CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN THE BALKANS: THE DETERMINANTS OF DEMOCRATIC TRANSFORMATION

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Abstract

The article makes a comparative analysis of civil-military relations in the Balkan states, which have experienced a radical transformation since the end of the Cold War. Doubtlessly, building a stable civilian control over armed forces is a primary requirement for democratic consolidation. Thus, especially during the post-Cold War era, the volume of the relevant studies showed a drastic increase to find solutions to the newly emerged civil-military problems. In the core of these new studies, there were former communist states such as the ones in the Balkan region. Indeed, military subordination to the civilian rule has been one of the most contested topics in the Balkans during the democratic consolidation. The main reason behind this is not only the importance of the case but its relationship with several other political variables. The democratisation of civil-military relations has been affected by a number of determinant factors, such as the Yugoslavian Civil War, relations with the European Union (EU,) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). Hence, at this point, the purpose of this article is to discuss the complex relations between these factors and democratisation of civil-military relations. While making the relevant analysis, the paper also uses the dominant civil-military theories in the literature.

Keywords: Civil-Military Relations, Balkans, Objective Control, Subjective Control, Second Generation Problematic.

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Introduction

Democratic control of the military is doubtlessly considered a vital requirement for an ideal democratic regime. The United States and Western Europe achieved this goal, a long time ago, in an irreversible way. In other words, it is almost impossible to see that the military interferes in civilian matters, because in those countries, civilian supremacy has been rooted on
a very strong legal, institutional, and normative basis. Hereby the last recorded military interventions in the Western world almost date back to the 17th-19th centuries. On the other hand, in the developing regions, we observe a highly different scheme wherein they still work for democratic consolidation. Some of them have been successful and subordinated their military to civilian will, but most of them still encounter with problems in this regard. Being the successors of former communist regimes, - with the sole exception of Greece- the Balkan states have also experienced similar challenges. Hence, at this point, this paper presents an analysis of the case with its different dimensions. That is, the paper questions how and in what extent the Balkan states have achieved military subordination and what kind of internal and external factors affected this. While doing this analysis, the paper marks the transition periods since the Cold War by exploring the differences and similarities. Apart from Greece, all of the regional states were the former members of communist bloc. However, unlike the other former communist regimes in the other parts of the world, the Balkan states have had relatively different experiences regarding civil-military relations. A number of internal and external factors, doubtlessly, played important role during the formation of this difference. First of all, Russia’s powerful presence in the region is naturally determinant because, if Russia gives more importance to a specific regional state because of its strategic position, the civil-military relations of that specific state tends to follow a different path regarding democratisation. This path can be either positive or negative depending on the circumstances. Secondly, the other side of the coin is that NATO is interested in the region. The national militaries which have close relations with NATO tend to be faster in absorbing western type of professional ethos, namely the political neutrality. Again, Russia’s interests in a specific region, naturally, become effective over the NATO’s approach to that specific region. Thirdly, the EU membership plays an important role for democratic consolidation especially for the creation of essential legal and institutional civilian control mechanisms. Lastly, the Yugoslavian Civil War has produced a determinant effect on its own, because after the dissolution of Yugoslavia, each former Yugoslavian state had found a distinct political environment. Moreover, the devastating effects of civil war changed from case to case and naturally the recovery became harder for some states (Dudley, 2016: 120). Hence, the following sections of the article elaborate these factors with examples from various Balkan states. In particular Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia and Romania are analysed broadly because they have the richest examples regarding the main arguments of the article. On the other hand, other Balkan states are discussed depending on the context. While considering the past and present events, the paper discusses what the future might bring for the relevant matters. During the analysis, the article compares each example with dominant theories of civil-military relations, namely the objective and subjective control models of Huntington and the second generation problematique of post-modern scholars.

1. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND: DEMOCRATISATION OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

The main purpose of the civil-military studies is to find the best method to democratise civil-military relations. In this context, democratisation means preserving military’s obedience to elected civilian politicians without hesitation and objection. If one considers that the military has power to apply coercion and violence due to its armed force, any disobedience from the military may lead to fatal results. Although the military’s armed forces were created to protect the state against external enemies, there is always the risk that such military power can turn its back on its own people whom it has to protect (Feaver, 1996: 150). To prevent this line of risk, civil-military scholars suggested several methods. Yet, in the relevant literature, the landmark study of Samuel Huntington the Soldier and the State (1957) still preserves its unique place as being the most influential contribution to the relevant field. Even most other theories on the
subject have all taken Huntington’s ideas as their blueprint (Koonings and Kruijff, 2002: 117; Nielsen, 2012: 369).

According to Huntington, the most ideal civil-military model in a true democratic regime can be achieved by separating civilian and military spheres (Huntington, 1957: 83-85). Through this way, an autonomous area is created for the military regarding ‘purely military matters’ and military’s professional standards can be preserved by breaking its connections with political interests (Whitehead, 2001: 3-4, 26). Further, through this way, the military implements the orders given by the civilian politicians without objection or hesitation and remains politically passive and neutral (Feaver, 1996: 158). This model defined as the objective civilian control is the ideal model for a democratic regime through which any possible military coup is prevented before happening and the military is saved from being a tool of political actors (Huntington, 1957: 83). Yet, Huntington maintains, even in the most liberal regimes, objective control can be difficult to achieve because the political rulers try to increase their dominance by influencing the high-ranking generals on their side (Huntington, 1957: 85). If this happens, the military still becomes subordinated to civilian rule but its political neutrality and its professional dynamics is damaged. Huntington defines the latter form as the subjective civilian control model (Huntington, 1957: 80-81).

Although it has been more than sixty years, Huntington’s theories preserve their importance as being the most useful solutions to the problem. Yet, it received harsh critics from the subsequent scholars. The most relevant criticism for the purpose of our work is Huntington’s Western oriented point of view. That is, Huntington’s models can be very useful for the Western States, especially for the United States but cannot always be useful for other regions of world, for each of these regions has its own unique historical experience and political culture (Schiff, 2012: 321). Therefore, the holders of these critical views created alternative models. Among them, one may count Morris Janowitz’s citizen soldier, Peter Feaver’s principle-agent and Rebecca Schiff’s concordance model (Janowitz, 1960; Feaver, 2003; Schiff, 2012). However, all of these contributions are considered within the first-generation scholars discussed below.

The first-generation scholars are categorised according to Huntington’s view which understands democratic civil-military relations with “no coup d’état.” However, the complex relations which emerged after the end of the Cold War have brought other types of civil-military problematics in which preventing military coups do not eliminate the problems completely. Therefore, for the existing problems in the post-Soviet regions and the Latin Americas, new suggestions were offered by post-modern scholars. The new civil-military approach also known as the second-generation problematique does not only focus on preventing military coups. According to the second-generation scholars, within Western democracies, it is hardly an expectation where armed forces directly intervene in the regime (Cottey et al., 2002: 36). Hence, the idea of “no coup no problem” may lead to misperceptions. To solve the paradox, the concept of democratic control should be separated from the concept of the civilian control, for the military can still be politically influential without making a direct intervention. Indeed, according to the second-generation scholars, the democratic control of civil-military relations, under current conditions, requires a more complex system in which the institutions should be tested for whether they effectively meet the democratic standards or not (Cottey et al., 2002: 40). According to this view, civilianisation of defense bureaucracy and ministry of foreign affairs and increasing state capacity are the most important notions that should be maintained for democratic civil-military relations (Cottey et al., 2002: 41-44). This line of explanation is especially applicable for the Eastern European and the Balkan states, because these armies do
not have a strong praetorian tradition.\textsuperscript{1} Therefore, they do not directly intervene in regimes. Nonetheless, given the communist legacy that they inherited from previous decades, they can be reactive against the democratisation efforts and thus they may still influence the political process if they were not constrained by effective institutional mechanisms. As we will be elaborating throughout the paper, the main problems in civil–military relations tend to be related to the second generation problematique. Because except some certain cases, the Balkan states still have a long way to go for institutionalising their civilian control over the armed forces.

2. THE LEGACY OF THE COMMUNIST PERIOD

More or less, the Balkan states seem to have adopted a democratic regime despite still having serious obstacles to overcome. However, it may still be necessary to observe the ongoing impacts of communist legacy to understand civil-military relations better. Because the military cultures of those armies had mostly been redesigned during the communist era and several dynamics that they absorbed in those years continued to survive after communism. Principally the communist era gives a typical example of subjective control—in Huntingtonian terms—in that all of these armies—except Greece—were acting as a tool of the communist party. Although their subordination sometimes directly was to the personality of a dictator such as Ceaucescu and Romania example, still they were staunchly loyal to the civilian will and were implementing the duties given by their rulers without objection and hesitation. As a result, the Balkan armies did not produce a strong praetorian legacy, rather, civilian supremacy had been a natural principle to obey. Because of this reason, the primary goal of civilians during the post-Cold War era had been the depoliticisation of the military but not demilitarisation of the regime (Barany, 1997: 21). In this context, depoliticisation means isolating the military from the former communist ideology and encouraging it to absorb the democratic and liberal norms of the new regime. As mentioned above, this purpose has been achieved relatively faster than the Latin American countries because of the inherited non-praetorian tradition (Barany, 1997: 21). Yet several reasons such as the relations with Russia, the EU and the NATO as well as several political developments such as the Yugoslavian Civil War also became determinants in this regard; either through accelerating or slowing the process.

Certainly, before communism, the Serbian, Greek, Romanian and the Bulgarian armies had undertaken a ‘nation builder’ role during their independence movement against the Ottoman Empire. Their image as ‘the saviours and founders of the nation’ had enabled them to have active political roles as being the ‘promoters of national ideals’ (Çelik, 2012: 47). This political role continued until the end of the Second World War. Furthermore, during the communist period, the Balkan states were relatively independent from the Soviet impact compared with the Central and Eastern European states because the Central and the Eastern European states had been considered the primary tools of the Cold War mission of conflict with the West. They were large in size, supported by defence spending and were based on universal male conscription. Hence, with regard to this highly militarist image, the Balkan states looked more independent under the rule of a powerful one-men such as Tito in Yugoslavia, Ceaucescu in Romania, Jivkov in Bulgaria and Enver Halil Hoca in Albania (Cottey, 2005: 1; Johnson, 1995; Tuncer, ).

Perhaps Tito’s image as a war hero and his military origin made it easier for the Yugoslavian army to accept his absolute domination. However, in the Romanian case, one may

\textsuperscript{1} Praetorian is a term which originally comes from the rebellion guards in the Roman Empire. The praetorian guards were often rebelling and removing the senior generals whom they were hired for protection. The term was later used by the civil-military scholars to refer political Armies who have an habit of conducting coup d’etats.
see clear proofs of subjective control efforts wherein Caucescu sought for increasing his dominance by a number of methods. For instance, Caucescu dismissed the opponent officers and replaced them with his loyal sympathisers, he produced paramilitary forces such as informers and secret police (Securitate) to investigate his opponents in the military (Hubble, May 1, 1997). By this way, nobody was trusting to each other in the military and any movement against Caucescu was becoming hardly possible. Eventually, Caucescu subordinated the military into his own will by undemocratic methods of oppression and fear which are based on dismissals, promotions, plots and slanders. As a result, highly patriot and communal Romanian military was gradually politicised, but it did not lose its national character, perhaps, due to the relatively weaker Soviet pressure (Hubble, May 1, 1997). A similar case could be observed in the Bulgarian army under the rule of Todor Zhivkov (1954-1989). Just after the Second World War, one-third of army was dismissed and all the appointments and promotions were made according to political motivations. The military education and trainings were designed according to the communist ideology; the officers were sent to the Soviet military institutions for education. As a result, the military’s subordination to the civilians was achieved through indoctrinating the communist ideology to the officer corps (Çelik, 2012: 48).

The Yugoslavian case, thanks to Tito as well as the Greek army due to its NATO membership, had considerable exceptions. The Yugoslavian army, perhaps, became the most independent army from the Soviet intervention given the Tito’s charismatic leadership (Banac, 1998). Especially after the beginning of Tito-Stalin conflict, this phenomenon became more apparent. The Yugoslavian army preserved its nationalist structure through this way and this became the primary reason for the Yugoslavian Civil War after the collapse of communism. Because they strictly reacted to the idea that Yugoslavia would be dissolved. Additionally, the Greek army is highly different from the other cases because of its membership in the Western bloc. Indeed, this army has a strong praetorian legacy with its coup d’etats though it had not been a member of communist block. The most recent one of them is the Colonels Junta (1967-1974), in which soldiers ruled the state for seven years. Yet, this country absorbed the principle of the civilian supremacy much quicker than the other Balkan states due to its NATO and EC membership and democratised its civil-military relations. Therefore, the post-colonels’ junta era has gradually witnessed a model closer to Huntington’s objective control, especially in compare to the other cases in the Balkans.

Apart from Greece, all the other Balkan states gave typical examples of subjective control with their absolute subordination to a party or an authoritarian leader with a highly political but non-praetorian behaviour. This case, indeed, had been the greatest positive legacy of communist era, in that they easily adapted themselves into the democratic structure of civil-military relations without implementing a coup d’etat during the collapse of old communist regimes. Even some of them took their side with the people against the authoritarian dictators thanks to their preserved nationalist and patriot structure. As we will be observing in the next section, the only thing to do was to depoliticise these armies from the communist ideology during the post-Communist era.

3. POST-COMMUNIST ERA

As mentioned previously, there are key aspects that summarise the post-communist framework generally. Firstly, the most beneficial legacy of communism was the non-praetorian legacy. Perhaps because of that, the armed forces did not show any reaction or objection to the democratic transformation and they absorbed the democratic norms and principles easily (Cottey, 2005: 2). The only thing to do was to break their previous ties with the communist ideology. Secondly, the Yugoslavian Civil War slowed down the democratisation process for
the former Yugoslavian states because there was a strict security risk and none of these states trusted each other (Cottee, 2005: 2). Hence, the military continued to be an active political actor for a while; at least, it had to wait until the negative results of war to completely disappear. Therefore, the subjective model continued to exist until the 2000s. Thirdly, the main political actors in foreign policy has been determinant to a major extent. As a safeguard against Russia’s possible intervention, the NATO and the EU gave a special importance to the region. As a result, the armies, after joining the NATO, could easily absorb the professional ethos of Western Armies; in other words, the Huntington line of depoliticisation. Thanks to the mutual campaigns, operations, the new NATO-orientated educational standards and the visitations to NATO countries for education, the professional transition became much easier. Additionally, the EU membership -or at least candidacy- enabled the Balkan states to implement necessary institutional reforms for controlling their armies in a democratic way. Greece had already been absorbed these standards at least two decades ago. Eventually, today all of the Balkan states adapted themselves into the democratic standards of civil-military relations. Additionally, their military cultures absorbed the professional ethos for a Huntington line of depoliticisation. Yet, each case has followed a different path due to the above-mentioned variables and thus each case had its own unique model of civil-military relations. Even, some of them continued to be a typical example of subjective control for longer processes.

4. THE IMPACT OF YUGOSLAVIAN CIVIL WAR

Just as other post-communist regions in Europe, the democratisation trend had also affected Yugoslavian states. Apart from Serbia and Montenegro, in the other Yugoslavian states, the communists lost the elections against the ethnicist nationalist parties. Between 1991 and 1992, four states except Serbian and Montenegro declared independence. Only Slovenia became successful after several days of conflict against the Serbian army. In other regions, Serbian army did not recognise their independence and reacted violently. Until 1995, the Serbian army and the separatists involved in a long running conflict titled as the Yugoslavian Civil War. The most striking parts of the war had been in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, which caused the deaths of thousands while taking strict reactions from the United Nations and human rights activists. Eventually, NATO involved in the process to stop the war against the Serbian Army. The leader of the Serbian rule Milosevic was declared as human rights violator and was put to trial at the courts of human rights. The Serbian Army and members of Serbian government were also found guilty for their actions. It took years for the courts to come to an end. But apart from the human rights problems and the political consequences of the civil war, the most important result of the war for our topic is its negative impacts on democratisation of civil-military relations in the region. Perhaps Macedonia seemed as an exception in the beginning, because this country was less-affected by the war. Yet, in the following process, the increasing criminalisation, corruptions and the conflict with Albania eventually slowed down democratisation process in this country as well. (Vankovska, 2006: 1-4, 10-13).

The first visible effect of the war is the emergence of national armies after gaining independence. Indeed, during the war, the resistant armies were mostly composed of paramilitary forces, most of whom were the voluntary citizens. Yet, despite the problems of criminal network or corruption of these half disciplinary forces, the first disciplinary armed forces were able to be established just after the end of war (Cottee, 2005: 4). Croatia, Slovenia and Bosnia and Herzegovina created their own national armies. Among these countries, Slovenia was perhaps the closer case to the European standards because just during the 1980s, the citizens began to show strict reactions to the conscription and usage of Serbian as the mother tongue in the barracks. Hence, there was an ongoing conflict between the civil society and the military. These tensions created the available conditions for a national army (Jelusic, 2007). On the other hand, civil-military relations remained problematic. Because the politicians of
independent Slovenia considered the new army as an opportunity for increasing their political influence. Hence, the elements of subjective control were frequently observed during the 1990s (Fluri et al., 2005: 212).

As we will be discussing more elaborately in the next part, the second step after the creation of national armies tended to be the formation of necessary institutional and legislative mechanisms in the new constitutions. More or less, each Balkan state has achieved a considerable level of progress until present time. Yet, there are still important problems to deal with, especially for deciding the share of responsibility between the civilians and the military. Because the borders among both sides sometimes become blurry, they require interpretations and amendments (Çelik, 2012: 49).

Hence, if one considers the case regarding the civil-military theories, the Balkan armies have been successful in absorbing Huntington line of depoliticisation –which is the case known as the first generation problematic-. However, they still have some problems for the creation of necessary democratic institutional mechanisms, in other words, the second generation problematic. The only exception at this point can be Bosnia, which has crossed one step further than its counterparts by creating more effective institutional mechanisms to prevent any military interference though it has sometimes experienced slowdowns since 2006. (Herd et al., 2006; Dudley, 2016: 120).

Indeed, the Bosnian civil-military relations have their own unique problems. But these problems are not driven from lack of institutional control mechanisms or the military’s politicised structure. The Bosnian problems have been the ethnic divisions which started during the civil war. Each ethnic group has had some level of autonomy in defense matters. Despite this autonomy which has not challenged state unity, it occasionally slowed down the democratisation process, due to the fact that each group regularly showed scepticism against the intentions of the other (Dudley, 2016: 120).

5. DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION AND REQUIRED REFORMS

The establishment of the above-mentioned institutions for democratic civilian control has been a priority for all post-communist states. The only exception is Greece because of its traditional attachment to the Western block. Yet, even Greece could stabilise its civilian control gradually after the Colonels Junta (1967-1973) (Karabelias, 1998: 40-55). Indeed, the main problems against the successful absorbance of second-generation reforms tend to be seen as the current framework of the Ministry of Defense, the problem of parliamentary oversight, and the limited number of non-governmental organisations. Any weakness in the working formation of those bodies can leave the state vulnerable to military abusing or increasing its influence on domestic and foreign policies.

The other side of the coin is that the absence of these democratic control mechanisms may make the military a political tool in the hands of the ruling political power. As has been defined in the theoretical section of the article, Huntington defines this kind of civilian control as the ‘subjective control’ which is not a democratic way because it makes the military a ‘mirror of the ruling political elite.’ There are several examples of this scenario, like the Bucharest municipal elections and the Miners’ Protests in Romania (Nelson, 2002: 439).

Sometimes the political influence of militaries, interestingly, serves peaceful democratic purposes. Therefore, sharing of responsibility and mutual solidarity, sometimes, can be more beneficial than a Huntingtonian line of complete isolation. For instance, the Bulgarian Army’s relative political influence enabled them to promote peace and solidarity in the region, interestingly, much passionality than civilians who fancied more aggressive and nationalist
policies. Through this way, the Bulgarian Army’s influence on foreign policy has been a balancing act against the politicians for stabilising peace and order in the region (Çelik, 2012: 50).

Principally, the subordination of the Chief of the General Staff to the Ministry of Defense both symbolically and practically is considered as a clear evidence of civilian control; especially, when the Ministry of Defense was dominated by civilians. At this point, the Balkan states have some problems because the number of civilian experts is limited. Hence, they still prefer appointing retired military personnel and this creates an obstacle against civilianisation. Also, the ongoing dominance of retired officers slows down the democratic control of armed forces because civilians cannot detect policy suggestions of the military and defence budget (Johnson, 1995: 502). In addition, parliamentary supervision should be very effective in democratic states. The Balkan states have serious difficulties in this regard because the deputies lacked the knowledge regarding defense matters and most parliamentary members show little interest in the issue (Çelik, 2012: 50).

The civil society’s interest in defense matters and civil-military relations are important for an effective civilian supervision. This may be achieved in several ways. Firstly, a free media which receives necessary information about the security matters and serves them to the public without objection and hesitation should be established. Secondly, non-governmental organisations which have specific interests in defense and security matters which may increase public awareness through journals, seminars and memberships should be established (Çelik, 2012: 50). Thirdly, civilian students should be encouraged for participating into the security studies programmes either through universities or civilian institutions. The participation of non-governmental organisations, media members and parliamentary deputies to these programmes might also be helpful. They should be strengthened by funding, academic think-tanks and communication networks. This line of cooperation between the civilians and politicians can provide much better democratic civil-military relations (Çelik, 2012: 51).

6. NATO AND EU EFFECT

The impacts of NATO and EU are remarkably important for democratisation of the civil-military relations. But their contribution changes from case to case with regard to their relationship with the region states. Especially the Yugoslavian War and the Western block’s general stance against the Milosevic regime in Serbia has created different type of relationships with the Western states. Furthermore, Russia’s political interests in the region are significant because the countries who are free from Russian interference performed better in democratisation. Moreover, against a potential Russian influence over strategic regions, NATO’s reaction varied from case to case. The non-Yugoslavian states naturally have established more stabilised relations. Especially, the EU membership of Romania and Bulgaria remarkably helped for their democratic consolidation including the civil-military relations. In the former Yugoslavian states, Slovenia and Croatia were the luckiest states in this regard, because both countries showed extraordinary efforts to adapt their democratic mechanisms into the EU Acquis Communutaria. Further, as previously mentioned, Greece completely reorganised its civil-military relations after its EC (current EU) membership.

The Croatian army undertook a very important role during the post-Communist period, which is relatively similar to the Romanian army’s patriotic character. The Croatian army was formed from scratch during the Yugoslavian Civil War. In the very beginning, it was a non-professional paramilitary force which composed of voluntary rebels against the Serbian nationalists. However, the sense of belonging and solidarity among these rebel forces during the independence war gave them a national character which eventually created the basis of the
national army. After the independence, the Croatian army was perceived as the founder and protector of democratic Croatia. Especially, during Tuctman’s term, it completed its transformation into a professional nationalist disciplinary army (Bellamy and Edmonds, 2005: 72).

On the other hand, Tuctman’s term became a typical example of subjective control in which Tuctman aimed to use army to suppress his opponents by politicising it with his own sympathisers (Bellamy and Edmonds, 2005: 73). Therefore, a more systematic democratic reform was only able to start after his loss in the elections in 2000. After Tuctman, the civil–military reforms started to be implemented. In the beginning, the implementations of reforms were slow and challenging. At this point, just as in the other cases, the increasing relations with the NATO and the EU candidacy resulted with a drastic change. Croatia became a member of the NATO in 2009 and member of the EU in 2013. The slowing effects of the war and the Tuctman regime almost disappeared and Croatia subordinated its military to civilian will. However, there are several reforms yet to be made, especially regarding second generation issues, to complete the process.

The Yugoslavian (current Serbian) army, on the other hand, made every effort to reconstruct its bad image during the civil war. This, so far, has been the greatest obstacle against its involvement into the Western bloc. After Milosevic, the Yugoslavian state was ruled by his loyal General Pavkovic. During his term, the Serbian state mostly preserved its militarist nature (Edmunds, 2005: 117). Interestingly the inherited structure from Milosevic had enabled the Yugoslavian army to benefit from a high level of professionalism and institutional autonomy. During the civil war, Milosevic considered the army as the main tool of the nationalist project. Whenever Milosevic saw a threat against his personality, he was using typical methods of the subjective model just as Caucescu’s case in Romania. The constitutional system was redesigned to subjugate the military into Milosevic’s will. With the new implementations, the president gained absolute authority over the armed forces. Milosevic also homogenised the military by purging the non-Serbs. Just as other dictators in the region, he created his own loyal paramilitary and police force. After replacing Milosevic, Pavkovic tried to maintain the ongoing nationalist project with the same methods. But he did not stay in power sufficiently to achieve this (Edmunds, 2005: 117). One interesting development was that the military did not show any reaction when Milosevic and Pavkovic were removed from power. This case again proved the non-praetorian legacy of the post-communist armies.

After the removal of Pavkovic by the president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Vojislav Kostunica, the replacement increased the expectations that a democratic civil-military relation now can be established. But still there were important obstacles against democratisation. The uncertainty about Pavkovic’s future position in the army created some scepticism. Secondly, the legal and institutional mechanisms for civilian control (second generation problematic) was not effectively built yet. And lastly, the overall framework of civil-military relations was quite vulnerable to civilian abusings of the security sector. (Edmunds, 2003: 108). The NATO impact showed itself again during the removal of Pavkovic. Normally he found the decision illegal and refused to go. But the increasing pressure from NATO and the EU, Kostunico secured his power by forcing Pavkovic to retire. The Yugoslavian constitutional court dismissed Pavkovic’s application with the claim that his removal from the position was illegal in 11 July 2002 (Edmunds, 2003: 110). After Pavkovic, the relations with the NATO began to develop. The Serbian army attended to NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme. That also showed that Pavkovic’s image as being the committed member of Milosevic regime had been a serious obstacle against relationship against the Western help for democratisation (Edmunds, 2003: 110). Today, although Serbia is not a member of the NATO,
it has built a remarkable level of political dialogue and cooperation with the organization (NATO, 11 Dec 2017). On the other hand, there are still important obstacles against civilian control especially matters regarding parliamentary oversight including the principles of accountability, transparency and budget control. The risk of subjective control is still high because civilians aim to benefit from the army to promote and to secure their partisan interests. Additionally, the political uncertainties, possibility of future divisions and political turmoils, continue to exist as potential future risks against democratic consolidation. The positive scenario is that, in the near future, the strengthening relations with the NATO as well as the recent EU membership may provide better democratic opportunities for completing the second-generation reforms. This would even remove the negative image of the Serbian army inherited from the human rights breaches during the Yugoslavian Civil War (Edmunds, 2003: 111-112). Apart from these facts, the existing obstacles against democratic institutionalism are almost similar to the ones in the other Balkan states. In other words, the dominance of the military personnel continues to remain in the Ministry of Defense. It should be civilianised immediately. Secondly, there is a lack of coordination between the General Staff and the Ministry of Defense. The share of responsibility and duties should be distributed clearly to prevent confusion or chaos (Edmunds, 2003: 111-114). Yet again, the EU candidacy and expected membership in 2025 could present Serbia better opportunities for solving these problems in the future.

Principally, the main contributions of the EU and NATO memberships should be analysed multi-dimensionally. The first effect is the absorbance of professionalism. As mentioned above, some Balkan armies especially the Yugoslavian (current Serbian) army were professional already. Yet, a Western type of professional understanding which is theoretically defined by Huntington requires depoliticisation. This line of depoliticisation was mostly absorbed after the NATO membership. After conducting mutual campaigns, operations and training programmes, the Balkan officers found better opportunities to observe Western types of military professionalism. Moreover, the education curriculums in the military academies were re-designed according to the professional standards of the NATO armies. (Pantev, 2001: 5). The above-mentioned PFP programmes especially played an important role in this regard. Secondly, during the membership negotiations, the Balkan states made every effort to adapt their democratic mechanisms to the EU norms and standards. The required reforms were mostly related to the ones mentioned by the second-generation scholars. Amongst them, one may count the subordination of the general staff to ministry of defense, parliamentary supervision, accountability, transparency, budget audit, removal of military members from civilian orientated state departments, civilianisation of ministry of defense. As we elaborated in the previous examples, there are still several problems in this regard; yet thanks to the EU, remarkable levels of progress have been achieved. Indeed, the Yugoslavian civil war had an opposite impact in that regard. Given the civil war, security threats and the human right breaches, the EU membership of the former Yugoslavian states delayed dramatically. On the other hand, both the general Western reaction to the civil war as well as the possibility of an increasing Russian influence on the region enabled the Balkan states to be members of NATO much faster than expected (Pantev, 2001: 9). Thirdly, NATO membership and regional integration enabled the Balkan states to change their strategic doctrine. Currently, to strengthen their regional solidarity, the Balkan states look for supporting the NATO operations in the cross-border regions including humanitarian interventions and peacekeeping operations. By joining cross-border campaigns and operations, they develop their relations with NATO and especially with the USA in order to gain powerful strategic partners against a possible Russian threat.
Conclusion

The civil-military relations in the Balkan states had experienced various stages before taking its current democratic form. During the communist era, they were subordinated to the civilian rule. But this subordination was not established according to democratic standards, in that, they were either serving to the Communist Party or to the dictators. Yet, this line of structure prevented their armies from developing a praetorian character. Perhaps because of that, they did not make any effort to save the communist regimes during their collapse. Even some of them acted more patriotically by joining with their citizens against communists. Nevertheless, the Yugoslavian Civil War slowed down the democratisation of civil-military relations in many regions. During the 2000’s, the democratisation efforts once again gained momentum. There are several reasons for this positive development. Firstly, NATO’s interest in the region was strengthened because of the Yugoslavian War and a potential Russian expansionism. Thanks to the increasing relations with NATO, the Balkan armies found opportunities to observe Western types of depoliticisation more closely. Secondly, the EU saw the area as a natural part of Europe which is culturally close and strategically important for security. Therefore, the EU welcomed the membership applications of the Balkan states. The democratic reforms during the membership negotiations strengthened the institutional mechanisms for civilian control. Thirdly, the Balkan armies were cleaned from the remnants of old communist ideologies and were redesigned with a nationalistic and patriotic character. This case made it easier for them to absorb liberal values of a democratic regime. Eventually, the civil-military relations were settled on a democratic basis.

Yet, several institutional reforms are still needed to secure military subordination. Some of these reforms can be listed as the civilianisation of ministries of defense and foreign affairs as well as defense bureaucracy, increasing state capacity and high levels of parliamentary monitoring over defense expenditures. These issues are still considered as deficiencies for most of the Balkan states. Clearly within the current political climate, any direct military intervention in the Balkan states seems extremely unlikely.

References


