

BOOK REVIEWS

(KİTAP TAHLİLLERİ)

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Great Catastrophe: Armenians and Turks in the Shadow of Genocide

Ahuhur: Thomas de Waal (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015)
313 pages, ISBN: 9780199350698; Language: English; Amazon.com
price (hardcover) \$22.17 (01.02.2015).

Thomas de Waal is a senior associate in the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a highly esteemed global network of policy research centers in Russia, China, Europe, the Middle East and the United States, founded in 1910 in the United States. Prior to the Carnegie Endowment, in the years between 2002 and 2009 de Waal worked as an analyst and project manager on the conflicts in the South Caucasus at the London-based NGOs Conciliation Resources and the Institute for War and Peace Reporting. He has reported for the reputable media outlets such as the BBC World Service, The Moscow Times and The Times¹.

Thomas de Waal is a renowned specialist on the South Caucasus region and the wider Black Sea region. He co-authored the book *Chechnya: Calamity in the Caucasus* (New York University Press. 1997) with Carlotta Gall. He is the author of the books *Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan Through Peace and War* (New York University Press. 2003) and *The Caucasus: An Introduction* (Oxford University Press. 2010). *Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan Through Peace and War* is a widely-acknowledged study and one of the main reference books on the Karabakh conflict².

Great Catastrophe: Armenians and Turks in the Shadow of Genocide

1 <http://carnegieendowment.org/experts/?fa=479>; <http://carnegieendowment.org/about/> (latest access 05.02.2015).

2 <http://carnegieendowment.org/experts/?fa=479> (latest access 05.02.2015).

(Oxford University Press, 2015) is Thomas de Waal's latest book. In this book, de Waal aims to provide a full account of the Armenian-Turkish relations in the last decade years. He narrates almost the full story of the Armenian-Turkish relations from 1890s via 1915 until today with a spirited style, reflects on the major turning points, displays some of the overlooked aspects of these relations and draws attention to complications in this relationship³. As such, de Waal spotlights some prospective research questions for the scholarly community. On the contrary to propagandist and recurring academic and popular studies that dominate the literature on the Armenian-Turkish relations, de Waal succeeds in keeping a correct distance from his subject matter and composes a rather balanced narrative and provides mostly impartial arguments. This helps him to decimate some of the 'myths' both in the academic and popular literature on the Armenian-Turkish relations. He provides valuable criticisms and corrections to some of the clichés in the literature.

Because the 1915 tragedy, which de Waal decides to call "genocide", has been the main parameter of the Armenian-Turkish relations, this tragedy and the "politics of genocide" occupy a central place in de Waal's book. As a central argument of the book, he draws attention to the unfruitful results of the "politicization of the genocide debate" for poisoning the Armenian-Turkish relations and obscuring a more comprehensive understanding of the history, which could be achieved through informed debate and dialogue between the two nations.

At the same time, inaccurate references, absence of references, historiographical/methodological faults, scant knowledge of the current socio-political developments in Turkey, unelaborated arguments and negligent utilization of the terms genocide, denial/denialist and deportation are the noticeable weaknesses of the book. These serious failures melt the validity of some arguments and lessen the value of the book which could have otherwise been a good introduction to the contemporary Armenian-Turkish relations for the general reader.

Some academic and most of the popular books on the 1915 tragedy contain exaggerated portrayals of the events that extinguish their reliability and validity. The conditions of the relocation of the Armenians following the *Sevk ve İskân Kanunu* (The Law of Relocation and Resettlement) issued on May 17th, 1915 and officially declared in the Ottoman state's official journal *Takvim-i Vekayi* on June 1st, 1915, are one of the frequently dramatized elements of the forced

3 On page 192, "Black City sea of Trabzon" is written instead of Black Sea city of Trabzon. This is an ignorable editorial mistake in the book.

relocation of the Armenians in 1915. Even in the Genocide Museum in Yerevan, besides the original photos, there are also dramatic illustrations of this period⁴. Although dramatized narratives and illustrations help to facilitate empathy with the people that had to pass through these difficult times, they obstruct the fuller understanding of the 1915 tragedy. On page 40 de Waal quotes a paragraph from the memoir of Hagop Arsenian, an Armenian who was subjected to relocation, in which he tells that a part of his transportation to Syria was by train and that he kept some of his money with him. This challenges the dominant narrative of ‘death marches to the desert on foot’. As such, it gives the researchers a hint for an important research topic: the conditions of transportation of the Armenians, different methods and, of course, the question ‘why’ and what this tells us about the 1915 tragedy. There are many more hints for the researcher like this one. For example, Chapter 3 nicely but very generally describes the entangled and multi-dimensional relations among Armenians, Russians, Ottomans, Great Powers and Azerbaijanis. This may give promising ideas for original research that would help to revise some elements of the dominant Armenian and Turkish historiographies. Other parts of the book, too, not poke in the eyes but hint at important research topics to the careful reader. This is the contribution of this popular book to the research community.

Throughout the book, de Waal clarifies his perspective on the unproductive results of the “politicization of the genocide debate”. According to de Waal, “politicization of the genocide debate” “has obscured the real history behind it, throwing up a barrier against those who otherwise would have been more ready to understand its flesh-and-blood realities”⁵. He also refers to the poisonous effects of the “politicization of the genocide debate” on the Armenian-Turkish relations.

This is certainly a correct observation, which is sometimes overlooked by the research community. However, it also carries a certain degree of naivety. Although a close observer of the Armenian-Turkish relations, de Waal fails to elucidate fully the political rationales of the Armenian and the Turkish sides in carrying out the “genocide debate”. De Waal, although not expressing it overtly, gives an impression that “politicization of the genocide debate” is a result of the irrational obstinacy of both sides. A more comprehensive explanation, however, should have addressed what the Armenian side was expecting to achieve following Turkey’s ‘recognition of genocide’. These are

4 The author of this essay visited the Genocide Museum in Yerevan latest in the summer of 2011.

5 De Waal, *Great Catastrophe: Armenians and Turks in the Shadow of Genocide*, New York, Oxford University Press, 2015, p.3.

reparations and territorial rearrangements between Armenia and Turkey. Not only the representatives of the radical sections of the Armenian diaspora but also the high-ranking officials of the Armenian state covertly or explicitly, but consistently, disclose that Turkey's recognition of the 1915 events as genocide would follow by demands for reparations and territorial rearrangements. As de Waal mentions in the passing the "aversion [of Armenia] to a formal reference to the Treaty of Kars" in 1993 when Armenia and Turkey were "95 percent" in agreement on a text" to sign diplomatic protocols⁶ reveals that Turkey's suspicions are not ungrounded. At the same time, "genocide" is used by the Armenian state to achieve some other political goals vis-à-vis Turkey such as the reinstatement of the diplomatic relations and opening of the land-border between the two countries. In other words, behind the curtain of a rhetoric based on morality and justice, there is a clear political rationale of the insistence on the recognition of the 1915 events as genocide. In fact, de Waal's book has hints about that, such as the quotations from Gerard Libaridian on page 202⁷ or from Vartan Oskanian on page 208⁸.

The position of the Turkish side shall be explained with reference to the political instrumentalization of the "genocide" by the Armenian side. In fact, that is at least one of the reasons of de Waal's impression, which he expresses as "from our conversation I got the impression that almost any initiative with Armenians was now acceptable to the Turkish government, but they still resisted the "genocide" word with everything they could muster"⁹.

De Waal states that state-building, conflict with Azerbaijan over Karabakh and closed land-border with Turkey are the "more important national ideas" for the citizens of the Republic of Armenia. He states "the Genocide is not an

6 Ibid p.205.

7 De Waal cites Libaridian as follows:

Do we want Turkey to recognize the Genocide? Of course. But is that a pre-condition? Of course not. Why not? Because that doesn't resolve any particular issue that the country is facing, that our people are facing. We have no energy, we have no economy, we have a war with Azerbaijan and we are going to go to Turkey and say, "You guys are killers and you are killers if you don't recognize [the Genocide] and we want what from you? Territory." What kind of policy is that? That's not a policy, that's reflex.

8 De Waal cites Oskanian as follows:

Because nothing was happening in Armenian-Turkish ties, Kocharian was thinking that it was our moral obligation to talk more about this and to raise it in international organizations. He had seen that being reserved about it had not produced any positive results anyway—so by putting it on the foreign policy agenda, it was not deemed as something that will change the situation drastically. I think he was right. Raising that issue more openly, speaking about it at the UN, also helping our different communities in different countries to pursue recognition was not detrimental in any way to our obligations. On the contrary what transpired in my period and after, leading to the [2009] Protocols, was maybe the result of more openness about the genocide issue, this led to more debate within Turkey, as more countries recognized. And I think that helped the debate.

9 De Waal, *Great Catastrophe*, p. 9.

organizing principle of identity for citizens of the Republic of Armenia”¹⁰. This argument reflects the truth only partially. Even a quick overview of press, state discourse¹¹, mainstream academic studies, think tank reports, political party speeches and a few conversations with the people of different socio-economic classes in Armenia reveals that “the Genocide” is indeed an “organizing principle of identity” in Armenia. What de Waals fails to acknowledge is that the present-day Armenia is not the Armenia of the times of Levon Ter Petrosyan. At the same time, by quoting Bishop Khajag Barsamian de Waal rightly mentions that “Anatolia has a plural memory...Armenian memory is too singular. The fact that [what happened in 1915] wasn’t a genocide doesn’t minimize the suffering”¹².

De Waal states that he uses “the term ‘Armenian Genocide’ in the book, having, after much reading, respectfully agreed with the scholarly consensus that what happened to the Armenians in 1915–1916 did indeed fit the 1948 United Nations definition of genocide”. He adds, “at the same time, along with many others, I do so with mixed feelings, having also reached the conclusion that the ‘G-word’ has become both legalistic and over-emotional, and that it obstructs the understanding of the historical rights and wrongs of the issue as much as it illuminates them”¹³. De Waal argues that there are many high quality studies on the “genocide” and there is almost a consensus among the academic circles that the 1915 tragedy constitutes genocide and the current scholarly debate is on the “secondary issues”¹⁴.

It is true that most of the international scholarly community sustains that the 1915 tragedy constitutes genocide. Yet, it is highly debatable that this agreement is built on high quality academic studies. A review of the literature would show that there are indeed very few good studies on the 1915 tragedy. De Waal mentions Taner Akçam, Donald Bloxham, Fuat Dundar, Hilmer Kaiser, Hans-Lukas Lieser, Raymond Kevorkian, Ronald Suny, Eric Zürcher, Peter Holquist, Donald Quataert, Michel Reynolds as the prominent scholars in the field¹⁵. Many of these names are distinguished scholars. However, it is questionable if Taner Akçam, the protégé of the propagandist-as-historian Vahakn Dadrian¹⁶, a professor at the Robert Aram, Marianne Kaloosdian and

10 Ibid p.3.

11 For the Armenian state discourse, see Turgut Kerem Tuncel, *Armenian Diaspora: Diaspora, State and the Imagination of the Republic of Armenia*, Ankara, Terazi Publishing, 2014, pp.81-124.

12 De Waal, *Great Catastrophe*, p. 9.

13 Ibid p. ix.

14 Ibid p.20.

15 Ibid pp.48-49.

16 See, de Waal, *Great Catastrophe*, pp.47-48 for de Waal’s criticism of Dadrian.

Stephen and Marian Mugar Chair in Armenian Genocide Studies at Clark University (MA, USA), contributor to the Armenian Weekly published by the ultra-nationalist Armenian Revolutionary Federation-Dashnaksutyun¹⁷, with organic ties with the radical sections of the Armenian diaspora can be named among those venerable scholars. Likewise, including Ronald Suny, a senior scholar of the Russian/Soviet history who gained his Ph.D. in 1968, in the list is a misfit, since Suny began to publish works on “genocide” only recently and his academic reputation is hardly because of his studies on “genocide”. On page 53, de Waal mentions the “Ten Commands” that “bought by British intelligence in 1919 from an Ottoman security official...[which] most scholars now believe that the document is a forgery”. He tells that Raymond Kévorkian, however, “speculates that it was an ‘authentic fake’ fabricated by someone who knew the thinking of the Unionist leadership and manufactured it in order to escape prosecution by the British”¹⁸. It is just fair to question the scholarly integrity of a historian that makes such a claim and, consequently, his name in the list of the prominent scholars of “genocide”. Only a few would claim writing a 1008 pages-long ‘complete history of the Armenian genocide’ makes one a good historian¹⁹.

Overall, a more precise definition of the current state of the art of research on the 1915 tragedy would have been ‘today, most of the international academic community accepts the 1915 tragedy was genocide. However, there are few good studies on the subject. For that reason more research has to be done by independent and detached scholars’. Unfortunately, today this is not an easily achievable enterprise both for the difficulty of getting out of the academic routine, luxury and security of conformity, and also the embeddedness of some of the academic circles. The fact that out of 20 issues composed of thousands of pages of the journal *Genocide Studies International*, published by the U.S. led International Association of Genocide Scholars, only nine pages of one article tackle with the Native Americans demonstrates the problem²⁰.

As it is said, “God is in the detail”; details are important. Therefore, studying the details of the 1915 tragedy, that what de Waal calls “secondary issues”, is an urgent task. Studying the “secondary issues” would terminate some of the

17 Armenian Revolutionary Federation-Dashnaksutyun is generally accepted as one of the orchestrators of the terrorist attacks on Turkish targets between 1975 and 1985. For the Armenian militant nationalist radicalism between 1975 and 1985 see, Tuncel, *Armenian Diaspora*, pp.287-286.

18 De Waal, *Great Catastrophe*, p.53.

19 Raymond Kévorkian in 2011 published 1008 pages-long book *The Armenian Genocide: A Complete History*.

20 See, Tal Buenos’ address at the luncheon hosted by NSW Parliamentary Friends of Turkey New South Wales Parliament on November,24 2014 at <http://www.avim.org.tr/yorumnotlarduyurular/en/THE-ADDRESS-DELIVERED-BY-MR-TAL-BUENOS-AT-NSW-PARLIAMENT/3795>

‘myths’ in the academic and popular mainstream such as the “Holocaust model” that de Waal, too, labels as “flawed”²¹. Furthermore, studying the “secondary issues” would facilitate comprehension of the “cumulative radicalization”²² of the events that led to the 1915, which renders the “intentionality” thesis less relevant. For that, de Waal could refer to Edward J. Erickson’s *Ottomans and Armenians: A Study in Counterinsurgency* (2013) published by the prestigious publisher Palgrave to provide the reader with a fuller picture. Alas, he did not. This would also help de Waal to elaborate the relations he mentions in passing between Armenians and “‘Uncle Christian’(Russia)”²³, the “provocation thesis”²⁴ or the questions he mentions on pages 55-56 as regards to the importance that shall be given to the role of the Armenian revolutionaries.

De Waal states²⁵:

Engaging with history rather than with a virtual Armenian-Turkish courtroom, contemporary historians spend less time on the issue of intent—after all, even if there is no single archival document which dots the i’s and crosses the t’s, there was demonstrably both a murderous disposition in the actions of the Young Turk leaders in 1915 and a genocidal outcome for the Armenians. Most (but not all) historians who write about the Armenians and 1915 use the word “genocide,” while acknowledging that it is more a legal-political term than a historical one.

Arguably, this passage includes one of the most critical observations in the book. De Waal, implicitly recognizes that genocide is a legal term defined by the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on December 9th, 1948. Genocide is a legal characterization of an event. Certainly, historical research has to provide evidence to characterize an event as genocide. To do that, in order to fulfil the requirement set by the Article 2 of the Convention, the “intent to destroy” has to be proved beyond any question. This has to rely on the analysis of reliable and valid data. Therefore, propagandist historical books and memoirs cannot stand for evidence. Accounts of the eye-witnesses and war-time diplomatic notes can be used only very cautiously. “Murderous dispositions”²⁶ of the individuals or “genocidal outcomes”²⁷ cannot prove the

21 De Waal, *Great Catastrophe*, p.64.

22 Ibid pp.60-62.

23 De Waal, *Great Catastrophe*, p.30-31.

24 Ibid p.55.

25 Ibid p.53.

26 Ibid p.53.

27 Ibid p.53.

intent. Only true archival documents can constitute the data for this enterprise. Therefore, historians and distinguished researchers like de Waal himself have to be cautious of using a legal term randomly. Likewise, using the terms like “denial” and “denialist”, which are equally politicized terms with the term genocide, risks de Waal’s book to remind propagandist books. The negligence of de Waal with some problematic terms is also evident in his usage of the term deportation which means banishment to a foreign country to refer to the forced relocation of Armenians ordered by the Law of Relocation and Resettlement issued on May 17th, 1915. By this law Armenians in certain regions of the Ottoman Empire were not expelled to another country, but were relocated to the north of the present-day Syria, which was then within the borders of the Ottoman state. In fact, de Waal seems to be aware of the problems of using the terms genocide and denial/denialist and sometimes use them in quotation marks. However, like the great majority of the scholars, he does not seem to be cognizant of the difference between deportation and relocation.

In the introduction to the Chapter 12 of his book “Two Memorials in Istanbul”, de Waal reflects on two memorials in Şişli district in Istanbul not far from each other. De Waal writes²⁸:

These two memorial sites, within walking distance of one another, say something about the schizophrenia of modern Turkey regarding its past. On the one hand, an Armenian poet [Daniel Varoujan] killed in 1915 is memorialized, along with hundreds of his ethnic kin. On the other, the man [Talat Pasha] who ordered the poet’s arrest and murder—and directed one of the twentieth century’s worst atrocities—is also still afforded a memorial, albeit one kept in far worse condition.

Although de Waal draws attention to some of the idiosyncrasies in Turkey nicely, he fails to notice that the Armenian cemetery in Şişli is the private property of the Turkish-Armenian community and is maintained by this community, whereas Talat Pasha’s monument is in a park that belongs to a municipality. The different conditions of the two sites are particularly due to the inadequacy of the municipal services. The fact that de Waal is not aware of this actuality reveals his insufficient knowledge of the present-day Turkey. In effect, de Waal’s absence of sufficient knowledge of the contemporary Turkey reveals itself most apparently in Chapter 8 titled “A Turkish Thaw” in which de Waal addresses the recent popularization of the ‘Armenian issue’ in Turkey. In this chapter, de Waal repeats some of the ‘myths’ that the Turkish ‘liberal intelligentsia’ has created, including the one that Taner Akçam created about himself. Consequently, while overrating some of the developments in

28 Ibid p.249.

Turkey, de Waal remains oblivious to some of the deeper agendas and the use and abuse of the ‘Armenian question’ by certain political groups. In the introduction of the book, de Waal fails to elaborate the political rationale behind the Kurdish political movement’s recent discourse on the “genocide”, although he implies that, yet only in passing²⁹. At the same time, by mentioning the ‘Sabiha Gökçen case’³⁰, de Waal provides the reader with important insights about the ‘Armenian question’ in present-day Turkey.

As mentioned above, de Waal’s book underlines some of the overlooked aspects of the history of contemporary Armenian-Turkish relations. Nonetheless, de Waal keeps some important historical turning points in this history relatively unexplored³¹. There are also some historically incorrect arguments such as the one that claims whereas in Lebanon there was a significant support to ASALA and JCAG-ARA terrorism, most of the Armenians in the Western countries deplored terrorism. To argue that, de Waal refers to Anny Balakian’s *Armenian-Americans: From Being to Feeling Armenian* (1993). Besides the methodological problems in Balakian’s research, the specific example that de Waal quotes from Balakian on page 157 is simply not valid for that argument. Besides, de Waal overlooks some of the documented facts that imply there was a significant support to terrorism among the Armenians in the Western countries³².

These might be considered as relatively minor mistakes. However, there are inexcusable historiographical faults in de Waal’s book. His unreliable sources are one of those faults. On page 62, when picturing Kemal, the “bloodthirsty” governor of Yozgat, de Waal refers to Peter Balakian’s *The Burning Tigris: The Armenian Genocide and America’s Responses* (2003). However, no serious scholar considers Balakian’s book as a serious historical study. On page 92, de Waal names Aram Andonian among his sources with respect to the ‘Armenian deportations’. This is nothing but ridiculous; the fakery of Andonian’s *The Memoirs of Naim Bey: Turkish Official Documents Relating to the Deportation and the Massacres of Armenians* that has been used as an evidence of the “genocide” has already been a proven fact. De Waal’s random references are also evident in his reference to Rafael de Nogales, a Venezuelan soldier of fortune that served in the Ottoman army between 1915 and 1917. On pages 54-55, de Waal cites Nogales’ description of the governor of

29 Ibid p.11.

30 Ibid pp. 189-190& 285-286.

31 For example, Chapter 9 that narrates the birth of the Armenian Republic in 1991 could have detailed this process in reference to Armenian-Turkish relations. This would have shown the change of the Armenian policy with respect to Turkey by 1998 with the presidency of Robert Kocharyan.

32 See, Tuncel, *Armenian Diaspora*, pp.87-97 for a brief overview of the Armenian militant nationalist radicalism between 1975 and 1985.

Diyarbakir Mehmet Reshid as a man belonging “to a very aristocratic family of belonging Stambol”, although Mehmet Reshid was born to a Circassian family in the Caucasus and his family fled to Istanbul when he was 1 year-old. As such, it was impossible for him to belong to a “very aristocratic family”. De Waal quotes Nogales as follows: “Talaat had ordered the slaughter by a circular telegram, *if my memory is correct*, containing a scant three words: ‘Yak-Vur-Oldur,’ meaning ‘Burn, demolish, kill’” (emphasis added). Here, the delusiveness of the expression “Yak-Vur-Oldur” shall be apparent to anyone who knows Turkish. Secondly, Nogales writes “if my memory is correct” as an act of honesty. Alas, de Waal ignores what is apparent.

These invalid references are not due to lack of attention, they are the consequences of a faulted historiography; de Waal accredits memoirs, diplomatic reports, eye-witnesses of the protestant missionaries as valid sources. He does that rather in a self-contradictory way; while acknowledging the biases in the sources for being “subjective” and carrying “anti-Muslim” and “Turcophobic” prejudices, he still uses them because they “all share essential details, which confirm their basic authenticity”³³ although, in his own words “much of the literature of the time seeks a crude narrative of Christian martyrdom or the cheap thrill of barbaric atrocities”³⁴. As to Bryce and Toynbee’s *Blue Book*, de Waal refers to Toynbee himself to prove the reliability of this book. Besides, the clearly manipulative claim of Toynbee that the content of the book was okay, but the publisher, i.e., British government, was the problem³⁵, de Waal’s reliance on the author’s guarantee for the reliability of his own book is not only methodologically but also logically odd. Similar oddness is also apparent on pages 44-45, where de Waal implies the unreliability of Morgenthau’s memoirs yet, eventually uses them as a source. What is difficult to accept is mentioning Heath Lowry, who published a book criticizing Morgenthau’s memoirs without even giving the name of this book, not to say the full reference to it³⁶. On pages 56-57 de Waal refers to Gurgun Mahari’s “self-censored” *Burning Orchards* that was published in 1966 in Soviet Armenia in a way to underline the faults of the ARF-Dashnaksutyun. Doing that, as a renowned specialist of the Caucasus region, he incomprehensibly forgets to think whether it was possible in Soviet Armenia to refer to ARF-Dashnaksutyun in terms other than negative. De Waal’s reference to Harut Sassounian’s forthcoming book as to the Zurich Meeting in

33 De Waal, *Great Catastrophe*, p.33.

34 Ibid p.43.

35 Ibid pp.42-43.

36 Heath Lowry’s book that de Waal refers is *The Story behind Ambassador Morgenthau’s Story*, Istanbul, Isis Publications, 1990.

1977 is another clear evidence of de Waal randomness in choosing his references³⁷. With these methodological faults, de Waal's accusation of the "more extreme Turkish polemicist"³⁸ for engaging "in a game in which they cast doubt on every eyewitness report" lacks validity.

Overall, Thomas de Waal's *Great Catastrophe: Armenians and Turks in the Shadow of Genocide* is a comprehensive introduction to the contemporary Armenian-Turkish relations for the general reader. It is a comprehensive review of the general course and the major turning points of this complicated relationship between two nations. On the other hand, this book is impaired for repeating some recent 'myths' that the Turkish 'liberal intelligentsia' has created, which reveals de Waal's shortcomings to understand the deeper socio-political dynamics in Turkey. For the scholarly community, *Great Catastrophe* contains aggravating methodological errors, undependable references and invalid arguments as the causes of 'great frustration'.

37 Harut Sassounian is the publisher of the English-language Armenian weekly *The California Courier* since 1983. He is a known outspoken person, who contributes to major Armenian journals in the USA. Whereas, he writes articles about Armenian politics, the main body of his articles is composed of rigid criticisms of Turkey. Sassounian's articles are good examples to study the vague boundary between critique and hate speech.

38 De Waal, *Great Catastrophe*, p.53.

