From the Ottomans to the Republicans: Accommodation of the Kemalist Content in Between the Spiritual and the Temporal

Osmanlılardan Cumhuriyetçilere: Manevi ve Dünyevi Arasında Kemalist İçeriğin Uzlaşımı

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ABSTRACT

The temporal in the kemalist content, resulted from the positivist ideology, especially as it relatedto the kemalist principle of secularism during the single party period. Consequently, even though the Ottoman "theocracy" had been a special case, the kemalist content in its opposition to the Ottoman State, opposed as well the spiritual element in public sphere. The reintegration of liberal Islam in public corresponded on the other hand,tokemalismbeing transformed. The article proposes that the kemalism as a process could transform in relationship to different historical contexts. In turn, the accommodation of the kemalist content in between the temporal and the spiritual depended on kemalism's getting reinterpreted. This,while attributed a new role model to Turkey on the international scene, obeyed nevertheless the status of religion since the Ottoman Empireas submitted to State. The article concludes that kemalist accommodation to the spiritual has only been possiblewithin the reinterpretation of kemalism because the kemalist ideology, as an open ended process, permitted it.

Keywords: Kemalism, Islam, spiritual, temporal, secularism, democracy.

ÖZET

Kemalist içeriktekidünyevilik, özellikle, tek parti süresinde uygulanan kemalist laiklik ilkesine olan alakası söz konusu olduğunda, pozitivist ideolojiyle bağlantılıdır.Sonuç olarak Osmanlı "teokratik" yapısı özel bir durum içerse de, Osmanlı devletine karşıt niteliğiyle Kemalist içerik kamu alanında maneviyatın ifadesine de karşıt olmuştur. Diğer yandan, liberal İslam'ın kamu alanınatekrar dâhil olması, bizzat kemalizmin uğradığı değişimle ilgilidir. Bu makale, dolayısıyla, kemalizmin bir süreç olarak, farklı tarihsel çerçeveler gereğince dönüşebilir niteliğini savunmaktadır. Bunun karşılığında dünyevi ve manevi arasında kemalizmin uzlaşımı, kemalizmin yeniden yorumuna dayanmıştır. Bu ise, bir yandan Türkiye'ye uluslararası sahada yeni bir rol model yüklerken, diğer yandan Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'ndan bu yana süregelen dinin devlete bağlı statüsüne de dayanmıştır. Sonuç olarak makale, kemalizmin maneviyatla olan uzlaşımının, açık uçlu bir süreç olarak,kemalizmin yeniden yoruma izin verebilmesiyle gerçekleştiğini savunmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Kemalizm, İslam, manevi, dünyevi, laiklik, demokrasi.

1. INTRODUCTION

The secularist sacralisation of politics to replace religion since the eighteenth century on has permitted the appearance of ideologies. But the sacralisation of politics, which has revolutionary, democratic and nationalist origins (Gentile, 2000:34), is to be distinguished from sacralisation of political power" (Mateescu, 2006:225-244). As suits those affirmations, kemalismwhich has revolutionary,relatively democratic and nationalist origins, took ground within a secularist state, with the consequence of the sacralisation of kemalist politics during the single party regime.

During that period, the sacralisation of kemalist politics occurred in contrast to the spiritual element because kemalism had its sources remounting to the positivism of the Union and Progress Party government. Although from this aspect, the appearance of the kemalist ideology follows the developments of the nineteenth century Ottoman State, the kemalist movement by its revolutionary character denied the Ottoman period. Such denial resulted not only from the spiritual character of the political power during the Ottoman Empire, but as well from the scholastic manner of thinking the spiritual element. Kemalist ideology was thensuspicious of the spiritual element, taken as a counter ideology, in opposition to the positivist sources of the new Republic. Although, the Ottoman "theocracy" had been a special case, given the customary law, kemalist history writing following almost rejected the Ottoman past and established and unchallenged relationship of rupture with it.

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In this sense, according to Baskın Oran (2008), the transfer of power from God to Prince has been kemalism's greatest achievement (Oran, 2008), yet according to Şerif Mardin (1993), kemalism has been deficient in one certain aspect.Precisely, kemalismcould not develop into a philosophical, aesthetic worldview for its emancipation on the individual levelto procure "a sense of meaning and normative framework at the level of everyday life"(Mardin, 1993:220). It may then be discussed that the priority of the temporal, in the kemalist content, resulting from its positivism, could not replace the aesthetic philosophy of the spiritual. As regards, kemalism of the single party period, took the spiritual as a dogmatic worldview, while itself being captured within a similarly dogmatism of the temporal (Mahçupyan, 2008: 89).

The historian Mete Tunçay, therefore indicated that both the Islamic and Western thinking shared traits of dogmatism (Tunçay, 2006:11-17), as the dogmatism of the positivist ideology, based on science, was no different than the scholastic way of Islamic thought. This aspect explains why the revolutionary kemalism of the 1920s, and its ideological conceptualizing during the 1930s, has suffered from harsh criticism with the passage to multi-party politics(1945).As it follows, since the passage to democracy, Kemalist content,turned into a spiritual reflex as well because of the necessities of the different historical contexts. The Turkish-Islam synthesis of the 1980 coup d'état, especiallycontributed to kemalism's getting reinterpretedin accommodation with the spiritual.

Over that background, this article proposes that kemalismgiven the competing reinterpretations of it since 1945, could remain as an open ended process instead of being a dead ended logic. On this subject, Stuart Hall calls ideology a process, which needs to be continuously asserted and reasserted in the name of establishing a moral, political and intellectual discourse (Hall, 1998:7). That affirmation suits as well the definition of hegemony by Louise Philips, according to whom hegemonyis a continuous struggle for meanings with the implication of diverse groups (Phillips, 1998:487). From this aspect, there is no disagreement over the fact that today kemalism has established a hegemonic discourse over the Turkish Republic, yet the diverse meanings accorded to kemalism in different historical contexts, made kemalisma flexible discourse.As such, the kemalist content evolved much sinceits opposing positivist stand to the spiritual.

The article consequently argues that the kemalist accommodation in between the spiritual and the temporal was possible, because of kemalism's being open to reinterpretation. In this context, it is proposed that the integration of the spiritual to the kemalist content resulted rather because of diverse reasons. The raison d'état within the international and internal conjuncture was the strongest among those. This obeyed the status of the spiritual as submitted to state priorities during the Ottoman Empire. Such reinterpretation of kemalism altered finally the dogmatism of the temporal content in the original kemalist interpretation.

Over this background, this article first treats the Ottoman"theocracy" and the late Ottoman Empire developments, within the exceptional case of the spiritual in contact with the temporal. The positivist sources of the kemalist content is then analysedfollowed by the efforts for the rationalization of the new Turkish identity, as opposed to the spiritual element, such attitude defining the kemalistsingle party government.The article then proceeds with the integration of the spiritual to the public sphere, along with a discourse of a viable democracy, as the secular state is not altered. The reflections of such opening in Turkey's foreign policy come next. Not withholding from this aspect, the accommodation of the kemalist content in between the spiritual and the temporalconstitutes the last section.

It is to mention that although it might have been useful to give an analysis of the Democrat Party period and the political path of liberal Islam in Turkish politics; due to the limitation of space and because this aspect is taken as a given, this subject could not be explored. On the other hand, throughout the article, a special attention is paid to be able to refer to the Ottoman socio-political structures, so as to better understand uptodate developments.

2.THE OTTOMAN "THEOCRACY" VIS A VIS THE KEMALIST POSITIVIST CONTENT

2.1.The Temporal Encounter with the Spiritual: Explaining the Ottoman "Theocratic" Monarchy and the Late Ottoman Empire

In the Ottoman political structure,the religion of the State was Islam. However under the Ottoman "millet system", different "nations" lived under the direction of their spiritual leaders.In this system, religion was the basic determinant in defining "nations". Each nation represented its spiritual community, self responsible of its legal affairs. A multiple legal order reigned as well as multiple cultures and educational institutions. On the common platform of Ottoman identity, next to one another, a cosmopolitan spiritualism occurred. Such political structure permitted the self

realization of those communities and/or "nations" of the empire. The "millet system" of the Ottoman Empire thus indicated the recognition of different Ottoman spiritual minorities. Yet, Islam was the official religion, as the founding core of the Empire is Turkish Islam. In theOttoman society, Islam, as the state religion, thus became the dominant system of ideas.On the other hand because the Ottoman "millet system" was religiously defined and because the political authority of the Sultan resulted from God, the division of spiritual and temporal, in other words between God and Caesar was not a real question" (Yılmaz, 2007:480).

Over this background, concerning Ottoman "theocratic" monarchy, it is important to bring a nuance. The Ottoman political system was based on sharia ideology but it was not possible to talk about the strict determinism of Islam in that political structure. The customary law present in the Ottoman political structure made the Ottoman case rather a different example. The customary law indicatedin fact, a parallel effort to develop a temporal understanding of law. This was at the presence of the sharia based on the spiritual and it did not aim at outlawing the sharia. The sense in the development of a temporal, rather secular law was to fill in the gaps which might occur in the sharia in the regulation of the administrative field. From this aspect the development of the customary law referred strictly to the State identity, while in the socio-cultural field sharia was the point of reference.

On the other hand, although it might be discussed that in the field of State administration the sharia and the customary law were rather complementary, the historical evidences prove the contrary. Throughout the Ottoman history, because of the practical necessities of State administration, the spiritual had rather been secondary to the temporal. Precisely, although the Ottoman Empire was built on sharia as a political ideology, in practice the Ottoman State tradition served from the sharia to explain and to legitimate politics. Thisoccurred in order to gain the Ottoman populations' support, for example when it comes to the decision to declare a war. Many other examples may be found in history.

In other words, although in some readings, the Ottoman political system is referred as "theocratic" monarchy, the subordination of the spiritual to the temporal in terms of the subordination of the sharia to the customary law, indicates a different example. Even when the sharia State ideology had been accentuated in State politics, such preferencewas rather strategically oriented. To be clear, the Ottoman Empire only privileged the spiritual in State affairs in the period corresponding to its decline and this is for strategic reasons.

Consequently, it may be asserted that the development of customary law indicated a process towards State secularization. This was, especially as concerns State centralization, beginning with Sultan Mahmut II. State centralization in fact meant a process towards secularization. Among the options of an Islamic State, decentralization and centralization for the revival of the Empire face to its decline, Mahmut II, opted for the centralist state. CentralistState, would therefore take control of the diverse populations of the Ottoman Empire, because the same law would apply to all, through secular legislation. Given this, it became possible to talk about a process towards State secularization even before the reception of Western law. Along with the customary law and state centralization, the temporal had already grounded in the Ottoman State tradition.

Sultan Mahmut II, was then followed by the Tanzimat intellectual.The mission of the Tanzimat intellectual wasto promote ottomanism, meaning an Ottoman nation. To succeed in that, the Tanzimat intellectual believed in the generalization of secular education. Secular education meant Western science based on the temporal. The Tanzimat intellectual therefore fought against the scholastic manner of Islamic thought, through the education of modern sciences, resulting from the temporal.However, the Tanzimat intellectual rather concentrated on a legislative effort to bring in the West, and their general approach to the problems remained from top to down.

The scholasticism of the Islamic thought had resulted from the insistence on the ideal order of society by turning to the past, which defined the traditional Ottoman State and society, until the end of the seventeenth century. In this structure, the rule of life was not change or revolution, but order; "the "ideal" was divine balance and the realization of this divine balance was justice" (Berkes, 1978:30). Starting with the eighteenth century, the Ottomans started as well to question what should be the "ideal".Since the eighteenth century on, given the framework of globalization which operated around the European continent, the Ottomans did not have the choice but to inspire from it. By that time, the Western impact due to the global superiority of the West was unpreventable.

Such impact was especially about the infiltration of the Western law in the Ottoman structures depending on the liberal ideology. This is through a

legislative effort which took its force from the worldly and the temporal. – Except the period of Sultan AbdülhamitII (1876-1909) who, after having ended the Second Constitutional Monarchy,strategically tried to promote Islam for gaining Muslim solidarity against the final Ottoman dissolution –, starting from the Tanzimat declaration[1], and from the nineteenth century on, the temporal became the rule against the spiritual. The West and its institutions were taken as model against the final dissolution of the empire.

As a result of that temporal dynamic versus the spiritual, following the Tanzimat intellectual, the Young Ottomans tried to reconcile the feudal Islam ideology with that of western science and technology (Timur, 2001:112). At the same time, they opposed the strict "westernism" of the Tanzimat intellectual. The Young Ottomans therefore believed that they could reconcile the spiritual with the temporal through the liberal interpretation of Islam. Their liberal interpretation of the spiritual reposed on the political representation of the Ottoman nations through a constitutional monarchy. The Young Ottomans who were the Ottoman civil servants from the lower middle class, declared thus the first constitutional monarchy. They thus refused from top to down Tanzimat methodology, if the objective was to create an Ottoman nation. For them, as the objective was to save the empire from dissolution, Turkish nationalism was the worst choice. (Akçam, 2003:54).[2]

2.2. From the Union and Progress Party Rule to the Radicalism ofthe Temporal in the Kemalist Content

The Young Ottomans were followed by the Young Turks who took a different path from that of the Young Ottomans. While the Young Ottomans defended Ottomanism and the construction of an Ottoman nation, that ideology was soon left by the Young Turks. This wassince the Ottoman failure in the Balkan Wars(October 1912–September 1913). In fact, inspired from the 1789 French revolution, even the Muslim populations of the empire, had lost their attachment to the Ottoman Empire.[3]The Balkan wars had been a failure but it helped create another understanding of national unity based on the Turkish ethnic core.

In fact, Young Turks thus took consciousness of the fact that the real owners of the Empire were Turkish in origin. Indeed, "the owners of the Ottoman Empire, who finally saw that the empire is in collapse, found their own identity, together with the understanding that they were then free of the responsibility to administrate the foreign populations of the empire"

(Kongar, 2000:74). Turkish nationalismconsequently appeared during the second constitutional monarchy with the union and progress party government in power and after the Ottoman failure in Balkan wars. It took ground solidly within the framework of the Turkish independence war.

On the other hand, associated to the process of nationalisms, a simultaneous development was the appearance of positivist ideology in sixteenth century Europe. Positivism was then generalized all during the eighteenth century as the philosophical current of the period.It developed as a modern political doctrine of modern science.The founder of positivism was Auguste Comte. In this sense, Comte defended that just like the positivist sciences the social phenomenon had as well certain rules. As regards, Comte defined society by two factors, being the dynamic social and the static social. The dynamic social, was the dynamics of a society which were submitted to change and evolution, meaning progress. On the other hand, the static social was about the elements of a society which were not subject to change. The static social was then about a spiritual coherence, expressing union.

The "Union" and "Progress" Party, declaring the second constitutional monarchy (1908-22)under the domination of young Turks, took its name from those two factors. The influence of Auguste Comte, in such a political formation was clear. Given this, Z. Gökalp (1876-1924), as the ideologue of the Union and Progress party, perceived a culturally united Turkish identity, including the spiritual to express the static social. However, as regards the dynamic social, meaning progress, a larger, global question remained to be answered. Precisely, Gökalp saw the dynamic social as a larger civilizational era to get connected for the Turkish society. But he did not know whether to connect to the Islamic civilization or the western civilization, the two larger civilizational eras to get connected in the contemporary world (Berkes, 1978: 429).[4]

The ideological environment of the first decade of the 20th century was therefore determined in between three ideological currents being Islamism, ottomanism and Turkism. A fourth current could be added to those, being westernism. However, Islamism was the strongest current among those; this is in reference to the glorious time period of Islam. Yet, none of those ideological currents was coherent in itself. Islamism for example included liberal and conservative versions. The conservative Islamic ideology accused the content of the temporal for the Ottoman disintegration. The Islamic ideology,

preserved its importance because the traditional structure of the spiritual, based on feudal agricultural economy, remained unchallenged. The integration of the temporal into the traditional fields of the spiritual on the socio-cultural field could not happen long after.

However, despite the influence of the Islamic ideology, the continuation of the Tanzimat (1839-1870) dynamic of secular legislation effort, exacerbated under the Union and Progress Party government.This happened again within a form top to down methodology. As mentioned, the secularization of State identity within the development of the customary law and state centralization, had relatively taken the form of a secular State structure. Along with the Union and Progress party rule, the secularization of the socio-cultural field was as well permitted. The promotion of women as the active members of society occurred for example under the Union and Progress party government. Consequently,the idea of Turkism developed within the priority of the temporal, secular dynamic, starting with the Young Turks on the Turkish political scene.

The ideological content of Kemal Atatürk's thought is in many ways the continuation of the positivist wing of the young Turks. From the secular, temporal conception of the State, to the secular conception of the socio-cultural field under the Young Turks, followed a secular, temporal conception of the Turkish individual, by the kemalist content. The submergence of the temporal down to the individual level, explained the radicalism of the kemalist content.

Within such radicalism, the preference between East and West was for K. Atatürk out of question. Consequently, Atatürk rejected the difference in between culture and civilization, within a totalitarian understanding of the temporal. In this sense, as contrary to Ziya Gökalp, for K. Atatürk, society and culture was not separate from civilization. In other words, "it was difficult and non necessary to dissociate civilization from culture; the West should be taken entirely as a system" (Oran, 1999:264-265). Precisely, Atatürk wanted to create a Western society which would necessarily belong to Western civilization.

From this perspective, it was not enough to simply transfer western institutions as did the Ottoman intellectual. Precisely, the acceptance of West meant the adherence to the same principles that founded western civilization. The kemalist ideology saw the West and western civilisation as universal and as an objective, while the Ottoman intellectual in order to save the Empire, had taken it as an instrument (Oran,

1999:265). The importance of kemalist revolutionism was that it was the first movement of a Muslim country who saw western civilization in its entireness, privileging the temporal.[5]

K. Atatürk's conception of Turkish nation was thus strictly Western oriented. However, Turkish nationalism underlined such conception of the nation. A Western nation to be created would thus depend on Turkish people's own power and determination (Tunaya, 2003:213). Kemalist content was therefore essentially nationalist, within a temporal, positivist world view.In fact, although kemalism wanted to be recognized as part of European civilization, the nationalism in the kemalist content, naturally wanted to break away from the imperialism of the European continent.

However, another point in defining kemalist nationalism is even more important. The accentuation of the nation based on Turkish ethnic core in the kemalist content wanted above all, to break away from the multinational Ottoman political structure. Kemalist nationalism was therefore not a question of racism. The kemalist breaking away from the Ottoman Empire wanted before all, to create a Western oriented, secularnation. Consequently, kemalism rejected the universal religion of umma (Islamic community of nations), if it was to construct the basis of the new Turkish nation (Berkes 1978:429). The scholastic manner of Islamic thought explains such rejection. For the kemalists, the "scholastic Islamic thought"had prevented the Empire to follow the scientific, political and economic evolutions of the European continent (Gönlübol and Kürkçüoğlu, 1985:35). Precisely, kemalist ideology associated scholasticism to the Islamic thought.

3. THE TEMPORAL RATIONALISATION OF TURKISH IDENTITY AND RELIGION: FILLING IN THE KEMALIST CONTENT

To repeat, scholasticism conditioned the national leader's attitude towards the spiritual. In this sense, the kemalist history writing following the republic established an unchallenged contrast in between the spiritual and the temporal (Toker and Tekin, 2004:83). Thiswas first, because of the need to "catch" the contemporary civilization. However, it resulted as well from a simple reality. A revolution would never put forward a linear understanding of historical continuity with the past, but would try to destroy a given order to put another at its place.

The positivist ideology, based on science, became precise and openly pronounced after the Lausanne Treaty (24 July 1923).[6] This is because with the

national victory on the battle field, kemalism could finally have a free space to function without any rival ideology, including Islam.This was important given the radicalism of the temporal in the kemalist content. However, despite such radicalism kemalism did not completely reject Turkish culture. Precisely, kemalism accepted Turkish culture through a selective conception of it. Within such selective perception, the Islamic sources of the Turkish culture were perceived almost nonexistent by the kemalist content. Kemalismthus took as the only framework of reference, the period of history when Turks did not accept religion. The spiritual was then seen as a regressive force and even in some context as reactionary.

Consequently, the kemalist ideology aimed at dissociating itself from the Ottoman spiritual universality. It wanted to reach its objective, being the development of a new sense of universality around global science, within the priority of the temporal. The above kemalist perspectivefirst took Western history as universal. In other words, for the kemalist ideology, the globalisation of the West, through the development of science, accorded to its civilization a universal character, because science was universal.

On the other hand, kemalismbelieved that paying a special attention to scientific methods in the development of the modern Turkish nation, would also procure universality of the kemalist revolution (Mango, 1968:619).This is understandable reminded thatanother feature of revolution is to make it permanent (Tunaya, 2003:146).Consequently, kemalism underlined the development of the new Western Turkish identity within the methodologies of science. To say it otherwise, for the kemalist ideology,Western nations'historical development was a history of scientific development. Turkish culture should then feed itself within such framework (Ülken, 1998:304-32).[7] Turkishness was therefore as well to be rationalizedaccording to scientific methods.

Kemalist ideology thus scientifically studied Turkishness and what it "really" means. While doing that, a new Republican, kemalist history writing was as well born.The effort to redefine Turkishness aimed as well to promote the new Turkish identity as an umbrella identity. This is precisely in order to replace Islam's role in the traditional Ottoman community. The kemalist history writing was thus for the first time to be pronounced by the Turkish Institution of History (1931).This institution claimed therefore that Turks detached from his/her Ottoman-Islamic roots, are the indigenous people of Anatolia.In this sense, without having to refer to the Ottomans, a self identification

of Turkishness with the ancient Anatolian and Mesopotamia civilizations was established. This was similar to what Greek revolution did, establishing a self identification with the ancient Greece (Timur, 1998:16).

The identification with Hittites as the most ancient civilisation of Anatolia, aimed at giving pride to the "contemporary" Turkish identity. On the other hand, it reinforced the thesis of identification with the West (Oran, 1999:277).In the same perspective, the sun language theory by the Turkish Institution of Language (1932), proposed that all the languages were born from a language spoken in Middle Asia in the most ancient history.The interesting point was that among all the languages Turkish language wasdeclared to be the most closest to this root (Zürcher, 1998:276).

Overall, what Turkish Institution of History and Turkish Institution of Language, did was to propose a new thesis of "Turkish otherness" (Çiğdem, 2004: 81)."Turkish otherness" meant a new thesis of authenticity and superiority as regards Turkish identity. Within the thesis of "Turkish otherness",the temporal definition of Turkish identity was treated as a prior condition is to reach contemporariness (Oran, 1999: 277).

On the other hand, although the kemalist thought, wanted to conceive a new Turkish identity based on the temporal, it was not possible to completely give up the spiritual aspect in that identity. As mentioned, the spiritual has always been a strong determinant in the individual and socio-cultural fields. The new Republic's identification with the temporal indicating "contemporariness" would then naturally pass from the rationalization of the spiritual.

Consequently, in continuity within the Ottoman tradition of religion as submitted to state, following the kemalist revolution, the status of official religion served as well to diffuse state's official ideology. This indicated the superior status of the temporal over the spiritual as it was the case during the Ottoman "Theocracy", within the priority of the raison d'état. To be clear, the secularism of the republic did not leave Islam religion, as some would proclaim(Shaw and Shaw 1983:459).[8] However, any composition below or above the nation, thus both the religious state and the sectarian formations were to be prohibited.

Precisely, the kemalist ideology wanted "to prevent the formation of an autonomous Islamist intelligentsia to interpret the spiritualand/or religion in such a way as to produce a political ideology out of it" (Yılmaz, 2007:489-90). Consequently, religion was confined to the private sphere and prohibited from the public field. As in an under-developed

social structure there is nearly an industry of fundamentalism (Tunaya, 2003:218), the question was as well the passage from under-development to a developed nation.

On the level of religion, Turkish exceptionism therefore concerned official Islam which is state's religion being the Sunni-Hanefi since the Ottoman Empire. Over such background, kemalism adopted a rationalist attitude towards the official religion. This meant state's monopolization of religious instruction through the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı), as suits the status of religion as submitted to State. However, on a second level of people, spiritualism developed as certain sects representing the various forms of Sufis (Timur, 2001:322). Kemalism thus opened a fight to all the sects.

Sectarian compositions, who were then pushed underground, would continue to endure up until present. Those sects in fact constituted a social network of solidarity because the State remained both incapable of diffusing a true social democracy and a aesthetic world view which would replace the spiritual. Within a complete rupture with the Ottoman state, kemalism in fact put science as contemporary/civic religion (Mardin, 1995:189-203), and opposed the priority of spiritual dimension in the "ideal" definition of Turkish citizen. In conclusion, in the absence of the spiritual dimension, the effort to fill in the kemalist content depended on the rational treatment of Turkish identity and religion.

4. FROM THE KEMALIST POLITICS VERSUS THE SPIRITUAL TO THE SACRALISATION OF KEMALISM

In a way, what kemalist revolution aimed, was as well solving within a western approach, the cultural dualism in Turkish society (Kongar, 2000:110). In between the temporal and the spiritual worldviews, such dualism remounted to the Tanzimat period. Indeed, the Tanzimat framework of mind had been a struggle in between East and the West. Kemalism thus wanted and reunite the Turkish nation through the generalization Western enlightenment. (Akşin, 2007:225). The reunification of Turkish nation through generalizing Western enlightenment aimed as well at the mobilization of the whole population for a total development. In sake of those two objectives, being enlightenment and a total development, for the kemalists, a strong political support to be able to realize the necessary revolutions should thus focus on the RPP (Republican People's Party) (Shaw and Shaw, 1983:451).

The concentration of power by the RPP was understandable as well from the view point of the positivist ideology. To be clear, positivism, because of the primacy of science, saw politics as a field of professionalization and "professionals". The kemalist single party regime, thus permitted pluralism in the non political fields but oppressed all the other affirmations of civil society (Özbudun, 2007:12). Briefly, the single party regime opted for an authoritarian methodology in dealing with the Turkish society.

Such authoritarian methodology was in fact inherited by the old Ottoman tradition of centralist State above society. Indeed, since the late, 19th century Ottoman Empire, the efforts of modernisation had come from the centralist State. The kemalist effort of social engineering was the prolongation of this process. In turn, an opponent class of liberal conservatives were born, throughout the Republican history.

The view tha the kemalists were in fact the prolongation of an authoritarian modernization became clearly pronounced with the passage to democracy and within the international conjuncture of the post Second World War. Precisely, it was accepted that "the Ottoman modernization beginning with the nineteenth century had created a military oligarchy and kemalism" (Apter, 1967:153). This last perception was to provide the mainstream discourse, beginning with the end of the Cold War.

In fact, since 1950s, the kemalism of the single party regime was already denied in domestic and foreign politics. This is on a wide range of issues ranging from state protectionism to neutral independence.[9] Within this framework, the kemalist understanding of secularism was the major issue of critics. Especially, on this issue, the single party regime was soon accused by the alienation of the periphery.

Indeed, kemalist politics of the single party regime had not been successful in resolving the dualism between the periphery and the centre, since the Ottoman centralist State. The threat perception of the centralist State face to the ethnic and spiritual heterogeneousness of the Anatolian territory remained during the kemalist single party regime (Mardin, 1995). During this time, the effort to create a secular Turkish identity above any religious or ethnical references, could not take ground in the periphery. As mentioned, this was because the authoritarian, behavioural codes of general approach to problems remained the same.

The new republic is almost immediately interiorized by the people by a vital need of democratic representativeness. However, the

methodologies of the single party regime did not represent democracy for many, especially on the issue of the strict secularism of the State. Kemalist State politics to replace spiritual and its social functions were strongly to be questioned.

Indeed, the program of secularism put into force was rather disturbing as regards the value system of a traditional Islamic society. This is because, given the limits of positivist ideology; that secularist program was not followed by structural changes of the economy.Given this reality, thekemalist revolutionremained a revolution rather through legal application (Kazancıgil, 198). On the other hand, the fact that the kemalist revolution could not challenge the socio-cultural structure rendered the kemalist fearful of any opposition movement.

In this environment, especially, after the Takrir-i Sükun law with its proclamation in 1925, the attitude taken towards religion became a politics of repression (Mumcu, 1996: 123-4).[10] "All the rebels in 1925s and 1930s of the single party regimewere thus qualified as movements of protest against the secularist principle of the republic, not to mention the Kurdish dimension" (Toprak, 1986:390). The Takrir-i Sükun law lasted until 1929 when the government do not see harm to abolish it. From then on until the aftermath of the Second World War and the passage to multipartism, there was no legally active political community in Turkey, except a short period of an "obedient" opposition.[11]Kemalism soon led to the homogenization of politics. Also, in the absence of any oppositional movement kemalism got rather stagnant.

In fact,the kemalist movement had been rather active in the first decade of the revolution, corresponding to 1920s. However, even the revolutionism of the 1920s, aimed at the legitimization of the radical measures to able to found the Republic through legislation (Shaw and Shaw 1983:456). In the third council of RPP in May 1931, kemalism became an ideology with the adoption of the six arrows of kemalism–republicanism, secularism, nationalism, populism, statism and revolutionism–.By 1930s, even the word revolution was forgotten (Timur, 1998:17). As it follows, "the six principles represented by the six arrows become constitutional in 1937. All together, those principles constituted the bases of indoctrination of the state ideology in the schools, media and the army (Zürcher, 1998:264).

Such indoctrination,with kemalism becoming an ideology, not only rendered kemalist movement stagnant, but as well causedthe sacralisation of the kemalism.Sacralisation of Kemalism, revolved around the personality cult of M. Kemal, as the national leader.

M. Kemal thus symbolized the modern Turkish nation asthe unique one to have constructed it. Although, M. Kemal did represent himself as the one against many others, in "Nutuk (Disourse)" that he wrote, it is to remind that M. Kemal had been one to strongly reject sacralisation of the political power.

On the other hand, the sacralisation of kemalismwhich was already the case in 1930s, took a new Islamic content, with the undermining of the kemalist principle of secularism over which the republic ideologically stood. The 1982 constitution, still valid, went so far on this subject that it could even be considered even "theological". The 1982 constitution, thus almost reminded a Turkish-Islamic trinity, in the triple combination of the "sacred state", "sacred religion" and the "eternal leader".[12]The reference made to the spiritual in defining "the sacred state" and "the eternal leader", aimed at the reunification ofthe nation around the spiritual factor.

In fact, the chaotic environment of 1970s, representing extreme polarization in between the leftist and the Islamic sectors, helped promote the spiritual against the left.A threat perception against the left, explains the manipulation of the kemalist secularist content. Consequently, the kemalist secularist content was reinterpreted through the spiritual. The Islamic shift in the kemalist content, contributed even more to kemalism's being sacralised.

Overall, the transition towards democracy included suchelements that the kemalist temporal worldview of 1930s, could almostqualify as reactionism. Such process was in fact about a revision of the revolution through Islam. However, it was not only the new liberal conservative class on the political scene who referred to the revision of the kemalist content.The kemalist army, who proclaimed themselves as the legitimate guardians of kemalism was as well a major actor in revising kemalism.Within this framework, kemalistsecularism as the basis of kemalist revolutionism, was first to be submitted to reinterpretation in the name of "retouching" the revolution. This process includedalso the RPP, who was first to alter the radicalism of the temporal in kemalism.[13]

5. INTEGRATION OF THE SPIRITUAL AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE KEMALIST CONTENT

In fact, during the single party government, what the kemalists did was to push the religious aspects of Turkish culture to the private realm. The controversy between the private and public realms represented

on the other hand the controversial relationship between the rural and the urban. Because the major vocation of the positivist ideology is scientific education, the "ignorance" of the rural culture wasto be associated rather to its spiritualism. The separation between the public and the private realms, therefore as well applied to the rural and urban contexts. All this was reflection of the orientalist dichotomy in between the temporal and the spiritual. In this framework Islamism of the rural culture was to be restricted, nearly hidden, while the Western style of life was free to demonstrate itself, as part of the urban culture.However, soon after, by the 1970s, Islamic identity was carried over the urban peripheries, with the associated immigration phenomenon.

In this framework, the Islamic parties, made their first appearance on the Turkish political scene, by the 1970s. In fact, during this decade, the political fragmentation on the Turkish political scene, in between left and right, resulted in the numerous political parties, advocating their differences. In such a context, Islam's promotion has made the Islamist parties a key force within the coalition governments. In fact, starting form 1960s, religion served to face up the leftist movements influenced by the international conjuncture. Following the 3rd coup d'état in 1980, it became an integral part of state politics under the Turkish – Islam synthesis. From thekemalist strict secularism tothe Turkish-Islam synthesis, kemalist nationalism gave place to a new formulate of nationalism, which would be fed with the spiritual factor. The gradual integration of the spiritual in Turkish politics represented for many a democratic opening. On the other hand, itappeared also to have resolved the well known the question of East, resulting from the late Ottoman period.[14]To be clear, the West was refused to project a western perception over the Turkish identity.

The idea that religion was a necessary component of all the cultures, was therefore recognized (Taha, 2002:18) with the third coup d'état,filling in the linking gap of the spiritual dimension in the kemalist content.This was to provide for peace and order, against the atheist communists as well as against the Kurdish separatists, given the Kurdish insurgence which appeared during 1980s (1984). On the other hand, "peace and order" meant the de-politization of the civil society.This in turn served to create a silent atmosphere to put into action a vigorous economic plan for Turkey's opening to the global market economy.Thus, all the political formations on the left as well as on the right political echelons of before the third coup d'état of 1980, have been forbidden.

The coup d'état de 1980, reconstructed the role of religion for the reintegration of social forces or rather to silence them for an obedient nation-building and economic development.

Consequently, the kemalist founding principle of secularism was to be submitted to re-evaluation. As mentioned, this is not only by the liberal conservatives in Turkish politics since the passage to Turkish democracy, but as well from then on, by the kemalistRepublican People's Party and the kemalist army.The kemalist ideology thus acquired a new Islamic content through those applications put into force, rather by the "raison d'état". The initial positivism of the kemalist content was rejected.

The Islamic movement then gained serious momentum, given the ideological gap of the end of the Cold War.That such Islamic momentum was to be suppressed by what was to be called a post-modern coup d'état in 1998, has this context, obeyed again the status of religion as submitted to state. Briefly, up until 2000s, religion in Turkish politics was allowed and even promoted as long as it was confined to minority. However, in the adverse case, it was to be maintained in control.This is within the delicate balance of not opposing the kemalist layer while permitting it as a socio-political instrument to provide for example for national integrity.

It is over this background,the Justice and Development Party government in power since 2002, has become a clear majority, with the liberalist segment of the political organization of the Islamist movement. The most available historical writing therefore suggested that coming to power of those Muslim Democrats, has been an indication of a functioning democracy.This was especially in comparison to the kemalist single party government and the following three coups d'états by the kemalist army. The re-evaluation of the strict secularism of the kemalist period, although corresponds with the restriction of civil society, permitted as well the liberal conservatives to evolve as an independent political actor. Briefly, the transformation of the temporal in the kemalist content within the raison d'état, permitted the gradual political integration of the spiritual.

Yet, such reintegration of the spiritual aspect could only be complete starting with the 2000s, with the Justice and Development Party (JDP).Although the strategic transformation of the kemalist content permitted such development, the difference that the JDP brought in the perception of the spiritual could not be ignored. With the JDP governments, the presence of the spiritual in Turkish politics ended to be a threat

for many. Behind such a positive evaluation, the preference made by this party for Turkey's integration in the European Union played a major role within the emphasis on democracy. Although JDPreferred to spiritual references in redefining Turkish identity, it refused the spiritual state ideology.

The initial kemalist thesis of the universality of the West and its civilization was clearly rejected, along with the transformation of the kemalist ideology. As mentioned, such transformation indicated rather the manipulation of the kemalist content for a moderate version of it. The evolution towards democracy through the integration of the spiritual went thus hand in hand with kemalism getting reinterpreted, through its being manipulated. It is not ironic that this could in turn renew the legitimacy of kemalism, which, as mentioned above,was especially undermined during the single party period.

In fact, although the positivist ideology conditioned the sources of kemalist nationalism, the idea of national integrity has never been distinct from Islam. It is to remind that Islam was for example the dominant ideology during the Turkish independence war. Turkish nation building thus evolved through the gradual integration of an Islamic discourse, with the consequence of kemalism, becoming an amalgam of Islam. It is to mention that in this development, the Sufi organizations and modern reformist groups played a major role.

Precisely, those groups acknowledged a nationalist discourse versus the Islamic umma ideology, while they championed the cause of Islam in Turkey. Consequently, they created the social basis of moderate Islamist formations on the Turkish political scene(Alam, 2009:359). For those above reasons, it may be asserted that the Islamic identity could negotiate the space, role and status of Islam with the kemalist secular order (Alam, 2009: 354). The Islamist formations could thus operate safely within the context of the kemalist ideology, being transformed (Alam, 2009:362).

Lastly, such transformation concerned the State-centred kemalist paradigm, being altered, especially with the Justice and Development Party government. Briefly, the EU vocation of the Justice and Development Party permitted it to alter the centralist State tradition, without clashing directly with it. The transformation of the kemalist content had therefore, also its implications concerning the centralist state. As opposed to the kemalist politics, the liberal conservative perspectivedefended consequently, the limitation of the political power.

In other words the omnipresent, absolute nature of political power was to be limited.

Apart from economics, this view applied especially to the public sphere where the State should only have a limited impact.Resulting from there, spirituality could as well be freely expressed in public. Such view thus defendedthe liberty of the spiritual element in the public sphere. Overall, the liberal conservatives, by defending the limited state against the centralist state,rather decentred the West. The whole process served at centring Islam in the public sphere versus the temporal and the decentralization of the West (Houston, Chris, 2006:168).The Ottoman centralist State tradition was altered. However, instead of the sense accorded to Turkish history by the kemalist rupture from the Ottoman State, the liberal conservative class could establish a continuous relationship with the past.

6. FROM THE OTTOMANS TO THE REPUBLICANS : MAKING PEACE WITH THE OTTOMAN PAST

The Ottoman past was to be accused for the scholastic manner of Islamic thought by the positivist content of kemalism, but, the throughout the evolution of the Turkish Republicans, was soon to give place to a new historical interpretation. For various reasons political, economic and socio-cultural - such as the internal and external conjuncture, opening to the global economy and public presence of the spiritual – Turkish Republicans both on the right and the left wing, evolved into another identity which would be more liberal than radical recognizing the differences and the Ottoman past.Although the actors of the kemalist legacy such as the army and the RPP were as well involved in this process, the liberal conservative class championed the cause. Especially, with the coming to power of JDP, the liberal conservative politics in foreign policy, reminded a new ottomanism for many.

New ottomanism indicated a multi-dimensional foreign policy, without having to choose in between East and the West. A strategic profoundness was suggested, using if necessary, Islamic affinities. Therefore, the reference made to the spiritual in defining Turkish identity, applied also in foreign politics. In fact,since the end of the Cold War, Turkey had proposed itself as a soft power meaning a bridge between East and West, precisely as a Muslim nation, a secular state, a democratic political system and as a capitalistic economic force (Taşpınar, 2008:3). The JDP further studied the above thesis in Turkish foreign policy, defending the uniqueness of Turkish

historical experience between two civilizations, East and the West. As it had been the case, for the thesis of "Turkish otherness" mentioned above, in the thesis of "the uniqueness of Turkish experience", a superior dimension was accorded to the Turkish identity, however from an opposite perspective.

The irony is present in it, given that, in none of Kemal Atatürk's affirmations, has Turkey been referred as a bridge in between continents or civilizations, that is between East and the West. Precisely, such a "dichotomy" between East and the West, would "logically" not persist because it would be bypassed by the positivist content of the kemalist ideology. In fact, it was reasonable for the original kemalist discourse to envision a complete European Turkey. The kemalist perspective by taking Europe and its civilization as universal wasin a sense visionarytoforesee the future formation of the European Union, with Turkey's still disputed "natural" place in it.As follows, Turkey's European orientation, contributed to thedeterminacy of the Westernimpact in Turkish domestic and foreign policies.

However, as early as the third coup d'état as mentioned above, Turkey's throughout historical mission and experience wasin fact, submitted to redefinition within Turkish-Islam synthesis.In this perspective, since the beginning of 2000s, under the consecutive JDP governments, Turkey presented itself to assume a new mission that was about the construction of a Muslim democracy. In practice, this meant a kind of "moderate secularism", appearing as an intermediate formulate to be promoted in response to the strict secularism of the kemalist single party regime. The preference made for this version of secularism, proposed that democracy did not fall at odds with the public appearance of Islamic spirituality.

To put it otherwise, since the third coup d'état and especially within the ideological gap of the end of the Cold War, a common consensus for progress,through the integration of the spiritual in public sphere, went together with the perception of a true version of democracy.While revolutionism was to be rejected in the name of progress, the radicalism of the temporal in the kemalist content was as well to be rejected. The once excluded liberal conservative class, now in central politics, redefined in fact, through the spiritual, the legitimacy of a functioning republican system which would as well be a role model on the international scene.

A more elaborated understanding of Turkish Republican history evolved together with the recognition of the spiritual in domestic and foreign policies. A continuous relationshipwas then to be established between the Ottoman past and the Republican present, as contrary to revolutionism.In this sense, progress meant as well the linear evolution of the Turkish democracy, excluding from top to down or military interventionism.However, underneath the preference made for progress in peace with the Ottoman past, kemalismhad long been reinterpreted.

7. REINTERPRETING KEMALISM: ACCOMMODATION OF THE KEMALIST CONTENT IN BETWEEN THE TEMPORAL AND THE SPIRITUAL

Overall, it may be asserted that kemalism has acquired an Islamic tone, through its reinterpretation. This was because throughout the Republican history, kemalism had never been a coherent discourse. As results,kemalism developed as a political reflex in relation to the socio-political and economic dynamics of different time periods.The political parties in the country, ranging from the right wing to the left wing could therefore differently reinterpret kemalism. Especially, since the passage to democracy,kemalism suffered from the serious manipulation, whether by electoral considerations or as analysed, by the raison d'état. The manipulation of the kemalist positivist content, led to its reinterpretation, in line with the socio-cultural inclinations.Such reinterpretation then served to legitimate the available political discourses. Consequently, the kemalism as perceived provided a shield to many, weather on the right or the left wing of the political echelons(Sarıca, 1993:191).

Indeed, a profound look to the six kemalist principles would relieve their incoherence. Among thosekemalist principles, while nationalism, republicanism and secularism would relieve the influence of the French revolution and of liberalism; protectionism, populism and revolutionism indicated those principle, influenced by socialism, characterizing the epoch (Türköne, 2002:402). Therefore, kemalismrather representeda totality of attitudes and convictions which facilitated its appropriation, by many whose world views were different (Zürcher, 1998, 264 and Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi, 90).

As such, the spiritualism of the liberal conservative current did notdeny kemalism, either. K. Atatürk, the unchallenged founding father, continued to hold a strong historical legacy. In fact, it is explored above that the integration of the spiritual to the kemalist content has been successfully achieved, through its reinterpretation, within the development of Turkish

democracy. In this respect, in Turkish society, the debate is not about the question of the compatibility of spiritual with democracy, but that of consensus in between many interpretations of kemalism as a vague ideology. This is because kemalism still marks the ideological and formative foundations of the official discourse (Aral, 1997:78).

On the other hand, the occurrence of such a debate results also from the search for legitimacy. In this respect, just like religion, kemalism legitimates politics. There remain thus multiple definitions of kemalism, in attempt to fix the "true" nature of it. On the other hand, such continuous attempts,did not renderkemalism insignificant, but has produced a dynamic discourse (Bagdonas, 2008:111). Kemalism thus found itselfcontinuously reconstructed, as no agreement on a one, single kemalism without reservation,existed (Bagdonas, 2008: 104). Consequently, "kemalism" acquired its dynamism through partial fixations to give ita meaning (Bagdonas, 2008:105).

As regards, the three coups d'état of 1960, 1970 and 1980, plus the coup d'état of 1998, all bring a new meaning to the kemalism. The actor behind those coups d'état was the same Turkish army, but each coup d'état perceived kemalism differently. As such, the 1960 coupenlarged the framework of democracy, while it tried to restrain the importance that spiritualism gained under the government of Democrat Party.The 1970 coup, on the contrary, was restrictive about democracy. The 1970 coup led at the same time to a new decade of thepromotion of the spiritual. The strategic treatment of the spiritual against leftist movements and terrorism during 1970s, exacerbated with the 1980 coup. On the other hand, the 1980 coup, while it brought a complete Islamic content to kemalism, prohibited at the same time, democratic pluralism. As to the 1998 post modern coup, in irony with the 1980 coup, the Islamic Welfare Party (RP) was closed, securitizing Islam, as perceived (Bagdonas, 2008: 108-110).

The important point about these coup d'états is that they were all carried out in the name of restoring kemalism(Kongar, 1986, cited in Akçalı and Perinçek, 2009:555). On the other hand, each coup had a different motivation and ideological background. Consequently, each served the evolution of a different political faction or social thought. Especially,kemalism acquiringan Islamic content, following the third coup d'état, created out of the liberal conservative current, a new class of Republican elite.

In fact, when the 1980 coup reformulated kemalist nationalism within the Turkish-Islam synthesis,the kemalist content of the western civilization's universality, based on temporal worldview, found itself also officially altered. Within that thesis,a metaphysical language developed around the personality cult of Mustafa Kemal, despite M. Kemal. This is understandable in his opposition to the Ottoman State that he saw under the influence of the spiritual.Finally, such personality cult was so strong that it became easier to challenge the six kemalist principles than such a personality cult. The initial positivism of the kemalist content thus disappeared behind such a metaphysicalapproach, in line with the spiritualism of the Turkish society.

8. CONCLUSION

From the Ottomans to the Republicans, the initial kemalist content suffered from serious reinterpretation because it was possible to modify and even to manipulate it. As such, the gradual integration of liberal Islam to the Turkish political scene since the passage to democracyhas marked a rupture with thekemalist positivist content. This has been possible because the kemalism had never been a dead ended logic. The accommodation of the kemalist content in between the spiritual and the temporal has thus depended on the following elements:

First,on the level of society, since the passage to democracy,the liberal conservative discourse based on the spiritual has depended on the public appearance of the spiritual and did not question the secular basis of the republic. It is thus not the reinterpretation of the liberal conservative discourse, but the reinterpretation of kemalism which permitted the public appearance of the spiritual. As such,the temporal at the source of kemalist content, being the positivist ideology, was replaced bythe spiritual. This development obeyed the status of Islam on the social level. Consequently, the critics of the priority of the temporal in the kemalist content led to the recognition of the Ottoman past, taking kemalism of the single party period as a prolongation of authoritarian modernization since the nineteenth century.

Second, on the level of State, the kemalist accommodation to the spiritual depended on the status of religion as submitted to state, that is within the raison d'état, which indicated nevertheless the priority of the temporal over the spiritual on the State level. The principle of secularism was therefore first among other principles of kemalism, to get continuously submitted to reinterpretation,especially by the army. Turkish army had indeedbeen the major

factor among others, behind the conceptualization of Turkish-Islam synthesis, which officially brought a new content to the kemalist ideology. The priority of the raison d'état within the process of the reinterpretation of the kemalist content, reminded again the Ottoman state tradition of religion as submitted to State.

Third, on the level of politics, although flexible enough, kemalism continued to mark the official basis of the political discourse. Kemalism thus legitimated politics. The diverse reinterpretations of kemalism whether on the right side or the left side of the political echelon,provided legitimacy for those political parties using the kemalist discourse. As such the four coups d'état de 1960, 1970,1980 and 1998 were all handled in the name of restoring kemalismin search for legitimacy and they all brought a new content to it. Briefly, kemalism provided legitimacy, similar to Islam's role legitimating politics, during the Ottoman Empire.

On the other hand, since the end of the Cold War, on the level of foreign policy,kemalistaccommodation to the spiritual, suggested, a hybrid discourse aboutTurkey'shistorical experience, proposing itself as a bridge and a role model in between continents, East andWest. Such foreign policy orientation reposed on the compatibility of Islam with democracy, which then took the formula of the promotion of moderate secularism as the ideal model. Such a hybrid discourse, using the spiritual element, caused such debates as a new ottomanism in foreign policy.

In conclusion, in between the temporal and the spiritual, the accommodationof the kemalist content became possible, through its reinterpretation, with the reintegration of the spiritual element on the levels of society, State and politics. Such development indicated, on the other hand, therecognition of the relationship of continuity with the Ottomans. The kemalisthistory writing could then finallymake peace with the Ottoman past.Briefly, kemalism as an ideology did not imply a static political culture. In fact, the diverse interpretations of kemalism rather than undermining its hegemony become the assurance of the flexible nature of it.In conclusion, it may be asserted that as long as kemalism remains adoptable to any historical context, it would remain legitimate.

END NOTES

[1]Tanzimat was essentially about guaranteeing the non Muslim minorities of the Ottoman Empire an equal treatment before law. It was thus about equal civil rights and duties to gain the Ottoman minority populations' attachment to the Empire and to gain the Western nations' approbation in a period of regression and gradual dissolution.

[2]In Ottoman context, Turkish nationalism was the last nationalist current to develop, as proclaiming Turkishness was viewed a source of divisionism, thus non-ethical, being this empire's composing identity (Türköne,2000:402). The fact that the Ottomans represented a grand, universal empire, influenced their consciousness of history, and weather it concerned Ottomanism or Islamism, they were thus more inclined to cosmopolitan ideologies (Akçam, 2003:54).

[3]Arab revolts during the course of First World War, under English interventionism, were a latent development but became surprisingly apparent evidence.

[4]Turkish modernization, which started with the nineteenth century, was in fact about knowing to which era of civilization to turn to in between East and West, in defining itself and the degree of westernization while preserving what is specific to Turkish culture and nation.

[5]Therefore it was stated: "It is not enough to take from the West, machines, tools and factories as behind this imported technology there is western science which means that while taking technology we must as well take science. However, the above frontiers of science concern philosophy; accordingly we will take western philosophy as well as social sciences of which western philosophy is part of… However for the philosophy to develop, it is not to ignore its inspiring dimensions and its relation to arts and culture. We may then assert that technology-science-culture and arts are a totality". (Akşin, 2007:223).

[6]Lausanne Treaty which was concluded in eight months following the national victory (30 August 1922) against the imperial forces following the end of the First World War indicated Turkish Republic's recognition on the international scene and by implication declared the already de facto end of the defeated Ottoman Empire.

[7]Gökalp then reviewed his propositions and realigned them in conformity with K. Atatürk's views, concerning the western civilization being the universal dimension of Turkish identity. (Ülken, 1998:304-332).

[8]"The secular program was not initiated by such an objective. There were not non religious institutions as seen in the Soviet example. As long as the clergy (ulema) did not interfere in the revolutions, the state was not against religion. The prayers in the mosques were not forbidden and the religious leaders were not prevented to practice their religious functions." (Shaw and Shaw 1983:459).

[9]Kemalist revolutions wanted to restore a planified economy which foresaw state protectionism for the economic development of the nation. This model was adopted as a mid way in between liberalism and economic centralization of which the objective was to create favorable conditions for the development of a national bourgeoisie to be able to compete with the foreign forces on the national market. On the other hand, on the level of foreign politics, neutral independence which was also a positioning in between communism and western liberalism rejected any involvement in the problems of foreign territories which indicated a choice for the concentration of all the effort for the installation of the revolutionary new regime. However following the Second World War, Turkey's being a member of the NATO forces and since then a part of the U.S. politics in this region was clearly a decline from the Kemalist principle of neutrality.

[10]"This law served to silence those who opposed the Kemalist revolutions. Accordingly, all the reactionary organizations' provocations and incentives, aiming at insurgence and the disruption of the country's social peace, security and public order were banned by the governmental ways of administration… It was thus stated that "the limits of liberties were determined by law". Any activities of those against the revolution were thus prevented." (Mumcu, 1996:123-124).

[11]Turkish Republic knew two periods of an opposition party which would be an alternative to the Kemalist RPP. The "Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası" founded in November 1924 was in less than a year to be closed following the February revolts of Eastern Anatolia, in the name of bringing back the sharia. The second attempt for the foundation of an opposition party was in August 1930 under the "Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası". However as happened in the first attempt, this party was closed in November 1930, as it became a common platform for those against the Kemalist revolutions. Following this incidence, the Islamist revolts of December 1930, to bring back the sharia resulted in the unique party regime to be in power up until 1945; precisely up until the passage to multipartism.

[12]For example, "eternal Turkish native land and nation", "Turkish sacred state", "eternal leader and unique hero", "eternal essence of the Republic of Turkey", "sacred religious feelings", etc. See, Tarhanlı,1993:185.

[13]Consequently, in 1948, the imam hatip courses for raising imams were opened by the ministry of education.

The same year, foreign currency was given to pilgrimages leaving for Mecca. In 1949, the program of RPP also foresaw the opening of a Faculty of Theology in University of Ankara. Finally, with a law proclaimed in 1950, the Sufi sanctuaries, having an artistic value were opened.

[14]All during the nineteenth century, "the question of East" occupied the European agenda. This question was essentially about letting a fare share of the Ottoman Empire among European powers, especially face to a growing threat of Russian ambitions, without causing a war, as regards the European balance.

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