



VERTICAL COLLECTIVISM, FAMILY-CONSCIOUSNESS AND URBANIZATION IN TURKEY

TÜRKİYE'DE DİKEY TOPLULUKÇULUK, AİLECİLİK VE ŞEHİRLEŞME

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Abstract

Urban living offers conveniences which reduce the need to rely on family and close friends. The current paper tested the urbanization hypothesis, which is that residents of urban areas will be more individualistic and less collectivistic than rural residents. Individualism, collectivism and family-consciousness were assessed in college students in several Turkish cities and one US city (Boston). Urbanization co-varied most strongly not with individualism, but with low values of vertical collectivism, which is the tendency to subordinate personal goals to those of in-group authority figures, and with family-consciousness (communalism within the family group). family-consciousness and vertical collectivism were less frequently endorsed in larger urban areas compared to rural areas. These associations provide a foundation for asking more specific questions about what aspects of urban living (e.g., income, education, religious belief, less frequent co-residence with family) influence collectivist values.

Key Words: individualism, collectivism, modernization, cross-cultural psychology

Öz

Şehir yaşamı insanlara, ailelerine ve yakın arkadaşlarına güvenme ihtiyacını azaltan kolaylıklar sunmaktadır. Bu araştırmada büyük şehirde yaşayanların kırsalda yaşayanlara göre daha bireyselci ve daha az toplulukçu olacağını öne süren şehirleşme hipotezi sınanmıştır. Bireyselcilik, toplulukçuluk ve ailecilik Türkiye'nin birkaç şehrinde ve bir ABD şehrindeki (Boston) üniversite öğrencileri arasında ölçülmüştür. Şehirleşmenin bireyselcilikten çok grup içi otorite figürlerinin bireysel amaçların önüne geçmesi olarak tanımlanan dikey toplulukçuluğun ve aileciliğin (aile içi toplumsalcılıkla) düşük düzeyleri ilişkili olarak değiştiği bulgulanmıştır. Ailecilik ve dikey toplulukçuluk kırsal alanlara nazaran, geniş kentsel alanlarda daha az kabul görmektedir. Bu ilişkiler, şehir yaşamının hangi özelliklerinin (gelir düzeyi, eğitim düzeyi, dini inanç, aileyle yaşamının pek tercih edilmemesi) toplulukçu değerleri etkilemesine ilişkin daha spesifik sorular sormak için bir temel oluşturmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: bireyselcilik, toplulukçuluk, modernleşme, kültürlerarası psikoloji.

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Introduction

An enduring observation in cross-cultural psychology is that individualism is a hallmark of modern, developed regions (especially North America, Europe and Australia) while collectivism characterizes the rest of the world, particularly developing nations (e.g., Hofstede, 1980; Nisbett, 2004; Hui & Triandis, 1986; Triandis, 1989, 1995). Researchers have sought to establish the exceptions and limits to this generalization, and to explain why a specific mixture of individualist and collectivist values has developed in a particular geographical area, society or subculture (e.g., Freeman, 1997; Kashima, Kokubo, Kashima, Boxall, Yamaguchi, & Macrae, 2004; Sinha & Tripathi, 1994).

An example of an exception to the well known, broad generalization comes from a meta-analysis of work on individualism and collectivism (Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002). Americans, usually considered to be individualistic, scored higher than other groups on scales measuring classic aspects of collectivism, including relational interdependence, sense of belonging to in-group, and seeking others' advice. However, there was one type of collectivism on which Americans scored lower than other samples. This is the feeling of duty toward the in-group, a key part of vertical collectivism.

Horizontal and vertical varieties of individualism and collectivism have been developed by Triandis and colleagues (Singelis, Triandis, Bhawuk, & Gelfand, 1995; Triandis & Gelfand, 1998), with vertical meaning hierarchical and horizontal meaning egalitarian (see also Cukur, De Guzman, & Carlo, 2004; Nelson & Shavitt, 2002). Horizontal collectivism is similar to relational collectivism and interdependence (as studied by, for example, Kashima et al., 2004). Vertical collectivism involves accepting hierarchy and being willing to subordinate one's own needs to the demands of in-group authority figures. A second example comes from the study of competitiveness between and within 20 countries (Green, Deschamps & Paez, 2005). Competitiveness has been thought to be an aspect of individualism (Triandis, 1995). Triandis et al. (1988) included it as a part of vertical individualism because people who are competitive accept hierarchy and the unequal distribution of resources resulting when some individuals gain status by competing more effectively than others (Triandis et al., 1988). However, Green et al. (2005) found that respondents from Western nations were often less competitive than those from non-Western nations. To understand this, note that one can compete in order to win for oneself, or one can compete against an out-group in order to

secure resources or status to share with one's in-group. A lack of resources, common in less wealthy non-Western cultures, favors a competitive personality in order to secure resources for kin and allies. A second explanation is that competitiveness interferes with on-going friendship seeking and maintenance. These activities may be more necessary in Western countries, because of fewer prescribed social roles and greater mobility. This means that individuals must work harder to join voluntary associations. A competitive personality can interfere with social relatedness goals (Green et al., 2005), with the result that horizontal collectivism can be higher in cities compared to rural regions.

Cross-cultural researchers use the terms idiocentrism and allocentrism to refer to the personality-level values corresponding to individualism and collectivism respectively. However, the cultural scenarios administered in the current paper are scored using the terms HI, HC, VI and VC, for Horizontal individualism (HI), Vertical collectivism (VC), etc. For descriptive convenience, we will use the labels individualism and collectivism interchangeably with idiocentrism and allocentrism.

Is modernization inevitably accompanied by individualism?

A long-standing question has been whether individualist and egalitarian orientations necessarily accompany modernization (Alwin, 1989; Inkeles, 1969; Hofstede, 1980; Reykowski, 1994). Modernization theory emerged in the 1960s (Inkeles, 1966) to refer to democratic nation-states, free markets, freedom of speech, decrease of religious influence, urbanization, and the nuclear family. A key proposal was that modernization requires changes in values and attitudes, including a shift towards individualism (see discussion in Camilleri & Malevska-Peyre, 1997; Hwang, 2005).

Modern nations are also highly urban areas. City dwellers usually have bank accounts, childcare centers, and 24-hour convenience stores. This infrastructure allows contemporary Americans and Europeans to be maximally self-sufficient and able to forego developing networks of reciprocal support relations. The resulting economic self-reliance means that hedonism, concern for the self, and competition with others do not incur social and practical costs. Members of traditional societies must rely on family and in-groups for daily needs and for support during emergencies. Maintaining these reciprocal alliances pushes members of traditional societies towards collectivism.

An implication of the modernization view is that collectivist cultures will adopt individualist values as they modernize and begin to interact with the cultural products that allow individual self-sufficiency (Alwin, 1989; Reykowski, 1994; Singelis, Triandis, Bhawuk, & Gelfand, 1995). Consistent with this, Triandis, McCusker, & Hui (1990) wrote "there appears to be a shift from collectivism to individualism in many parts of the world" (p. 1008), and Hofstede argued that increases in national wealth mediate this shift (Hofstede, 1991, pp. 77-78).

The convergence hypothesis is that industrialization and urbanization will eliminate cultural differences (Kerr, Dunlop, Harbison, & Myers, 1960). Some scholars have proposed that convergence will occur due to the economic aspects of modernization (Fu & Chi-Yue, 2007). Labor specialization, impersonal markets, and monetization of exchange relationships will plausibly lead to changes in political/social dimensions, urbanization, education, greater secularization, and mass communication. The result may be a reduction in cultural differences as societies around the world become more similar due to possessing similar economies, with cultural homogenization then being exacerbated through global marketing, migration, and travel.

These ideas about modernization and consequent changes in values have been contested by several authors (see review in Hwang, 2005), perhaps most forcefully by Kağıtçıbaşı (1996a, 1997). She notes that the values underlying cross-cultural differences in individualism and collectivism predate the modern era. For example, the countries of Western Europe, especially England, had individualistic traditions dating back to agrarian times (Razi, 1993). These included widespread peasant mobility (low ties to the land) and low family cohesiveness, as evidenced by the practice of sending children to work as servants in other people's homes.

Kağıtçıbaşı noted that all humans have needs for autonomy and relatedness, although society's infrastructure and technology can certainly influence these needs. She proposed that modernization will lead to a blend of autonomy and relatedness, in which adherence to group norms become less important than pursuing individual goals. She thus agrees that modernization provides freedom to assert individual autonomy, but economic self-sufficiency does not invariably lead to isolation or lack of concern for close relations. Individuals will be free to search for and cultivate the strong relations with family and chosen friends necessary for fulfilling human psychological needs for intimacy and companionship.

Consistent with Kagitcibasi's position, studies of cultural change have not supported the convergence hypothesis or the view that modernization increases individualism (Hwang, 2005). Japan has high levels of personal wealth and technological development, but Japanese culture continues to value hierarchy and authority, obedience towards superiors, inequality of men and women, and sexual propriety (Bond, 1991). Much discussion about cultural change involves the special case of China (Yang, 1996) and whether modernization will result in the loss of Chineseness. Chineseness includes the central values of devotion to family, political disinterest, technical mastery, educational achievement, pragmatism and belief in a balanced way of life (Bond, 1991).

The modernization hypothesis is difficult to test empirically because if two allegedly modern societies continue to differ in culture products or the results of personality sales, one could claim that one society has had more time to modernize than the other. A fruitful avenue is to test how idiocentrism and allocentrism vary with demographic factors that are part of modernization, such as education, family structure and urbanization.

This is the approach taken in this paper. We investigated whether idiocentrism is greater in more urban areas and whether allocentrism is greater in rural regions. Relevant prior work is reviewed in the next section.

Prior work on the demographic correlates of idiocentrism and allocentrism

Anecdotes abound about how residents of small towns are more oriented towards community and family, and less oriented towards individual achievement. These intuitions have gathered considerable empirical support (Conway, Ryder, Tweed, & Sokol, 2001). In the U.S., collectivism is strongest in the Deep South and weakest in highly urban regions (Vandello & Cohen, 1999). In Greece, Georgas (1989) found that individualist values were stronger, and collectivist values weaker, for students residing in a large metropolitan area (Athens) compared to students from rural communities.

These findings support Triandis' assertion that urban residence should co-occur with individualism at the cross-cultural level of analysis (Triandis, 1988; 1995). Triandis' reasons were those touched on above: the self-sufficiency provided by urban infrastructures and the way that the cultural complexity of urban environments facilitates voluntary association.

The urbanization hypotheses received only mixed support in Freeman's (1997) comprehensive analysis of what demographic variables correlated with idiocentrism vs. allocentrism. Idiocentrism was stronger in more urban areas than in less urban areas, as predicted. However, allocentrism varied primarily with income, and did not vary with urbanization once income had been statistically controlled. Consistent with this income finding, in Korea, low income was associated with a strong orientation towards social networks (Han & Choe, 1994). Freeman's finding about the role of income supports Triandis' assertion that affluence should be a key factor in promoting individualism, even in highly collectivist societies, because people do not need to rely on others for either daily needs or as insurance against an emergency (Triandis, 1988; Triandis, 1995).

Kashima and colleagues compared endorsement of the collective self, relational self and autonomous self for residents of metropolitan areas and residents of less urban areas (what they called regional cities). In both Japan and Australia, the collective self was less important for those in highly urban areas (Kashima et al., 2004). Kashima et al. (2004) speculated that the force of urbanism may have a universal effect on reducing the collective side of the social self, but the relational self will vary depending on other factors. That is, urban life can promote relational interdependence because people have to work harder to have relationships (because of high mobility and eradication of socially prescribed roles). The impersonal nature of urban life may also cause people to withdraw into their autonomous selves.

These findings indicate that we should expect some differences in values based on urbanization. Whether individualist values or collectivist values will be most influenced is not clear.

In the two studies reported here, we tested the urbanization hypothesis by comparing idiocentrism and allocentrism among students who were reared in rural vs. urban areas of Turkey. Studying university students allowed us to keep educational level constant across samples.

We choose to study Turkey, long considered a collectivistic country (Kağıtçıbaşı, 1997; Oyserman et al., 2002; Kara, 2007), because it is undergoing rapid modernization. Compared to Turkish families in 1975, Kağıtçıbaşı and Ataca (2005) found that contemporary high-income, urban Turks wanted greater independence for their children, and regarded their children as providing psychological value to them as parents, rather than economic value. The

authors ascribe these changes to the economic growth and educational opportunities in Turkey of the last 3 decades. Other researchers have noted that Turkish culture blends individualism and collectivism, with the importance of the family unit being particularly strong in rural areas (Kara, 2007; Mango, 2004).

Study 1: Three areas in Turkey varying in urban density

We tested the urbanization hypothesis by measuring idiocentrism and allocentrism among college students residing in rural areas in the central Anatolian region (Nigde) and eastern Turkey (Van), and students residing in urban areas along Turkey's western coast (the cities of Izmir, Edirne and Istanbul). Nigde and Van, with populations of 877,524 and 348,081, were chosen as our rural sample following prior work by Kağıtçıbaşı (1982), who classified these as rural areas in her study of the value of children. Kağıtçıbaşı confirmed (personal communication with the first author, 2008) that these areas would also be considered rural today. In contrast, Izmir and Edirne are cities located in densely populated areas; Izmir, population, 3,370,866 is on the Mediterranean coast while Edirne, population 402,606, is on the European continent and shares a border with Bulgaria. Istanbul is a large, cosmopolitan city whose residents have a strong sense of their proximity to Europe. This international city may foster individualism in its residents and attract migrants from the rest of Turkey who are comfortable with an individualistic life-style. We also sampled students living in Boston to test our assumption that college students in Istanbul are the group within Turkey whose mix of idiocentrism and allocentrism is most similar to American students.

Prior writers have urged cross-cultural psychologists to examine individualism and collectivism in samples within a country, rather than just comparing between nations (Cukur et al., 2004; Kağıtçıbaşı, 1997; Oyserman, et al., 2002), and the current research fills this gap.

Gender was included as a predictor variable, given current controversies on the influence of gender. Triandis (1995) reported that females are frequently more collectivist than males, but Kashima et al. (1995) did not find this. Using an attitudinal scale with a unidimensional construct of idiocentrism and allocentrism, Shafiro, Himelein, and Best (2003) found American women to be more collectivistic than women from a modernizing region, the Ukraine, which has been believed to be collectivistic. Our primary aim was to test the hypothesis that collectivist values would be stronger in rural areas and individualistic values

stronger in urban areas. We additionally tested whether females would endorse stronger collectivist values than males.

Method

Participants. Students were recruited from 4 geographical areas: Boston, USA; Istanbul; western urban Turkey; and eastern rural Turkey. There were 131 students from Boston University (87 females, 34 males), 219 students (135 females, 84 males) from Istanbul (Istanbul University and Mimar Sinan University), 318 students (209 females, 109 males) from the western urban cities of Izmir (Ege University) and Edirne (Trakya University), and 381 students (146 females and 235 males) from two universities in eastern rural Turkey (Van Yuzuncu Yıl University and Nigde University).

Groups comprised convenience samples. Students volunteered in exchange for psychology course credit; all students who wished to participate were included. Turks who have grown up in Istanbul may attend university in rural areas because admissions standards are less stringent; students from rural areas may choose to enroll at an urban university in order to experience urban life. For this reason, when recruiting participants, we specified that individuals had to have lived continuously in that area since early childhood. More females were available to participate in the study in all geographical regions except the rural East of Turkey, where our sample of males was larger. In the rural areas, males attend university at higher rates than females, and thus males outnumber females even in college classes such as psychology that typically attract female students. Most students were in their first two years of college (age 18-20). Mean education across all groups was similar (13.0-13.5 years of education). Participants also reported number of siblings, and age and years of education of mother and father.

While interacting with students during questionnaire administration, signs of poverty were visible among the students in Van and Nigde, such as wearing tattered shoes with holes. During informal discussions, our respondents chatted about the challenges facing them as students, including living in a small house with many siblings, lacking a quiet place to study, lacking money for the bus and thus enduring a lengthy walk from home to school. In contrast, students in Izmir, Edirne and Istanbul did not mention these problems and appeared to have a more comfortable middle-class lifestyle. These observations are consistent with median income levels in the cities (2001 data, the most recently available from the Turkish

government (TUIK, 2001). Incomes for Nigde (\$1781) and Van (\$859) were substantially lower than for Istanbul (\$3063) and the cities of the urban West of Turkey (\$3215 and \$2403 for Izmir and Edirne).

Materials. We administered the 17 Cultural Orientation Scenarios from Triandis et al. (1988; Triandis & Gelfand, 1998; also described in Chirkov, Lynch, & Niwa, 2005)¹. Participants were instructed to circle the response that was the best fit to them. An example, with labels underlined on the left of each response, is:

In your opinion, in an ideal society, national budgets will be determined so that:

Horizontal Individualism (HI) People can feel unique and self-actualized.

Horizontal Collectivism (HC) All people have adequate incomes to meet basic needs.

Vertical Individualism (VI) Some people will be rewarded for making brilliant contributions.

Vertical Collectivism (VC) There will be maximum stability, law and order.

Using the Cultural Orientation Scenarios avoids the problem of response sets (meaning respondents have a bias to respond high or low or to avoid extremes) because participants choose one of 4 responses rather than rating the strength of their agreement.

The Turkish translation of the scenarios was performed by the first author and has been used in two prior studies of Istanbul residents (Ayçiçeği-Dinn & Caldwell-Harris, 2011; Caldwell-Harris & Ayçiçeği, 2006).

Results and Discussion

Data analysis. The scenarios were scored to yield 4 percentages corresponding to the percent of the scenarios for which respondents endorsed the HI, HC, VI, or VC choice. Residents of the cities of the urban west responded similarly, as did residents of the rural east, allowing us to average over cities in a geographical region, resulting in 4 geographical regions to be compared (see Table 1). Each of the four subscales of the scenarios were separately analyzed with a 4 way ANCOVA, with age, years of education, and gender entered as covariates (see Baron, 1996, for discussion of using parametric tests on ipsative scales). Pairwise comparisons were tested with the post-hoc Scheffe test. Table 1 lists the scores for the 4 subscales for each of the geographical/cultural region, and F values and statistical significance

for the ANCOVA conducted on each subscale. Gender effects are noted when significant but discussion is withheld until the General Discussion.

Table 1: Percent Choice for Cultural Orientations Scenarios in three regions in Turkey and Boston (Study 1)

	BOSTON (N=121)		ISTANBUL (N=219)		TURK. URBAN (N=318)		TURK. RURAL (N=381)		CITY F(3,1032)	GENDER F(1,1032)
HI	45	=	43	>	39	>	35	21.8**	females higher, F=27.1 except for Boston	
HC	28	>	23	=	25	=	25	7.4**	females lower, F=44.8** except for Boston	
VI	20	=	19	=	18	=	18	1.3	no differences	
VC	7	<	15	<	18	<	22	86.5**	females higher, F=4.1* except no dif. for Istanbul, Boston	

Table notes. HI, HC, VI, VC values are percent of choices and thus sum to 100%. **= $p < .001$, *=.04

As shown in Table 1, regions were similar in that horizontal individualism was the most frequently selected choice. The strongest difference in choices between the four geographical regions concerned vertical collectivism (VC). Boston residents made the fewest VC choices, with increasingly more VC choices made by Istanbul residents, residents of the Turkish urban west, and the Turkish rural dwellers. Indeed, VC choices were sufficiently high for the rural group that they showed a different order of frequency of choices (HI > HC > VC > VI). Horizontal individualism is the response option whose percentage increased to compensate for decrease in VC with increasing urbanization. This suggests that residents of denser urban areas continue to respect authority figures (the vertical, or "V" component) who are from the in-group (collectivism, or "C" component), but those in the more densely populated west resemble Boston college students and value egalitarianism (the horizontal or "H" component) with independence (individualism, "I"). This means that what is associated with larger population density is not simply a broad increase in individualism, but a specific decrease in one type of collectivism, vertical collectivism, and a concomitant increase in egalitarian individualism.

A small main effect of age occurred across all regions in VI, $F(1,1032)=4.5$, $p < .05$. Vertical individualism includes tolerance for inequality resulting from individual competition. The increase in VI with age is consistent with trends reported by Triandis (1995). Education was never significant as a covariant, presumably because education was highly similar across respondents, and thus statistics for these covariates are omitted.

One-way ANOVAs performed on family variables revealed that mother's and father's education, number of siblings, and mother's age (but not father's age) varied significantly by geographical region. Mother's and father's years of education were lowest for rural Turkey (9 and 13.2 years respective) and highest for Boston (15.8 and 16.4 years). Number of siblings was the highest for rural Turkey (5.3) but was similar for other regions (e.g., 2.9 for Istanbul and 2.3 for Boston). Mother's age didn't vary across geographical regions (45.5 years) but was slightly higher for Boston (47.6 years). Taken together, these are consistent with a cline of development in which greater urbanization correlates with greater educational level of parents. However, the cline did not occur evenly for each family variable. In particular, the high number of siblings for respondents residing in Nigde and Van, and their report of much lower maternal education, indicates major demographic differences between the rural and urban Turkey, similar to what experts have reported for Turkey (Mango, 2004).

Study 2: Familialism for Students in Urban vs. Rural Turkey

Collectivism encompasses beliefs and attitudes in which the line between self and members of one's in-group are blurred. Familialism is a specific type of collectivism where the primary in-group is the family (Lay et al., 1998; Oyserman et al., 2002). Our own observations of Turkish culture provide many examples of familialism. Turks prefer to borrow money from a family member than from a bank; they are uncomfortable placing elderly relatives in nursing homes, and feel teenage and young-adult students should be financially supported by parents (if possible) rather than taking an after-school job (see discussion in Caldwell-Harris & Ayçiçeği, 2006). Familialism may be the key in-group structure operative in Latin American and Mediterranean cultures (Freeberg & Stein, 1996; Triandis, 1995), and theorists assert that familialism is central to Turkish collectivism (Aycan & Eskin, 2005; Kağıtçıbaşı, 1982, 1997), more so than duty to abstract authority figures and belief in hierarchy, as in East Asian societies.

This raises the question of whether familialism, like vertical collectivism, will also decline with urbanization. Kağıtçıbaşı (1996b) has suggested that individualism is not a necessary outcome of modernization, and that formerly collectivist cultures may retain interdependence with modernization. On this view, familialism may be a component of collectivism that does not decrease with urbanization. The reason is that individuals in family-centric societies such as Turkey will retain their strong sense of family unity even though endorsement of vertical collectivism is less frequent for persons living in densely populated urban areas. On the other hand, as we described in the introduction, the conveniences of urban area decreases the need to depend on family and exposes residents to more daily interactions with strangers. The urbanization hypothesis thus predicts that familialism will be less valued by urban than rural residents. To investigate familialism as a specific type of collectivism, in Study 2 we administered the Family Allocentrism Scale developed by Lay et al. (1998), together with the Cultural Orientation Scenarios.

Method

Participants. Participants were recruited from Boston (121 females, 35 males, Boston University), Istanbul (87 females, 50 males, Istanbul University), and Van, one of the rural cities used in Study 1 (46 females and 99 males, Van Yüzüncü Yıl University). As in Study 1, we specified that individuals had to be native to that area. The majority of students were in their first year of study (ages ranged from 17 to 26). Mean educational level of the total sample was 13.1 (SD = 0.4). Mean age of the total sample was 19.2 (SD = 1.6).

Materials. The Cultural Orientation Scenarios described in Study 1 were administered. The Family Allocentrism Scale (Lay et al., 1998) contains 21 questions such as “I would feel ashamed if I told my parents 'no' when they asked me to do something” and “When I am not staying at my parents' house, I am not accountable to them” (reverse-scored). Respondents rate their agreement from Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree on a 5-point Likert scale. This scale has been shown by Lay et al. (1998) and Sato (2007) to have Cronbach alpha values ranging between .80 and .84, with a test-retest reliability of .93. We administered the original English version of the test to 304 American participants and obtained an alpha of .84. A small group of American students (N=18) took the scale twice, separated by three weeks, resulting in a test-retest correlation of $r=.91$.

The scale was translated into Turkish by the first author, with back translation by a native Turkish-speaking colleague. As part of assessing the internal reliability of the Turkish translation, we administered it to 430 Turkish students from several regions of Turkey (227 female, 203 male). The Cronbach alpha was .81. We obtained test-retest reliability of .83 between English and Turkish versions, by administering the two scales to 19 Turkish-English bilingual students one month apart (bilingual test-takers grew up in Istanbul and attended English-language high schools). We also separately factor-analyzed the American and Turkish respondents' item data. Both data sets yielded a single factor, consistent with the report of the test-developers (Lay et al., 1998). We concluded that the original English version and the Turkish translation both have adequate reliability and measurement equivalence.

Results and Discussion

Analysis of the scenarios proceeded as in Study 1. A similar pattern regarding vertical collectivism was obtained, with students from the rural part of Turkey (Van) having higher VC choices than those from Istanbul (see Table 2). The familialism scale could have, in principle, generated values ranging from 0 to 105, and thus the average values of 71 (Boston and Istanbul) and 80.4 (Van) indicate that respondents endorsed many family allocentric values. Like VC, familialism was higher for students in Van than for students in Istanbul, confirming the predictions of the urbanization hypothesis. Familialism scores for Istanbul students did not differ from Boston students'. There were no gender differences in familialism. As shown in Table 3, familialism was negatively correlated with HI and positively correlated with VC, especially for Istanbul students. This is consistent with inferences from Study 1 that HI and VC are the values that co-vary with urbanization. The modest size of the correlations in Table 3 suggest that familialism is a distinct construct from VC.

Table 2: Percent Choice for Cultural Orientation Scenarios and Familialism Total in Boston, Istanbul and Van (Study 2)

	BOSTON (N=156)		ISTANBUL (N=137)		VAN (N=145)	CITY F(2,432)	GENDER F(1,432)	
HI	45	=	43	>	37	4.4*	6.2*	female higher, except Boston
HC	28	>	25	=	25	4.7**	3.0	no differences
VI	19	=	20	>	17	4.7*	6.0+	female except no diff. for Van
VC	8	<	12	<	21	65.9**	0.6	no differences
FAMIL.	71.2	=	71.1	<	80.4	31.1**	0.3	no differences

Table notes. HI, HC, VI, VC values are percent of choices and thus sum to 100%. **= p<.001, *=.01, +=.02

Table 3: Correlations between Familialism and Cultural Orientation Scenarios in Study 2

	VAN (N=145) FAMILIALISM	ISTANBUL (N=137) FAMILIALISM	BOSTON (N=156) FAMILIALISM
HI	-.22**	-.27**	-.16*
HC	.11	.03	.05
VI	-.12	.01	.00
VC	.22**	.32**	.24**

Table notes. **= p<.001, *=.01

General Discussion

Theorists have proposed that traditionally collectivist cultures adopt individualist values as their populations become more educated and more urban (Alwin, 1989; Reykowski, 1994; Singelis et al., 1995). The current paper partly supported the urbanization hypothesis by finding that allocentric values were weaker in more urban areas. However, idiocentric values were not overall greater for those in more urban regions. Instead, living in more urban areas was associated with less vertical collectivism. We observed a continuum in VC responding

across four geographical regions, with Boston < Istanbul < Urban Western Turkey < Rural Mid and Eastern Turkey. Additionally, endorsements of familialism were less frequent for students who grew up in Istanbul compared to those who grew up in Van (Eastern Turkey, a rural area).

When comparing this result to the prior literature, our findings are most similar to those of Kashima et al. (2004). They found that endorsement of the autonomous self (i.e., idiocentric values) did not vary across large metropolitan areas compared to regional cities, but endorsement of the collective self was lower for residents of the larger cities. Although we did not specifically measure the same construct as Kashima et al. (i.e., the collective self), the collective self is encompassed in horizontal collectivism, vertical collectivism, and familialism, and the last two of these were weaker in the more urban areas.

Our results are also consistent with the meta-analysis conducted by Oyserman et al. (2002), discussed in the introduction. Americans scored lower than other samples on scales emphasizing a sense of duty toward the in-group (i.e., vertical collectivism), but on items related to horizontal collectivism, they reported higher scores. North America has been considered the most individualist region, but our findings resemble those of Oyserman et al. (2002), because Boston residents primarily differed from Turks in their less frequent endorsement of vertical collectivism. We could modify Kashima et al's. (2004) proposal that urbanization has a universal influence on the collective self by proposing that it has a universal influence to reduce the need to subordinate one's own goals to family and in-group authorities.

Theorists have noted that individualism is likely to increase with education, urban residence, globalization/mass-marketing and immigration (Alwin, 1989; Reykowski, 1994; Singelis et al., 1995; Freeman, 1997). Our finding is broadly consistent with this if the claim is rephrased as a "decrease in vertical collectivism" rather than an increase in individualism.

Gender Effects

Male and female respondents did not differ in familialism (see Table 2) either within or between cultures. However, there were gender differences on the Cultural Orientation Scenarios. Females made more HI choices in both studies across all geographical regions (except in Boston), and made more VC choices in study 1 (except in Boston and Istanbul, where the genders made a similar number of VC choices). Despite the greater HI choices, the

ordinal ranking of choices did not differ for genders within a geographical group. The results fail to support suggestions in the literature that females are less individualistic than males (Triandis, 1995) and that U.S. females are less individualistic than comparably educated females in developing countries (e.g., Shafiro et al., 2003). We thus conclude that males and females differ not in overall level of individualism or collectivism, but may differ weakly in their HI, HC and VC choices, at least when measured using the Cultural Orientation Scenarios.

Future Work

The correlational nature of the current data is a key limitation of the current project. Future work could thus focus on causation. It would be helpful to conduct a longitudinal study to determine that vertical collectivism and familialism become less frequently endorsed as a specific area increases in urbanization. Another important question is whether urban density is correlated with weaker familialism and weaker vertical collectivism in other parts of the world. Studies on U.S. samples have found increased collectivism in more rural areas (Vandello & Cohen, 1999), but collectivism was very broadly defined in that study. Our U.S. college student sample came from one of the most liberal cities in the country, in one of the densest urban regions (the urban Northeast). It would be useful to investigate the extent to which endorsement of vertical collectivism varies across the U.S. and Europe according to the same or different factors governing variation of VC and familialism across Turkey.

Our finding of greater vertical collectivism and familialism for college students residing in rural areas opens the door for focused future research on what aspect of rural residence is responsible for this difference in values. Urbanization, as measured by population size, is associated with differences in almost every facet of life. Freeman (1997) found that lower income was associated with allocentrism in Sri Lanka, as did Han and Choe (1994) in Korea. Income level of the regions we studied co-varied with urban density, although we did not have sufficient income variability in the rural areas to unconfound rural residence and income level, but how income trades off with urbanization in influencing allocentrism could be a goal of future research. Parental education and number of children showed a steep change between the rural west and urban east of Turkey, and this is also likely to be important in understanding how values vary across areas that vary in urbanization. Cukur et al (2004), also measured horizontal and vertical individualism and collectivism using the scale of

Singelis, Triandis, Bhawuk, & Gelfand, (1995) and found that vertical collectivism was positively correlated with religiosity in their Turkish sample. Future work will need to assess how strongly religiosity varies with urbanization and how each contributes to less frequent endorsements of vertical collectivism.

Finally, it should be noted that the degrees of urbanization studied here co-varied with a west-to-east geographical gradient. The eastern areas of Turkey have long been culturally different from the western areas (e.g., less "Western", more traditional, poorer, less connected to Europe, as discussed by Mango, 2004). These factors could be both a cause and an effect of less urbanization in eastern Turkey.

The fewer VC choices in Istanbul compared to the urban western cities must be due to factors other than residing in a densely populated urban area. These factors are likely to include all the ones already discussed, including a different cultural history, greater education of parents, as well as media messages and proximity to Europe, western migrants and tourists.

Notes: We used the 16 scenarios listed in Triandis et al., 1988 plus one additional (different) scenario listed as an example in Triandis and Gelfand (1998). The Turkish translation of the two scales in this paper can be obtained from the first author.

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