The Theory and Practice of Preventive Diplomacy: The Case of Preventive Deployment in Macedonia

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ABSTRACT

This study will focus on the preventive deployment in Macedonia with special emphasis on the theory of preventive diplomacy. Nicolaidis's prevention action model is used as an analytical framework. In the model, the concept of coercive diplomacy is helpful in explaining the preventive deployment in Macedonia. The United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) in Macedonia is the first United Nations peacekeeping operations with a mandate on preventive deployment. The study aims to contribute to the improvement of preventive diplomacy in order for this to become a tool for conflict prevention in inter- and intra-state conflicts. It also offers suggestions and lessons for future preventive deployment activities.

Keywords: United Nations Preventive Deployment Forces (UNPREDEP), Macedonia, Preventive Diplomacy, Preventive Action, Conflict Prevention.

Önleyici Diplomasi Teorisi ve Pratiği: Makedonya'ya Önleyici Barış Gücü Yerleştirilmesi Olgusu

ÖZET

Bu çalışma önleyici diplomasi teorisine özel olarak vurgu yaparak Makedonya'da yapılmış olan önleyici barış gücü yerleştirme olgusuna odaklanmaktadır. Nicolaidis'in ortaya attığı önleyici aksiyon modeli analitik araç olarak kullanılmıştır. Bu modelde önleyici diplomasi kavramı Makedonya'ya önleyici barış gücü yerleştirilmesinin açıklanmasına yardımcı olmaktadır. Makedonya'daki Birleşmiş Milletler Önleyici Barış Gücü Kuvvetleri (BMÖBGK) Birleşmiş Milletler'in tarihinde bir ilk olarak önleyici barış gücü olarak görevlendirilmiştir. Bu çalışma devletler içi ve arası çatışmalarda bir çözüm aracı olarak önleyici diplomasinin geliştirilmesine katkıda bulunmayı amaç edinmiştir. Ayrıca gelecekteki önleyici barış gücü yerleştirmelerinde kullanılabilecek öneriler ve çıkarılacak dersleri de sunmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Birleşmiş Milletler Önleyici Barış Gücü, Makedonya, Önleyici Diplomasi, Koruyucu Aksiyon, çatışma önlenmesi.

"In this part of the world it is difficult to find the true path between reason and emotion, myth and reality. This is the burden of the Balkans, which prevents us from becoming truly European."
- Kilo Gligorov
First President of the Republic of Macedonia[1]

Introduction

Since 1945 states have gradually been obliged to apply the range of peaceful dispute resolution methods, as mentioned by the article 33 of the United Nations Charter, before a dispute crossed the threshold to armed conflict.[2] Although the founders of the United Nations (UN) had preventive diplomacy in their minds as one of the functions of the UN, this function was neglected for its first 40 years. However, after UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, presented his 1992 report "*An Agenda For Peace*" devoting a chapter to preventive diplomacy, this approach began to attract the attention of scholars of international relations as well as the public at large. The term preventive diplomacy refers to actions or institutions that are used to keep the political disputes that arise between or within nations from escalating into armed conflicts. The UN Secretary-General defined preventive diplomacy as: "to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit to spread of the latter when they occur".[3] The Secretary-General also stated that the "most desirable and efficient employment of diplomacy is to cease tensions before they result in conflict-or, if conflict breaks out, to act swiftly to contain it and resolve its underlying causes". [4] This statement was broadly recognized as reasonable and promising. Scholars of peace research suddenly became aware of the lack of knowledge of the subject and began to focus on the mechanisms and potential effects of preventive diplomacy.

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1   Quoted from P. H. Liotta and Cindy R Jebb. "Macedonia: End of the beginning or beginning of the end?", *Parameters;* Spring 2002, Vol. 32, No 1, p. 96-111.
2   The first condition of the *Article 33* states that "The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice". The second condition of the same article goes as follows: The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means".
3   Boutros Boutros-Ghali. *Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping.* A report of the secretary-general pursuant to the statement adopted by the summit meeting of the Security Council on January 31, 1992, New York, United Nations, June 17, 1992, p. 11.
4   Ibid, p. 13.

This study will focus on preventive diplomacy in the analysis of preventive deployment in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM)[5]. The first aim is to analyze the effect of the unprecedented preventive deployment in Macedonia. Overall, the study was undertaken in order to contribute to a strengthening and improvement of applied preventive diplomacy. Moreover, the paper supports the idea that preventive diplomacy should become the main conflict resolution tool for interstate and intrastate conflicts in the 21st century.

The paper will consist of the following sections. The introduction will give a general overview of preventive diplomacy, early warnings and post-Cold War environment. Then, it will attempt to find some answers about the necessity of conflict prevention. The next section will explain Nicolaidis' prevention action model as an analytical framework of the paper.[6] One of her models, coercive diplomacy, is very helpful to explain preventive deployment. Next, it will focus on preventive deployment as one of the preventive action tools. In the following section, Macedonia will be taken as a case study for the analysis of preventive deployment. After explaining the conflict issues and parties in the Macedonian case, the analysis will concentrate on the United Nation Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) as a first UN peacekeeping operation that has a preventive mandate. The section also consists of lessons and suggestions about the mission. Also, the operational and structural conflict prevention measures of the European Union (EU)/the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)/the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) will be analyzed in the world in general and in Macedonia in particular. Since the study aims to contribute to preventive diplomacy activities, the final conclusion will focus upon the lessons to be learned from the experiences accumulated in the Macedonia case.

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5   FYROM is the acronym used by most countries to represent the country's provisional name, the Yugoslav Former Republic of Macedonia. Turkey was one of the first countries to recognize Macedonia which was part of the Ottoman Empire for centuries with its constitutional name. The article will use Macedonia, the nation's self-chosen name. On November 1, 2004, the United States changed its decision about this issue and decided to refer Macedonia officially as the "Republic of Macedonia" its chosen constitutional name. See John R. Crook, "U.S. Relations with Republic Macedonia", *The American Journal of International Law*, January 2005, Vol. 99, No 1, Law Module, p. 254.

6   Kalypso Nicolaidis. "International Preventive Action: Developing a Strategic Framework", Robert I. Rotberg (ed.), *Vigilance and Vengeance: NGOs Preventing Ethnic Conflict in Divided Societies*, Brookings Institution Press, Washington D.C., 1996 p. 23-73. Robert I. Rotberg, "Conclusions: NGOs, Early Warning, Early Action, and Preventive Diplomacy", Rotberg (ed.), *Vigilance and Vengeance*, p. 263-269.

A General Overview of Preventive Diplomacy as Pre-Conflict Prevention

The end of the Cold War has not brought general peace and prosperity to Europe. Instead, elements of instability and even war have become all too frequent in Eastern and Central Europe and the Former Soviet Union. The collapse of the Yugoslav Republic has given way to the disintegration of multi-national states, to a painful process of political and economic transition toward democracy and market economy, and to the re-emergence of nationalism as a destabilizing factor in the Balkan region (the Balkanization). Escalating tensions in several other countries have caused serious concerns in the international community. During the Cold War, ethnic and tribal wars have been understood only within the simple framework of superpower rivalry and cold war risk. However, it is no longer possible to force homogeneity and to repress ethnic differences. The stability of governments and the status quo of borders are at stake.

The world has changed; the major conflicts threatening world peace and security have changed; the parties involved in the conflicts have changed; the international environment has changed; and the relationship between international organizations and the conflicting parties has changed. The new specific challenge for the world and European leaders is how to respond to emerging ethno-national conflicts in this new international environment. As Neil J. Kritz indicates, the overwhelming majority of wars around the world are intranational rather than international. He claims that the ethnic and religious conflicts, disputes over self-determination or secession, and violent power struggles between opposing domestic political factions account for 96 percent of the major armed conflicts.[7] The international community now is forced to deal with the core causes of these conflicts, and neither the conventional processes for enforcing human rights obligations nor "the traditional peacekeeping" for resolving conflicts during the Cold War provides an effective guide to dealing with them.[8]

Consequently, governments have increasingly turned to efforts to find softer and less costly strategies for dealing with ethno-national conflicts. Because of the need to find alternatives for resolving intra-national

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[7] Neil J. Kritz, "The Rule of Law in the Postconflict Phase", Chester A.Crocker & Fen Osler Hampson and Pamela Aall (eds.), *Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict*, United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington D.C., 1996, p. 587.

[8] Gareth Evans, *Cooperating For Peace: The Global Agenda for the 1990s and Beyond*, Australia, Allen&Unwin, 1993, p. 103.

conflicts in the post-Cold War era, the international community and international organizations began to emphasize "preventive diplomacy" and introduced the term "conflict prevention". As a response, the United Nations (UN) Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali proposed to strengthen preventive diplomacy through strengthening the information-gathering and deterrent instruments available to the United Nations. In his report *An Agenda for Peace*, the Secretary General wrote that "preventive diplomacy requires measures to create confidence; it needs early warning based on information gathering and informal or formal fact-finding; it may also involve preventive deployment, and in some situations, demilitarized zones.[9] In short, preventive diplomacy may present a new approach in this transition period. Chayes and Chayes define this transition period very well: "The old is not yet dead: the new cannot be born". [10]

Why is Preventive Diplomacy (or Conflict Prevention) Necessary?

Preventive diplomacy, *as early as possible* is the least complex, the most humane and the most cost-effective path for the international community to take in resolving disputes. Although the UN Charter combines all three approaches-peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peace building- into the UN's structure, other organizations like the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), and/or different non-governmental organizations (NGOs) focus on preventive approaches for dispute settlement because of cost as well as risk effectiveness.

If we scrutinize UN's peaceful measures such as peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations closely, we observe that they are more costly than preventive diplomacy tools. Earlier involvement was not only to save lives, but also to avert the need for often dangerous, costly, and politically troubled peacekeeping and humanitarian rescue operations.[11] If we compare the financial burdens of

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9 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *Agenda for Peace*, p. 13.
10 Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, "Introduction", Abram Chayes and Antoina Handler Chayes, (eds.), *Preventing Conflict in the Post-Communist World*, The Brookings Institution, Washington D.C., 1996, p. 3.
11 Michael S. Lund, "Early Warning and Preventive Diplomacy", Crocker, Hampson and Aall (eds.), *Managing Global Chaos*, United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington D.C., 1996, p. 380. Michael S. Lund, Michael S., *Preventing Violent Conflicts: A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy*, Washington D.C: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996. Hanne-Margaret Birckenbach, *Preventive Diplomacy: Conclusions from International Intervention into the Estonian and Latvian Conflicts over Citizenship*, Kiel, SCHIFF, 1997. Francis Deng, *Preventive Diplomacy: The Case of Sudan*, London:,ACCORD, 1997.

all these operations in terms of finance, it can be seen that strengthening and widening preventive diplomacy efforts yield considerable benefits. The establishment of adequately equipped preventive diplomacy units in six regional centers with a total staff of 100 and funds for necessary travel would require $ 21 million per annum in 1993. Similarly, preventive deployment in Macedonia costs approximately $ 50 million a year. However, the expected UN peacekeeping budget for 1993 was $ 3.7 billion. Amazingly, the estimated cost of the Gulf War, a single peace enforcement operation, was well over $ 70 billion in 1991.[12] If we compare the cost of human factors, the facts are astonishing. Garenth Evans indicated that the UN Secretariat has around 40 staff assigned within the Department of Political Affairs to preventive diplomacy and its companion strategy duty compared to some 82,000 peacekeepers in field. The cost of an individual peacekeeper or peace enforcer, taking into account the logistics which support him or her in the field, will far outweigh the cost of individual UN personnel engaged in preventive diplomacy.[13]

Preventive Action

Categories of Preventive Action

When considering whether and how to intervene preventively, outsiders must also assess when intervention is most likely to work, precisely what they are seeking to prevent, what the risk factors are, and whether the differences between prevention and cure are likely to be significant. They need to identify what the relevant parties stand to gain or lose through employing peaceful alternatives and assess whether these calculations, and their incentives, can be altered at any of the different phases of the conflict.[14]

Before outlining a typology of preventive tools, we need to elaborate on preventive action. Stated in positive terms, preventive diplomacy or action seeks to promote the peaceful settlement of disputes between nations or groups within nations. Preventive diplomacy is a part of preventive action undertaken by governments to keep the disputes from escalating into violence. International preventive action is a broader notion that includes tools that are targeted at particular disputes and actors beyond governments. An international prevention regime would

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[12] Garenth Evans, *Cooperating For Peace*, p. 177.
[13] Ibid., p. 63.
[14] Kalypso Nicolaidis, "International Preventive Action", p. 36- 37.

designate actions, norms, or institutions that strengthen all alternatives to violent conflict.[15]

If preventive actions are defined too narrowly, the international community may overlook potential effective tools as well as the need to develop appropriate norms and institutions to maximize the effectiveness of preventive action. The international community may also fail to optimize the simultaneous use of different preventive instruments in a given situation. Finally, action by parties other than governments, such as indigenous and international NGOs may be overlooked.[16] But one also has to be very careful not to broaden the scope and the capability of prevention beyond its relevance.

Since the outcomes of domestic conflicts will reconstitute international diplomacy, intra-state conflict prevention also has become as important as interstate conflict prevention towards the end of the twentieth century. Most international institutions justify their existence not only through short-term benefits, but also through their role in preventing long-term conflicts. The European Union (EU) and the UN are two examples of this kind. The whole construction of the UN system and of international networks of cooperative arrangements can be seen as a grandiose scheme to prevent interstate conflicts. To what extent can this model be transposed to deal with the escalation of intrastate conflicts rooted in ethno-nationalism or in historical and contemporary grievances, as in the case of Macedonia?

The threat of the use of force and sanctions as well as other traditional diplomatic intervention techniques undoubtedly play some role in preventing internal conflicts, but they also have obvious limits. First of all, each conflict is unique, and some may require some non-traditional methods of conflict prevention. For example, the recent success stories resulting from OSCE interventions point to the promise of a new kind of active mediation by global, regional, or local organizations. The incentive of promised institutional membership gives the EU added leverage in its preventive efforts. Increasingly, organizations that deal with crises related to violent conflict stress the need to address the underlying causes in cooperation with local actors, in particular "moderates", who constitute the most reliable (as well as the most vulnerable) beacons for a

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[15] Ibid., p. 24.
[16] Ibid., p. 37.

peaceful resolution of conflicts. Prevention depends on better use of existing international instruments, from the enforcement of human rights to the targeting of development aid, or on the design of new instruments, such as adaptable approaches to minorities' rights enforcement. Similarly, NGOs operating in emergency situations look for ways in which they might have been able to help avert the crisis, either by having expanded the scope of their proven methods or by having devised new approaches. At the core of the prevention challenge is the question of how best to articulate and coordinate these disparate dimensions.[17] Because of these limitations, we need to develop prevention techniques in addition to traditional diplomatic intervention. The following model does not aim to present a theory of preventive action. Rather, it suggests an analytical framework for the relationship between various types of prevention and their relative effectiveness.

Four Paradigms of International Preventive Action

The classic debate over prevention has to do with proactive strategies. Although any attempt at drawing typologies is an oversimplification, identifying alternative paradigms for prevention is useful in order to organize a discussion of appropriate tools for intervention.

In her article, Kalypso Nicolaidis differentiates four paradigms of international preventive action: coercive diplomacy, institutional inducement, cooperative management, and systemic transformation. Although all of these four paradigms have been implemented in Macedonia, the best fit to preventive deployment is coercive diplomacy.[18]

In her model, Nicolaidis attempts to distinguish the criteria for broad categories of preventive action.[19] First, she differentiates two broad categories: hands-off and hand-on preventive strategies. Hands-off approaches assert that third-party intervention seeks to influence the parties by external incentives. The third party is neither directly involved in the conflict, nor do they seek to transform the conditions that led to the conflict. In this approach, coercive prevention techniques such as deterrence and compelling threats or inducement strategies can be applied. On the contrary, hands-on approaches claim that prevention should move beyond changing incentives of the parties. Instead, it

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[17] Ibid., p. 25.
[18] Ibid., p. 40-59.
[19] Ibid., p. 36-40.

should develop or strengthen alternative means for peaceful settlements and address root causes of conflict by providing external support and resources. Therefore, outsiders become insiders. Hands-on strategies are also transformative.

Nicolaidis also distinguishes between ad hoc and systemic approaches. Metaphorically speaking, the first is akin to malaria pills for the adventurous traveler and the second one is similar to polio immunization for a whole population. Ad hoc strategies may be reactive and early signs of potential conflict. On the other hand, the approach to prevention can be systemic. The criterion for falling under a systemic approach can simply be that of jurisdiction, norms and international regimes.

Coercive Diplomacy

Hands-on ad hoc strategies usually seek to prevent the escalation of disputes into violent conflicts or the spread of an existing conflict through more or less coercive methods. In these cases, the focus of the external intervention is the enforcement of a desired solution. This refers to the potential use for preventive purposes of either multinational intervention or of UN Chapter VII instruments as well as Chapter VI and half- measures.

Coercive diplomacy refers to a defensive strategy in order to secure a peaceful resolution of a serious dispute. This strategy primarily involves the threat of force or sanctions. The use of threats as an instrument of peaceful diplomacy is preventive by definition since threats are meant to prevent the escalation of a given conflict into war. Military and economic threats and sanctions are used extensively as alternatives to war. A threat of punishment for non-compliance is credible and potent. Also, external intervenors should rely on positive incentives for face-saving purposes.

Although coercive diplomacy basically depends on the use of force, it should be a last resort; in some circumstances the threat of force should be moved upstream for preventive purposes. In passive or tripwire coercion, a potential use of force may be enough for preventive purposes. One example of such an approach is preventive deployment introduced in Macedonia. It has two objectives: To prevent the spread of the Bosnian conflict, and to provide assistance to maintain local security.

Preventive Deployment

Preventive deployment is a new concept for the UN. It was first advocated by the Secretary General in *Agenda for Peace* and was applied for the first time in Macedonia. The essence of this strategy is a preventive military rather than diplomatic response. It involves the positioning of troops, military observers and related personnel on one or both sides of a border between entities that are in dispute (or where there is an emerging threat of conflict). The primary objective is the deterrence of an escalated situation into armed conflict. The other objectives may be to calm communities in the area by monitoring law and order and general conditions, and to render other forms of assistance to local authorities.

The legal basis for preventive deployment by the UN is Chapter VI of the UN Charter. Such a deployment would only be authorized by the Security Council. In cases of inter-state disputes, consent would be needed from both governments if the deployment were to be both sides of a border. But a deployment could proceed with the consent only of the requesting country if it were able to persuade the Security Council that this was desirable to deter hostilities. For intra-state conflict, the intervention would occur only with the consent of the government or all parties.

A preventive deployment force has similar tasks to the early warning observers, but by deploying in greater strength, it performs a greater symbolic role. While the primary object of such a force is deterrence, its task may also include some or all of the following:

- Monitoring, observing and reporting on developments which could undermine confidence or stability (or including, e.g. arms flows) in the vicinity of a contested border, or more generally;

- Assisting and monitoring local authorities in the maintenance of law and order, including the protection of threatened minorities;

- Assisting and monitoring local authorities in the maintenance of essential services (water, power, and the like); or

- Assisting local authorities, UN agencies or non-government organizations in the provision of humanitarian assistance.[20]

As already stated, the clearest preventive deployment situation involves a border between disputing parties. This border can be an international one between sovereign states. However, preventive deployment can also be

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[20] Garenth Evans, *Cooperating For Peace*, p. 83.

applied to national borders within a state where dispute lines can be drawn in the context of a dispute. One can also think of cases where preventive deployment might be contemplated without an immediate border question. An example would be a dispute, which is not between immediate neighbors and the threatened action against which troops are preventively deployed is by way of an air strike. The important issue is not where troops are deployed or why they are deployed. The essence of preventive deployment is to contain the dispute or emerging threat and to prevent it turning into an armed conflict. However, UN involvement might be viewed as taking sides where preventive deployment is requested by only one party to a dispute (whether government or non-government) and takes places only on its territory.[21]

In *Agenda for Peace*, the concept of preventive deployment is taken a little further to apply to situations of internal national crisis where military personnel are sent in to give humanitarian assistance or create secure conditions with the consent of the government or all parties concerned.[22]

Case Study: The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM)

Conflict Areas

Macedonia is a landlocked nation located in southern Europe. It is a nation of about 2.3 million people. About 64.2 % of the population is Macedonian but there is a large Albanian minority, totaling about 25.2 % of the population. There are also Turks (% 3.9), Serbs (% 1.8), Romanies (% 2.7), and other ethnic groups (% 2.2).[23] The principal religion is Eastern Orthodox. The main language is Macedonian, but the Albanian minority speaks Albanian and the Turkish and Serb minorities speak Turkish and Serbo-Croatian, respectively.

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[21] Gareth Evans, "Security Peace in the Post-Cold War Era: Issues Confronting the International Community", Kevin Clements and Christine Wilson (eds.), *UN Peacekeeping at the Crossroads,* Canberra, Peace Research Centre, 1994, p. 40.

[22] Boutros-Ghali, *Agenda for Peace,* p. 17.

[23] In the 1994 census, the percentage of ethnic groups is as follows: Macedonians (% 67), Albanians (% 21), Turks (% 4.5), Serbs (% 2.3), Roma (% 2.3) and Muslims (% 2.1). Janusz Bugajski, *Ethnic Politics in Eastern Europe: A Guide to Nationality Policies, Organizations, and Parties,* New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1994, p.97. The last census was held in November 2002 after the Ohrid Agreements. See, Youssef Courbage and Ronald Wilkens, "Censuses, Elections, Population: The Case of Macedonia", *Population,* Vol. 58, No 4/5, July-October 2003, p. 429-450. http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/mk.html

After the end of the Cold War, we have witnessed the disintegration of multinational states, a painful process of political and economic transition towards democracy and the market economy, and the re-emergence of nationalism as a destabilizing factor in the Balkans. After the breakup of the Yugoslav federation, the Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia declared its independence. However, the new republic has faced multi-faceted potential conflicts: a dispute between Macedonia's ethnic Albanians and the Slav Macedonian majority over the status of the former and their weight in the Republic; the possible extension of the conflict via Kosovo; the expansionist ambitions of Serbian leaders regarding Skopje;[24] potential irredentism in Bulgaria; finally, and perhaps most importantly, the controversy with Greece over Macedonia's name and symbols, which has hindered international recognition and assistance.[25] The problem with Greece contributed to Macedonia's growing economic and political isolation and Macedonia maintains its status as the poorest former Yugoslav republic. The crisis in Bulgaria, Serbia, and Albania has had only an indirect effect on Macedonia. Only instability in Bosnia and Kosovo might constitute a serious source of destabilization. The spillover effects of the Kosovo crisis in 2001 have brought Macedonia near the brink of Civil War because of intense fighting between government troops and ethnic Albanian rebels- the National Liberation Army (NLA) in the city of Tetovo, Macedonia's second-largest city near the border with Kosovo and 90 percent ethnic Albanian.[26]

Map 1- The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. (Adopted from Julie Kim)[27]

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[24] Eran Frankel, "International NGOs in Preventive Diplomacy and Early Warning: Macedonia", Rotberg (ed.), *Vigilance and Vengeance:*, Brookings Institution Press, Washington D.C., 1996, p. 115.

[25] Apart from the name Macedonia (for the country is constitutionally called 'Republic of Macedonia'), which Greece claims as part of its heritage, these symbols include the 'Vergina Sun' (depicted on a casket found in Philip's tomb) which is displayed on FYROM's flag, and a symbolic tower from Thessaloniki, the regional capital of Greek Macedonia, which appears on FYROM's coins.

[26] Duncan Perry. "Destiny on hold: Macedonia and the dangers of ethnic discord", *Current History*, Vol. 97, No 617, p. 119-125, March 1998.

[27] Julie Kim. "Macedonia: Country Background and Recent Conflict", *CRS Report for Congress*, Updated November 7 2001, http://www.fas.org/man/crs/index.html

Map adapted by CRS from Magellan Geographix.

The Macedonian-Albanian Question

There are three issues at the center of the Albanian question. First, Macedonia's ethnic Albanians believed that their demographic weight, - they claim that 40 % of the total population is Albanian - entitled them to become a "constitutive people" of the Republic. Second, they demand an increased presence in all levels of the administration and upgrading of the status of their language, both in education and media. Last, they also call for territorial autonomy.[28]

The resolution of three issues began after the NATO, EU and OSCE broken peace agreement- the Ohrid Agreement: the dispute over the census, the constitutional amendment and the alleged discrimination of ethnic Albanians and their culture. The last census was boycotted by ethnic Albanians in 1994. For the internal stability of Macedonia, a new

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[28] V. Petroska Beska, "NGOs, Early Warning, and Preventive Action: Macedonia", Rotberg (ed.), *Vigilance and Vengeance*, Brookings Institution Press, Washington D.C., 1996, p. 136.

census was held in November 2002 after the Ohrid Agreement. The result of the census made Albanians believe that they can imitate "Kosovo as a model and they are more numerous than the censuses record".[29] Second, the Macedonian constitution still perceives the Slav Macedonians as a titular nation. It also restricts the rights of "members of nationalities" to the cultural sphere. But it was amended in November 2001 to strengthen minority rights. The state guaranteed the protection of the nationalities' ethnic, cultural, and linguistic identity. In spite of their being in a better position than the Kosovo Albanians, there may have been de facto discrimination of the ethnic Albanians and their culture in Macedonia.[30] But the Macedonian Albanians have a chance to improve their situation in Macedonia with the possible membership of the European Union. Ethnic Albanians have been seeking to use their language and alphabet in all national institutions, to establish an Albanian-language university that has been granted in 2004 at the Tetova University and to increase their participation in all sectors of Macedonian political, institutional, and economic life.[31]

Macedonia: The Testing Ground for Preventive Deployment

The most publicized among international efforts to prevent an armed conflict in Macedonia has undoubtedly been the preventive deployment of UN forces. In December 1991, during talks with Cyrus Vance President Gligorov unofficially requested the sending of UN observers to Macedonia. On 12 November 1992, UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali recommended the dispatch of UN troops in case the political situation in Kosovo deteriorated and if the war in former Yugoslavia spilled over to Macedonia.[32] On 11 December 1992, UN Security Council Resolution 795 authorized the deployment of an infantry battalion and observer to monitor Macedonia's border with Albania and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia that was called UNPROFOR Macedonia Command (M). On 11 June 1993, the United States offered a reinforced company team to the UN in Macedonia because of the seriousness of early warning symptoms.[33] The United Nations Preventive De-

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[29] Youssef Courbage, "Censuses, Elections, Population", p. 446.
[30] Aydin Babuna, "The Albanians of Kosovo and Macedonia: Ethnic identity superseding religion", Vol. 28, No 1, *Nationalities Papers*, p. 67-92.
[31] V. Petroska Beska, "NGOs, Early Warning", p. 136.
[32] UN Document S/24923, 9 December 1992.
[33] Gabriel Munuera, *Preventing armed conflict in Europe: lessons from recent experience*, Institute for Security Studies Western European Union, Paris, June 1994, p. 53.

ployment Force (UNPREDEP) came into existence on 31 March 1995 to replace UNPROFOR in Macedonia.[34]

UNPREDEP's main mandated task was to monitor and report any development in the border areas that could have undermined confidence and stability in Macedonia and have threatened its territory.[35] UNPREDEP has used a variety of means to accomplish this task, including good offices, troop deployment, mediation, negotiation, conciliation, the humanitarian dimension, and other peaceful means. The mission served as an early warning source for the Security Council, helped to strengthen mutual dialogue among political parties and assisted in monitoring human rights as well as inter-ethnic relations in the country. UNPREDEP also assisted in the country's social and economic development along with other agencies and organizations of the United Nations system. UNPREDEP maintained close cooperation with the Monitoring Mission in Skopje of OSCE, HCNM, NATO, EU, and NGOs and enjoyed an excellent relationship with the host Government.

In response to the crisis in Kosovo, the Security Council extended the mission's mandate for a six-month period until 28 February 1999. The Secreary-General observed that the development in Kosovo in 1999 highlighted the danger of renewed violence in the area. Such violence could have had an effect upon the security situation in Macedonia. The slow progress in implementing some civilian aspects of the Dayton Peace Accords in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the return of refugees and displaced persons caused concern that could affect regional peace and stability. Thus, UNPREDEP has increased its patrols along the border with Yugoslavia, using both ground and air assets. It has also established temporary observation posts for 24-hour monitoring and reporting on activities at the border throughout the area of operation.

In spite of the intensification of aggressive and violent activities in Kosovo, China vetoed the renewal of the mandate of UNPREDEP on February 25, 1999. It was speculated that China's veto was retaliation

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[34] Nikolaos Zahariadis, "External interventions and domestic ethnic conflict in Yugoslav Macedonia", *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 118, No 2, Summer 2003, p. 259-279.

[35] UNPREDEP's mandate adopted by the Security Council on 11 December 1992 and resolution 795 (1992). Its mandate was to: -monitor the border areas with Albania and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro);
-strengthen, by its presence, the country's security and stability; and
-report on any development that could threaten the country. http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Mission/unpred_b.htm

for Macedonia's diplomatic recognition of Taiwan in January in exchange for $ 1 billion aid.[36] After the cancellation of UNPREDEP, NATO/EUFOR forces have played a preventive role against Yugoslavia and had a spillover effect on the Kosovo conflict.

Post-UNPREDEP Missions: NATO, EU, and OSCE

After the UN forces were withdrawn from Macedonia, two regional organizations, NATO and the EU, have become more actively involved in the Macedonian low-intensity conflict. The EU's European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) created a European Union Military Force (EUFOR) that manages the security crises in the Balkans and outside of Europe. Another important milestone for ESDP and NATO/EU peacekeeping operations was the Berlin Plus. The Berlin Plus refers to institutional and operational links between NATO and the EU for peacekeeping operations. It gives the EU "assured access" to NATO operational planning capabilities and common assets.[37]

After the peace agreement between the Macedonian government and the ethnic Albanian leaders-the Ohrid Agreement, the Macedonian President invited NATO to implement the plan for the demilitarization of the rebel forces. The result has been the deployment of 3,500 NATO forces and the implementations of military operations, namely, Operation Essential Harvest(OEH)/Task Force (TF) Harvest.[38] Before the completion of the OEH, a new mission had been approved by the North Atlantic Council- Operation Amber Fox/TF Fox.[39] Its mandate is to provide security for international monitors overseeing implementation of the peace plan, advise and assist the host government with normalization process by taking ownership of security throughout the country, and bring confidence and stability to the region. As the first test case, the EU launched its first military mission - Operation Concordia- that replaced the small NATO forces – Allied Harmony mission[40] – in Macedonia in early 2003.[41]. The core objective of Concordia was "to

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[36] Mayura Koiwai, "Veto ends UN mission in Macedonia", *Peacekeeping & International Relations*, Vol. 28, No. 2, March-April 1999, p. 11.

[37] Julie Kim. "Bosnia and the European Union Military Force (EUFOR): Post-NATO Peacekeeping", *CRS Report for Congress*, Updated June 2006, http://www.fas.org/man/crs/ index.html

[38] Julie Kim, "Macedonia:" and OEH web site at http://www.nhqs.nato.int/missions/ essentialHarvest/tfh.htm

[39] OAF/TFF website at http://www.nhqs.nato.int/missions/amberFox/amberFox.htm

[40] OAH website at http://www.nhqs.nato.int/missions/alliedHarmony/alliedHarmony%20Mission.htm

[41] Kristin Archick and Paul Gallis, "NATO and the European Union", *CRS Report for Congress*, Updated January 4, 2005, http://www.fas.org/man/crs/index.html

contribute a stable security environment and to allow the implementation of the Ohrid Agreement". [42] After Concordia, the EU commenced a new mission to monitor, mentor, and advise the local Macedonian police forces - Mission Proxima. The mission was to use "community policing", oversee the integration of ethnic Albanians into the police force, and combat organized crime. Apart from the Balkans, the EU, headed by France, sent an international peacekeeping force -Operation Artemis- into the Democratic Republic of Congo that aimed to end rebel fighting and protect the aid workers in September 2003.[43]

Assessment

Several factors have so far contributed to preventing an armed conflict in Macedonia. The first of these is the relatively responsible behavior of some ethnic Albanians in their demands for state-building status and territorial autonomy and the moderate elements in the Party for Democratic Prosperity (PDP), the main party representing ethnic Albanians. Moreover, the Albanian President has officially endeavored to ease tensions and to maintain a cooperative approach vis-a vis Skopje. His government has recognized the "Republic of Macedonia". The Macedonian President visited Tirana, Albania in June 1992 and played an instrumental role in Albanian-Macedonian relations. The PDP has also contributed to defusing tensions. It joined the cabinet, remained cool during crises and put its demands into the legal framework.

Second, regional organizations especially the EU, OSCE and NATO have played crucial roles during the crisis. Albania, Serbia, Macedonia, and Kosovo all rely heavily on Western assistance and all want to be integrated into the Western forums, mainly the EU and NATO. These motives provide strong indirect incentives to compromise. The West has directly affected developments by economic and humanitarian aid. Moreover, international organizations (IOs) have been major preventive factors. For example, the representatives of the EU and the UN have defused the tension during the Greek blockade. The OSCE mission has also projected stability, through the information it provides, the advice it offers to the parties, and its deterrent value as a token of international attention (It was called a "political preventive deployment").[44] The High

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[42] Accessed on March 2006. http://www.nhqs.nato.int/missions/nhqsMission.htm
http://www.delmkd.cec.eu.int/en/Concordia/mission.htm
[43] Bastian Giegerich and William Wallace, "Not Such a Soft Power: The External Deployment of European Forces", *Survival*,Vol. 46, No 2, Summer 2004, p. 163-182.
[44] Gabriel Munuera, p. 57.

Commissioner of National Minorities (HCNM) as an insider third party opened a channel for dialogue, improved mutual understanding, and recommended compromise measures in order to alleviate tension.

Another factor that has contributed to the prevention of armed conflict has been the preventive deployment of UN troops. The UNPREDEP mission has demonstrated that preventive deployment is an effective form of peacekeeping and that results can be achieved even with a small, almost symbolic deployment of UN peacekeepers. It was done at the right time and with a clear mandate. It has certainly helped reassure Macedonia and deterred Serbia's potentially aggressive aims by demonstrating the UN Security Council's interest in the region. As the conflicts in former Yugoslavia have already widely demonstrated, the "preventive" value of preventive deployment is directly linked to the credibility of the international commitment. It is not surprising that the effect of the UN blue helmets in Macedonia has increased dramatically when the United States engaged its troops and backed them with pledges of further intervention, if they were attacked. The presence of UNPREDEP has so far contributed successfully to preventing the spillover of conflicts elsewhere in the region to Macedonia. For example, during the past few months of its mandate, UNPREDEP has been particularly important in diffusing tension that could have arisen as a result of the crisis in Kosovo.[45]

One can question the effectiveness of UNPREDEP in the event of internal destabilization that is a civil crisis between ethnic Albanians and Slav Macedonians. In this case, UNPREDEP has an indirect deterrent effect via Albania, which does exert clear influence on ethnic Albanians in Macedonia. Albania is deeply interested in Western assistance and integration; therefore, it understands the implications of the Western action in Macedonia. Also, UNPREDEP sent a message to Greece about the issue of recognition.

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[45] The Secretary-General stated that "preventive diplomacy requires the constructive engagement of the international community. Rhetoric must be matched with deeds, theory much closely linked with practice, and goodwill has to prevail over prejudice. Few will doubt that in terms of human and material resources, prevention is less costly than cure. The challenge is to summon me political will to act. UNPREDEP remains the first and only United Nations preventive peacekeeping operation. It is a demonstration of what can be accomplished in the realm of conflict prevention when good offices and troop deployment are put to effective use. Experience has taught us that postponing action to avert conflict is often a recipe for disaster. If we are to have any hope of ending human suffering and material destruction, preventive diplomacy must remain a prime objective of the United Nations.", in *International Workshop, An Agenda for Preventive Diplomacy: Theory and Practice*, Skopje, 16-19 October 1996.

The accomplishments of the UNPREDEP mission can be summarized as follows:

- It has served as an additional element of support for the international community's efforts to promote a peaceful resolution to the overall situation in the former Yugoslavia;
- It has been a valuable source for the Security Council;
- It has helped to strengthen mutual dialogue among political parties and assisted in monitoring human rights as well as inter-ethnic relations, both at the national level and in areas populated by ethnic minorities;
- It has successfully mediated several tense border encounters and negotiated a military administrative patrol line between the two parties that determined the northern limit of the area of operation for its troops;
- It has established mutually beneficial contacts with the military authorities of Albania and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and at the highest political level of Albania;
- It has evolved into a fully-fledged preventive operation along the lines spelled out in the Secretary-General's *Agenda for Peace* and the Supplement thereto; and
- It has developed a strong three-pronged approach to the implementation of its mandate, covering political action and good offices, troop deployment, and the human dimension.[46]

There is a need to assess NATO/EU/OSCE conflict prevention policies. Those organizations created various instruments and implemented measures to avoid the spill-over effects of the Kosovo conflict into Macedonia. First, new positions and bodies were created such as the High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP-HR). Second, the defense links among NATO, EU and the Western European Union (WEU) were strengthened. Moreover, they initiated structural conflict prevention measures such as peacemaking, post-peace building, and humanitarian intervention. The structural conflict prevention policies has addressed the many cross-cutting issues such as using developmental aids, the creation of the Stability Pact (SP) to fight organized crime, the elimination of structural violence that is associated with inequitable distribution of resources and unequal

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[46] UNPREDEP official home page: http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unpred_b.htm

decision-making power and caused inegalitarian practices, poverty, hunger, oppression, discrimination indecent education and housing. The trio of IGOs has had success on the operational side of conflict prevention. They showed strong leadership (EU and US), a coherent political-military approach (the presence of NATO units in Macedonia, NATO's visible military might and NATO's willingness to contain violent acts), adequate resources for preventive deployment (enough NATO soldiers and equipment were deployed), and a plan to restore host country's authority (first, census was held; next, the national unity government was formed, and last, early elections was held in 2002).[47] In addition, the EU launched extensive structural prevention efforts. Macedonia received economic and political developmental aid and signed the Stabilization and Association Agreements (SAA) that helps Macedonia to fulfill its EU membership conditions.[48]

The strengths of preventive deployment are to show the conflicting parties that the international community has a high level of political commitment, to be well-suited to large crises, and to build trust between the parties. One of the weaknesses is that the deployment does not focus on the structural causes of the conflict. Second, it may delay a possible political settlement and it is hard to convince the international community to contribute troops since there is no crisis on the ground and on the TV screen. Last, the forces may become a part of the problem by becoming involved on the weaker side.[49]

Lessons and Suggestions

The first lesson about Macedonia is that there is a need to act in time and decisively to the crisis situation. The European Union's failure to reach decisions on recognition and economic assistance has increased the chances for internal conflict. This has pushed the shaky economy of the poorest former Yugoslav republic to the point of collapse. Moreover, the lack of solidarity among European Union members in foreign policy, as a result of Greek pressure, may have fed the ambitions of countries that might hope for Macedonia's partition or eventual absorption.

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[47] Carnegie Council, "Preventing Deadly Conflict", Colombia International Affairs Online, http://www.ciaonet.org/book/ccp01/index.html

[48] Philip Gounev, "Stabilizing Macedonia: Conflict prevention, development, and organized crime", *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 57, No 1, Fall 2003, p. 229-240.

[49] http://www.caii.com/CAIIStaff/Dashboard_GIROAdminCAIIStaff/ Dashboard_CAIIAdminDatabase/resources/ghai/toolbox9.htm

Second, we have learned that preventive deployment should be conducted in accordance with other peaceful means especially economic incentives and possible membership to the European Union. Macedonia desperately needs financial and technical assistance. It has suffered from the Greek blockage of transportation routes, the loss of markets and raw materials due to problems with Serbia and Greece. Also, there are problems of transition to a market economy and an uncertain climate for investment and foreign aid. The implementation of UN sanctions imposed an additional hardship. Therefore, Macedonia needs foreign assistance, especially supplies of wheat and a reduction of the $ 650 million debt with the World Bank.[50] The European Union together with other institutions like the IMF, the World Bank can provide assistance. Although Macedonia became one of the candidate country to the EU in 2005, the need for the judicial, economic, electoral, and other reforms requires the cooperation and assistance from European institutions. Before gaining full membership in the EU, Macedonia may play an instrumental role in the future economic integration at the sub-regional level. After the final solution to the problem of recognition, the solution of the ethnic conflicts (Kosovo, the Albanian question in Macedonia, the Bosnia-Herzogovina, etc.), the promotion of the peace-building and post peace-making activities, the sub-regional integration (Western Balkans and South East Europe), including Macedonia, Greece, Albania, Bosnia-Herzogovina, Crotia, Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey, and Serbia will first become a reality and the enlargement of the European Union will become more likely.

Third, the consent and cooperation of all parties are essential to dampen tension and to build trust at the local level. Not only diplomatic consent but also operational cooperation on the ground increases the effectiveness of preventive deployment. Fourth, the political will of the international community and the commitment of contributing nations are central issues to conflict prevention. In order to deter the parties using their forces on the ground, first-class world troops have to be deployed with mobility, equipment, credibility, air assets and out-of-theater back-up forces.[51]

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[50] http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/ECAEXT/ 0,contentMDK:20700603~menuPK:258613~pagePK:146736~piPK:146830~theSitePK:25859 9,00.html http://www.worldbank.org.mk
[51] Ibid.

Although there is a possibility of solving the Albanian question at the constitutional level, efforts to enhance the de facto status of ethnic Albanians should continue. Although the legislative changes in the fields of ethnic and human rights have been successful, the ethnic and cultural rights should be implemented on the ground for ethnic Albanians. For example, it is possible to implement the positive discrimination iniatiatives in favor of Albanians for their presence in the administration as well as the teaching and broadcasting in their language more widely. Also, the resolution of the current problems in Kosovo will indirectly help stabilize Macedonia.

When Milosevic's nationalist ambitions in the Western Balkans have had effects on the destabilization of Macedonia and an open conflict in Kosovo has had spill-over effects, it has been shown that soft preventive deployment was not enough to prevent an armed conflict. Even though UNPREDEP has been withdrawn from Macedonian territory, the involvement of NATO and the EU has had a great effect on the ground as a muscular preventive deployment with combat-ready forces. NATO has implemented peacekeeping operations in Macedonia and deployed enough forces to prevent spillover from the Kosovo conflict. Also, the UN monitoring presence was integrated into the NATO military plan that was implemented quickly and decisively. Moreover, the mandate of NATO/EU forces have been constantly renewed and updated as the situation on the ground has been changed. A small group of forces have been deployed until the stability in Bosnia and Kosovo can be restored.

UNPREDEP was a unique conflict prevention case in which the international community sent a small number of peacekeepers for a preventive deployment mission. Despite its small size, the UNPREDEP mission became a turning point for the UN and opened new horizons for Boutros Boutros-Ghali's Agenda for Peace initiative in the 21st century. Overall, the UN presence in Macedonia had a positive effect and has shown that the deployment of troops before conflict erupted preserved relative negative peace on the ground. However, external intervention like the UNPREDEP gave a false sense of expectations and euphoria on the side of the Albanian minority. When UNPREDEP was perceived as impotent in stopping abuses by government and paramilitary police, it created frustration and resentment that resulted in further radicalization of the Albanian majority.

Conclusion

There is no question that internal violence and ethno-national conflict present an increasing threat to stability in East Central Europe (ECE), South East Europe (SEE), and the former Soviet Union (FSU). The real danger today is not that the international community may intervene at all. It is only when conflicts are "on the screen", literally as well as figuratively, that they receive attention in spite of sophisticated early warning systems. Often, the response to the conflict is either too late or too weak. It is necessary to monitor early warning signals to the greatest extent possible and prevent a possible crisis from becoming a protracted violent conflict. In the same vein as the distinction between "preventive" and "predictive" medicine, conflict prevention may be the most cost-effective strategy with regard to domestic conflicts. Rapid reaction capacities need to be enhanced and relied on automatically.

The preventive deployment of military forces was tested for the first time as an instrument of conflict prevention in Macedonia. Its value lay in the message of the UNSC's intention. It sent the message to Serbia by reassuring the independence and territorial integrity of Macedonia. After US troops joined the UN forces, UNPREDEP's effect doubled and became a deterrent toward Albania and Greece. Since the number of troops deployed could not stop an attack on any significant scale, UNPREDEP has mainly symbolic value. However, it has achieved its mandate purpose.

While tensions in the region remain high and deployment is still necessary, the Macedonian experience provides important lessons for preventive peacekeeping operations. Factors that have contributed to the success of the mission include:

a) The timing of implementation;

b) The relatively low intensity of tensions along the line of deployment;

c) A clear objective and mandate;

d) Considerable interest of the international community;

e) Cooperation with regional and non-governmental organizations;

f) A strong support of the Macedonian government, most opposition political parties, and leaders of indigenous ethnic communities.[52]

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[52] Alice Ackerman and Antonio Pala, "From Peacekeeping to Preventive Deployment: A Study of the United Nations in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia", *European Security*, Vol. 5, No 1, Spring 1996, p. 83-97.

The effectiveness of this deployment was largely increased when the United States showed its commitment to prevent conflict in Macedonia. If all parties perceive the objective and deterrent effects of the preventive deployment, it is more effective in terms of human and financial costs. As a soft preventive deployment, UNPREDEP has traditional UN peacekeeping features: lightly armed troops and the use of force in self-defense.

However, when the beginning of conflict is imminent something further is needed. A "hard" or "muscular" preventive deployment may become necessary, in which troops have the mandate and the capacity to prevent or de-escalate the conflict. In this case, the force deployed should either be strong enough, or it should be easily reinforceable. Also, it is necessary that either one of the states in dispute or the government of internal crisis should call for preventive deployment. In case of internal conflict, preventive deployment freezes the situation and allows for humanitarian supplies and provides an environment in which political negotiation can take place. However, it is hard to identify "lines of separation" in internal conflicts.

Such "muscular" deployment requires a coalition of states or a single power all of which act under the mandate of the UN. In the case of Europe, regional organizations like the West European Union or NATO have become responsible for muscular preventive deployments.

The UN needs to develop strict criteria for any future use of preventive deployment, including clear objectives, clear mandates, clear criteria for early warning, and clear linkage to comprehensive political and economic processes for settlement of the dispute. Regional organizations might find preventive deployment practicable, particularly in cases, in which they have the consent of all sides and regional actors have a stake. However, any preventive deployment should take place as part of a comprehensive diplomatic process and with the Security Council authorization and broad support from the international community. Preventive deployment could become more systematic and comprehensive in the future. Moreover, we need to create a system that includes international, regional, and local community, organizations and governments.

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