

Instructions for authors, permissions and subscription information:

E-mail: bilgi@uidergisi.com

Web: www.uidergisi.com



An Analysis of the Headscarf Issue in Feminist Debates in Germany

Berrin Koyuncu Lorasdağı, Hilal Onur İnce*

Assoc. Prof. Dr., Hacettepe University, Department of Political Science and Public Administration

* Assoc. Prof. Dr., Hacettepe University, Department of Political Science and Public Administration

To cite this article: Koyuncu Lorasdağı, Berrin and Onur İnce, Hilal, “An Analysis of the Headscarf Issue in Feminist Debates in Germany”, *Uluslararası İlişkiler*, Volume 6, No 24 (Winter 2010), p. 81-98.

Copyright © International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT). All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored, transmitted, or disseminated, in any form, or by any means, without prior written permission from UİK, to whom all requests to reproduce copyright material should be directed, in writing. References for academic and media coverages are beyond this rule.

Statements and opinions expressed in *Uluslararası İlişkiler* are the responsibility of the authors alone unless otherwise stated and do not imply the endorsement by the other authors, the Editors and the Editorial Board as well as the International Relations Council of Turkey.

An Analysis of the Headscarf Issue in Feminist Debates in Germany

Berrin KOYUNCU LORASDAĞI and Hilal ONUR İNCE*

ABSTRACT

This study intends to be a discussion of the headscarf issue in the German context. Germany stands as a peculiar case with its return to its historical background as a culture-oriented nation after the Second World War. In this article, it is contended that this orientation evinces itself in the feminist debates on the headscarf affair in Germany. Thus the aim here is to reveal that in the 2000s both in pro and contra-headscarf feminist debates, the headscarf issue, in the specific case of Germany, is restricted to be understood as a cultural matter.

Keywords: Headscarf, Germany, Gender, Feminism, Culture.

Almanya'daki Feminist Tartışmalarda Başörtüsü Meselesinin Analizi

ÖZET

Bu çalışmanın amacı, Almanya'da başörtüsü meselesini feminist tartışmalar üzerinden incelemektir. Önemli ölçüde Müslüman göçmen barındıran Almanya, İkinci Dünya Savaşı sonrasında kültür-odaklı millet anlayışının hâkim olduğu tarihsel arkaplanına yeniden dönmesiyle, Avrupa'da başörtüsü tartışmaları içerisinde istisnai bir yere sahiptir. Bazı Alman eyaletlerinde İslami başörtüsünün yasaklanması, bu tarihsel arkaplan çerçevesinde 'çoğunluk Alman toplumu' ile 'azınlık Türk toplumu' arasındaki problemleri ortaya çıkarmaktadır. Bu makalede Almanya'nın "kültür-ulusu" mirasının 2000'lerde başörtüsü "kavgasının" feminist tartışmaları – hem başörtüsü yasağını benimseyen hem de ona karşı olan- belirlediği ve bu nedenle Almanya örneğinde başörtüsü tartışmalarının kültür meselesine indirgenerek ele alındığı iddia edilmektedir.

Anahtar kelimeler: Başörtüsü, Almanya, Toplumsal Cinsiyet, Feminizm, Kültür.

* Berrin Koyuncu Lorasdağı, Assoc. Prof. Dr., Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Hacettepe University, Beytepe, Ankara, Turkey. E-mail: bkoyuncu@hacettepe.edu.tr. Hilal Onur İnce, Assoc. Prof. Dr., Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Hacettepe University, Beytepe, Ankara, Turkey. E-mail: ohilal@hacettepe.edu.tr

It has become a cliché to say that globalization processes have caused the world to become smaller and smaller and more interconnected in economic, political and cultural terms. Without undermining the significance of the effects of globalization on each area, its impact on cultural issues has become more important in the Western European context. The growing migratory flows to European countries have led to the inevitable interaction between Western culture and the other cultures in the world, and specifically Islamic culture. In the post-September 11 era, the widespread belief regarding the famous thesis of a ‘clash of civilizations’, which is based on the idea that “cultural differences are deemed to be highly resistant to change and increased interaction has produced conflict”,¹ has become very popular. This argument highlights the prevalence of culture, not politics or economics, “that would dominate and divide the world”.² The incidents of September 11 had a detrimental effect on what were already negative and racist images of Islam in the West.³ While Muslims are mostly portrayed as irrational, uncivilized, threatening and uniquely fundamentalist, Muslim populations and societies with different cultural, political and religious traditions are homogenized to embody certain specific, negative characteristics.⁴ In the process, Islam is demonized and made to appear incompatible with more “progressive” Western values and civilization and Muslim residents of Europe are believed to represent “threats” to Europe.⁵

The recent attacks on the mosques in Germany and the Netherlands highlight the fact that any ordinary Muslim who goes to a mosque can be perceived as an Islamic fundamentalist or terrorist and stigmatized as someone who poses a threat to the country’s security. In this context, as Fekete remarks, “a culture of suspicion”⁶ has been created in Europe in the aftermath of September 11, under the guise of the “war on terror”.⁷ This has resulted in the implementation of racist measures against the Muslim migrants living there and in Islam becoming a racial category “naturalized” through culturalist (cultural difference) discourse.

¹ Samuel Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, New York, Simon Schuster, 1996.

² Tark Ali, *The Clash of Fundamentalisms: Crusades, Jihad and Modernity*, London, Verso, 2002, p. 273.

³ The murder of a Dutch film-maker, Theo van Gogh, by an Islamic fundamentalist in Amsterdam at the beginning of November 2004 because of his controversial film on Islamic culture entitled, “Submission”, provoked aggressive reactions against Islam in Holland. Although Dutch-Moroccan institutions condemned the murder, a lot of mosques and institutions belonging to Muslims were attacked. This episode indicates the increasing intolerance against the Muslim minority living in Europe in the aftermath of September 11.

⁴ Sina A. Muscati, “Reconstructing ‘Evil’: A Critical Assessment of Post-September 11 Political Discourse”, *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, Vol 23, No 2, 2003, p. 249-69.

⁵ Mustafa Aydın and Sinem Açıkmeşe, “İslam Örneğinde Küreselleşen Dünyada Kimliğe Dayalı Güvenlik Tehditleri”, *International Relations*, Vol 5, No 18, Summer 2008, p. 197-214.

⁶ Liz Fekete, “The Emergence of Xeno-Racism”, *Race & Class*, Vol 43, No 2, 2001, p. 23.

⁷ For the impact of “global security paradigm” on the rising tension between the West and Islam, see Rasim Özgür Dönmez, “Küreselleşme, Batı Modernliği ve Şiddet: Batı’ya Karşı Siyasal İslam”, *International Relations*, Vol. 1, No 4, winter 2004, p. 85.

It is maintained that the very contentious issue of the headscarf ban in the schools of most European countries has become an important issue within this context as a ban like this is considered to be the legitimation of the growth of Islamophobia. As Beverly Weber highlights, “the Islamic headscarf has recently gained a special place in the national imagination, understood as a symbol of the Muslim migrant women’s otherness, her oppression, and her cultural difference, implicitly revealing a growing fear about the place of Islam in Germany.”⁸ Under these circumstances, the Islamic headscarf is no longer explained within the economic status of a Muslim immigrant woman. Instead due to the shift in the status of headscarf-wearing Muslim immigrant woman from a cleaner or housewife to a subject demanding to be recognized as a “*Türkische Mitbürger*” (“Turkish co-citizens”)⁹, the headscarf has been attributed a specific emphasis in the cultural otherness of minority Turkish society. Therefore, this study intends to be a discussion of the headscarf issue in the German context, which is argued to represent “racism without race” in Western Europe. In this regard, after the Second World War, Germany stands as a peculiar case with its return to its historical background as a culture-oriented nation. In this article, it is contended that this orientation evinces itself in the feminist debates on the headscarf affair in Germany. Thus the aim here is to reveal that both in pro and contra-headscarf feminist debates, the headscarf issue, in the specific case of Germany, is restricted to be understood as a cultural matter.

“Majority versus Minority”: The German Case

Since German society has traditionally not defined itself as an immigration society and migrants were mostly excluded from political participation, immigrants are still considered as a *foreign* group with *foreign* customs on the German territory.¹⁰

In the German context, Balibar uses the term *Kulturnation* (cultural nation), which is based on the concept of “the Elect nation”. Although the seeds of this idea were sown originally in Hegel’s studies, the concrete expressions of the “Elect Nation” can be found in Fichte’s “Addresses to the German Nation” (1806). What is significant in Fichte’s study is the ‘purification of the “German nation” - which to him is sacred, from “all kinds of traditional and particular features”¹¹ that are common to all other nation buildings. Given Fichte’s views on Germany as a “cultural nation”, one can argue that Germany is a “country of philosophers and poets” where the ideal of culture is the determining and sacred category. In this vein, by drawing a bold line between the German and the non-German, culture transforms into *Leitkultur* (predominant and guiding culture) which denotes discriminating and culture-chauvinistic attitudes of some Western people against the immigrants, in the racist discourse. The roots of the discussion

⁸ Beverly Weber, “Cloth on her Head, Constitution in Hand: Germany’s Headscarf Debates and the Cultural Politics of Difference”, *German Politics and Society*, Vol. 22, No 3, 2004, p. 33.

⁹ Schirin Amir-Moazami, “Muslim Challenges to the Secular Consensus: A German Case Study”, *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, Vol. 13, No 3, 2005, p. 274.

¹⁰ Mark Terkessidis, “Der lange Abschied von der Fremdheit. Kulturelle Globalisierung und Migration“, *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, B 12, 2002, p. 36.

¹¹ Etienne Balibar, “Der Rassismus: auch noch ein Universalismus“, in: Ulrich Bielefeld (ed), *Das Eigene und das Fremde. Neuer Rassismus in der Alten Welt?* Hamburg, Hamburger Edition, 1998, p.177.

on *Leitkultur* go back to the national debate in Germany which aims to draw distinctions of belonging on the basis of culture in order to establish the terms according to which foreigners should gain access to citizenship and be excluded.¹²

As a consequence of the increasing number of “foreigners”, exclusionary policies adopted after 1989 have resulted in the “otherization” of those people who are considered as “different and dangerous”.¹³ Relatedly, such policies lead to foreigners’ being defined as the “enemy” on the basis of the claim that they will act contrary to the German constitution. The debate on *Leitkultur* was therefore returned to the agenda in 1999 when the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) attempted to prevent the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and Greens from passing a citizenship law designed to improve foreign settler status. The term *Leitkultur* was used by Jörg Schönbohm, former minister responsible for internal affairs of Brandenburg, in March 1999 in an interview with the neo-Nazi paper *Junge Freiheit*. Here Schönbohm denounced parallel cultures and defined the basis of common life “since Otto the Great to today” as the value order of Christian Western culture. In this vein, he argued that German culture had to predominate.¹⁴ This argument includes the claim that the integration of migrants living in Germany into German society is possible only when they thoroughly adapt to the dominant leading culture. In the speech he gave at the German Federation Parliament in the autumn of 2000, Friedrich Merz, the former Secretary General of the CDU, told his audience that “*Ausländer*” (foreigners) have to be ready to adapt to the German guiding culture”.¹⁵ *Leitkultur* implies a community and a set of German cultural attributes which Angela Merkel, the chancellor of the coalition of CDU and SPD, defined as “a clear commitment to the fatherland, tolerance, civil society and world openness”.¹⁶ This definition is related to the de facto dominance of Western Christian values. Rafik Schami interrogates the *Leitkultur* argument of the Germans in his following words: “the concept of the leading culture is the modern version of racism. From now on the essential thing is to be convinced of the existence of a culture that others have to submit to rather than accepting the loftiness of a race”.¹⁷

In fact, the term “racism” is not used in Germany to refer to the discrimination of people who have non-German origins. The preferred term is *Ausländerfeindlichkeit* (hostility against foreigners). Due to Germany’s particular history and due to German

¹² Jude Bloomfield, “Made in Berlin”: Multicultural Conceptual Confusion and Intercultural Reality”, *International Journal of Cultural Policy*, Vol. 9, No 2, 2003, p.173.

¹³ See M. Zeki Duman, “Modernden Post-Moderne Geçişte Kimlik Tartışmaları ve Çokkültürlülük”, *International Relations*, Vol. 4, No 13, Spring 2007, p. 9-10.

¹⁴ Jörg Schönbohm, “Ich möchte, dass die innere Einheit vorangetrieben wird”. Der CDU-Landeschef über seine Partei, die PDS, Brandenburger Verhältnisse, deutsche Leitkultur und sein Verstaendnis von nationaler Identitaet in Europa”, 26 March 1999, <http://www.jf-archiv.de/archiv99/139aa09.htm> (Accessed on 12 June 2004).

¹⁵ Friedrich Merz, *Die Welt*, 25 October 2000.

¹⁶ Angela Merkel, the Speech delivered in the Party Congress of the CDU on 6-7 December 2004, Dusseldorf, www.cdu.de/doc/pdf/Parteitag-Dusseldorf.pdf (Accessed 21 July 2009).

¹⁷ Rafik Schami, “So schön ist deutschland: Der Schriftsteller Rafik Schami kommt viel rum. Notizen aus dem Land der Leitkultur“, *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 18 November 2000, p. 11.

fascism the term “racism” was a taboo in political and theoretical discussions. This led to a rejection of the reality of racism. However, in recent years, the term racism has started to feature in the intellectual discourse. In this context, the fundamental question in Germany should be “who can be defined as foreigners?” “Should people who have been living in this country for approximately fifty years be defined as foreigners, aliens, guest workers (*Gastarbeiter*) or outsiders”? During those years, the real character of the status of non-Germans has been changed from rotating workers to immigrants with their own neighborhood and cultural and religious areas. Despite this development, the identity of immigrants, particularly of the younger generation, has not transformed into a form of German identity. “While *de facto* the guests became residents, they did so without *de jure* status under German law”.¹⁸ Without doubt, this situation is related to the understanding that “Germany is a cultural nation” and the strict definition of “who is German”. The following words of Nora Raethzel¹⁹ spotlight this fact:

First, no connections can be made between what is happening with the rise of racism today and the past... Second, the politics of defining the German nation by legislation... and excluding those not so defined, have been so successful as to become the unquestioned commonsense of the vast majority of West Germans. Third, this national self-definition, this national idea of Germany, has completely obliterated the reality of Germany as a country of immigration.²⁰

In July 2001, the independent *Süessmuth* Commission released its report on the future of immigration in Germany. The report reveals what politicians have denied for decades, namely that Germany has become an immigration country. According to the newly published integration report of *Berlin Institut für Bevölkerung und Entwicklung* (Berlin Institute for Population and Development), approximately 14 million people from a total population of 82 million have non-German origins.²¹ With a population of approximately three million people, Turkish people are the largest ethnic minority. The main point of the report is that, as the ethnic German population shrinks,²² Germany will require significant reforms to modernize its approach to immigration and immigrants. Although the German industry, churches, cultural and social institutions are the most enthusiastic supporters of this report and advocates of the multicultural transformation of the German society, the official political mainstream view is still against the adoption of such a liberal immigration policy as a consequence of the failure of integration. Two out of every three people feel that too many foreigners are being let into the country. A more disturbing observation is that, according to a

¹⁸ Jude Bloomfield, “‘Made in Berlin’: Multicultural Conceptual Confusion and Intercultural Reality”, 2003, p. 170.

¹⁹ Nora Raethzel, senior researcher at Umea University in Sweden, is recognised for her works on racism and women’s studies. She is one of the founders of the institute for migration and racism studies in Hamburg and a member of the editorial board of the journal *Das Argument*.

²⁰ Nora Raethzel, “Germany: one race, one nation?”, *Race & Class*, Vol. 32, No 3, 1990, p. 45.

²¹ Franzis Woellert, et.al., “Ungenutzte Potenziale. Zur Lage der Integration in Deutschland“, *Berlin Institut für Bevölkerung und Entwicklung*, Berlin, 2009, p. 12, 26.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 80-86.

report by the Free University Berlin in 2006, one in every eight Germans considers himself or herself to be staunchly anti-foreigner and sympathizes with the right-wing extremist groups.²³

Such attitudes against the foreigners can be explained by the assumption of the existence of *Mehrheitsgesellschaft* – a German majority – in Germany. As Bloomfield argues, the term *Mehrheitsgesellschaft* does not refer to a politically constituted and verified majority, but an implicit ethnic majority.²⁴ Following the legacy of the German *Kulturnation* understanding, *Mehrheitsgesellschaft* presumes to “share a certain linguistic and lifestyle characteristics that imply a common way of life and values”.²⁵ When the “majority society” is used, it implies “an opposition between the majority and its minority others, whose distinguishing features are generally negative social and cultural traits, leaving an implicit, contrary, positive image of the majority”.²⁶ The primary minority that is defined as a negative other to the German majority is the Turks. As Bloomfield states, “Turks are portrayed in terms of large families, self-excluding and ghettoizing tendencies, with a poor command of German, an alien, with Islamicist political tendencies, focused on the fundamentalist organization *Milli Görüş* (National View)”.²⁷ The following advertisement written by a Turk in an ironic manner highlights the prejudices against Turks as the minority:

One young Turkish family is looking for a 3-4-room house in *Giessen*. Attention! Although our advertisement seems to have no problems, still, like each foreign family living in Germany we are not unproblematic. We have one daughter but as you know we reproduce like rabbits so, in a couple of years, we will have a series of dirty and spoiled children who will turn your house into a hell... If you have a nice garden with nice trees and flowers, our children will destroy it in a few minutes and we will hang our clothes in the garden as well. These hung clothes will only disappear when we have garden parties with our friends and relatives. Besides, we slaughter our sheep in the bathroom. As soon as we have moved to your house, the apartment corridors will smell of garlic. Everyday, a ‘cacophony of’ Turkish music will be emitted from our windows. Traditionally, Turkish women are battered by their husbands at least once in a week. For this reason, your house will soon be well known to the local police. As we often involve in criminal activities, which pose a threat to public order, there will almost always be police cars parked outside your house. As you know, knife-fights are the norm for us. Although we are a three-person family, your house will be used by about twenty people since we often have guests.²⁸

²³ www.polsoz.fu-berlin.de/polwiss/forschung/systeme/empsoz/forschung/media/ahosz12.pdf (Accessed on 21 July 2009).

²⁴ Jude Bloomfield, “Made in Berlin”: Multicultural Conceptual Confusion and Intercultural Reality”, 2003, p. 171.

²⁵ Ibid., p.171.

²⁶ Ibid., p.171.

²⁷ Ibid., p.172.

²⁸ DOMIT-Ausstellung, “40 Jahre Fremde Heimat. Einwanderung aus der Türkei”, June 2001, http://domit.de/seiten/resonanz/re_40jahre_fremde_heimat_heimat-de.html (Accessed on 15 February 2004).

The following words of a young German-Turkish woman are also very meaningful to attract attention to how the ‘majority society’ is built on a foundation provided by a ‘minority society’:

In the ever-recurring discussion on ‘foreign’ cultural identities I wonder whether the majority society is conscious of its own cultural identity. Does it not too often produce its own “cultural identity” as the mirror image of that of minorities? The “majority society” is modern because “minority society” is conservative, “majority society” is tolerant because “minority society” is intolerant, in “majority society” emancipation is realized while in “minority society” women are oppressed. So long as we do not transcend this net separation between “we” and “you”, there will be no warmth in this country. Therefore, it is time to overcome these and form a common, solidaristic, and pluralistic, human civic space.²⁹

The headscarf debate should therefore be evaluated within this context in Germany, a country in which the issue is reduced to a fight about a “small piece of clothing” in relation to cultural and religious values. In fact, this issue is not that simplistic since if one considers the differences on the basis of culture, the restrictive attitude on the headscarf reveals the tendency of German majority society to view the minority society, here the Muslim Turks, as underdeveloped and to discriminate against them.

The Headscarf Issue in Germany: A Cultural Struggle on “A Piece of Clothing”?

Since the formal proposition of the then French President Chirac on 17 December 2003 to enact a law banning the display of religious symbols in state institutions in France, serious debates have taken place in European countries on the Islamic headscarf and the proposal of a law that bans it. The law, passed in March 2004, forbids conspicuous religious signs or apparel in public schools, including Christian crosses, Jewish skullcaps and Islamic headscarves. Enforced since the beginning of September 2004, the ban is justified on the basis that France’s much cherished principle of secularism which, they argue, is “the best way to guarantee peaceful coexistence among the country’s various religions and communities”.³⁰

Teachers have been the issue in Germany. It started in 1998 when Fereshta Ludin, a German of Afghan origin went to court to try to overturn a decision by school authorities in Stuttgart not to hire her because she insisted on wearing a headscarf.³¹ Her case failed at all lev-

²⁹ Ibid., p. 172.

³⁰ Over six thousand Muslim women demonstrated in Paris in December 2004 to protest against the law that bans the wearing of headscarves by teachers and students at public schools. They wore French tricolor headscarves –with the blue, white and red colors symbolizing France’s most cherished values of liberty, fraternity, and equality and sang the French national anthem. The marchers carried banners like “The Veil is My Choice”, “Beloved France, Where is My Liberty?” and held their identity cards above their heads to show that they are French citizens most of whose native language is French.

³¹ For more detailed information about the Ludin case, see Axel F. von Campenhausen, “The German Headscarf Debate”, *Brigham Young University Law Review*, No 2, January 2004, p.665-699; Weber, “Cloth on her Head”, p. 42-46.

els of administrative appeal. She had to wait until 24 September 2003 when the Constitutional Court ruled that a ban on teachers was impermissible as long as there was no legislation to this effect. However, it also declared that new laws could be passed by individual states to ban them if they were deemed to influence students. Following the court's decision, since the autumn of 2004, seven of Germany's 16 federal states³² legislated to ban the wearing of headscarves by Muslim teachers because they feel that the headscarf is an expression of an aggressive, political or missionary attitude and is incompatible with the required neutrality of state institutions.³³ However, unlike France, the German government did not enforce any restriction on the wearing of a monk's or nun's habit, nor crucifixes because they believe that such religious symbols are the expressions of "almost two hundred years of Christian culture in the West".³⁴ This argument stems from the dominant perspective based on (Christian German) *Leitkultur*. The then Justice Minister of Baden-Württemberg, Corinna Werwigg-Hertneck, claimed that headscarves are different from crosses because children have to learn the roots of Christian religion and European culture.³⁵ In a more radical manner, Monika Hohlmeier, the former Bavaria's minister of culture, also demanded a legal prohibition that regards all those who wear headscarves as potential "enemies of the constitution" and added, "we must not open a door for fundamentalism and extremism".³⁶ She claimed that it was completely different for nuns to wear their habits while teaching and to hang crucifixes in classrooms because the churches had declared their allegiance to basic social values.³⁷ Parallel to these views, some people in the Supreme Court stated that hanging a crucifix above the school door did not disadvantage pupils' freedom of religion since it was a "cultural symbol of openness and tolerance"³⁸, while the headscarf represented the subservient role of the woman and is therefore in conflict with the constitution. In this situation, "male Muslim teachers would have to shave off their beards before entering the classroom while Protestant teachers with big bushy beards would still be tolerated"³⁹. In this respect, it is not exaggeration to claim that the ban on Islamic headscarves is a tool used to express the growing hostility against the Muslim community in Germany.

³² Berlin bans all religious symbols in schools. Bavaria, Baden-Württemberg, and Hessen banned headscarves for Muslim teachers but allow the display of Christian and Jewish symbols such as nuns' habits and yarmulkes. Headscarves are forbidden in Saarland and Lower Saxony.

³³ On January 2004, the Central Committee of German Catholics stated that the headscarf should be viewed as a political not a religious symbol and they demanded the exemption from this ban of the symbols that they regard as part of the country's Christian tradition. "Muslim Headscarf, a Political Symbol Should be Banned", *U.S. Catholic*, 7 January 2004, p. 10.

³⁴ Some federal states that are governed by the CDU proposed bills to ban teachers from wearing headscarves and at the same time grant consent for the wearing of Christian religious symbols for historic and cultural reasons. Lale Akgün, "Against the Relativism of the Headscarf Debate!", 12 March 2004, Retrieved from http://www.qantara.de/webcom/show_article.php?wc_c=549&wc_id=3&wc_p=1 (Accessed on 19 January 2005).

³⁵ Stefan Theil, "Tolerating Intolerance", 4 March 2004, <http://www.aicgs.org/analysis/c/theil030404.aspx> (Accessed on 5 October 2004).

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ *Netzeitung Deutschland*, 11 November 2004, <http://www.netzeitung.de/deutschland/312834.html> (Accessed on 21 February 2005).

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Peter Philipp, "Will Beards Be Banned Soon Too?", *Deutsche Welle/DW-WORLD.DE*, 2003.

Naturally, there are two sides to this debate. There are people who are against the ban, and others who are in favor of it.⁴⁰ Rather than taking sides, this study aims to analyze the headscarf issue in Germany to reveal how race, gender, and the dominance of “majority culture” intersect in this context.

In the following part of the study, after an investigation of the gender dimension of this affair, particularly through from the perspective of German feminists,⁴¹ we will highlight how the ground has been prepared for cultural racism in Germany. It is important for such a study to be carried out because the headscarf issue in Germany has different dimensions in comparison to the situation in France.⁴² While in the latter case secularism is the primary tool of analysis, in the former, racist and gender discrimination prevail from a culture-essentialist perspective. It is for this reason that we believe the situation in Germany to be interesting as it provides us with clues for the emerging picture in the aftermath of September 11 in relation to the attitudes and policies of Western European countries which have attempted to associate and explain all the issues concerning Islam with culture.

German Feminist Perspectives on the Headscarf Debate

The main argument feminists raised about the Islamic headscarf is that Muslim women have to cover their heads symbolizes their subjugation and oppression. It is on this basis that most feminists in Europe approve the headscarf ban. To them, the headscarf symbolizes the inferior status of women in Muslim societies and threatens the Enlightenment’s achievements. Daniela Martin, one of the editors of *EMMA*, the popular feminist magazine in Germany, stated that they are primarily against the headscarf because they believe in the separation of church and state. Secondly, they believe that the headscarf is used as a political strategy in the oppression of Muslim women.⁴³ The supporters of *EMMA* also contend that Muslim women are oppressed by Muslim men, that is by their fathers or brothers who force them to cover their heads. They therefore claim that Muslim girls and women do not voluntarily or consciously choose to wear headscarves. In this respect, they support and justify the ban by saying that German politicians are fighting for the “liberation” of Muslim women with the help of a law that bans headscarves. However if veiling means the seclusion of women and the strengthening of male dominance and oppression, as Western feminists suggest, “what about non-Islamic veils such as those of Christian nuns?”⁴⁴

⁴⁰ For the pro-headscarf and anti-headscarf positions in Germany, see Susan B. Rottmann and Mayr Marx Ferree, “Citizenship and Intersectionality: German Feminist Debates about Headscarf and Antidiscrimination Laws”, *Social Politics*, Vol. 15, No 4, 2008, p. 481-513.

⁴¹ We do not want to generalize about German feminists, as there is variety of perspectives on the headscarf debates. For example while radical German feminists writing in *EMMA* support the ban and associate the headscarf with the gammadion, the Marxist feminists writing in *Argument* contend that such a ban will discriminate only against Muslim women, and not men.

⁴² For the difference in legal situations in France and Germany, see Von Campenhausen, “The German Headscarf Debate”, p. 694-698.

⁴³ Nora Fitzgerald, “Headscarf in Schools Divides Germans”, *International Herald Tribune*, 21 October 2003.

⁴⁴ Emmanuel Terray, “Headscarf Hysteria”, *New Left Review*, No 26, March-April 2004, p.124.

In all European countries, and particularly in Germany, feminists have engaged in the headscarf debate in a quite controversial and “hectic manner”.⁴⁵ Expectedly, there are pro and contra headscarf positions among the German feminists.⁴⁶ But, to us, more important than taking either of sides is the dominance of the *Leitkultur* approach concerning the evaluation of women’s oppression as part of Muslim women’s culture. The vagueness of German feminists with regard to what they mean by terms such as mentality, value judgements and socialization when they talk about “those who are different”, “those who do not belong to the majority”, causes them to explain any issue which is related to the “other” by associating it with culture. This tendency is increasingly evident in the recent headscarf debate in Germany, which the feminists base on culture.

Culture is a key element used to distinguish (German) “majority” women from (Turkish) “minority” women. Here the emphasis is on the construction of culture, with a non-historical, closed and unchangeable character.⁴⁷ For this reason, it is accepted that the dominant culture understood as universal but predominantly German *Leitkultur* is a reality that determines the life of a person who belongs to that culture in all areas of his/her life. Gumen and Lenz criticize this presumption of the priority of *Leitkultur* which, they believed, paved the ground for the naturalization of cultural differences.⁴⁸ As the minority (here Turkish) women move away from the existence of cultural characteristics that are determined by their roots, they are treated with the same cultural prejudices which women from the same country and with the same roots have been confronted with. A study carried out by Otyakmaz on the formation of group behavior by Turkish women reveals that somatic characteristics like dark skin color and black hair are linked with secondary outer characteristics such as headscarves, wearing style of clothing, language, and the personal behavior of women as a whole.⁴⁹ They therefore are regarded as the determining characteristics of all Turkish women. Due to this stereotype, Turkish women and/or *Ausländerin* type are opposed to German women. Here Otyakmaz points out the opposition created between Turkish and German cultures in feminist discourses to attract attention to the “racist” characterizations of culture “that reduce people to being representatives of a static culture”.⁵⁰ This approach, which is based on the cultural deficit argument with a focus on issues

⁴⁵ Sabine Kebir, “Vom Zwang familiaerer Autoritaet befreien. Das Kopftuch und die sexuelle Selbstbestimmung der Frau”, Frigga Haug & Katrin Reimer (eds.), *Politik ums Kopftuch*, Berlin and Hamburg, Argument, 2005, p. 82.

⁴⁶ See Rottmann and Marx Ferree, “Citizenship and Intersectionality”, p. 497-501.

⁴⁷ Ayşe Çağlar, “Das Kultur-Konzept als Zwangsjacke in Studien zur Arbeitsmigration“, *Zeitschrift für Türkeistudien*, Vol. 3, No 1, 1990, pp. 93-105.

⁴⁸ See Sedef Gumen, “Die sozialpolitische Konstruktion kultureller Differenzen in der bundesdeutschen Frauen- und Migrationsforschung“, *Beitraege zur feministischen theorie und praxis*, No 42, 1996, p. 77-87; Ilse Lenz “Grenzziehungen und Öffnungen: Zum Verhaeltnis von Geschlecht und Ethnizitaet zu Zeiten der Globalisierung“, Ilse Lenz, Andrea Germer, Brigitte Hasenjürgen (eds.), *Wechselnde Blicke. Frauenforschung in internationaler Perspektive*, Leske+Budrich, Opladen, 1996, p. 209.

⁴⁹ Berrin Özlem Otyakmaz, *Auf allen Stühlen. Das Selbstverstaendnis junger türkischer Migrantinnen in Deutschland*, Köln, Neuer IPS-Verlag, 1995, p. 43.

⁵⁰ Rottmann and Marx Ferree, “Citizenship and Intersectionality”, p. 496.

like headscarf, honor crimes etc., has been called ethno-feminism⁵¹ in recent years in Germany and it is believed to lead to culture-essentialist tendencies. Consequently, it became difficult to find a common ground in a context in which cultural differences are too multi-dimensional.⁵²

One of the important tendencies in the German feminist groups is represented by Alice Schwarzer, the radical feminist editor of EMMA. In her declaration entitled "Half Victory of the Fanatics",⁵³ Schwarzer criticizes the 2003 Court Decision which regards any headscarf ban undemocratic. She argues that this decision laid the viable ground for the enhancement of the patriarchal system. In this vein, with an emphasis on the need to struggle against the patriarchal culture, those who support the ban on wearing headscarves have a tendency toward culture-determinism. Basing their approach on the need for a universal culture, with a focus on Western culture, they believe that any inequality or discrimination against women should be opposed. In this regard, since they believe that the headscarf is a tool used to oppress Muslim women, they are against the Islamic headscarf.

At the same time, three leading politicians, namely Marieluise Beck,⁵⁴ Barbara John,⁵⁵ and Rita Süßmuth⁵⁶ initiated a call entitled "Religiöse Vielfalt statt Zwangsemanzipation!": Aufruf wider eine Lex Kopftuch" ("Religious Multiplicity Instead of Obligatory Emancipation!": A Call Against A Headscarf Decision"). This call was signed by approximately 100 leading German women including feminists, academics, and spokespeople for the institutions such as the church and cultural associations. The main argument here is that wearing headscarves cannot be regarded as the regulation of clothing. The suggestion is that migrant women living in Germany are under pressure from their traditions and cannot participate freely in society. They claimed that there is therefore an urgent need to apply legal sanctions to ensure that these women are not prevented from participating in society. But at the same time, they attracted attention to the fact that the freedom of expression, freedom of religion, and religious pluralism should not be associated with fundamentalism. They expressed that women in diaspora (here Turkish women in Germany) covered their heads not just for religious reasons but as a symbol of their cultural identities.⁵⁷

⁵¹ See Lisa Schmuckli, *Differenzen und Dissonanzen*, Sulzbach, Helmer Verlag, 1996; Rita Casale & Barbara Rendtorff, *Was kommt nach der Genderforschung?: Zur Zukunft der feministischen Theoriebildung*, Bielefeld, Transcript, 2007; Sabine Hark, *Dis/Kontinuitäten: Feministische Theorie*, Wiesbaden, Vs Verlag, 2007.

⁵² Helma Lutz, "In zwei Welten denken und handeln", Marion Schulz (ed.), *Fremde Frauen. Von der Gastarbeiterin zur Bürgerin*, Frankfurt/M., iko-Verlag, 1992, p. 65.

⁵³ Alice Schwarzer, "Ein halber Sieg für die Fanatiker. Über das Kopftuch-Urteil in Karlsruhe", 15 September 2004, <http://www.aliceschwarzer.de/63222568822561.html> (Accessed on 7 January 2005).

⁵⁴ She was from the Green Party. She acted as the then head of the Migration, Refugee and Integration Department of the German government.

⁵⁵ She was from the Christian Democratic Union (CDU). She performed the duty responsible for Foreigners of the Berlin state.

⁵⁶ She was from the Christian Democratic Union (CDU). She performed the duty responsible for Women and Family Affairs.

⁵⁷ Marieluise Beck et al., "Religiöse Vielfalt statt Zwangsemanzipation!": Aufruf wider eine Lex Kopftuch", Frigga Haug & Katrin Reimer (eds.), *Politik ums Kopftuch*, Berlin and Hamburg, Argument, 2005, p. 10-12.

Frigga Haug, a Marxist feminist and one of the editors of the journal *Das Argument*, discusses the headscarf issue in terms of gender discrimination. Haug, who signed the open letter written by the leftist and feminists under the title “Foreigners, who are enemies of women, get out of Germany”⁵⁸, said that “the course of the headscarf dispute concealed the real problems”⁵⁹ and underlined the need to recognize that the headscarf issue stands as a case where women are prevented from making decisions about their own bodies. In an interview, she said she only signed this letter to provoke, to enlighten the bigotry of the headscarf discussion. She remarked, “It was only a joke!”. When the interviewer told that this joke would not be appreciated by migrants, Haug replied:

That is a question of reality. In all cultural revolutions, for example against the abuse of girls, there has been this debate. Do you really think that my aim is to put the blame on fathers and take them out of the families? But something must be done to highlight the scandalous circumstances in the families.⁶⁰

Despite Haug wanting to create space for a discussion of this topic and to manifest “a political didactic play”⁶¹, she did so in a very sensitive German situation. In fact, her antiracist, feminist-Marxist and egalitarian background should have caused her to realize that such a provocative call has the potential to be manipulated and misused by those with racist, conservative and other discriminative views.

Haug rejected the criticism that such a call can be associated with a perception that Western women are attempting to save Muslim women. She is against discussing the headscarf issue in a neo-liberal way which regards covering a woman’s head as a personal choice. She claims that approaching the headscarf issue as the “continuation of a folkloric tradition without studying the background” would be equivalent to accepting that Chinese women voluntarily want their feet to be tied together tightly to prevent them from walking. It does so by stressing the idea that everybody has the natural right to live under a bridge or to be a slave, and neglects the fact that the real problem is the removal of all kinds of slavery and oppression. By claiming that the salvation of woman can be accomplished based on the dynamics which change from one culture to another, Haug expresses her view that the binary attitude toward wearing a headscarf or not should be transcended with new spaces being opened for women who are culturally different so that they can express themselves and debate their own problems and participate freely in society.⁶² Here Haug suggests that women should bring about their own emancipation themselves. On this point, Haug argues that if the headscarf issue is debated free from discourses such as “tolerance for the headscarf” or “yes or no for the headscarf”, a political space can be created where “with the struggle for equality of women and discrimination against women, women’s questions in general and Muslim migrant women’s problems in particular can be

⁵⁸ “*Frauenfeindliche Ausländer raus aus Deutschland*”, January 2004, <http://www.vsp-vernetzt.de/soz/040303.htm> (Accessed on 11 March 2005).

⁵⁹ Frigga Haug, *taz*, 17 January 2004.

⁶⁰ Haug, *taz*, 17 January 2004.

⁶¹ Haug, “Der Kopftuchstreit als politisches Lehrstück”, p. 171.

⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 188-190.

discussed in a productive manner.”⁶³ However, she does not develop a concrete method as to how women can realize this goal. At this point, one can claim that the problem with Haug is rooted in her unclear approach to headscarves in this context.

Unlike Haug’s intention to establish a dialogue between different sides, the discussions following the open letter have evolved in the opposite direction. Thus the letter constitutes a rupture concerning the headscarf struggle in Germany. Up until this time, the headscarf discussion in Germany had focused on schoolteachers. However, after the letter, the discussion was shifted to headscarves in general. Teachers in schools have started to think of imposing the ban on schoolgirls.

Besides the feminist headscarf debates in Germany that revolved around the political issues such as freedom, discrimination, and participation, we should take into account the views of those feminists who highlight the importance of the cultural dimension of this affair. These feminists criticize discussions on the headscarf issue along the lines of banning and tolerating. Instead, they believe that this issue should be considered within the hegemonic relationship between the “majority” and the “minority” culture. At this point, the following words of Birgit Rommelspacher⁶⁴ can be read as a serious criticism to Haug’s vacillating position:

It is a must to stand up against oppression and violence against girls and women and their fathers’ and brothers’ forcing them to wear a headscarf. However, what if it is the woman’s will to wear it, if it was an expression of resistance to the assimilation demands of the dominant society, so as to speak a form of emancipation against Christian-Western domination, which would be only such a provocation because it would target against ourselves. This domination reveals itself in using two different measures also when talking about values of equality and freedom. Because who would expel all the German-Christian men and women who act against the principle of equal treatment?⁶⁵

Rommelspacher argues that the Western feminists are behaving in an illusion of “colonial feminism”. She expresses that the demand to ban the headscarf is “a fatal continuation of the German tradition” and “a strategy that will gain the sympathy of a lot Germans”.⁶⁶

Those who adopt a differentiated view towards the headscarf issue, contend that the belief that the cause of the oppression of woman changes from society to society means that the emancipation of Muslim women cannot be achieved through banning headscarves. They state that such a practice would imply an intervention in the daily life practises of those women. In this vein, with a feminist and anti-racist perspective,

⁶³ Frigga Haug, “Der Kopftuchstreit als politisches Lehrstück”, Frigga Haug & Katrin Reimer (eds.), *Politik ums Kopftuch*, Berlin and Hamburg, Argument, 2005, p. 175.

⁶⁴ Birgit Rommelspacher, a professor of psychology in Berlin and an expert on racism. She is one of the members of the Berlin Senate commission established to ensure equality of opportunity for women.

⁶⁵ Birgit Rommelspacher, “Eine “billige” Lösung”, Frigga Haug & Katrin Reimer (eds.), *Politik ums Kopftuch*, Berlin and Hamburg, Argument, 2005, p. 98.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 97.

Raethzel raises her criticism with her following words: "It is possible to analyze being a housewife as a way of choosing consciously to be under the yoke. Still, nobody requests the prohibition of being a housewife as the premise of housewives' self emancipation".⁶⁷ Using this differentiated view; Raethzel draws attention to the existence of more than one route to emancipation. She stresses the potential danger of proposing a single way to achieve the emancipation of Muslim women by claiming that it would have an ethnically marginalizing effect, which may help to stabilize sexist and the likely hegemony practises. In this context she touches on the significance of the concept of dialogue. Raethzel believes that dialogue can be used to ensure that differences are accepted on the basis of equal representation without demands to change them. By revealing the commonalities and differences, dialogue will also help to rethink the hegemonic practises in which all women participate.⁶⁸

By focusing on the German feminist debates, the headscarf issue presents us with a "political didactic play"⁶⁹ to see that, in the case of the Islamic headscarf, the particular points of views that are put forward up to now are insufficient to develop a total perspective for understanding the unique feature of Germany which has not solved the cultural, political, economic, and social problems of majority-minority distinction yet.

Future Prospects

The headscarf issue in the specific case of Germany is complicated because the arguments that the German feminists have raised point to the coexistence of gender and racist discrimination and mask the reality that the headscarf issue in the German context expresses more than the "subordination and exploitation" of Muslim women. In fact, what is lacking in the debates by the German feminists is the search for the real and sincere reason as to why these Muslim women wear headscarves. They do not take into account the reality of the distinction in the society between the existence of the dominant "majority" and the ghettoized "minority". We believe that the ignoring the existence this distinction prevents the development of dialogue and generates the assumption that the "majority" culture dominates. Naturally, the fact that they were obliged to carry on with their lives on the sidelines and to face up to the hegemony of the "majority" caused the minority migrant women to hold onto such symbols as the headscarf. Hence, the practice of wearing a headscarf can be regarded as a form of resistance in the German context.

It should be underlined that the feminist movement in Germany is no exception. It supports the mainstream view in Germany on the headscarf issue. By resisting the differences through prohibitions and by demanding the integration and/or adaptation of non-Western women to the Western model or typologies of women, a Euro-centric and ethno-feminist perspective is introduced.

⁶⁷ Raethzel, "Begegnungen mit dem Kopftuch", p. 114.

⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 116.

⁶⁹ Haug, "Der Kopftuchstreit", p. 171.

It is evident that the headscarf debate in Germany revolves around the support and objection to the ban. However, we have argued that none of the attitudes provides a significant solution to this problem. The position of the differentialist-feminists may have the potential to generate a fruitful perspective on this issue through their stress on the significance of establishing dialogue. Nevertheless they do not clarify how such a dialogue can be developed. At this point, it is necessary to think about the form and content of the possible dialogue. Without having sufficient information about the feelings, thoughts and ideas of Muslim women and without including them in this dialogue process, we believe that balanced and equal conditions conducive to the flourishing dialogue that both sides yearn for cannot be reached. Since a real dialogue needs an environment in which both sides can express their historical and cultural backgrounds, and their related ideas and practices on an equal basis, we hope that this controversial debate on the headscarf issue has the potential to force such a dialogue in the specific case of Germany, and in the other Western European countries as well.

Bibliography

- Akgün, Lale, "Against the Relativism of the Headscarf Debate!", 12 March 2004, http://www.qantara.de/webcom/show_article.php?wc_c=5498&wc_id=38&wc_p=1 (Accessed on 19 January 2005).
- Ali, Tarik, *The Clash of Fundamentalisms: Crusades, Jibad and Modernity*, London, Verso, 2002.
- Aydın, Mustafa and Açıkmeşe, Sinem, "İslam Örneğinde Küreselleşen Dünyada Kimliğe Dayalı Güvenlik Tehditleri", *International Relations*, Vol. 5, No 18, Summer 2008, p. 197-214.
- Balibar, Etienne, "Der Rassismus: auch noch ein Universalismus", Ulrich Bielefeld (ed.), *Das Eigene und das Fremde. Neuer Rassismus in der Alten Welt?* Hamburg, Hamburger Edition, 1998.
- Bloomfield, Jude, "'Made in Berlin': Multicultural Conceptual Confusion and Intercultural Reality", *International Journal of Cultural Policy*, Vol. 9, No 2, 2003, p. 167-183.
- Casale, Rita & Rendtorff, Barbara, *Was kommt nach der Genderforschung?: Zur Zukunft der feministischen Theoriebildung*, Bielefeld, Transcript, 2007.
- Çağlar, Ayşe, "Das Kultur-Konzept als Zwangsjacke in Studien zur Arbeitsmigration", *Zeitschrift für Türkeistudien*, Vol. 3, No 1, 1990, p. 93-105.
- DOMIT-Ausstellung, "40 Jahre Fremde Heimat. Einwanderung aus der Türkei", June 2001, http://domit.de/seiten/resonanz/re_40jahre_fremde_heimat_heimat-de.html (Accessed on 15 February 2004).
- Dönmez, Rasim Özgür, "Küreselleşme, Batı Modernliği ve Şiddet: Batı'ya Karşı Siyasal İslam", *International Relations*, Vol. 1, No 4, Winter 2004, p. 81-114.
- Duman, M. Zeki, "Modernden Post-Moderne Geçişte Kimlik Tartışmaları ve Çokkültürlülük", *Uluslararası İlişkiler*, Vol. 4, No 13, Spring 2007, s.3-24.
- Fekete, Liz, "The Emergence of Xeno-Racism", *Race & Class*, Vol. 43, No 2, 2001, p. 23-40.
- Fitzgerald, Nora, "Headscarf in Schools Divides Germans", *International Herald Tribune*, 21 October 2003.
- "Frauenfeindliche Ausländer raus aus Deutschland", January 2004, <http://www.vsp-vernetz.de/soz/040303.htm> (Accessed on 11 March 2005).
- Gumen, Sedef, "Die sozialpolitische Konstruktion kultureller Differenzen in der bundesdeutschen Frauen- und Migrationsforschung", *Beiträge zur feministischen Theorie und Praxis*, No 42, 1996, p. 77-87.
- Hark, Sabine, *Dis/Kontinuitäten: Feministische Theorie*, Wiesbaden, Vs Verlag, 2007.
- Haug, Frigga, "Der Kopftuchstreit als politisches Lehrstück", Frigga Haug & Katrin Reimer (eds.), *Politik ums Kopftuch*, Berlin and Hamburg, Argument, 2005, p. 171-191.
- Huntington, Samuel, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, New York, Simon Schuster, 1996.
- Kebir, Sabine, "Vom Zwang familiärer Autorität befreien. Das Kopftuch und die sexuelle Selbstbestimmung der Frau: Gegenüber Musliminnen in Deutschland sollten nicht die falschen Signale gegeben werden", Frigga Haug & Katrin Reimer (eds.), *Politik ums Kopftuch*, Berlin und Hamburg, Argument, 2005, p.81-84.
- Lenz, Ilse, "Grenzziehungen und Öffnungen: Zum Verhältnis von Geschlecht und Ethnizität zu Zeiten der Globalisierung", Ilse Lenz, Andrea Germer, Brigitte Hasenjürgen, (eds.), *Wechselnde Blicke. Frauenforschung in internationaler Perspektive*, Leske+Budrich, Opladen, 1996.
- Lutz, Helma, "In zwei Welten denken und handeln", Marion Schulz (ed.), *Fremde Frauen. Von der Gastarbeiterin zur Bürgerin*, Frankfurt/M., iko-Verlag, 1992, p. 64-80.
- Merkel, Angela, the Speech delivered in the Party Congress of the CDU on 6-7 December 2004, Düsseldorf, <http://www.cdu.de/doc/pdf/Parteitag-Duesseldorf.pdf> (Accessed on 21 July 2009).
- Muscari, Sina, "Reconstructing 'Evil': A Critical Assessment of Post-September 11 Political Discourse", *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, Vol. 23, No 2, 2003, p. 249-69.

An Analysis of the Headscarf Issue in Feminist Debates in Germany

- “Muslim Headscarf, a Political Symbol Should be Banned”, *U.S. Catholic*, 7 January 2004, p. 10.
- Netzeitung Deutschland, 11 November 2004, <http://www.netzeitung.de/deutschland/312834.html> (Accessed on 21 February 2005).
- Otyakmaz, Berrin Özlem, *Auf allen Stühlen. Das Selbstverständnis junger türkischer Migrantinnen in Deutschland*, Köln, Neuer IPS-Verlag, 1995.
- Philipp, Peter, “Will Beards Be Banned Soon Too?”, *Deutsche Welle/DW-WORLD.DE*, 2003.
- Raethzel, Nora, “Germany: One Race, One Nation?”, *Race & Class*, Vol. 32, No 3, 1990, p. 31-47.
- Raethzel, Nora, “Begegnungen mit dem Kopftuch”, Frigga Haug & Katrin Reimer (eds.), *Politik ums Kopftuch*, Berlin and Hamburg, Argument, 2005, p. 112-119.
- Rommelspacher, Birgit, “Eine “billige” Lösung”, Frigga Haug & Katrin Reimer (eds.), *Politik ums Kopftuch*, Berlin and Hamburg, Argument, 2005, p. 96-98.
- Rottmann, Susan and Marx Ferree, Mayr, “Citizenship and Intersectionality: German Feminist Debates About Headscarf and Antidiscrimination Laws”, *Social Politics*, Vol. 15, No 4, 2008, p. 481-513.
- Schami, Rafik, “so schön ist deutschland: Der Schriftsteller Rafik Schami kommt viel rum. Notizen aus dem Land der Leitkultur”, *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 18 November 2000, p. 11.
- Schönbohm, Jörg, “Ich möchte, dass die innere Einheit vorangetrieben wird”. Der CDU-Landeschef über seine Partei, die PDS, Brandenburger Verhältnisse, deutsche Leitkultur und sein Verständnis von nationaler Identität in Europa”, 26 March 1999, <http://www.jf-archiv.de/archiv99/139aa09.htm> (Accessed on 12 June 2004).
- Schmuckli, Lisa, *Differenzen und Dissonanzen*, Sulzbach, Helmer Verlag, 1996.
- Schwarzer, Alice, “Ein halber Sieg für die Fanatiker. Über das Kopftuch-Urteil in Karlsruhe”, 15 September 2004, <http://www.aliceschwarzer.de/63222568822561.html> (Accessed on 7 January 2005).
- Terkessidis, Mark, “Der lange Abschied von der Fremdheit. Kulturelle Globalisierung und Migration”, *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, B 12, 2002, p.31-38.
- Terray, Emmanuel, “Headscarf Hysteria”, *New Left Review*, No 26, March-April 2004, p. 118-27.
- Theil, Stefan, “Tolerating Intolerance”, 4 March 2004, <http://www.aicgs.org/analysis/c/theil030404.aspx> (Accessed on 5 October 2004).
- Von Campenhausen, Axel F., “The German Headscarf Debate”, *Brigham Young University Law Review*, No 2, January 2004, p. 665-699.
- Weber, Beverly, “Cloth on her Head, Constitution in Hand: Germany’s Headscarf Debates and the Cultural Politics of Difference”, *German Politics and Society*, Vol. 22, No 3, 2004, p. 33-64.
- Woellert, Franzis, Kroehnert, Steffen, Sippel, Lilli, and Klingholz, Reiner, “Ungenutzte Potenziale. Zur Lage der Integration in Deutschland”, *Berlin Institut für Bevölkerung und Entwicklung*, Berlin, 2009.
- <http://www.polsoz.fu-berlin.de/polwiss/forschung/systeme/empsoz/forschung/media/ahosz12.pdf> (Accessed on 21 July 2009)