Civilian Powers and the Use of Force: The Evolution of Germany as a 'Realist Civilian Power'

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Abstract

Because of Germany's rising economic and political clout not only in European but also in global politics, it is worth analysing the dynamics of change and continuity in Germany's policy towards the use of force. This article aims to critically examine the evolution of Germany's civilian power characteristics based on three case studies of Kosovo, Afghanistan, and the uprisings in the Middle East, by using the theoretical framework of realist constructivism. The article tries to answer the following research questions: To what extent has Germany been able to maintain its traditional peaceful foreign policy in the new "global disorder"? Which factors affect its decision to be involved or not in military interventions in various regional and global conflicts? What does the German case tell us about the evolution of civilian powers in the current global circumstances?

Key Words

Realist Constructivism, Civilian Powers, Use of Force, Germany, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Libya.

Introduction

"The use of military means as a last resort cannot and should not be excluded, but no conflict that we face today can be solved by military means alone."[1]

Angela Merkel

"Germany's path to greater military assertiveness has not been linear, and it never will be. Germans do not believe that talking at roundtables solves every problem, but neither do they think that shooting does. The mixed track record of foreign military interventions over the past 20 years is only one reason for caution."[2]

Frank-Walter Steinmeier

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The literature on civilian powers has so far mainly analysed actors like Germany, Japan and the European Union, which formulated their foreign policies during the Cold War based on civilian national role conceptions.[3] The current challenges seem to encourage these actors to rethink their traditional foreign policy approaches, which exclude the use of power. For example, Japan has been reconsidering its foreign policy since the end of the Cold War.[4] The current government under the prime ministry of Shinzo Abe has been putting great emphasis on increasing Japan's role in the global system. The creation of the National Security Council in 2013 and approval of a new legislation in 2015 allowing Japanese soldiers to participate in collective self-defense operations by simplifying the procedures for the deployment of Japanese troops abroad were important steps in the evolution of Japanese security policy.

Meanwhile, the European Union has also been reconsidering its security and defence policies considering the period since the early 1990s. Ever since the formation of the three pillar system with the Treaty of Maastricht, the Union has been trying to consolidate its common foreign and security policies. The Treaty of Lisbon created a Common Security and Defense Policy with the aim of increasing cooperation among member states and allowing them to cooperate better. In its Global Strategy 2016 it was stated that "While NATO exists to defend its members-most of which are European- from external attack, Europeans must be better equipped, trained and organised to contribute decisively to such collective efforts, as well as to act autonomously if and when necessary."[5] On the one hand, the EU tries to create a better coordination among the defence policies of the member states via the European Defense Agency; on the other hand, it is engaged in an ever increasing number of civilian and military operations abroad.[6] In November 2017, the Permanent Structured Cooperation on security and defence (PESCO) was established in order to improve cooperation on defence and security issues.[7]

In addition to Japan and the European Union, Germany has also been reconsidering its security policy ever since its dream of unification was fulfilled on 3 October 1990. A comprehensive examination of German foreign policy is important in the current *Zeitgeist* because of several factors. First of all, Germany has been one of the least affected countries by the global economic crisis that started in 2008. While some EU countries, like Greece, Portugal and Spain, were experiencing deep economic crisis and

rise of unemployment rates, Berlin continued to grow at stable rates and in fact saw its unemployment figures decrease. Therefore, the economic weight of Germany within the EU and in the world has an increasing trend. Second, because of Brexit, Germany's political weight in the EU will also increase and Berlin administrations will probably play a more leading role in the organisation. Third, recent years have witnessed a flourishing of Germany's role in global affairs. The country has been involved in taking initiatives, starting negotiations and trying to find solutions to regional and global problems on almost every occasion, the best examples being the P5+1 negotiations in the Iranian nuclear crisis and the Russian-Ukrainian conflict.

In addition to Japan and the European Union, Germany has also been reconsidering its security policy ever since its dream of unification was fulfilled on 3 October 1990.

Therefore, because of Germany's rising economic and political clout not only in European, but also in global politics it is worth analysing the dynamics of change and continuity

in Germany's international relations. This article aims to critically examine the evolution of Germany's civilian power characteristics based on three case studies, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Libya, as well as the fight against DAESH.

The concept of "civilian power" was constructed during the Cold War era in order to describe those actors which refrained from using force in their external relations. Although the era of the Cold War was characterized by balance of power and military rivalry between two antagonistic blocs, there were some actors who preferred not to depend on military power in order to have an impact on their neighbourhood and the global system.

The concept of civilian power was first used for the policies of the European Community. It was then extended to the foreign policies of Germany and Japan. All these three actors relied on civilian means in their international relations. They did not become part of any military involvement or conflict. Based upon the military guarantee of mainly the USA, they could devote their financial capacity and intellectual potential to education, health, social security and other areas of civilian public policies. Both Germany and Japan also guaranteed the concept of civilian power in their constitutions as well by banning the use of force and

emphasising peaceful foreign policies. Their notorious histories as aggressive military powers pursuing expansionist policies in their external relations was reconstructed as the "other" and they were thus able to create new identities. In addition to taking lessons from their past, the soft and hard pressure of the Western countries, mainly that of the US, towards democratisation and pacifism, should be taken into consideration as well.

As the bipolar world order came to an end, it was hoped that the newly emerging international system would be more peaceful. The concept of peace dividend became popular and increased the hopes that, as the global system was becoming more civilian, civilian powers such as Germany could consolidate the peaceful nature of their international relations further. However, the regional conflicts starting with the Balkans and the Middle East and the international tension following the terrorist attacks of 9/11 created an unanticipated global turmoil that continues to pose challenges for the civilian powers.

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Although German decision makers did try to stick to their role concept created in the late 1940s and the German public was not yet ready to question the peaceful state identity, the international circumstances forced Germany to re-evaluate its traditional foreign policy.

This study will focus on those challenges pushing Germany to reconsider its civilian power identity. As mentioned above, Kosovo, Afghanistan and the current turmoil in the Middle East will be considered as three case studies. In each case, German foreign policy will be analysed in order to understand the continuities and changes. To what extent has Germany been able to maintain its traditional peaceful foreign policy in the new "global disorder" and refrain from use of force is the basic research question of this article. Which factors affect its decision to be involved or not in military interventions in various regional and global conflicts? What does the German case tell us about the evolution of civilian powers in the current global circumstances?

The article will consist of five parts. In the first part, it will provide a conceptual framework to explain the approach of realist constructivism and concept of civilian power. Then, in the second part, it will provide a summary of German foreign policy during the Cold War. Afterwards, in the third part it will consider German foreign policy

towards the war in Kosovo; in the fourth part it will deal with Germany's approach towards the Afghanistan operation; and in the last part it will explain how Germany reacted to the Libya intervention and the struggle against DAESH.

The Conceptual Framework: Realist Constructivism and Civilian Power

Realist constructivism is based on the assumption that classical realism and mainstream constructivism do in fact have many common characteristics. In the International Relations literature realism is associated with power and constructivism is based on norms, values and identities. These two theories are considered to be the opposite of each other. In fact, classical realism does not omit the importance of morality and mainstream constructivism does not deny the importance of power in international relations. Hence, these two approaches can be compatible with each other. Barkin's groundbreaking article argues that a realist constructivist perspective can be a useful approach in studying global politics. In fact, different dimensions of power as well as normative factors affect the state of international relations together. Hence, realist constructivism argues that there can be an interaction between dynamics

of power and norms.[8] This study will benefit from the realist constructivist approach.

Realist constructivism is based on the assumption that classical realism and mainstream constructivism do in fact have many common characteristics.

Realist constructivism can be an appropriate framework to study contemporary German foreign and security policy. On the one hand, German leaders try to maintain the basic features of classical norms, values and identities; on the other hand the current global power dynamics promote making limited changes in their global approach. Hence, both dynamics of power relations and impact of morality do exist in German foreign policy.

In addition, the concept of civilian power will be useful in studying the current German foreign policy. The notion of "civilian power" was first used with regard to the European Community in the 1970s during the period of *détente*. As being one of the main scenes of the horrors of the two world wars, Europe had to take lessons from its terrible history of the first half of the 20th century. As the main project for the reestablishment

of a durable and positive peace on the continent, the foundation of the European Community (EC) was a big step forward for the de-militarisation of the region.

Hence, it is quite understandable that the first usage of the concept of "civilian power" emerged in the context of the European Community through the academic works of François Duchêne. He argued that the basic strength of the EC was stemming from its civilian characteristics and refraining from military means. Emphasising that "Lacking military power is not the handicap it once was"[9] his main argument was that the EC should concentrate on non-military forms of power, like economic power, and that would be its main strength in global politics.[10]

Stating that "Western Europe could in a sense be the first of the world's civilian centres of power",[11] his idea was that EC could use this power to "domesticate"[12] international relations. According to his view, the EC must try to spread its civilian and democratic values to other actors as well and try to emphasise the understanding of common responsibility for the global problems. In other words, it was argued that the EC's civilian characteristics, i.e. its emphasis on non-military means, like economics, was a great asset for itself and it would have the potential to civilise the international politics as well. In fact, this was an outstanding conceptual contribution to the literature on the EC during the time in which two blocs were competing with each other in every aspect, including militarily.

The concept was then further developed, clearly defined and transmitted to two countries, namely Germany and Japan, by Hanns W. Maull. In his landmark studies, he elaborated how and why these two countries could be defined as civilian powers. Focusing on the foreign policies of Germany and Japan after the Second World War, he analyzed how the two countries could create peaceful identities despite the fact that they were allied with the Western block.

In Maull's classical definition, the notion of "civilian power" consisted of three basic elements: First, civilian powers should focus on cooperation with other actors in order to realize their aims; second, they use non-military means in their foreign policy, like economics; and third, they are eager to develop supranational institutions meaning that they are ready to share their sovereignty with other actors.[13] Characterising Germany and Japan as "prototypes of a promising future"[14] he argued that their security alliance with the US provided them with the opportunity to develop their non-military potentials.

This study will take this definition of the concept as the basis to be able to analyse whether Germany can still be considered as a civilian actor or not. Historical analysis will be used in the article focusing on both discourse analysis and policy analysis. The next section will provide a brief sketch of German foreign policy after the end of the Second World War till the reunification of Germany in 1990. This historical background is important in order to grasp how the change in global politics in the 1990s and reunification affected German foreign policy and its approach towards the use of force.

German Foreign Policy between 1949 and 1989: "Never Again War"

Situated in the heart of Europe, surrounded by rival states, led by leaders with global ambitions, entering the global political arena by delay because of late unification, German history after 1890 was mainly based on militarism, whose roots dated back to Prussia. With the firm belief that Berlin had the potential to become one of the great powers, the German ruling elite invested substantially in the army, thereby contributing to the emergence of rival blocs and, in the end, to the outbreak of two world wars.

However, the humiliating defeat of the Second World War and the following occupation by the Allied forces led to the construction of a new national and state identity in both East and West Germany. Since East German foreign policy is out of the scope of this paper, this study will only focus on the case of West Germany, namely the Federal Republic of Germany.

The humiliating defeat of the Second World War and the following occupation by the Allied forces led to the construction of a new national and state identity in both East and West Germany.

First of all, the way that the concept of peace is handled in the German Basic Law (Constitution) will be analysed. In the Basic Law, the notion of peace is mentioned in several places. First, in the Preamble it is stated that Germany has the determination to serve world peace. Then, in the first article, par. 2 on basic rights, it is stated that "inviolable and inalienable human rights" are required in order to have "peace and justice in the world."[15] In Article 8, par. 1 the right of peaceful assembly of the German people is recognized. Article 24, par. 1 states that Germany can transfer its sovereign powers to

international organisations. Par. 2 mentions that the country may enter into an organization of mutual collective security "(i)n order to preserve peace"[16] and this might lead to restrictions on its sovereignty. This article includes the element of supranationalism, one of the elements of civilian power according to Maull. In addition, Article 26, par. 1 focuses on global peace and states that any activity giving harm to world peace is unconstitutional and needs to be punished. The significance of international law is expressed in Article 25; international law will be part of federal law and it will have priority over other laws. In sum, in the legal governance system of the Federal Republic of Germany the notion of "peace" has been given a central place and the idea of supranationalism has been recognized from the very beginning.

The legal reforms were accompanied by other reforms as well. On the one hand, the centralized political structure of the state was replaced by federalism leading to distribution of power, on the other hand economic, educational and other reforms were also carried out in order to create a democratic country and instil a peaceful identity on society.

One might argue that at the time West Germany did not have any alternative other than creating a democratic legal and political system based on

internal and external peace. It was under occupation and did not enjoy full sovereignty. The Allies would not have allowed it to resume a militarist foreign policy. However, it should be remembered that this legal framework and foreign policy based on civilian power managed to consolidate itself in the country and found support from all the political parties as well as the German public. Across the spectrum of German politics a consensus was established to create (or recreate) a peaceful foreign policy that might lead to a regaining of respect and trust in regional and global politics. Therefore, although Germany's transition from aggressive to peaceful international politics was painful and dictated by the great powers, its consolidation was rooted in endogenous factors. It was because of its embracement by the wider society that this identity could be sustained. Renouncing the use of force and pursuing a peaceful policy became fundamental pillars of West German foreign policy.

Although Germany's transition from aggressive to peaceful international politics was painful and dictated by the great powers, its consolidation was rooted in endogenous factors.

Westpolitik and *Ostpolitik* became two basic and complementary principles of Bonn's foreign policy, each one based on the notion of creating a peaceful foreign policy. The catastrophic events that Germany lived through were considered as a result of its deficient integration with the West.[17] Therefore, West Germany became a founding member of the Council of Europe and The European Coal and Steel Community. In 1955 it became a member to NATO as well.[18] *Westpolitik* represented a policy of integration with the Western institutions and its participation in the Western bloc during the bipolar environment of the Cold War.

After constructing a peaceful national and state identity and furthering its integration with the Western institutions, West Germany created *Ostpolitik* in order to improve its relations with the Eastern bloc countries as well. As the era of *détente* started leading the way to a warming up of relations between the two rival blocs, Germany's ruling elite under the leadership of Chancellor Willy Brandt started a rapprochement policy with the socialist countries, signing agreements with each of them in order to better political, economic and cultural ties.[19]

Ostpolitik was an important sign of how Germany tries to civilise its relations with the "others" as well.

After consolidating a civilian identity inside and establishing itself a secure place in the Western system, the Bonn administration turned its face to the East. Benefitting from the appropriate international environment it tried to build new bridges with the socialist countries hence contributing to the consolidation of the *détente* in global politics. Therefore, *Ostpolitik* can be considered as an example of an initiative of a civilian power to spread the civilian values in the neighbourhood and across the globe.

In brief, German foreign policy between 1949 and 1989 fulfilled all the conditions for being a civilian power: First, cooperation constituted the main norm in its international relations. Second, it refrained from any use of force and put an emphasis on other forms of power like economics. Third, it also concentrated on supranationalism as experienced in its becoming one of the main founding fathers of the European integration process.

Having provided a brief sketch of historical background of German foreign policy after the Second World War, the next part will analyse the period after the reunification in 1990. After focusing on the main foreign policy debate between supporters of normalisation and liberalisation, case studies will be dealt with, starting with the Kosovo War. Although the Cold

War period witnessed the consolidation of civilian power role, the period of the 1990s brought new challenges.

Germany's Global Politics After Reunification: Old Wine in a New Bottle?

Although the end of the Cold War was characterised by the breakup of some states, like Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union; Germany was the only country that emerged from the Cold War as reunified. As a result of the signing of the The Unification Treaty on 3 October 1990, West and East Germany succeeded to end their separation and continue as a single state. As a now larger, more populated and richer country (despite the financial cost of the initial years) and through realising its historical dream of unification in a peaceful way, "the German question" came to the forefront of intellectual debates. Being able to spread its political regime, economic system, legal structure, norms and values to the former East Germany, some experts argue that in fact what happened in 1990 was not the reunification of two Germanies, but the enlargement of West Germany to the East.[20]

Irrespective of whether it was reunification or enlargement of West Germany, there was an increasing debate both inside and outside on the possible foreign policy path of the new state. This debate can be defined as the Liberalisation-Normalisation debate.[21] Some observers argued that Germany should stick to its national role conception of the Cold War years and hence continue to focus on global partnerships and peace-oriented policies. This approach was named as *liberalisation*. According to the liberalisation supporters, Germany should continue its European path and not deviate from the civilian power orietation. On the other hand, some others argued that it needed to formulate a new identity and new policies that would help the country to normalise. This approach was labelled as *normalisation*. The advocates of normalisation argued that Berlin should try to act like a normal country without letting its history limit itself. This approach also claimed that, like normal countries, Germany should be able to resort to use of force as well if it became necessary.[22] Mearscheimer, for example argued that the reunified Germany would change its course, become a major power and try to acquire nuclear weapons,[23] which in the end did not happen.

Germany was the only country that emerged from the Cold War as reunified.

However, immediately after the reunification Germany was confronted with new challenges in the realm of foreign policy. The Gulf conflict in 1990-1991 presented one of the first challenges in regional politics. During the US-led intervention into Iraq Germany mainly used checkbook diplomacy and did not take part in the military conflict. The wars of the Yugoslavia dissolution process were another big challenge. The Yugoslavian wars presented an important issue for Germany because of historical burden, geographical closeness and refugee flows.

It could be argued that the liberalisation approach became effective between 1990-1999 until the Kosovo operation. However, the period since 1999 deserves a closer look, which will be the topic of the next section.

The Kosovo War and Germany: Never Again War or Never Again Auschwitz?

As the newly reunited Germany was trying to carry out the reform process to reintegrate with the former East, a conflict erupted in its neighbourhood. Because of its historical burden in Yugoslavia due to its occupation in the Second World War, the existence of Yugoslav guest workers in the country and multilateral ties with

Yugoslavia, this conflict created a challenge for Berlin. As the debates on its early recognition of the breakaway republics of Croatia and Slovenia were continuing, the war spread to Bosnia Herzegovina. After the United Nations decided to impose sanctions on the transfer of weapons and ammunition to the warring parties, the Berlin administration decided to send military personnel, aircraft and destroyers to the international peace missions.

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However, as soon as the German government wanted to participate in out-of-area missions, it led to a huge debate within domestic German politics. The German Constitutional Court decided in 1994 that if the following two conditions were fulfilled, Germany could send soldiers to the international missions: First, the operation should be carried out within the framework of collective defence or security; second, for each operation an affirmative simple majority vote of the *Bundestag* (German parliament) is required.[24] As NATO started its military operations against Serbian

targets the following year, Berlin did not take an active part and did not become part of the military campaign. It played a role only behind the scenes by taking part in the observation of the sanctions and in sending humanitarian assistance.

Although Germany did not take part in the NATO operation, still the military experience, political discussions and decision of the German Constitutional Court during the Bosnian War played an important role in the learning process of German foreign policy elites as one step forward in the use of "salami tactics."[25] As the war spread to Kosovo and all the diplomatic initiatives of Germany and other countries were exhausted, NATO carried out an intervention against Serbian targets without an authorisation from the United Nations Security Council in order to pressure the Milosevic regime for a ceasefire.

Despite all the domestic discussions, Germany took an active part in the bombing campaign, hence using force in its foreign policy for the first time since the end of the Second World War.[26] Why? How could Germany with its consolidated civilian power identity participate in a military operation that was not in line with international law (at least in a narrow sense) and in a region in which it faced many historical prejudices because of its past violent

policies? How would it be possible that such a policy was realized by a coalition government consisting of the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) and The Alliance 97/Greens, which were seen as the political actors most favouring peaceful policies, and throughout their history had stayed at arm's length from the use of force.[27]

First of all, German leaders insisted on the claim that all peaceful means had been used and exhausted to end the Kosovo conflict. Despite all the international diplomatic initiatives it was not possible to convince the Milosevic regime to stop the violence against civilians. Chancellor Gerhard Schröder stated that the NATO operation was not a war, but the realisation of a peaceful solution through military means. The German government tried to convince the public that it was not part of power politics, instead it was a humanitarian intervention, meaning that the military campaign was carried out to realise humanitarian objectives and reestablish peace in the region. In other words, it was claimed that sometimes the use of force might be necessary to reinstall peace. During the Cold War German foreign policy was based on two axioms: "never again war" and "never again Auschwitz". But in the case of the Kosovo conflict, applying the two principles simultaneously was not possible. Therefore, the ruling

political elite argued that in order to prevent new cases of Auschwitz, the use of force might become necessary. The relevant debate on the use of force for peaceful purposes led to cleavages both within the SPD and the Greens, however the cleavages were only of a temporary nature.

Another evaluation of the Kosovo intervention was related to the Basic Law as well. In Article 4 it is stated that if the government does not act in compliance with the Constitution, the German people have the right to resist. According to some views this line of thought could be extended to the Kosovo case, implying that even if there was no affirmative resolution of the UNSC, still the intervention could be seen justified because of the fact that what was happening in Kosovo between 1998-1999 was against the basic principles of international law.[28]

One should also emphasise the importance of increasing international expectations from Germany to contribute to dealing with the new global challenges. Checkbook diplomacy would not last forever. The allying countries were expecting Germany to play a greater role in global politics, one that would be in line with its increasing weight.

In the literature it was emphasised that despite its participation in the NATO intervention Germany still

kept intact its basic foreign and security principles and values that had been formulated since 1949.[29] It acted in a multilateral way, cooperating closely with its traditional allies without any hegemonic ambitions. Moreover, it did not favor any kind of expansion of the intervention, stating that there was no intention whatsoever of sending in ground forces.[30]

The Kosovo moment in German foreign and security policy characterised a turning point at which the civilian power identity was reframed according to the new internal and external circumstances.

Still, we would argue that the Kosovo moment in German foreign and security policy characterised a turning point at which the civilian power identity was reframed according to the new internal and external circumstances. The breaking of the taboo on the use of force would have repercussions on future international missions. Although there is high amount of sensitivity in the German public for each and every debate on the use of force, the Pandora's box was opened in March 1999. The fact that it was opened by the most peaceful political parties in

German politics would convince the German public about the necessity and justification of the operation.

Considering the three basic preconditions of civilian power identity, it can be stated that Germany did continue to cooperate with its main allies in the case of the Kosovo conflict. The fundamental nature of its supranationalism was maintained as well. But with regard to instruments of foreign policy, the use of the air force did not fit the definition of civilian power. Therefore, the Kosovo case has shown that under the new global circumstances, if there were humanitarian objectives at stake, and if there was broad support in German internal politics, Berlin could break its taboos with regard to the use of military means. Even if the Kosovo case constituted an exceptional moment in the German post-war history, it led to new debates on civilian actorhood. The Kosovo experience also showed that power and morality can interact with each other in German foreign policy as argued by realist constructivism. Its allies pushed Germany to take more responsibility, and the Berlin administration decided to use force in exceptional circumstances despite maintaining civilian power orientation in general.

After the terrorist attacks of 9/11, German foreign policy again had to

face new challenges and take difficult decisions. The Kosovo case may have represented a turning point in German security policy, but the post-9/11 world pushed Germany to take difficult decisions. Germany's approach towards the ISAF operation in Afghanistan would be dealt with in the next section.

A Litmus Test of Civilian Actorhood in Afghanistan

As the 9/11 terrorist attacks shocked the whole world and started a new era in international politics, Germany was one of the countries to declare its full support to the US in its upcoming fight against global terrorism. As its main ally that had provided a comprehensive security umbrella for Germany during the Cold War was attacked by a global terrorist organisation, Germany wanted to give its wholehearted support not only rhetorically, but also through its concrete actions as well. Chancellor Schröder declared his government's "unlimited solidarity" (*uneingeschränkte Solidarität*) with the US in this struggle, however, being conscious of the sensitivities of the German public towards any kind of use of force, he also stated that Germany was ready to take military risks, but Germany was "not available for adventure."[31]

In the case of Iraq, as the US government was preparing for a

military intervention against Iraq, the German coalition government objected to it from the very beginning. Backed by the majority of the German public, the Schröder government opted to not support any military operation against the Baghdad regime since the link between the Iraqi government and Al Qaida could not be substantiated and there was no authorisation from the UNSC. Joining forces with France and some other countries in Europe, Germany experienced an important crisis with the George W. Bush government.[32]

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However in the case of Afghanistan, after the United Nations Security Council authorised the establishment of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in order to provide stability and put an end to the activities of terrorist organisations, the German government wanted to contribute as well by sending soldiers to the region. However, since the SPD-Allliance 90/Greens coalition government had

already experienced the domestic difficulties of sending soldiers in the case of the Balkans, it decided to organize a confidence vote in the Bundestag on 16 November 2001 by asking two questions: Should Germany send soldiers to the Afghanistan mission and should the coalition government remain in power? The vote was passed by a slim majority.[33] It is important to look at how the government justified sending soldiers to Afghanistan and what kind of reactions it had from the opposition, mainly the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS).

First of all, it was argued by the coalition government that the Afghanistan mission would mainly be a peace mission. German forces would be deployed to contribute to the reconstruction and stabilisation of Afghanistan. The ISAF mission was considered to be a separate mission from the US military intervention. Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer during the debates at the *Bundestag* stated that it would be a *peace mission*. Second, as emphasised by Prime Minister Schröder, Germany should fulfill its increasing responsibilities in the world since it did regain its full sovereignty with the reunification. The notion of "increasing responsibilities" came to the forefront whenever a new international mission was being discussed on the German political scene. Third, the concept of the partners'

"increasing expectations" was also stated by Schröder. Fourth, despite all the risks and dangers associated with the mission, an understanding emerged that sometimes in order to reach peace and peaceful solutions states have to resort to the use of force. That was an understanding that had emerged with the discussions during the Kosovo War and became influential during the Afghanistan operation as well.

This approach is clearly in line with the assumptions of realist constructivism. The argument that force and morality can not be separated from each other is in accordance with realist constructivism. During the discussions in the Parliament, the coalition government MPs reminded their peers about Germany's successful missions in the Balkans, mainly in Macedonia. Only the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) opposed the mission. The PDS MPs argued that war was the wrong answer to the problem of terror. They claimed that the UN mandate was not clear enough. They reminded their colleagues of the bitter results of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Instead they favoured a mission under Chapter 6 of the UN Charter, focusing on humanitarian aid and peaceful means. Fifth, the persistent claim of German politicians was that participating in the ISAF mission was necessary for protecting Germany's own security as well as global security. Only

if the risks and threats in Afghanistan were dealt with on the ground, it was argued, could Berlin maintain its own security. The then Minister of Defense Peter Struck stated that "the security of the Federal Republic of Germany is today defended at Hindukush as well."[34]

In tracing the discussions on German foreign policy since the early 1990s, it should be noticed that the following concepts have been increasingly used: partner with equal rights in the international society, increasing duties and responsibilities, and increasing expectations. These terms can be considered as evidence of the country's moving closer to normalisation, at least rhetorically.

Germany sent its first contingent of soldiers to the ISAF mission in January 2002. In February 2003 German troops together with Dutch troops overtook ISAF leadership for six months. Over time Germany established Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) in Kundus and Faisabad, hence concentrating its mission in the North. In 2006 Germany became the leader of the regional commando in the north of Afghanistan. During these first years, German troops were mainly focusing on reconstruction activities and training of Afghan security forces.

However, as the security situation in Afghanistan worsened by 2007

because of the rising control of the Taliban, Germany's position became much more difficult to preserve. From 2007 onwards, German soldiers had to be involved in counter-insurgency measures that would be impossible to associate with the concept of civilian power. As a result of the deteriorating security situation, German special forces were forced to get involved in the fight against the Taliban, which had not been foreseen when German soldiers were sent there in 2002. Hence, a German military mission seen as a *stabilisation force* turned into a *combat force* within five years. Over the years the number of German soldiers increased from 1,200 to 5,350, making Germany the third biggest military force in the ISAF.

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As a result of such growth and changes, the concerns and criticisms of the German public towards the Afghan operation increased tremendously, as the public was not ready to face such a challenge. At the very beginning when the German government was

sending the soldiers to the area, the main discourse of the ruling political elite was based on the idea of a peace mission that was foreseen to contribute to the stabilisation and reconstruction of the country as well as training of the Afghan security forces. However, at the end of the day, the Taliban's resurgence and its rising control over different parts of the country radically changed the circumstances in which the German mission had to operate.

In fact, the Afghanistan mission contributed to the evolution of German security doctrine. In the White Book of the Defence Ministry published in 2006 the concept of "networked security" ("Vernetzte Sicherheit") was developed, meaning that security should include different elements, not only military, but also societal, economic, environmental and cultural factors. Security does not concern just national, but also international level as well.[35]

As the fragile situation in Afghanistan got worse, the challenges for the German mission got bigger. It was stated that the German mission deployed in Kundus received intelligence claiming that two of NATO's fuel trucks had been hijacked by the Taliban and were going to be used in a suicide attack. As a result, a senior German officer ordered two American jets to carry out an airstrike on the area on 4 September

2009. The strikes led to the death of many people. The exact number is not known, but according to different sources the number of casualties was between 90-142, many of them civilians.[36] It was later understood that the intelligence did not reflect the truth. German leaders did not recognise the civilian casualties in the first days, but as the truth became explicit, German Chief of Staff Wolfgang Schneiderhan stated that "Now we have lost our innocence."[37]

The Kundus affair became a bitter military fault for Germany, leading to questioning its early hope that on the ground in Afghanistan it would be the missions of other countries that would deal with hard threats whereas Germany would mainly contribute to civilian and humanitarian activities.[38] That was not the case. In a fragile country such as Afghanistan, any mission could encounter any threat at any time. Hence, the German leaders' "defensive mindset" became much more questioned as a result of the Kundus affair.[39] A good example of this change can be observed in the definition of the German mission. As the then Minister of Foreign Affairs Joschka Fischer stated on 22 December 2001 in the German Parliament on the day of voting to send the German soldiers to the ISAF mission, it was a "peace mission" ("Friedensmission"),[40] however, Chancellor Angela Merkel, in

her declaration after the Kundus strike, used the concept of "combat mission" ("Kampfeinsatz")[41] to describe the German mission. This was an important rhetorical change for the leadership of a country mainly characterised as a civilian power for half a century.

The Kundus affair became a bitter military fault for Germany, leading to questioning its early hope that on the ground in Afghanistan it would be the missions of other countries that would deal with hard threats whereas Germany would mainly contribute to civilian and humanitarian activities.

Even after the Kundus debacle Germany continued its mission within ISAF, as Merkel in the declaration after the strike emphasised that German soldiers were acting together with partner countries and the mission itself was contributing to German security as well as global security against the threat of global terrorism, while at the same time conveying her sorrow over the incident.[42] About 2½ months after the incident, the Labor Minister Franz Josep Jung, who was Defence Minister at the time of the incident, and Chief of Staff Wolfgang Schneiderhan, both resigned.[43]

The mission in Afghanistan continued to have a considerable impact on German politics in the following years as well. In May 2010, German President Horst Köhler led to an outburst of criticism during his visit to Afghanistan when he made the following statement:

"A country of our size, with its focus on exports and thus reliance on foreign trade, must be aware that… military deployments are necessary in an emergency to protect our interests… for example when it comes to trade routes, for example when it comes to preventing regional instabilities that could negatiely influence our trade, jobs and incomes".[44]

His speech was criticised by wider segments of the German public with the accusation that he was supporting a military mission for the purpose of Berlin's economic interests. Until that time German leaders had been justifying the decision to be part of the ISAF mission by putting furward security needs, protection of the country from threats of global terrorism, and Berlin's increasing international responsibilities. It was for the first time that a German leader was explaining German's role in ISAF via its economic interests. The idea of using an international mission to furher

Germany's economic activities was not in compliance with its traditional role conception. As a result of heavy criticisms, Köhler had to resign from his post. For the first time in German history a foreign mission of the German army led to the resignation of three high-level officials, the President, the Labor (and former Defence) Minister, and the Chief of Staff.

As a result of German soldiers' participation in counter insurgency operations, German leaders felt the need to change their rhetoric. In 2010 Defence Minister Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg talked about "war-like conditions" in Afghanistan.[45] It was the first time a German minister was mentioning the concept of *war* in the case of the ISAF operation and hence acknowledging the facts on the ground. Hence, the rhetoric of German leaders was changing from emphasising the peacefulness of international missions to referencing the "war-like" conditions on the ground.

Since the 1990s, German decision makers began having to reconsider the instruments of foreign policy with every global challenge. As the traditional peaceful means of the Cold War, such as diplomacy, economics and culture, were not enough to solve the new types of problems, and as its global allies had increased expectations from the reunified Germany, Germany

had to reformulate how it would act in the realm of global politics. After securing the legal background for sending soldiers to international missions during the Bosnian War, the conflict in Kosovo played a historical role for actual direct participation in an international intervention, and afterwards, the Afghanistan mission became Germany's first counter-insurgency operation.

However, it was a thorny path, since every time the Bundeswehr became involved, it led to hot debates in internal politics and faced domestic criticism. Even in cases when the majority of the German public believed that military intervention would be necessary to solve a conflict, their view on the participation of German soldiers in these missions was negative.

The ISAF mission resulted in a rethinking of how to reformulate Germany's interests, responsibilities and actorhood under the new international circumstances in which global terrorism was becoming an ever increasing threat.

As the ISAF mission had to face increasing challenges with the rise

of Taliban power, "the culture of restraint"[46] saw greater impact. The Kosovo operation was relatively short and succeeded in having a lasting impact of stabilisation and a return to peace without leading to any German casualties. The ISAF experience, on the other hand, presented a different and more difficult experience. Starting as a peace mission it turned into a combat mission leading to the deaths of more than 50 German soldiers, recreating a culture of remembrance and martyrdom. Therefore, the ISAF mission resulted in a rethinking of how to reformulate Germany's interests, responsibilities and actorhood under the new international circumstances in which global terrorism was becoming an ever increasing threat.

Meanwhile, German leaders tried to play a "double game" during the ISAF mission as they aimed to show their allies that Germany had started undertaking responsibilities towards global challenges, at the same time they did their best to make the German public believe that ISAF was in fact an humanitarian mission.[47]

German leaders emphasised that the country was gaining more weight, thereby more responsibilities, that the use of military means was possible in the case of exhaustion of all peaceful instruments, and it would like to act in alliance with partners. However,

the case of Afghanistan showed very bitterly that all this was easier said than done. As the then Defense Minister Thomas de Maizière stated, to establish a security structure and sustainable peace in post-conflict Afghanistan was a complicated process. He also drew attention to the following change in Germany's policy towards Afghanistan during 12 years of Germany's participation in the ISAF mission:

> "Afghanistan has triggered a learning process. While a western-style democracy used to be the objective at the beginning, the task at hand now- after many, sometimes painful years- is to empower the people in Afghanistan to preserve at least a minimum of peace in their country themselves."[48]

De Maizière's statement provides a critical account of the change in German perception of the Afghan mission from an ambitious one to a minimal one.

Hence, as opposed to the Kosovar case, it would be possible to draw the following lesson from the Afghanistan case: Even if Germany acts in line with international law, cooperates with its partners, uses force only as last resort after trying peaceful means, still that does not guarantee that the mission will be successful. Especially after the worsening of security in the country,

the ISAF mission turned into "mission impossible" and could not achieve the aim of creating a stable and secure Afghanistan. Therefore, the issue of use of force when confronted with security challenges continued to become ever more problematic. Therefore, even if the cooperative nature of German foreign policy behaviour continued and supranationalism persisted, the use of combat force that sometimes led to civilian casualties created a further debate on the civilian foreign policy identity. However, the lessons drawn from the Afghan mission led to a questioning of effectiveness and success of international military missions in fragile countries.

> Even if Germany acts in line with international law, cooperates with its partners, uses force only as last resort after trying peaceful means, still that does not guarantee that the mission will be successful.

Another important point is the emerging gap between politicians' discourses and public perception. Although German leaders' official declarations and statements draw attention to the rise of Germany and the expected normalisation of its policies,

the same change can not be seen in the public attitude. The German public is still very concerned and suspicious towards the use of force. Therefore, it might be possible to mention the emerging normalisation of political discourse versus the preservation of liberalism and peace-dominance of the public attitude. It is to be seen how this gap between politicians and public will evolve in the foreseeable future.

The German public remained cautious towards military missions especially when they continued for a longer period of time and involved casualties. As the surveys proved, German public support for the ISAF mission decreased tremendously after the German army was involved in combat missions. In 2005 64% of Germans supported ISAF, in 2010 it decreased to 44%, and in 2011 to 37%, almost half of the initial support.[49] According to another survey that same year, only 22% of the German public supported the participation of German soldiers in ISAF.[50]

It is also worth noting that a majority of the German public thinks some international military missions are necessary and they should be carried out. But they think that Germany should not be part of them and should not send any soldiers. For example, according to one survey, in the case of Libya, 62% of the German public supported an intervention against the regime of Muammar al Qaddafi, with only 31% opposed. However, 65% of those surveyed rejected any possible German involvement in military mission, with only 29% approving it.[51]

Figure 1: Factors affecting the decision making process in Germany with regard to missions involving use of force

Meanwhile, as the Afghanistan operation was continuing, Germany undertook an important reform in 2011 with regard to its military by putting an end to the system of conscription and paving the way for a voluntary army. Following the example of other Western countries that had already abolished the draft years years earlier, German leaders were aiming to reduce the number of soldiers and make the army more efficient. German soldiers' increasing global involvement and need for professionals in these international missions paved the way for this comprehensive reform. Schulte, an expert on defense issues stated that "After the end of the Cold War, we don't need mass armies any more. And if you send your soldiers into harms way like in Afghanistan or at the Gulf of Aden, where people are on anti-piracy patrol, you do need professionals."[52] Hence, the Bundeswehr's increasing global entanglements led to a substantial reform.

> Germany undertook an important reform in 2011 with regard to its military by putting an end to the system of conscription and paving the way for a voluntary army.

After analysing German participation in the ISAF and its meaning for its civilian actor role, the next section will shed light on German policy towards the turmoil in the Middle East that started as the "Arab Spring" but turned into Arab Uprisings.

Arab Uprisings: Returning to Limbo

This section will examine how German foreign policy makers behaved towards the uprisings in the Middle East after 2010 and to understand whether there was a continuation or change of the policy implemented in Kosovo and Afghanistan where we have observed that there was a cooperation with the Western allies.

In fact, the Middle East has not been a priority area of German foreign policy, which instead mainly focused on Europe and its periphery after the Second World War. The Middle East, as a region in which great powers have made their historical weight felt, did not offer much maneuvring room for Berlin. Since Germany was not one of the colonizing countries of the region, it did not have the historical interests and ties that some of its partners like France and the United Kingdom have. From Berlin's perspective, the energy relationship with Middle Eastern countries and sensitive ties with Israel have become the main pillars of its attitude.

As the first social movements started in Tunisia and then in Egypt, the Berlin administration supported the democratisation of the regional countries and called the leaders of those countries to listen to the protestors and not resort to violence. However, as the situation became more complicated, Berlin had to begin rethinking its policies.

> As the first social movements started in Tunisia and then in Egypt, the Berlin administration supported the democratisation of the regional countries.

As the protest movements spread from Tunisia to Libya, they were met with the violence of the Muammar Qadhafi administration. When he tried to quell the protests against his dictatorial regime, the situation turned into a conflict and then a civil war. As the number of civilian casualties started to rise, the human tragedy and ensuing disorder was referred to the United Nations Security Council, in which Germany was a non-permanent member. As the voting took place on 17 March 2011, 10 members of the UNSC voted affirmatively to intervene in Libya to stop the violence in accordance with Chapter 7 of the UN Charter. Germany abstained from voting

together with four other members.[53] Hence, Berlin, on this occasion, did not act together with its historical allies, like the UK, the US and France. Interestingly enough it voted together with many BRIC countries. How can we explain the fact that Germany was separating itself from its Western allies and finding a common path with the emerging countries of the global North and South despite its bandwagoning in the previous cases of Kosovo and Afghanistan?

In fact, the case of Libya is a clear evidence that Germany's policies towards the use of force would not proceed in a linear way,[54] instead it will be full of ups and downs. In each and every case with regard to resort to military means German decision makers would consider the domestic and international circumstances, compliance with international law, the possibility of civilian casualties as well as casualties on the side of the Bundeswehr, in addition to availability of an exit strategy.

In the case of Libya, the turmoil started at a time when the German mission was already experiencing difficulties within ISAF, leading to an important decline in the support of the German public towards the operation in Afghanistan. Hence, as a result of increasing public concerns towards military missions, German leaders were extremely

sensitive about the idea of starting a new operation.

Five reasons can account for Germany's lack of support towards a military intervention in Libya. First of all, as stated above, the German public was becoming ever more apprehensive about sending German soldiers abroad because of the increasing difficulties and failures experienced in the Afghanistan mission. As a democratic country, politicians were affected by the changing public mood.

Second, the fact that every military operation involved the risk of civilian casualties led to concerns on the part of Berlin. Although an international operation under UN mandate would target military installments of the Qaddafi regime, it would possibly lead to civilian casualties that would make it more difficult to explain military involvement to the German public.

Third, the fact that it was not only Libya that was engulfed in turmoil, but Bahrain, Egypt and Syria which were also experiencing similar protest movements, led to further concern among German decision makers. What if the domino effect would occur and violent conflicts would continue to spread? Would it be possible to intervene in each and every conflict? Did these interventions carry any chance of durable success?

Fourth, the lack of a clear exit strategy and concerns with regard to the effectiveness of a military solution to the complicated problems in Libya constituted another reason for German abstention. Having in mind not only the debacle in Afghanistan but also failures resulting from the occupation of the US-led coalition in Iraq were also remembered in the German capital. Peter Wittig, the then German Ambassador to the United Nations stated the following:

> "Decisions on the use of military force are always extremely difficult to take. We have carefully considered the options of using military force, its implications as well as its limitations. We see great risks. The likelihood of large scale loss of life should not be underestimated. If the steps proposed turn out to be ineffective, we see the danger of being drawn into a protracted military conflict that would affect the wider region. We should not enter a military confrontation on the optimistic assumption that quick results with few casualties will be achieved. Germany, therefore, has decided not to support a military intervention."[55]

The then Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle also stated that it was

wrong to consider using military instruments everytime there is injustice in North Africa or in Arabia.[56]

Fifth, Libya did not have close economic and political ties with Germany, hence it was not one of the priorities of German global politics.

The other conflict that will be examined under this section is the Syrian Civil War and the fight against DAESH in the Middle East. The involvement of the external actors like the US and Russia converted the Syrian conflict into a multilateral one. Germany did not join the global coalition against DAESH at the beginning when the coalition was established in September 2014, because of its traditional value-based foreign policy and its negative stance against democracy through interventions. According to Germany's view, democracy should be found and initialized gradually by inside forces to become successful.[57]

However, Germany's position has changed as a result of refugee influxes from the region to the EU countries and terrorist attacks operated by DAESH militants in the main European cities. Germany became part of the coalition in December 2015. The terrorist attacks in Paris in November 2015 played an important role in Germany's decision to join. Germany joined the conflict indirectly at the first phase via giving arms and providing training to

Iraqi Kurdish peshmerges to help their fight against DAESH.[58] Although this policy was criticized because of the news claiming these weapons were sold on the black market, Germany maintained its policy. Germany sent renaissance aircraft and soldiers to İncirlik base in Turkey to give support to the fight against DAESH, but it was not involved in direct confrontation.[59] In addition, Germany initiated a transformation partnership program to help the regional countries via giving support to projects.

Hence, Germany's position during the Libya intervention and fight against DAESH represents a step back policy and has parallels with the classical civilian power role. Germany did shy away from military intervention in Libya and dared to break away from its traditional allies. In the fight against DAESH it is not involved in combat operations, but mainly contributes to the surveillance role. Therefore, it can be stated that on every occasion German leaders have considered to use the instrument of force very carefully, considering international law, domestic concerns, past experiences, and the possibility of an exit strategy. The normalisation of German attitudes did not represent a finished story. Although German leaders gave signals of *normalisation*, the majority of the German public still favours *liberalisation*.

Table 1: Military Expenditure and its share of Germany's GDP since 1990

Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database: https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex (last visited 20 December 2017).

Table 2: German Arms Exports and its ranking in the World since 1990

Source: SIPRI Arms Transfer Database https://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers last visited 20 December 2017).

Considering all three case studies it can be stated that Germany's classical civilian power role has evolved considerably since the 1990s mainly because of the shifts in the global system and emergence of new challenges, like ethnic conflicts and global terrorism. Both decisionmakers and the public still give priority to non-military means in the solution of the problems, but when all other means are exhausted and humanitarian causes are at stake, then a consensus can emerge in German politics to send German soldiers and military equipment abroad. In other words, the decision depends on the definition of German interests under the current circumstances. Therefore, it can be stated that Berlin is evolving into a realist civilian power using force when it seems appropriate or when it is forced by the external conditions. As shown in Table 1 above, in deciding whether or not to use instruments of force the following factors are being taken into consideration: Are all the civilian means exhausted in the solution of the conflict? Do military means have a chance to bring a solution in the foreseeable future? Are there humanitarian causes that are being harmed by the conflict? What do the German public and main political parties think about it? What are the expectations of the other countries, mainly those of allies? Considering all these issues, German policymakers try to come up with a decision.

> Germany's classical civilian power role has evolved considerably since the 1990s mainly because of the shifts in the global system and emergence of new challenges.

Table 2 depicts Germany's military expenditures, showing that although military expenditures have increased since early 2000, their place in terms of GDP almost remains the same. Meanwhile, with regard to arms exports Germany is ranked third. It can be argued that there is a discrepancy between civilian power identity and its arms exports. The interplay between force and morality, as realist constructivists claim, needs to be further studied in light of Germany's high ranking in global arms sales.

In Lieu of Conclusion

Ever since the end of the reunification process, Germany's attitude in the global politics has attracted much more attention in the literature and the expectations of its allies have been increasing. In an era of global ambiguity, the rise of alternative security issues, and the increasing importance of non-state actors, Berlin administrations have tried to find a way to reframe the classical role conception of civilian

power that had dominated German foreign policy since 1949.

In an era of global ambiguity, the rise of alternative security issues, and the increasing importance of non-state actors, Berlin administrations have tried to find a way to reframe the classical role conception of civilian power.

The process of adoption to new circumstances still continues, however a balance sheet can be drawn by reconsidering the 28 years since unification. This article tried to understand whether Germany can still be considered to concentrate on civilian instruments, when it is confronted with new challenges.

In the case of Kosovo and Afghanistan Germany mainly allied with its partners and dared to use the instrument of force. The NATO air operation during the Kosovo War continued for 2½ months and did not lead to any German casualties (although it resulted in civilian casualties in Kosovo). Therefore, it did not lead to a major discussion in the German public afterwards. Since it was the first instance of German soldiers using force after the Second World War, it was an important turning point.

Table 3: Summary of Three Case Studies and German foreign policy

	Scope	Perception in Germany	Compliance with international law	Exit strategy from German perspective	German decision
Kosovo	NATO intervention	Humanitarian causes	No UNSC Resolution	Clear	Participation
Afghanistan	First UN, then NATO mission	Humanitarian causes and eradication of global terror threat	UNSC Resolution	Not clear	Participation
Libya	NATO intervention	Geopolitical interests of Western countries	UNSC Resolution	Clear	No participation

The case of the Afghanistan mission turned out to be a greater challenge because of the complexity of the problems on the ground. An international operation starting as a peace mission was transformed into a real combat mission and German soldiers had to be involved in counter-insurgency operations. As the mission lasted for 12 years, the support of the German public tremendously decreased, especially after 2007 during which time the Taliban started regaining control over certain territories. This mission also overshadowed the civilian actorhood of Berlin.

The Arab uprisings constituted an important landmark, showing that evolution of German security policy will not be straightforward, instead it will be full of ups and downs. Going back to its former role conception of civilian power, the Merkel administration did not approve the NATO operation in Libya and gave only surveillance support to the fight against DAESH.

The paper argues that although the case of Germany showed that a civilian power could try to reframe its role in global politics and adopt to changing circumstances in accordance with realist constructivism, the evolution does not have to follow a smooth path and could be full of ups and downs. Each experience, successful or bitter, provides feedback for the formulation of policy towards new challenges. Therefore, Germany's new national role conception can be called a *realist civilian power* since it decides on each case considering internal and external conditions and its own interests. Its attempts to preserve a civilian power role in general and its concern towards being part of military missions at the same time are in line with realist constructivism.

> The paper argues that although the case of Germany showed that a civilian power could try to reframe its role in global politics and adopt to changing circumstances in accordance with realist constructivism, the evolution does not have to follow a smooth path and could be full of ups and downs.

Second, the paper also claims that in the German case there is a gap between the perspectives of politicians and the public. Although many of the mainstream political parties do favour use of force as a last resort, the German public is still wary of the effectiveness and morality of using force. In addition, a majority of Germans are against greater involvement of their country in international affairs. According to

surveys by the Körber Foundation, while 62% of Germans approved greater German involvement in global politics in 1994, the rate of support dropped to 34% in 2015. Although the figure rose to 41% in 2016, still the majority thinks otherwise despite all the appeals by German policymakers, from Gauck and Steinmeier to Merkel, von der Leyen and de Maiziere, to take more responsibilities worldwide.[58] In addition, only 13% of the public approves of the use of force in foreign policy.[59] It seems that the *partial normalisation* of German foreign policy does not have any major impact on the 'liberal' and 'civilian' German public.

This article, based on the case study of Germany, has showed that traditional civilian powers may have a tendency to reframe their national roles depending upon changes in the global system and on the emergence of new security problems that can not be solved by classical peaceful means. However, this process of evolution is not smooth and may create important problems inside the country because of the opposition of different political actors. Especially when the use of military force does not bring about expected outcomes in the short or medium term, this might have a tendency to make things more complicated. The article also argued

that the evolution of German foreign and security policy can be understood through a realist constructivist approach because of the interplay between morality and power.

As the global tensions continue in different parts of the world, it is worth observing German foreign behaviour in the future since Germany enjoys a higher standing in regional as well as global governance. Whether German foreign policy orientations will give any inspiration to other countries in its neighbourhood is an important research question. Would its possible attitude, civilian or military, towards different challenges be taken as a model or case of inspiration by other countries? That would be an interesting question to be analysed by looking at different case studies comparing German foreign policy with that of other countries.

Another point of interest for further studies would be how Germany reconciles its identity of civilian actorhood with its becoming the third biggest arms exporter in the world, with 23% of its arms exports going to the Middle East, a region where there are ongoing violent conflicts.[60] The relationship between civilian identity and trade interests is another topic to be analysed.

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