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LOCKE'S ACCOUNT of LIBERTY in the *ESSAY*: CAN "FINITE INTELLECTUAL BEINGS" BE FREE?

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ÖZET

Bu makale, *Deneme*'nin farklı edisyonları boyunca Locke'un özgürlük anlayışının gelişimini ele almaktadır. Locke'un en temel ahlaki problemi insanın doğal yetileri ile onun ahlaki ödevlerini, ahlaki ilkelerin doğuştan geldiğini savunan bir doktrine başvurmadan uzlaştırabilmektir. *Deneme*'nin özellikle birinci ve ikinci edisyonları arasındaki farklara odaklanan bu karşılaştırmalı çalışmanın amacı, Locke'un bu temel ahlaki problemi ile "Güç Üzerine" adlı bölümde yaptığı revizyonlar arasındaki bağlantıya odaklanmaktır. Makalede Locke'un güç anlayışı, iradi eylemler ile özgür eylemler arasında gözetilen fark ve de iradenin belirlenimi sorusuna verilen cevaptaki gelişim tartışılmaktadır. Son olarak ise, ahlaki özgürlüğün koşulu olarak "arzunun askıya alınması" ilkesi ele alınır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Özgürlük, güç, arzunun askıya alınması, iradi eylemler, iradenin belirlenimi.

ABSTRACT

The article deals with the evolution of Locke's idea of liberty from its appearance in the first edition of the *Essay* up to its development in later editions. Locke's main moral problem is that how the natural abilities of human beings can be reconciled with their moral duties without referring to the doctrine of innateness of moral principles. The aim of this comparative study is to focus on the connection between this moral problem and the changes Locke made in the chapter "of Power" especially for the second edition. In the article, an account of the idea of power, of the difference Locke puts between voluntary actions and free actions are given. Following these, the question of determination of the will and the development of the answer to this question in the succession of editions are introduced. Finally the principle of "suspension of desire" as the condition of moral liberty is discussed.

Keywords: Liberty, power, suspension of desire, voluntary actions, determination of the will.

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I

Introduction

As Peter H. Nidditch remarks in his "Introduction" to the *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, this *opus magnum*, with respect to the frequency of its altered and enlarged editions, can be counted among the very few philosophical classics of the 17th and 18th centuries.[1] Concerning Locke's account of liberty, this feature of the *Essay* is especially important because this notion is discussed in the chapter "Of Power" (Book 2, Chapter xxi) which was considerably rearranged and to which a lot of new sections were added after the first edition. In the renewed part of the "Epistle to the Reader" for the second edition, Locke informs the reader about these changes as follows:

> most of [the additions and amendments in the second edition are] either farther confirmation of what I had said, or Explications to prevent others being mistaken in the sence of what was formerly printed, and not any variation in me from it; I must only except the alterations I have made in Book *2*. Chap. *21*. What I had there Writ concerning *Liberty* and the *Will*, I thought deserv'd as accurate a review, as I was capable of: […] Upon a closer inspection into the working of Men's Minds, and a stricter examination of those motives and views, they are turn'd by, I have found reason somewhat to alter the thoughts I formerly had concerning that, which gives the last determination to the *Will* in all voluntary actions.[2]

This warning to the reader points out that the most important change Locke made concerning his account of liberty and of will is related to the question of what *finally* determines the will. To give a hint about the essence of the difference in this introductory part, in the first edition (1689), Locke states that "*Good* […], *the greater Good is that alone which determines the Will*";[3] yet in the second edition (1694) he makes the following revision: "*good*, the *greater good*, though apprehended and acknowledged to

[1] Peter H. Nidditch, "Introduction" to John Locke's *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, ed. Peter H. Nidditch (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. x. Locke's *Essay* has early six editions: the first edition was published in 1689, the second in 1694, the third in 1695 (almost reprint of the second), the fourth in 1700, the fifth in 1706 (after Locke's death in 1704), and the sixth in 1710 (reprint of the fifth with correction of misprints). Nidditch takes the Fourth Edition of 1700 as his copy-text (but by accommodating the material alterations appeared in the Fifth Edition of 1706 as well). In this paper, all the quotations from the *Essay* will be taken from Nidditch's standard edition that also includes, at footnotes, the textual variants between all editions. When it is needed, I will also refer to these textual variants. Consideration of the third and the sixth editions will be omitted.

[2] *E*: 11 (**II**, **IV**, **V**). ("*E*" designates *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975) and the Arabic number the page. The Roman numbers in brackets refer to the editions. If there is no significant textual variant or rearrangement between the first and later editions, the edition number will not be indicated).

[3] *E*: 251, § 29 (**I**) ("§" and the following number refers to the section).

be so, does not determine the *will*, until our desire, raised proportionably to it, makes us *uneasy* in the want of it."[4] In the first version, Locke seems to think that the knowledge of good[5] can directly determine the will but in the later versions, he admits that it cannot be so immediately efficient in human actions and that it always needs the mediation of *desire* and *uneasiness*. In addition to this, in the second edition, he introduces the doctrine of *suspension of desire*,[6] that is, the government of passions, which is regarded as the ability that makes human freedom possible.

With regard to the abundance of alterations and amendments Locke make in the very chapter where he deals with the problem of liberty, one may think that, starting from the second edition, he offers a new account of human freedom.[7] Yet, without putting the question as novelty (or sameness) of the account, these revisions can also be surveyed from another perspective, that is to say, as some important contributions to the treatment of the main moral problematic occupying Locke's mind for years: reconciliation of our abilities with our moral duties without referring to innate principles. For him, the question of human liberty is the question of liberty of finite intellectual beings, and the conceptions of moral virtue and liberty are closely related to that of religious piety. And the apparent dichotomy between "what we can do" and "what we ought to do" arises from our dual nature: we are both passionate and intellectual beings. If we were not finite, if we were not exposed to multitude of passions, it would be easy for us, as it is the case for superior beings,[8] to be determined by the highest good. Yet we are finite beings and we always need something other than understanding in order to preserve our lives. And the question of Locke is that: despite all "our frailty"[9], can we be free? Can "such poor finite Creatures as we are"[10] reach the true happiness and liberty? Locke, from the beginning, gives a positive answer to this question and all the amendments he makes especially in the second edition can be seen as an elaboration of his previous answer, without any change in his basic premise: all human actions, in the most general sense, are directed toward happiness. Locke, throughout various editions, always preserves the happiness-orientation of his conception of morality and liberty. But in the second edition, he deep-

4 *E*: 253, § 35 (**II**, **IV**, **V**).

5 Locke defines good and bad (he mostly says "evil") with reference to happiness and to the degrees of pleasure and pain. But his doctrine of happiness, besides its egoistic and hedonist aspects, also includes the theme of blessedness based on the possibility of eternal happiness hereafter. I will discuss Lockean conceptions of good and evil, and of happiness later in detail.

6 Locke introduces this doctrine in added sections starting from the section 47.

7 A terminological remark: Locke uses "liberty" and "freedom", "being at liberty" and "being free" synonymously.

8 "If we look upon those *superior Beings* above us, who enjoy perfect Happiness, we shall have reason to judge that they are more steadily *determined in their choice of Good* than we. […] God himself cannot choose what is not good" (*E*: 265, § 49 (**II**, **IV**, **V**); *E*: 254-5, § 31 (**I**)).

9 *E*: 268, § 53 (**II**, **IV**, **V**).

10 *E*: 265, § 49 (**II**, **IV**, **V**); *E*: 255, § 31 (**I**).

ens (rather than shifting) the discussion so as to deal with the passion aspect ("desire" and "uneasiness") more in detail. In this paper, I will discuss Locke's answer to the question of human liberty and try to show the dependence of this answer on his main moral problem, that is, as I noted before, the reconciliation of our passionate and intellectual natures, and consequently, the reconciliation of our abilities and our duties without referring to innate moral principles. From this perspective, the differences between the first and the second editions will be regarded as a continuation and elaboration of the treatment of this fundamental problem, rather than as a sign of a totally new account. But before all these, let me mention an important occasion behind Locke's revision of the chapter "Of Power".

Background of the Revision

After the first edition was published in 1689, Locke did not give up studying on his *Essay* and also wished to take his friends' comments into consideration in the preparation of the next edition. He particularly "desire[d] [William Molyneux's] advise and assistance".[11] During their correspondence, Molyneux made various contributions on several matters and concerning Locke's account of liberty, he wrote in his letter dated 22 December 1692 that he found it "requiring some farther explication".[12] The objection he made seems to be connected to the problem of evil and moral responsibility: "you seem to make all sins to proceed from our understandings, or to be against conscience, and not at all from the depravity of our wills. Now it seems harsh to say, that a man shall be damn'd, because he understands no better than he does."[13] As the quotation above from the "Epistle to the Reader" shows, Locke took seriously this short but critical comment coming from his friend. Or rather, it should be said that, Molyneux well touched on the points in the first version of the chapter "Of Power" with which Locke seemed to have been not fully satisfied. As we will see, this dissatisfaction led him to a more detailed inspection into the nature of the determination of the will. What was this dissatisfaction about? He confessed it in his first reply to his friend's comment:

> I own freely to you the weakness of my understanding, that though it be unquestionable that there is omnipotence and omniscience in God our maker, and I cannot have a clearer perception of any thing, than that I am free, yet I cannot make freedom in man consistent with omnipotence and omniscience in God, though I am as fully as perswaded of both as of any truths I most firmly assent to. And therefore I have long since given off the consideration of

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[11] Locke's letter to Molyneux of 20 September 1692 in *Some Familiar Letters between Mr. Locke, and Several of His Friends* – hereafter *L* – (London: A. J. Churcill, 1708), p. 7. Accessible from http://www.archive.org/details/somefamiliarlett00lockuoft.

[12] *L*: 15 (The Arabic number refers to the page).

[13] *Ibid*.

> that question, resolving all into this short conclusion, That if it be possible for God to make a free agent, then man is free, though I see not the way of it.[14]

On the one hand human freedom and on the other hand the omnipotence and omniscience of God. To put it in other words, on the one hand "the ability to act *in one's own power*", and on the other hand "being *under the divine power*". If God foreknows and has a power to predetermine everything, how could it be possible for a man to act freely by following his own judgments? Moreover, a passage from the *Essay*, where Locke denies that there are innate moral principles, shows that divine determination is not the only one that preoccupies his mind. The coexistence of human liberty and natural or mechanistic determination is also another difficulty to explain.[15] If everything is necessarily determined by an antecedent cause, then how could we say that a man has a power to act or not to act, according to his own preference? Thus, whether divine or natural, the consistency of determination in general with the human freedom seems to remain problematic for Locke. Yet, since the human freedom is an unquestionable conviction for him, he puts his efforts to prove that they are not in fact contradictory. I hold the view that, in order to do it, he will adopt a position which implies a distinction between these two kinds of determination, divine and natural, and try to show that human freedom is not incompatible with either of them but sometimes may conflict with the latter. Then, in the second edition, toward the end of the chapter,[16] he will make a new juxtaposition between the human power to act freely and the divine determination through referring to our intellectual nature. As far as we use our understanding and reason, which are the faculties bestowed on us by God, our freedom and divine determination do not contradict. Hence the real opposition (but not the incompatibility) is between natural determination and human freedom. By our passionate nature, we are under the determination of external objects which arouse desire in us, and as long as we do not consult the guidance of our reason and do not govern our passions, we cannot be really free agents. But in the mean time the desire is an indispensible affection for finite beings like us, and it should be noted that, for Locke, the matter is not negating or suppressing it. As he adds in the second edition, it is the only motive that can immediately determine the will and moves us into action. The only way that could make human freedom possible is, without pretending to deny the force of desire, to

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14 *L*: 27 (20 January 1693).

15 "a great part of Men are so far from finding any such innate Moral Principles in themselves, that by denying freedom to Mankind; and thereby making Men no other than bare Machins, they take away not only innate, but all Moral rules whatsoever, and leave not a possibility to believe any such, to those who cannot conceive, how any thing can be capable of a Law, that is not a free Agent: And upon that ground, they must necessarily reject all Principles of Vertue who cannot *put Morality and Mechanism together*; which are not very easy to be reconciled, or made consistent" (*E*: 76-7, § 14).

16 Between §§ 51-70 (**II**, **IV**, **V**).

put it under the guidance of deliberative faculty, that is, reason. In that case too, the force that moves human beings into action would be a desire but a desire, in a sense, filtered by the directions of reason. For the elaboration of such a doctrine of liberty whose main points I tried to give here, Locke made some additions and alterations that he summarized in a scheme in his letter to Molyneux, dated 15 July 1693:[17]

§ 28. Volition is the ordering of some action by thought.
§ 29. Uneasiness determines the will.
§ 30. *Will* must be distinguish'd from *desire*.
§ 31. The greater good in view barely consider'd determines not the *will.* The joys of heaven are often neglected.
§ 32. Desire determines the will.
§ 33. Desire is an uneasiness.
§ 34. The greatest present uneasiness usually determines the *will*, as is evident in experience.
§ 35. Because uneasiness being a part of unhappiness which is first to be removed in our way to happiness.
§ 36. Because uneasiness alone is present.
§ 37. The uneasiness of other passions have their share with desire.
§ 38. Happiness alone moves the desire.
§ 39. All absent good not desired, because not necessary to our happiness.
§ 40. The greatest uneasiness does not always determines the will, because we can suspend the execution of our desires.

This summary, then, will be the content of modified sections in the second edition (though the exact section titles differ a bit). I will discuss all these changes and other additions in detail in the "Determination of the Will" Section, and do it with reference to the Lockean moral problem: harmonizing (or demonstrating the already given harmony between) what we *can* do *in our power* and what we *ought* to do *under divine power* without any reference to innateness of moral principles. But now, it might be useful to start with the *simple idea of power* itself from which the *complex idea of liberty* is derived.

17 *L*: 47-8.

II

The Idea of Power

Locke states that the idea of power, along with the ideas of thinking and motion, is one of the most modified simple ideas and "out of whose Modifications [are] made most complex Modes".[18] Qualities of bodies and operations of the mind which are called faculties are all related to the idea of power. In the beginning of the chapter "Of Power", Locke explains how we acquire the idea of power, which he classifies as one of the fourth type of simple ideas (simple ideas coming from both sensation and reflection),[19] by referring to the constant change of ideas in our minds.[20] We observe our ideas change, sometimes following the impressions

[18] *E*: 293, § 10.

[19] Locke's rejection of the innate speculative or practical principles depends on the thesis that in order a proposition to be innate, above all, each of its terms of which it is made up must be innate and, as we know, it is impossible for Locke (*E*: 58, §18; 84, § 1). For him, the ideas for which the terms of a proposition stands are not innate but acquired (*E*: 55, § 15). Then, the main question of the *Essay* is to explain how the ideas are acquired and how they gain the complex formation in which they are found in the mind. Locke argues that when the complex formation of all our ideas are properly analyzed, all the complexity can be, in a sense, distilled into its simple parts, in other words, into *simple ideas* which constitute "the Materials of all our Knowledge" (*E*: 119, § 2). We acquire these simple ideas by two ways: *by sensation* and *by reflection* (*E* 117-8, § 24; 119, § 2). We get the ideas of external objects by sensation and have the ideas of internal operations of our minds by thinking. The understanding, furnished at first by the particular *ideas of sensation* (*E*: 55, § 15), "in time, […] comes to reflect on its own *Operations*, about the *Ideas* got by *Sensation*, and thereby stores itself with a new set of *Ideas*, which [Locke] call[s] *Ideas of Reflection*" (*E*: 117-8, § 24). These include "ideas of *Perception*, *Thinking*, *Doubting*, *Believing*, *Reasoning*, *Knowing*, *Willing*" (*E*: 105, § 4) and all other various operations of the mind. Locke remarks that when he uses the term "operation" he takes it in a larger sense comprehending passions such as "satisfaction or uneasiness arising from any thought" (*Ibid.*). He likens our state of mind while having these simple ideas to a mirror; that is, the mind cannot but have these ideas passively as soon as they are presented to it (E: 118, § 25). Unlike simple ideas, complex ideas are the products of Mind's own active thinking power: "when the Understanding is once stored with these simple *Ideas*, it has the Power to repeat, compare, and unite them even to an almost infinite Variety, and so can make at Pleasure new complex *Ideas*" (*E*: 119, § 2). Infinity of complex ideas can be reduced to three groups: complex ideas of modes, complex ideas of substances, and complex ideas of relations (*E*: 164, § 3). As for the simple ideas, Locke classifies them into four groups (*E*: 121, § 1): a) ideas coming from one sense only (light, colors, sounds, taste, smell, touch etc.); b) ideas coming from more than one sense (space, extension, figure, rest and motion); c) ideas coming from reflection only (thinking and volition); d) ideas coming from both sensation and reflection (pleasure and pain, power, existence, and unity). Thus, before coming to the due chapter, Locke already defines the idea of power as a simple idea coming from both sensation and reflection: "*power* also is another of those simple *Ideas*, which we receive from *Sensation and Reflection*. For observing in our selves, that we can, at pleasure, move several parts of our Bodies, which were at rest; the effects also, that natural Bodies are able to produce in one another, occurring every moment to our Senses, we both these ways get the *Idea* of *Power*" (*E*: 131, § 8).

[20] *E*: 233, § 1.

coming from external objects and sometimes following the mind's own choice. From observing this constant change in its ideas, the mind concludes that "the like Changes will for the future be made, in the same things, by like Agents, and by like the ways, considers in one thing the possibility of having any of its simple *Ideas* changed, and in another the possibility of making that change; and so comes by that *Idea* which we call *Power*".[21] This introductory explanation of how we come by the idea of power may be a bit perplexing because it does not seem to be compatible with the previous qualification Locke made concerning simple ideas. In the chapter on simple ideas in general, Locke characterizes them as "uncompounded", containing "*one uniform Appearance*, or Conception in the mind, and not distinguishable into different *Ideas*".[22] Hence, one may expect the idea of power be uncompounded and having one uniform appearance as a simple idea should be. Yet, as the above account of the generation of the idea of power and what Locke says following it shows that the ideas of change, of cause, of effect, and of relation are already implied in the conception of power: "I confess *Power includes in it some kind of relation*, (a relation to Action or Change,) as indeed which of our *Ideas*, of what kind soever, when attentively considered, does not?"[23] Therefore Locke must have something other than uniformity in his mind for regarding especially the idea of power as a simple one. He immediately expresses it in the following lines: "*Idea* […] of *Power* […] may well have a place amongst other simple *Ideas*, and be considered one of them, being one of those, that make a principal *Ingredient*[24] in our complex *Ideas* of Substances."[25] Moreover, in the chapter "Of our Complex *Ideas* of Substances", he admits that at least some ideas of powers, are "not simple *Ideas*, yet […] for brevity's sake, may conveniently enough be reckoned amongst them".[26] Locke, in Chapter iii of Book 2 ("of *Ideas* of one Sense"), has already described the simple ideas as ingredients of complex ideas.[27] So, it is not a new qualification. It seems to me that, at this point, what is behind "for brevity's sake" is important. He gives his account of passing the idea of power for a simple idea for brevity's sake at the end of the same section: "all those Powers, that we take Cognizance of, terminating only in the alteration of some sensible Qualities, in those subjects, on which they operate, and so making them exhibit to us new sensible *Ideas*, therefore it is, that I have reckoned these Powers amongst the simple *Ideas*, which make the complex ones of the sorts of *Substances*; though these Powers, considered in themselves,

21 *Ibid*.
22 *E*: 119, § 1.
23 *E*: 234, § 3.
24 Emphasis added.
25 *Ibid*.
26 *E*: 299, § 7.
27 *E*: 122, § 2.

are truly complex *Ideas*."[28] It means that the powers are "inherent Qualities"[29] in the Subject and they produce some changes in other Subjects. We observe these changes by means of the changes in our simple ideas related to these other subjects. It can be said that since the powers produce changes that can be perceived by us only through the changes in our simple ideas, the idea of power can be also considered a simple idea in this respect. Not the powers themselves but their effects are perceived by us as the changes in our simple ideas.[30]

This general idea of power, in one respect simple and in other not, expresses both the ability to make and the capacity to receive any change; and the first is called *active* and the latter called *passive* power.[31] Yet Locke adds soon after, that what we properly understand by the term "power" should be in fact mainly the active power, because power must be related to action which has only two sorts, namely thinking and motion.[32] Moreover, we acquire such an idea of active power not from the observation of bodies but from that of the operations of our minds.[33] For bodies can neither afford us an idea of thinking nor begin motion by themselves. What they do is merely transferring the motion they receive from other bodies. That is why we receive the clearer "idea of the beginning of motion" from the ideas of reflection on the operations of our minds.

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28 *E*: 299, § 7.

29 *Ibid.*

30 "For we cannot observe any alteration to be made in, or operation upon any thing, but by the observable change of its sensible *Ideas*; nor conceive any alteration to be made, but by conceiving a Change of some of its *Ideas*" (*E*: 233-4, § 1).

31 One of the examples Locke gives to the active and passive powers is this couple: "Fire has a *power* to melt Gold" and "Gold has a *power* to be melted" (*Ibid.*). He later calls passive power as "passive capacity" (*E*: 285, § 72).

32 *E*: 235, § 4.

33 *Ibid.*

III

Human Actions: Voluntary or Free?

Locke builds his account of faculties of the mind on such a conception of active power. Two principal actions of the mind are *thinking* or *perception*[34] and *volition* or *willing*. And the faculties, namely, the *understanding* as the faculty of perception and the *will* as the faculty of volition are nothing but "powers or abilities" exercising these actions.[35] All other operations of the mind (such as "remembrance, discerning, reasoning, judging, knowledge and faith" fall under these two main actions of the mind and constitute various modes of simple ideas of reflection.

According to Locke, any of these actions (most particularly thinking), which are merely the operations or execution of certain powers cannot be the inseparable essence of the mind.[36] Moreover, the status of the mind regarded as a substance would be very vague because the idea of substance (both the idea of material substance and that of immaterial substance) is one of the most obscure and confused ideas and it solely depends on a supposition caused by the incapability of our imagination. Since the mind cannot imagine how some simple ideas can "subsist by themselves", and observe that some of them "go constantly together", it "accustom[s itself] to suppose some *Substratum*, wherein [those simple ideas] do subsist"[37] Thus, for Locke, it is not the case that the mind or the soul is a substance to which thinking belongs as an inseparable attribute. Thinking is the action of the understanding, which is a power of the mind.

Like thinking, willing (volition) is merely an action, an operation of the mind and the faculty carrying out such an action is called the will: "We find in our selves a *Power* to begin or forbear, continue or end several actions[38] of our minds, and

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34 In the chapter on "Perception" he introduces a distinction between thinking and perception. According to this distinction, thinking, like willing, is the proper active power of the mind, because it signifies voluntary attention or consideration of the mind on its ideas. On the other hand, the "bare, naked *Perception*", most of the time, is only a passive capacity of the mind, because "what it perceives, it cannot avoid perceiving" (*E*: 143, § 1). Here one must not confuse passivity with being unaware of the perception. Although our mental state is considered passive with respect to most of the sensual perceptions, for Locke, we are always conscious of them: "whatever alterations made in the Body, if they reach not the Mind; whatever impressions are made on the outward parts, if they are not taken notice of within, there is no Perception" (*Ibid.*).

35 *E*: 128, § 2.

36 "I confess my self, to have one of those dull Souls, that doth not perceive it self always to contemplate *Ideas*, nor can conceive it any more necessary for the *Soul always to think*, than for the Body always to move; the perception of *Ideas* being (as I conceive) to the Soul, what motion is to the Body, not its Essence, but one of its Operations: And therefore, though thinking be supposed never so much the proper Action of the Soul, yet it is not necessary, to suppose, that it should be always thinking, always in Action" (*E*: 108, § 10).

37 *E*: 295, § 1.

38 "Thoughts" in **I**.

motions of our Bodies, barely by a thought or preference of the mind ordering, or as it were commanding the doing or not doing such or such a particular action.[39] This *Power* which the mind has, thus to order[40] the consideration of any *Idea*, or the forbearing to consider it;[41] or to prefer the motion of any part of the body to its rest, and *vice versâ* in any particular instance[42] is that which we call the *Will*."[43] Hence the will is a power and the volition (willing) is the "actual exercise of that power".[44] The completed actions resulting from this exercise is called *voluntary* actions.[45] The idea of liberty arises from the reflection on this will-power. Yet, for Locke "voluntary" and "free" are not the same. He attaches importance to the distinction between voluntary actions and free actions. To say it more clearly, an action may be voluntary but not necessarily free:

> […] so far as a Man has a power to think, or not to think; to move, or not to move, according to the preference or direction of his own mind, so far is a Man *Free*. Where-ever any performance or forbearance are not equally in a Man's power; where-ever doing or not doing, will not equally follow upon the preference of his mind directing it,[46] there he is not *Free*, though perhaps the Action may be voluntary. So that the *Idea of Liberty*, is the *Idea* of a Power in any Agent to do or forbear any particular[47] Action, according to the determination or thought of the mind, whereby either of them is preferr'd to the other; where either of them is not in the Power of the Agent to be produced by him according to his *Volition*, there he is not at *Liberty*,[48] that Agent is under *Necessity*. So that *Liberty* cannot be, where there is no Thought, no Volition, no Will; but there may be Thought, there may be Will, there may be Volition, where there is no *Liberty*.[49]

To illustrate the difference between a voluntary action and a free one, one of the examples Locke gives is that of a man who is, while sleeping, carried into a room where he is locked in. When he wakes up, he sees a person he longs to see and have a conversation. In this case, Locke argues, the man stays in the room willingly, in other words, he prefers his friend's company to getting out; but we cannot say he is free.

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39 "barely by a […] action" in **II**, **IV**, **V**; "barely by the choice or preference of our Minds" in **I**.

40 "This *Power* which […] order" in **II**, **IV**, **V**; "This *Power* the Mind has to prefer" in **I**.

41 "the consideration […] to consider it" in **II**, **IV**, **V**; the consideration of any *Idea* to the not considering" in **I**.

42 "and […] instance" (added in **II**, **IV**, **V)**.

43 *E*: 236, § 5.

44 *E*: 236, § 5 (**II**, **IV**, **V**); "the actual preferring one to another, is that we call *Volition*, or *Willing*" in **I**.

45 *E*: 236, § 5 (**II**, **IV**, **V**).

46 "directing it" (added in **V**).

47 "particular" (added in **V**).

48 "according to his *Volition* […] *Liberty*" in **II**, **IV**, **V**; "according to his preference, there is not *Liberty*" in **I**.

49 *E*: 237-8, § 8.

For the other option, getting out, is not equally possible for him. Though he enjoys it, he *necessarily* stays in the room. Thus for Locke, in order to attribute freedom to someone, both the doing and the not doing of the action must be available for her, even though her preference inclines toward only one of them. Hence, we can say that, if the will is a power to be directed toward or to prefer a particular action,[50] then the liberty is the power to actualize that preference. This definition can be regarded as true only provided that the *not doing of the preferred action* is equally possible for the same person. In other words, liberty, for a person, is the power to do what she wills, only in condition that it is not her sole option. If it is not the case, then she cannot be free but is under necessity. Thus someone who is walking is regarded as being at liberty, not only because she has a power to walk, but because she can stop walking if she wills it.[51]

On the basis of holding such a distinction between volition (and the will as the faculty of volition) and liberty, Locke displaces the question of freedom from the voluntary-involuntary opposition onto the plane of being agency and he finds the question of whether the will is free improper: "it is as insignificant to ask, whether Man's Will be free, as to ask, whether his Sleep be Swift, or his Vertue square: *Liberty* being as little applicable to the *Will*, as swiftness of Motion is to Sleep, or squareness to Vertue. [….] Liberty, which is but a power, belongs only to Agents, and cannot be an attribute or modification of the *Will*, which is also but a Power."[52] Powers can only belong to agents. Since the will and liberty are closely related but distinct powers, then they cannot belong to each other but only to an agent. The will itself is not an agent on its own but can only be a power of an agent. Even it can be said that (though Locke does not say it explicitly) the expression "free will" can be at most an abuse of words, that is, words without clear ideas.[53]

This argumentation seems to imply the *non*-freedom of the will, in other words, that the freedom (or its opposite) simply cannot be attributed to the will (just like squareness to virtue or swiftness to sleep). However, starting from the section 23 in the chapter on power, Locke tends to assert that the will is *not* free. The reason he gives is that one cannot have any alternative state to that of willing, as it is the case when she is free: "*a Man is not at liberty to will, or not to will, because he cannot forbear willing*."[54] Since the liberty is the power not only to act but also not to act and since

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[50] "*Will* in truth, signifies nothing but a Power, or Ability, to prefer or chuse" (*E*: 242, § 17). Although this definition and its several versions are included in the second and later editions, this kind of equation of willing with preference seems to be more faithful to the spirit of the first edition. Starting from the second edition, Locke attaches importance to the nuance between the will and preference. I will return to this matter soon.

[51] *E*: 246, § 24.

[52] *E*: 240, § 14.

[53] *E*: 490, § 2.

[54] *E*: 246, § 24 ("*because we cannot forbear willing*" in **V**; "*any thing in his power, that he once considers of*" in **I**, **II**, **IV**).

the mind has only the power to prefer something, and does not have the power to not prefer anything, willing always occurs under necessity. If liberty means following one's will (as I emphasized before, provided that the not doing of the preferred action is also available), then what does the will follow? For Locke, it is certain – and it is certain right from the first edition –[55] that the will is necessarily determined by something other than itself; and the later amendments mainly made in the second edition do not change this view but aims to give a better account of the complexity of this determination.

Determination of the Will

The major differences between the first and the other editions start with the section 28, in which the volition is redefined. In the first edition, volition (willing) is described as nothing but preferring.[56] Though, as I said before,[57] in later editions too, Locke sometimes uses the word "preference" for explaining volition, starting from the second edition we see an attempt to define it without referring to the word "preferring" and to hold these two separate.[58] Why does Locke make such a revision? Following renewed sections show that Locke makes it, first, in order to separate "desire" (which seems more close to preferring) and "willing", and then to give a more nuanced explanation of the determination of the will, which will help him later to clarify why people, though knowing good, still choose evil.

Before dealing with the new content added in the second edition and with its difference from the first version, let's start with the basic argument that is common to both of them. As I stated in the "Introduction", it is the happiness-orientation of Lockean conceptions of morality and of liberty. The 29th section in the first edition is dedicated to the definitions of happiness, good and evil and to the relationship between them. In the second and other editions, the 41st and the 42nd sections correspond to same content and most of the passages from the previous version are preserved. According to these sections, the main motive that moves human beings is in fact happiness and the happiness is nothing but the highest degree of pleasure.[59]

55 *E*: 248, § 29 (**I**).

56 For example, "*Volition* or *Willing*, regarding only what is in our power, *is* nothing but the *preferring* the doing of any thing, to not the doing of it; Action or Rest, *et contra*" (*E*: 248, § 28 **(I)**).

57 See the 50th footnote.

58 "*Ordering, Directing, Chusing, Preferring, etc.* which I have made use of, will not distinctly enough express *Volition*, unless [the reader] will reflect on what he himself does, when he *wills*. For example, *Preferring* which seems perhaps best to express the Act of *Volition*, does it no precisely. For though a Man would prefer flying to walking, yet who can say he ever *wills* it" (*E*: 240-1, § 15 (**II**, **IV**, **V**)).

59 Here, it should be noted that Locke uses the terms "pleasure" and "pain" in a large sense so as to include pleasures and pains of both the mind and the body (*E*: 248, § 29 (**I**); *E*: 258, § 41 (**II**, **IV**, **V**)). For some degree of pleasure or pain, or more precisely as it was said in the chapter on simple ideas, "*Delight*, or *Uneasiness*" accompanies almost all ideas, both to the ideas of sensation of the affections of the body and to the ideas of reflection on the operations of the mind (*E*: 128 § 2).

Human beings, by their natural inclinations, always have a "desire for Happiness, and an aversion to Misery".[60] And Locke maintains that the ideas of good and bad are formed according to this pleasure-orientation: "what has an aptness to produce pleasure in us, is that we labour for, and is that we call *Good*; and what is apt to produce pain in us, we avoid and call *Evil*."[61] It means that nothing is good/bad in itself but is called as such because of the pleasure/pain it gives to a person; and consequently, the definitions of good and evil have always a relative nature depending on the subjective pursuit of self-interest.

However, Locke will recontextualize this subjective aspect of good and bad into a more universal account. In the chapter on ideas of moral relations (Book 2, Chapter xxviii), he introduces the terms "*morally* good and evil" and there defines them as "the Conformity or Disagreement of our voluntary Actions to some Law".[62] Here the law is not another reference point (other than pleasure and pain) to define what is good and bad, since the respective connections between pleasure and good and between pain and evil are preserved in the following of the section: "Good and Evil is drawn on us [by the Law], from the Will and Power of the Law-maker; which Good and Evil, Pleasure or Pain, attending our observance, or breach of the Law, by the Decree of the Law-maker, is that we call *Reward* and *Punishment*. […] For since it would be utterly in vain, to suppose a Rule set to the free Actions of Man, without annexing to it some enforcement of Good and Evil, to determine his Will, we must, where-ever we suppose a Law, suppose also some Reward or Punishment annexed to that Law".[63] Thus, through the denominations of reward and punishment, the ideas of good and bad based on the degrees of pleasure and pain become articulated with the idea of law.[64] Then the reward of conformity to divine law would be the endless happiness, and the breach of that law would be the endless misery. This tripartite relationship between good/bad, reward/punishment, and law also ensures that the hedonist and egoist aspect of human actions do not conflict with the promises of a universal religious piety. In both cases, Locke claims, human beings move with a certain expectation of pleasure and it does not contradict with morality.

Thus far, I have dwelt on the common hinge on which the first and later versions of the chapter on power turn. Based on this view, Locke, in the first edition, reaches

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60 *E*: 67, § 3.

61 *E*: 249, § 29 (**I**); *E*: 259, § 42 (**II**, **IV**, **V**).

62 *E*: 351, § 5.

63 *Ibid*.

64 Though what most concerns us here is the divine law and religious conceptions of reward and punishment, this articulation can be observed in all three kinds of law that Locke enumerates: *divine law* according to which sin and duty are defined, *civil law* which decides who is criminal and who is innocent, and finally *law of opinion*, according to which virtue and vice are defined (*E*: 352, § 7).

the conclusion that "*the greater Good is that alone which determines the Will.*"[65] After all, if all people pursue happiness and all the means leading to happiness are called good, then the determination of the will by the greater good seems to be consistent with the initial supposition. Yet such a view, as Molyneux pointed in his letter, may be interpreted as implying that someone who chooses evil does it because of her *ignorance* of her highest self-interest (that is, "virtue, piety, and religion"[66]), hence she can hardly be accused of "depravity of will".[67] In fact in the first version, Locke already posits this question: "*How Men come often to prefer the worse to the better;* and to chuse that, which by their own Confession has made them miserable?"[68] And as an answer this question, he holds a distinction between the terms "apparent good" and "real good" and maintains that though in present they are "always the same",[69] a good in present may have some evil consequences in the future. Then to be able to choose the real good (good in the long-term), one must *see* "the remote and concealed Evil"[70] behind an apparent good. This *seeing* is required, though in different degrees, both for a patient being about to decide whether she will accept the painful treatment of a disease and for the pious whose concerns do not terminate in this life.[71] For, the furthest stage of "seeing beyond the present" would be "seeing beyond this world".

However, when the matter is posited as seeing or not seeing the good, the focus inevitably stays on one's *intellectual* power to compare her various advantages, and in this case it would be hard to attribute virtue or vice to her will. This point can be read as one of the major concerns behind Locke's inclusion of an account of the passionate nature in general and of desire or uneasiness in particular to his account of liberty. Consequently, in the second and next editions, we see that the *immediacy* of the determination of the will by "the greater good" becomes problematic and Locke makes such an allowance as follows:

> good, though appearing, and allowed never so great, yet till it has raised desires in our Minds, and thereby made us *uneasie* in its want, it reaches not our *wills*, we are not within the Sphere of its activity; our *wills*, being under the determination only of those *uneasinesses*, which are present to us […] as long as any *uneasiness*, any desire remains in our Mind, there is no room for *good*, barely as such, to come at the *will*, or at all to determine it.[72]

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65 *E*: 251, § 29 (**I**).
66 *E*: 272, § 57 (**II**, **IV**, **IV**).
67 *L*: 15.
68 *E*: 266-7, § 36 (**I**).
69 "Things in their present enjoyment, are what they seem: the apparent and real good, are, in this case, always the same" (*E*: 267-8, § 37 (**I**)).
70 *E*: 271, § 38 (**I**).
71 *E*: 260, § 34 (**I**).
72 *E*: 262-3, § 46 (**II**, **IV**, **V**).

An uneasiness may be a disorder in the body or disquiet of the mind and in both cases it is nothing but a mode of the idea of pain. It can also contain a social content, as Locke calls it, a "fantastical uneasiness"[73] like longing for honor, power or money. Since the elimination of the *present* uneasiness (pain) is the first step toward happiness (toward increasing pleasure), to this uneasiness, a degree of desire always accompanies because, under the present pressure of uneasiness, we are always in want of some ease. Then the desire is "an *uneasiness* of the Mind for want of some absent good [ease]"[74] or following an earlier definition, "the uneasiness a Man finds in himself upon the absence of any thing, whose present enjoyment carries the *Idea* of Delight with it".[75] Even the delight is presently enjoyed, there is always an accompanying desire to continue it, or a fear to lose it.

By taking the passionate aspect into account, Locke becomes able to explain why the mere knowledge of good cannot be so immediately efficient (as it seems to be argued in the first edition) to put human beings into action. Under the aspect of intellect, the comparison of a *future but greater* good and a *present but lesser* good does not lead to a false judgment (choosing evil). For the power of understanding, considered in itself as a power of perception of the connection between ideas, can stay immune to the pressure of present affections. Yet as finite beings, we are always under the pressure of present affections. That is why there occurs a disparity between a present uneasiness and a future (absent) good and the first has more force to determine the will: "absent good may by contemplation be brought home to the mind, and made present. The *Idea* of it indeed may be in the mind, and view'd as present there: but nothing will be in the mind as a present good, able to counter-balance the removal of any *uneasiness*, which we are under, till it raises our desire, and the *uneasiness* of that has the prevalency in determining the will. Till then the *Idea* in the mind of whatever good, is there only like other *Ideas*, the object of bare unactive speculation; but operates not on the will, nor sets us on work."[76] The patient, as long as the future good of the painful treatment (healing) does not arouse *more desire* in her, she would be likely to refuse it. A person who *knows* the eternal joys of Heaven could (at least) be possible, as long as this idea of eternal joy stays as an idea among other ones, as a mere object of contemplation, under the pressure of present passions, she may still easily "commit a sin". Locke's position is that the pressure of a passion cannot be counter-balanced with a mere contemplation. Then what can do this? Another desire, a *counter-desire* toward a future good. In order for our wills to be determined not by a present-apparent good but by a future-real good, the latter should arouse desire in us and this "new"

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73 *E*: 261, § 45 (**II**, **IV**, **V**).
74 *E*: 251, § 31 (**II**, **IV**, **V**).
75 *E*: 230, § 6.
76 *E*: 254-5, § 37 (**II**, **IV**, **V**).

desire should be able to counter-balance (even over-balance, if it is possible) the existing one. Now the matter is not *seeing* the real good but *desiring* it. People move only by the principle of pleasure and even the moral laws that aims to restrain a certain kind of pleasure must offer another kind of it, instead of the unwelcome one: "moral Laws are set as a curb and restraint to these exorbitant Desires, which they cannot be but by Rewards and Punishments, that will over-balance the satisfaction any one shall propose to himself in the breach of the Law."[77] The same track of argumentation could be followed for the sanctions of divine law but here, as we will see in the next section of this paper, since its penalties or rewards concern the very long future, referring to a nature other than passionate (which moves only by the *present* pressure of pleasure and pain), to an ability to make sound conjectures about the future on the basis of given facts, would be required. And this faculty is nothing but reason whose operation is "deducing unknown Truths from Principles or Propositions, that are already known."[78]

Suspension of Desire: "Liberty of Intellectual Beings"

Above I have emphasized that the only counter-balancing force against a present uneasiness would be another uneasiness and desire. This is one part of the main assertion developed by Locke after the first edition. Yet in order this counter-desire to be efficient, before the will is determined to an action, the present desire must be *suspended* so as to make room for due consideration. And this point completes the revision made for the second edition. Locke thinks that this due consideration could raise a new desire which is needed to counter/overbalance the present one whose pursuit may give pleasure at the moment but be evil for the future and inconsistent with the real happiness in the long-term: "By a due consideration and examining any good proposed, it is in our power, to raise our desires, in a due proportion to the value of that good, whereby in its turn, and place, it may come to work upon the *will* and be pursued".[79] The faculty which can evaluate the value of proposed future good is the faculty of reason. Like our passionate nature, our intellectual power is also native in us and all the moral laws, none of which, Locke claims, are innate, are inferred by this faculty.[80] The Lockean reason, apart from its role in the extension of speculative knowledge, concerning moral actions of human beings, is not a faculty detached from the pursuit of happiness.[81] We should suspend our present desires

77 *E*: 75, § 13.

78 *E*: 51-2, § 9.

79 *E*: 262, § 46 (**II**, **IV**, **V**).

80 "Moral Principles require Reasoning and Discourse, and some Exercise of the Mind, to discover the certainty of their Truth. They lie not open as natural Characters ingraven on the Mind […] It may suffice, that these moral Rules are capable of Demonstration: and therefore it is our own faults, if we come not to a certain Knowledge of them" (*E*: 66, § 1).

81 In the chapter "Of Reason", where the original role of the faculty of reason, both in the enlargement

before the will is determined by them and deliberate on the consequences of our prospective actions not for any other end but for our happiness. That is why the matter for Locke is the *suspension* of desires and *not* the *suppression* of them. Moreover, the matter under consideration is the suspension of *a particular* desire and not the desire in general. For the pleasantness or unpleasantness accompanying any sort of action cannot be annihilated but may be altered by the "contemplation of [its] end".[82] Thus, by introducing the doctrine of suspension of desire in the second edition, Locke does not offer any other thing to determine the will, instead of the uneasiness or desire. Nor he now argues that the deliberative faculty can directly determine the will. On the contrary, what he emphasizes is that the deliberative faculty makes us able to see that the present desire may not be the *only* good and there may be also *other* good*s* which may equally be objects of our desire. Hence what our reason provides us with is, in a sense, an ability of seeing the "whole picture", that is, of examining the present desire "on all sides, and weigh[ing] [it] with others".[83] Locke considers the ability of suspension of desire the real liberty of intellectual beings.[84] Liberty is "a Power to do or not to do; to do, or forbear doing as we *will*"[85] but with the doctrine of suspension of desire, Locke attempts to show that this power can be exercised under the guidance of reason too. And if an agent, using her own native intellectual abilities makes the determination of her will follow the direction of this guide, she can be considered a truly free agent.

As I noted before in various occasions, this doctrine of suspension of desire is added in the second edition. By doing this, Locke may, at first sight, seem to reemphasize the intellectual aspect in the determination of the will, as it is the case in the first edition according to which the will is determined by the knowledge of good. Yet the explanation provided in the later editions gives a more comprehensive account of the tension between two natures human beings have, and consequently, of the possible reconciliation between desire and reason. With the help of the conceptions of desire and suspension of it, as far as I can see, Locke aims to realize two things: firstly, he shows, within the limits of his account, that someone who chooses the evil "could

of our knowledge and in the regulation of our assents is explained, Locke says that the exercise of reason is required to discover and order the connection between the ideas and then to draw the certainty or probability looked for. The *source* of all material of knowledge is "outward sensation" and (in part) "inward perception" but the extension of knowledge depends on the *discursive* exercise of the faculty of reason which is inborn in all human beings (*E*: 668-70, § 1-4). In addition to this, the faculty of reason has also a *deliberative* role in the conduct of life, in the regulation of human actions. Thus the *same* faculty plays two roles, one speculative and the other practical. Yet the matter is more complex in the latter because the pursuit of happiness gets involved.

82 *E*: 280, § 69 (**II, IV, V**).

83 *E*: 263, § 47 (**II, IV, V**).

84 *E*: 266-7, § 52 (**II**, **IV**, **V**).

85 *E*: 270, § 56 (**V**). Compare to the definition of the liberty in *E*: 237-8, § 8 (quoted previously in the 10th page).

have done otherwise".[86] For human beings are not "beasts" having only passionate nature but they are rational creatures and the suspension of desire is an act which they are capable of. Hence choosing evil cannot be seen anymore as only arising from the lack of sufficient knowledge but in fact it depends on the pressure of the present uneasiness which can be suspended: "That which most commonly causes [wrong judgments], is the prevalency of some present Pleasure or Pain,[87] heightened by our feeble passionate Nature, as most strongly wrought on by what is present. To check [the] Precipitancy [in our judgments], our Understanding and Reason was given us, if we will make a right use of it, to search, and see, and then judge thereupon"[88] As rational beings, we can reflect upon infinite happiness and upon our duties to reach it, and someone who does not it can be condemned for not using the opportunity of consulting her rational abilities properly. In virtue of this articulation of the right use of reason with the prevention of wrong actions, it will be possible to attribute vice or virtue to the will. The "feeble" passionate nature cannot be denied, yet neither can be the intellectual nature. Secondly, by defining the liberty with reference to the power of suspending desire and to the guidance of reason, a reconciliation of "what we can do" and "what we ought to do" in the pursuit of happiness will be possible: "during *suspension* of any desire, before the *will* be determined to the action, and the action […] done, we have opportunity to examine, view, and judge, of the good or evil of what we are going to do; and when, upon due *Examination*, we have judg'd, *we have done our duty, all that we can*, *or ought to do*,[89] in pursuit of our happiness; and this is not a fault but a perfection of our nature to desire, will, and act according to the last result of a fair *Examination*."[90]

IV

Conclusion

In this paper I have tried to examine the evolution of the Lockean idea of liberty from its appearance in the first edition of the *Essay* up to its development in later editions. I started with an account of the idea of power from which, Locke claims, the idea of liberty is derived. If we follow his doctrine of ideas and his assertion that all complex ideas can be decomposed into their simplest ingredients, the main issue seems to be giving account of the very simple ideas themselves, and as I have tried to show, in the instance of the idea of power, this is not so simple. Secondly, the difference Locke puts between voluntary actions and free ones is discussed because

86 *E*: 673, § 4 (**IV**, **V**).
87 "or Pain" added in **II**, **IV**, **V**.
88 *E*: 278, § 67 (corresponds to § 44 in **I**).
89 Emphasis added.
90 *E*: 263-64, § 47 (**II**, **IV**, **V**).

this theme is one of the characteristic features of his account of liberty. On the basis of such a distinction, he declares that the question of *free will* is an improper one. Following this, the question of determination of the will, and the "different" answers Locke gives in the succession of editions are introduced. Finally the principle of suspension of desire as the condition of moral liberty is discussed.

While dealing with these issues, my aim was to focus on the connection between Locke's main moral problem and the changes he made in the chapter "of Power" especially for the second edition and to show the dependence of the latter on the former. His main moral problem was that without referring to the doctrine of innateness of moral principles how the natural abilities of human beings can be reconciled with their moral duties. And I tried to show, Locke builds his positive answer to this question on the basis of his doctrine of suspension of desire and of right use of reason. For discussing all these, I made a comparative study on the editions of the *Essay* itself, and consequently did not mention Locke's political works which also include a substantive account of human freedom. While closing the paper, I wish to note briefly some common points concerning the idea of liberty between the *Essay* and the *Two Treatises of Government*. Certainly here is not the place to exhibit all of them but I will touch those which could serve as additional evidence in favor of the view I adopted, that is, the doctrines of "desire and uneasiness" and of "suspension of desire" were not a new account. The *Two Treatises of Government* was published in 1689[91] (but most of it was written between 1679 and 1681).[92] It can be said that here Locke puts "the right use of reason" into the foundation of civil society: "we are born free, as we are born rational"[93] and in the state of nature we have the "perfect freedom", that is, the "uncontrolled enjoyment of all the rights and privileges of the law of nature".[94] But we quit this state and unite into a civil society.[95] Why do we do this? Why do we quit such an unrestricted liberty and enter into the bonds of civil laws? Locke claims that we quit the enjoyment of our natural liberty for the *better* preservation of our property (our "lives, liberties and estates"[96]) which is, in the state of nature, always under the threat of invasion of others. Then as rational beings, we deliberate on our *present* and *future* advantages and this due consideration raises a desire in us to give consent to being a member of a civil society for our main end (a secure and comfortable life). Thus, in the foundation of body politic lies the rational deliberation and more importantly

91 The first edition of the *Essay* was published in the same year.

92 Ian Shapiro, "Introduction: Rethinking Locke Today" to John Locke's *Two Treatises of Government and a Letter Concerning Toleration* –hereafter *TT*–, ed. I. Shapiro (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2003), p. x.

93 *TT*: 125, § 61.

94 *TT*: 136, § 87.

95 *TT*: 141-2, § 95.

96 *TT*: 155, § 123.

the suspension of present pleasure ("being absolute lord of his own person and possessions"[97]). Furthermore, though Locke does not use the term "uneasiness" in the *Treatises*, I see a strong connection between the idea of uneasiness in the *Essay* (where he describes it as "the chief […] spur to humane Industry"[98] and the ideas of labor and of appropriation in the *Treatises*, both of which depend on the conception of a *desire* toward enlarging possessions.[99]

97 *TT*: 154, §123.
98 *E*: 230, § 6 (**II, IV**, **V**).
99 TT: 146-7, § 106-8.

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