HUME’S RESPONSE TO MIND-BODY DUALISM

Sun DEMİRLİ

ABSTRACT
The mind-body problem concerns Descartes’ question of how material things can cause something completely different in nature: sensations, ideas or mental experiences. Hume does not confront this puzzle head on and never worries about the problem of causation between mental and physical. He nonetheless emphasizes this Cartesian puzzle in terms of representation: how something mental can be about things that are completely different in nature? How perceptions can represent external bodies? His answer is that this is Locke’s double existence view, according to which, there is an external reality behind the “veil of perceptions”. In his words, this view is “the monstrous offspring of the modern philosophy”. I argue that Hume holds that there are only perceptions, which are neither mental nor physical and that minds and bodies are constructions out of such neutral perceptions. This brings him close to Spinoza’s view according to which mind-body distinction is a conceptual rather than a real distinction.

Keywords: Mind-body problem, Hume, Descartes, causation, early modern philosophy

HUME’ÜN BEDEN ZİHİN PROBLEMİNE CEVABI

ÖZET

Anahtar Kelimeler: Zihin-beden problemi, Hume, Descartes, nedensellik, modern felsefe tarihi
Mind-Body Dualism

The mind-body problem concerns Descartes’ question of how material things can cause something completely different in nature: sensations, ideas or mental experiences. In bringing forth this problem, one has to look into Descartes’ dualism and his conception of humans. Dualism is the view that each human being has a mind along with a body.

Consider various properties a human being like Descartes has. He weighs less than 80 kilograms on the surface of the Earth; he has a human shape; he has a scar on his left shoulder; and so on. These are all physical properties. Along with such properties, he has also mental properties such as pondering whether to visit Vienna, having a pain on his right elbow, and having a desire to eat an apple. All the properties that Descartes has must be grouped under physical and mental properties. No mental property can be reduced to (or understood in terms of) physical properties and vice versa. This is the position that is called “property dualism” (PP 1:9; and also CSM 2: 259-87.)

Descartes’ contention is that humans have two natures: being extended and thinking. Properties relate to natures as determinates relate to determinables. For example, green and red are different determinates of the same determinable; that is, they are different ways of being colored. In the same way, according to Descartes, physical properties are different ways of being extended whereas mental properties are different ways of thinking.

Following Descartes’ views closely, Spinoza also endorses property dualism. There are two fundamentally distinct natures, or as Spinoza puts it, there are two distinct attributes (E 1d4.) According to Spinoza, properties stand to attributes in the same way that Descartes thinks that they stand to natures; physical properties are different determinates of being extended, and mental properties are different determinates of thinking.

Neither Descartes nor Spinoza offers any argument for property dualism. Humans have two fundamentally different natures; and as a result, they instantiate various determinates of these two. The distinction between being extended and thinking on the one hand, and the distinction between physical properties and mental properties on the other, is central to Descartes’ and Spinoza’s way of thinking so that they do not even question them.

Property dualism is a weaker form of dualism than substance dualism. Descartes endorses substance dualism. He argues for “the real distinction between mind and body.” What he means by this is that his mind and his body are distinct substances. The mind has a mental nature (thinking) and instantiates mental properties, and the body has a physical nature and
instantiates physical properties. Descartes offers two arguments for the real distinction between mind and body: (i) the argument from indivisibility and (ii) the argument from conception. These arguments occur in various places in his *Meditations* and there will no discussion of them in what follows.

Spinoza, however, explicitly denies substance dualism. He claims that “although two attributes may be conceived to be really distinct (i.e., one may be conceived without aid of the other), we still cannot infer from that that they constitute … two different substances” (E 1p10s.)

Not only does Spinoza hold that a single substance can have two attributes (extension and thought), he holds a much stronger thesis: there is only one single substance altogether (that he calls “Natura sive Deus”), which has infinitely many attributes (E 1p11 and E 1p14.) For Spinoza, humans are cognizant of only two attributes but there may be more than two. There is a reason for that. In Christian theology, God is often characterized as the most real being (i.e., *ens realissimum*), and therefore, God must exist in every possible way. Thus, Spinoza plays it safe and claims that the only single substance (maybe God or maybe the Nature) has more than two attributes: It has all of them. In fact, however, Spinoza’s discussion in the *Ethics* is consistent with there being only two attributes. So, Spinoza is ultimately agnostic on the question of the number of attributes.

The standard view is that Spinoza’s single substance possesses two different attributes and instantiates both physical and mental properties. In my opinion, there is a more interesting way to read Spinoza that puts his attack on the real distinction between mind and body in a proper historical context. Scholastic philosophers drew a wedge between two objects’ being *really distinct* and their being *formally distinct*. The latter distinction can be understood in terms ofd “conceptual distinctness”. One can conceive the surface of a table independently from the table itself. That is, one can separate these two in one’s mind. They are conceptually distinct. To be really distinct one must exist independently from the other.

My view is that Spinoza may have thought that there is not a real distinction but rather a conceptual distinction between mind and body. One and the same substance can be conceived as extended and thought to instantiate physical properties; and it can also be conceived as having a thinking nature and thought to instantiate mental properties. As will be seen, this is the way Hume understands the distinction between mind and body.

**Descartes’ Anthropology**

Let us turn back to Descartes’ substance dualism and see how this relates to his conception of human beings. Descartes who argues that the mind is distinct from the body should explain how they could be so united as to
constitute a single human being. Descartes faces this question at the end of the *Sixth Meditation*. He says:

I prove that the mind is really distinct from the body—although the mind is so closely joined to the body, that it composes one thing with the body.

Descartes maintains that the mind and body can compose a unity that he calls "a man". Although he believes that no substance can have thought and extension, he maintains that the composed entity (in his words, a “man”) may be so. How do the thinking mind and the extended body come together to compose a single entity? Descartes has an answer. This is his “causal connectedness” answer. The mind acts on the body when we move our fingers; and the body acts on the mind when we perceive external objects. Through the causal flow from mind to body, the mind controls the body. And through the causal flow from body to mind, the mind receives information about various states of the brain (and hence about various states of the world).

For Descartes, the “causal connectedness”, however, falls short of explaining the union between mind and body. We are much more closely connected with our body than is (say) a sailor connected with his ship.

By these sensations of pain, hunger, thirst and so on, nature teaches me that I am not merely present in my body as a sailor is present in a ship, but that I am very closely joined and, as it were, intermingled with it, so that I and the body form a unit. If this were not so, I, who am nothing but a thinking thing, would not feel pain when the body was hurt, but would perceive the damage purely by the intellect, just as a sailor perceives by sight if anything in his ship is broken. Similarly, when the body needed food or drink, I should have an explicit understanding of the fact, instead of having confused sensations of hunger and thirst. For these sensations of hunger, thirst, pain and so on are nothing but confused modes of thinking which arise from the union and, as it were, intermingling of the mind with the body.

(Sixth Meditation)

As a result of certain causal interactions between mind and body, I do not simply get the information that the body is harmed, but I feel the pain. When I intend to move my arm, I do not move anything else on the way to the motion of my arm, but I move my arm. The question of whether the causal connection between mind and body is mediated or not should do the trick. Descartes holds that mind and body form a unity (and thus constitute a single entity), because the causal flow from mind to body (and from body to mind) is not mediated by anything else (ibid.)
Gassendi’s Objection

In *Objections and Replies to Meditations*, Gassendi congratulates Descartes for distinguishing between feeling the pain and having the mere information about damages to one’s body. But he questions the possibility of causal interaction between mind and body:

You still have to explain how that "joining and, as it were, intermingling" or "confusion" can apply to you if you are incorporeal, unextended and indivisible. If you are no larger than a point, how are you joined to the entire body, which is so large?... If you wholly lack parts, how are you intermingled or "as it were intermingled", with the particles of this region? For there can be no intermingling between things unless the parts of each of them can be intermingled. And if you are something separate, how are you compounded with matter so as to make up a unity? Moreover, since all compounding, conjunction or union takes place between the component parts, must there not be some relation between these parts? Yet what relation can possibly be understood to exist between corporeal and incorporeal parts? (Fifth Objections to the Meditations)

There are two points in Gassendi’s objection: (i) how can the mind without parts interact with the body which has parts?; and (ii) how can the “incorporeal” mind interact with “corporeal” body?

Let us first focus on Gassendi’s point (i). This point involves two related assumptions: (1) the mind cannot be located without being an extended thing; and (2) to causally interact with a part of the body, the mind must have multiple locations, and but only an extended thing can have multiple locations. There is no indication that Descartes questions (1). He in fact claims that the mind is located at different locations in the brain in the *Passions of the Soul* and is located at a single location (i.e., the pineal gland) in the *Meditations*. Descartes thinks that the mind doesn’t need to be extended in order to have a location in space. This seems to be true. Points are non-extended but may still be located in space. We can easily talk about a point located between Istanbul and Ankara.

When we turn to (2), one must accept that it is difficult to see how an object, which does not have any part, can be located at several points simultaneously. In the *Passions of the Soul*, Descartes gives the following answer. The mind is spread throughout the body. He says: “the whole mind seems to be united to the whole body.” This suggests that Descartes thinks that the mind is located at each point within the body. But although he cannot maintain that the mind is located at several points at a given time, he may still claim that it is located at different points at different times. But this
view has the consequence that a mind cannot feel pain and think of apples simultaneously. Therefore, one must contend that Descartes’ view in the *Passions* is that the mind is omnipresent in the body.

In the *Meditations*, Descartes gives a different answer. He claims that the mind is located at a single point (i.e., the pineal gland.) This is the seat of the mind. He maintains that the nerves are like cords, which can be pulled and stretched. Each cord leads to the pineal gland, and each has its characteristic motions. When a chord is pulled, the motion is transmitted to the pineal gland, and from the pineal gland to the mind, where perception takes place. And in moving a part of the body, the mind causes the pineal gland to pull one of the chords that leads to a nerve ending that is, in turn, connected with a part of the body. This view explains how an object without parts can be causally connected with a body that has a multiplicity of parts.

Gassendi’s objection (ii) is much more serious though. How can an “incorporeal” object be causally related to “corporeal” objects? Gassendi presupposes that there is no difficulty in understanding how bodies can causally interact with other bodies (and how minds can interact with other minds.); but there is a difficulty in understanding how minds can interact with bodies. Why is that? It seems that one who claims that there is a difficulty in mind-body interaction assumes that causal interactions can only be possible among items with similar natures. But is this a warranted assumption? For instance, when Locke discusses the question of how minds can interact with bodies, he maintains that this question is no more difficult than the related question concerning the interactions between material objects. He writes: “we are equally lost when we try to explain how material bodies have influences over other material bodies.” And Suarez and Leibniz also thought that all instances of causation are equally problematic (Thorpe 2010; see also Thorpe 2011.)

Is the mind-body interaction more problematic than body-body interaction? The answer depends on the theory of causation at one’s disposal. If the theory explains how bodies interact with other bodies and if this theory cannot explain how minds and bodies causally interact, then one should worry about mind-body interactions? What is Descartes’ view of causation? There is the view attributed to Descartes by “occasionalists”. According to this view, the damage in one’s body is not the cause of the pain; it is simply an “occasion” for God to cause pain in the subject. Although Cartesians bring forth occasionalism to solve the problem of mind-body interaction, they also appeal to the occasionalist model to explain body-body interaction. We will need to talk about the causation view that is operative in Descartes’ mind that leads to the problem of mind-body interaction. Scholastic philosophers thought of causal interaction as some sort of ‘*accident* transfer’. How does fire boil water? For scholastics, the
answer is easy: there is heat in fire, and fire transfers its heat to water. A fortiori, in the scholastic thing, a billiard ball colliding with another ball causes this second ball to move, because the first ball has ‘motion’, as an accident, and passes its motion to the second ball and, as a result, the second ball begins to move. In a sense, in this scholastic model, causing is nothing other than giving. But this model requires that there must be a similarity in nature between cause and effect. One cannot give what one does not have. For example, something that is not in motion cannot cause anything to move, or something that is not hot cannot cause a kettle of water to boil.

The problem is more acute when we consider causal interactions between mind and body. Body and mind have radically different natures; they there can be nothing in common between thought and extension. What can be the accident that is transferred from mind to body (or from the body to mind)? There is no doubt that Descartes (and also Gassendi) have this theory in mind when discussing causal interactions. In the third Meditations, when Descartes presents his version of the “ontological argument”, he appeals to this view of causation. He claims that only a being that possesses perfection can cause his idea of a perfect being that has a lesser degree of perfection.

Of course, this “causing is giving” account of causation faces a serious problem when the scholastics try to explain how God created the world. God creates a material world; that is, He causes all his creatures to exist. But how can He create Adam who is made out of flesh and blood? Scholastic philosophers had a solution; they invoked a distinction between God’s having a property intrinsically (or straightforwardly) and His having a property eminently (or in a higher way). God is the most real being (i.e., ens realissimum); he has all of the earthly properties, in a higher form, without himself being earthly ways, and in creation he passes properties as such to his creations. But he has also divine features; He has them in a straightforward manner, and this is why He is omniscient, omnipresent, all-powerful, benevolent and so on.

Although this scholastic distinction can be of some help in solving mind-body problem, there is no indication that Descartes appeals to this distinction in his writings. Some commentators maintain that Descartes tried to get help from “animal spirits” as an intermediary between what is mental and what is physical. But one should agree with Stephen Voss that Descartes gave up his project of explaining the unity of mind and body. In Voss’ terms, this was the end of Descartes’ anthropology (Voss, 1994.)

Hume’s response to substance dualism

Hume does not confront the Cartesian puzzle head on and never worries about the problem of causation between mental and physical. It could be that
in the back of his mind there was Locke’s comment that mind-body causation was no more in need of explanation than body-body causation. But more importantly, according to Hume’s regularity analysis of causation, interaction between mind and body is no more problematic than interaction between two bodies. Although Hume doesn’t conceive the mind-body problem in terms of causation, he nonetheless emphasizes this Cartesian puzzle in terms of “representation”: how something mental can be about things that are completely different in nature? How perceptions can represent substances?

The discussion of mental-physical distinction occurs in the section, titled ‘Of the Immateriality of the Soul”, of the Treatise. Hume presents his own version of the mind-body problem, and asks the question of how something mental, “an impression can represents a substance”, which is purely physical (T 233). Hume follows Berkeley on the point that representation can only be possible in terms of resemblance. But since “an impression has none of the peculiar qualities or characteristics of a substance”, Hume concludes that an impression cannot represent this substance either (ibid.)

In “Of the Immateriality of the Soul”, Hume doesn’t come up with a solution and doesn’t even try to bridge the gap between mental and physical, because in this section his main goal is to challenge various arguments for the immateriality of the soul. However, Hume’s solution to the mind-body problem is present in his metaphysics, expounded in the first book of the Treatise in general, and in the section, titled ‘Of Scepticism with Regard to the Senses’, of this book in particular (T 187-218).

In presenting Hume’s solution to Descartes’ mind-body problem, I suggest an interpretation according to which Hume endorsed and anticipated neutral monist metaphysics in the fourth book of the Treatise I. The suggestion is roughly this. Hume maintains that there can be no causation (and no representation) between mental and physical: a red apple does not cause the sensation of this red apple, and thus sensations cannot represent physical objects. But in his view, there can be no problem of bridging the gap between mental and physical. According to Hume, to suggest that in addition to the sensation of a red apple there is also a physical object causing this sensation is the “monstrous opinion of double existence” (T 215). He does not have much tolerance for Lockean view of the veil of perception according to which the immediate objects of our perceptions are ideas that are internal entities and we come to know about external physical objects only inferentially as the causes of our internal ideas. This Lockean view is the ‘monstrous offspring of the modern philosophy’. 
Rather than drawing a distinction between internal mental sensations and external physical objects, Hume follows Spinoza in maintaining that mental and physical distinction is not a real distinction, not a distinction in reality. In his view, there is only one single type of reality that he calls ‘perceptions’, of which ‘impressions’ and ‘ideas’ are sub-species. He writes: “there is only one single existence, which I shall call indifferently object or perception, … understanding by both of them what any common man means by a hat, or shoe, or stone, or any other impression, convey’d to him by his senses” (T 202). That is: there are only sensations (or perceptions, in his language) like the sensations of a red apple (or of a hat, or of shoe, or of stone), that we may use in lieu of a sensation or in lieu of the object itself, but he understands by such sensations what we commonly understand at non-philosophical moments as external objects like red apples or hats, or shoes. Hume acknowledges that sensations or perceptions are ‘fleeting’, ‘perishing’ and ‘momentary’ beings (ibid.) Nonetheless, he believes that such a reality is neither mental nor physical, and that it is of a neutral origin and that their existence does not depend on a substantial mind.

Hume denies mental-physical distinction as a distinction in reality. But he allows that there is a formal distinction, a distinction of conception, between mental and physical. By using his philosophy as an analytical tool, he shows that what can exist are only perceptions, which are “perishing and fleeting” existences, which cannot continue to exist from one moment to another. But he acknowledges that humans like us are driven by their circumstances and necessities brought about by circumstances as such, and cannot be content, survive or do natural philosophy, in a world, populated by such a meagre reality. In the last section of the book I of Part IV of the Treatise, titled ‘Conclusion of this Book’, he writes that such ‘a wretched condition’ is barely bearable in the study when doing philosophy under the stringent condition of his normative investigation. But, as he continues, to cure oneself from this philosophical melancholy one must go back to one’s friends in order “to dine, converse, and play backgammon in a carefree manner”. But in his view one can effectively accomplish all of this only under the supposition that one lives in a world that is inhabited by both physical objects and minds.

The explanation of how humans, who are in need in comfort, come up with an illusion of a steady world that continues to exist through time constitutes Hume’s naturalistic project that he follows all through the first book of the Treatise. In following this project, he discusses belief-forming-mechanisms which enable one to construct such a “pretended” reality.

In section 2 of Part IV, titled ‘Of Scepticism with Regard to Senses”, he offers a genetic account concerning the formation of the belief in physical objects. In this account, he describes certain associative mechanisms of our
imagination that are responsible for this belief. This is the Humean constructivist view according to which external physical objects are bundles of perceptions: the imagination takes the meagre reality of temporary and perishing perceptions as input, and by getting help from constancy and coherence with which these perceptions present themselves, the imagination feigns an external spatial world where our bodies move around.

In ‘Of Personal Identity’, Hume presents his constructivist view of minds by writing that “what we call a mind, is nothing but a heap or collection of different perceptions, united together by certain relations, and supposed, tho’ falsely, to be endow’d with a perfect simplicity and identity.” (T. 207) This is the bundle of perceptions view of minds. In discussing the genealogy of our natural belief in mind, Hume offers a similar story that explains of how the imagination, taking the same meagre input (i.e., perceptions), creates and constructs a non-spatial mind which is nothing but an inner theatre where various perceptions appear in the stage and mingle with each other and eventually disappear.

In Hume’s constructivist bundle view, the same reality, say, the sensation of a red apple can take part in two different constructed entities: the mind that is the perceiver and the external object that is the apple; in his view, the same perception of a red apple which is a neutral entity figures in one conception as a part of a mental entity, and in a different conception as a part of a external entity. In sum, according to Hume, there is nothing mental about a perception of red apple in itself, it turns out to be mental (as a part or thought in a mind) when it is conceived as a constituent of an object feigned (or pretended) to be a mind and the very same entity turns out to be physical when it is conceived as a constituent of an object feigned to be external.

Hume’s neutral monism
My defence of Hume’s neutral monist solution to the mind-body problem is two-pronged. First, there is the neutral monist view of perceptions that amounts to the view that mental-physical distinction is not a real distinction.

(i) perceptions are fundamental entities which are intrinsically neither mental nor physical.

This position needs to be distinguished from a recent view that attracted many followers such as Thomas Nagel (2012) and David Chalmers (2015). According to these philosophers, the ultimate reality (which is the building block of the universe as we observe it) has both mental and physical aspects. On this view, unlike Spinoza’s view, these mental and physical aspects are really there and are independent from how we conceive this reality. These authors use the more apt term “panpsychism” for their position.
But nonetheless some authors call this position “neutral monism” in a way that may be conflated with the position defended here.

Secondly, there is the constructivist view according to which perceptions, being Hume’s fundamental entities, figures in the construction of two different types of entities: non-spatial minds and spatial physical objects. This amounts to the view that mind-body distinction is a distinction of conception.

(ii) the same fundamental entities (i.e., perceptions) are constituents of both non-spatial minds and spatial physical objects.

The traditional interpretation of Hume had been neutral monist (Russell 1921; Price 1940; Bennett 1971; and Pears 1999.) But the new Humeans bring serious challenges to this traditional interpretation (Wilson 1988 and Wright 1983). All of these writers share the view that Hume endorses a fundamental schism between mental and physical and that he accepted a Lockean “veil of perception” view as a tenet in his philosophy.

Especially Wilson and Wright’s bring forth serious challenges against the neutral monist interpretation. In their view, Hume recognizes the mental character of perceptions, and even though he allows that our pre-theoretical belief system (the vulgar view) doesn’t make a difference between perceptions and their physical content, he accepts that the "calm" and "reflective" part of our imagination (namely, our causal reasoning) has a saying in the genesis of our beliefs; he does not believe that the "instinctual" and "undisciplined" operations of our imagination is the final arbiter and he thinks that we need to temper this instinctual belief with the help of our causal reasoning.

In his double image experiment Hume talks of perceptions as dependent beings (T 210-11). But this doesn’t show that Hume accepts mental character of perceptions. Contrary to what Wilson and Wright argues, the "dependence" which is at issue in these passages is not an ontological dependence of our perceptions upon a substantial mind but a causal dependence between perceptions (that is, a causal dependence of our perceptions upon sensory faculties). Hume argues about this causal dependence without presupposing a divide between mental and physical. Let us look at the passage where Hume presents this experiment:

When we press one eye with a finger, we immediately perceive all the objects to become double, and one half of them to be removed from their common and natural position. But as we do not attribute a continu’d existence to both of these perceptions, and as they are both of the same nature, we clearly perceive that
all our perceptions are dependent on our organs and the disposition of our nerves and animal spirits. (T. 210-11)

The "double image experiment" is supposed to show that the existence of our perceptions depends upon the existence of a substantial mind. For instance, Wright writes: "Hume's argument establishes the mind-dependent character of our perceptions." (1983, p. 53)

But Wright’s view cannot be correct. First of all, Hume’s position is that the existence of perceptions cannot be ontologically dependent upon the existence of a substantial mind. According to him, our perceptions have a primary ontological status; and like all other objects, mind is simply a construction out of these perceptions. As he puts it, "what we call a mind, is nothing but a heap or collection of different perceptions, united together by certain relations, and supposed, though falsely, to be endowed with a perfect simplicity and identity" (T. 207.) Secondly, the "dependence" which is at issue in this argument is not an ontological dependence of our perceptions upon a substantial object but a causal dependence between perceptions (that is, a causal dependence of our perceptions upon sensory faculties). Now let us examine this argument in detail.

The argument proceeds as follows. While Hume is experiencing a perception, certain alterations in his eyeball lead to a second one. By causal reasoning, he recognizes that this second perception depends upon his sensory organs (and the "disposition of his nerves and animal spirits") for its existence; it is generated by a physiological process which precedes the sensing of it and would have no existence otherwise, that is: its existence is causally dependent on the operations of the process in question. Then, he argues, there is no way of differentiating between the original perception and this second, because "they are both of the same nature". Therefore, we have to assign like causes to both of them; that is, if we admit that one is brought into being by physiological processes, we must admit the same of the other. Furthermore, if we maintain that one's existence is causally dependent upon the operations of these processes, then we must maintain the same of the other's. Hence, he concludes, all perceptions that we have are dependent upon the physiological processes that precede the sensing of them, and would have no existence otherwise.

Having established that all our perceptions are causally dependent upon the physiological processes that precede our sensing of them, Hume reminds us the intimate connection between the belief in "independence" and the belief in "continuity" and claims that since the latter is a "necessary consequence" of the former, "the natural consequence of this reasoning should be, that our perceptions have no more continued than an independent existence" (T. 211.) Therefore, according to him, just as the belief in the
"independent" existence of our perceptions is false, the belief in the "continued" existence of these perceptions must also be false.
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