DISCUSSING THE PROBABILITY OF TURKISH-ARMENIAN INTEGRATION BY MAKING COMPARISON TO THE EUROPEAN CASE

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Abstract: *When there are serious problems among countries, such as lack of diplomatic relations or closed borders, there are mainly two options to normalize their relations: Either, first at least solving the major problems and then normalizing relations or the opposite which is normalizing relations first and then trying to solve the problems in the course of time. A radical move would be, while the problems and conflicts remain, starting a process of integration and waiting for the problems to vanish by themselves. Two neighboring states, Turkey and Armenia, have a few in quantity but big in quality problems which are very far from being solved even in the remote future. On the other hand, the European Union project successfully eliminated the problem of bloody wars, though having problems about its raison d'être at the moment. If a number of enemies on the European continent accomplished to come together to start a clean page, why not the ones in the Caucasus region would achieve a similar one?*

Key Words: *Turkish-Armenian relations, EU, integration, integration theories, peace*

Introduction

Turkey and Armenia are two neighboring countries with problems which seems impossible to be solved. While the Armenian diaspora puts pressure on Turkey and the Armenian government as well to recognize the 1915 events as genocide and apologize for it before starting a "real" dialogue, the Armenian government on the other hand insists on the opening of borders to normalize relations. The Turkish state would not fulfill the demand of the diaspora because although what happened in 1915 is accepted as tragic events in Turkey, the general belief is that the massacres were mutual, both sides did suffer and cannot be called as genocide. It is difficult for the Turkish state to also fulfill the demand of the Armenian state, because the borders were closed after the Armenian state occupied Azerbaijan's territories. Therefore, for Turkey, opening the borders is linked to the condition of leaving the occupied Azerbaijani territories.

What if these two states start a process of integration with the aim of making serious conflicts or war impossible? Such a process in which the states integrate themselves with each other in several areas would have so much in common that conflicts would give serious harm to all the parties. As a result, existence of common interests and the perception of common future, as well as the risk of losing too much would make the quondam major problems insignificant.

The most successful integration example as such is the European integration process which is operating under the name of European Union (EU). With a sui generis style, the EU reached all its aims, eliminating the main threats of the post-war period, keeping the Germans "down", recovering their collapsed economies and most significant of all, establishing peace on the bloody continent. Although there are a lot of different factors which make it difficult to make a comparison between European integration and the imagined Turkish-Armenian integration, as the EU is the most successful one to establish peace among enemies, it is chosen as a case. On the other hand, as the post-war goals are all reached, it can be put forth that there isn't any "big issue" left for the European states to constitute its *raison d'être,* to make them stay together anymore. This makes the future of the EU blurred, which should be taken seriously into consideration in the realist aspect.

> *Integration refers to "the possibility of overcoming the conflicts without use of violence"*

Definitions of Integration

The most popular definition of integration is made by Karl W. Deutsch, which is, "the achievement of a 'sense of community' on a certain territory; the existence of sufficient power and popularity of the institutions and the activities of this community".[1] According to Deutsch, integration refers to "the possibility of overcoming the conflicts without use of violence".[2] He explains integration as "the relation between the mutually interdependent units which collectively constitute the qualities of the system that would not be possible separately". Deutsch also defines political integration as "the integration of political actors and political units such as individuals, groups, municipalities, regions and states by taking their political behaviors into account".[3]

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1   Karl W. Deutsch, "Political Community and the North Atlantic Area" in Brent F. Nelsen and Alexander C-G. Stubb (eds.) *The European Union: Readings On The Theory And Practice Of European Integration*, Second Edition, Macmillan Press Ltd., London, 1998, p.117.

2   Leon N. Lindberg, "Political Integration: Definitions And Hypotheses" in Brent F. Nelsen and Alexander C-G. Stubb (eds.) *The European Union: Readings On The Theory And Practice Of European Integration*, Second Edition, Macmillan Press Ltd., London, 1998, p.147.

3   Karl W. Deutsch, *The Analysis of International Relations*, Third Edition, Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 1988, p.212.

Ernst Haas makes the definition of political integration as "a process in which political actors from different national environments transfer their attachments, expectations and political activities to a new centre that has institutions capable of making supranational legal judgments.[4]

Lindberg's definition of political integration is "the process where the nations - independently from each other- assign new central bodies for decision-making after abandoning the power of making domestic and foreign policies". According to Lindberg, it is "the persuasion of different political actors to transfer their expectations and political activities to a new centre".[5]

Dedeoğlu defines political integration as "building a supranational body for interdependent states in a certain region in order to transform their national sovereignties to a common and functional sovereignty".[6]

We can conceptualize political integration of the EU as "coming closer of the member states to each other by increasing or deepening the cooperation areas, eliminating the borders, which will end by the weakening of the nation state and its disappearance".

Meanings of Integration

The meaning of European integration varied among peoples, countries and periods. Just after World War II, European integration meant, "coming together to fight against the German threat that can regain its previous power". During the Cold War, it referred to "close cooperation against the Soviet threat".

General Charles de Gaulle imputed a Euro-centric meaning to European integration. For him, it was "the cooperation of the European states to resist both the Soviet and the American domination, to become more independent in the international arena and to prove the world that Europe was the third superpower". For the Atlanticists,[7] integration represented the enlarged continuation of the process of elimination of the trade barriers, which started with GATT[8] in 1947.[9]

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4   Ernst B. Haas, *Beyond The Nation- State: Functionalism And International Organization*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1964, pp.26-27.

5   Leon N. Lindberg, "Political Integration: Definitions And Hypotheses" in Brent F. Nelsen and Alexander C-G. Stubb (eds.) *The European Union: Readings On The Theory And Practice Of European Integration*, Second Edition, Macmillan Press Ltd., London, 1998, p.149.

6   Beril Dedeoğlu, "Avrupa'da Siyasal Bütünleşme: 'Birlik' Modelinin Yeniden Düzenlenmesi" in Faruk Sönmezoğlu (ed.) *Uluslararası Politikada Yeni Alanlar Yeni Bakışlar*, Der Yayınları, İstanbul, 1998, p.356.

7   A doctrine defending cooperation between Europe and USA especially on political, economic and military issues.

8   GATT: *General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade*.

9   Robert Bideleux, "European Integration and Disintegration" in Robert Bideleux and Richard Taylor (eds.) *European Integration and Disintegration: East and West*, Routledge, London and New York, 1996, pp.2-4.

Following the end of the Soviet threat in the 1990s, the meaning of integration changed once again. Since economy and international trade became much more important, according to some groups, integration referred to "unification of European states by cooperating more deeply in more areas in order to compete with the US; and/or in order to keep the Germans under control".

It should be asserted that, what European integration represented, aimed, and meant changed many times. The integration theories have also been influential in shaping the meaning of integration. For example, when the functionalist theory was dominant, integration mostly meant economic cooperation, and was lacking a political dimension. However, when neo-functionalism was popular, the Maastricht Treaty was signed which paved the way for political union.[10] Moreover, when federalism was on the rise, especially during the first years of European integration, it has been easier for the European states to accept transferring power from national to supranational bodies in coal and steel sectors.

Stages of Integration

Integration is a process with its own inner dynamics. For that reason, to complete the process, there are various stages to pass over. The first layer of integration is partial cooperation, which means integration in limited sectors. When we look at the European integration history, we see that the first step is the European Coal and Steel Community. Starting with a close cooperation at the supranational level only in coal and steel sectors, the integration process continued with the European Economic Community. The Maastricht Treaty has been a milestone in the European political integration process, aiming at a political union in the end.

As argued above, theories have been essential in building the integration process in Europe. The founding fathers of the Coal and Steel Community Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman's federalist views have been very influential in the first years of integration. Besides, the theories defended by the leaders also have been powerful in the country's role in the integration process. While federalist leaders' countries supported more and more integration, realist leaders' countries most of the time supported a looser union.

After the "euro", economic integration came very close to the end. There were few areas left, like taxation, for the completion of the process and pronouncing "economic union". We should also note that it is almost impossible to make progress in the integration process by separating political and economic areas.

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10 Michael J. Baun, "The Maastricht Treaty As High Politics: Germany, France And European Integration", *Political Science Quarterly*, 110(4), Winter 95/96, p.605 .

Intergovernmentalism Versus Supranationalism

Integration theories explain the process of unification for separate nation states.[11] While federalism, neo-functionalism and consociationalism are theories of supranationalism; confederalism, realism, institutionalism and functionalism are theories defending the existence of nation states.

When the EU creates an independent authority in order to transfer some of the national sovereignties of the member states, then we can talk about supranationalism. The members allow the institutions that were created by themselves, to make common policies for the whole community. For example, decisions of the European Court of Justice, which are at the supranational level, is accepted by national courts.

At an intergovernmental level, the functions of the EU are constructed through the member states themselves, which have an association relationship with each other. The model that is much looser than the supranational one, allows the national governments to make policies and national law remains core.

Supranational model requires majority voting while it is important to make decisions with unanimous voting in intergovernmentalism. The voting system is an essential sign to show the depth of integration.

Supranationalists represent the European political elite who are ready to give up national interests for the sake of Europe's common interests and a common future. On the opposite side, the intergovernmentalists represent the national political elite who –as sometimes criticized- "selfishly" defend their national interests.[12]

These two concepts stay at the two margins in the integration discussions. The reality is different than both, where the two doctrines exist simultaneously in the structure of the Union. While in some areas, decisions are made at the supranational level; some areas remain at the intergovernmental level. If the political union had successfully been achieved, supranationalism would have been the dominant concept.

The states, which show sensitivity in high politics,[13] defend intergovernmentalism. Supranationalism, which is mentioned within the framework of federalism, is sharply opposed by states where the national sovereignty is sensitive such as the UK, Denmark, sometimes France and lately the Netherlands. On the other hand, smaller

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11 Sergio Pistone, "Altiero Spinelli and the Strategy for the United States of Europe" in Brent F. Nelsen and Alexander C-G. Stubb (eds.) *The European Union: Readings On The Theory And Practice Of European Integration*, Second Edition, Macmillan Press Ltd., London, 1998, p.85.

12 *Flexible Integration Towards a More Effective and Democratic Europe*, Monitoring European Integration 6, Centre for Economic Policy Research, London, 1995, p.41.

13 High politics: The essential political areas for a state such as foreign policy, defence and security.

states such as Belgium, Luxembourg, the Baltic states and, with the aim of becoming leader of the united Europe, Germany support supranationalism.

Federalism

National administrative units and regional administrative units simultaneously exist in a federal system. There is equality among all of the regional administrations; none is powerful than the other. There is a chosen national government, which is the sole one with authority over foreign and security policy of the state. A federal state has one currency, one constitution, has both national and regional legislative organs.[14] The best example for a federal state is the USA since 1789.

When we suppose the EU as a federal state, the regional states of the US correspond with the member states. However, the EU members have much more power and authority than the states of America. EU members have the authority to sign international agreements or to build military power, which the states of America lack.[15] Besides, the EU institutions still do not have a similar authority that the US government has.

Altiero Spinelli criticized European integration after World War II, arguing that the process was too slow and anti-democratic. He was in favor of a "revolution" for a federal system. What Spinelli dreamed of was a new European state where the member states transferred their national sovereignties to common democratic institutions. According to Spinelli who argued an American type of federalism for the European Union, the only way to bring success to the integration process was through federalism.[16] Spinelli opposed the functionalist theory, which defended a "step by step" integration process, because for him it was impossible for the functionalist model to be democratic enough to meet the needs of the people, and to be capable enough to build institutions to solve the basic problems. Advocating a "United States of Europe", he also focused on the methods of building a federal system for Europe.[17] Spinelli stressed that federalism should not be dictated through illegal, violent or forceful methods. On the contrary, it should be accepted by all states. He also claimed

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14 William H. Riker, "European Federalism: The Lessons of Past Experience" in Joachim Jens Hesse and Vincent Wright (eds.) *Federalizing Europe? The Costs, Benefits, and Preconditions of Federal Political Systems*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1996, pp.9-12; William H. Riker, *Democracy in the United States*, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1953, pp.303-318.

15 John McCormick, *Understanding the European Union*, Macmillan Press Ltd., London, 1999, p.7.

16 Ernesto Rossi and Altiero Spinelli, "The Ventotene Manifesto, August 1941" in Trevor Salmon and Sir William Nicoll (eds.) *Building European Union: A Documentary History And Analysis*, Manchester University Press, Manchester and New York, 1997, p.18.

17 Altiero Spinelli, "The United States of Europe and the Various Political Trends (1942)" in Trevor Salmon and Sir William Nicoll (eds.) *Building European Union: A Documentary History And Analysis*, Manchester University Press, Manchester and New York, 1997, pp.19-20.

that the representatives of the member nation states would be biased in protecting their sovereignties, which would keep them from finding federal solutions. As a result, founding of the federal institutions should be the duty of a Constitutive Assembly.[18]

Federalist statesmen have been in majority during the first years of European integration. The reason is simple. World War II has been an enormous tragedy for the continent. The aim was to prevent European states from making war again. The pain of the war was fresh enough to put the national ambitions to a second place.

The second wave of federalism was just after the Cold War. The explanation is again simple. West and East Germany unified, thus became stronger; which raised question marks and alarmed Germany's neighbors: "Is Germany strong enough to start another war as she did twice before?" Especially the French, probably believing that they were the ones who suffered most from the German attacks, proposed a precaution to detain Germany in an ever closer Union. The price of keeping Germans down would be paid by sacrificing some of the national sovereignty. The conclusion of this idea had been the Maastricht Treaty.

Third and the last discussions of federalism started in 2000 by the German Chancellor of that time Joschka Fischer. It is from Fischer's argument that a federal system with a powerful president chosen by the whole EU citizens is inevitable.[19] Following these discussions the EU started to work for a constitution, which brought a serious crisis for the future of European integration.

A federal model is a dilemma for the EU. On the one hand, political integration of the EU is in a deadlock. The reason is not only the increase in the number of member states, but also that there are no more acceptable areas left to be transferred to supranational power. The intergovernmental areas are the sensitive ones such as taxation, foreign policy, defense etc., which the member states do not want to lose control over. In order to move forward in the political integration process, federalism could be a model. Federalism could have been a "solution" to kill the nationalistic passions, extremisms, self-seeking and exclusive politics, racism, discrimination and so on. There would be one state, one nation, thus one national interest.

On the other hand, it is almost impossible to constitute a United States of Europe, since it is extremely difficult to govern 27 states in harmony with different cultural, historical and political backgrounds. How will that super-state manage to suppress

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18 Sergio Pistone, "Altiero Spinelli and the Strategy for the United States of Europe" in Brent F. Nelsen and Alexander C-G. Stubb (eds.) *The European Union: Readings On The Theory And Practice Of European Integration*, Second Edition, Macmillan Press Ltd., London, 1998, pp.85-89.

19 John Vinocour, "EU's Future: The Vision And The Slog", 29.06.2000, http://www.adetocqueville.com/cgi-binloc/getzip.cgi?0+2657.

the clashing national interests, passions and identities? Besides, a federal EU might lead to a repercussion, inflaming nationalisms and might last with disintegration.[20]

According to Hesse and Wright, while a federal Europe will have serious economic advantages, it will also lead to the danger of losing national culture, norms, customs and choices. In order to build a successful federation for Europe, enormous efforts should be made for preservation of the national institutions' independency and different cultures. As a result, Hesse and Wright argue that a federal Europe will not be a real federal system.[21]

Confederalism

While the units preserve their different identities, they assign power to a higher authority for more security, efficiency and affectivity. In a confederal system, high authority cannot go beyond the limits assigned by the independent units.[22]

It differs from federalism, as the regional units do not transfer their sovereignties to the high authority, but assign it to use limited power. Confederalism allows the nation states to preserve their national independence and decision-making remains within the power of the member states.[23]

The EU has some parts from confederalism. Although the member states transfer their sovereignties in some areas, they can still make appointments to the high authority and are influential in the decision-making process.

Consociationalism

Consociationalists defend that "groups" should be given power of representation in the decision-making process. The sources and authority of the groups are designated due to their size.[24] Developed by Arend Lijphart in 1968, the theory is defined as "sharing of power by the different segments in the society".[25]

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20   William H. Riker, "European Federalism: The Lessons of Past Experience" in Joachim Jens Hesse and Vincent Wright (eds.) *Federalizing Europe? The Costs, Benefits, and Preconditions of Federal Political Systems*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1996, pp.9-12.

21   Joachim Jens Hesse and Vincent Wright, "Federalizing Europe: The Path to Adjustement" in Joachim Jens Hesse and Vincent Wright (eds.) *Federalizing Europe? The Costs, Benefits, and Preconditions of Federal Political Systems*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1996, pp.375-397.

22   John McCormick, *Understanding The European Union*, Macmillan Press Ltd., London, 1999, p.4.

23   Wolfgang Wessels, "Institutions of the EU System: Models of Explanation" in Dietrich Rometsch and Wolfgang Wessels (eds.) *The European Union and Member States: Towards Institutional Fusion?*, Manchester University Press, Manchester and New York, 1996, p.23.

24   John McCormick, *Understanding The European Union*, Macmillan Press Ltd., London, 1999, p.5.

25   Arend Lijphart, *The Politics of Accomodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands*, Third Edition, University of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 1968, pp.215-219; Nikolas K. Gvosdev, "Collective Rights", http://www.geocities.com/Athens/Olympus/5357/ihr6a.html.

The basic aim of consociationalism is to ensure the permanency of the status quo by the leaders of various cultural and social fractions which have different domestic politics from each other, through a common work to build cooperation in order to eliminate the differences and conflicts resulting from the torn structure of the society.[26] By taking the minorities into account, the goal is to provide equality, because unlike the pluralist democracies executive power must be shared among a large coalition. According to Lijphart, Belgium, which has socio-economic, religious and linguistic differences, has the most suitable democratic system that is built on consociationalism.[27] For some, this system would function successfully within the EU, since it is the union of nation states with different cultural backgrounds.

Realism

The fundamental idea of realism is Aristotle's observation that man is a political animal.[28] Realists advocate the international arena is completely anarchic, and the main actors are the nation states. According to realists, what lies behind international relations is competing and conflicting nation states.[29]

For them, it is very dangerous and synthetic to change the nation state with a supranational model, because the new system will sooner or later become destructive.[30] The realist view contends that the existence of the EU depends on the satisfaction of the national interests of its members.[31] Some neo-realists however, like Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer believe that the sole reason for European integration has been a reaction to the two-polar system during the Cold War; thus as this period is over then there is no reason for more integration. Moreover, according to them, states henceforth should have the chance to leave the EU. Since neo-realism claims that international institutions play a minimum role in shaping international politics, it is understandable that they do not value the EU, and even sometimes see it dangerous.

Mearsheimer argues that in a realist world, cooperation, or at least maintaining cooperation is almost impossible. This is because each side would move towards its

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26 Armağan Emre Çakır, *Avrupa Bütünleşmesinin Siyasal Kuramları*, Beta, İstanbul, 2001, p.55.

27 Arend Lijphart, *Conflict and Coexistence in Belgium: The Dynamics of a Culturally Divided Society*, Institute of International Studies, Research Series No. 46, University of California, Berkeley, 1981, pp.4-10.

28 Robert G. Gilpin, "No One Loves a Political Realist" in Benjamin Frankel (ed.) *Realism: Restatements and Renewal*, Frank Cass, London, 1996, p.7.

29 Alfred E. Pijpers, "European Political Cooperation and Realist Paradigm" in Martin Holland (ed.) *The Future of European Political Cooperation: Essays on Theory and Practice*, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1991, pp.16-33.

30 Kenneth N. Waltz, "Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory" in Charles W. Kegley Jr. (ed.) *Controversies in International Relations Theory: Realism and the Neoliberal Challenge*, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1995, pp.80-81.

31 John McCormick, *Understanding The European Union*, Macmillan Press Ltd., London, 1999, p.10.

own interests, so some members would have no chance other than cheating.[32] Since the international system is anarchic, since there is no trust among nations, and since each state is the enemy of each other, then no international organization would have the capacity to punish the aggressive states or to keep the system in order.[33] It won't be true to claim that the realists are against European integration. They believe that integration is sometimes necessary if the process is parallel with the member states' national interests or it is seen as a tool for the members to reach their national goals.[34] However, realists are against all supranational institutions, including the European Parliament.[35]

Functionalism

The Functionalist theory, excluding the political dimension, is based on economic and technical cooperation. Integration is built through creating a harmony among some of the functions of the members.[36] Functionalists assert that when the states start the integration process in some areas, an "invisible hand" will lead them to cooperate in more areas.[37]

The father of functionalism, David Mitrany, believed that this theory would be a solution to eliminate conflicts among competing states and would prevent war. Increasing amounts of cooperation among states would decrease conflicts and making war would be impossible. Opposing the supranational bodies, Mitrany clarifies that the states will transfer some of their national authority to international executive bodies only for limited issues. The result will be "a working peace system".[38] He believed that the success of the functionalist model depends on elite performance and people's support. He insisted on the importance of excluding the political dimension from the integration process as well.[39]

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32 John J. Maersheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions", *International Security* 19(3), Winter 1994/1995, pp.5-49.

33 John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War", *International Security* 15(4) Summer 1990, p.12.

34 John J. Mearsheimer, "Why we will Soon Miss the Cold War" in Richard K. Betts (ed.) *Conflict After The Cold War: Arguments on Causes of War and Peace*, Simon & Schuster, Massachusetts, 1994, pp.44-61; Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory" in Richard K. Betts (ed.) *Conflict After the Cold War: Arguments on Causes of War and Peace*, Simon & Schuster, Massachusetts, 1994, pp.88-95; Kenneth N. Waltz, "Structural Causes and Economic Effects" in Richard K. Betts (ed.) *Conflict After the Cold War: Arguments on Causes of War and Peace*, 1994, Simon & Schuster, Massachusetts, pp.221-229.

35 Donatella M. Viola, "International Relations and European Integration Theory: The Role of the European Parliament", Jean Monnet Working Papers, January 2000, http://www.fscpo.unict.it/EuroMed/jmwp26.htm.

36 For more information on functionalism see. Ernst B. Haas, *Beyond The Nation-State: Functionalism and International Organization*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1964.

37 John McCormick, *Understanding the European Union*, Macmillan Press Ltd., London, 1999, p.10.

38 David Mitrany, "Functional Co-operation as the Road to Peace" in Evan Luard (ed.) *Basic Texts in International Relations: The Evolution of Ideas about International Society*, Macmillan, Houndmills, 1992, pp.498-504.

39 Karl W. Deutsch, *The Analysis of International Relations*, Third Edition, Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 1988, pp.222-225.

The life of the functionalist theory did not last long. By stressing the importance of the elimination of political and supranational dimensions, functionalists contradicted with themselves. Although they accepted that, once the integration process started, with a "spill over" effect[40] it would continue by widening and deepening, they were unable to see that the inclusion of the political dimension would be inevitable.

Neo-Functionalism (Federal Functionalism)

Neo-functionalists added the political dimension to the traditional functionalist theory. As a result of this, a mixture of functionalism and federalism occurred. They define integration, as a process to create a "political community" resembling the federalist supranational model. According to neo-functionalism, the continuous increase in cooperation areas would inevitably produce supranational institutions. Like functionalists, neo-functionalists point out the importance of the role of the political elite as well. And like federalists, they believe that in the course of time, decision-making power will be transferred to a supranational level.[41]

Institutionalism

Developed by Friedrich, Henry and Rougemant, institutionalist theory depends on the preservation of the political union and sovereignty of the states. Institutionalists basically try to build new common institutions without losing national autonomy.[42] According to Mearsheimer, institutions, due to their prescriptive characteristic, are necessary for the states to cooperate and compete with each other. However, he also believes that institutions have a very limited effect on the actions of states. Besides, he adds that institutionalism would not be able to save the world from destabilization following the end of the Cold War.[43]

Transactionalism

By advocating transactionalism, Karl W. Deutsch argued that the more European states and citizens communicate, the more that mutual understanding will occur. Transactionalists assume that common symbols, values and norms will lead to a

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40 Spillover: According to neo-functionalists, there are two kinds of spill-over: functional and political. Functional spill-over is the interconnection of various areas, and the integration in one policy-area spilling over into others. Political spill-over is the creation of supranational governance models.

41 John McCormick, *Understanding the European Union*, Macmillan Press Ltd., London, 1999, p.14.

42 Beril Dedeoğlu, *Adım Adım Avrupa Birliği*, Çınar Yayınları, İstanbul, 1996, p.28.

43 John J. Maersheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions", *International Security,* 19(3) Winter 1994/1995, pp.5-49.

feeling of common identity among European people. The existence of a common identity will open the way for a healthy and self-progressing integration. At the end of the 1960s, transactionalism was sharply criticized, because although the relations among European countries increased, neither mutual understanding nor a common identity had developed.[44]

TURKISH-ARMENIAN INTEGRATION

Reasons for starting an integration process

> *Existing situation with hostile relations does not produce any winner currently in neither side. In fact, winners are the third parties who profit from the bad relations between the two states.*

Integration among countries especially with tense relations is defended, because it is generally believed that integration brings peace. The states cooperating in many areas in the integration process are attached to each other so much that breaking the links or starting a conflict would be extremely risky. Therefore, rather than taking the risk of breaking up, they would prefer to live with the existing problems without allowing them to turn into serious conflicts.

Both Armenia and Turkey would benefit from an integration process in economic, political, social, and cultural areas, because the existing situation with hostile relations does not produce any winner currently in neither side. In fact, winners are the third parties who profit from the bad relations between the two states.

By not having normalized and good neighborly relations with Armenia, Turkey above all suffers from a psychological pressure from a lot of states, organizations and groups around the world. The pressure to recognize the 1915 events as genocide and to apologize for it creates an atmosphere of chronic defense for the Turkish people. It is irritating for people to be accused of being perpetrators and deniers of genocide. Moreover, although accepting the existence of mutual massacres, Turks do not believe that these tragic events could be accepted as genocide. Secondly, even if genocide were real, not the contemporary Turkish people, but their predecessors would have been guilty.

The EU puts political pressure on Turkey also. It will not be surprising if the EU asks Turkey to recognize the events as genocide in order to become a member. The European parliament has several resolutions asking Turkey to recognize the mutual

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44   Laura Cram, Desmond Dinan and Neill Nugent, "Reconciling Theory and Practice" in Laura Cram, Desmond Dinan, Neill Nugent (eds.) *Developments in the European Union*, Macmillan Press, Houndmills, 1999, p 9.

killings as genocide and to open the land borders with Armenia which they intentionally call "economic blockage". Although none of the accusations and condemnations have legal conclusions for Turkey, having a bad and false record as perpetrator of genocide is not something preferable. As a result, Turkey will benefit from normalized and peaceful relations in which there would not be any accusations from and hostilities with Armenia.

When we look at the issue from the Armenian side, it can be argued that the Armenian people need good relations with Turkey much more than Turkey does. Armenia does not have problem-free relations with any of its neighbors. Its relations with Georgia are established on distrust and competition. Armenia wants the Cevaheti region in Georgia where an Armenian minority lives.[45] The Russian-supported irredentist and expansionist policies of Armenia towards Georgia are similar to the one it pursues towards Azerbaijan. It is currently only Iran which has good relations with Armenia in the region. Both countries, as stuck geopolitically without routes to reach the western world, cooperate closely due to political necessities.

Russia seems to be the main "partner" of Armenia. It is its top trading partner. However, due to the asymmetrical character of their relations, Armenia does not have an equal status before Russia. When Armenia couldn't pay its debts to Russia, it turned over its strategic institutions to Russia. Lack of peaceful and close relations with neighbors and its isolated status, perhaps forced Armenia to give itself up to Russia. It is well known that Armenia is not independent from Russia.

In the economic sense, integration with Turkey can open a new gate to Armenian economy which is among the poor in the world. Better relations with Turkey and Azerbaijan will help Armenia to gain power firstly in the political and then in the economic sense. Therefore, it can have the opportunity to evade Russian economic and political domination.

The geopolitical position of Armenia is problematic as it is a closed country far from seas and trade centers. It immensely needs Turkey and Azerbaijan to reach the rest of the world, as both countries are on the strategic routes. The problem-ridden geopolitics also has a negative impact on Armenian economy. Delicate economy means at the same time, being powerless, which would lower the international negotiation capacity of a country. Besides, a bad economy would invite extremities and violence into domestic politics.[46] The results would be aggressive nationalism, fear, distrust, irredentism and territorial claims. In a geo-psychological sense, while

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45 Kamil Ağacan, "Ermenistan-Gürcistan İlişkileri", *Ermeni Araştırmaları*, No. 19, Sonbahar 2005, pp.62-82.

46 Sedat Laçiner, "Ermenistan Dış Politikası ve Belirleyici Temel Faktörler 1991-2002", *Ermeni Araştırmaları*, No. 5, Bahar 2002, p.173.

historically Armenians have always been a minority, today it is trying to possess the geography it is in. This seems as the major reason behind its irredentism.

It is not always preferred to be situated in a strategic geopolitical position. Both Turkey and Armenia suffers from this characteristic of their countries. Turkey is always forced to make a choice between the west and the east. In fact, it is impossible to choose one of them for a country situated between both "sides". When Turkey tries to pursue a balanced foreign policy, it is perceived negatively as an "axis shift". Although not the same, Armenia has similar pressure due to its geopolitical position. In fact, it is not Armenia alone, but it is the whole region which is the target of competing foreign policies and conflicting interests, and an area of hegemony wars. However, Armenia is the weakest country in the region which is not able to resist foreign pressure and remain independent. Therefore, due to the lack of political sovereignty, Armenia is the country with the heaviest pressure on it.

> *Due to low population, weak economy and weak military elements, Armenia not only remains a weak country in the economic and political sense, but also is a dependent country.*

Low population and constant emigration weakens the country as well. Due to low population, weak economy and weak military elements, Armenia not only remains a weak country in the economic and political sense, but also is a dependent country. Therefore, Armenia will be confined to military alliances and various partnerships unless it gains economic independence and gradually starts to become a modern colony.[47] Currently, it seems impossible to refer to Armenia as an independent state, because it is either under the control of Russia or diaspora.

It can be asserted that the future and independency of Armenia depends on healthy relations it will establish with Turkey.[48] The first president of Armenia Levon Ter-Petrosyan said; "Unless the Armenians forget historical hostilities and normalize their relations with Turks, it will be impossible for them to gain independence from Russia".[49]

An intensive cooperation or an integration process between Turkey and Armenia would lead to a larger area to benefit from it. When we consider that the Caucasus is one of the most unstable regions in the world where almost every state has tense relations with each other, an integration process can help to save the region as a

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47 Ahmet Akter, "Ermenistan Cumhuriyeti'nin Jeopolitik Analizi", *Ermeni Araştırmaları*, No. 27-28, 2007, p.147.

48 Sedat Laçiner, "Ermenistan Dış Politikası ve Belirleyici Temel Faktörler 1991-2002", *Ermeni Araştırmaları*, No. 5, Bahar 2002, p.221.

49 Sedat Laçiner, "Ermenistan-Türkiye İlişkilerinde Sınır Kapısı Sorunu ve İlişkilerde Ekonomik Boyut", *Ermeni Araştırmaları*, No. 6, Yaz 2002, p.57.

whole. Turkish-Armenian cooperation will first of all facilitate economic and energy cooperation in the region. Economic and energy issues are so important that these two topics would be enough to bind the countries in the region together.

One of the most important subjects which create pressure on both countries is the psychological results of integration. Particularly for diaspora Armenians, an extremely intense process of victimization produces a heavy psychological burden. Reconciliation between Turks and Armenians would be very difficult without some degree of healing. Reconciliation involves real acceptance of each other; or in other words, it is a mutual process involving both victims and the perpetrators.[50] For healing, there is a need to forgive. When victims begin to be able to forgive, which may not even involve any contact with the perpetrator, there is a psychological relief; giving up of a burden.[51]

Although forgiveness is a mutual psychological relief for both sides, there are many groups who would derive benefit from the ongoing period of conflict, especially in the case of Armenians. It is not the Armenians nor the Turks, but the "foreign elements" or the "third parties" who transformed the tragic events of 1915 into a "problem without possibility of reconciliation or understanding" and aimed to use this conflict for their own interests. The states which caused World War I and destroyed the loyalty of the two nations today use the Armenians again by seemingly supporting their genocide claims.[52] The French, British and Russians used this strategy before to divide the Ottoman territory into pieces. The French, while trying to apply the rules of colonialism in Cilicia, used the method of having Armenians and Turks to kill each other. The French ignored the massacre of Turks by the Armenians in Cilicia,[53] because it was planning to establish an Armenian state under their mandate.

When the Turkish and Armenian states come together to solve or forget their problems, without allowing any interference, the third parties would be unable to profit from the conflictual situation. Therefore, they would lose the opportunity of using and exploiting Armenia and Turkey to reach their political goals.

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50 Ervin Staub, "Healing and Reconciliation" in *Confronting the Armenian Genocide. Looking Backward Moving Forward*, Richard G. Hovannisian (ed.), Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick and London, 2003, p.271.

51 Ervin Staub, "Healing and Reconciliation" in *Confronting the Armenian Genocide. Looking Backward Moving Forward*, Richard G. Hovannisian (ed.), Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick and London, 2003, p.273.

52 Şener Akyol, "Hukuk Açısından Türk/Ermeni Barışı" in *Çeşitli Yönlerden Türk-Ermeni İlişkileri*, Şafak Ural, Kazım Yetiş, Feridun Emecen (ed.), İstanbul Üniversitesi yayını, İstanbul, 2006, pp.297-298.

53 Selehattin Sert, *Fransızların Ermenileri Yok Etme Planı Kilikya 1918-1922*, Kum Saati Yayınları, İstanbul, 2005, p.113.

Which Types of Integration Methods Would Be Suitable?

Forcing someone to do something by rewards and penalties usually works for especially difficult processes. Balkan states today have to cooperate and integrate with each other in order to become EU members. In case of Armenia and Turkey, this method cannot bring success. As the economic and political levels of the two countries are very different from each other, it is not possible for them to become members at the same time. However - if the EU states really want the conflict to be over - the EU could provide financial assistance to both countries as carrots in return for better relations. As it is known, peaceful relations, cooperation and integration are values which are always promoted by the EU. Therefore, contributing to the normalization process of the two countries by a carrot, not by a stick, would be meaningful for the EU.

Functionalism would work best as a method of integration between two states. First of all, it is based on economic and technical cooperation, which are one of the easiest and one of the most difficult tasks to be jeopardized at the same time. Secondly, since functionalism does not involve a political dimension and is limited with technical parts, the beginning of the process will not be too problematic. As David Mitrany, the founding father of the functionalist theory asserted, when the amount of cooperation between the states increase, the possibility of conflicts and war will decrease and "a working peace system" will be created.

The difficult part of functionalist theory is to successfully determine the point to stop further integration. Functionalists defend that once the integration process in some areas start, an "invisible hand" will make them cooperate in more and more areas. However if states leave the control of the integration process to the invisible hand, it will probably move further with a "spill-over effect" towards federalism as the neo-functionalists put forward. The result will be neo-functionalism or federal functionalism where a political community is created which resembles the federalist supranational model.

Institutionalism can be conceived as another suitable integration model for Turkey and Armenia. The Institutionalist model can be used at the beginning process. Turkish and Armenian officials would decide to establish new common institutions which would lead the cooperation process. As sovereignty of the states will be preserved, there wouldn't be any nationalist reactions and resistance in terms of national autonomy. However, this constitutes the weak part of this method at the same time, which is the inefficiency of these newly built institutions. Since these institutions would not have enough power "above" the states, they may not be able to effect the decisions of the states.

Conclusions of Integration

If integration between Armenia and Turkey becomes successful, then what would be the conclusions?

Armenia would have borders with Turkey, which means Armenia would be able to better communicate with Europe. So, the first result of integration would be Armenia's chance to reach the European market if it successfully adapts free market economy to be able to compete in the global sense. Under existing circumstances, it is not possible for Armenia to increase its exports remarkably, due to lack of competitiveness. While Armenian goods do not have a chance to compete in the European or Turkish markets, Turkish goods would not be able to find enough consumers in Armenia because of the low level of purchasing power. The low population and low level of economy, which means a small and poor market, will not serve Turkish interests. Russia has a larger trading volume with Georgia – of which it went into war in the recent years – than its number one ally Armenia. In conclusion, neither Turkish nor Armenian businesses would have a big chance to make profits at the moment.

Secondly, as a result of cooperation and closer relations, Armenian people would have the peaceful sentiments of relief from the feelings of disturbance of hate, hostility and revenge. However, this can also be comprehended as a negative conclusion. If the hostile feelings disappear, the genocide issue would die out as with territorial and compensation demands. This outcome would work well for Turkey, as it would be freed from accusations and pressure. On the other hand, what makes an Armenian an Armenian today is their hopes for recognition of genocide and compensation. What happens if the only aim of living for an Armenian is destroyed? Armenians would fall into an identity crisis and would start asking again "who they are", "what to live for" etc.

Thirdly, if Armenia and Turkey, and perhaps other countries in the region, establish a successful integration process, then they would constitute a powerful bloc against third parties. Before anything else, Armenia could speak up against Russian hegemony and become more independent. Therewith, it would not be that much easy for great powers to use and sometimes abuse the societies in the region for their national interests. They would not communicate with single states, but this time with a bigger bloc. Integration would not only make Armenia independent alone, but other countries in the whole region to be more powerful and confident, thus more independent from great powers. Integration would bring independency, stability, better economy, better relations with the neighbors and eventually peace. However, in order to achieve this power in the global arena, the countries in the integration process would have to sacrifice some of their sovereignties in favor of a big goal; becoming a larger single voice.

Global powers' approach to an integration process between Armenia and Turkey is important as well. While some of the big countries would like to see an integrated Caucasian region, others would prefer a divided region to rule them easily. Integrated Armenia and Turkey, and perhaps others in the region, would serve well to the American interests. Isolation of Russia would be vital to keep this big power "down". Being perceived as a "potential threat", Russia should be kept isolated, weak, and alone, according to American interests.

On the contrary, Russia would not like to see an integration initiative in the region. Though asymmetric, the only "ally" of Russia in the region is Armenia since all the others were lost to the EU or NATO. While Russia can easily dominate Armenia, and can currently frighten other states, it would not be able to control the whole bloc. Besides, a region in which the parties are hostile to each other would be preferable, because each party would be a potential trump to each other. And this would give more power to third parties. As a result of this possibility, Russia would not like to see peaceful relations among Caucasian states.

> *Russia would not like to see an integration initiative in the region. Though asymmetric, the only "ally" of Russia in the region is Armenia since all the others were lost to the EU or NATO.*

Obstacles for Integration

Turkey and Armenia are quite different in size and in political and economic culture. This makes integration of the two countries incompatible. If integration occurs among more countries, including for instance Georgia and Azerbaijan as well, then this disparity can be absorbed with fewer problems.

Since Armenia is a country which is extremely open to external pressures, third parties should also be included in the consideration. Armenia is under the control of diaspora and it cannot make any single act without Russian confirmation. Sometimes, it is put forward that the relations between Armenia and Turkey remain too much in the political context, without including any civilian element. However, Turkish hostility among diaspora is supported by Armenian businessmen to a great extent.[54] As discussed above, an integrated Caucasian region would not be in the interest of Russia. Likewise, Turkey has some restraints as well. It would not prefer to ignore or to offend Azerbaijan, although it has the power and ability to do that. It should be contended that if integration does not include confirmation of some

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54 Sedat Laçiner, *Türkler ve Ermeniler. Bir Uluslararası İlişkiler Çalışması*, Genişletilmiş 2. Baskı, USAK Yayınları, Ankara, 2005, p.353.

third parties such as diaspora Armenians and Azerbaijan, the integration process can face problems.

The integration process of Armenia with the EU through Eastern Partnership may hamper its rapprochement with Turkey. Since the EU will be able to satisfy most of the needs of Armenia, it would not require Turkish friendship. The EU emerged as a significant alternative for Armenia due to the necessity to balance Russian power. However, it should be asserted that the relations eventuate to the degree that Russia permits.[55]

It is almost impossible to get into an integration process with states which do not accept the territorial integrity of each other, what is more, which has territorial demands at the official level. Dissolving hostilities would be left to time in the integration process. However, there should be a minimum level of respect to initiate a process. Cooperating with an aggressive state would foster aggressiveness and destroy the platform of cooperation.[56]

Moreover, as asserted above, it would be extremely difficult for Armenians to be integrated with Turkish society, of which Armenian existence in the psychological sense is completely dependent on Turkish hostility.

What is Common or Uncommon With the EU and the Turkish-Armenian Integration Project?

European countries made war with each other for many years in which all countries on the continent seriously suffered in economic, political, and psychological terms. The two main reasons of integration process have been to recover the collapsed economies altogether and to prevent making war again. The European integration process worked well in both obtaining economic recovery and making peace with each other.

When the relations of Turkey and Armenia are considered; they also had conflicts and killed each other's people. The tragedies caused a lot of people from both sides to suffer. Today, the possibility of war between the two states is not visible, so the main aim of integration will not be the prevention of war. However, the project will work to drop the on-going topics which create problems that are impossible to be solved. Mutual accusations and denials do not take the two countries anywhere and

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55 Sedat Laçiner, *Türkler ve Ermeniler. Bir Uluslararası İlişkiler Çalışması*, Genişletilmiş 2. Baskı, USAK Yayınları, Ankara, 2005, pp.236, 237.

56 Sedat Laçiner, "Ermenistan-Türkiye İlişkilerinde Sınır Kapısı Sorunu ve İlişkilerde Ekonomik Boyut", *Ermeni Araştırmaları*, No. 6, Yaz 2002, p.63.

cannot even normalize their relations. Although the situation does not have similarities with the post war European countries, they need integration in order to establish normal relations.

In the economic sense, the situation does not resemble post war Europe. While Turkish economy is one of the biggest in the region, Armenian economy is the poorest. Integration of Turkey and Armenia will not have a common aim of economic recovery, because there is a huge asymmetry between the two economies.

Return to Realism

When we look at today's integration model of the EU, we see that it is being changed from neo-functionalism towards realism. The "constitution crisis" of the 2000s has been paramount to show the problems and deadlocks of the EU and its future integration tendency as well. It is extremely interesting that the major change in the reviewed constitution has been the removal of the common flag, common anthem and the taboo word "constitution" which evokes a "state". For some, the nature of the constitution has changed completely and became "EU Treaty" – later Lisbon Treaty – for others the change has remained cosmetic.

The discussions and conflicts around the constitution show us the basic problems. First of all, European people are not included in the integration process and secondly each member country wants a different type of Union due to their different needs. As a result, various members and various groups support different integration models. Some would like to continue political integration and favor a super-state, which they think will solve most of the problems in Europe; while some others believe that they do not receive enough from the EU, so they ask why lose from national sovereignty? While the EU was pursuing a neo-functionalist model of integration, realism started to be dominant. The solution that would make the two sides satisfied is a "multi-speed Europe". Before getting into the multi-speed Europe, it would be better to point out what caused realism to revive.

When we look at the legislation of a member state, we see that each year at least half of them are made not by the national parliaments, but by the EU. National parliaments and citizens lose power with every EU treaty, for they no longer have the final say in the policy areas concerned.[57] Here the problem is: the governors of the EU are not chosen by the governed. This means that 27 people who are governing half billion are irremovable as a group regardless of what it does.[58] In other words, nationally chosen ones are governing supranationally; which means

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[57] Anthony Coughlan, "Why the EU Cannot Go on Like This", *EU Observer,* 14.05.2007.

[58] Anthony Coughlan, "Why the EU Cannot Go on Like This", *EU Observer,* 14.05.2007.

the democracy within the EU becomes problematic. Therefore, it is understandable for European people to be against further integration with the desire "to be governed by their own people".

Referring to this problem, what the former German President Roman Herzog pointed out is pivotal:

> *"People are ill-at-ease and increasingly reserved and skeptical about the EU, because they can no longer make sense of the integration process, because they can't shake off the feeling of an ever stronger, increasingly inappropriate centralization of competencies, and because they cannot see who is responsible for which policies".*[59]

The study by Tallberg shows the problem of democracy from another aspect, pointing out the difference among the bigger and smaller member countries. According to Tallberg, "the presidency gets together with the large member states and settles the matter among them, and then they ask the other states if they are in or not". Tallberg's study report includes the comment of Luxembourg Prime Minister Jean-Claude Juncker as saying that "greater member states have a greater say. We never admit it, of course, but one has to acknowledge that geography and demography are playing a role".[60]

It is too hard for realists to accept the situation where the bigger states use more power than the smaller ones in the same partnership. As the preservation of national interests is paramount for each state, members will naturally evaluate their gains and losses. What Waltz argues is essential:

> *"When faced with the possibility of cooperating for mutual gain, states that feel insecure must ask how the gain will be divided. They are compelled to ask not 'will both of us gain?' but 'who will gain more?' If an expected gain is to be divided, say, in the ration of two to one, one state may use its disproportionate gain to implement a policy intended to damage or destroy the other. Even the prospect of large absolute gains for both parties does not elicit their cooperation so long as each fears how the other will use its increased capabilities".*[61]

The discussions during the transformation efforts of the constitution to a treaty, demonstrated the red lines, sensitivities, objections of the members, which proved

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59 Roman Herzog and Lüder Gerken, "An Article on the EU Constitution", *Welt am Sonntag*, 14.01.2007, http://www.openeurope.org.uk/analysis/herzog.pdf.

60 Teresa Küchler, "Big EU States Gaining Power Despite Enlargement", *EUObserver*, 05.04.2007.

61 Kenneth N. Walz, *Theory of International Politics*, Addison-Wesley, Reading, Mass, 1979, p.105.

us "interestingly" that some states give more importance to their national interests than the EU goals. Integrationists, by pointing out the "danger" of losing the Union's common spirit, criticized the "rogue" states. What the "troublesome" states did was, in order to preserve their national interests, to resist sacrificing them.

Europhiles also tried to prevent member states from putting the new treaty to national referendum, which strongly challenges with Western type of democracy. As Peter Sain ley Berry noted, *"it is the dread 'R' word - ratification that is the cause of this denial of the obvious. Constitution equates to referendum; referendum equates to failure. Drop the word constitution and the problem is solved"*.[62] For instance, the discussions in the UK on the referendum decision of the treaty are evaluated as "The British Treat". The "treat" was the "impossibility of the British people to accept the treaty" and the decision for referendum would be "deflection from the goal". As a result, since European integration is carried -or dictated-through the monopoly of the political elite, agitation from the citizens, who are becoming more and more distant from the EU, is rising.

It would be very appropriate to cite from Herzog again:

> *"Most people have a fundamentally positive attitude to European integration. But at the same time, they have an ever increasing feeling that something is going wrong, that an intransparent, complex, intricate mammoth institution has evolved, dissolved from the factual problems and national traditions grabbing ever greater competencies and areas of power; that the democratic control mechanisms are failing: in brief, that it cannot go on like this"*.[63]

Furthermore, the debate on the constitution/Lisbon Treaty put forth clearly that not all the members have the same needs and expectations within the EU. The cross talks on the new treaty reflected that the European integration is not among the national political goals, or at least it does not take part in the members' foreign policy priorities. This fact brings us to the point that the EU needs a different model of integration, which is realistic, pragmatic and much more flexible.

From now on, the EU should -and probably will- choose the "multi-speed integration" model. In the official web site of the EU, it is explained as "the idea of a method of differentiated integration whereby common objectives are pursued by

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62 Peter Sain ley Berry, "Behind the Muddied Language the Dread 'R' Word Looms", *EU Observer*, 23.07.2007, http://euobserver.com/18/24345.

63 Roman Herzog and Lüder Gerken, "An Article on the EU Constitution", *Welt am Sonntag*, 14.01.2007, http://www.openeurope.org.uk/analysis/herzog.pdf.

a group of Member States both able and willing to advance, it being implied that the others will follow later".[64] "Enhanced cooperation" or "variable-geometry Europe" or "core Europe" are similar terms used to describe the idea of differentiated and separated integration method. Such a model will on the one hand give the member states opportunity to make choices through their national interests; while on the other hand, will eliminate the veto "threat", thereby prevent blockings, deadlocks, crises, and the fear of disintegration.

It must be noted that multi-speed Europe is not a problem-free method. A report dated 1995 and prepared by the Centre for Economic Policy Research demonstrates the risks of this model. As every member state would belong to different spheres, it would be difficult to see their rights and duties in the EU. While monitoring and transparency would be hard to achieve, there might also be a tendency to treat participation in each sphere of integration in isolation. Besides, construction of links between spheres would be difficult.[65] In fact, the report studies the flexible integration models mostly

> *We can even anticipate that we will not wait for a long time to conceptualize "supranationality" as a "political anachronism".*

from an economic aspect. Perhaps, we should clarify that it is impossible to bring 27 states together and to satisfy the national interests of all without harming any member's interests. As a result, models such as multi-speed, variable geometry, Europe à la carte are only better than the United States of Europe model or the status quo where almost everybody is uneasy. It should be pointed out that flexible integration models are lesser of two evils.

We claim that the future integration of the EU will pursue multi-speed method, because the cross talks on the EU Treaty contained concessions. In fact, it was the first time the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 included opt-outs, which were for Denmark.[66] Although still a draft paper, it is planned for the new EU Treaty to allow the members to stay outside the integration areas such as social security, judicial affairs, defense and foreign policy. Although the multi-speed integration method de facto exists, it is too soon to speak out about it.

While choosing integration models with different speeds and levels have some benefits for the members and the EU as well; it also has some drawbacks. The first and the foremost point is vanishing of dreams such as "United States of Europe",

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64 EU official web site, http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/multispeed_europe_en.htm.

65 *Flexible Integration Towards a More Effective and Democratic Europe*, Monitoring European Integration 6, Centre for Economic Policy Research, London, 1995, pp.51-58.

66 For a brief information about the Dannish opt-outs see. Michael J. Baun, *An Imperfect Union The Maastricht Treaty and the New Politics of European Integration*, Westview Press, Oxford, 1996, pp.115-120.

"Federal Europe", or "the European super-state". Therefore, the possibility of the EU acting as one voice in the international realm dies away. Besides, since there is a strong reaction towards Brussels, which is thought to be the dictating one for a long period of time, in the forthcoming years we can expect a shift of power from supranational institutions to the national bodies. If we go a step further, we can even anticipate that we will not wait for a long time to conceptualize "supranationality" as a "political anachronism".

Since the circumstances that gave birth to an integration process in Europe do not exist anymore, it is time to return to realism and review the integration methods.

> *The most important point is revealing the "cost of non-integration" for both countries.*

When Turkish-Armenian integration process is considered, it can be asserted that it is not vital for neither Turkey nor Armenia to get into an integration process like the post-war European countries had.

In the "real" world, the most important point is revealing the "cost of non-integration" for both countries. What are the carrots and sticks for each country? Who will win what and how much? Perhaps, it is quite a difficulty that although both Turkey and Armenia have sticks for each other, they do not have "dependable" and lasting carrots. The probability of not keeping promises or changing the decisions, as with the governments, would not be counted as a carrot. A future Armenian government could bring on the issue of genocide again by breaking the previous government's promises, while a future Turkish government could close the border again. However, once integration starts, keeping the *pacta sunt servanda* would be much easier, because it would be too risky to discard the integration process.

Conclusion

Kenneth Waltz contends that;

> *"Insofar as a realm is formally organized, its units are free to specialize, to pursue their own interests without concern for developing the means of maintaining their identity and preserving their security in the presence of others. They are free to specialize because they have no reason to fear the increased interdependence that goes with specialization".*[67]

Then why do the EU member states still try to abstain from further integration?

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[67] Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, Random House, New York, 1979, p.104.

This is because, in anarchy, there is no higher body or sovereign that protects states from one another.[68]

Robert Powell argues that there are three issues at the centre of the neo-realist – neo-liberal debate which are the meaning and implications of anarchy, the problem of absolute and relative gains, and the tension between cooperation and distribution.[69] When we apply these three points of discussion to European integration, it becomes obvious that the current lack of enthusiasm appeared as a result of their evaluations. In other words, people started to think about the position of the EU in a hegemonic or anarchic world system, necessity of the EU, their benefits from the EU, cost of being a member, distribution of power within the EU, distribution of power in the international realm, cost of cooperation etc.

Idealism, which was inspired by the desire to avoid recreating the conditions that had led to a war that nobody wanted, seems death.[70] Realism claims that anarchy is the defining characteristic of the international system. This causes states to make security their number one concern and to seek to increase power as against other values.[71] Realists assert that states are motivated primarily by their national interests, which may be economic, ethnic or territorial.[72] For realists, power politics is no historical accident, but, as Morgenthau called it, a "human fact" and a "logical necessity".[73] When we look at the EU, we see that member states are after their own national interests, national power and national security, even daring to by-pass the Union most of the time. Since the anarchical realist system is a self-help one, in which no one relies on anybody, then the EU – as an institution – becomes meaningless.

As Waltz points out, "the greater the power of the centre, the stronger the incentive for states to engage in a struggle to control it". He claims, "the prospect of world government would be an invitation to prepare for world civil war".[74] The EU, before a war, or before disintegration, is going to choose the multi-speed method of integration.

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68 John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War", *International Security,* 15(4), Summer 1990, p.12.

69 Robert Powell, "Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The Neorealist-Neoliberal Debate", *International Organisation*, 48(2) Spring 1994, p.329.

70 Stefano Guzzini, *Realism in International Relations and International Political Economy The Continuing Story of a Death Foretold*, Routledge, London and New York, 1998, p.19.

71 Richard Ned Lebow, "The Long Peace, the end of the Cold War, and the Failure of Realism", *International Organisation*, 48(2) Spring 1994, p.250.

72 Robert G. Gilpin, "No One Loves a Political Realist" in Benjamin Frankel (ed.) *Realism: Restatements and Renewal*, Frank Cass, London, 1996, p.26.

73 Stefano Guzzini, *Realism in International Relations and International Political Economy The Continuing Story of a Death Foretold*, Routledge, London and New York, 1998, p.19.

74 Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, Random House, New York, 1979, p.112.

As Axelrod and Keohane contends;

> *"Achieving cooperation is difficult in world politics. There is no common government to enforce rules, and by the standards of domestic society, international institutions are weak. Cheating and deception are endemic; yet cooperation is attained. World politics is not a homogenous state of war: cooperation varies among issues and over time".*[75]

Their argument fits appropriately to the European integration project. However, the conditions have changed dramatically. Today, people started to question the necessity of such a "deep" and "unequal" cooperation.

What lies behind the crises within the EU is about its *raison d'être*. The European integration project started in the post war period to serve as a "rescuer for the states which were on the verge of disappearance", because European states were in a serious political, military and economic decline. However, there are no major current dangers left for the member states like economic threat (just after World War II), German threat, Soviet threat, American threat, Russian threat etc; thus further integration becomes insignificant. According to Riker, if the idea of federation emanated from military and commercial reasons, then due to the end of the Soviet threat, the military element disappeared. If federal Europe is still a dream, for Riker the only reason is trade and economy.[76] Thus, once more we come to the point that the EU should not need to be a political union. As Morgenthau and Gilpin insist, defending the national interests is the highest priority for a state. Consequently, for most of the people, the EU is not worth enough to make sacrifices especially in vital issues such as national sovereignty.

Robert Gilpin assumes a test of loyalty and self-sacrifice. While people continue to give their utmost loyalty to the nation state and are willing to die for it, very few individuals have made an equivalent sacrifice for the European Community. Thus, he says, the state still holds a virtual monopoly over human loyalty.[77] Although one of the fundamental goals of the European integration project was to kill nationalisms; it only managed to contain destructive nationalisms, but could not suppress national ambitions.

While the situation of the EU does not look very promising, so is similar for the

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75 Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane, "Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions" in David A. Baldwin (ed.), *Neorealism and Neoliberalism The Contemporary Debate*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1993, p.85.

76 William H. Riker, "European Federalism: The Lessons of Past Experience" in Joachim Jens Hesse and Vincent Wright (eds.) *Federalizing Europe? The Costs, Benefits, and Preconditions of Federal Political Systems,* Oxford University Press, New York, 1996.

77 Robert G. Gilpin, "No One Loves a Political Realist" in Benjamin Frankel (ed.) *Realism: Restatements and Renewal,* Frank Cass, London, 1996, p.26.

Turkish-Armenian integration prospect. It should be noted that opening of borders will not serve equally for the two countries' interests. While Armenia will gain a lot when the borders are opened, Turkey will not be able to gain anything. However, if the two countries dive into a process of integration, and if it works well, then both will acquire some benefits.

The idea of Turkish-Armenian integration looks like a utopia. What makes the issue almost a "dream" is the Armenian approach towards rapprochement with Turkey. According to the Armenian point of view, it is better for them to maintain the existing tension rather than to normalize relations. This is because they believe that they would be able to force Turkey to recognize the events as genocide, then agree to pay compensation and furthermore, accept to give some of its territory to Armenia. Feeling more secure with money and slightly larger territory, according to this view, Armenia will be freer than Russian hegemony.

In conclusion, although it seems extremely difficult- almost utopist to see Armenia and Turkey willing to get into a process of integration, it is not unthinkable as it will be beneficial to both sides. The problem is that Turkey will never recognize genocide and it is also far from ignoring Azerbaijani troubles, while Armenia will not stop making propaganda on genocide stories. Although Armenia can think about dropping the subject, it will not be able to do it due to the pressure of the powerful diaspora and perhaps other states as well.

There is a risk that tension and break up can appear any time they start a dialogue. Therefore, a very big step should be taken to start a quick and deep integration process without pronouncing any sensitive words at the beginning.

Today, Armenia rejects Turkish call for dialogue. However, there is a need for dialogue to start the integration process. There is a risk that tension and break up can appear any time they start a dialogue. Therefore, a very big step should be taken to start a quick and deep integration process without pronouncing any sensitive words at the beginning. If achievements of integration are more than the achievements of "abnormal relations", then the only solution would be to start with giant steps, rather than the traditional baby steps.

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