

## STATE FORMATION: STRUCTURE OR CULTURE?

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### **Abstract**

This article aims to analyze state formation process. By evaluating both structural and cultural theories of state formation process, we will show that historical sociologists and social theorists have failed to develop a well-equipped converging theory to analyze this large process. First, we deal with the definition of state and state formation. Second, we divide theories of state formation into two broad categories as structure-oriented and culture-oriented. We aim to clarify how these theories present an overreaching process of state formation. Finally, we advocate a theory of state formation that involves a richly woven analysis of factors on different levels based on the combination of structural and cultural elements.

**Keywords:** Culture, Social theory, State, State formation, Structure

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## **Özet**

Bu makale, devlet kuruluşu sürecini analiz etmeyi hedeflemektedir. Devlet kuruluşu süreci üstüne olan yapısal ve kültürel teorileri değerlendirerek, tarihsel sosyologların ve sosyal teorisyenlerin bu sözü edilen geniş süreci analiz etmek için iyi donanımlı ve tutarlı bir teori geliştiremediklerini göstereceğiz. İlk olarak, devlet ve devlet kuruluşu tanımları üzerinde durmaktayız. İkinci olarak, devlet kuruluşu üstüne olan teorileri iki geniş kategoriye ayıracağız: yapı-yönelimli ve kültür-yönelimli teoriler. Bu teorilerin devlet kuruluşu sürecini altından kalkılamayacak düzeyde nasıl temsil ettiklerini göstermeyi hedeflemekteyiz. Sonuç olarak, yapısal ve kültürel elementlerin kombinasyonu üzerinde temellendirilen ve farklı düzeylerdeki faktörlerin analiziyle örülmüş devlet kuruluşu teorisini savunuyoruz.

**Anahtar Sözcükler:** Devlet, Devlet kuruluşu, Kültür, Sosyal teori, Yapı

The state-formation has been one of the fundamental areas in comparative historical sociology. Today, historical sociologists are faced with a fundamental dilemma: whether to conceive of the state-formation as a structural or cultural process. Even, it seems, because of this dilemma historical sociologists have fallen into two main theoretical camps when dealing with state formation process. One camp focuses on structure by marginalizing culture. In turn, the other camp takes structure as if it does not exist except in people's mind. The purpose of this article is to lay out the essential features of state formation process by reviewing theories from both camps.

In the field of state formation, the main issue is to theorize history to achieve a reasoned interpretation of the long-term historical change, emergence of modern state. For doing so, detailed historical change and its interpretation with a general theory are combined in many different ways from different approaches. In this article, this large process has been evaluated from structural or cultural perspectives in order to analyze the genesis of modern state, which is the dominant model in the contemporary societies.

The article begins by giving definition of state and state-formation. Then, it divides theories of state formation into two broad categories as structure-oriented and culture-oriented to bring together the various lines of reasoning in these perspectives and to clarify how they present an overarching process of state formation. In the closing page, it also ponders the difficulty and challenge that state formation analysis is now facing with.

### **State and State-Formation**

Taking Weberian side Tilly (1975: 70) defines state as "an organization which controls the population occupying a defined territory is a state in so far (1) it is differentiated from other organization operating in the same territory; (2) it is autonomous; (3) it is centralized; and (4) its divisions are formally coordinated with one another." For him states are "coercion-wielding organizations" (1992: 1).

To be a state, an organization, which necessitates political power, must be vested and operated through a set of arrangements. These arrangements, that consist of body of rules, a series of roles, and body of resources have to be committed themselves into a distinctive, unified interests and purposes. The state-formation process is a political enterprise

that commits itself to the construction of a single organization distinguished itself from other entities taking role in ordering social existence.

The concept of differentiation, according to Poggi (1990), has been historically emerged through Church-state struggle that ended with secular state and separating state from civil society. The separation between state and civil society is brought up during eighteenth and nineteenth centuries while state recognized individuals as subjects having capacities and interests that would be expressed and pursued. These were mostly related to economic activities based on capitalist relations and the institutions of private property. Controlling the population in an occupied territory brings the state's involvement in coercion with its characteristic ultimacy. The state claims the monopoly of such control that can be exercised by individuals who are authorized by the state.

Autonomy and sovereignty are two central elements for being a state. The autonomy is an outcome of combined factors of necessity, multiplicity, and territorial centrality of the state (Mann, 1988). It is the sovereignty that makes controlling organization a state (Poggi, 1990). This means that state does not share its power over population with any other sources of power. Sovereignty implies supremacy and/or superiority (Vincent, 1987). But no sovereignty theorist accepts that sovereignty is simply the *de facto* ability of persons or groups (Vincent, 1987). The sovereignty was understood as *de jure*. The implication of the sovereignty of the state is related to its territory. The territory is a geographically distinct, fixed, continuous boundary that can be militarily defensible. The state has control over this area.

Within this territory all political activities must originate from the state or refer to it. This is the centralized feature of the state. Of course people living in this territory have forms of power, but they cannot exercise political power. This does not mean that social groups cannot have any power. They can exercise power by influencing the activities of state agents. There are a number of public bodies that can exercise political faculties, but they are all deriving those faculties from the state. The state as a centralized organization needs to coordinate all of its parts formally. The complex organization of the state which has distinguishable parts must be arranged as organs of state instead of being independent power center to make.

The state sovereignty and territoriality produce a political environment composed of plurality of states. Each state exists and shares this environment as a unit standing next to the others within a more complex entity, the states system. The sovereignty of a state assures that each state has its own peculiar entities and the states system cannot impose anything which destroys its independent existence.

The formation of the state defined above, includes a set of processes through which state formation occurred in Western Europe. These processes were "consolidation of territorial control, differentiation of governments from other organizations, accession of autonomy by some governments, centralization and coordination" (Tilly, 1975:70). In this process the shift from consolidated service to differentiated service with a shift from differentiated territory to consolidated territory were two crucial processes that pave the way toward modern state (Finer, 1975).

### **Theories of Modern State-Formation:**

#### **a. Structural Perspective**

We divide theories of state-formation based on structural explanations into three categories according to which structural explanations they emphasize on. In the first category, the role of war-making is central in the process of state-formation. The second category focuses on the institutional development of modern state. The last category deals with the role of capitalism in the rise of modern European state.

#### *The Role of Warfare and State-Formation*

The theories of state-formation that give priority to war-making confirm that the new political order, a modern state, was not stemmed from society. The motor of this development came from external conflicts, long struggles between proto-states, warrior houses, and other diverse political units in the international context of incessant warfare (Hintze, 1975; Tilly, 1992; Mann, 1986; Zolberg, 1986). Actually the struggles between two warrior houses, the Capetians and their successors as Kings of France and Kings of England, not only did form the two states, but also initiated the process through which Europe was transformed into a system of states (Elias, 1994; Strayer, 1970; Zolberg, 1986). The focus on war-making as the main mechanism spearheading state formation has fostered a vast number of studies of warfare, military

organization, police forces, and necessary extractive apparatus which must be developed to maintain that expenditure (Tilly, 1992; Mann, 1986, Downing, 1991; Finer, 1975; Brewer, 1989).

The key to the relationship between war-making and state-making in Western Europe, according to Finer (1975), is the extraction-coercion cycle. It is a simple rule that wars require capital. Because war-making became so expensive by the 16th century, it necessitated the mobilization of an entire country. These changes led states to penetrate their societies in increasingly complex forms to obtain resources. The organizational innovations that occurred during wartime did not disappear with peace but left an infrastructural residue. State enlarged itself through the external and internal violence, performed by army and police. This is a division of hunting labor (Poggi, 1998).

In famous essay of "War-Making and State-Making as Organized Crime," Tilly writes "war making, extraction, and capital accumulation interacted to shape European state making" (Tilly, 1985: 172). Preparation for war, especially on a large scale, involves rulers in extraction. This builds up an infrastructure of taxation, supply, and administration that requires maintenance of itself and often grows faster than the armies that it serves. War and preparations for war stimulated the creation of ever more sophisticated state institutions across Europe (Anderson, 1974; Downing, 1991; Hintze, 1975, Mann, 1986; Tilly, 1985; 1992). The greater bureaucratic complexity required is at the heart of the institutional legacy of war. Wars provide an organizational focus around which the state's organizational capacity may improve. Through warfare that necessitated more extraction and more complex taxation process, the state evolved to a fiscal-military apparatus by 1500. Armies raised for war might also serve as a means with which collect resources from subject population.

The intense external pressure increased the resource-extracting ambitions of ruler. The collection of tribute and rent was increasingly accompanied or displaced by the taxation of cash transactions, stocks and incomes. With this process the state entered into bargaining with the unwilling population. Through these confrontations the state yielded a variety of rights to the population and accepted a widening range of tasks. Those tasks are adjudicating disputes over rights, and taking responsibility for economic distribution and production while the apparatus of state surveillance increase in scope (Tilly, 1992). With these developments

population increasingly became the subjects of unifying influence of the state and national market and evolved to be more homogenous under these circumstances. This development went parallel with the disarmament of the population to have monopoly over means of violence that occurred by the Tudors in England and the Richelieu in 1620, in France (Tilly, 1985).

As states fought wars, built standing armies and required resources for state-building activities, they directly confronted subject population who were often unwilling to help in this endeavor. Although state-making emerged out war-making and reinforced each other, they remained indistinguishable until state began to form secure recognized boundaries around territories. These activities were depended on extraction of resources from local population. The states, in order to realize these goals, had to form allies especially with those powerful actors having rich resources. With this play of alliances and the attempt to draw resources from those powerful actors led the state's involvement in protection, and checking the competitors and enemies of selected clients. The expansion of extraction and protection created demands for adjudication of disputes within the subject population. This also included the legal regularization of both extraction and protection themselves. Another important outcome of this relationship between state makers and subject populations has manifested in emergence of citizenship and its increase of political components. The constitution of standing army and extension of military obligation and suffrage went together (Downing, 1991).

The state-formation was outcome of bargaining, co-optation, legitimation, and sheer coercion between state-makers and societal forces. When states grew dependent on populations for crucial resources, they were forced to develop symbiotic relationship with the subject population. According to Mann (1986) two different types of European states emerged out of this relationship. One is the French model that was dependent on the mobilized alternative where the state develops as a large, absolutist, centralized military, manpower administration; and the fiscal alternative of the English state, which developed a constitutional state (see Brewer's 1989).

Ertman (1997) brings three factors that must be combined with military competition model to see the different state formation paths in Europe. First factor was political regime that was determined by the ability

of national representative assemblies to oppose absolutism. This was a function of nature of local government. If the local government was organized in the early period of state formation, it was more likely to have cooperative interaction across social groups at local and national level. With this interaction social, financial, and military resources could be mobilized to fight against absolutism and to force royal acceptance of constitutionalist power sharing. If local government was structured from above without participatory model, status based assemblies remained divided and this made rulers to pursue their absolutist aims. Second factor was what kind of state apparatus emerged in response to military competition. State that encountered this military competition before 1450 faced shortage of administrative and financial know-how and ready cash under military pressure. In that case rulers who could expand infrastructures during this period were weak vis-a-vis social groups who had those resources. Those groups enabled to have direct control over the emerging state apparatus. Rulers who face military competition after 1450 were stronger vis-a-vis social groups having resources. The last factor was the independent influence of representative assemblies on administrative and financial infrastructure.

Especially after about 1500, the increasing scale of war and the increasing integration of the European state system, meant that a military advantage was obtained by the national states (Tilly, 1992). These could support large standing armies and combine capacities of large agricultural populations, capitalists and commercialized economies. The competitive advantage of national state (reflect cultural unity) led European states took that form. This was a shift from indirect rule to direct rule. According to Tilly (1992) European states reach that point through four successive stages: patrimonialism, brokerage, nationalization, and specialization. Patrimonialism that was the period until 1500, operated through combining customary forces like feudal levies and the extraction of rent and tribute from land and people under ruler's immediate control. In the brokerage period (1500-1700,) rulers used the mercenaries, tax-farmers, and independent bankers willing to make loans. This period can be evaluated as equal to Poggi's *standestaat*. The period between 1700 and 1850 was defined as nationalization through which rulers managed to get the full control of the task of raising large military forces and tax revenues from the national population. The specialization period started in 1850 brought the creation of distinct professionalized armies,



navies, police forces and fiscal administration. The specialization period led separation of armed forces from the mass of population, which has increasingly being civilianized.

The theories summarized above agree on the close relationship between war-making and state-making in the Western European context, but they have not sufficiently emphasized historical order in their analysis. There is a causal ambiguity in identifying that either states or wars came first.

#### *State-Formation, Development of Administrative Apparatus and Law*

The institutional perspective on modern state formation tends to accept that wars came later (Strayer, 1970). This perspective focuses on the development of law and political institutions as the essentials for the modern state. In this model the state firstly makes itself differentiated from society then after consolidates its position. Administrative structures of the state developed according to the internal crisis of feudalism that was characterized with extreme fragmentation.

The state developed judicial, administrative, and financial structures first, then military warfare machines and diplomatic apparatuses (Strayer, 1970). The priority is given to the internal affairs in state-building process. The role of the Church as providers of a specific theology, the model for administrative machinery and the providers of administrative staff to the rulers and state administrative positions is very vital for the emergence of the modern state. The Church had provided the basic principle of law and sovereignty to secular ruler. The Western Law that paves a way to form modern state had its roots from Medieval Church (Berman, 1983). As Berman writes "the basic institutions, concepts, values of Western legal systems have their sources in religious rituals, liturgies, and doctrines of the eleventh and twelfth centuries, reflecting new attitudes toward death, sin, punishment, forgiveness, and salvation' (1983: 165). With the Gregorian Revolution the Church established its autonomy from secular rule with the rule. Rulers administered justice and were responsible to distribute it to the all people according to sovereignty theories of medieval church (Strayer, 1970). The Roman Law and its categories that could allow the idea of distinction between civil and criminal law fostered the idea of public welfare. This idea of public welfare emerged from this distribution and justified the innovations like taxation.

Development of Law is unique to the Western world (Poggi, 1998). The modern state requires great sense of law as a way of justifying and establishing political institutions. Law as not for only to suppress or punish, but also to guarantee rights and to establish and to govern the state had emerged in the West around eleventh century. The law becomes discourse and it was getting increasingly rational and secular. It has developed through the extensions of rights to the subject population. Progressively with the modernity, everybody has got rights within a given territory. That made possible to claim one's existence. Law needs to be enforced and rulers began to originate with the law. Making and enforcing the law led it to become the instrument of government. The transformation of law from being comment of rules to the law as a guaranteeing rights and governing to the state became crucial for the development of modern state (Poggi, 1998). Growing importance of law led more and more people to study law and become state officials.

The rise of modern state that emerged in Europe between 1100 and 1600, started with improving the art of estate-management (Strayer, 1970). The existence of High Courts of Justice and Treasury Departments before defense ministries is evidence for point. For managing scarce resources over the scattered area of feudal kings' domain an efficient management was a necessity thus the estate-management developed. Estate-managers were those more literate and sophisticated people who functioned in centralizing the scattered revenues of their territories for their masters while they were also administer of justice.

The administration of justice and collection of revenues went together throughout Middle Ages as the royal courts spread all over the King's territory. The Chancery emerged in everywhere in Western Europe to do this task and also to deal with the barons who had still responsibility of internal order and of fighting against external threat. In France, having very heterogeneous social groups through series of annexations, Philip Augustus (1180-1223) started to process of royal centralization that proceeded fits and starts for nearly six centuries by appointing royal officials to provinces, which were allowed to keep their traditional customs.

By the thirteenth century some basic internal administrative structures emerged. After that period wars became a necessity to determine boundaries of the state that claimed sovereignty over a certain territory. The state needed that sovereignty to be independent from any

outside threat for being final authority over its subject population. The growth of mediaeval courts led to creation of representative assemblies that aimed at limiting the action of government. These assemblies became places where the King asked for the consent of propertied classes. Powers of parliament constrained the ability of English king to act, but Parliament's assent to issues presented by the king had meaning only because the king was recognized to have sovereign power.

Strayer demonstrated slow progresses of all those administrative, fiscal and financial apparatus in relation to the development of sovereignty of the state and to the loyalty to it. Since the twelfth century, the emergence of bureaucrats as estate-managers had been the ferment of modern state based on impersonal political institutions. The clergy came to play important role with the expansion of state administrative apparatuses. All those bishops, monks, and other church officials became state officials. The reasons of this trend were many. First of all those Churchmen knew Latin which was the international language at that period of time. They were already in the work of administration within their church institution. The most important reason was the overlap between the Law and Latin. The growing body of these estate managers with the expansion of state administration led more and more people to take position of state officials, especially those who were literate and studied law. With the professionalization of state administrative people pre-politically qualified notables transformed into the state administrative officials who were qualified to this position with their knowledge and performed their tasks as a matter of duty (Poggi, 1998). This went parallel to the rationalization of rule, the second phase of the development of modern state according to Poggi (1998). The political enterprise became purposeful activity with knowledge as the state activity was specialized. The secularization was also put into process parallel to these developments.

Poggi (1978; 1990) focuses on the history of Western political institutions and institutional law to show the emergence of modern state. The development of modern state occurred as four sequential political systems: feudalism, Standestaat, absolutism, and finally constitutional state. The key development toward modern state was the transformation from feudalism that based on individual contractual relationship to rule over a territory, to Standestaat, the polity of Estates. This came with a set of social changes that determine the intensification of rule. The polity of

Estates was the early modern system of rule through which rulers constructed new kinds of political relations with various sections of society by establishing different arrangements to rule. The emergence of Standestaat was closely linked to the growth of towns after 1000. In this new political system law guaranteed specific clusters of rights claimed by estates and rules. This provided each estate its own legal entitlement to defend itself by its corporate power (Poggi, 1978). The powerful towns collectively had an interest in a wider and more uniform context of rule in order to facilitate trade. This collective interest of the towns was reflected in the creation of late medieval assemblies-the Standee-in which urban groups, nobility and clergy were represented. The counterpart of the ruler was not an individual but different body, such as assemblies of aristocrats, cities, ecclesiastical bodies or corporate associations. In order to rule in a legitimate base, the ruler had to call the estates of a given region periodically into a constituted, public gathering. The rulers mostly called for the assemblies to ask financial aid for war expenditure. Rulers needed to justify their demands for money not with the interests of ruling dynasty but the public ends.

Although in the Standestaat and the following period of absolutism both Roman law and Greco-Roman republican tradition were major mobilizing actors in the modern state formation. The legacy of Empire or Papacy to create the universal rule had lost while the polity of Estates managed to produce a protracted and sophisticated intellectual argument over the proper arrangement to rule that would produce the idea of sovereignty. The standee included three social groups with interests so different from each other and generating conflicts among them. It was the crisscrossing alignments in which nobility and urban interests joined to defend the prerogatives of the Estates against the crown while the urban interests were generally allied with the crown against the nobility. The alliance of crown with the financial resources gave a way for the centralization of power that culminated in absolutism in association with the rivalry among states that created the impetus for centralization. It was absolutism that gives a way to the rise of bureaucratic administration. Urban groups tended to allied with the crown, after gaining legitimate ground within system of rule, to limit the power of the feudal elements by lending king financial and military support by manning his growing administrative apparatus. The relationship between these assemblies and

rulers continued until the territorial rulers succeeded to take a greater authority over taxation.

The ruler's role had increased overwhelmingly as he secured the emergent capitalists through his fiscal, military, and administrative apparatus. The emergence of international law also gave a strong unique position to the ruler. This was also coincided with the decreasing power of feudal element with new economic and administrative innovations. Mercantilism as the specific economic aspects of absolutism reduced the locally based economic organs and increased commercialization of the economy. This led a reduction in power of feudal elements. As the state managed to construct its standing armies they also lost the military significance. Furthermore, the expansion and professionalization of court system also reduced the feudal element.

Transforming the king's court into a visible place of the polity was important development of French absolutism. In association with the court a new administrative bodies that could be identified as early forms of ministries developed in King's councils. These duties were taken by a group of appointed officials responsible to ensure the management of political and administrative affairs. The creations of new administrative positions that were sold to individuals allowed the ruler to have extra revenues. These lucrative and honorable offices purchased by the individuals could be inherited to heirs with an additional charge. This patrimonial absolutism that gave a way of monopolizing many positions by the privileged bodies was the combination of the polity of estates and feudalism. The polity of estates played the key role in the emergence of institutional arrangements to perform political and administrative tasks. Through this system individual and bodies had right to perform those tasks.

As absolutist king became sole holder of political power and main referent of public life, the social group who were deprived of their political privileges and responsibilities, increasingly focused on their private interests (Poggi, 1990). Although some groups experienced the polity of estates got some rights to perform administrative and political tasks, increasing level of absolutism restricted those activities and privileges. The rising bourgeois whose economic interests had political implications that cannot be solved with absolutism led some new developments. The political implications of bourgeois class brought the idea that state power must be constrained. This was the base of the notion

of constitution. Transformation to constitutional state can only be possible in the condition where society succeeded to develop itself autonomously and where the bourgeoisie did not fight with the nobility for the status advantage and economic privileges given by the ruler. Transformation to constitutional state was an outcome of rising bourgeoisie that were radically politicized by new social forces distinct from entrepreneurial groups, particularly those having intellectual, literary and artistic interests and composing a distinct social identity. Poggi, drawn from Habermas, identified these groups as public or a variety of publics who followed their interests within different settings and media by which they produced public opinion. Bourgeois attack to the absolute state became more fatal when it committed to the enlightenment aggressive rational, antitraditionalist, and emancipatory ideas (Poggi, 1978).

The rise of similarity between the members of bourgeois public and those who had rights over the ruler's own apparatus in terms of moral and intellectual concerns and intellectual qualifications brought the idea that a new form of institutionalization would give a central role to the public and the confrontation of opposing opinions. The rising complexity of civil society with growing working class and their class struggle against capital also another factor directed the route toward constitutional liberal state. The public, electorate and the legislative assemblies, which progressively broke down the power of Crown and its rule, realized the massive process of constitutionalization of political arrangements.

This institutional development of the modern state formation has demonstrated that rising towns and bourgeois were the key elements in emergence of early modern state institutions. That came with a new mode of production, capitalism.

#### *State Formation and Capitalism*

The rise of modern state and capitalism as a mode of production, have been historically twin processes that need to be examined one in relation to other. For this reason, all of those state formation theories have to take capitalism into account in one way or another. The majority of these theories that focus on the war-making give equal importance to capitalism that emerged as the dominant mode of production (Anderson, 1974; Mann, 1986; 1988; Tilly, 1992). Capitalism as a mode of production includes three main elements that are interrelated. These elements are: the private property, commodity production in which every

product is exchangeable, and the free labor market (Mann, 1988). Anderson (1974) generated a theory of state-formation by combining an awareness of the significant role played by warfare with a neo-Marxist framework with an emphasis on socioeconomic formations and on the legacies of the past in bringing about divergent political regimes and infrastructures. He actually seeks to explain the genesis of capitalism in terms of historical realization of conditions theoretically necessary for its existence. Because capitalism emerged in Western Europe, its history had a series of unique filters to capitalism. Absolutist states were such a filter through which capitalism emerged. Anderson compares a number of Western countries in each of which had a feudal crisis marked by collapse of serfdom. This was followed by the construction of a centralized monarchical regime equipped with an apparatus of elaborate military, administrative, fiscal, and legal control. This absolute state was built on the combination of the absolute public authority of the state with private rights of property.

Absolutism could only be a filter to capitalism if it was constructed within a particular sequence of interactions and social relations that constituted the Western European lineage. Within this lineage absolute state functioned as the redeployed political apparatus of a feudal class which abolished serfdom. In the absence of that phasing absolutism neither emerged nor was a significant condition for the formation of capitalism. A set of events had brought a feudal crisis that resulted in absolute regimes. The disappearance of uncultivated lands and overpopulation, weakening of serf-based agriculture and noble landlords strengthened both the towns and royal absolutism as a means of maintaining basic conditions of reproduction for the feudal aristocracy. The period of absolutism in which rulers introduced standing armies, permanent bureaucracy, national taxation, a codified law, and the beginnings of a unified market provided a base for capitalism. Anderson defines feudalism as "a mode of production founded on extra-economic coercion: conquest, not commerce, was its primary form of expansion," (1974: 197) and absolutist states had been essentially feudal political systems. While these states kept those feudal elements, they successfully redeployed and recharged apparatus of feudal domination (1974: 18) for the emergent forces and relationships of capitalism. It was this paradox what lied in the formation of absolute state.

The absolute states, emerged at the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, were formed on the basis of a temporary compatibility of class interests between feudal nobility and an emergent bourgeoisie at moment of feudal crisis. Feudal forces united against the peasantry after the dissolution of serfdom while the rise of an urban bourgeois was in process. These states emerged out of these relationships of feudal and bourgeois interests both of which could find satisfaction in the elaboration of wide ranging and well protected systems of property rights. Absolute states lost its feudal element by "frustrating and falsifying its promises for capital' (1974: 41). This was symbolized with a royal repudiation of debts incurred in efforts to appropriate land through war. Absolutism did two important tasks: providing more land and people available for noble exploitation through foreign conquest and creating armed forces and bureaucracy to protect elite property rights. A rising bourgeois was partly feudalized through sailing offices within the growing state apparatus. But in England and Netherlands commercial bourgeois was strong enough not to be pacified with this way. The absence or presence of serfdom, how strong bourgeois and towns, and presence or absence of a direct Roman inheritance determined three kinds of outcomes to the process of early modern state-building. In France and Spain absolutism took a moderate form characterized in the administrative sphere by the sale of offices while in England and Netherlands emerging bourgeois class succeeded to throw away the absolutist regime. The harshest form of absolutism emerged with a militarized form in Brandenburg-Prussia, Austria and Prussia. The emergence of capitalist interests brought the end of absolute state.

Two interconnected social processes gave a way to develop European states as territorially strong states: warfare that fuelled more complex, large scale coordination of resources and European economic expansion in form of capitalism (Mann, 1988). The relationship between the capitalism and rise of modern nation state lied in the fact that both developments in military technology and economic expansion increasingly took capitalistic form. The capitalist expansion necessitated military protection abroad and more new legal regulation of property and market transactions. Owners of capital needed territorial states for solving all these problems from capitalist expansion. With this capitalist expansion both at domestic and international level state managed to acquire a greater infrastructural power: "regular taxation, a monopoly



over military mobilization, permanent bureaucratic administration a monopoly of law-making and enforcement" (Mann, 1988: 133). In relation to this process the state also enhanced infrastructural capacities of societal groups, especially those property owners, and this prevented a state to get despotic powers.

European states started to loose despotic powers as capitalist class increasingly manipulated them. The development of infrastructure led extensive class organization and consciousness took shape and produced class-based political control. This firstly happened among the upper-class. The penetration of market economy into country side and development of national states also led the lower classes to develop their organization. Centralizing territorial states created and structured the social spaces into which social classes, including bourgeois, and working class later, entered. States benefited from the realizable and taxable wealth generated by capitalism as the capitalists got protection from state in performing their activities, especially abroad. It was the symbiotic relationship between capitalist and states that sharpened the national boundaries further. This symbiotic relationship was not struggle-free. This fiscal-military relationship evolved between states and dominant economic classes were mediated through constitutional forms and gave a way to extract taxes to finance war. As they fought over extraction and taxation they paved the way toward monopolistic, territorial, and national character of the state. By the nineteenth century industrial capitalism emerged and it was largely segmented series of national economies.

Many scholars have accepted the importance of international aspects of capitalism and modern European state formation. Wallerstein's "modern world system theory" states that the emergence of capitalism in the sixteenth century gave a way of developments of states emerged within the European context. Emergence of capitalism in Europe and its expansion to the rest of globe divided the world into three zones: core, semi-periphery, and periphery. This division has been an outcome of processes of unequal exchange that has been performed in the absence of a political community by the populations of the disadvantaged zones to obtain more equitable distribution of benefits. Wallerstein's theory claims that classes, national ethnic groups and states have all been products of emergence, development, and expansion of capitalism. In this theory individual states are tools used by economically dominant groups to

world-market oriented development at home and the international economic advantages abroad.

Although Wallerstein's approach emphasized that economic transformations brought an important contribution to the formation of the European system of states, the emergence of this system was one of the conditions favoring the emergence of capitalism in Europe, and expansion of capitalism into other regions of world, and finally emergence of modern world system (Zolberg, 1987). Skocpol (1979) has paid a special attention to these international state systems in her analysis of revolutions. She has mainly looked at the international political conjuncture in her analysis of revolutions that caused a reinforcement of the state. Skocpol (1994) has treated international political factors as a kind of independent variable. The developments within international state system have played decisive role in the revolutionary breaks of state and class structures in the countries that fall back to these developments. Unequal or competitive transnational relations have played an important role in shaping a country's state and class structures, so influenced the domestic context from which a revolution could emerge or not (Skocpol, 1994).

The role of war-making, development of specific institutions of modern European states and the role played by capitalism were all important factors of European state-making. All these modern state formation formulating on the basis of structural causal explanations have brought invaluable insights to for the evaluating this big process. But this does not mean that they have proven to be sufficient in explaining all aspects of the state formation. We argue that the state-formation is not a culture-free process. These structural models must be modified with cultural aspects of state-formation in order to reach a complete understanding of this important process. Now next section will provide insights for cultural aspects of state formation into the light.

#### **b. Lame Leg of Modern State-Formation: Cultural Dimension**

Although cultural dimension of state-formation is as significant as structural one, it has been neglected for a long time in social theory. As comparative historical sociology has donated the state formation process with the structural theories, it has been impoverished with paying less attention to cultural dimension. That is why we call the cultural dimension of state formation lame leg of this large process.

State and society engaged in a struggle that is seen to operate in the cultural arena (Barkey, 1994). Although the state gained power over the population through coercion, it was able to gain their consent as well by making them citizens entitled to certain rights from this state. The state in this sense is also a cultural creation in its struggle with society. It forms institutions that regulate social life and constantly redefine the boundaries of culture (Corrigan& Sayer, 1985). In this relationship the state has its strength not from its autonomy and capacity but rather from the allegiance and identification of the community as a national community. In the emphasis on the cultural practice of the state, state formation gains another dimension in the state society relations. Actually diversity in the state formation process depends on the type of state-society relations that develop (Barkey, 1994). In that sense, the state takes role in the construction of the cultural context in which society operates.

*State Formation as a Cultural Revolution*

Corrigan and Sayer have brought this cultural dimension of state formation from English experience. According to them English state formation was a cultural revolution. Cultural revolution means "a revolution as much in the way the world was made sense of as in how goods were produced and exchanged" (Corrigan& Sayer, 1985: 1-2). This revolution "in the way the world is made sense of" occurred both in the way subjects of the state elaborate their experience and in the manner in which "state activities, forms, routines, and rituals ... for the constitution and regulation of social identities" (1985: 2) are elaborated. Cultural revolution has always been implicated in the processes of state formation and social transformations and its manifest in moral regulation, which produces normalizing, taken for granted reality of deep processes of social change. English state had been articulated and imposed ideologically and culturally through institutions of Parliamentary sovereignty, private and public property, natural rights of man and the primacy of law. State formation process is an ideological project- a cultural revolution in which legitimate modes of control was consolidated through rituals and routines of rule. State formation cannot be understood unless it is studied as an ongoing revolution in cultural practice. Corrigan and Sayer (1985) reconstruct for England a centuries long cultural process, which was embodied in the forms, rituals, and discourses of rule. Cultural revolution was the generation of a common social and moral project that included popular as well as elite notions of political culture.

Cultural revolution was linked to the moral regulation. Moral dimension of state activity has been manifested in "moral regulation," which formed a key part of the epochal cultural revolution. Moral regulation involves "a project of normalizing, rendering natural, taking for granted in a word 'obvious' what are in fact...premises of particular and historical form of social order" (Corrigan& Sayer, 1985: 3-4). Modern state formation should properly be understood as a profound cultural revolution, one that tends to impose a moral regulation on the most disparate spheres of a society.

Corrigan and Sayer's state formation model in which they take state formation as cultural revolution can be corrective to the equation of state formation with concentration of coercion and capital and war-making. State is not evaluated as sum of its institutional capacities but as politically organized subjection (Corrigan& Sayer, 1985: 7); a set of practices that, through their exercise, and makes an impositional claim to legitimacy. What is legitimate "is always that of a dominant class, gender, race, delineating and idealizing its conditions of rule" (1985: 6). They argued that it must be more weight to the political side of political economy, because capitalism is sustained by a state that engages in "more of less violent suppression of alternatives coupled with active 'encouragement' by state agencies and activities of preferred forms." In this sense, state formation is taken as cultural revolution. The state succeeded to have political power as it coerced. That provided to win consent for this political power among people of themselves as citizens with certain limited rights and with related obligations to confine their activities within the bonds of state-legitimated forms of property and family relations, political organs, and national identities. The Englishmen rights, they showed, were largely limited to property rights to elect representatives to Parliament on a geographic basis. The practice of those rights created a sense of nation and citizenship among Englishmen that the state later drew upon when it summoned human and material resources for conquest, first in Great Britain, then in the world.

Drawing from Japanese case, Ikegami (1995) has demonstrated how the state formation affected cultural sphere. She has analyzed Japanese state formation process with the changing cultural self-understanding of the samurai class. Ikegami takes the samurai's culture of honor and investigates its changing over centuries in terms of state-formation process of Japan. Japanese state formation, according to

Ikegami, "1. was carried out as a consequence of a vertical military consolidation of power among samurai class; 2. its clashes with horizontal political alliances and; 3. the forced demilitarization and subordination of the non-samurai population in the process of state-making together explain the unique nature of early modern shogunate." She has mainly focused on the Tokugawa state formation, because it was the Tokugawa period in which many regulations reorganized every sphere of social life of groups ranging from villages to the shrines and merchant guilds. Tokugawa state affected the cultural sphere very deeply because of this reorganization. Ikegami argues that state's role in cultural sphere is not limited to defining or organizing but rather it went beyond these roles and took a role of creating social and political institution that had strong impacts on cultural development. Cultural impact of state formation must be evaluated as an articulation of state regulated and individual behavior.

Transformation honor codes of samurai class and the state formation process of Tokugawa Japan have been linked in her analysis. The understanding of samurai honor shifted from using violence to the virtuous self discipline. This development followed by a shift that led to transform individual based honor to organizational based. The last shift occurred via transformation of loci of samurai honor culture from performance to status. All these three shifts coincided with different periods, while the latest one associated with the Tokugawa state-formation. Meiji era abolished samurai, but used sons of ex samurai as human resources for in the period of nation-building.

#### *State Formation, Family and Gender*

Recently, there has been a rising interest on the relationships among state formation family and gender. Corrigan and Sayer have also been sensitive to the ways that the state favored men over women, and indeed regulated household and family relations. Family strategies and gender and masculinity played key roles in the state formation. We would like to develop this family and gender issues with a few more studies. Benadusi (1995), Liddle (1996) and Adams (1994) have suggested very interesting and vital aspects of state formation process through their research on complex relationships among family, gender, and state formation. A very interesting argument raised by Bestor (1996) who has demonstrated how illegitimate offsprings had been legitimized in the

absence of an legitimate son who could be successor at the expense of legitimate daughter.

Because state formation is a socially embedded process, it is necessary to give an attention to institutions such as family and religions as well as gender relations. Benadusi (1995) has argued that the role provincial elite families were not only passive recipients of larger socioeconomic and political circumstances, but they were active participants in the large process of state formation and consolidation. She took the local elite of Poppi and explored the interaction among socioeconomic values, family traditions, and local interests of provincial elite families and state consolidation. Her examination of Poppi local elite and its relation to state consolidation shows how the matrimonial and patrimonial strategies of these local elite families were redefined in order to adapt the modified social, political, and economic circumstances surrounding state consolidation. During most of the 16th century elite families combined endogamy with marriage alliances with provincial families from other parts of state while they shifted to endogamy in 1580s for the political monopoly and the consolidation of landownership. Gendered family relations and marriages played important roles in the state formation because all these relations between parents and children, husband and wives were embedded in patrimonial package of fairly dominant class and state, and embodied in genealogy of office (Adams, 1994).

The state formation led a fundamental shift in the social structure of gender and more specific politicization of masculinity (Liddle, 1996). This process deepened the sexual division as well as brought a distinction between warrior masculinity and bourgeois masculinity during the rise of capitalist state. The state formation process is linked to politicization of social reproduction and as well as politicization of masculinities. He showed how state formative activity of seventeenth and eighteenth centuries associated with an increase in witch-hunting and social order concerns that were increasingly framed in gender terms. Bestor (1996) provides interesting case of Estense, which was governed for one hundred fifty years by princes who were born as illegitimate offspring preferred over legitimate daughters in succession. This case illuminates the complex relations between practices and creation of general value that resulted investment of personal and dynastic honor in patrimony in state formation process. All these studies on gender and family relations to

state formation show that it is necessary to incorporate gender dimension into state formation studies.

Hunt (1995), departed from Corrigan and Sayer notion of cultural revolution and moral regulation, has taken attention to issue of popular culture in English history through legislation that aimed at moral regulation. As the notion of cultural revolution has always been implicated in the state formation processes and has manifested in moral regulation by producing the normalizing, taken for granted reality of deep processes of social change, the role of the law in the formation of the modern state, modern self and the practice of everyday life has, and still is, crucial. Hunt (1995) has demonstrated how English rulers have produced statutes to keep laboring class subservient since the fourteenth century. Statutes such as prohibiting and/or regulating the gambling, drinking, and prostituting, had been emerged out of the ruling class' concerns on disciplining the labor. The attempts were made to bring under control and discipline the fairs and alehouses that were untroubled spaces within which popular culture was lived. As state tried to control everyday life of working population through legislation, its aim was to bring the popular culture under control and pacify it (Hunt, 1995). Although state agency is central, the way in which conflicts over antagonistic discursive formations within the field of popular culture provide the arena within which the direction and the targets of regulation are formed and acted upon by both state and state agencies. For that reason, it is not a good idea to make a polarization between state projects of the reform of morals and non-state social purity movements. It is necessary to reject the idea that state having some institutional personalization is an autonomous agent that selects its target as part of some wider objectives and then organizes their moralization in order to subject them to moral regulation.

#### *State Formation and Civilizational Process*

As the cultural dimension of state formation has been evaluated, Elias's work cannot be ignored. There has been a recent reinvention of his work especially among those who try to go beyond structural explanation of state-formation process. Although Elias took a start from Weber's identification of state as having a monopoly of the legitimate use of violence, he has tried to solve the problem of legitimacy by linking a rising level of internal security and calculability in everyday life directly to the formation of habitus. His theory is based on the elimination contest

between numerous rival territorial magnates, a violent competitive process with a compelling sequential dynamic through which larger territorial units emerge with more effective central monopoly apparatuses. Elias emphasizes the small disparities among many small territories with fluctuating balances between contending elements within the emerging states. State formation is one of the processes interweaving with others to enmesh individuals in increasingly complex webs of interdependence. This process interweaves with the division of labor, the growth of trade and towns, and use of money, and increasing population in spiral process. The embeddedness of civilizational process within state formation is important.

The courtization of warrior aristocracy is an important point in his theory of state formation that linked to civilizing process. He demonstrated how state-formation process related to changes in personality structure through constraints on human drives and impulses. Elias has demonstrated on the basis of his material on aggression ad manners in European case how people got civilized in the sense of internalizing social constraint, becoming more self-disciplined and managing their feelings and emotions in a more stable way. The intensification as self-constraint is outcome of lengthening chains of social interdependency that is associated with the process of state formation manifesting in the concentration and monopolization of the means of state formation. The explanatory reliance on monopolization of violence and lengthening chains of interdependency in explanation of state formation and self-discipline ignores the bureaucracy as an important feature of state formation having effects on personality structure (van Krieken, 1989).

The civilizing process that was embedded in modern state formation in Europe had been affected by other civilizations too. European state had encountered many different civilizations, as they developed their modern state system (Burke, 1997; Lewis, 1995). Drawn from Abu-Lughod (1989), Burke (1997) argues existence of and struggle between civilizations played an important role in the rise of European state system between the eighth and the seventeenth centuries. European civilization evolved in its interaction and reaction against the power constellation of other civilizations such as Ottoman, Asian, Mongols, and etc. Burke also argues that many geo-military competition theorists who mentioned before have neglected the importance of Crusade. It was



important in cultural sphere in which papacy played a kind of unifying force in leading Western Europe against Islam. In organizing Crusades the papacy took active role. The Crusades brought a capitalist boom to Italian city states, while the decline of the manor and the states emerged out of civilizational conflicts developed certain cultural patterns, repressed others and influenced the degrees of differences allowed within a civilization. Culture as a powerful causal mechanism was an important sustaining mechanism in the development of European states. Culture of Catholicism succeeded to hold decentralized medieval states together in clashing of Islam (Burke, 1997). Not only the internal dynamics but also the interaction of these dynamics with the intercivilizational conflicts of the crusades promoted European state-building.

*Religion and State Formation*

Bax (1991) and Turner (1988) have paid special attention to the linkage between Christianity and state formation process. Turner (1988) points out that there has been an ignorance of religious culture in studying of state formation. The development of states requires effective means of communication and the Church provided an important means of communication for the Western state formation and with being a mean of communication provided Church an opportunity to Christianize the common people. Creation of the state church in England led to a "fusion of Protestantism and Nationalism" (Corrigan & Sayer, 1985: 45). The developments of religious movement had affected different countries in different ways, for example Germany emerged as a dominant bureaucratic state as a result of religious movements. Lutheranism by rejecting the right of Christians to oppose princes provided a base for the legal power of the centralized state that adopted and developed Roman constitutional law as German princes controlled over their subjects through professional law and university trained legalists. The monopolization of violence had affected the Roman Catholic church. It lost control over the means of physical violence and so it developed a different strategy to make alliance with the masses (Bax, 1991). Now there was a struggle for hegemony over the means of orientation. The main aim of the Church became to control over the means of socialization and orientation by reducing the other alternatives of socialization. The state formation process led the church to take some emancipatory strategies that aim to affect the lower social categories. This attempt resulted in emergence of new inequalities and new potential clients. The

struggle over means of orientation had not been totally won by the Church. As Corrigan and Sayer demonstrated through English case, the state formation as a cultural revolution managed to be dominant over the means of orientation.

### **Conclusion**

So far we have evaluated both structural and cultural theories of state formation process. Despite the quantity and quality of the scholarship that the state formation analysis has produced over many years, historical sociologists and social theorists have failed to develop a well-equipped converging theory to analyze this large process.

The field of state formation has become dominated by a structuralist perspective that demotes culture to the marginal role of reflecting social structural processes. Only recently, of course because of the “cultural turn” in social sciences in the 1990s, have historical sociologists realized that culture is “constitutive of social order” (Sewell, 1985: 161) and looked at culture as a major aspect of state formation process. No doubt is state formation process culture-free. Indeed, state formation has deep impacts on cultural sphere through its rules and regulation (see Ikegami, 2005).

Historical sociologists who attempt to bring culture into state formation analysis have reacted to structural determinism and recognize that cultural systems are crucial to how people formulate their understandings of the world. However, historical sociologists focusing on culture to understand state formation process should not be fallen into trap of going so extremes in their culturally deterministic explanations by completely forgetting about structure.

The reciprocal process of formulation between culture and social structure forces historical sociologists to make structural analysis of state formation process to understand the significance of symbolic structures in the interpretation of concrete experience. On the other hand this reciprocity between culture and social structure encourages historical sociologists to focus on culture in state formation process in order to be aware of structure that is very real with its both enabling and limiting capacities.

In conclusion, we advocate a theory of state formation that involves a richly woven analysis of factors on different levels based on the combination of structural and cultural elements. State formation process provides a window on the reciprocal formulation of culture and structure. There is an urgent need to understand the relationship between cultural and structural analyses in state formation.

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