

**A PROBLEM ANALYSIS OVER HUMANITARIAN AID
ISSUES BASED ON AID PRINCIPLES AND
METHODOLOGY OF DONORS DEPENDENCY AND
POST-DEVELOPMENT THEORIES**

*Ahmet EFE**

Makale Geliş Tarihi-Received: 16.01.2018
Makale Kabul Tarihi-Accepted: 12.11.2018

ABSTRACT

Aid coordination is in a constant theme of discussion among national and international aid agencies in their search for more effectiveness and efficiency in delivering development assistance. Not only at the international scope but also at the national and regional scales, coordination always seems to be cumbersome when it comes to donations and charity issues. In this study it is tried to sketch out literature in the domain of international aid and with a solution finding of both theoretical and conceptual approaches to the problems that hinder coordination amongst donors and aid agencies are laid out to be analyzed and scrutinized. One of the main arguments is that lack of coordination not only does spoil market resilience in the recipient country but also hamper ecosystem and investment climate that make poor countries more and more aid-dependent. It is concluded that the stakeholders of donors and funding institutions have their own agendas in which coordination with other donors does not seem to be a priority.

Keywords: Humanitarian Aid, International Organizations, Public Aid Management, Aid Dependency, Lack of Coordination.

Jel Codes: F35, F54, F55, L31

* Dr., CISA, CRISC, PMP, Internal Audit Executive, Ankara Development Agency, Turkey. icsiacag@gmail.com

**BAĞIŞ SAHİPLERİNİN YARDIM İLKELERİ VE
YÖNTEMLERİ ÜZERİNDEN İNSANİ YARDIM
KONULARININ BAĞIMLILIK VE KALKINMA SONRASI
TEORİLERİYLE SORUN ANALİZİ**

ÖZ

Yardım koordinasyonu, ulusal ve uluslararası yardım kuruluşları arasında, kalkınma yardımlarının sağlanmasında daha fazla etkinlik ve verimlilik arayışında olan sürekli bir tartışma konusudur. Bağış ve hayır işlerinde sadece uluslararası kapsamda değil, ulusal ve bölgesel ölçeklerde de, koordinasyon her zaman zahmetli görünmektedir. Bu çalışmada, uluslararası yardımlar alanında literatürün taslak haline getirilmesi ve vericiler arasında koordinasyonu engelleyen sorunlara hem teorik hem de kavramsal yaklaşımların çözümünde çözüm bulunmaya çalışılmış ve yardım kuruluşları analiz edilerek incelenmiştir. Temel argümanlardan biri, koordinasyon eksikliğinin sadece alıcı ülkede pazar esnekliğini bozmakla kalmayıp aynı zamanda yoksul ülkelere daha fazla yardım bağımlı hale getiren ekosistem ve yatırım ortamını da engellemesidir. Bağışçı ve fon veren kurumların paydaşlarının, diğer bağışçılarla koordinasyonun öncelikli olmadığı birtakım özel gündemleri olduğu sonucuna varılmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: İnsani Yardım, Uluslararası Örgütler, Kamu Yardım Yönetimi, Yardım Bağımlılık, Koordinasyonsuzluk.

Jel Kodu: F35, F54, F55, L31

INTRODUCTION

According to the United Nations World Food Program, one in seven people go to bed hungry every night. In fact, hunger kills more people than HIV/ AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis combined. In addition, some 884 million people do not have access to clean drinking water, of these, 468 million live in Asia, and 328 million live in Sub-Saharan Africa. Furthermore, in excess of 1 billion people make a three to seven-hour journey on foot just to collect water, the weight of it carried on their heads is commonly 20kg, and these journeys are often dangerous¹.

Economic growth is necessary but not enough to accelerate reduction of hunger and malnutrition. It costs on average just US 25 cents a day to feed a hungry child and change her life forever. While food is the most basic of human needs required for survival, on average, 1 in 8 people go to bed hungry each night. Hunger kills, maims, reduces IQ, lowers wages, reduces school attendance and undermines economic growth (Murphy, 2013: 58).

Recent evidence demonstrates that aid is effective in raising economic growth and reducing income poverty in good ecosystems, but ineffective in poor ecosystems. Therefore ecosystem, market conditions, investment climate, environmental health and security competency and considerations are of crucial importance. All these parameters are requirements of building an independent state and public order. The result holds both when the environment is defined narrowly as fiscal, monetary, and trade policies and more broadly in terms of wide range of policies and public institutions (Burnside, 2000: 23).

Evidence also shows that the policy and institutional ecosystem of the recipient country has only a limited impact on the present allocation of aid. It is because donors have multiple objectives for their aid, such as strategic and historical considerations, the actual allocation of aid differs significantly from the poverty-efficient allocation that would target poor countries with good policies and institutions. According to

¹ For more information, see: WFP FAQs, www.wfp.org and <http://www.fao.org/hunger/en/>

one calculation, the present allocation of aid lifts 10 million people out of poverty annually, while poverty-efficient allocation would double the effect of aid on growth and poverty (*Ibid.*).

Therefore, aid effectiveness could be much enhanced if donors improved their allocation of aid between recipient countries towards those that are poorer and have good policies and institutions. That is also a contradiction. That poorest ones do not have both effective institutional structure and human resources to handle problems makes them more aid-dependent. Great emphasis has recently been paid on harmonizing the donor practices to reduce the transaction costs for distribution of aid effectively. International aid organization and their operation costs are the transaction costs for global community.

84

IJSI 11/2
Aralık
December
2018

As is seen in the figure 1, The Core Humanitarian Standard on Quality and Accountability (CHS) sets out Nine Commitments that organizations and individuals involved in humanitarian response can use to improve the quality and effectiveness of the assistance they provide. It also facilitates greater accountability to communities and people affected by crisis: knowing what humanitarian organizations have committed to will enable them to hold those organizations to be accountable.

Figure 1. The Core Humanitarian Standard on Quality and Accountability (CHS)



Source: Core Humanitarian Standard (Anonim, 2015)

Here lack of coordination, improper information, digital divide, inappropriate usage of funds and mismanagement in recipient countries are main hindrances for effective use of funds for the cause of fighting against hunger and malnutrition related conditions. A comprehensive literature review is being conducted and their discussions and main findings are skimmed for a better understanding of management and governance of aid organizations.

1. RESEARCH PROBLEM AND THE LITERATURE REVIEW

Our study tries to provide answers and solutions for aid dependency and malfunctioning ecosystem of poor countries via continuous and frequent foreign aid mechanisms that are being functioned by diverse aid agencies. While extensive researches lay down in the domain of foreign aid, we have found aid dependency as our research problem. Expectations of continuous consumer demand and conduct of different business are focal points for economic activities with which employment, tax revenue and investments trigger engine of business. Certain market conditions and an ecosystem that feed entrepreneurs and attract new investments are being blocked by foreign aid.

According to Ross (Ross, 2007) and Poppendieck (Poppendieck, 1997) hunger is something which, it can be argued, is universal in human nature and experience, and universally regarded as something which can be changed with the provision of proper food. However, as Shaw (Shaw D. J., 2001, s. 33) argued that politics starts to intrude if, rather than just getting food to the hungry, questions are raised about why people lack access to enough food.

As defined by Barrett, Maxwell (Barrett, Maxwell, 2005: 105) that the US is yet to shift from in-kind to monetary donations to the WFP, though almost all other donors have done so, is consistent with this argument concerning differences between international regime and domestic US feed-the-hungry norms. For example, as it is pointed out by Clay (Clay, 2003: 704) that shifting from in-kind to monetary donation has also been associated with an overall reduction in the value of donations, and the WFP is concerned with the trade-offs which may be involved with the US shifting away from in-kind donations.


It is argued by Easterly (Easterly, 2006: 75) that a vast amount of money has been spent on foreign aid, especially in Africa, and that national growth rates have not increased as a result of the aid. There is a shadow currently hanging over the field of international aid that has been a waste of money and has even done more harm than good, spoiling their market and ecosystem. Mayo (Mayo, 2009) claimed that aid to Africa has only increased poverty, deepened dependence to aid given by the West, and institutionalized corruption in government.

Collier (Collier P., 2007: 86) takes a more analytical approach to the situations that retard economic growth. Ian (Smillie, 2009) presents a striking example of how indigenous non-governmental organizations can be highly effective in the struggle against poverty and hunger.

86

IJSI 11/2
Aralık
December
2018

Figure 2. Exaggerative Aid Dependency Problem



Source: Cartoon Movement (Matumula, 2016)

In a report of GAO (GAO, 2015) it is defined that USAID cannot systematically measure the performance of food-for-assets activities across all development projects and therefore cannot determine the


A Problem Analysis over Humanitarian Aid Issues Based on Aid Principles and Methodology of Donors Dependency and Post-Development Theories

effectiveness of food-for-assets activities in achieving short-term or longer-term development goals.

As is stressed by Bourguignon, Platteau (Bourguignon, Platteau, 2015: 88) that the need for a proper evaluation of aid agencies is even more pressing as, side by side with serious agencies, there exist careless organizations that are not equipped with proper monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms to assess desired results and planned achievements. They tend to disburse funds quickly either because they do not have a good understanding of the game or are not single-mindedly pursuing the objective of poverty alleviation or they are being involved in agendas that does not ail recipients. The second problem arises when, despite all their pro-poor rhetoric, aid organizations are concerned with reproducing themselves as job- and income-providers for their employees.

It is analyzed by Halonen-Akatwijuka (Halonen-Akatwijuka, 2005) the allocation of foreign aid to different sectors in a recipient developing country. It is found that donors tend to favor social sectors over other public expenditure programs. Coordination failure occurs due to incomplete information and lack of transparency and proper cooperation. It is recommended that the donors may concentrate too much on the priority sectors leaving the lower priority, yet important, sectors lacking funds. Alternatively, it is also recommended that there may be gaps in services in the priority areas because of the information problem. It is found that the more similar preferences the donors have, the more scope there is for coordination failure.

Figure 3. Problematic Ecosystem of funding agencies with NGOs



88

IJSI 11/2
Aralık
December
2018

Source: Odessablog (Anonim, What to make of Decree 68/2016, 2016)

Increase of food prices are also studied as part of problems of humanitarian aid. While food prices have declined slightly since 2008, they are found to be relatively high. It is argued that rich countries do better in terms of delivering food assistance to the world's poorest people. In an article by Ramachandran, Leo, McCarthy (Ramachandran, Leo, McCarthy, 2013: 330), it is outlined ways in which donors can commit to feeding the poor and financial mechanisms that will enable more food to reach more people around the world. However, this becomes a major problem of humanitarian aid system when a country tends to be more aid dependent.

Therefore, a review of changes in food assistance policies and practices is important for several reasons (Harvey, Proudlock, Clay, Riley, Jaspars, 2010).

1. A shift from food aid to food assistance by key donors, UN agencies and NGOs is an important step. In terms of assistance programming, significant trends include the shift from in-kind food aid to local and regional procurement, an increase in the use of cash transfers and an increasing role for social protection and hunger safety nets.

2. Changes is required in the context in which food assistance is to be provided. The global food, finance and fuel crises and climate change, as well as the ever more protracted nature of some internal conflicts are all factors which are putting pressure on the international community for a change of focus in food assistance policy and practice.

3. Changes in the international architecture and the delivery of food assistance would be a strategic move. The humanitarian reform agenda (the clusters, the CERF) and the future of the Food Aid Convention (FAC), currently in debate, are critical areas of change in the international humanitarian and food security architecture.

2. THEORETICAL STRUCTURE

Our study leans on theoretical assumptions and hypothesis of the dependency theory and post-development theory. Dependency theory was developed by Raul Prebisch (1950) and Cardoso and Faletto (1960) that tried to understand economic divergence between developed and underdeveloped world in a period of 200 years in the favor of western industrialized countries (Cardosso, Falletto, 1979). Main argument of dependency theory can be concisely explained that the dependent states supply cheap minerals, agricultural commodities, and cheap labor, and serve as the repositories of surplus capital, obsolescent technologies, and manufactured goods. These functions orient the economies of the dependent states toward the outside: money, goods, and services do flow into dependent states, but the allocation of these resources is determined by the economic interests of the dominant states, and not by the economic interests of the dependent state (Ferraro, 1996: 3).

Later, dependency theory has turned out to be critics against modernization theory and state building policies of western countries. Therefore, the no classical theory of development became main target for dependency theory. This tendency has been reached its cusp by post-development theory of postmodern school that seeks to find alternatives to development theory. Post development theory argued that the rich countries cannot lift the poor countries out of poverty vicious cycle. Regional and local communities need to be empowered to form their own policies that fit to their abilities and needs.

Therefore, development countries should not follow moral and cultural guidance of aid donors that relying on ill-suited ideas from overseas.

According to Sayigh (Sayigh, 1991: 41-45), the critique of the modernization theory by dependency advocates focused on three central points.

1. Modernization was viewed by its theorists as an evolutionary, transitional process which moved nonlinearity, thus transforming societies from traditionalism to modernity in stages. Therefore, the periphery needs to adapt to policies and institutional requirements of central western countries.
2. Modernization meant the adoption essentially of one ideal western model that had universal and humanitarian value and applicability. Third world must use own resources to come closer to a western modern country.
3. Several pattern variables like the traits or features of modernity versus traditionalism were identified and assigned a central function in causing underdevelopment, or in being instrumental in leading to development. Cultural convergence to western values and capitalist tradition became symbols of wealthy state.

According to Ateş and others (Ateş, Es, Bayraktar, 2005), today, by the aid of globalization, the capitalist world order sets the agenda for investments almost all over the world. If the investments in poor countries are on low level, and the trade deficit threatens the countries' financial resources, the dependence on aid and on borrowed funds seems crucial. The developed countries have always opposed change in the structure of power allocation in the international economic order, basically because of their benefits of today's status quo. It is because that their ecosystem spoiled from early colonial age in which their natural resources brutally stolen and their human capital taken as the slaves that were used in capital accumulation and building western modern states. In the post-colonial period, the former colonial powers made the use of people that could take care of their interests in the country. Therefore, dependence of the developing countries on developed countries should be attributed to external and internal factors that led to insufficient internal dynamics.

3. MAIN ORGANIZATIONS AND DONORS IN THE AREA

International aid is being delivered by various foundations that try to provide basic needs to poor countries that are guided towards building a western style modern state. Key players are first donors then the multinational organizations that are operating in the field of aid, relief and development of poor nations. Here is a list of 53² international, multinational organizations and NGOs collected from various internet resources:

1. Action Against Hunger (AAH)
2. African Development Bank (AfDB)
3. Development Bank of Latin America (CAF)
4. Asian Development Bank (ADB)
5. CARE
6. Caribbean Development Bank (CDB)
7. Caritas Internationalis
8. Catholic Relief Services (CRS - USCC)
9. Colombo Plan (CP)
10. Doctors Without Borders
11. Emergency Nutrition Network (ENN)
12. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)
13. European Investment Bank
14. Food For The Hungry International (FHI)
15. Hunger Plus, Inc
16. Inter-American Development Bank (IADB)
17. Interaction
18. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD; part of the World Bank Group)
19. International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
20. International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC)
21. International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)
22. International Labour Organization (ILO)

² In addition to those given above, there are a few hundreds of organizations that are working in the aid field. For more information see: <http://reliefweb.int/organizations> and also <https://www.charitynavigator.org/index.cfm?bay=search.results&cgid=7&cuid=20>

23. International Monetary Fund (IMF)
24. International Organization for Migration (IOM)
25. International Red Cross (ICRC AND IFRC)
26. International Rescue Committee (IRC)
27. Islamic Development Bank (IDB)
28. Lutheran World Federation
29. Mennonite Central Committee (MCC)
30. Mercy Corps (MC)
31. Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA, part of the World Bank Group)
32. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
33. Overseas Development Institute (ODI)
34. Refugees International
35. Relief International
36. Save the Children
37. Technical Centre for Agricultural and Rural Cooperation ACP-EU (CTA)
38. The Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA)
39. United Nations (UN)
40. United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)
41. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)
42. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
43. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)
44. United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA)
45. United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)
46. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
47. United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO)
48. US Committee for Refugees (USCR)
49. World Bank Group
50. World Food Programme (WFP)
51. World Health Organization (WHO)
52. World Trade Organization (WTO)
53. World Vision International

Among the new ingredients of international relations since the Second World War—nuclear warfare, space research, race relations and development—none is in greater need of expert signposting than international aid. As an example, by Stevens (Stevens, 1966) amongst

A Problem Analysis over Humanitarian Aid Issues Based on Aid Principles and Methodology of Donors Dependency and Post-Development Theories

some studies of similar concern has concentrated on creating better public understanding of the reasons why rich countries should aid poor ones; and critically to analyzing the process of aid-giving in both economic and political terms for the benefit of policy-makers and practitioners.

An article by Ross (Ross, 2007: 270) sought to analyze the normative and political characteristics of the WFP which have contributed to its effectiveness. Among its most significant findings is that American agricultural interests, interpreted through the prism of domestic political norms, have dovetailed with 'feed-the-hungry' norms that are projected and implemented by the WFP, resulting in the strong support of the United States for the WFP. This huge amount of support underlines the perception, promoted by some critics, that the UN is somehow incapable of acting in ways that are incompatible with the national interests of the United States and other significant member-states who inherently pursue 'national interests' in institutional environments.

As illustrated at the Table 2, due to their economic wellbeing majority of total aid given is always provided by developed countries. USA is always found at the top just above EU countries as it seen in the table 1 below for WFP donor rankings of top 20.


Table 1. Contributions to WFP: Comparative Figures and Five-Year Aggregate Ranking

5-year Rank	Donor	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	Total
1	USA	2,226,726,364	2,006,615,618	2,016,791,216	2,506,277,407	999,701,880	9,756,112,485
2	European Commission	372,457,869	250,393,394	894,682,804	1,146,923,974	108,372,572	2,772,830,613
3	Germany	301,321,896	329,258,331	884,648,184	925,484,119	260,519,215	2,701,231,745
4	United Kingdom	408,791,019	456,855,096	355,982,023	588,323,265	260,624,127	2,070,575,530
5	Canada	350,065,593	261,645,796	211,004,816	199,626,298	215,406,049	1,237,748,552
6	Japan	156,778,855	196,773,084	207,052,776	173,483,613	80,904,801	814,993,129
7	Saudi Arabia	271,146,747	151,249,675	35,724,885	8,300,087	239,440,315	705,861,709
8	UN CERF	137,313,501	159,928,948	122,092,323	143,190,918	80,095,241	642,620,931
9	Sweden	93,678,610	91,490,856	121,897,591	117,142,937	121,435,662	545,645,656
10	UN Other Funds and Agencies (excl. CERF)	115,246,796	76,968,803	129,120,180	85,531,447	34,843,857	441,711,083
11	** Private Donors	113,772,665	99,023,455	78,064,946	84,128,599	44,140,201	419,129,866
12	Netherlands	88,493,216	101,441,861	66,808,595	80,325,978	49,400,155	386,469,805
13	Norway	71,893,757	92,580,419	68,525,154	99,940,123	35,371,741	368,311,194
14	Switzerland	86,680,791	84,965,034	67,406,126	69,957,445	55,629,718	364,639,114
15	Australia	112,790,663	72,401,915	83,384,344	65,137,854	19,445,685	353,240,461
16	Denmark	67,879,053	57,256,988	46,412,135	67,627,377	41,900,383	281,075,936
17	United Arab Emirates	29,760,000	2,163,343	6,097,008	5,114,296	221,398,315	264,532,962
18	Pakistan	69,553,012	80,626,872	55,614,046	19,625,573	8,515,784	233,935,287
19	Republic of Korea	31,001,154	37,316,848	39,398,114	33,839,341	50,148,258	191,703,715
20	Russian Federation	66,477,065	48,722,936	37,000,000	33,700,000	4,400,000	190,300,001

Source: WFP (WFP, Contributions to WFP: Comparative Figures and Five-Year Aggregate Ranking, 2018)

As the above table shows the amount of aid paid by donors to WFP, the table in below shows total amount given by donors to all aid organizations (including WFP) in 2018.

Table 2. The Biggest Global Humanitarian Contributions in 2018: Totals by donor



Source: Derived from UNOCHA (Anonim, UNOCHA, 2018)

As expressed by Stevens (Stevens, 1966: 645) it is clear that there is great need for better co-ordination between Western donors, which in effect means only the five major ones—the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany and I.B.R.D (with associates). Considering the amount that are being given by big boys' interventions to the aid organizations in order for their products and services be sold and their companies regain advantages from the recipient countries they will not remain idle. This makes a point why aid organizations do not collaborate and lack in cooperation. It is because nearly every western country has created some aid organizations that are serving mainly for the cause of prosperity of their ecosystem that needs roots from dependable countries alleviation capital inflow.

As it is be argued Spector, Wagner (Spector, Wagner, 2013: 329) that the donor countries usually want something from their assistance which is the main motivation behind aid organizations. Certainly, there are self-interested reasons for providing assistance as well: gaining access to a country's resources, attracting the recipient into the donor's sphere of influence, and influencing and supporting the

political opposition if the donor seeks regime change, among many others.

4. PROBLEMS FACED DUE TO LACK OF COORDINATION AND PROPER INFORMATION SHARING

Coordination of humanitarian aid is a difficult process. Organizations come into coordination structures voluntarily, but they have different, occasionally contradictory mandates. Inevitable differentiations in approach, methodology, perspective, and donor priorities reflect the diversity of the humanitarian community. Should there be a proper ERP system that all the aid agencies are included for management and governance of aid coordination, then it would be easier for agencies to have better cooperation and information sharing. WFP seems to be far ahead of aid agencies in using ICT infrastructure.

96

IJSI 11/2
Aralık
December
2018

In an interviewed by Mari (Mari, 2013) with Jakob Kern, CIO of WFP of the time, it is stressed that the very need of aid organization is to have an ERP system that includes the much-updated information regarding real needs of people. The next area of focus will be the implementation of an information governance mechanism, to serve as the foundation for a knowledge-sharing and collaboration platform. "We have our ERP system for core financial and human resources data, so there is no technical requirement in those areas – it is more about the governance and management of the operational data. We are putting in place a master data management framework and basic things that are common, such as 'who owns geospatial data' and 'who owns procurement data'," he adds. "This governance structure aims at determining who owns the data, so we can produce all the reports we provide to our donors." Once the data owners are identified, they will determine the information format they require, where the data is stored and who has access to it. With that, Kern expects to stop the duplication of data. Until recently, IT leadership at WFP was presented as the sum of many elements such as salaries, licenses, hardware, software, contracts and data center costs.

The Paris Declaration of 2005 outlined a strategy to make aid more efficient through the rationalization of donor behavior. In 2011 there was a high-level meeting in Busan, where participants agreed on the "*Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation.*" According to

A Problem Analysis over Humanitarian Aid Issues Based on Aid Principles and Methodology of Donors Dependency and Post-Development Theories

Bingsten and Tengstam (Bigsten, Tengstam, 2015: 81) this is an attempt to adjust the aid architecture to the new realities with a more diverse body of donors. Four shared general principles are listed in the Busan Declaration which was signed by 109 countries 52 international aid organizations³ :

1. *Ownership of development priorities by developing countries:* Countries should define the development model that they want to implement.
2. *Focus on results:* Having a sustainable impact should be the driving force behind investments and efforts in development policy making. This principle emphasizes that learning from experiences and the importance of alignment of aid inflows with recipient priorities and policies.
3. *Inclusive development partnerships:* Development depends on the participation of all actors and recognizes the diversity and complementarity of their functions. The desire to be inclusive and open for the new players meant that there is less emphasis on harmonization than in previous declarations.
4. *Transparency and accountability:* If recipient governments cannot account for the resources that have been transferred to them, donors will not be willing to continue transferring resources. Development co-operation must be transparent and accountable to all citizens

It is claimed by Bourguignon, Platteau (Bourguignon, Platteau, 2015: 86) for donor countries, the main shortcoming of aid coordination is the loss of national sovereignty and the impeded ability to pursue national objectives through aid programs. For recipient countries, it is their diminished independence owing to reduced competition among donors. There is need to clarify some of the arguments in support of aid coordination in the light of the unavoidable trade-offs born of the existence of political costs of both donors and recipients.

³ For more information see:
<http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/busanadherents.htm>

A. PROBLEMS RELATED WITH FIELD MONITORING

Competency in field monitoring is one of the key elements of aid coordination. Every aid agency must set up a system of monitoring and control for aid operations, procurement, logistics, delivery and reporting. Usage of a collective or shared frameworks and systems in collaboration will inevitable decrease transaction costs and increase efficiency and effectiveness of aid allocation and distribution.

As an example and best practice, a detailed organization-wide guidance for monitors is available in WFP's Monitoring and Evaluation Guidelines and in WFP's Program Guidance Manual, which includes guidance for conducting food distribution monitoring and post-distribution monitoring for emergency operations and relief activities.

As is expressed in the report (GAO, USAID Should Systematically Assess the Effectiveness of Key Conditional Food Aid Activities , 2015), WFP's monitoring and evaluation guidance provides instructions for collecting field data, including discussions of sampling options, methods for choosing beneficiaries to interview, and instructions on collecting and processing qualitative data. In addition, WFP has developed numerous forms for food aid monitors to conduct on-site food distribution monitoring and post-distribution monitoring. WFP's job profile for its monitors states that they are responsible for conducting continuous monitoring and reporting of food assistance, identifying potential problems, and periodically monitoring risk management and report on any actions taken.

According to Audit reports (OIOS, 2006), WFP's organization wide monitoring guidance does not provide clear instructions or guidelines stating that monitoring of warehouses and distribution sites should be based on risk, including risks to WFP's ability to distribute food to intended beneficiaries. In 2006, the External Auditor recommended that WFP use statistical sampling approaches based on risk profiling and informed by implementing partner records, beneficiary concerns, and prior history, as a basis for focusing its monitoring resources.

WFP's organization-wide field monitoring guidance instructs monitors to follow up on issues based on prior field monitoring

findings and notes that risks, along with resources, budget and other factors should be captured in monitoring and evaluation plans. According to COSO which is an internal control standard referenced by the guidance, an effective approach to monitoring includes designing and executing monitoring procedures that are prioritized based on risks to achieving organizational objectives. However, according to Audit reports, the guidance does not clearly instruct WFP staff and field monitors to consider risk as a key factor when determining the level of monitoring needed at warehouses and distribution sites. In addition, the guidance does not include instructions for tailoring monitoring based on the types of risk identified, including contextual risks, such as armed conflict, and institutional risks that could affect WFP's reputation. For example expressed in the report (GAO, USAID Should Systematically Assess the Effectiveness of Key Conditional Food Aid Activities , 2015), WFP's organization-wide monitoring guidance does not address alternative approaches to ensuring monitoring of food assistance distribution sites in high-risk areas where the UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) has restricted WFP staff's access. Without specific guidance that monitoring should be risk-based, WFP staff lack appropriate instructions to develop monitoring plans for those areas that are most vulnerable to waste, fraud, and abuse (WPF, 2006).

99

IJSI 11/2
Aralık
December
2018

B. PROBLEMS RELATED WITH ECOSYSTEM AND ENVIRONS OF AID RECIPIENTS


A set of indicators to facilitate the identification of needs and obstacles follow below that also provides pertinent data regarding failures of humanitarian aid. Gini, GDP, Corruption indexes and development traps are considered as the key factors that can give clear picture of an ecosystem.

(a) The Gini Index and Gross Domestic Product (GDP)

The Gini Index measures income disparity among families within a country. A Gini coefficient of zero expresses perfect equality. Using income as an example, this would mean everyone made the same amount. On the opposite end of the spectrum, a Gini coefficient of one means only one person has all the income. The plot is a little alarming.

The trend of the US is not towards countries that have a good standard of justice and social equality. The trend of the US is towards countries that are known for social inequality, corruption, and what some might call banana republics (Anonim, gini vs gdp, 2007).

Figure 4. GINI vs. GDP Index



Source: CIA World Fact Sheets by Mindcontagion

Tying GDP per capita to the Gini Index gives a clearer picture of how well off a country is and how the wealth is distributed. Here are four possible scenarios and a possible analysis and prescription for each by Keenan (Keenan, 2011):

Low GI and low GDP: The country is uniformly poor. Therefore, widespread income generation strategies may be appropriate and are probably connected to the need for enhanced literacy, education and training. Quality of governance in both the public and private sectors will also likely need upgrading. Examples are several countries of the former Soviet Union, and Ethiopia.

Low GI and high GDP: Most people are reasonably well off. This scenario is typical of EU countries, especially the Nordic countries, as well as South Korea and Australia, none of which is a candidate for international development assistance.


High GI and low GDP: Non-uniform poverty exists in the country. Several examples are in sub-Saharan Africa, such as the Central African Republic, Niger, Namibia and Lesotho, as well as Haiti. Income-generation strategies targeted to specific sectors may be appropriate and are probably connected to the need for enhanced education and training. However, there may be obstacles to development created by families, political parties or ethnic groups that hold economic power. Examples are Sierra Leone, Zimbabwe and some countries in Central and South America.

High GI and high GDP: One possibility is that the entrepreneur class in the country has been successful in producing wealth. However, this wealth is not extensively shared with the rest of the population. Examples are Brazil, Chile, Singapore and Hong Kong. Another possibility is that, in resource-rich countries like Nigeria and Venezuela, there is a group with political power that is reluctant to share national wealth with the rest of the population. An absence of democratic institutions combined with narrowly held wealth suggests that corruption and the lack of transparency will be obstacles to development.

(b) Corruption Perceptions Index and Bribe Payers Index

Two helpful indicators created by the organization Transparency International (TI) are the Corruption Perceptions Index and the Bribe Payers Index. The CPI has a scale from 10 (highly clean) to 0 (highly corrupt). The TI Bribe Payers Index evaluates the supply side of corruption - the likelihood of firms from the world's industrialized countries to bribe abroad. Belgium and Canada shared first place in the 2008 BPI with a score of 8.8 out of a very clean 10, indicating that Belgian and Canadian firms are seen as least likely to bribe abroad.

Figure 5. Corruption Perception vs. Bribe Payers Index



Source: Transparency International (Hardoon, 2011)

The BPI also shows public works and construction companies to be the most corruption-prone when dealing with the public sector, and most likely to exert undue influence on the policies, decisions and practices of governments. Therefore, both indexes show degree of healthiness of an ecosystem.

(c) Negligible Economic Growth and Development Traps

According to Paul Collier, in his book *The Bottom Billion*, there are some 58 countries that do not experience economic growth even though they have received considerable amounts of aid and support over several years. These countries, is found to have been fallen into one or more "development traps," labelled by Collier (Collier P. , 2007) and detailed Keenan (Keenan, 2011) as follows:

The Conflict Trap: Coups and civil wars impose huge costs on a country. Relapses are likely because some warring participants learn how to profit from fighting. For most of the population, however, poverty is increased because of conflict, resulting in resentment and anger in young people, and leading them to more fighting.

A Problem Analysis over Humanitarian Aid Issues Based on Aid Principles and Methodology of Donors Dependency and Post-Development Theories

The Natural Resource Trap: Countries that are rich in natural resources attract national, regional, and international groups eager to fight for control of the resources. Governments become wealthy and increasingly unresponsive to their citizens. Resource wealth discourages industrial development in the country.


Landlocked with Bad Neighbors: It is very difficult for such countries to participate in international trade, especially if transportation infrastructure connections are poor.

Bad Governance in a Small Country: International investors can be discouraged by countries with economies damaged by inept management, combined with the smallness of markets and labour pools.

103

IJSI 11/2
Aralık
December
2018

Figure 6. Trapping Factors Determining Poor Ecosystem



Source: Coolgeography (Anonim, 2015)

The above mentioned the conflict trap, the natural resource trap, landlocked with bad neighbors and bad governance in a small country are all sources of a vicious poverty cycle that hamper economic growth and development. In the Figure 6 it is illustrated how a poverty trap works. All of the elements are deteriorating the ecosystem which is the basis for efficiency, effectiveness and economy of public or international supports and indicator of direct investments, market maturity, and private entrepreneurships.

(c) Merciless Colonization that Crippled Ecosystem of Underdeveloped Nations

Since the time of wild capitalization era in which the western countries transferred natural resources and exploited human resources of colonies of the time that are now underdeveloped countries. Those acts of civilizations are considered by some scholars as evils that cause celestial retributions in kind. Here are some expressions: *“do you not see that nothing apart from the most basic subsistence is left in the hands of Muslims? The rest is either stolen or seized by the European infidel tyrants or the dissemblers of Asia”* (Nursi, Lemalar, 1655: 169) *“You should understand that what I mean are the good things that are civilization's virtues and its benefits for mankind. Not its iniquities and evils that idiots have imagined to be its virtues, and imitating them, devastated our possessions. Through civilization's iniquities prevailing over its benefits and its evils being preferred to its virtues, mankind has suffered two calamitous blows in the form of two world wars and overturning that sinful civilization men have been so utterly disgusted that they have smeared the face of the earth with blood”* (Nursi, Hutbe-i Şamiye, 1950: 38).

104

IJSI 11/2
Aralık
December
2018

These examples have shown how effects of colonization in the history have reflected negatively in the minds of undeveloped nations. In order to cure such kind of resentments of underdeveloped or developing countries humanitarian institutions should take care of institutional development of poor nations.

While colonization has decreased the capacity of poor nations it accelerated development of western countries. This process also contributed to institutional competency of western countries. Considering majority of international aid organizations are western dominated effectiveness of institutions at the humanitarian aid domain by which ecosystem of developed nations increase market share and hinder economic competition.

The idea that difference in institutions and government polities largely depends on differences in income per capita across countries is shared both by many economists and social scientists. Since the determinants of institutions and attitude of governments towards economic progress is not widely accepted, it becomes difficult to isolate exogenous sources of variation in institutions to conjecture their effect on performance. It has been argued by Acemoglu

(Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson, 2001) that differences in colonial experience of countries could be a source of exogenous differences in institutions.

Institutions in many countries were shaped during colonization age, so that examining colonies is a natural experiment as delved by Easterly (Easterly, 2006). It is argued by Chang (Chang, 2002) that increased wealth of western countries may have created higher demands for capability and maturity of institutions. Geography and culture which include embodied knowledge as well as embracing innovations are also quite important for development of institutions. Acemoglu (Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson, 2002) argued that institutional changes are not always welcome by some interest groups such as landlords, dictators who wish to hold the reins of power. This shows (Alesina, 1994: 360) a lack of democracy which flourishes institutions in a country. Even so, some cross-country regressions show that there is no effect of democracy on growth. Therefore, democracy cannot feed the poor and build a stable state that can be self-sufficient to national and local needs of people. But evidence showed (Dawson, 1998: 610) that having good institutions are a significant determinant for economic growth. Hence if international institutions are well organized and coordinated according to real needs of poor countries such as a resilient ecosystem then problems of stemming from failures of “feed the hungry” norm can be easily solved.

(e) Problems Related to Methods of Aid and Attitude of Aid Recipients

There are two reasons why aid doesn't not sow its positive effects. One is inappropriateness of aid methodology and the other is the attitude of aid recipients. There are many research articles and official reports that emphasize the importance of organizational and strategic change in these areas. Organizations are failing in providing self-reliance of poor nations and recipients tend to be dependent of continuous aid. However, as the problems persist, we found it appropriate to provide some comments from a subjective perspective such as religious obligations. It is a known fact that religions are important source of motivation for helping people in need and goodness of society. Furthermore, we have found that religion can also provide insight for methodology of aid and development of

underdeveloped nations. The wisdom can be taken, or objective research can be emboldened by these sources.

For example, in the Islamic tradition, helping to poor are always appreciated and ordered as a good deed. Therefore, helping to poor and needy people is considered as a virtue of Islamic obligations. However, there are certain instances in the Prophets implementations that needs to be taken into consideration. One day a poor man came from the Muslims of Medina to the Prophet, and he wanted something to eat.

106

IJSI 11/2
Aralık
December
2018

Allâh's messenger told him:

"Is there no any assets in your house?" He asked.

Companion:

He said, "Yes." *"We have a water tank and a coat some of which we have clothed, some of which we have covered."*

The Prophet said:

"-Go and bring them to me!" He said. The man brought a water bottle with a sack. Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) took them away and said:

"-He who want to buy?" He asked.

One of the Companions said that they would give them a dirham. The Prophet:

"Would you give more?" He said a few times, and another companion, who gave two dirhams bought them. Giving money to the poor companion:

"Take a meal with a dirham of it to your family. Bring me an ax purchasing with the remaining money!" He said.

To the ax that the man brought, the Prophet took a wooden handle with his own hand and said to him:

A Problem Analysis over Humanitarian Aid Issues Based on Aid Principles and Methodology of Donors Dependency and Post-Development Theories

"- go now; Cut the wood with it and sell it in the market! Work for fifteen days; come after it! "

The poor man came fifteen days later. He earned ten Dirhems, bought clothes and food for himself and his family with this money.

Our Prophet was very happy and said:

"If you want that your begging does not look like a stain on the Day of Judgment, it is better for you to earn yourself rather than leaning on others."
(Paksu, 2006)

This anecdote is a very important example of treating poor people. There are many instances when some hungry people ask for food he would give what he had in hand available. If self-reliance of poor nations is not provided and attitude of aid recipients is not changed, then the coordination of aid will remain unresolved as a persistent chronic problem of international humanitarian aid organizations.

CONCLUSION

It is clearly the case that donors should be willing to take some risk in the aid processes and possibly to coordinate their activities to manage these risks. It is not desirable for donors to hold back on the implementation of reforms because they are risky, if one is convinced that they lead to better outcomes for the recipients in the long run. It should be possible to admit that interventions have failed, but according to the current perception one risks undermining aid support if one admits failure. As argued by Bigsten, Tengstam, there is a need for a more serious management of risks, and it should involve recipient governments as well.

Aid coordination is a very desirable objective, because it can reduce the costs of delivering and monitoring aid (the transaction cost effect) and improve the targeting of the poor (the governance effect). The latter effect is achieved through more effective disciplining of the central or local governments and agencies in the host countries. In practice, however, too little of such aid coordination is observed. Even when the problem of aid coordination is seen as a "pure" coordination problem, coordination ought not to be taken for granted. As a matter

of fact, donor countries may fail to coordinate because, in the absence of a centralized decision-mechanism, they do not expect that other countries, or enough other countries, will join the coordinating group. Second, serious problems of free riding need to be overcome. Third, donor countries may take political costs seriously into account when they decide about the level or intensity of aid coordination efforts they want to apply. According to Bourguignon, Platteau (2015) a trade-off is thereby created between costs and benefits of coordination and the equilibrium level of coordination that donor countries want is far from optimal from the standpoint of aid targeting and aid outreach.

108

IJSI 11/2
Aralık
December
2018

To sum up the international aid organizations and donors should:

1. Focus on local capacity development and contribution to local market resilience and sustainable national ecosystem for self-reliance in the long term.
2. Stop providing in kind assistance but rather direct financial support that can be infused as new demand for local products and services.
3. Use a collective or shared frameworks and systems in collaboration that will inevitably decrease transaction costs and increase efficiency and effectiveness of aid allocation and distribution.
4. Encourage usage of local and national resources and mobilization of internal dynamics to be resilient against unexpected events and disasters.
5. Support business ventures and economic infrastructure that can handle needs at the local and national levels.
6. Give money to the needy people rather than giving food in order to stir local and national market or provide job opportunities in line with requirements of local potentialities and regional dynamics.
7. Implement joint activities focused on field application of humanitarian standards, knowledge-sharing, operational contextualization, and advocacy with emerging humanitarian standards initiatives in order to ease coordination of aid.
8. Convene and progressively formalize a global alliance of humanitarian standards initiatives to increase impact of aid

A Problem Analysis over Humanitarian Aid Issues Based on Aid Principles and Methodology of Donors Dependency and Post-Development Theories

programs and provide for cross-sectoral learning and joint services to practitioners.

9. Improve and further develop consistent standards models and approaches in order to continue building greater coherence and compatibility amongst humanitarian aid donors, agencies and standards.
10. Track humanitarian programs, projects and actions to identify trends and gaps where the development of new collaborations and cooperation may become necessary

REFERENCES

Acemoglu, D.; Johnson, S.; Robinson, J. (2002). "The Rise of Europe: Atlantic Trade, Institutional Change and Economic Growth". *National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 9378* <http://www.nber.org/papers/w9378>.

Acemoglu, D.; Johnson, S.; Robinson, J. A. (2001). "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation". *The American Economic Review*, 1369-1401.

Alesina, A. (1994). "The Political Economy of Growth: A Critical Review of the Recent Literature". *World Bank Economic Review*, 8(3), 351-371.

110 Anonim. (2007). *gini vs gdp*. Retrieved from Mind Contagion:
IJSI 11/2 Aralık December 2018 http://www.mindcontagion.org/html/gini_vs_gdp.html

Anonim. (2015). *Environmental, Economic, Social and Political Factors Affecting Development – Global imbalance of Trade between Different Parts of the World*.

Retrieved from Cool Geography:
http://www.coolgeography.co.uk/GCSE/AQA/Development_Gap/Factors_affecting_inequalities/Factors_affecting_development.htm

Anonim. (2015). *The Standards*. Retrieved from Core Humanitarian:
<https://corehumanitarianstandard.org/the-standard>

Anonim. (2016). *What to Make of Decree 68/2016*. Retrieved from Odessa:
<https://odessablog.wordpress.com/2016/02/28/what-to-make-of-decree-682016-on-promotion-of-civil-society-in-ukraine/>

Anonim. (2018). *UNOCHA*. Retrieved from appeals: <https://fts.unocha.org/>

Ateş, H.; Es, M.; Bayraktar, Y. (2005). "Dependency Theory: Still an Appropriate Tool for Understanding the Political Economy of the Middle-East?". *Atatürk Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi*, <http://e-dergi.atauni.edu.tr/atauniiibd/article/view/1025003654>.

Azam, J. P.; Laffont, J. J. (2003). "Contracting for Aid". *Journal of Development Economics*, 25-58.

Barrett, C. B.; Maxwell, D. G. (2005). *Food Aid after Fifty Years: Recasting its Role*. London and New York: Routledge.

Bergstrom, T. L.; Varian, H. (1986). "On the Private Provision of Public Goods". *Journal of Public Economics*, 25-49.

Bigsten, A.; Tengstam, S. (2015). "International Coordination and the Effectiveness of Aid". *World Development Published by Elsevier*, 75-85.

Birdsall, N.; Kharas, H. (2010). *Quality of Official Development Assistance*. Washington, DC: Center for Global Development: CGD report.

A Problem Analysis over Humanitarian Aid Issues Based on Aid Principles and Methodology of Donors Dependency and Post-Development Theories

- Bourguignon, F.; Platteau, J. P. (2015). "The Hard Challenge of Aid Coordination". *World Development*, 86-97.
- Burnside, C. A. (2000). "Aid, Policies and Growth". *American Economic Review*, 847-868.
- Cardoso, F. H.; Falleto, E. (1979). *Dependency and Development in Latin America*. California: University of California Press.
- Chamberlin, J. (1974). "Provision of Collective Goods as a Function of Group Size". *American Political Science Review*, 707-716.
- Chang, H. J. (2002). "Breaking the Mould: An Institutionalist Political Economy Alternative to the Neo-Liberal Theory of the Market and the State". *Cambridge Journal of Economics*, 539-559.
- Clay, E. J. (2003). "Responding to Change: WFP and the Global Food Aid System". *Development Policy Review*, 21(5-6), 697-709.
- Collier, P. (2007). *The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries are Failing and What Can Be Done about It*. Oxford University Press .
- Collier, P. A. (2002). "Aid Allocation and Poverty Reduction". *European Economic Review*, 1475-1500.
- Cornes, R., Itaya, J. (2003). "Models with Two or More Public Goods". *University of Nottingham Discussion Paper* , 03/21.
- Cornes, R.; Schweinberger, A. (1996). "Free Riding and the Inefficiency of the Private Production of Pure Public Goods". *The Canadian Journal of Economics*, 70-91.
- Dawson, J. (1998). "Institutions, Investment, and Growth: New Cross-Country and Panel Data Evidence". *Economic Inquiry*, XXXVI, 603-619.
- Devarajan, S.; Swaroop, V. (1998). *The Implications of Foreign Aid Fungibility for Development Assistance*. World Bank.
- Easterly, W. (2006). *The White Man's Burden: Why the West's Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good*. New York: Penguin Press.
- Ferraro, V. (1996). *Dependency Theory: An Introduction*. Mount Holyoke College, <https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/d715/82f1a87a914036b3af3696b2be5e8411a7c8.pdf>.
- Gao, U. (2012). *Report to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives: Stronger Controls Needed in High-Risk Areas of WFP*. Washington: GAO.
- Gao, U. (2015). *USAID Should Systematically Assess the Effectiveness of Key Conditional Food Aid Activities*. Washington: GAO.

111

IJSI 11/2
Aralık
December
2018

- Halonen-Akatwijuka, M. (2005). *Coordination Failure in Foreign Aid*. Retrieved from siteresources: <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDR2004/Resources/coordfailurewb.pdf>
- Hardoon, D. (2011). *Bribe Payers Index 2011: When Trade is anything but Free*. Retrieved from Transparency: <http://blog.transparency.org/2011/11/02/bribe-payers-index-2011-when-trade-is-anything-but-free/>
- Harvey, P.; Proudlock, K.; Clay, E.; Riley, B.; Jaspars, S. (2010). *Food Aid and Food Assistance in Emergency and Transitional Contexts: A Review of Current Thinking*. [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/284720346_Food_aid_and_food_assistance_in_emergency_and_transitional_contexts_a_review_of_c](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/284720346_Food_aid_and_food_assistance_in_emergency_and_transitional_contexts_a_review_of_current_thinking)urrent_thinking: Humanitarian Policy Group.
- Hopkins, R. F. (1992). "Reform in the International Food Aid Regime: The Role of Consensual Knowledge". *International Organization*, 46(1), 225-264.
- Keenan, F. J. (2011). "Effective Management in International Development: What Works and What Doesn't". *Ivey Business Journal*.
- Kemp, M. (1984). "A Note on the Theory of International Transfers". *Economic Letters*, 259-262.
- King, R. F. (1999). "Welfare Reform: Block Grants, Expenditure Caps, and the Paradox of the Food Stamp Program". *Political Science Quarterly*, 3(114).
- Mari, A. (2013). "IT Adds Efficiency to the World Food Programme's Battle against Hunger". *Computer Weekly*, 9(24), 9-10.
- Matumula, P. (2016). *Carton Moovement*. Retrieved from Aid Dependency: <https://www.cartoonmovement.com/cartoon/8990>
- Mayo, D. (2009). *Dead Aid: Why Aid Is Not Working and How There Is a Better Way for Africa*. Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
- McGuire, M. (1976). "Group Homogeneity and Aggregate Provision of a Pure Public Good under Cournot Behavior". *Public Choice*, 107-126.
- Mul, E. D. (2002). Coordination of Humanitarian Aid – A UN Perspective. *The Lancet*.
- Murphy, J. (2013). "Using Sustainable Practices to Improve Food and Water Security". *Geodate*, 26(2).
- Nursi, B. S. (1655). *Lemalar*. İstanbul: Envar Neşriyat.
- Nursi, B. S. (1950). *Hutbe-i Şamiye*. İstanbul: Envar Neşriyat.
- OIOS, U. K. (2006). *World Food Programme: Review of the Arrangements for Reporting Post Delivery Food Losses to the Executive Board*. UN.
- Olson, M. (1965). *The Logic of Collective Action*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

A Problem Analysis over Humanitarian Aid Issues Based on Aid Principles and Methodology of Donors Dependency and Post-Development Theories

- Paksu, M. (2006). *Dilencilere Para Vermenin Hükmü, Ebû Dâvûd, Zekât, 26/1641; İbn-i Mâce, Ticârât, 25*. Retrieved from Sorularla İslamiyet: <https://sorularlaislamiyet.com/dilencilere-para-vermenin-durumu-nedir-dilenmek-gunah-midir>
- Palfrey, T.; Rosenthal, H. (1984). "Participation and the Provision of Discrete Public Goods: A Strategic Analysis". *Journal of Public Economics*, 171-193.
- Poppendieck, J. (1997). "The USA: Hunger in the Land of Plenty". In *First World Hunger: Food Security and Welfare Politics*, G. Riches (Ed.), Houndmills, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 134-164.
- Ramachandran, V.; Leo, B.; McCarthy, O. (2013). "Strategies to Improve the World Food Programme's Revenue Mobilisation and Procurement Practices". *Development Policy Review*, 32(3), 321-341.
- Rangarajan, C. (1967). "International Aid: An Introduction to the Problem of the Book Review for: International Aid: An Introduction to the Problem of the Flow of Public Resources from Rich to Poor Countries. By I.M.D. LITTLE and J. M. CLIFFORD". *Journal of Finance*, 722-725.
- Ross, S. (2007). "The World Food Programme: A Case of Benign US Policy?". *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 267-281.
- Sayigh, Y. A. (1991). *Elusive Development: From Dependence to Self-Reliance in the Arab Region*. London: Routledge.
- Shaw, D. J. (2001). *The UN World Food Programme and the Development of Food Aid*. Hampshire: Palgrave.
- Shaw, J.; Clay, E. (1993). *World Food Aid: Experiences of Recipients and Donors*. Rome, London and Portsmouth: World Food Programme in Association with James Currey.
- Smillie, I. (2009). *Freedom from Want: The Remarkable Success Story of BRAC, the Global Grassroots Organization That's Winning the Fight Against Poverty*. Kumarian Press.
- Spector, B. I.; Wagner, L. M. (2013). "Negotiating International Development". *International Negotiation*, 327-340.
- Stevens, R. (1966). "Book Review: International Aid. By I. M. D. LITTLE and J. M. CLIFFORD". *Economic Journal*, 648-650.
- Torsvik, G. (2005). "Foreign Economic Aid; Should Donors Cooperate?". *Journal of Development Economics*, 503-515.
- WFP. (2018). "Contributions to WFP: Comparative Figures and Five-Year Aggregate Ranking". Retrieved from http://documents.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/research/wfp232961.pdf?_ga=1.35151329.1515096639.1477294381
- WFP. (2006). *Food Procurement in Developing Countries*. Rome: WFP, WFP/EB.1/2006/5-C.

ÖZET

Dünya çapında yüzlerce farklı ajans insani yardım alanında çalışıyor. İnsani faaliyetlerin koordinasyonu zaman alıcı ve bazen de zor bir süreçtir. Organizasyonlar farklı, ara sıra çelişen görevlere sahiptir. Yaklaşım, perspektif ve önceliklerdeki değişimler insani toplumun çeşitliliğini yansıtması bakımından kaçınılmazdır. Bu çalışmada, katılımcı ülkelerde koordinasyon eksikliği, uygunsuz bilgi, gizli ajandalar, dijital uçurum, uygun olmayan para kullanımı ve kötü yönetimin açlık ve yetersiz beslenmeyle mücadelede etkili bir şekilde kullanılmasının önündeki temel engeller olduğu tespit edilmiştir. Kapsamlı bir literatür taraması yapılarak, yardım kuruluşlarının yönetimi ve yönetiminin daha iyi anlaşılması için tartışmaları ve ana bulguları gözden geçirilmiştir. Dünya çapında artık neredeyse her gelişmiş ulus kendi yardım kuruluşlarına sahiptir. Yardımın koordinasyonu normalde çok istenen ve dile getirilen bir amaçtır. Çünkü etkin koordinasyon, yardımın teslim edilmesi ve izlenmesi (işlem maliyet etkisi) maliyetlerini azaltabilir ve yoksulların (yönetişim etkisi) sorunlarının hedeflenmesi süreçlerini iyileştirebilir. Bu son etki, ev sahibi ülkelerdeki merkezi veya yerel yönetimlerin ve ajansların daha etkili bir şekilde disipline edilmesiyle elde edilebilmektedir.

Bağış yapan ülkeler, genellikle yardımlarının sonuçlarından dolayı olarak bir şeyler istiyorlar. Şüphesiz, yardım sağlamak için kendine has nedenleri vardır; bir ülkenin kaynaklarına erişim kazanmak, alıcıyı bağışçının nüfuz alanına çekmek ve bağışçıların rejim değişikliğinin peşinden koşması ve diğerlerinin yanı sıra siyasi muhalefeti etkilemek ve desteklemek gibi pek çok özel nedenler de bulunabilmektedir. Bağışçı ülkeler için, yardım koordinasyonunun ana eksikliği ulusal egemenliğin kaybedilmesi ve yardım programlarıyla ulusal hedeflerin takip edilmesinin engellenmesidir. Alıcı ülkeler için bu durum daha çok bağımsızlıklarının azalması olarak görülmektedir. Hem bağışçıların hem de alıcıların siyasi maliyetlerinin mevcudiyetinden doğan kaçınılmaz ticari kararları ışığında yardım koordinasyonunu destekleyen argümanların bir kısmının açıklığa kavuşturulması gerekmektedir.

Bu çalışmada, uluslararası yardım alanında literatürün kısa bir özeti ve değerlendirmesi çıkarılmaya çalışılmıştır. Hem teorik hem de kavramsal yaklaşımların çözümünde bağışçılar ve yardım kuruluşları arasında koordinasyonu engelleyen sorunlar analiz edilerek incelenmiştir. Temel argümanlardan birisi, koordinasyon eksikliğinin sadece alıcı ülkedeki pazar esnekliğini bozmakla kalmayıp, aynı zamanda onları daha fazla ve daha fazla bağımlı hale getiren ekosistem ve yatırım ortamını da olumsuz yönde engellemesidir. Bağışçı ve fon veren kurumların paydaşlarının, başkalarıyla koordinasyonun öncelikli olmadığı ancak, kendi özel gündemleri de olduğu sonucuna varılmıştır.