HOW JUDGEMENTS ARE TO BE JUSTIFIED REMAINS A FAIR QUESTION[1]

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Abstract

This paper deals with the importance of logical analysis for establishing our judgments of "justified beliefs" for deciding on truth values in reasoning. Primarily thought developing processes for justification has been analysed through establishing ground discussions for propositions and syllogism. I analyse structures of judgements which are established on analysis of Truth-claims. Conceptual processes are essential part of this critique of justification for truth-values. Also epistemic preferences grounds conviction, assurance, acceptance, assumption, decision, and belief for validity and coherency.

Key words: Judgments, Belief, Truth-claims, Justifications, Epistemic Justification,

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Özet

Bu makalede yargıların dayandığı temel unsurlar ve ilkeler üzerinden önerme ve argumanlarda tutarlılık, geçerlilik ve gerçeklik tartışmalarının haklılama için dayandığı unsurlar üzerinde durulmaktadır. Doğruluk değerlendirmelerinin dayandığı yargılar ele alınırken, kavramsal süreçlerin bu süreçteki eleştirel yeri tartışılmış, epistemik yargılamaların kabuller, inançlar, zanlar, tasdiklerin geçerlilik ve tutarlıkla olan ilişkileri üzerindeki problemler tartışılmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Yargılar, Kabuller, Doğruluk iddiaları, Haklılama, Epistemik Yargılama

The Thought Processes for Justification

Logical analysis for establishing our judgments of "justified beliefs" for deciding what is true, and what is not are very crucial for thought developing. Considering that all our thoughts somehow are part of our justification process which requires involvements of various levels of mind attitudes like conviction, assurance, acceptance, assumption, decision, and belief. The believed judgements are results of final stage of our decisions in mind but the decision making processes on this justification varies on various epistemic grounds. Awareness of those epistemic grounds would allow a clear understanding of asserted arguments. Techniques of logical analyses are there to inquiry what are verified grounds for those judgments as evidential and satisfactory justifications for epistemic preferences. For any rational thought it is important to inquire how argumentations rely on judgements about "truth" and "falsity" on which is ascribed as forms or frames of thinking on certain claims and values (Hintikka 1987, pp.211-238). This will demonstrate that how the formation of the thoughts as structure of epistemic judgements can be analysed in rational spheres. Logical analysis is to decide what is right what is wrong in argument in order to find out what are the certain epistemic preferences which produce that argument in whole. I.Copi identifies an argument that "an argument may be defined as any group of propositions of which one is claimed to follow from the others, which are regarded as supplying evidence for the truth of that one" (Copi, 1967, p.3). How one knows that the argument he believes is "true" and how one is certain about what he knows is "truth"? It is justifying epistemic structure and preferences in establishing arguments such as opting statements to define concepts or realisation of preferences to form an argument in formal or informal ways. Epistemic justification is analysis of whole process of thought production

which involves not only in premises and conclusion but also whole dependences of argument such as concepts and larger family of arguments.

1. Truth Claims

In order to reach evaluations of ideas, the process of epistemic justification of thoughts are analysed in truth-claims and truth-claims in which producing concepts of argument. Those truth claims are formed or, produced or, made by epistemic preferences. In the search of validity of thoughts, epistemic preferences can be perceived through ontological and epistemological interpretations on various areas such as metaphysical, ethical, aesthetical, legal, political, and other types of propositions. Propositions are primary elements as nucleus of thoughts to analyse the structure of any process of justification of thoughts.

For realisation of any validity of justificaiton of truth-claims, ground beliefs and utilisation of concepts are key elements to produce propositions for arguments. Then those arguments are shared, promoted or disputed even refuted dialectically with various forms like modus pollens, modus tollens, and with like syllogistic forms enthymeme, paradox, dilemma and etc. (Daor, 1978). However it is so complicated to analyse its epistemic justification, truth seekers are attracted to find out what really lies behind or under that particular argumentation. In the course of civilisations, one may realise that there are certain ideas and thoughts frame the discourse of that particular civilisation within certain time and space. Any civilisation has its own characteristics about producing statements on their value-judgements and framework how they work their argumentation through epistemic justifications out. It might sound here – contrary to my intention- it suggests that non-universal epistemic justification have some kind of pluralistic value-judgments, but rather it is suggested here that there are various ways to emphasis claims on epistemic justification regardless they are accepting a common epistemic justifications or not.

Arguably, religion, philosophy and science aim to reach and define "truth" (Walbridge 2011) through justification of thought on their own accord. But do they have complete and separate epistemologies and methodologies which might use different epistemic justifications and then this might form a different propositional structure that might lead different conclusions? In fact religious, philosophical and scientific propositions are derived or produced from a larger picture of thought producing a mechanism which they all belong to it in human mind. This larger Picture could be foci of basic beliefs and assertions. Basic beliefs and ground beliefs in epistemic preferences to produce ideas and thoughts which are mainly inter-knitted. From various subject matters of ontology, epistemology and methodology to ethical, legal, metaphysical, moral, aesthetical and similar kind of propositions can or more likely should logically stand supporting each other in consistency with one's own thought processes to

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reach sound argumentations. That will demonstrate that how the formation of the thoughts as structure of epistemic judgements can be analysed in a more rational spheres without being bias against other spheres and sources of truth-value justifications like perceptions, senses or other effects of formation of thought.

Those justifications of truth-values are discussed in various approaches like, foundationalist, coherentist, reliabilistic theories. Foundationalist theories argues for the ground beliefs and assertions for truth-value of argument has to be primarily established. Coherentist theorises argues importance of value for not only the form of the assetions but also the content of an assetion must have consistent truth-value throughout the argument. Also, It becomes an important issue in reliabilistic theories that inter-dependence of premises and conclusion should rely in a more concrete, realistic, in and justifyible scheme. Then, there must be also justification on inferential justification, evidential justification, sense-data justification, intuitionistic preference, sensation experience, and supervenience relations. For example, supervenience argument is to infer "the possibility of nondoxastic justification from the claim that epistemic properties supervene on nonepistemic properties" (Lyons 2009, p.26). Doxastic beliefs can be derived through justified or unjustified assertions but still justify truth-value of statement. Doxastic belief itself as basic belief could justify other statements to be established over them (Wansing 2006, p.201). Perceptions also play very important role to demonstrate roots of rational value of truth-values. Perceptions are also one of epistemic principles of justification of thought in conjunction with their thorough possibilities of falsifiability.

In rational and logical discussions, I would argue that the contradiction of thoughts and ideas are mainly based on differences of epistemic justifications of propositions. Epistemic principles or other preferences of thoughts grounds for justification for contradiction of thoughts in order to reach "truth". For instance, philosophy aims to reach and define "truth" on its accord which is rooted in historical epistemic discussions (Stump, 1989). In general framework produce all other philosophical propositions, inductions and deductions on that grounded epistemic justifications. In fact, that is to say that propositions are derived or produced from a larger picture of thought. This larger picture have important similarities to produce epistemic preferences to establish other ideas and thoughts.

When one believes what exactly is the "reality" for him to establish ground of his own or shared ideas, then any argumentation can be clearly built upon this ground for justification (Daor 1978). Possible commonality on those grounds gives a possible agreement for argumentations in judgements. Moreover, agreement on particular conceptualisation does not necessarily bring about same conclusion as true assertions, however it is very important to use same terms for same concepts in mutual understandings. Deriving different

conclusions from same premises are putting assertions at stake to argue who is reaching to a valid conclusion through valid justifications. Valid conclusion will be believed as true assertion, that is the truth (Kirwan 1978, p.95). There is a possibility of having universal concepts for everybody, amongst many examples, such as justice and truth. But it is always the matter what does one mean and understand by those terms. There is always a possibility of distorting truth-values of statements for use and abuse of concepts for establishing argument.

Human beings are not just rational beings as Aristotle would not like to compromise over the very idea. But in human experience it is clear that man judge truth-values not only rational but also emotional levels. Although emotional feelings easily turn to be blurred or clear judgments of its own kind, then they become part of decision making process. When one like or dislike, hate or love, those feelings are part of justification process even they might be counted not rationally justified. Obviously, it has to be taken consideration that while emotional feelings easily escape from rational justification and boundaries of logic, judgments of any kind are to be analysed same epistemic grounds to be consistent to reach truth. The problem is that emotional acceptance of assertions can overcome validity of logical frame. From logical point of view, it seems problematic to overcome emotional attitudes of thought over logical ones. Emotions are hard to hold for accountability for rational analysis, but epistemic analysis of assertions requires getting hold of them in consistent manner to recall them in justification of thought. As it can be experienced, when emotions are confused, it causes difficulty to keep up rational justifications on consistent epistemic justifications. Notwithstanding, the examples of this can be given through usage of certain concepts which many people would not disregard but unfulfill the "real meaning" of the concepts for validity of arguments on justifications. But, concepts like democracy, human rights and justice seems to be more problematic than ever as they are welcomed by many but failed to come to fill and fulfil same assertions in those definitions of concepts. In following, I will emphasis more on importance of usage of conceptual process in justificaiton of valid argumentations.

2. Conceptual Processes

In a particular thought production process, logic and language is utilised for producing certain understandings of argumentations (Stump 1989) about - for example – certain terms and concepts such as democracy and human rights which is formed in which that certain justifications on the basis of preferred or believed truth-values. It sometimes becomes confusing in different judgments on and about assertions of argumentations and their practical interpretations in social affairs and public sphere. Judgements are part of our daily life along with theoretical evaluations (MacCormick 1978, pp.32-37). Justifications rely on our judgments of epistemic preferences. Therefore an understanding of any thought

should go back to analysis of its roots in those epistemic preferences to built up a conceptual framework.

Argumentations for discussions about certain concepts and terms require primarily common understanding of those concepts in order to pursue any meaningful argumentation on a common basis of logical analysis for epistemic preferences (Alex 2010a, p. 96). Meanwhile, general concepts like religious, philosophical, scientific concepts or social, legal, moral, and many more types of specific concepts are utilised in same sort of structure of logical analyses in mind. One asserts a true statement on the basis of his judgement of certain justification of his epistemic grounds which produce and affect the whole process of thought for one to believe that is true knowledge. Thus, one may follow from this aspect how a thought is produced in that particular way rather than any other one.

Thoughts are product of our minds to be uttered with language (Abed, 1991). Seeking truth in reality uses language as a tool for producing propositions (Gyekye, 1979). Truth of reality and reality of truth can be expressed in sentences as propositions. Propositions are primary elements as nucleus of thoughts in order to analyse the structure of any process of justification of thoughts. Whether truth can be found, understood and reached is aim of justification to discover reality. Although truth can be described and named according to its features like factual truth, logical truth, necessary truth etc., it is important to express it in language within its unique entity (Gaskin 2008, p.60). While it is being formed in mind and expressed as a proposition, then whole process becomes as an issue of epistemology. That is to say that any proposition which has truth-value within true-false scale, it requires epistemic justification for this process and result. Then this almost touches every proposition which needs to be presented as reasonable and sensible assertions.

In the history of classical education, training starts with language and logic which are essential means for establishing any thought. It has been suggested that any science of thought and reasonable thinking starts with a solid knowledge of language and logic (majority of treatises on logic emphasis that points from Aristotle to Farabi, Ibn Sina, to and up to modern ages) (Abed 1991). Both subject areas are interactive mind tools which allow instructing and flourishing any ideas, opinions and views (Adamson 1911). Establishing any of them for the structured thoughts which are relied and flourished through logic and language requires being part of logical analysis to express what is believed to be true. Logic is to ask for the concepts and to structure assertions and then to put them in argumentations and finally find an answer for its truth-value. As H. Cairns puts it, 'logic aims at a statement of the necessary conditions for the formulation of true propositions (1980, p.13). Finding truth in logical terms may mean that a search for a consistency and validity of the assertions for the coherent conclusions in its utilised area. This process is expressed through any

given language. As a matter of fact that in order to achieve a valid logical conclusion there is a long and thorough process in thought. In this case, there are two stages. One is preparation of concepts for propositions to become logical assertions and then second and final stage is to reach a justification of truth of statement. In Arabic logic, they are called tasawwurat and tasdikat respectively. To run a proper discussion, two stages are required properly analysed epistemic grounds. Burhan as epistemically and conceptually analysed and justifed arguments are believed to be true arguments for true judgements of statements with correct usage of concepts.

As one of the important stage of thought process, conceptual analysis urges to certain understanding of proper usage of concepts which are variably and widely used in various contexts. Therefore it is a live discussion whether universal or conjectural usage of concepts conflicts in various language and given contexts. But this does not require concrete unity of usage of concepts for argumentations during conceptual analysis. How any language runs production of concepts for truth value of judgements is far more complex than language on its own. Alex argues for that 'language-systems and systems of concepts cannot have truth-value, truth can only be established in respect of statements and the reasoning put forward to substantiate them' (2010a, p.114). Furthermore, hypothetically while one may think that various languages of nations, civilisations and different spheres of thought at any given time and space might have exactly same concepts, he might be puzzled that differences in utterance are not only in the usage of different terms of same concepts. Evenmore, A.Berger writes "if a terem signifies a property that is intrinsic in one theory, but not in another theory, we say thatthe term expresses different concepts when used in different theories" (2002, p.39). I argue that one cannot be fulfilled for any rational justification of thought through only conceptual analysis in argumentation, but there is a need for a complex and thorough analysis for basis and results of premises and conclusions, separately and together at the same time. On the other hand, arguably, in this case one has to consider that conceptualisation does rely on very complex processes and structures which are deeply related to preferences in thought processes. It has personal, social, political etc. along with more universal sides of this input in which producing argumentations are rooted in them. Thus, justification of thought processes are sought and analysed not only in argument structures but also fragments of the premises and conclusions.

3. Epistemic Processes

Epistemic justification is a certain rational process to seek the roots of how one decides what is true or not. Truth and falsity are values of any meaningful proposition as a decision which is formed by assertion. These truth-values can be thought as a result of any thought processes which are sometimes quite complicated to ponder and concentrate (Bronn, 1998, pp.81-95). To decide

which proposition is true or not, rely on epistemic preferences which leads that decision. One's own epistemic justification in relation to a particular proposition is derived from various related thought processes. In fact, epistemic justification can be counted as a proposition 'production base' which all our thoughts are flourished and packed up there before final stage of being a proposition which appears with the tool of language. Moreover, any proposition keeps its roots and existence embedded in epistemic justification. If one may think that any analysis of a proposition requires two stages, one stage is a production process of a proposition and then the stage just after it is uttered. Both stages are inseparable than each other. Justification of thoughts is a constant job in mind for any consciously made proposition; although there are times sub-conscious might produce a proposition on previous epistemic justifications (Grayling, 1982). Arguably unconsciously or non-consciously made propositions should not be exempt entirely from this process. What I mean by this, that is the individual, cultural, social or historical thinking habits or thought attitudes effect justification of thoughts which are not necessarily epistemically justifiable. Therefore, it became essential for any proposition how and why it depends on that particular justification on epistemic grounds.

In fact epistemic justification is not only run by rational means but also all personal decision making tools throughout that thought process which might sometimes include non-rational or irrational input. Amongst many of those tools, cumulative consequence of ideas, opinions and views which were assumed or believed to be true produce their related propositions in accordance with them. Those thought processes is to know something is true and know why it is true does have direct inner-connection to know why it is not false. Analysing any sort of propositions in this sense depends on their truth-values which oblige us to explain targeted meanings in those assertions (Daor 1978). Whilst decision making processes are creating these assertions, meaningful and sensible understanding what is true or false requires certain realisation why one is convinced that it is true on the basis that how he knows what he knows to be true. Thus, there is a need for realisation how much important to grasp sound understanding about the grounds of epistemic references and preferences for justifying truth.

In the emphasis of epistemic preferences some arguments are taken grounded as logically true statements or rather some propositions are believed to be true as factual truth. The range of examples can be given in every field of thought. Since one believes any particular proposition as a true proposition (Hintikka, 1989), it is most reasonable to expect that he acts upon it but even it is not always the case. If one does not believe any given proposition as true proposition, it is also reasonable to expect not to be acted upon it. If one believes "fire burns", rational attitude is expected upon it. Belief state is the state of cumulation of epistemic preferences and justified or unjustified propositions in

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argumentation (Brown 1986, pp. 357-378), Thus any proposition which is believed to be true does not only logically require to be examined in its roots epistemically but also there is a urge to realisation of truth-values which are implanted in actions (not necessarily ethical or behavioral meant here) that are to be traced backed through in thought process for epistemic justification. Socratic dilemma is always there why one does act upon a false action if he had known it is false. Socrates' answer is simple: because he does not know that it is false. Epistemic justification is a fine evaluation of propositions for analysing, composing and differentiation of thoughts right from the beginning in mind and language. Attempt to know truth is life-time effort. Lack of epistemic justifications suggests unwillingness to what really truth is all about, that would mean that rushing to escape from an essential mind process. Notwithstanding that if epistemic justification is sought by any intellectual purposes, the target would lead to find out why that proposition is formed in that way or another. Because, only a proposition is believed to be true might be able to produce any valid and sound argument unless there is purposeful mistake (Copi 1995).

Amongst those propositions some of them seen more important than the others by individuals, however any given civilisation emphasises on what are the important propositions (Daor 1978). That so called "important propositions" creates some other related proposition to structure a thought which is based on the process of judgements. It seems to me that is the cracking point how different cultures and civilisations produces their own identities in their claims (Gutas, 1998). In order to reach evaluations of those ideas, views and opinions which are expressed in propositions, a process of epistemic justification of thoughts are analysed in truth claims. Those truth claims are formed or, produced or, made by epistemic preferences. Epistemic preferences in this point demonstrate what our rational priorities in our best of intellectual capacity. It seems plausible to argue that the conflict of thoughts is mainly based on different grounds of epistemic justifications of religious and philosophical propositions. What are the epistemic principles or preferences of thoughts define the frame of conflict of thoughts in way to reach "truth".

In the search of validity of thoughts for the sake of truth, as long as epistemic preferences are analysed, perceived and understood through ontological and epistemological interpretations in various areas such as metaphysical, moral, aesthetical, legal propositions and so forth, rational position will continue not to cease. Moreover any epistemically preferred divine rooted proposition rules out and over-rides other propositions for a believer who is convinced that is the truth over other epistemic justifications (Gwynne 2004). That is huge and very lively debate between sacred and humane assertions which gives me very little space to look upon it here. In fact all these propositions need to be carefully analysed within a framework of consistency for compatibility of proposition with ones epistemic justification to keep

intellectual reliability. In decision making processes of thought, higher "authority" to decide what to decide, how to know what to know- whatever it might be- is influential to make epistemic preferences to define "truth". One might seek theoretical and methodical structures to analyse epistemic judgements which might influence either personal or common interpretations, and their practical applications in public spheres. How people should treat different religious, philosophical and scientific preferences is important to evaluate various dynamics of thoughts in terms of epistemic logic.

It is essential to discover fallacies in epistemic justifications. An example of distortion of valid epistemic justification can be found in logical fallacies of authority and popularity. In the history of thought, there are various ideas and thoughts justify thoughts in particular discourse within specific time and space. Any school of thought has its own characteristics about producing statements about value-judgements along with certain usage of concepts. As a matter of fact that, a certain school of thought is based on those truth-value of those judgements. That is what makes it as a specific school of thought. Therefore differences of those assertion and fallacies in them are related to differences of epistemic preferences.

Realisation process of truth-value and avoiding logical fallacies become possible epistemically justify whole process of argument (Hintikka 1987, pp.211-238). In decision making processes of thought, higher authority, popularity of thought, personal expectations and other types of logical fallacies might be influential to make epistemic preferences as much as personal decisions to define "reality" or "truth". In fact, those roots and practice of fallacies of justifying assertions and arguments without logical and rational ground oppose aim and purpose of epistemic justification. One might seek theoretical and methodical structures to analyse epistemic judgements in personal level and their interpretations and applications in public spheres to sketch logical fallacies in argumentations (Weston 1992). How people should treat different preferences of epistemic justification is important to evaluate various dynamics of thoughts in terms of epistemic logic.

Conlusion

It is emphasised in this paper on the importance of the processes of rational thought in argumentation in conjunction withs it truth-values and their conceptual and epistemic processes that is vital for any argumentation. In thought processes, validity of argumentations rely on the consistency of the whole part of the argument. Truth values are base and ground for establishing judgements to frame correct usage of epistemic preferences and concepts in order to produce valid argumentation. In various ways of reasoning, justification discovers a realisation of connection of arguments to truth. Epistemic and conceptual analysis demonstrate complexity of judgments. Judgements either

justifed or -supposedly- unjustifed are involved every single step and stage of the argument as belief state. The aim of logic is to discover truth value of any argumentation which justifies what argued for or against is valid, consistent and sound on justifed epistemic roots and correct usage of concepts. Without any epistemic justification and conceptual analysis, justification of judgement cannot be fulfilled. Therefore how judgements are justified remains active process of discovering, realising and controlling of epistemic preferences and careful production and utilisation of concepts for establishing logical argumentation.

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