

Seher ÇELEN
Hazel Çağın ELBİR
Ekin GÜNAYSU
Aslan Yavuz ŞİR
Ali Murat TAŞKENT
Mehmet Oğuzhan TULUN

CHAPTER BY CHAPTER SYNOPSIS AND REVIEW OF TURKS AND ARMENIANS: NATIONALISM AND CONFLICT IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE BY JUSTIN MCCARTHY

(JUSTIN MCCARTHY'NİN "TÜRKLER VE ERMENİLER: MİLLİYETÇİLİK VE OSMANLI İMPARATORLUĞUNDA ÇATIŞMA" KİTABININ BÖLÜM BÖLÜM ÖZET VE ANALİZLERİ)

Author: Justin McCarthy

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Introduction and Chapter One

In the introductory pages and the first chapter of *Turks and Armenians: Nationalism and Conflict in the Ottoman Empire*, Prof. Justin McCarthy makes a strong argument by stating that the widely accepted belief that the Turks are guilty of one-sided massacre of Armenians is a result of a traditional prejudice against Turks based on religious and ethnic racism. One of Prof. McCarthy's biggest success in this section of the book is the fact that he immediately captures the reader's attention by making his arguments more concrete with the racist quotations from an article published in 1827 in *Blackwood's* magazine in Britain and with his reference to August Keane who claims that Turks are "dull, reserved, somewhat sullen and apathetic, nearly all brave, warlike, even fierce, and capable of great atrocities". By pointing out to these two sources, he not only underlines the fact that the racist portrayal of Turkish people was embraced by the

intellectual and educated section of the Western society as well as the general public, but also effectively demonstrates the scope of the bias against Turks. It is also important to note that the prejudice against Turks continued well into the 20th century; the CASR/NER publications in 1916 used statements such as “bloodthirsty Turks,” and “Ottoman hordes” during the WWI.

In the introduction of the book, Prof. McCarthy makes three important points which, on the one hand, prepare a solid ground for his arguments presented in the following chapters, and, on the other hand, introduce the content of the book to his readers. First and foremost, by noting that Islam was seen as the traditional enemy of Christianity, he affirms that the prejudice against Turks had a religious dimension. Second, he elaborates on how the Caucasian race was deemed superior to the “yellow race”, which was associated with Turks, setting the basis for racial discrimination. Last but not least, he touches on how this propaganda was used by the politicians and missionaries to further their own practical ends.

Prof. McCarthy’s clear and straight forward language engages the reader from the first pages of the book. Though his arguments might be new to many readers in the West, given the fact that the commonly accepted version of the relations between Turks and Armenians is quite different than the facts presented in this book, the logic and the scientific approach behind his work not only disproves the “Myth of the Terrible Turks” but also deserves credit, for his objective accounts of the history of Anatolia.

Prof. McCarthy begins his first chapter, on Eastern Anatolia and the Southern Caucasus, by stating that “the thinkers who spent time on such questions speculated that the Garden of Eden must have been in the valley of the Tigris and Euphrates river”, as a reference the beauty of the region. First few paragraphs of the chapter give an overview of the region’s geographic features, such as its climate and topography. In fact, Prof. McCarthy makes comparisons between the temperatures of the eastern and southern cities of Anatolia with that of American cities, thus effectively making the content specifically interesting for American readers.

After highlighting the obstacles posed by the physical geographical barriers of the region, he continues with giving important demographic information on the Turkish, Kurdish and Armenian populations. He attaches particular importance to the distribution of the Armenian population in Bursa (5%), Ankara (9%), Izmit (18%) and Istanbul (9%) and emphasizes the fact that “the Armenian populations in western Anatolia and Europe were quite different than those in eastern and central Anatolia” under the Ottoman rule. It is also important to note that he presents the relevant data in a clear and organized

manner by providing four detailed tables on the climate, the population distribution by religion and the demographic picture of Eastern Anatolia, Cilicia and the Russian Southern Caucasus.

Following his analysis on demographics, he focuses on education and reaches a clear conclusion that “nowhere was the superior situation of the Armenians more evident than in education”, basing his argument on a number of striking statistical facts. Here, we learn that “in 1901 there were only 201 Muslims in secondary schools” whereas the number of Armenian students attending Armenian private schools was as high as 1,070 and 390 in those operated by American missionaries. Gregorian, Catholic and Protestant communities had their own schools funded by American religious congregations. While the Armenians could afford to pay for their education in American missionary schools, supported by donations from the United States, “the impoverished government could not match the foreign and Armenian educational expenditure”. Due to these imbalances in education caused by the unequal financial resources, he argues, the Armenian populace “was better educated and more able to cope with the modern world”.

In the final section of this chapter, Prof. McCarthy takes a critical look at the relationship between the Armenians and the Ottoman State, and he underlines Armenians’ ability to interact with the European merchants due to their familiarity with the European finance industry and their language skills, which enabled them to become “intermediaries between European merchants and the government and the Ottoman market”. He also draws attention to the fact that Armenians became high officials in the government such as the ministers of Foreign Affairs, Treasury and Finance during the final decades of the Empire.

Chapter Two: Early History

In chapter two, “Early History”, Prof. McCarthy elaborates on the ethnic diversity in Anatolia by focusing on the origins of Armenians, Turks and Kurds. One of the positive things about this chapter is that despite his detailed analysis of the complex economic, social, political and religious relationships between the groups in question, the historical processes are presented in a simple, clear and understandable way, which makes his narration appealing for the readers regardless of whether or not they have the adequate prior knowledge on the subject matter.

Among the important points made in this chapter, religion occupies a crucial place, given the fact that in the early ages the construction of the Armenian

identity was in large part based on their religious ties with the Armenian Apostolic Church. In fact, Prof. McCarthy very effectively indicates how Christianity served as a common ground for European, American and Russian entities in providing certain social and economic support systems for the Armenians which were not available for the Muslims.

Refraining from over-sympathizing with any of the groups he mentions, he objectively lays out the complex relationship between the Armenians, Turks and Kurds by touching on every factor that plays a significant role in the construction process of these relations. In this context, he highlights how some Kurdish tribes assisted Armenian revolutionaries in smuggling weapons into the Ottoman East, while some Armenian revolutionaries were attacking Kurdish tribes. Yet, his most outstanding argument is that during the 19th century, as the Ottoman Empire extended its governmental control over its territories, not only Armenians, but also the Turks and Kurds suffered in Eastern Anatolia, mainly due to geographic factors, raids by armed Kurdish tribes and Russian attacks. In fact, multiple times throughout the chapter, he stresses that neither the Turks nor the Armenians living in eastern Anatolia were better off; that both groups had difficult lives.

Also central to this chapter is his analysis of Russia's quest for warm water ports and its political agenda set up towards this goal. Prof. McCarthy not only elaborates on Armenians collaborating with Russians when the latter invaded the eastern Anatolia in 1828, but he also highlights the fact that "the result of the Russian invasion was enmity and suspicion between peoples who had lived together for centuries", which is especially crucial to understanding the effects of the Russian policy of *divide and conquer*.

Prof. McCarthy effectively rebuts the widely accepted argument that only Armenians suffered under the Ottoman rule by making references to concrete historical events that uncover the complex relationship between Armenians, Turks and Kurds. Thus, *Turks and Armenians: Nationalism and Conflict in the Ottoman Empire* is a thought provoking book presenting Prof. McCarthy's criticisms of the ongoing Armenian allegations and rebuttal of their arguments.

Chapter Three: Armenian Revolutionaries

In the 3rd chapter titled "Armenian Revolutionaries", Prof. McCarthy writes about the two major Armenian revolutionary societies: Dashnaks and Hunchaks. He elaborates the formation process of these revolutionary groups,

their ideologies, goals, and activities. While doing this, he demonstrates Armenian revolutionary uprising with the help of the maps of Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia, saving the readers from the event-space dilemma. He also stays away from shallow explanations and biased arguments and provides cause-and-effect analysis to understand the conflicts and complicated relationships in these regions.

First of all, Prof. McCarthy states that the Armenian revolutionaries were influenced by revolutionary and nationalistic ideologies which was spread among the Ottoman Armenians by Europeans and Americans. He presents the advantages and disadvantages of the Armenian revolutionaries and the Ottoman government in their conflict. However, he points out that success of the Armenian rebellion depended on the support from European powers.

McCarthy begins to explain the development of the Armenian revolts with the foundation of the Hunchakian Revolutionary Party in Geneva, Switzerland in 1887 by Armenian students from the Russian Empire. He states that the Hunchaks wanted to create a socialist Armenian state and believed that only after the Ottoman Armenians were “liberated” would the Armenians in Iran and Russia be joined with them in one state. He also touches upon Hunchaks’ official program, which called for violence and terrorism to achieve their goals.

He expresses that the Hunchaks took the Bulgarian Revolt in 1876 as a guideline to create their own nationalist state out of the Ottoman Empire. An Armenian revolt would follow the plan seen in Bulgaria: First there would be revolt and attack on Muslims, leading to reprisals. Europeans would condemn the Ottomans for the death of Christians, taking no notice of the slaughter of Muslims. Finally, either through diplomacy or war, Europeans would force the Ottomans to cede territory to a new Armenian land and Muslims would be forced out or killed, leaving an Armenian majority.

However, Prof. McCarthy states that Hunchak’s plan taken from the Bulgaria example did not work for the Armenians. The main reason was that in Bulgaria, the majority of the population was ethnically and religiously Bulgarian and Christian, but it was not the case for Armenians. If they wanted to create an Armenia, they had to kill or forcefully relocate more than half of the population, which was obviously not possible for Armenians to do. Therefore, their purposes depended on interventions of Europe, but the Europeans were unwilling to intervene.

In the light of such a background, Prof. McCarthy talks about the Hunchak Rebellion in Anatolia between 1894-96. Revolutionary gangs, mainly from

Russia, attacked Muslims in towns and villages. They attacked Turks and Kurds (McCarthy uses the term Muslim to define all of them) and Muslims responded Armenians with their own counter attack. Such events took place in Bayburt, Muş, Tokat, Sasun, and Sivas regions, and shortly after, all over eastern Anatolia. Revolutionaries destroyed Muslim's houses, shops and attacked soldiers and civilians. As one can guess, furious Muslim groups also lashed out at Armenians. While explaining the Hunchak Rebellion, Prof. McCarthy puts all historical realities on the table and does not show only one side's pains and sorrows during the Hunchak Rebellion, which is essential when writing about historical events.

Another crucial Armenian revolutionary group was the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Dashnaks), which was founded by Armenians in the Russian Empire. Prof. McCharthy states that the Dashnaks were more successful and planned than the Hunchaks. Like the Hunchaks, the Dashnaks aimed to create an Armenian state and believed that an European intervention was necessary. He states that although the Dashnaks were socialist, they emphasized on nationalism to unite all Armenian population.

He notes that Dashnak activities and main Dashnak organizers were known by the Ottoman government but that the government could not take necessary action due to the fear of an European intervention. Europeans were symphatetic to Armenians due to the anti-Turkish propaganda and religious prejudice. Any action against rebel Armenians was portrayed in the European press as attacks on innocents.

Prof. McCarthy also states that the Dashnaks and Hunchaks murdered Armenians who did not join their cause or who stood against them. He also states that these groups forced Armenians to pay 'revolutionary taxes', 'revolutionary donations' and other funds. Thus, Prof.McCarthy points out that Armenians had no choice but join the revolutionaries and fund their cause.

He also elaborates on the smuggling operations of the Armenian revolutionaries. Prof. McCarthy indicates that Armenians revolutionaries, in order to arm themselves, were smuggling weapons from Russia almost immediately after the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78 until World War I. He also states that revolutionaries smuggled in fighters for the cause. The main routes for smuggled armes and fighters were on the Ottoman-Russian border or from Russian territory through Iran. Most of the time, the Russian government and the Russian border guard generally overlooked the smuggling. By World War I, the Armenian revolutionaries were armed and ready to rebel.

Chapter Four: European Intervention, Ottoman Pacification

In the fourth chapter titled “European Intervention, Ottoman Pacification”, Justin McCarthy mainly elaborates on European Intervention in Ottoman affairs regarding Armenians before World War I. This chapter clearly exposes how the European powers watched over Armenian rebels and how the Ottoman government’s hands were tied by the Europeans when it tried to stop the Armenian rebel activities and maintain order in eastern Anatolia.

First of all, Prof. McCarthy underlines that European powers claimed the right to act as protectors of the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire and saw the 1878 Treaty of Berlin as a justification for their constant interference in Ottoman affairs concerning Armenians. He points out that Europeans forced the Ottoman government to implement reforms in favor of Armenians in eastern Anatolia, which actually aimed to weaken government’s sovereignty in the region by giving Armenians power. Indicating that the European powers, in essence, intended the dissolution of the Empire, McCarthy argues that the Empire was saved due to disagreements among them.

Prof. McCarthy acknowledges that, judged by modern standards, the Ottomans did not enforce satisfactory government in eastern Anatolia. The region was indeed not secure for both Muslims and Armenians and the economic situation in the region was poor. On the other hand, McCarthy points out that the actions of the Armenian revolutionaries prevented the government to make reforms. Also, poverty of the Ottoman state impeded any reforms or improvements. However, as Justin McCarthy clearly puts it in this chapter, Europeans were not helping in this respect.

This chapter clearly shows that Europeans constantly acted in favor of Armenians. Muslim attacks on Armenians were always portrayed as Muslim murders of Christians and “atrocities”, even if in some cases it was the Armenian rebels who attacked first and provoked Muslims. When Muslims attacked Armenians, European consuls and ambassadors complained to the Ottoman government, demanding action. On the other hand, if Muslims were attacked by Armenians, Europeans did nothing.

Furthermore, Prof. McCarthy points out that the Ottoman government was in a near impossible position when it attempted to stop and prosecute Armenian rebels due to continuous interference by Europeans. Arrests of rebels were reported in the European press as Ottoman oppression. Pro-Armenians demanded the release of the rebels convicted of treason which they called “political prisoners.” McCarthy provides several examples where Armenian

rebels, due to pressures especially by the British, were granted amnesty, which eventually emboldened the rebels and led them to believe that they can act with impunity. He also mentions that Russia in particular prevented the Ottomans to prosecute rebels by claiming that they were Russian subjects and therefore, could not be tried and punished by Ottoman courts. Correspondingly, McCarthy reveals Europe's hypocrisy and double standards. In Europe, such rebels guilty of treason, would have been punished severely. Having said that, the Europeans were making it nearly impossible for the Ottomans to prosecute the Armenian rebels.

Prof. McCarthy highlights poverty and lack of resources as the key for many of the problems in Eastern Anatolia. 1877-78 Russo-Turkish war had damaged the Ottoman Empire both militarily and economically. As a result of the war, the Empire had lost manpower, supplies and productive territory and was forced to pay Russians ruinous amounts of indemnities, although it was the Russians who started the war. Furthermore, the fear of another Russian attack had forced the Ottoman government to make huge military expenses and it couldn't spare soldiers for internal security. European powers also worsened the economic state by enforcing capitulations. These factors prevented the government to improve the lives of the population in Eastern Anatolia.

However, Prof. McCarthy points out that the Ottoman government did what it can to ensure the security of Armenians and appease them. Most importantly, more Armenians were included in the government and even in security forces in order to make them feel more loyalty to the government. Also, in order to maintain order in eastern Anatolia and preventing conflicts, the government also tried to take measures such as assigning more soldiers to internal security, despite its economic burden, to protect Armenians in their conflicts with several Kurdish tribes.

Ultimately, Prof. McCarthy indicates that Ottomans had tried to improve the situation in eastern Anatolia and in fact, in the 1890s, conditions had started to improve and order was gradually restored. However, at the same period, ironically, Armenian revolutionaries had begun their campaigns against the Ottomans. Therefore, it is possible to say that the Europeans, although indirectly, prevented the restoration of peace and order in the region due to their support to Armenian rebels.

Chapter 5: Armenians and the Ottoman Revolution

McCarthy's narration of this chapter begins with an overview of Abdülhamit II's reign and its consequences. The repressive reign of sultan Abdülhamit II

led to the formation of revolutionary groups amongst Ottoman military officers and intellectuals who came to believe that radical changes were needed to prevent the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. Some believed in centralization of power with a strong government, a unified state, and an Ottoman nationalism that moved passed ethnic identities. Others believed in a system of autonomous national groups which would nevertheless work together for the good of the empire.

These differing revolutionary plans were cut short by the revolt of the Third Army in 1908, which brought a different kind of Ottoman Revolution that placed the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) to power within the empire. Out of practical considerations, CUP chose to collaborate with the Dashnaks, seeing them as a key to appeasing Western powers. The Dashnaks became an integral part of the political alliances that kept CUP in power, became the main representative force of Ottoman Armenians, and used their position to bring many of their members (who actively worked to undermine the empire) into positions within the empire's administrative and political system. However, despite their proclaimed loyalty to the empire, the CUP always suspected that the Dashnaks were in fact vying for secession. When, in the subsequent years, the CUP managed to firmly establish itself in power and when it realized that there was simply no way to appease the Western powers, relations between CUP and the Dashnaks began to deteriorate.

The incident in Adana in 1909 only served to mark up the tension between the Armenian revolutionaries such as the Dashnaks and the empire. Armenian revolutionaries were encouraging local Armenians in this region to arm themselves. As put forth by the British consul in Adana, the swagger with which the local Armenians carried their guns and their verbal remarks began to provoke the local Muslims. Tensions between both sides eventually turned a minor altercation into a major communal fight. Although the local Armenians had the guns, the local Muslims had the numbers. Roughly 5000 Armenians and 1000 Muslims perished in the violence and excessive behavior that ensued. The Ottoman government took action against the perpetrators of violence, albeit in an ineffective way, for example by executing some of the culprit Muslims and Armenians. As McCarthy puts it; "No one planned the events in Adana, neither the Armenians nor the Turks. The deaths resulted from a long-simmering distrust between Muslims and Armenians."

The fight over property rights in eastern Anatolia further damaged the relations between Ottoman Armenians and the empire. The Ottoman government exercised weak control over the Kurdish tribes who operated in eastern

Anatolia. These tribes vied for power amongst each other, extracting protection money from Muslim and Armenian farmers alike, and paying few taxes to the government. Meanwhile, wealthy Armenian money lenders also preyed on the population by lending money and seizing property when debts were not paid. As such, Kurdish overlords and Armenian lenders turned local farmers into little more than serfs. The Dashnaks wanted reforms to improve Armenian farmers' situation. However, the Ottoman Empire lacked the manpower to truly bring the Kurdish tribes and carry out reforms for the good of both Muslim and Armenian farmers, and furthermore did not wish to alienate the Kurdish tribes too much and risk losing their military support against the Russian Empire. Some Kurdish tribes actually collaborated with the Russians when it suited their interests. As such, the Ottoman government adopted a delaying tactic against all sides, which pleased no one, and increased the suspicion held both by Armenian revolutionaries and Kurdish tribes. The Dashnaks wanted the "feudalist" Kurdish tribes to be punished, something the government was incapable of doing. Meanwhile, the Kurdish tribes saw the government as an "enemy of traditional status and privileges" of the tribes. As such, the Ottoman Empire was caught in the middle of two conflicting sides, incapable of finding an effective solution.

The Dashnaks gained great legitimacy and influence from being a part of the CUP government. They used pressure and punishment to silence or remove any Armenian who did not agree with their work and methods. This included forcing the removal of the Armenian Patriarch of Istanbul. Knowing that the CUP regime's reluctance to put a stop to their machinations to avoid Western interference, the Dashnaks went about stockpiling weapons and recruiting revolutionaries. They intimidated local Armenians into buying the weapons they were selling, making a huge profit out of them. They also drew up elaborate plans for what McCarthy calls "partisan warfare", meaning a revolutionary and secessionist struggle that was to be waged against the empire and the Muslim population. These plans were distributed in communities where Armenians lived, who were expected to carry out the orders given to them. As McCarthy points out, the actions of Armenian revolutionaries such as the Dashnaks was very alarming for the Ottoman Empire. The Armenian revolutionaries' involvement in the creation of the two "inspectories" (easily exploitable special administrative zones established with the pressure of Western powers and Russia) in the eastern section of the empire was the final nail in the coffin for relations between the Ottoman government and the Armenian revolutionaries. The Ottoman government came to see the Armenian revolutionaries as untrustworthy groups that posed a danger no different than that of the one posed by the British, French or Russians.

McCarthy's narration of these events serve to highlight the following fact to the reader: the latter half of the 19th century and the 20th century presented a number of conundrums for the Ottoman Empire. Both the Western powers and the people of the Ottoman Empire were well aware that the empire was in decline and that reform was need to resuscitate it. However, the Ottoman Empire lacked the resources and unity needed to carry out such reforms.

As McCarthy explains, the empire needed the cooperation of both Ottoman Armenians and Kurdish tribes to make reforms easier to carry out, but both groups actually worsened the situation with their behavior. In the end, the weakening Ottoman Empire became caught in the middle of the power struggle of Western powers and Russia, and the machinations of both Kurdish tribes and Armenian revolutionaries. It simply lacked the capacity to carry out changes that would have help put a stop to its disintegration.

Chapter 6: World War I

McCarthy tries to give an overall picture of the most critical phases of Ottoman-Armenian relations in this very densely informative chapter. He concludes that the war was devastating for all people in Anatolia and states that "at the end of the war, the population of eastern Anatolia was far different than it had been for centuries... Armenians were gone... number of Muslims were greatly diminished". The result of the World War I was a region that was left with ruins, disease, and devastation.

McCarthy begins his narration by explaining the events that led to this ruin. He argues that the reemergence of the Armenian rebellion in eastern Anatolia, their joining of forces with the Russians, and coordinated assistance for the Russian advance in Eastern Anatolia proved successful as the Armenians and Russians occupied Van. Armenians provided intelligence, struck a blow to communications between Ottoman army outposts, raided civilian posts to divert attention of the Ottoman security forces behind the front lines and therefore successfully forced the Ottoman army to detach one third of its forces to fight the Armenians in and around Van. Armenians proved very helpful for the Ottoman defeat and tried make the occupation even easier for the Russians when they began the occupation of Van in advance of the anticipated Russian occupation.

As McCarthy delicately highlights, the Armenian rebellion became uncontrollable when the Russians realized they were taking action not only against the Ottoman forces in the region but rather acted against the Muslim

civilian population. Russians were later defeated and during their retreat they abandoned the Armenians in Van, determined not to seek Armenian support again in the future.

McCarthy argues that the main effect of the rebellion in Anatolia was to create chaos in the interior and draw away soldiers who should have been fighting the Russians. Ottoman government realized that the Armenian rebellion was a critical factor and their success was a direct result of local support, either voluntary or involuntary. Thus McCarthy later describes some of the prominent rebellions by the Armenians that occurred in 1915 that reflects the level of the threat to internal security of Anatolia; in Sasun-Muş-Bitlis (February 1915), Sivas-Karahisar (February 1915), Zeytun-Maraş (January 1915), Urfa (August 1915), Musadağı (August 1915). As a result, Ottoman government had to treat these rebellion as an extensive insurgency and therefore took measures to deal with this growing security threat during a time of war. Ottoman government lacked the adequate resources and manpower to come up with a gradual counterinsurgency policy, thus it necessitated a more radical approach, namely what McCarthy calls the “forced migration” of the Armenian population from the provinces in active, large-scale rebellion and/or occupied previously by the Russians. McCarthy recommends the use term “forced migration”, but he continues to use the terms “relocation” and “transfer” interchangeably and frequently during the chapter.

McCarthy argues that the forced migration process did not include all the Armenians. Accordingly most Armenians in western Anatolia and Ottoman Europe, who were not considered a danger, were excluded from the relocation order. All the orders and regulations regarding the process indicated to the fact that there was concern for the well-being of the relocated Armenians and in no way reflected a desire to cause death or directly kill Armenians. In fact, as McCarthy correctly points out, there were no documents, regulations, or orders that directly indicated an intention or will to destroy Armenians. All the evidence, with regard to the official policy of the state, proves the opposite. McCarthy admits that Armenians suffered greatly from the process, as did all the peoples in the empire who bore the effects of the war in Anatolia, but this was due to government inefficiency, lack of resources, and rapaciousness of Kurdish tribes, criminals, and even some avaricious Ottoman officials. McCarthy states that in theory the relocation process were to be orderly and well supervised, but the system could not cope with the process.

McCarthy tries to give some estimates with regard to the number of people who were relocated, which is only possible when someone makes use of the relocation statistics, what is known of the relocation process, and population

records. Accordingly, McCarthy argues that slightly more than half of Armenians in territory controlled by the Ottomans were not relocated; most of them also either left before or during the war for Istanbul and other cities, or other countries such as Greece, US, Canada, France, Bulgaria, and Egypt.

One of the most important arguments McCarthy makes in this chapter with regard to the intention of the Ottoman government to keep the well-being of the Armenians who were relocated is that the Ottoman government openly supported and invited the American efforts to aid the Armenians in need. Ottoman government accepted missionary aid to Armenians that amounted to approximately 10 billion dollars today, which McCarthy correctly calls the greatest expenditure of non-governmental relief funds in history. He also points to the fact that at the same period, Muslim population in Anatolia was also suffering from diseases and starvation, but they could only make use of the limited government resources.

McCarthy uses this example to show that Ottoman attempts to protect the Armenians were deficient. But he also argues that the Ottoman government could not protect the Armenians from other threats besides starvation and disease. Ottomans were incapable of properly protecting either the Armenians or even its own troops from the attacks of the Kurdish tribes, bandits, looters etc. However, explaining the underlying reasons behind the attacks against the Armenians in the region, McCarthy claims that a good deal of the hatred and vengeance against the Armenians was an inevitable result of their earlier attacks and collaboration with the Russians, and their rebellion that cost the lives of the Muslim civilian population in the region. The existence of over 250,000 Muslim refugees who were forced out of Southern Caucasus and their sufferings at the hands of the Armenians under Russian command could probably be another factor. In the end, McCarthy states that there were unprincipled state officials who misbehaved against the Armenians, but Ottoman government recognized these crimes took place and responded with investigations that led to trials and even executions at the time. He correctly points out to the fact that neither the Russians nor the Armenians ever tried those who were guilty of crimes against Muslims.

McCarthy suggests that the Armenian killings and expulsion of the Muslims was not a result of pragmatic interest calculation. Armenians were destroying the region and cities together with the infrastructure and the settlements, the space that they were aiming to take under control. According to McCarthy, the only remaining explanation was the hatred felt against the Muslims, because the level of destruction made no sense. Even when in 1916 Russians invaded eastern Anatolia again, Armenians proved uncontrollable by continuing

murders of Muslims, and therefore Russians began to court-martial the Armenians in the region prior to their retreat in 1917 revolution.

McCarthy shows that the atrocities by the Armenians continued after the Russian retreat to the South Caucasus. Anticipating Ottoman advance, Armenians fought the Muslims in the region, especially the Kurdish tribes, and when the Ottoman forces began to take control of the region the remaining Armenians fled, leaving devastation and committing mass killings on their way. Armenian executions of the Ottoman prisoners of war, who were kept under guard by the Russians were an example of the hatred McCarthy mentions throughout the chapter.

McCarthy analyzes the Armenian attempts to establish control over the lands in the south, mainly in Adana, by assisting the French occupation in the region and argues that in the end this attempt also failed due to Armenian atrocities against the Muslim population in the region, which resulted in a coordinated collaboration between the Turks and Kurds against the French and the Armenians. Armenians were abandoned by the French as a result, and most of those Armenians fled with the French.

McCarthy's evaluation of the World War I is full of details despite the shortage of space. He successfully points out to several critical points that clearly shows how the Ottoman state fairly perceived a direct threat that had been gradually developing before and during the war. Despite the physical and social devastation of the threat McCarthy also shows how the Ottoman government displayed a delicate concern for the civilian lives, however deficient the implementation of the process, and showed good intentions by admitting to the fact that the administration of the precautions for the safety of the Ottoman state were inadequate and therefore any help to that end were welcome. He profoundly demonstrates how the Armenian rebellion and insurgency were abandoned by the foreign powers at the end of the war and even then how the Armenians played a devastating role for the region.

Chapter 7: Conclusion

In the conclusion part, McCarthy gives a general framework of his book, "Turks and Armenians" by focusing on how Turks were seen and what was believed of the Turks. Besides that, although Armenians had the lesser population in Six Vilayets, McCarthy highlights the irrationality of desire for minority rule by giving examples and providing documents. McCarthy, points out the importance of the right description of the genocide term by submitting

names who tried to form the definition of the genocide term including the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.

Justin McCarthy states that the true history is always underestimated and virtual sources were only mentioned by newspapers and magazines. What happened in the World War 1 is the product of American missionaries and British propagandists' studies.

McCarthy emphasizes that the true events in the Eastern Anatolia was never reflected in a just way. The events were always narrated by the pro-Armenians and prejudice against Turkey was fed with one-sided reports.

On the other hand, McCarthy states that no one tried to narrate events with the contributions of Turks. There is an unjust case here according to McCarthy. Actually, Turkey had no time to deal with such discussions because they tried to rebuild the ruined country. Turkey still have problems of defending herself but these are directly related with not dealing with older problems. Nevertheless, Armenians' modern claims were grounded on the historical propaganda activities. It is pointless to ground the Armenian nationalist identity on historical propaganda data, because none of them are based on truths, but based on what they want to believe, like the classification of "Terrible Turks".

Armenians has always dreamt the creation of Ottoman Armenia. Nevertheless, there is a distinct problem; Armenians were always dreaming of acting as a majority. This is nothing more than emulation to European majorities who had been integrated in the community they had been living in. However, Armenians were distinct to Professor McCarthy for being very few in Six Vilayets. Moreover, McCarthy adds if all Armenians in the world had come to Anatolia, the population would have been still below forty percent. According to Justin McCarthy, Armenians were less than one-fourth of the population in these Six Vilayets. What the Armenians sought was to dominate the whole population, although they were minority in the Anatolian community.

McCarthy mentions that, according to Armenians, eastern Anatolia, Cilicia and southern Caucasus were Armenian lands and everyone but Armenians were invaders and foreigners. McCarthy states that the Dashnaks claimed that the whole land belonged to them. McCarthy states that, despite the fact that 1.7 million Muslims were forced to leave their lands in the South Caucasus and Crimea, they had never made territorial claims.

McCarthy says, today, Armenians use their allegations as their warranty and

Armenians are certain that Turkey will not gain European Union accession if they will not accept the Armenian allegations.

The question of genocide is very confusing in general as Justin McCarthy says. However, it is clear that, if there is an intention to exterminate a group of people, it can be one of the acceptable components of act of genocide. Justin McCarthy highlights some names to make the definition of genocide clear in readers' mind. McCarthy says that, there is an evolution of the term 'genocide'. Henry Huttenbach and Peter Drost's definitions are grounded on killing of individuals, but what missing is "an attempt to kill all members of large groups.

As a wider definition of genocide, Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn are brought to the attention of the readers of Turks and Armenians. According to McCarthy, their definitions seem much clearer than the definitions of Huttenbach and Drost. Chalk and Jonassohn made a strong contribution to the definition by using "one-sided mass killing" and "authority intend". Israel Charney, the last name who made a final contribution to the definition of genocide, emphasized "the essential defenselessness of the victim." All stages of the genocide definition lead people to identify Nazi state of mind during the act of genocide.

Pointing out that "the most important quality of genocide is intent", Justin McCarthy states that, "most definitions of genocide, including the UN definition, are strangely silent on intent." According to McCarthy, if Ottoman administration had intended to kill Armenians, it would not have enacted a relocation policy. Moreover, there is no proof of any Ottoman intended to kill all the Armenians. On the contrary, there are countless indicators that Ottomans had never intended to exterminate the Armenian population in Anatolia. For instance, McCarthy draws attention to the fact that officials who persecuted Armenians were tried by Ottoman courts.

To conclude, McCarthy highlights that there had been a mutual massacre during World War I and in a war case, it is a natural result to be subjected to starvation and disease. McCarthy ends his words by saying no one was guilty and no one was innocent. Therefore, the case was not genocide, but it was a war.