

The Quasi-Real World of Fiction and The Cognitive Value of Literature in Roman Ingarden's Philosophy of Literature*

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Abstract

Literary works of art present us a fictional world in which the objects and states of affairs are purely intentional. These objects and state of affairs do not have a correlative in an ontic sphere that is independent from the work itself. However, that does not mean that the sentences in a literary artwork do not have any assertive power. The predicative sentences in a literary artwork assert something in a particular manner. Hence, literary works of art have a cognitive value. They say something to us about the world we live in, about our lives, our being on this world etc. But they do not teach us about the world in a straightforward way by referring directly to the extra-textual world. Rather they teach us by presenting us their own world; the quasi-real world of the text. In this paper I will try to reveal the particular manner by which the literary artworks help us to better understand our disposition through the world. I will achieve this aim by focusing on the structural and functional differences between the literary work of art and the factual work in Roman Ingarden's literary theory.

Keywords: Roman Ingarden, Quasi-real, Literary Work of Art, Scientific Work, Truth-value.

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Roman Ingarden'in Edebiyat Felsefesinde Kurmacanın Quasi-Gerçek Dünyası ve Edebiyatın Kognitif Değeri

Öz

Yazınsal sanat yapıtları bize nesnelere ve durumların saf yönelimsel olduğu kurmaca dünyalar sunar. Bu nesne ve durumların yapının kendisinden bağımsız bir ontik alanda karşılıkları yoktur. Fakat bu durum yazınsal sanat yapısını oluşturan cümlelerin bir iddia ortaya koyma gücünden mahrum oldukları anlamına gelmez. Yazınsal yapıtı oluşturan yüklemci cümleler bir şey iddia ederler, fakat bunu çok özel bir şekilde yaparlar. Dolayısıyla yazınsal yapıtların kognitif bir değeri olduğunu söyleyebiliriz. Bu yapıtlar bize içinde yaşadığımız dünya, bizim bu dünya üzerinde bulunmaktığımız ve bu dünyadaki hayallerimiz hakkında bir şey söylerler. Ne var ki yazınsal yapıtların bize dünya hakkında öğretme şekilleri metin dışı dünyaya direk göndermede bulunarak, bu dünyayı doğrudan işaret ederek olmaz. Metinler bize kendi dünyalarını, metnin quasi-gerçek dünyasını sunarak kendi dünyamız hakkında bir şeyler söylerler. Bu yazıda amacım yazınsal metinlerin bu çok özel gösterme şeklini açmaya çalışmak olacak. Bu amaca ulaşmak için Roman Ingarden'in edebiyat felsefesinde yazınsal yapıt ile olgusal yapıt arasındaki yapısal ve işlevsel farklılıklara odaklanacağım.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Roman Ingarden, Quasi-Gerçek, Yazınsal Sanat Yapıtı, Olgusal Yapıt, Gerçeklik değeri

I. Poetic Works and Other Kinds of Linguistic Discourse

When using the term “literary work,” Ingarden has in mind all linguistic works, including scientific works.¹ In order to distinguish works of literary art (poetic works) from other kinds of linguistic discourse, he uses the term “literary work of art,” saying that these works “lay claim, by virtue of their characteristic basic structure and particular attainments, to being ‘works of art’ and enabling the reader to apprehend an aesthetic object of a particular kind” (*Ingarden 1973a, 7*). In this paper, my aim is to lay out the quasi-real nature of various kinds of sentences in a literary work of art. I will start my investigation by presenting the functional and structural differences between the literary work of art and factual work. Later, with the help of this distinction, we will be able to consider the structure of the literary work of art more clearly as a quasi-real construction.

For Ingarden, there are two major areas of difference between the literary work of art and the scientific work. The first difference is in the function of the two kinds of work. Scientific work mainly aims to transmit knowledge of objects

1 Jeff Mittscherling notes that “the Polish term *naukowy*, which Ingarden employs here, does not bear the same connotation as the English ‘scientific.’ In Polish, any serious research is regarded as ‘scientific,’ including sorts of research that English speakers would not refer to as such – e.g., the present study of Ingarden” (Mittscherling 1996, 158).

and states of affairs that exist independently from the work or the conscious activities of the author or reader. “An essential feature of the scientific work is that it is intended to fix, contain, and transmit to others the result of the scientific investigation in some area in order to enable scientific research to be continued and developed by its readers” (Ingarden 1973a, 146). Whereas “the literary work of art does not serve to further scientific knowledge but to embody in its concretization certain values of a very specific kind, which we usually call ‘aesthetic’ values” (Ingarden 1973a, 147).

Hence, expressing scientific or historical truths, philosophical or psychological insights are not an essential function of literary works of art. That does not mean that such functions are prohibited in these works, rather, if they occur in a literary work of art, they can only be counted as secondary functions and do not contribute to the work as a work of art. Hence the aspects of a literary work of art that do not directly contribute to the aesthetic cognition of the work (constitution of an aesthetic object) are either irrelevant to the work as a work of art or, if they are too prominent, constitute a flaw in the work. Restricting the function of literary works of art in such a way may seem problematic, especially when we consider many works in the history of literature that are mixed in the sense that they claim to be both works of art and instructive for the reader, or works which were once treated as scientific works but later as literary works. Gregory G. Colomb defines the problem in the following words:

Thus polemic, instruction, panegyric, satire, and all information-bearing elements are in this view out of place in the work of art. Many objections to this conclusion can be raised on purely empirical grounds. There are, for example, works such as Burton’s *Anatomy of Melancholy* whose literary status has changed through time, from science to art. There are also the many *ars poetica*’s – Horace’s, Vida’s, Scaliger’s, Boileau’s, Pope’s – which are intentionally and in fact both art and science. Or there are the innumerable didactic works throughout all of literary history, whose instructional aspect, usually central to the author’s own view of his purpose, Ingarden would have to consider irrelevant to art. And what of works such as Thoreau’s *Walden*, Henry Adams’s *Education*, or Mailer’s *Armies of the Night*? Ingarden must have a work be one or the other, and literary history presents too many works that seem somehow mixed. (Colomb 1976, 9)

Before focusing on these problems, I believe that it is necessary to scrutinize the second area of difference between the literary work of art and the scientific work. These are the structural differences between the two kinds of works that appear as the correlative of the functional difference mentioned above. The first difference appears in the stratified structure of both kinds of works. Like a literary

work of art, a scientific work also has a stratified structure.² However, there are some significant differences between the stratified structures of the two. The first difference can be observed in the stratum of schematized aspects. For Ingarden, this stratum is essential for literary works of art in order for the objects presented in the work to be apprehended by the reader intuitively. Whereas for the scientific work, the presence of such aspects is not essential, “they need not be present in it at all” (*Ingarden 1973a*, 151). Their appearance in a scientific work depends on the object on which the work focuses. If the work is about the objects that are perceivable by the senses (e.g. a scholarly work on a specific work of art), the aspects can perform an auxiliary role by helping the reader bringing the work in question into appearance. Whereas if the object of the work is not perceivable (e.g. in some areas of mathematical investigation), the stratum of aspects does not usually appear in the work. Even in the former case, these aspects are dispensable and can cease to exist without damaging the work. In some cases, they can even disturb the reader in gaining knowledge about the problem of the work and in such a case they are to be removed or at least not actualised by the reader. As a result, scientific works are stratified structures that are essentially composed of three strata. These are the strata of verbal sounds, semantic units, and portrayed objectivities.

Another important structural difference can be observed in the relation between the linguistic strata and the quasi-visual strata. In Ingarden’s theory, the stratum of portrayed objectivities is aesthetically the most important of the literary work of art. All other strata are organised around this stratum; hence the linguistic strata are only a passage for the apprehension of portrayed objectivities on the part of the reader. However, in the scientific work the stratum of portrayed objectivities is almost transparent, leaving the central role to the linguistic strata, especially to the stratum of semantic units – for the aim of a scientific work is not to direct the attention of the reader to the world of portrayed objectivities, but “directing the reader’s intention, realized in the understanding of the sentences (judgements), to the objects which are transcendent to the work” (*Ingarden 1973a*, 148). In such a situation, the portrayed objectivities are immediately identified with the ontically autonomous objects they represent. Hence, in a scientific work portrayed objects are only bi-products through which the sentence intentions only pass, as if they were transparent.

2 Ingarden presents the literary work as a complex, stratified object. The literary work is a many layered formation composed of four strata: “(a) The stratum of verbal sounds and phonetic formations and phenomena of a higher order; (b) the stratum of semantic units: of sentence meanings and the meanings of whole groups of sentences; (c) the stratum of schematized aspects, in which objects of various kinds portrayed in the work come to appearance; and (d) the stratum of the objectivities portrayed in the intentional states of affairs projected by the sentences” (*Ingarden 1973*, 12). Here, I will group the four strata of the literary work under two headings: the stratum of verbal sounds and the stratum of semantic units constitute the linguistic strata of the work, while the stratum of schematized aspects and the stratum of objectivities constitute the quasi-visual strata.

Another difference lays in the aesthetic value of the work and aesthetically relevant qualities that may appear in the various strata of the work. It is obvious that the aim of a scientific paper is not to lead the reader to an aesthetic concretization of the work that results in the constitution of an aesthetic object. As a consequence, the aesthetically relevant qualities need not be present in the scientific work. Even if they are present, they represent a dispensable luxury and do not contribute to the main function of the work. "In a literary work of art, on the other hand, these qualities constitute not only an essential element but in fact the most important element in the work of art as brought to aesthetic concretization" (*Ingarden 1973a*, 151). A very similar distinction holds for the metaphysical qualities.³ Although they play a significant role in the aesthetic concretization of a literary work of art, in a scientific work they are dispensable and might be distracting if they do occasionally reveal themselves.

II. Seriousness and Responsibility: Genuine Judgements, Pure Affirmative Propositions, and Quasi-Judgements

All these differences are necessary consequences of the main structural difference between the literary work of art and the scientific work; the qualitative difference between judicative sentences in the work: "All assertions in a scientific work are *judgements*. They may not all be true, they need not all be true, but all claim to be true... By contrast, literary works of art (or at least works that claim to be works of art) contain no genuine judgements... they contain only quasi-judgements, which make no claim to being true, not even if their content out of context could be judged with regard to its truth value" (*Ingarden 1973a*, 147). Not only judicative sentences, but also all other types of sentences (e.g. interrogative, imperative, and exclamatory sentences) undergo a similar modification in literary

3 For Ingarden, the idea of the literary work of art can sometimes appear in a form of metaphysical quality. Metaphysical qualities such as "the sublime, the tragic, the dreadful, the shocking, the inexplicable, the demonic, the holy, the sinful, the sorrowful, the indescribable brightness of good fortune, as well as the grotesque, the charming, the light, the peaceful, etc." are very rarely realized in actual life (*Ingarden 1973b*, 290–91). But, when they are realized they have a striking effect on our lives. The metaphysical qualities in a literary work, in contrast to the metaphysical qualities revealed in actual life, are heteronomous and purely intentional formations. In other words, they share the same mode of existence with represented objectivities. Hence, the metaphysical properties that are realized in real-life situations are not realized but concretized in a literary artwork. And in this way, they simulate their own realization. The distance that appears due to their ontic heteronomy enables the reader to contemplate them calmly, contrary to her contemplation of them in actual situations. The effects of the realization of metaphysical qualities in real-life situations are so powerful that they grip and overpower us. In such a situation, we do not have the power to contemplate these qualities. It is only through the distance that is provided by the literary artwork that we can calmly contemplate them. However, this distance also weakens the power and the richness they attain in actual realization; our encounter with these qualities in a literary artwork does not evoke such powerful changes in us.

works of art (quasi-interrogative, quasi-imperative, quasi-exclamatory).⁴ Moreover, the intentional objects projected in literary artworks are quasi-objects too.

Now, we can focus on this quasi-nature of the sentences in literary artworks. In so doing, I will follow Ingarden and mainly focus on predicative sentences as a paradigm of the quasi-nature of the literary work of art. According to Ingarden, declarative sentences (especially predicative sentences) in a literary work of art are neither pure assumptions nor genuine judgements (serious judgements).⁵ In order to understand the nature of quasi-judgements, I will first focus on the nature of genuine judgements and pure assumptions.

Ingarden defines genuine judgements as judgements “in which something is seriously asserted and which not only lay claim to truth but *are* true or false” (Ingarden 1973b, 160). Hence, the “directional factor” of these judgements, which are directed at first to the corresponding purely intentional object, refers beyond this object to a real or ideal object (or one intended as real or ideal). Through this reference, the purely intentional state of affairs, in which the given object is portrayed, is applied to that real or ideal object: “it is intentionally transposed into the real ontic sphere in which [the given object] finds itself and in which ... it is rooted” (Ingarden 1973b, 161). Moreover, the state of affairs developed by the meaning-content of the sentence is set in the given ontic sphere (real or ideal) as truly existing. “In both these functions – in the *transposition* into the given (real, ideal, etc.) ontic sphere and in the *existential setting* – there is based what one usually calls the ‘claim to truth’ of the judgement” (Ingarden 1973b, 161–62). That is to say, the judgement makes the claim that the state of affairs developed by the meaning units and the object referred does in fact exist, not as a purely intentional state of affairs or purely intentional object, but as an object portrayed by the state of affairs that is, in turn, rooted in an ontic sphere, which is independent from the judgement itself. This transposing is bound to the “identification” function in the judgement: “the intention that the *content* of the purely intentional sentence correlate should be so precisely *adjusted*... to the state of affairs existing in the ontic sphere that is ontically independent of the judgement, that, in this respect, the two can be *identified*”

4 Ingarden writes: “Thus when we are dealing, for example with an interrogatory sentence, it is no longer a genuine question, but only a quasi-question; sentences which express a wish or a command are not genuine wishing or commanding sentences but are only quasi-commands, etc. Likewise, the value judgements appearing in the representing text, regardless of whether they pronounce an ethical, or a social or, for that matter, an aesthetic valuation are not genuine value judgements but are only quasi-evaluations even though, in their purely external form, they do not differ from genuine valuations. Their function consists solely in the intentional projection of certain ontically heteronomous objectivities, which can at most give themselves an appearance of reality but can never attain it” (Ingarden 1973b, 181).

5 Ingarden’s concept of pure assumption is equivalent to Alexius Meinong’s *Annahmen*, in which belief in the reality of the sentence is deprived of all force. See: Weinberger, Christiane, 1976. *Zur Logik der Annahmen*, Wien: VWGÖ.

(Ingarden 1973b, 162). Due to this identification function – which arises from the “matching intention” of genuine judgements – the purely intentional states of affairs are passed over and the intentions of the judicative proposition points directly to the ontically independent states of affairs; thus, “the purely intentional states of affairs, as a purely intentional one, disappears from our field of vision” (Ingarden 1973b, 163).

Pure affirmative propositions, on the other hand, lack the aforementioned functions characteristic of genuine judgements: transposition, existential setting, matching intention, and identification. The intentional directional factor in these propositions refers directly to the purely intentional objects or purely intentional states of affairs, not to objects or states of affairs that are independent of the sentence correlate: “the intentional directional factor of the subject of the sentence does not point, by way of appertaining intentional object, at an ontically independently existing object but precisely at the purely intentional object itself” (Ingarden 1973b, 166). In this sense, we can talk neither about an ontic sphere that is independent from the judgement, nor about a transposition into that ontic sphere. Under these circumstances, an intention of identification with an autonomous object is beside the point. As a result, pure affirmative propositions do not hold any claim to truth.

The sentences that appear in the literary work of art are conceptualized by Ingarden as “Quasi-Judgements.” These lay between the two extreme types explained above: genuine judgements and pure affirmative propositions. It is understandable that Ingarden tries to stress the difference between literary sentences and genuine judgements, but why does he take the trouble to distinguish these sentences from pure affirmative sentences? The answer lies in the special relation between the literary work and its claim to truth. Although literary sentences “have the external *habitus* of judicative propositions... they neither are nor are meant to be genuine judicative propositions” (Ingarden 1973b, 167). Hence, they don’t have a claim to truth in the sense that genuine judgements have. However, they are not completely deprived of truth, like pure affirmative sentences: “Yet something is undoubtedly asserted in a particular manner [in literary sentences]; we are therefore not dealing with pure affirmative propositions” (Ingarden 1973b, 167). Now my aim is to show the specific manner in which literary sentences as quasi-judgements assert something.

I first want to lay out an important point of difference between the genuine judgements and quasi-judgements: the state of “seriousness.” Genuine judgements (which Ingarden sometimes also calls “serious judgements”) carry a character of seriousness. Ingarden defines this serious character by looking at the position of a subject who judges seriously:

When I judge seriously I do so in good faith and take full responsibility. I am prepared to defend the rightness of the assertion either by producing suitable argument or by actions conforming to the content of the judgement, and I am also prepared to abandon such an assertion if either I myself or someone else with the help of suitable and seriously proposed arguments to convince me that this assertion is false. When I judge I engage myself personally: that act of judgement issuing from the center of my consciousness constrains me to accept responsibility for the given assertion, for contending that things are as the assertion proclaims. This is not a game from which I can always withdraw simply declaring that the assertion in question was expressed as a joke without an act of judgement entering into it and without that specific solidarity with one's own judging which is so characteristics of judgements. (*Ingarden 1985, 135*)

As seen from the above quotation, the serious character of genuine judgements imposes a responsibility on the utterer. She has the obligation to stand behind her judgement. Such a serious character and responsibility cannot be seen in a literary work of art. Neither the author nor the reader feels such a responsibility and a need to take the judgements in a literary work of art seriously in this sense. The below quotation, which defines the position of the reader in front of a literary work of art, demonstrate the difference – when read with the above quotation – very clearly:

By coming to understand [literary sentences] I perform the sentence-forming act, but at the same time I behave as though I were judging that I was not doing this seriously. As a result, I do not engage myself openly, I take no responsibility, I do not intend to submit what I am reading to an examination, I do not look for arguments for and against the assumption that what the sentences say is or was true. I do not for a moment assume that they claim a right to truth or even that they designate a certain state of affairs in the real world. . . . On the contrary, I know that these sentences, because of their assertive apparel, designate and set up an object in some quasi-real world. (*Ingarden 1985, 136*)

Hence, the quasi-real world of the literary work of art has a very special relation to the extra-textual world. The quasi-real world is undoubtedly an intentional world. The objects designating this world are not merely picked up from the real world but are the result of the artistic creational acts of the author. In other words, they are the products of “poetic fantasy.” In this sense, they do not merely represent objects in the given world, but aim to “progress beyond the world already given, and sometimes even liberation from it and the creation of an apparently new world” (*Ingarden 1985, 137*).⁶ Hence, what is at stake here is not a naïve mimetic

6 The relation of the literary work with the extra-textual world and the ways in which the elements of the extra-textual world are comprehended by literary artworks are discussed by Wolfgang Iser under the title “Repertoire.”

attempt to represent the world as it is, but a creative act that tries to go beyond this world. However, going beyond the given world does not mean that the work does not have a sense of reality. It does. As we saw in the quote above, the judgemental sentences of this new product in the end “assert something in a particular manner.” This refers to the sense of reality that the literary work of art tries to establish, the reality of “as-if” which is skilfully created by poetic fantasy according to the following formula: “be such and such, have those particular properties, exist as though you were real” (*Ingarden 1985*, 137). If a novel contains objects whose type of existence is real existence, they appear in the work with the character of reality. However, this character of reality should not be confused with the ontic character of truly existing objects. What is at stake here is only an “external habitus” of reality. In consequence, the reader of such a work experiences the work as if it were real, although she knows, in the back of her mind, that she is experiencing a fictive world.⁷ This is what Ingarden means by “the assertive power” of quasi-judgements that are lacking in pure assumptions. And it is for this reason that Ingarden defines the judgement in the literary work of art as a quasi-judgement rather than a pure assumption. “For, if they were ‘assumptions,’ objects presented in literature would have been deprived of all character of real existence ... and would not have imposed themselves as real. All artistic illusion would be impossible” (*Ingarden 1985*, 161). Thus, the lack of serious attitude in quasi-judgements does not lead to a frivolous attitude, but to an attitude that simulates the seriousness of genuine judgements.

III. Degrees of Matching Intention: Three Types of Literary Artworks

We can, then, claim, with Ingarden, that the judicative sentences in a literary work of art are modified assertive sentences. They are modified in such a way that they apparently keep their assertive nature while they don't have any claim to truth. Ingarden is undoubtedly aware of the fact that not all kinds of literary works undergo this modification to the same degree; it diverges in various types of literary works. For his purposes Ingarden distinguishes three types of work according to the criterion of being faithful to historical facts. The first type of works is those that do not have any intention of being faithful to historical facts. The second type is that which Ingarden calls “contemporary or period novels,” which are not “historical” in the proper sense, but in which “the represented objectivities refer in a totally different and, at the same time, if one may put it so, narrower manner to the real world” (*Ingarden 1973b*, 169). The third type contains works that claim to be historical and as faithful as possible to the facts and objectivities known from

7 Ingarden writes: “when the work is read, it can often happen that the reader takes quasi judgemental propositions for genuine judgements and thus considers to be real intentional objects which only simulate reality. But the transformation connected with this does not belong to the work itself but rather to one of its possible concretizations” (*Ingarden 1973b*, 221).

history. I will now briefly focus on these three types of works. This will help us to better understand the relation between the quasi-real world of the text and the extra-textual world in different types of literary artworks.

The first type includes works that in no sense claim to be historical (Ingarden mentions symbolist drama as representative of this type). In these works, “there is a total absence of the intention of an exact matching ... of the projected states of affairs to corresponding states of affairs that is objectively existing and that is to be found in an ontically autonomous sphere” (*Ingarden 1973b*, 168). The sentence correlates are transposed and existentially set in the real world, but with neither a matching intention nor an intention of identification. The intentional directional factor does not point to objects existing in an objective sphere. The transposition of the sentence correlates into reality in these works is never to be taken as “fully serious,” but “simulatedly serious,” which means they are only regarded as really existing: “the sentence correlates are transposed, in accordance with their content, into the real world. But here this goes hand in hand only with the ontic setting and not – as is the case with genuine judicative propositions – simultaneously with the matching intention and with identification” (*Ingarden 1973b*, 168). Thus, in reading these kinds of works, the reader does not apprehend the sentence correlates without noticing their intentional character. The correlates themselves are transposed into reality “without any diminution of our awareness that they have their origin in the intentionality of the meaning of the sentence” (*Ingarden 1973b*, 168). Consequently, they are not transposed into an independent sphere of existence, but into the world of the text, the world of “as-if” – an illusory reality into which they are set as purely intentional.

In works that are categorized under the second degree of quasi-modification, namely what Ingarden calls “contemporary or period novels,” the transposition and setting functions are also only “simulatedly serious,” but at this stage there is a matching intention. “The individual assertive propositions are given in such a way that the states of affairs projected by them are to be matched, not with *any* entirely *determinate individual* state of affairs truly existing in a given epoch, but only with a *general type* of states of affairs and objects that would be ‘possible’ in a given time and milieu” (*Ingarden 1973b*, 169). What is at stake in this kind of novel is a kind of adaptation to typical features of a specific period. Individual details, such as names of places, persons, etc. can be seen in these works. However, the intention here is not to match these intentionally projected objects with what is real, nor are characters projected in this way to be “literary representations” of determinate persons existing in the real world. Instead, the matching intention proper to these sentences refers to the “type” that is manifested in this represented character. The aim in using these individual details in the work is to lend verisimilitude to this transposition into illusory reality.

The third degree of quasi-modification is found in works that purport to be historical and claim to be as faithful as possible to objectivities and facts known from the history. In this kind of work, the transposition and setting functions are serious, and the matching intention is extended from the general types to the individual objects and states of affairs. But there is still no intention of identification between the intentional objects or states of affairs and the extra-textual ones; the intention of identification is replaced by an intention of substitution. What the intentional states of affairs or objects tries to achieve in these works is to substitute for the states of affairs or objects existing independently of the judgement itself, instead of identifying with them:

On the strength of the far reaching similarity between them, they should only duplicate the objects which at one time have really existed; they should indeed attempt to *substitute* for them, as if they themselves were these objects... By dint of their far reaching similarity – in accordance with the intention- and their matching with objectively existing states of affairs, they make the latter quasi-incarnate, quasi-present. Thus, the past, long gone and turned into nothingness again arises before our eyes in the merely intentional states of affairs incorporating it. (*Ingarden 1973b*, 171)

But the past itself is not ascertained here. Although the intentional states of affairs and objects very much converge with states of affairs and objects of the past, although the matching intention is intended for determinate individuals, the last point that divides quasi-judgements and genuine judgements, the identification function is still missing in these works. Although we are one step closer to them, the sentence correlates of a historical literary work of art are still not literal representations of independent objects or states of affairs. Hence the semantic units composing these works should be apprehended in their quasi-character. The reader can neither take them seriously nor attribute them responsibility with regard to the objects and states of affairs they claim to depict.

The analysis laid out above shows us the comprehensiveness of Ingarden's theory of quasi-reality. A similar analysis can be carried out for different genres in literary history according to their claim to correspondence with extra-textual reality. In that sense an analysis of realist novel and fantastic novels will reveal the differences between these two genres with regard to the basic points indicating the quasi-character of the work (intentional factor, matching intention, identification, existential setting). Despite these differences and by extension despite differences in their degree of their faithfulness to extra-textual reality, all literary artworks share this quasi-character. In this regard, all affirmative sentences constituting a literary artwork should be apprehended by the reader in their quasi-character. That means that they cannot be held responsible for what they utter in the way that scientific works can. The intentional directional factor of li-

terary artworks does not transpose from the intentional objectivities appearing as the correlatives of semantic meanings to the extra-textual objectivities. Thus, as a reader I do not attribute to these works the seriousness that I expect to find in a factual text. When I read a sentence like “Last night, a man found stabled to death close to Goldhawk Road Station, in the city of London” in a novel, I do not check the news agencies to see if there really was such a murder or refer to a city map to see if there is really a Goldhawk Road Station in the city of London. I am aware of the fact that the state of affairs depicted here refers to the quasi-world of the novel and does not have the intention of identifying with an extra-textual incident. Even if I know that there is a Goldhawk Road Station in London and there has been a murder close to that station in recent years, this does not lead me to take the sentence as a genuine judgement. What is at stake here is that, to use Ingarden’s terminology, the existential setting of the story is constructed such that it has a matching intention with the extra-textual world, but not an identification. The aim of laying out the existential setting in this way is, we might think, to strengthen the visual aspects of the sentence, or its “suggestive power.” The literary judgement, with its “suggestive power,” absorbs me into the simulated world. It is this suggestive power that differentiates quasi-modified sentences from pure affirmations. “By virtue of their described properties, they are capable of evoking, to a greater or lesser degree, the illusion of reality; this pure affirmative sentences cannot do. They carry with them, in other words, a suggestive power which, as we read, allows us to plunge into the simulated world and live in it as in a world peculiarly unreal and yet having the appearance of reality” (*Ingarden 1973b*, 172). Hence, considering the quasi-nature of the literary work of art, the existential setting of this sentence can be interpreted as a textual tool used to strengthen the “as-if” function of the work, but not as an indicative of an intention of identification.

IV. Pure Literary Works of Art and Literary Works of Art on the Periphery

Hitherto I have laid out the quasi-nature of the world portrayed by the literary work of art, and the nature of judicative sentences in the work as quasi-judgements. We can now come back to Colomb’s question, which we quoted in the beginning of this section. Does Ingarden’s theory prohibit the existence of genuine judgements in the literary artwork in the strictest sense? And does he thus over-restrict the function of literature and disregard the works in literary history that are somehow mixed in the sense that they both claim to be works of art and identify with extra-textual reality? First of all, as we will see in the following passages, Ingarden is aware of the fact that not all works that are classified under the category “literary work of art” belong to that category to the same degree. In some works, we can observe genuine judgements coming directly from the author.

But these works cannot be categorized as “pure literature”; rather they should be placed on the periphery of the genre. Second, Ingarden does not disregard other functions that can be attributed to literary artworks (instructive, documentative etc.). However, attributing such functions to the work and interpreting the work in accordance with these functions does not say anything about the work’s being a work of art. They can only be regarded as secondary functions.

Let’s start with the first point. I stated that Ingarden is aware of the fact that some works that claim to be literary artworks do contain genuine judgements. He differentiates these works from pure literary artworks by placing them on the periphery:

There are some that are *par excellence* pure works of art and others that have a dual, mixed character and form borderline cases... Some are on the borderline between literature and sculpture, others on the borderline between literature and music, while others stand on the borderline between literary art proper and writings whose purpose is science, popularization, politics, propaganda, factual reporting and so on. (*Ingarden 1985, 139*)

It is natural to observe genuine judgements in these kinds of borderline works. In propaganda and various types of persuasive literature, we come across many genuine judgements that obviously come directly from the author. In some examples this phenomenon goes so far that the artistic elements of the work are used only as a pretext for introducing these opinions. These genuine judgements, however, do not help the work to achieve its essential function; rather they tend to distract from the experience, and hence from the aesthetic value of the work and its character as a work of art. Ingarden does not totally exclude these works from the premises of literary art; he places them on the periphery of literature, but only on condition that the genuine judgements that appear in these works contribute to, or at least do not destroy the aesthetic character of the work: “Only an instance where the appearance of a judgement in a literary work does not constitute a blemish and is not a clear deviation from the character of the work as a work of art would be evidence forcing us to accept the thesis about the existence and artistic role of judgements in this type of work” (*Ingarden 1985, 139*).

Ingarden identifies two types of borderline works that “despite their marginality, are excellent examples of artistic excellence and power” (*Ingarden 1985, 157*). The first type are works that can be treated either as a literary work of art or as a factual text. The second type are works that contain both poetic and factual parts. Ingarden offers Plato’s *Symposium* as a representative example of the first type of work. The *Symposium* can be read either as a literary work of art or as a learned treatise. Hence, two possible concretizations can be derived from the same work:

When we read the “Symposium” as a work of literary art, the singular and general statements become quoted statements uttered by characters presented in the work and are expressions of these character’s views. They are then quasi-judgements ... When, however, we read the “Symposium” as a special type of learned treatise, then the various views become contributions to the problem under discussion. (*Ingarden 1985, 157*)

In this case, the quality of the judgements is determined by the attribution of the reader. They can be read as quasi-judgements the aim of which is to contribute to the aesthetic quality of the work and to perform the functions they have in the wholeness of the literary work of art. And as judgements uttered by the characters in the work, they refer to the world of the work, not to the extra-textual world. When they are read as genuine judgements, on the other hand, they refer directly to the extra-textual work and should be supported by appropriate arguments. The artistic and aesthetic qualities do not help the work as a philosophical treatise, although they can attract the reader to a beautifully constructed text.

The second type of marginal works are those which, unlike the *Symposium*, do not allow diverse interpretations. These works contain both poetic and factual parts (composed of genuine judgements) and force the reader to switch her attitude while reading specific phases of the work. The reason why these works are regarded as works of art is because the factual parts in the work are also presented in a strictly artistic form, and they do not destroy the wholeness of the work; rather they contribute to it. Still, in these works it is the presence of quasi-judgments that makes them work a work of art. If these works were composed of only genuine judgements constructed in a strictly artistic form, the work would not be a work of art but a factual work that would shock us for being peculiar in style. Hence, what makes these works a work of literary art is not the existence of genuine judgements but the arrangement of these judgements in the work in such a way that they do not detract from the aesthetic wholeness of the work, but contribute to it. In other words, not because it contains genuine judgements, but despite the occurrence of these genuine judgements, the work can be categorized as a poetical work.

As a result, for Ingarden pure literary works of art do not contain any genuine judgements: “if such judgements occur, such works ought to be placed on the periphery of the area, with various other considerations playing a part in the decision as to which borderline type the given work is allocated” (*Ingarden 1985, 160*). Under these circumstances, we can say that Ingarden’s attempts are directed towards establishing the essential properties of a literary work, and genuine judgements do not belong to this essential structure. Although in some borderline cases they may appear in some literary works of art, they do not play any role in determining the artistic character of the work in question. Hence, in reply to Colomb’s objection, we can say that, yes, literary history contains “many works that

seem somehow mixed,” and some of these works can be placed on the periphery of literature, but what makes them a literary work of art is the existence of literary judgements at the core of the work – while the genuine judgements may only be supplementary elements as long as they do not destruct the main function of literary work, namely to lead the reader to concretize the work as an aesthetic object through an aesthetic experience.

The second point about Colomb’s objection to the restrictedness of the function of literary artworks is not unrelated to the first point we analysed above. Colomb says that “there are innumerable didactic works throughout all literary history, whose instructional aspect, usually central to the author’s own view of his purpose, Ingarden would have to consider irrelevant to art” (Colomb 1976, 9). The above analysis has shown us that Ingarden does not totally exclude these works from the realm of literature as long as they can be cognized in an aesthetic manner despite their inclusion of didactic parts. However, he is also on guard against the reduction of literature to such a function. In such a situation, the artistic properties in a literary artwork becomes a mere pretext for instruction in certain ideas. It seems to me that Ingarden troubles himself with clarifying the limits and boundaries of genuine judgements allowed in the work precisely to prevent such an instrumentalisation and to preserve the autonomy of the literary artwork as a work of art. In this sense, Ingarden does not totally disregard these secondary functions in literary artworks as long as they do not destroy the aesthetic wholeness of the work. But, again, they can exist in the work only as secondary functions and their functional (instructional, ethical etc.) value does not say anything to us about the work as a work of art. In this sense, the didactic or instructive parts, as Colomb claims, would be considered irrelevant to art by Ingarden. But that does not necessarily mean that works containing such genuine judgements are regarded as non-literary works. As I have already stated, they are positioned by Ingarden on the periphery of literature.

V. The Approach of the Reader

In this regard, there is another problem that requires clarification. This problem is not about the intentions of the author but about the approach of the interpreter. A literary work of art can be cognized in various ways. One of the sources of these differences is “the reader’s adopting very different attitudes with regard to one and the same work and consequently conducting himself in different ways with respect to it” (*Ingarden 1973a*, 169).⁸ In the history of reading there exists

8 On the problems related to the role of the attitude of the reader in deciding about the nature of the judgement in the work (if they are quasi-judgements or genuine-judgements), see (Hamburger 1993). In this work, Hamburger claims that the concept of quasi-judgement “describes nothing other than a vague psychological attitude of the author and likewise of the reader” (22). In the extended edition of his *Literary Work of Art*, Ingarden replies to Hamburger’s criticism, stating that

a not-uncommon practice of extracting some sentences from the work, treating them as if they were genuine judgements, and drawing interpretative conclusions from the extracted sentence or sentences. At first sight, such a practice may seem applicable here, since these extracted sentences have the external appearance of genuine judgements. Hence, when they are extracted from the wholeness of the work, and consequently from the quasi-real world in which they function, they may easily be stripped of their quasi-character. A very popular example of this practice can be observed in Jared Diamond's *Guns, Germs and The Steel*. In the ninth chapter of this book, entitled "Zebras, Unhappy Marriages, And the Anna Karenina Principle," Diamond refers to the well-known gnomic first sentence of Tolstoy's *Anna Karenina*: "All happy families are alike; each unhappy family is unhappy in its own way." In this work, Diamond interprets the sentence as follows: "By that sentence, Tolstoy meant that, in order to be happy, a marriage must succeed in many different respects: sexual attraction, agreement about money, child discipline, religion, in-laws, and other vital issues. Failure in any one of those essential respects can doom a marriage even if it has all the other ingredients needed for happiness" (Diamond 1998, 157). He then extracts the sentence from its context, conceptualizes it as the "Anna Karenina Principle," and claims that "this principle can be extended to understanding much else about life besides marriage" (Diamond 1998, 157). And in the aforementioned chapter he applies this principle to the problem of the domestication of wild animals (Diamond 1998, 158f.). Later this principle becomes popular and is used by many scholars to illustrate different problems in various areas.

It is obvious that such an extraction is inappropriate to the essential function of the literary work of art. A literary work may contain many gnomic sentences like the one above. It may even contain larger semantic units of this kind (e.g. paragraphs, chapters etc.). A reader may extract different ideas or philosophical or historical results by interpreting these sentences or parts of the work. But these practices say nothing about the work as a work of art. We cannot aesthetically evaluate this kind of sentences or parts in order to clarify problems external to the world of the work nor the work itself for containing such peculiar sentences. In Diamond's example, the Anna Karenina principle helps us to better understand some issues about the world we live in; hence it enhances our understanding of

the nature of the judgements in a text are not determined solely by the attitude of the reader. There are some stylistic elements in the work (style of language, composition, the presence of aesthetically valent qualities, appearance of metaphysical qualities, etc.) that will inform the reader that she is dealing with a literary artwork. Moreover, most works include external elements that will clue the reader that she is face to face with an artwork – like a subtitle (a novel) and a blurb. When Ingarden talks about attitude of the reader he does not refer to an attitude that determines the nature of judgements, but an attitude that is determined by the type of work that is being dealt with. As soon as the reader realizes that she is dealing with a literary work of art, she should take the right attitude and read the judgements in the work in their quasi-nature.

life. In this sense, we can attribute a cognitive or a moral value to Tolstoy's sentence for inspiring such a principle. But that has nothing to do with the literariness of Tolstoy's work. The sentence could have been used by Tolstoy in a philosophical treatise, and in that case, nothing would have changed. It would be valuable for the above reasons to the same degree. A similar practice can also be observed in literary studies. Some interpreters extract some semantic units from the text in the same fashion, and consider it as a judgement, the truth value of which can be determined in relation to the real world; they debate whether this judgement would be acceptable to the author of the work, and construct a new system of assertions upon the judgement that would be philosophically acceptable to the author. Such an investigation may also be supported by external documents like the letters or the diaries of the author. Ingarden's theory does not reject such practices completely. He only emphasizes that these interpretations are inappropriate to the aesthetic character of the work: "such reflection may be quite interesting and even quite significant for the study of history of ideas. But we must remember that doing this we cease to study the [work] as a work of art and move beyond it. Doing this we use the work as a spring board for reflections that have little to do with the interpretation of a literary work" (*Ingarden 1985, 147*).

Moreover, such an extraction also diminishes the effect of the sentence. As mentioned, the literary work of art is composed of four strata and all of these strata have some specific factors that contribute the overall value of the work. We have also seen that these factors sometimes enrich the meaning intended by the sentences of the work. Hence, when we separate the sentence from the wholeness of the work, we also cause its poetic effectiveness to vanish:

If we uproot the sentence from the totality of the work, if we remove it from the presented web of facts, if we deprive it of melody, rhythm, tone, and other contextual factors, if we deprive it of what this sentence expresses in the psyche of the lyrical subject, we shall be left with a sentence that, naturally enough, we would be able to regard as a judgement in the strict sense of the word, but then the whole dynamism of poetic charm would be vanished, leaving only, as Charles Lalo remarks: "...la valeur prosaïque de vérité, et non lyrique de beauté." (*Ingarden 1985, 153*)

VI. Conclusion

As a result, both the instructive parts of a literary artwork and the parts extracted from the wholeness of the work and treated as genuine judgements are irrelevant to the work as a work of literary art. The literary artwork should be cognized in an aesthetic manner if it is to be treated as a work of art. Does Ingarden's theory suggest an idea-free aestheticism, in this sense? We have seen above that one of the peculiar properties of quasi-judgements, which differentiates them from pure

assumptions, is the fact that they have an “assertive power,” that is, they “assert something in a particular manner.” The discussions so far have tried to unpick what Ingarden means by a “particular manner.” If the work asserts something, what it asserts cannot be revealed by extracting peculiar semantic units and treating them as genuine judgements. It should be revealed through an appropriate cognition of the work: cognizing it in an aesthetic manner. Through an appropriate cognition, which can be carried on through an aesthetic experience, the work reveals its “idea.” Ingarden does not deny that we learn from literary artworks. He only emphasizes that literature does not teach us about the world in a straightforward way by referring directly to the extra-textual world. The sentences and other higher semantic units in the work refer never beyond the world of the text. It is through the quasi-real world of the text that we learn something about the world and our disposition towards it. In that sense, what Ingarden’s theory implies is not an idea-free aestheticism. Rather, it states that the idea of the work is revealed through an aesthetic experience in an unstraightforward way.

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