) are secondary and after them their followers (*Atba’ al-Tabi’in*) come. At first glance, it is very easy to find out that who made this arrangement and why. First of all, it is considered that this arrangement was made after the third generation (i.e. *Atba’ al-Tabi’in*) because a certain phenomenon can be identified just after it occurred. According to the approach of hadīth scholars, however, this definition was made by God and His Messenger toward the future. This definition which states the subject of the “history”, in the same time, also envisaged the line of superiority. It is the “*sahāba*” who were at the top of the classification. They obtained great esteem thanks to

²⁵ al-Bagdādī, *Sharaf*, 75.

²⁶ Ibid., 59 and see *al-Rihla*, 90.

²⁷ Ibn ‘Athākīr, *Tārīhu Madīnati Dimashk*, Dimashk, 1982-1996, 38, 30.

the praise of God and Prophet. Rather, *the science of hadīth* presents them with such a styl. And this prestige caused an approach that they have an indisputable position as narrators of hadīth and that their transmissions should be accepted without any hesitation. I quote from al-Hatīb's *al-Kifāya* by summarizing the Qur'ānic verses and the prophetic hadīths which were used by hadīth scholars to make "*sahāba*" sacred:²⁸ According to al-Hatīb, one shouldn't inquire whether they were trustworthy or non-trustworthy in accordance with the principles of hadīth science apart from the other narrators. Their trustworthiness is known with God's report and his choice them. This was emphasized in a lot of verses. For example: "Ye are the best community that had been raised up for mankind..." (Qur'ān, 3:110)²⁹ Besides, to him, some hadīths prove their innocence. For example: "The best of my community is my generation and thereafter those who will follow them, thereafter those who will follow the followers."³⁰ All these, in al-Hatīb's opinion, mean an objective absoluteness for their innocence. But he does not care whether the verses really mean this sense and if hadīths are authentic or not. He also reminds that all reliable scholars are in agreement with him. And he cited the following expression of Abū Zur'a (d. 264/877): "Whenever you see someone who disparages one of the companions of Prophet, you must know that he is a *zendīq* (i.e. unbeliever or non-Muslim)." Al-Sahavī cited these information in his work and finally stated his approach, saying: "it is an agreeable chapter" But he is aware that the verse that al-Hatīb used as first evidence may be interpreted in different sense. He, however, can't help limiting the sense of the verse with the situation of the companions in *the science of hadīth*. Moreover, he tries to support this approach with other evidence.³¹

As seen above, the aforementioned verses are used in proving the reliability of the *companions* in *the science of hadīth*. However, the

²⁸ al-Bagdādī, *al-Kifāya fī 'ilm al-rivāya*, Beirut, 1988, 46f.

²⁹ According to al-Bagdādī, it is possible to increase the number of these verses. For example: "Thus we have appointed you a middle nation..." (Quran, 2:143); "O prophet! Allah is sufficient for thee and those who follow thee of the believers" (Quran, 8: 63); "And the first to lead the way, of the Muhajirin and the Ansar, and those who followed them in goodness--Allah is well pleased with them..." (Quran, 9:100); "Allah was well pleased with the believers when they swore allegiance unto thee beneath the tree..." (Quran, 48:18)

³⁰ Some other examples which al-Bagdādī used as evidences are those: "Don't curse my companions! If any of you were to spend as much gold as Uhud (the name of a mountain), he would not attain to the merit of a mudd (a measure of grain) of theirs or half of it."; "Cling to what you find in Quran, there is no excuse to omit it. If it (i.e. what you look for) is not in the Quran!, cling to my tradition! And if there is no tradition, cling to what my companions say. They, truly, are in the degree of stars..."

³¹ al-Sahavī, *Fath.*, 4, 94-95.

verses, in fact, were placed in the Qur'ān not to prove that aim, but to give praise for the supports which they gave to the Prophet. It is far too different to praise the *Companions* due to their supports to the Prophet from evaluation them for *the science of hadith*. But as this discussion occurred under the protection of Qur'ānic verses, there is no useful conclusion. On the other hand, the word "*Companion*" as a scientific term of hadith, is not found in the Qur'ān. The fact that it was contained in prophetic reports reminds me of the probability that something could be inserted into them later. The terms "*Followers*" and "*Followers of the Followers*" are as the former. It is possible that those who lived in the period of revelation would be addressed as persons of some messages, but it is not possible to think that they are the "*Companions*" as a term of the science of hadith which was established a great many years later.

The *Companions* and their *Followers* are sanctified as the narrators of hadith. They, too, are presented as persons applauded and defined by the Qur'ān and the Prophet. A later development is searched for in the Qur'ān and the Prophetic hadith. Thus both are made to talk about someone who will be born and who will live after their time. This is a familiar emergence of an anachronism which Muslim scholars often repeat. The famous traditionist al-Hākim, for example, believe that the *Followers* are mentioned and applauded in the verse: "And the first to lead the way, of the Muhājirin and the Ansār, and those who followed them in goodness – Allah is well pleased with them..."(Qur'ān, 9:100) He also says that the Prophet applauded them as "The best of my community is my generation and thereafter those who will follow them, thereafter those who will follow the followers." Al-Hākim also states that this report has an important blemish (*'illah*) but he nevertheless uses this report in his epistemology because it was written down in the *Sahīh* of Muslim.³² Al-Hākim quotes the variant of the same report to prove that the third generation of narrators (i.e. *Followers of the Followers*) were mentioned by the Prophet and he interprets the hadith: "As you see, this is the quality of *Followers of the Followers*. Because the Prophet made them the best of the people after the *Companions* and the *Followers*.³³ In the subsequent pages, the fourth generation is added and those who will follow them are counted as bad men. Al-Hakim states his opinion about this report and says: "The Messenger mentioned in this hadith four generations of the narrators. This is the fifth generation to which we belong."³⁴ Namely he and his contemporaries are among the bad and non-reliable men (i.e. *narrators*). In that case, isn't the

³² al-Nisābūrī, *Ma'rifa*, 41.

³³ Ibid, 46.

³⁴ Ibid, 60

reliability of the books and reports of his generation and their followers extremely open to dispute? As a result, al-Hākīm, for the sake of sanctification the past (i.e. his predecessors), disgraces himself and both his contemporaries and later scholars.

Al-Hatīb claims that the Prophet had warned his people against the liars who will live after him. But these liars will not be among the *companions*, the *followers* and *their followers*, but among the later generations. This idea is based on Omar's report: "The Messenger of God said to us: behave reverentially to my companions and thereafter those who will follow them and thereafter who will follow them. And after, there will increase the untruth, and there will be someone who will swear without made to swear, and will testify without being asked to testify."³⁵ Here, the Prophet is made talk with a wrong style of speaking. Namely, any Companion who is addressed with this speech, for example Omar, is in a position that he must behave reverentially to the *Followers of the Followers*. As a matter of fact, it is impossible for this reverence to become a reality.

Having been determined of the categories of the narrators with religious origins went so far that they made the Prophet plain each of the categories and write the future history. Allegedly he said that: "Categories of my community are four; each of them is forty years. My generation is the category of the people of knowledge and the faith. And thereafter, the period of goodness and devotion will follow till to the 80th year, and thereafter, the period of affection, respect and unity will follow till to the 120th year, and thereafter, the period of difference and disunions will follow till to the 160th year, and thereafter, the period of chaos and fight will follow till to the 200th year."³⁶

Another term of the science of hadīth in which the religionization mostly appears is *isnād* (ascription or the chain of narrators). It is offered, too, as a divine view and thus it is believed that God and His messenger are its subject. And sometimes the religion itself is equated with *isnād*. Although it was constituted a long time after the Prophetic period, *isnād* is searched in the Qur'ān and the Prophetic tradition. Matar al-Warrāk (d. 125/742) for example, interpreted the phrase "vestice of knowledge" in that verse: "... Bring me a scripture before this (Scripture), or some vestige of knowledge (in support of what ye say), if ye are truthful." (Qur'ān, 46: 4), as *isnād al-hadīth*³⁷

³⁵ al-Bagdādī, *al-Kifāya*, 35.

³⁶ al-Daylamī, Abū Shucā', *al-Firdaws bi ma'thūr al-hitāb*, Beirut, 1986; 2, 459; ayrıca bkz., al-Sahawī, *Fath*, 4, 395.

³⁷ Ramahurmuzī, *al-Muhaddith al-fāsil*, third edition, 1984, 210; Bagdādī, *al-Sharaf*, 39.

And a famous hadīth scholar Mālik b. Anas interpreted that verse: “And lo! It is in truth a reminder for thee and for thy folk...” (Qur’ān, 43: 44) as *isnād* and said that: “This means someone’s saying: my father related to me from my grandfather.”³⁸ al-Hatīb, who included both examples in his book, gave a title which written as: “the merit of isnād and its being one of the things by which God bestowed favors on this Muslim community.” al-Hatīb tried to increase these feelings in the following lines of his book. Because to the recent and ancient Muslim scholars, the complex of *isnād* was not granted to any other communities apart from the Muslims.³⁹ And Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1327) regarded *isnād* as a trademark of Islam, and moreover as trademark of *ahl al-sunna* (the Sunnīs) in the Islamic community.⁴⁰ But while Muslim scholars were taking pride in *isnād* as a trademark of the Muslim community, apart from the others, they unfortunately did not talk about its contribution to the culture of the world except for transmission of Muslim culture.

We said above that *isnād* was searched by hadīth scholars in the Prophetic tradition. It was alleged that the Prophet himself recommended his community to use *isnād*. But the evidence of this aim is an invented hadīth. The Prophet, allegedly said: “When you write a hadīth, write it with his *isnād*. If it is genuine (*sahīh*) you share in the merit (with the narrator). But if it is false, the crime belongs him.”⁴¹ Abū Gudda, a recent hadīth scholar, considers using this invented hadīth as a scandal. He is astonished at how the scholars whom he considered as critical and perfect could do this.⁴²

This understanding leads Husayn al-Hācc, one of the recent authors of *usūl al-hadīth*, to make an anachronic statement that the Prophet considered “hadīth” important and asked his community to memorize it and thereafter transmit it with a genuine chain of transmission (!).⁴³ The same author, again, tries to present the Prophet, with the title “The method of the Prophet in teaching hadīth”,⁴⁴ as a scholar who instructs people about his hadīth (i.e. reports). But the content situated under the title does not corroborate it. Surely this thought is not a new one. Al-Bagdādī, too, be-

³⁸ Ibid.; Iyād, *al-Ilmā’*, 38.

³⁹ al-Bagdādī, *al-Sharaf*, 40. Such approaches can be seen in all works which wrote about isnād. See for examples, Abū Gudda, *al-Isnād min al-dīn*, Damascus, 1992, 11 and 15.

⁴⁰ Ibn Taymiyya, *Minhāc al-sunna*, Beirut, 4, 11.

⁴¹ ‘Abd al-Karīm al-Samānī, *Adāb al-implā wa al-istimlā*, Beirut, 1981, 1, 4; Ibn ‘Athākīr, *Tārīh*, 36, 390.

⁴² Abū Gudda, *al-Isnād*, 50-51.

⁴³ Husayn al-Hacc, *Nakd al-Hadīth fi ‘ilm al-rivāya wa ‘ilm al-dirāya*, Beirut 1985, 1, 155.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 158

lieved that the Prophet had his community taught the principles of *usūl al-hadīth* to protect religious doctrines and sharia⁴⁵. That is, establishing *the science of hadīth* was a way to protect the religion. So the Prophet allegedly said: “Verily this science (‘ilm) is the religion. Take care on whose authority you receive your religion.”⁴⁶

The Holy Responsibility and Religious Advantage

One of the phenomenon which opens the door to religionization of *the science of hadīth* is to unite the actions of hadīth scholars with religious attitudes, as already mentioned. In other words, *the science of hadīth* and its principles were established in a mood of worship and sensibility of obedience to the orders of God and the Prophet. The upholders of the understanding, which searches everything in the religious texts (Qur’ān and hadīth), consider that they obey God And Prophet and so they will be rewarded by God because of their efforts to support the principles of the *usūl* and what they do for the science based on religious texts. However this appears as if it is an innocent religious attitude but suggests a hidden intention about *the science of hadīth* and the charisma of hadīth scholars. That is, scientific activities are included in religious/divine orders and prohibitions. To a recent author, Abū Shahbah, for example, the Muslim scholars’ attaching importance to the science of isnād and criticism of narrators occurred because God and the Prophet encouraged the scholars to investigate the reports and to receive information from only those who are trustworthy (*ādil*) and from accurate (*dābit*) reporters.⁴⁷ Nuraddīn al-‘Itr, a contemporary scholar, believes that to busy with hadīth is a grand worship which gets one to become nearer to God. For this reason God and His Messenger encouraged learning hadīth, and promised great rewards and lofty degrees for the learners.⁴⁸ In other words, those who set off on a journey to learn hadīth will go in to the heaven and attain the God’s pleasure, the greatest reward.⁴⁹ Sufyān al-Thawrī, one of the earliest hadīth scholars, believed that there would not be a better occupation than learning hadīth for those who want God’s pleasure, at the same time he was encouraging re-

⁴⁵ al-Bagdādī, *al-Kifāya*, 35.

⁴⁶ al-Bagdādī, *al-Camī‘ li ahlāk al-rāwī*, Riyad, 1403, 1, 129; Iyād, *al-Ilmā’*, 59. This words also was attributed to some other people. See, *ibid*; al-Bagdādī *al-Kifāya*, 121-122.

⁴⁷ Muhammad Abū Shahba, *al-Wasīt fi ulūm wa mustalah al-hadīth*, Jidda, 1983, 45-46.

⁴⁸ See where Nuraddin ‘Itr wrote an introduction to al-Bagdādī’s *al-Rihla*, 34.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.* p. 31. See for the reports about the dreams concerning that some hadīth specialists, after death, went in to the heaven and attain lots of reward, Hatīb, *Sharaf*, 107, 108, 109 and *al-Rihla*, p.90; Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr, *Gāmi‘*, 1, 211-214 (n.: 228-231).

ligionization in the science.⁵⁰ And Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr, at the beginning of his famous book *Gāmiu’ bayān al-‘Ilm*, while explaining why he wrote it, acted on his religious feelings of attaining rewards in the next world.⁵¹

Another important issue which a hadīth scholar had to do when he taught hadīth was positioning himself to worship. In other words, it was recommended to prepare himself a mystic atmosphere. Al-Sahawī describes this recommendation: He (the teacher of hadīth) should perform an ablution like the ablution of prayer, brush his teeth (with miswak), cut his nails, shave his mustache, perfume his body and clothes as the Prophet had done, dress himself in the best costumes and doll himself up. This because the God and the Prophet are pleased with beauty. He also should obstruct those who lift up their voices at the time of transmitting hadīth, because lifting up the voice at such a time is tantamount to lifting up it near him and this was prohibited by God. The teacher also should sit down on a high location turning his face to the kiblah (i.e. Kaabah) and be well behaved. Mālik b. Anas, while teaching hadīth, had carried this out too.⁵² The custom of reading a sūrah from Qur’ān means to present what hadīth scholars did as a worship.⁵³ One of the important parts of worship in Islam is greeting (i.e. to turn one’s head to the right and to the left at the end of prayer). Thus Ibn ‘Amr said to Mūsā b. Yesār: “Greet when you finish the transmission of hadīth. Because you are in prayer.⁵⁴ Behold, a hadīth scholar who did such worship was considered as a prophet. Al-Shāfi‘ī said: “When I see a hadīth scholar, I feel as if I saw the living Prophet”⁵⁵ So it is not a surprise for us to find some approaches like that the innovators those who mock hadīth scholars must be considered non-Muslims with whom human relations must be severed.⁵⁶

Having been offered some issues of the history of hadīth in relation to religious orders like *al-halāl-al-harām* (i.e. permitted-forbidden), *sevāb* (merit) -sin and *fard-cāiz* (obligatory duty-necessary) reflects the religionization of science. Let’s read al-Bagdādī’s expression: “...And the intention of *al-Habar* (information, report), is to relate it completely. For that reason, it should be related as a whole. And it is forbidden (i.e. *Harām*) to shorten it...”⁵⁷ In an-

⁵⁰ al-Isbahānī, Abū Nu‘aym, *Hilyat al-awliyā*, Beirut, 1405, 6, 366; al-Bagdādī, *Sharaf*, 81 and 127.

⁵¹ Ibn Abd al-Barr, *Gāmi’*, 1, 1f.

⁵² al-Sahawī, *Fath*, 3, 221-222.

⁵³ Ibid., 256

⁵⁴ al-Bagdādī, *Sharaf*, 83.

⁵⁵ Ibid., 46

⁵⁶ al-Nisābūrī, *Ma’rifā*, 4.

⁵⁷ al-Bagdādī, *al-Kifāya*, 190.

other hadīth scholar's opinion there was an agreement among the Muslim scholars that it is forbidden to exchange the words of the report.⁵⁸ And the problem of *isnād* which mentioned above was considered as collective duty (*fard kifāya*) of Muslim scholars.⁵⁹

Having turned *the science of hadīth* in to a field of religious practices, is a phenomenon that causes an understanding that it was a dogma and immutable. But it, on the contrary, is a branch of knowledge by which the hadīths and the problems related to them were investigated. The hadīths, the materials of investigation of hadīth science, can be considered as a religious text, but it is so important to discriminate hadīth as a religious text from hadīth as a science. *The science of hadīth* is far from being a religion but must be receptive to all scientific developments, dialectics and criticism. Otherwise it unavoidably will withdraw and become a dogmatic accumulation by which the religious feelings satisfied.

Human/Cultural Science of Hadīth

It is exceedingly limits the ability of science and the scientist to consider science as religious dogma. The examples of this matter appeared both in western and eastern communities. It is possible to see, in the readings of the history of science, that the sciences shone when the domination of religious dogmas had decreased. This, at the same time, means that science, in its historicity, is a field which mankind establishes (in a cultural atmosphere with man's reason and his experiences) and receptive to criticism and change. If *the science of hadīth* has these features, it will get shut of the historical dogmatic one and cause to arise some new approaches. It is certain that Orientalism provided an important contribution to this development among the Muslim scientists in the field of hadīth. On the other hand, the acceptance of *the science of hadīth* as a department in the faculties of divinity and academical formation in Turkey and the acceptance of those who study in this field as a scientist may be described as the second step of the development. Thanks to this *the science of hadīth* began to be rid of representing a dogma. Thus it will be a contemporary branch of science and its system of study will be renewed. I suggest that the science of hadīth may be named as "hadīthology" which will be able to present a new point of view. This attempt, which will establish its own system and terminology in the future, brings formation of hadīthology and its area of study onto the human (i.e. cultural) existence, will get a possibility to produce knowledge as it is in the other human sciences. Whereas the knowl-

⁵⁸ Iyād, *al-Ilmā'*, 174.

⁵⁹ Abū Gudda, *al-Isnād.*, 30.

edge in the Islamic civilization is not an object formed and done away with by human being, as Gābirī mentioned, but what consists of a heap of ready-made knowledge taught by God through his messenger. The duty of the Muslim scholar is almost limited to just collecting and classifying it.⁶⁰ This, as I tried to consider above, caused to religionization of knowledge and became dominant on the scientific approaches of Muslims, especially in the hadīthology, in the historical period. And the recessive one was the approach that made the knowledge and science devoted to human being and historicity. So it can't be denied that there was, if not enough, an approach made the subject of knowledge and science to human being and historicity, except for the other. We, occasionally, meet some examples of this in the expression of hadīth scholars. But unfortunately because of the problem was just theoretical, sensational and ideological, the second approach especially was veiled. And so the dialectic -the uterus in which the science grows up- did not appear. As a matter of fact, it is very difficult to say that the religious approach is not one of the legs of the scientific dialectic. Because in that case, other leg, as mentioned above, is expelled outside the religion (Islam). The science may find his basis in the past in becoming a human and cultural field in opposition to religionization or not find. But, both states have no importance for my argument as I don't pay attention to it. Because it is exceedingly clear that the development of the scientific activity is just human one. The discussion of "historicity" which one of its aim to expose this feature of the science, may provide a theoretical support. Now the second answer of the question asked at the beginning like "Who was the subject of the knowledge/science?" appears: the human being and a historical phenomenon. It is effective in giving such an answer that the first one (God and the Prophet are the subject of the science) as we mentioned above, is impossible in addition to the nature of the problem. With a truly reading we are not able to find a term of Hadīthology and anything related to history of Hadīthology in the Qur'ān. We saw above that such claims were unreal and means exploiting of religious feelings. And we also mentioned above that it was out of history (i.e. anacronism) to claim that the Prophet Muhammad was the subject of the hadīthology.⁶¹ On the other hand, I

⁶⁰ Muhammed Abid al-Gābirī, *Takwīn al-akl al-'arabī*, fourth edition Beirut, 1991, 63-64.

⁶¹ Muhammad 'Abdūh (d. 1323/1905) pointed out that it was wrong to make all branches of occupations and sciences based on the prophet Muhammad: "It is not a job of the Prophet to explain the subjects about which was established the branches of science, and to do what a professor or a teacher of any branches, to teach history, to explain the extents of the world of stars and the difference of their movements, the wideness of the stratum in the earth and the seas, what the plants

mentioned above that the hadīths which was used to establish *the science of hadīth* are not genuine (*sahīh*).

The second and true subject is an origin for the hadīthology to become cultural. Because the science, its mechanism and terms are all created by human being. And every man-made science has no divine merit (i.e. holiness), but has a merit just as much as mankind has. The knowledge and science has a certain merit (holiness) with regard to its importance and benefits to the mankind. But it is opposite to its structure to claim that it has a holy immunity. When we consider with this point of view, we can say that hadīthology has not any holiness too. The object of the study of hadīthology is the prophetic reports. In other words, it investigate whether a certain report which attributed to Prophet really belongs to him and study the cultural and historical problems occurred around that reports. And this investigation and study are altogether human and historical, but not divine and dogmatic.

I consider the Hatīb's rational and logical expressions about the merit of the Companions in Hadīthology after establishing their merits with Qur'ānic verses and Prophetic hadīths importance for the humanization of Hadīthology. According to al-Hatīb their trustworthiness does not lean on just the verses and hadīths but on the rational reasons as well. Even if there had been no verses and hadīths mentioned about them, it would provide a superiority to them against the others that they had acquired a strong faith, they had migrated from Makka to Madīnah (al-Hijrah), they had strived effort for the sake of Islam by spending their possession and sacrificing life.⁶² With such an approach he gave an impression that he was essentially aware that it was unimportant to argue the issue with the verses and Prophetic hadīths. In other words, it is possible to know the importance of the Companions and the hadīthology could be established with human activity. But in spite of this, al-Hatīb could not leave the tendency to finding religious evidence and religionization as the other Muslim scholars.

Al-Sahawī cited Ahmad al-Salafi's (d. 576/1180) opinion in a section that he treated the discussions about the acceptability of transmitting a book of hadīth to a student with permission (*igāza*). According to the information al-Sahawī gave, al-Salafi pointed out the different human conditions in spite of connecting the problem with the verses and prophetic hadīths. Al-Salafi's following expressions describe the problem as a human and historical one: "It is nec-

need in growing up and what the animals need to make their own species continue etc." *Risala al-Tawhīd*, 1989, 121.

⁶² al-Bagdādī, *al-Kifāya*, 49.

essary. Because the narrators (*ruwwāt*) have gradually died, the memorizers (*huffād*) are gradually lost. And on the other hand the chain of transmission (*isnād*) must survive. The only way of this is permission (*igāza*). There is a great benefit in it. The intention is to strengthen prophetic traditions which related to the religious rules and to revive the tradition. So it doesn't matter whether it was realized with the *samā'* (hearing), the *kirāe* (recitation), *munāwala* (handing over), or *igāza* (permission)....⁶³ This expression, which stresses that the *igāza* occurred through social and human realities, is also an approval that science is a historical phenomenon grew up without connection with the dogmas. And now in our time it is widespread to accept that the scientific progress is a result of the sociocultural circumstances. In other words, knowledge and science materialized through history.⁶⁴ This historicity is essentially a feature of all human production. But al-Salafi, after his words, tried to find the origin of the *igāza* in the Qur'an and the Prophetic hadīths, returning again to traditional thought. In that case he had made the human side of the science a matter of secondary importance or took no note of it.

The writing of Prophetic hadīth was faced with very important arguments through the transition period to the written culture. The religious side of the writing (*kitāba*) caused some tense and endlessly disputes as well as the political, economical, and cultural sides of it.⁶⁵ In these disputings many contradictory Qur'anic verses and Prophetic hadīths had been raced each other, some in opposition to and the others in support of, were used by the Muslim scholars. And many works had been written on this issue since the beginning and continues to be written. For that reason, I want to mention the religionization of the knowledge in the discussions of writing without mentioning the general problem of writing hadīth in Islamic civilization. One of the problems, hadīth scholars faced in the period of writing them, was "defective writing". Al-Sahawī explained how defective writing should be corrected: The papers should be left to dry so that the ink must not scatter and the letters mix each other. The easy and rapid way to do this is to use the sawdust of Indian oak instead of sand. The sand can be used only after the ink on the paper dried in order to clean the blots. So it is rumored that sand causes the

⁶³ al-Sahawī, *Fath*, 2, 223.

⁶⁴ Hans-George Gadamer, *Truth and method*, second revised edition, translation revised by Joel Weinheimer and Donald G. Marshall, New York, 1991, 229.

⁶⁵ See for a wonderful study about the disputings around the writing in the history of hadīthology, Paul L. Heck, 'The Epistemological Problem of Writing in Islamic Civilization: al-Hatib al-Bagdādī's (d. 463/1071) Taqyid al-'ilm', *Studia Islamica*, 94, 2002, 85-114.

woodworms. And soil mustn't be used as well.⁶⁶ These pieces of information are the sort of what the men can get with own experiences and accumulations. So it is not necessary to turn to any religious and divine information or prophetic advice to protect the paper and writing against insects and deformations. Furthermore, this would be an absurd action as the circumstances change from day to day. But while al-Sahawī was trying to present the subject as a human accumulation, he also cited a report from one of al-Hatīb's books, including the Prophet's advice about the subject. According to this prophetic report, Abd al-Wahāb al-Hagabī wanted to correct the defective writing which he wrote with using the soil. And Yahyā b. Ma'īn would try to hinder him to do this as the woodworm might plague. But 'Abd al-Wahhāb replied that the Prophet had said: "Make the book covered with dust. Because the dust is blessed, it is the most sound thing to fulfill the requirement." And Ibn Ma'īn protests him saying that the *isnād* (i.e. chain of transmitters) of this prophetic report is utterly worthless.⁶⁷ In other words, its *isnād* is not a genuine one (i.e. *sahīh*). Besides Ibn al-Hibbān without no doubt declared that this hadīth was invented (*Maudū*). But al-Sahawī wouldn't want to believe this. Being included with this hadīth in the *Gāmi'* of al-Tirmidhī is his justification. And again al-Sahawī, pointing out that the hadīth was located in some other books, was slanted towards to consider it genuine.⁶⁸ So he preferred the religionization of knowledge to humanization in the discussions of correcting the defective writing. Al-Sahawī, on the other hand, sanctified the ancient scholars and their books by knowingly including an invented report in his book to use it an evidence of his claim.

It is possible to see some other examples of the dilemma of divinity and humanity in the books of the *'ulūm al-hadīth*, al-Sahawī's book is an important work in which many such examples are contained. I have to content my audience with this orientation toward that book and to postpone a detailed psychological and sociopolitical discussion of the issue to my future research.

Conclusion

It is a characteristic of the Muslim scholars to make all human activities religious and to search everything in the holy texts. This is a constant issue. See! all the recent social, political and scientific developments are even searched in the Qur'ān and Prophetic hadīths. The contemporary phenomenons are unfortunately considered in the titles such as "The stock exchange in the Qur'ān", "The stock ex-

⁶⁶ al-Sahawī, *Fath*, 3, 102.

⁶⁷ al-Bagdādī, *al-Gāmi'*, 1, 278

⁶⁸ al-Sahawī, *Fath*, 3, 102-103

change in the Prophetic tradition”, “The environment in the Qur’ān”, “The environment in the Prophetic tradition”, “The airplane in the Qur’ān”, “The computer in The Qur’ān” and so on. All of this kind of matters are contemporary and have never been occurred in the period which the Qur’ān and the Prophetic tradition was formed. This point, to me, must be criticized seriously. Another phenomenon appeared after the period in which the Qur’ān and the Prophetic tradition was formed is *the science of hadīth* (*‘ulūm al-hadīth*). And the scientific concepts are not able to be formed by only one person in only one moment and before their historical existence. But hadīth scholars tried to present *the science of hadīth* and its principles as if they were just designed by God and His messenger. And so they have misled their audiences.

God created man as a thinking subject and made contact with him on a high level knowledge. But he did not teach him how to establish and develop sciences such as history, medicine, zoology, tafthīr (i.e. interpretation of the Qur’ān), hadīthology and so on. Because this is completely a human activity, it is openly to be criticized. Otherwise, science would become transformed into a universal nuisance which restrict men’s ability of action. The belief of “there is no scientific thing to do” would become widespread. The interest in trying to get a new knowledge would disappear. And all of these are the greatest obstacle the the scientific development. The problem of the closing of the gate of *ijtihād* in the Islamic civilization certifies such a bad experience. And the famous hadīth scholar, Ibn al-Salāh’s expression of nothing remained to do in hadīthology, is an interesting example as well.⁶⁹ It can’t be said that only those who have such an understanding are hadīth scholars. Some other scholars belong to the other branches of science have same understandings. For example, Ibn Khaldūn believed that *the science of hadīth* and its terms had reached the last degree of the perfection.⁷⁰ And this belief still continues in our time. Such an understanding lies in the quotation located in the introduction of this article.

It was the individual perceptiveness of the Muslim scholars to religionize the hadīthology and establish it with the religious texts. But continuation of this perceptiveness after them, without any critique, got rid of scientific dialectic completely. Science is a contemporary phenomenon reflecting its own historicity and time as well as it was affected by the past. For that reason we can say that if hadīthology had arisen some other times or places, it would have arisen in a different character.

⁶⁹ Ibn al-Salāh, *Mukaddima*, Damascus, 1972, 9.

⁷⁰ Ibn Khaldūn, ‘Abdurrahmān, *Mukaddima*, Beirut 1984, 436.

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