# International Migration and Diplomacy: Challenges and Opportunities in the 21st Century

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## Introduction

In today's world, international migration is one of the key public policy areas with repercussions for international relations and diplomacy. In fact, the movement of people has proven to continue to be a significant topic of discussion, as it has direct implications on borders that nation-states try to maintain, on the existing political and social institutions, as well as on the receiving and home societies.[1] Various kinds of political and social animosities, including xenophobia, Islamophobia, and racism are in ascendancy all around the world, creating problems for the maintenance of a healthy national and international order. Hardly any country or society seems totally immune from such tensions, since almost all countries in the world face the challenges of managing migration, border controls and integration of immigrants.

Although the mobility of persons is often a contested area, it also provides a forum within which international diplomacy may play a key role. However, there is a limited number of case studies in the migration literature that sheds light on how migration processes can become a part of diplomatic relations and when negotiations over migration can evolve into 'diplomacy of migration'.

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One of these cases that explores the role of migration in international relations and diplomacy is Thiollet's account on labour migration in the Middle East.[2] Looking at the free circulation of Eritrean refugees and other migrants in the Arab region, Thiollet argues that diplomacy over labour migrants and refugee movements revived pan-Arabism and facilitated regionalism in the Middle East in the 1960s and 1970s. Thiollet's research sheds light on how migration diplomacy links sending and receiving countries via intense bilateral relations while engaging with a wider range of actors in this process.

In another historical analysis on US-Chinese relations, Oyen argues that migration diplomacy over Chinese Americans was a crucial aspect in forming alliances and creating disputes between the two countries in the period of 1943 to 1972.[3] Beginning with the US's rescinding of the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1943 to create a strong wartime alliance with the nationalist Chinese regime, Oyen argues that migration policies and practices were used to renegotiate the intergovernmental relations during the war and post-war period. Oyen's historical account on how irregular migration, student exchange, family remittances, asylum movements and deportation of dissidents were deployed by both the US and China in terms of *rapprochement* or *detente* is quite impressive in the sense that it clearly indicates that migration diplomacy becomes a means of realizing other foreign policy objectives through changes in migration legislation. While Oyen's research suggests that the positive or negative impact of migration to diplomacy and vice versa is prone to change over extended periods of time, Thiollet's discussion captures the possibilities of regional integration as a response to incoming diverse migration flows. These studies are enlightening for discussion of the complex and intertwined relationship between migration and diplomacy.

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In the context of the EU and Turkey, we see that migration related issues are still relevant, and diplomatic tools are proving to become even more important to solve current problems. The externalization of border policies has led to the increasing involvement of the EU member states in the border

infrastructure of transit countries, and in the negotiations of re-admission agreements to deport irregular migrants and reject asylum seekers. Turkey, as a candidate country guarding the external borders of the EU has long been under pressure from the EU. Many media outlets referred to 2015 as the year of the European refugee crisis. Today, the number of Syrian and other refugees living in the EU is still minimal, with Germany holding the highest numbers, with over one million. However, we are aware that most of the refugees (84 %) today live in developing and neighbouring countries rather than in the global North.[4] While many traditionally migrant receiving and refugee settlement countries in Western Europe and North America have introduced more restrictions on entry or lowered their quotas, they donate large sums of money to many governments in the global South to curb flows of people before entering the EU territory. What we witness in this process is so-called 'transit' refugees, stuck in the countries of transit for longer periods of time. This eventually either paved the way to more human smuggling and an immense death toll in the Mediterranean and the Aegean[5] or to the creation of a migration project industry with increasing activities carried out by international, intergovernmental and local/national organisations to contain and to improve living standards of 'transit' refugees.

As of April 2011, Turkey started receiving refugees from Syria fleeing the civil war. Since then, the civil war escalated in Syria and Turkey has become the country hosting the highest number of refugees in the world. According to the Directorate General of Migration Management of Turkey (DGMM), as the end of 2017, the number of Syrian refugees under temporary protection settled in Turkey stands at 3.5 million.[6] Turkey has displayed an exemplary humanitarian effort in this crisis with its open border policy up until 2017, and was able to manage unprecendented migration flows from Syria mostly relying on its own resources. Beyond the immediate and evident humanitarian perspective, though, there are obviously political, economic, demographic, and socio-cultural implications of this mass movement for the wider society and for the refugees themselves. After seven years of living together with almost four million Syrian and other refugees and asylum seekers mainly from Afghanistan, Iraq, Bangladesh, and Iran, Turkish authorities have finally accepted that Turkey has *de facto* become a country of immigration. This transformation from being an emigration country to an immigration country appears to be acknowledged by the government, as the DGMM 2016 Turkey Migration Report suggests the completion of the transition to

a destination country for migrants, asylum seekers, and refugees.[7]

With a large number of immigrants and refugees in its territory, Turkey is also coming to terms with the challenges of integration. Although most of the Syrians enjoy a temporary protection regime, they are still not considered as 'refugees' due to Turkey's upholding of the geographical limitation clause in the 1951 Geneva Convention on Refugees. Nevertheless, Turkey closely follows the principle of *non-refoulement* and other duties in accordance with the international protection. There are also thousands of Syrians holding only residence permits but without temporary protection and an unknown number of Syrian irregular migrants.[8] Their 'liminal' situation and temporary status not only automatically limits opportunities given to Syrians like permanent settlement in Turkey, but also hinders the political will to put proper integration regimes in place at the national level even after seven years of living together.

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Yet, there were good lessons for Turkey in this process, especially at the institutional and polity level to address the challenges. In fact, Turkey has started to make a series of changes and reforms in migration policies not only to address pressing issues resulting in large numbers of flows over the course of seven years but also for the sake of the EU Accession Process since the early 2000s. In 2003, Turkey adopted the law on work permits for foreigners (No. 4817), mainly addressing the growing number of irregular and circular economic migrants working in the informal sector, who were lured into the country thanks to Turkey's booming economic stance as the 10th largest economy in the world and a G-20 country. Wage differentials in their countries of origin is another factor attracting labour migrants from diverse locations, including Central Asia, Eastern Europe, Africa, and South Asia. Changes in regulations continued with the International Labour Force (Law No. 6735), which became the primary legislation for foreign labour in 2016. The Law includes both employer-led and points-based approaches with an emphasis on selective labour migration. The introduction of the Turquoise Card is the signifier of this emphasis, which enables permanent work permits for those considered of strategic importance, determined by indicators such as education level, professional

experience, and investments, and provides residence permits for the holder's spouse and children. The Law also assigns the task of determining international labour force policy to the International Labour Force Policy Council.

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In 2005, Turkey adopted the Action Plan on Asylum and Migration, laying out the tasks to be completed in aligning migration law to the EU *acquis* until 2012. That would include lifting the geographical limitation as well as making asylum and migration procedures in line with that of the EU. However, Turkey's concerns over becoming a buffer zone for irregular migrants and rejected asylum seekers as well as the EU's reluctance to admit Turkey as a full member even after meeting the set criteria were evidenced by its hesitation to eliminate the geographical restriction. Nevertheless, the Action Plan was a strong assurance for reforms on migration-related issues and led to changes to the 1994 Asylum Regulation. One of these changes was lifting the 10-day time limitation for refugees to apply to the governorates and the UNHCR for asylum. Before the change, this limitation was already targeted in the cases against the deportation of asylum seekers who were recognized as refugees by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), in both local courts[9] and the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR).[10]

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In 2006, Turkey made some amendments in the Settlement Law (No. 5543) that had dated back to the 1930s, and in 2009, to the Citizenship Law (No. 5901). As such, the new Settlement Law that replaced the 1934 Resettlement Law (Law No. 2510) maintained the definition of migrants as those of Turkish descent despite the relaxation in other aspects. In 2008, pursuant to the Action Plan, the Bureau for the Development and Implementation of Asylum and Migration Legislation and Administrative Capacity Improvement

was also established to draft the Law on Foreigners and International Protection (LFIP) (No. 6458). It was adopted later in 2013 and the temporary protection regime that came into force in October 2014 literally changed the legal status of Syrians from temporary guests to those under temporary protection.[11] The current asylum system established under the LFIP presents four statuses of international protection: refugee; conditional refugee; subsidiary protection; and temporary protection. A person who qualifies neither as refugee nor conditional refugee would be assigned to subsidiary protection. Lastly, those who left their country in exodus would apply for temporary protection. Applications for temporary protection must be made at a Provincial Directorate of Migration Management, local divisions of the DGMM that are established in every province. All issues related with migration and integration will be handed to the DGMM, including the camps for Syrians which, since their inception, have been run by the Disaster and Emergency Presidency (AFAD).

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Temporary protection provides access to primary and secondary education, healthcare and other social services. The Ministry of Education and the DGMM report that there are currently more than 976,000 Syrian children of school age in Turkey. Language remains a barrier in public schools, where the language of instruction is Turkish. While the language of instruction is Arabic in temporary education centers, most Syrian children go to Turkish public schools, while the remaining receives education at the temporary education centers. These figures indicate a significant rise in the number of Syrians who have the right to access to education. About 62% of Syrian children in the 2017-2018 school year are in schools compared to 30% in 2016. There are also almost 17,000 Syrian young adults who receive higher education in Turkey. The YTB provides scholarships for more than 4,000 of those students at the university level. 400 Syrian academicians are also employed in Turkish universities in different departments.[12] The Ministry of Education aims to enroll the remaining children and plans to transfer students to public schools from temporary education centers in the coming years. The enrollment of all Syrian children at school age and limiting child labour is important to prevent 'lost generations', delinquency, and high unemployment rates among

young refugee populations in the years to come. Access to healthcare in public hospitals is also provided while medication is quite costly. Although fewer in numbers, Syrian and Arabic speaking medical doctors are also employed at community centres run by some municipalities and at public hospitals.

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Currently, due to their large numbers, Syrians constitute the largest number of beneficiaries for temporary protection. Only a fraction (8%) of Syrians under temporary protection reside in shelters. Their protracted situation, mass flows, and limited capacity in camps have forced many Syrians to find housing in mostly poor neigbourhoods in cities, underlying the urban refugee issue. While cities closer to the Syrian border host most of the Syrians, the city with the largest number of Syrians is İstanbul, with 545,753 as of February 2018.[13] Under the Law, reception and accommodation centers and removal centers have also been established. Reception and accommodation centers provide services such as accommodation, healthcare and food, whereas removal centers accommodate those under administrative detention. Regarding border management between Turkey and the EU, the implementation of online processing and biometric data requirements eased visa processes in 2010. The prerequisites of the EU membership process marked some of the developments in this area, such as the modernization of border crossing points necessary for the European Integrated Border Management Strategy (IBM). In 2013, a cooperation agreement was concluded with the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (FRONTEX), which enables cooperation between the parties such as the "exchange of relevant strategic information".[14] However, issues such as the military control of borders rather than a special police force remain as obstacles to the IBM.

The LFIP law is comprehensive in that it regulates the activities of foreigners in the country, such as entrance and residence, and the requests for asylum and protection. With this new law also came the establishment of an important institution: the Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM), which, for the first time, is monitoring entries, and keeping and disseminating statistical data on migrants and refugees. Moreover, the DGMM, as a department of the Ministry of Interior, operates as a civilian nucleus of migration management, taking over the tasks previously undertaken by the General Directorate of Security

and other different authorities. These tasks include the development, implementation and execution of migration legislation and projects; coordination among related parties; international and temporary protection; prevention of irregular migration and human trafficking and protection of victims; and management of foreigners' entrance to, staying in, and exit from the country. Assembling these tasks under one roof, the DGMM became the sole authority in migration management in Turkey. To address one of the urgent matters in migration, the DGMM devised the Strategy Document and National Action Plan on Irregular Migration in 2015. The Plan aims to achieve progress in reducing the scale of irregular migration until 2018 through the development of extensive legislation, articulation of strategic and statistical knowledge, utilization of precautions against organized crime such as trafficking in persons and human smuggling, improvement of voluntary and involuntary return programmes, and promotion of local and global cooperation. As part of the institutional changes, the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB) was established in 2010 to address the needs of the Turkish diaspora and ethnic kin living in different countries.

As for labour market integration, a series of improvements also took place.

The Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB) was established in 2010 to address the needs of the Turkish diaspora and ethnic kin living in different countries.

Up until January 2016, work permit regulations prevented Syrians from acquiring formal employment, since a residence permit was a requirement to obtain work permits. Most Syrians who did not hold residence permits had to work in the informal economy at much cheaper rates than Turkish nationals. However, with the change in the legislation, Syrians under temporary protection for six months are eligible to apply for work permits through an employer that offers minimum wages at least. More incentives were also introduced to hire highly-skilled Syrians, like medical doctors, nurses, teachers, and engineers. To protect the national workforce and prevent resentment, the employment of Syrians is restricted at 10% of all employees in any given workplace, yet this cap was not even close to being exceeded, as the number of work permits granted in 2016 reached 9,989 and 17,062 in 2017.[15] Turkey still needs to adopt policies and a clear roadmap to facilitate labour market integration of Syrian refugees.[16] Furthermore,

in order to support the livelihood of Syrians, the Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN) programme was launched by the Ministry of Family and Social Policies. The programme is funded by the EU and coordinated by Turkey, the World Food Programme, and the Turkish Red Crescent. The programme provides cash (TL 120) topped-up debit cards for up to 1.3 million Syrians. Self-sustaining programmes were also introduced by civil society to Syrian men and women to equip them in the labour markets and increase their capacity to find better employments. As of late 2017, there were 8,000 registered Syrian-owned small and medium-scale enterprises in Turkey and the number is expected to rise with the support of international donors.[17]

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Another important turning point regarding the legal status of Syrian refugees is about the recent amendment in the Turkish citizenship law in Turkey, opening up the possibility of foreign investors and contributors to the economy of becoming Turkish citizens regardless of their descent. Then comes the option of extending Turkish citizenship to some of the chosen Syrians who are under the temporary protection regime. As mentioned earlier, Turkey has already provided temporary protection to Syrian refugees, which somewhat eased their access to certain rights, including access to public healthcare, education of children in public schools and participation in labour markets via the new law introduced on work permits. The idea of granting Turkish citizenship to Syrian refugees who found refuge in Turkey was first voiced in 2016 by President Erdoğan in Kilis, a neighbouring city with Syria, with already existing close kin ties between Syrians and Turkish nationals. Stressing the overlapping borders of motherland and adopted homeland, he also heralded a change in naturalization policy by announcing that "the path to Turkish citizenship will be opened for our Syrian brothers and sisters".[18] Kilis is an interesting case study to consider as the Syrian refugees there have gradually exceeded the number of local inhabitants in the city and the city has *de facto* become a buffer zone between Syria and Turkey. Such public announcements triggered a heated debate partly due to the lack of legal status of Syrians as 'refugees'

or as 'permanent residents/denizens' in the first place, and partly because they fueled nationalist fears that the temporariness of Syrians would be replaced with permanence.[19] In order to thwart the political backlash and public outrage, government officials clarified that conditions of granting citizenship under exceptional criteria to Syrians would be based on high skills and higher education levels of applicants.[20] Almost 40,000 Syrians under temporary protection were given Turkish citizenship by the end of 2017.[21]

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In line with the developments in the migration system in Turkey, the official and academic discourses surrounding Syrians have also changed dramatically over the last seven years. Initially, they were considered as 'guests' underlying temporariness and hospitality. Then it took the form of religious duty of Muslims that referred to early Muslims and hijra (emigration of early Muslims from Mecca to Medina) with the terms of *ensar* (host) and *muhajir* (forced religious migrant). Regardless of a shared religion, a recent study gauging public reactions against Syrians in Turkey, 80% of Turkish people cannot find any affinity between themselves and the Syrian population. In fact, the vast majority of Turkish citizens believe that the Syrians will never go back to their country of origin.[22] Social exclusion and other-ization is also evident in the recent attacks in different urban centres in Turkey targeting Syrians[23] and some racist hashtags on Twitter.[24]

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Nowadays, reflecting public perceptions before the 2018 presidential elections in Turkey, the official discourse has taken on the form of eventual safe return of Syrian refugees and providing a safe zone for returnees, as Turkey cannot keep Syrians within its territory forever.[25] It seems that many Turkish people (86.2%), regardless of their political affiliations and voting behaviour, are united in their wish of repatriation of Syrians once the war is

over.[26] The ongoing military operation run with the Syrian Free Army across Turkey's borders called the 'Olive Branch' and the earlier 'Euphrates Shield' were launched to secure the Syrian territories across the Turkish border from terrorists but also to provide a safe zone for many Syrians who want to go back to their homeland. After the Euphrates Shield Operation, more than 100,000 Syrians repatriated voluntarily while Turkey still provides safety in the area and meets basic humanitarian needs of many living there.

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Prospects of resolving migration issues based on shared interests by diplomatic measures are evident in a most recent experience. Beginning with the 1990s, the management of borders and the mobility of persons have entered the agenda for both Turkish and European actors, finally reaching a peak point in 2015, as a result of the abrupt rise in border passages. Whereas Turkey holds the highest number of refugees of Syrian and other nationalities on its territory, the fact that many refugees succeeded in reaching the EU through land and sea borders via irregular means made this a pressing item in bilateral official visits and multilateral talks. Albeit with smaller numbers, such irregular migration had always included the movement of asylum seekers and refugees, partly due to Turkey's maintenance of the geographical clause limiting the granting of refugee status to only the citizens of Europe,[27] and partly because of Turkey's crucial position in between many developing and politically unstable countries of the global South and the developed member states of the European Union. Turkey's hand appears to have been both strengthened and weakened during the negotiations, especially in relation to its candidacy prospect.

During the summer of 2015, with the sudden increase in the irregular migration flows from Turkey to the EU, the Joint Action Plan on Migration became operational in November 2015, with the aim of curbing irregular flows. According to Frontex, some 885,000 migrants arrived in the EU in 2015 via the Eastern Mediterranean route, the vast majority comprised of Syrians, Afghans, and Somalis, arriving from Turkey on the shores of several Greek islands in the Aegean Sea.[28] On 18 March 2016, a readmission agreement

was concluded with the EU despite certain EU member states' concerns over Turkey's potential membership to the union. The decrease in the number of sea arrivals in Greece suggests that the EU-Turkey agreement has made an actual impact on stopping irregular migration, human smuggling networks and the heavy death toll from sea crossings. UNHCR data demonstrate that there were 24,739 sea arrivals in Greece in 2017 compared to 173,450 for 2016.[29] Moreover, the number of people who drowned while attempting to reach Greece through the Aegean has decreased by almost 95 % in 2017.[30] However, other routes on the Black Sea and the Mediterranean were established almost simultaneously with the EU-Turkey deal. Many human-rights organizations also criticized the EU, saying that signing an agreement would jeopardize lives and limit the opportunities of genuine asylum seekers to reach safety by suggesting that the EU is simply shifting its responsibility towards refugees onto Turkey. The living conditions of many asylum seekers stranded in Greece as the first country of asylum were reportedly inhumane.[31]

According to the EU-Turkey deal, Turkey readmits Syrian migrants who arrived in Greece from Turkey but were denied from international protection, in return for the EU's admission of another Syrian migrant in Turkey. Under the 1:1 agreement, the number of Syrians resettled in the EU countries reached more than 12,000 by early February 2018.[32] Another component of the agreement was international burden-sharing and financial help. Turkey would be compensated with EUR 3 billion initially, and with another EUR 3 billion promised by the end of 2018. To date, Turkey has spent US$ 30 billion on Syrian refugees and has only received a small part of the financial support (1.85 billion Euros) from the EU while the rest of the sum is slated to be given under humanitarian aid and only in installments.[33]

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In addition to burden-sharing, another expectation from the deal was that the Schengen visa requirements would be lifted for Turkish citizens by the end of June 2016. While the readmission agreement reduced the number of refugees taking the Balkan Route, the EU did not lift the visa requirements for Turkish citizens on the pretext that Turkey's reluctance to reform its anti-

terror laws would be a violation of human rights. However, the Turkish government considered these reforms as impossible by referring to security reasons[34] and cautioned several times that in the case that visa-free travel was not granted, Turkey might withdraw from the agreement.[35] As expressed by Stringer, although visa diplomacy is usually seen as part of consular affairs and "low politics", issuing or denying visas - as part of carrot and stick policy - "often allow regimes to make policy statements that cannot be expressed by other diplomatic means."[36] Although Turkey still meets the requirements borne from the agreement, the possibility that it could withdraw unilaterally alarmed the European countries, especially the ones on the Balkan Route such as Greece and Austria. There are also public concerns and anecdotal evidence that the EU countries are handpicking the skilled Syrians under the scheme, while the unskilled are dumped into Turkey.

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For some time now, the two migration processes, the emigration of Turkish nationals and the mobility of third country nationals have been attached to one another- frequently utilized as a *quid pro quo* by political leaders. In terms of the readmission agreement negotiations, from the perspective of Turkey, since the beginning of negotiations in 2002, the agreement was understood as a very risky instrument, which would eventually turn the country into a buffer zone between the EU borders and the borders of the source countries of irregular migrants. It was within this context that a visa facilitation agreement, which would lead to a visa-free regime between Turkey and the EU, was seen as the only positive outcome that Turkey could gain from this process.[37] Paradoxically, the free movement of workers across Turkish-EEC borders has been envisaged and deemed extremely positive in Article 12 of the Ankara Agreement in 1963,[38] nevertheless it has not been put into practice up to date. Still, the prospects for free circulation have continued to be addressed by certain political leaders and state officials in Turkey, to boost electoral wins in domestic politics, or to strengthen the bargaining capacity of the country in the negotiation processes. Moreover, in the course of the Turkey-EU readmission agreement, there have always been concerns over

domestic security.[39] Opening up the black box of statecraft, this illustrated that migration diplomacy almost always involves more than two actors.

Another area of contention between the EU and Turkey is related with the large Turkish diaspora- the majority of which live in Germany, with three million. Many examples around the world indicate that diasporas are active participants in homeland politics, that they influence and even challenge foreign policy-making of the host and home states, and develop alternative political identities transcending borders.[40] Since the 1990s, international migration has become a major component in the diplomatic relations between Turkey and the EU, shaping particularly policies on irregular migration and the five million Turkish emigrants living in Europe. Over the last couple of years, diaspora engagement and state-led transnationalism have also entered high on the agenda for policy makers as well as public opinion in Turkey.[41]

Diasporas are active participants in homeland politics, they influence and even challenge foreign policy-making of the host and home states, and develop alternative political identities transcending borders.

As a traditional country of emigration, international migration has clearly influenced Turkey's diplomatic relations with other countries, particularly with those on the European continent. The history of migration from Turkey to Europe has been shaped by the search for work in the expanding European economies of the 1960s in the context of Fordist guestworker programmes, and later continued by family reunification and formation as well as asylum flows throughout the 1980s and 1990s.[42] Beginning with the 1961 bilateral labour recruitment agreement signed with the Federal Republic of Germany and followed by the agreements with other countries in Western Europe and elsewhere, the planning and management of the mobility of persons across the borders as well as the managing of post-migratory conditions entered in the agenda of the state actors. Over the last two decades, the acknowledged permanence of Turkish citizens in the EU and Turkish state's policies around reinforcement and institutionalization of diaspora governance have posed some challenges in bilateral relations. These include questions about how to deal with the spill-over effect of domestic politics beyond the physical borders and how to approach dual citizens' loyalties towards their home and host countries. A significant development for the Turkish diaspora

was the introduction of external voting for Turkish citizens. After the implementation, the participation rates of the Turkish diaspora in domestic politics increased significantly, from about 5% in 2014 to 48% in 2017,[43] which reinstated its position as a political actor in Turkey. Moreover, an initiative referred to as the Blue Card was established for foreigners who had previously renounced their Turkish citizenship to benefit from rights defined for citizens. The politicization over Turkey's diaspora engagement policies coupled with populism fed by xenophobia and Islamophobia and electoral concerns in the EU have contributed to the already worsening relations between the EU and Turkey.

As a traditional country of emigration, international migration has clearly influenced Turkey's diplomatic relations.

Recently, migration diplomacy was tested with the deterrence of Turkish ministers from campaigning on the April 2017 referendum in the EU. One of these instances coincided with the Dutch general election. The attempts of Turkish officials to organize a political rally in the Netherlands resulted with the Dutch government's withdrawal of the landing permission of the flight of the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu and the forced expulsion of Fatma Betül Sayan Kaya, Turkish Minister of Family and Social Policies, from the country, causing a political and diplomatic incident between the two governments in violation of the Vienna Agreement. Consequently, the Turkish government terminated diplomatic relations at a high level and prohibited the return of the Dutch Ambassador to Turkey. As a response, the Dutch government announced that the Ambassador was being withdrawn from Turkey and diplomatic representation was lowered. In Austria and Germany, there were similar problems[44] and the Turkish government's response was severe. The Turkish President Erdoğan severely condemned the Dutch government and accused the Netherlands of being responsible for the Srebrenica massacre, while the President of the European Council, Donald Tusk, considered the reaction as "detached from reality."[45]

The free movement of workers across Turkish-EEC borders has been envisaged and deemed extremely positive in Article 12 of the Ankara Agreement in 1963, nevertheless it has not been put into practice up to date.

However, the larger locus of tension was in Germany. Similar to the Netherlands, political rallies for the Turkish referendum were not allowed in Germany either.[46] President Erdoğan labeled these last minute cancellations as "Nazi practices."[47] Additionally, a Kurdish opposition rally in Frankfurt attracted the attention of the Turkish government because of the use of the Kurdistan Workers' Party's (PKK) forbidden symbols. Germany's permission for this rally but not for the others was considered as a "double standard" by the Turkish Foreign Ministry. Other officials further accused Germany of supporting and giving refuge to terrorists- both PKK and Gülen supporters (FETÖ).[48] Lastly, it has been claimed that some Turkish imams affiliated with the Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs (DITIB), funded by the Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs, were collecting intelligence on Turkish Gülen supporters living in Europe.[49] The developments in the relations between Germany and Turkey resulted in Germany's more critically determined stance on Turkey, which was publicly announced by the former German Foreign Minister Gabriel along with a caution to travel to Turkey.[50] Germany's Chancellor, Angela Merkel, visited Turkey couple of times before concluding the EU-Turkey deal. Yet, over the course of the 2017 German federal elections, this quite harsh stance was retained and even extended to the EU-level. Merkel openly expressed her opposition to Turkey's EU membership and expansion of customs union while supporting economic sanctions through the restriction or suspension of EU funds. In retaliation, Erdoğan urged Turkish-Germans not to vote for Turkey's adversaries, and other officials made comparisons of racism and the far-right to the German stance, which were also complemented with a travel advisory on Germany.[51]

Germany's Chancellor, Angela Merkel, visited Turkey couple of times before concluding the EU-Turkey deal.

To sum up, in the current state of affairs, the diplomatic relations between Turkey and the EU and some of its member states are strongly linked with three issues of concern related to migration and post-migratory conditions: The first point is whether the intense migratory flows due to the free circulation of Turkish nationals could create significant adjustment problems for the labour market and migrants. The second point is whether Turkey will continue to fulfil the requirements of the readmission agreement signed between the EU and Turkey and to

meet the EU's objectives on border control and management in order to keep irregular migration heading to Europe at a minimum pace.[52] The third concern is over dual citizenship and allegiance. Turkey's continuous ties with and influence over its emigrants in Europe on domestic politics have created problems in the recent past. In fact, the bilateral relations, especially with some of the EU member states, have reached their "lowest point" in history.[53] The deterioration of relations between Turkey and European countries also corresponded to the periods of referendums and national elections. All these examples related to cross-border practices may carry the potential for tension or cooperation in diplomatic relations between states, which are already entangled with concerns over domestic politics.[54]

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The picture, however, is not void of signs that can bring optimism. While the ties between Europe and Turkey displayed a negative slope recently, there were also instances of positive initiatives at the diplomatic level. These were also coupled with the remarks of officials affirming the continuation of relations and the strategic importance of the relations for both sides.[55] One of these remarks belongs to Commissioner Avramopoulos, which portrayed the current progress on visa liberalization as the "last mile to run."[56] An EU-level prohibition of PKK assemblies and symbols would also be considered as a materialization of these initiatives and remarks.[57] Although some Turkish political leaders speak of the possibility of choices other than the EU and sometimes express that the EU memberships is not a necessity any longer, negotiations on membership and visa-free travel continue.[58] However, there are indications that relations between the EU and Turkey may evolve to a different form in the future, one with a higher emphasis on strategic partnership and a lower stress on membership.[59] For so long, the relationship between the EU and Turkey has been an unbalanced one. The EU was the active agent demanding changes, which Turkey had to accept unconditionally in anticipation of full membership. Yet, the new driving force in Turkish foreign policy with the motto of an "enterprising and humanitarian outlook" and Turkey's

eventual move from being a country in the periphery to a core country, has altered the dynamics of uneven power relations.

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Other positive important institutional developments related to migration have been as follows:

i) The establishment of the Migration Policies Board under the Chairmanship of the Interior Minister, with the participation of of undersecretaries from different ministeries, the president of the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB), and the director general of the DGMM. The Board was given the task of determining Turkey's migration policies, coordinating migration-related activities, and devising strategies on the management of migration and integration.

ii) The other was the report prepared by the Refugee Rights Sub-committee of the Human Rights Commission at the Turkish Grand National Assembly, which was released in January 2018. The report calls for a comprehensive integration policy for the first time in order to thwart social distance in society between Syrians and Turkish citizens and to increase social acceptance and inclusion. Underlining the emergency of integrating Syrian refugees into Turkish society, the report suggests the creation of an institutional framework either by the division of the Ministry of Family and Social Policies into two, thereby allowing another Ministry of Social Policies and Integration; or establishing a Presidency of Integration. Recognizing the urgent need to support municipalities for the integration of Syrian asylum seekers especially, the report also mentions the utmost important role of local administrations in integration processes due to differing local conditions in each city. Furthermore, the report takes into consideration those who would stay in Turkey regardless of the political situation in Syria and suggests that a new strategy should be developed to envision integration policies in coordination with the EU and the Syrians themselves.[60] As it is anticipated that the Integration Strategy Document and National Action Plan for the coming five years will be announced anytime soon, there are expectations

that they would address integration issues in detail.

In fact, migration issues have always been high on the agenda of the EU and Turkey.

Against this comprehensive background, the idea of putting together a special issue on international migration and diplomacy came about after organizing an international conference in İstanbul on 18 May 2016 with the coordination of the Migration Research Center at Koç University (MiReKoc) and the Center for Strategic Research (SAM) of the Turkish Foreign Ministry. A lot has happened since then as a clear indication that the topic of international migration and diplomacy will not disappear from headlines anytime soon. Based on the past and ongoing events taken place, the question of international migration has already been positioned at the center of politics and policies within Turkey shaping Turkish-EU relations. In fact, migration issues have always been high on the agenda of the EU and Turkey. It will, most likely, continue to be one of the most important agenda items in foreign policy in the years to come, as predicted by the Global Trends 2030 Report: "International migration is set to grow even faster than it did in the past quarter-century."[61] Therefore, it has increasingly become important for diplomats to address the political and humanitarian crisis that accompany large-scale population movements together with the international community.[62] Shared interests could indeed lead to new partnerships on international migration. If policy makers and diplomats could use it well, this might pave the way for closer cooperation not only in migration and asylum issues, but also in trade and fight against global terrorism.

It has increasingly become important for diplomats to address the political and humanitarian crisis that accompany large-scale population movements together with the international community.

Common themes that came up during the conference were solidarity; the need for burden-sharing; addressing humanitarian issues and global inequalities as root causes of outmigration; and multilateralism and migration diplomacy as important tools to solve the problems. Some of the speakers underlined the urgent need to develop a holistic multilateral,

multifaceted approach, arguing that it may be more useful than traditional bilateral diplomacy as it might open up channels for human development, cooperation and stability.[63] Other speakers mentioned good practices of global governance from bottom up, in which cities and municipalities were taking more initiatives and setting examples for national governments and even supranational organizations. In many migrant-receiving countries, from Turkey, Greece, Germany, to the UK, there are both political and civil societal approaches welcoming migrants. In these countries and beyond, there has been an army of volunteers and civil society actors in recent years working to help the migrants, offering them food and shelter. These grassroot organizations have also been pressuring the governments to provide more support for migrants by helping them help themselves.

As we were reminded in his keynote speech at the Conference on International Migration and Diplomacy back in 2016, Philip Fargues stated that the world was not facing an unprecedented international migration crisis- definitely not Europe and at least not in terms of numbers. He further added that the current system was not capable of dealing with migration. What we are facing then is not a migration crisis, but a crisis due to inadequate refugee policies and migration management or lack thereof. Most of the forced migrants today are not even able to cross borders and remain stuck in their countries of residence as Internally Displaced People (IDP). Their numbers stand at more than 40 million by the end of 2016 compared to 25 million refugees and asylum seekers.[64] The UNHCR's Global Trends report also highlights that those people who are lucky enough to cross international borders usually move to neighbouring countries.[65] We also see more and more unaccompanied minors and single women on the move. What we focus on, though, is the security of nation-states and unfortunately not the "human security" of forced migrants.[66] Throughout the world, people are fleeing for a safe haven, but are confronted with closed borders. Syrians constitute the highest number of displaced people at the moment, but it might be some other country's nationals in the near future.

> The existing sharp dichotomy between refugees and economic migrants seems to be no longer valid, as there is an overlapping of these categories.

During the conference, we also addressed the need to reconsider migrant categories. The existing sharp

dichotomy between refugees and economic migrants seems to be no longer valid, as there is an overlapping of these categories. This "categorical fetishism" simply fails to explain the complexity of the migration phenomenon while reinforcing dominant political thinking.[67] Obviously, this migration crisis is not only about numbers but about human stories demonstrating resilience. First and foremost, people on the move are using their human agency to come up with their own solutions in defiance of rules and regulations (sometimes with the help of human smugglers). They choose their own destinations and are very creative with their survival strategies. Most of the time, we hear from testimonies of saved 'boat people' that risking their lives is deemed worthwhile when crossing the borders, considering what they have been going through in their countries of origin. It has become evident that the securitization and externalization of border controls will not deter people from moving.

It seems more migration will continue to be the trend in the years to come. Forced migration due to civil wars, conflicts, or climate change will continue in the future in the Mediterranean and in West Asia and in other parts of the world, like South America, South Asia, and Africa. At the same time, we are experiencing the resurgence of nationalism and right-wing extremism in Europe as an outcome of popular demands and as a reaction to threats to security and sovereignty. As Franck Düvell mentioned during his speech: "Key values of the EU came under pressure, such as liberalism, human rights, solidarity and joint policies, and with these the historical heritage, moral grounding, and finally even the political foundations of the EU. The EU lost its credibility in the international arena when dealing with the migration management crisis and realizes that in order to manage migration, they need Turkey and other partners."[68]

It seems more migration will continue to be the trend in the years to come.

International migration is only one of the many complex emergencies in our current political environment. It is, however, one that needs to be carefully and comprehensively addressed as its implications affect many areas of people's daily lives. Qualifying the current situation with the word 'international' implies that no single nation or country alone can resolve it. However, it is equally important to note that the concept of international community should not be restricted into a certain pattern of affairs where only state leaders, politicians

and high-level government officials take part. The scope of stakeholders in the international community, especially in the case of international migration, also encompasses citizens and bureaucracy, as well as the private sector. A dedicated cooperation is required to address the issues related with international migration. In the current context, diplomacy proves to be a promising essential tool in achieving such a cooperation, since it facilitates interstate dialogue. Such a dialogue at this level can help the international community to move beyond the logic of externalising the burdens to other parties. Indeed, not shifting but sharing the burden will not only alleviate the pressures on each state, but also provide a platform to come up with more effective actions to help the community of international migrants in need of protection.

International migration is only one of the many complex emergencies in our current political environment.

As the current refugee system does not address many of the issues mentioned above, the UNHCR has released a 'zero draft' of the Global Compact on Refugees, outlining new perspectives towards the global refugee crisis by the end of January 2018. The idea of putting together a draft on the management of migration and refugee flows goes back to September 2016, when the UN General Assembly adopted the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, establishing the baseline of the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework. Two processes emerged from the Declaration: one is the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM)[69] and the other is the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR). As I write the introduction, the GCM meeting is underway at the UN Headquarters whereas the GCR process will take place in Geneva with the participation of the International Organization for Migration (IOM). The GCR aims to transform the way the international community responds to refugee crisis in providing more protection for refugees and more sustained support for the host countries as well as building the self-reliance of refugees and expanding opportunities for resettlement in

Not shifting but sharing the burden will not only alleviate the pressures on each state, but also provide a platform to come up with more effective actions to help the community of international migrants in need of protection.

third countries. It further aims to convene a "global platform" to respond to migration challenges through diplomacy by engaging state actors, regional organizations, and other stakeholders, such as networks of cities and municipalities, civil society organizations, faith-based organizations, public-private partnerships, and academia.[70] Turkey has the potential to play a key role during this transformative process. Both processes are promising to pave the way for a rights-based approach in human flows.[71]

The Secretary General of the United Nations and former UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Mr. Antonio Guterres, praised Turkey on many occasions and its effective humanitarian response towards Syrian refugees.

At his speech, the Deputy Foreign Minister at the time, H.E. Mr. Naci Koru, underlined the growing importance of migration issues in Turkey and the need for concerted action to address the well-being of all people crossing borders. He also stated: "Migrants, refugees or asylum-seekers are, first of all, human beings. And everyone deserves to be treated as such. By improving conditions for a life in dignity, by reducing inequalities, and by promoting peaceful societies, we can make crossing international borders a matter of informed choice, not desperate necessity."[72] Following humanitarian diplomacy as a major pillar of Turkish foreign policy, this new outlook in Turkish foreign policy also helps us understand Turkey's new interest in playing a role in extending humanitarian assistance across a vast geography, extending from Africa to Asia, as one of the most important global players in the international arena, and in becoming a champion for the rights of oppressed Muslims around the world, as in the case of the Rohingyas and Palestinians.[73] The Secretary General of the United Nations and former UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Mr. Antonio Guterres, praised Turkey on many occasions and its effective humanitarian response towards Syrian refugees as well as those living in other geographies.[74]

This special issue addresses the gaps in the migration literature and provides an account of how the incorporation of international migration in diplomacy can take place in practice. It is evident that recent developments in migration, the Syrian refugee issue, and Turkey's EU membership process, will keep international migration at the heart of foreign policy. Focusing mostly on

the cases of Turkey and the EU from macro, meso and micro perspectives, the articles in this special issue analyze different instances in which diplomacy is interlinked with migration. Surely, the promise of 'Migration Diplomacy' or 'Diplomacy in Migration' necessitates holistic engagement not with the state institutions and bureaucrats only, but with the people as well, whilst moving beyond the populist political discourse and separating the issue of international migration from short-term electoral concerns and immediate gains.

Frank Düvell's article focuses on key challenges of the EU policies that shape foreign policy and diplomacy in the field of international migration. More specifically, he looks at the responses to the 2015/2016 migration and refugee crisis. In order to conceptualize the reasons for forced migration, he suggests that a critical analysis is needed. Giving examples from case studies of his field research during the same time period, he explores secondary and tertiary displacement of refugees before moving to the EU. Indicating the misconceptions in the media and in the general public, he underlines how these recent flows were regarded as a security threat while many of his interlocutors crossing the Aegean belonged to educated and urban middle classes. This was partly attributed to the emergence of Da'esh and a series of attacks in major cities, including İstanbul, Ankara, Paris, Nice, Brussels and London. Although EU-Turkey relations were largely based on Turkey's accession process during which Turkey had to comply with the EU standards, the migration crisis altered the power relations between the two. He concludes that the biggest challenge for the EU in managing migration and sharing responsibility is sharp political divisions within the member states, which threaten the unity and even undermine the legimitacy of the EU.

Since the neigbouring countries of Syria are hosting the highest number of refugeees despite limited resources, and doing a "public good" for the overall international community, the EU could have used ethical and altruistic values based on human rights instead of solely security-oriented policies.

Başak Kale takes up the concept of burden-sharing and refugee protection as an international "public good". Drawing examples from institutional and legal developments targeting Syrian refugees living in Turkey and the lack of significant international support towards Turkey, she points out the limitations of burden-sharing

and suggests the need to create a better mechanism within the EU. She describes the current situation not as a refugee crisis but the crisis of refugee protection, as the legal framework provided by the 1951 Geneva Convention on Refugees is ambigous in ensuring cooperation for burden-sharing among nation-states and is inefficient for dealing with large flows of people. This is usually coupled with the lack of interest by the international community to work on clear-cut universal principles on burden-sharing for refugees. She further suggests that this 'crisis' can only be eliminated with putting in place a functioning and systematic approach to burden-sharing under global leadership and a supranational framework. Since the neigbouring countries of Syria are hosting the highest number of refugeees despite limited resources, and doing a "public good" for the overall international community, the EU could have used ethical and altruistic values based on human rights instead of solely security-oriented policies.

Underlying the importance of good governance in international migration with the incorporation of international organizations, the international community and all stakeholders for a concerted action, Can Ünver's article elaborates two main international frameworks: the International Convention for the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and the Members of their Families from 1990 (IRCMW) and the recently launched process of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM). He argues that in order to address new migration and refugee patterns effectively, there is a growing need for all nation-states- sending, transit and receiving countries- to get more involved in global migration management processes. As the primary concern of nation-states have been preserving national sovereignty in controlling migration movements into their territories, he proposes these two rights-based legal instruments for safeguarding the human rights of all migrants and refugees regardless of their legal status.

Yelda Devlet Karapınar's article showcases how immigration has become "high politics" between the EU and Turkey, first with the EU accession process and then with the Syrian refugee issue. Yet, she argues that these developments fall short of explaining Turkey's restructuring of current immigration policies. Turkey's engagement with regional consultative processes, international platforms, and international organizations working on diverse dimensions of migration have also contributed to its involvement in global discussions related to migration, and encouraged the country to become a significant actor in the international

migration governance. Building on Giddens' concept of structuration, she adopts mainly a constructivist approach by saying that implementation of policies after the 2000s in external affairs, development, economy, security, international cooperation, and humanitarian aid have all had an impact on current migration policy making in Turkey. She ultimately comes up with nine trends which directly and indirectly affect Turkish migration policies: humanitarianization, developmentalization, politicization, diplomatization, regionalization, economization, securitization, externalization, and projectization.

Turkey's engagement with regional consultative processes, international platforms, and international organizations working on diverse dimensions of migration have also contributed to its involvement in global discussions related to migration.

After giving a brief account of changing conceptualizations of the term "diaspora", Şebnem Köşer Akçapar and Damla Bayraktar Aksel argue that the new Turkish diaspora policy was shaped by the acknowledgment of transnational and permanent Turkish migrant populations in Western Europe and the United States and the re-orientation of Turkish foreign policy after the 2000s. This era, ushering in more diaspora engagement by the state and the recognition of public diplomacy as an important tool in bilateral relations, also led to major policy transformations targeting Turkish immigrants living in different countries. These transformations are analysed under four major headings: ii) institutionalization processes; ii) ideological changes; iii) political (electoral) regulations; iv) other relational factors. Finally, as the Turkish state's institutional and administrative presence abroad become consolidated, it is expected that diaspora members assume a bridging role as they are considered as permanent communities with transnational linkages to the homeland. However, the authors underline that the diversity and fragmentation within the Turkish diaspora indicate that it is not a monolithic and unified entity, and policies targeting the emigrant populations should reflect and respect this diversity.

Based on her fieldwork in three different cities in Turkey and face-to-face interviews with Syrian refugees, Doğuş Şimşek's article scrutinizes the EU-Turkey deal closely in an effort to explore the impact of the Agreement

and whether Turkey can be recognised as a "safe third country" for refugees. Following a brief historical overview of the Syrian mass migration into Turkey, she provides personal accounts of refugees themselves as regards their access to rights, settlement choices, and the different levels of discrimination they feel in society. She concludes that living in limbo and not feeling secure because of temporariness implied in status, many respondents preferred taking costly and perilous journeys to Europe. She concludes with some recommendations for the EU and Turkey to provide an effective protection and integration environment for Syrian refugees.

In her article, Meltem İnce Yenilmez examines the impact of forced migration in the Middle East- mainly Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan- and takes up two protracted cases: Palestinian and Syrian refugees. She looks at the economic, cultural and political dynamics of forced migration in the region and argues that despite the immediate negative effects on labour markets, politics, culture, and security, forced migration has a net benefit on the host countries in the long-term. She further explores the reasons for the lack of regional coping mechanisms with mass refugee flows, including the absence of regional migration management, and proposes that terms such as "crisis" and "guests" could be replaced with more adequate terminology by giving refugees more opportunities and incentives to integrate faster into the host societies.

This era, ushering in more diaspora engagement by the state and the recognition of public diplomacy as an important tool in bilateral relations, also led to major policy transformations targeting Turkish immigrants living in different countries.

# Endnotes

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