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INTERNATIONAL SECURITY IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

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The turmoil associated with the emergence of the New World Order is, to a large extent, the result of the interaction of at least three types of states which call themselves nations but share few of the historic attributes of the nation state. First, there are ethnic splinters from disintegrating empires (e.g. the states that emerged from the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union). Historic grievances obsess them, they often adopt a policy of nation-state building ignoring the goal of international order and their foreign policies are highly volatile since they have no experience or diplomatic tradition to rely on. These states need to be socialised1 into the international system. Walt2 argues that states of this type are almost revolutionary, tending to wage wars against one another because the turmoil surrounding them alters the balance of power, this increases the danger of misperception and affects their calculations about how easy it is to win.
Second, there are post-colonial states (e.g. in the Middle East and Africa). These states are characterised by the traditions of tribalism and authoritarianism. However, the imperial powers imposed a new tradition upon them: the modern nation-state. In post-colonial states, political identities were traditionally drawn from one's religious affiliation or one's local kin group. However, the imperial powers took out their imperial pens and carved out an assortment of nation-states. In other words, most of the post-colonial states were not willed into existence by their own people; rather, the imperial powers imposed their shapes and structures and they have little or no historical precedent. When these new nation-states were created, in each one, a particular tribe-like group either seized power or the imperial powers ensconced them in power (e.g. the Alawites in Syria, Saddam Hussein in Iraq, etc.). These modernising rulers tried to solidify and develop their relatively new nation-states, and, therefore, the state too often came to mean the army, which was usually the only national institution safeguarding domestic order.

Third, there are continental-type states: India unites a multiplicity of tongues, religions and ethnic communities; China unites a multiplicity of languages under common writing, common culture and common history; the United States has succeeded in holding together a multiplicity of ethnic groups; and the Russian Federation is, at the end of the twentieth century, characterised by trends of disintegration on the one hand and reimperialisation on the other (after the collapse of the Soviet empire, Russia has been trying to strengthen the CIS3 and establish it as an internationally recognised regional organisation).

Apart from the interaction of different types of states in the post-Cold War world, the fact that the number of states multiplies and their capacity to interact increases leads to a more complex

international system. On the one hand, fragmentation characterises the international system of the post-Cold War era and on the other hand globalisation.4

In the long run, the new international system will discourage the concentration of power in the hands of a single state.5 The reasons for this are mainly the following: (i) the erosion of the nation-state by the emergence of global issues (e.g. the global ramifications of a nuclear war, the management of the global economy, etc.) and non-state actors in the international system (e.g. the OECD, the IMF, the WTO, multinational corporations, etc.); (ii) the diffusion of knowledge and power as a result of the information revolution and the globalisation of the world economy; (iii) democratisation and multiculturalism produce domestic pressure to shift resources from defence to other priorities (especially in the absence of a clear-cut adversary) and hence make the conduct of an imperial foreign policy more difficult.6

In the New World Order, there are six main geopolitical actors, i.e. states that can challenge the geopolitical image of the world, namely, the United States, EU, China, Japan, Russia and India. As far as Europe is concerned, NATO provides the trustworthiest guarantee for the deterrence of aggression. If Germany and Russia become tempted to aggression and pursue a condominium over Central Europe or quarrel with each other, then the United Kingdom and France would be unable to sustain the political balance in Western Europe without the US. NATO is a necessary institution for the integration of Germany into the West and for the prevention of any Russian attempt to pursue the imperial goals of the Tsars and the communists. Additionally, the European Union plays a crucial role in the maintenance of stability in Central and Eastern Europe.

Post-communist Russia needs to devote much of its energy to redefining its identity. On Russian television on 2 August 1992, Andrei Kozyrev argued that if Russian policy turned against America and other Western states, it would lead the state into isolation. This, he argued in an article for the American journal Foreign Affairs in the spring of 1992, would have a disastrous impact on Russian reform. Moreover, both the US and (especially) Russia have an interest in avoiding another arms race, in preventing nuclear proliferation (Russia has three neighbours possessing nuclear weapons: Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine), in insuring the stability of Central and Eastern Europe (even though they differ about whether the eastwards expansion of NATO will help achieve such stability), and in stabilising international relations and domestic politics in Central Asia, which is a strategic black hole between the old Russian, Chinese, Indian, Persian and Ottoman empires.

However, in 1993-1995, the so-called Eurasian group became influential in Russian foreign policy (cf. Aleksandr Zhilin, 'Ia ne militarist i ne konservator', Moskovskie novosti, 4-11 February 1996). They argue that Russia should not trust the West. First, because, in case of a North-South confrontation, or in case of a confrontation between the West and Islam, a Russia that was part of the northern club would due to its geopolitical position pay the cost of being the club's shield. Moreover, the economies of the Asian dragons complement Russia's own, since they need its natural resources and it needs their technology. Boris Yeltsin claimed in January 1993 that his "recent series of visits to South Korea, China and now India is indicative of the fact that we are moving away from a Western emphasis" (ITAR-TASS, 30 January 1993).

Second, for Eurasians, what matters most is Russia's relations with Germany and Eastern Europe, rather than the EU and NATO.

Third, the Eurasians argue against a strategic partnership with the West and this has to do with the

emergence of Ukraine as an independent state, making Russia feel geopolitically isolated from the centre of Europe.

Given that Russia will always be essential to the world order, the West must pursue a strategic partnership with Russia in a way that will not allow Russia to threaten US interests, will prevent the development of an anti-hegemonic coalition of Russia-China-Iran against the US and will contribute to the peaceful integration of Russia into the world order. Moreover, Russia can play an important role in countering a possible decision of Chinese strategists to challenge the trilateral coalition of America-Europe-Japan and it can operate as the West's natural shield against Islamic fundamentalism.

The Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Co-operation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation, agreed in Paris on 27 May 1997, is a major step toward the co-ordination of the foreign policies of NATO and Russia, "To contribute to the establishment in Europe of common and comprehensive security based on the allegiance to shared values, commitments and norms of behaviour in the interests of all states." According to this Act, "NATO and Russia will create the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council. The central objective of this Permanent Joint Council will be to build increasing levels of trust, unity of purpose and habits of consultation and co-operation between NATO and Russia, in order to enhance each other's security and that of all nations in the Euro- Atlantic area and diminish the security of none."
At the same time, the United States must maintain smooth triangular relations with China and Japan. Close Japanese-American relations offer a significant military reassurance to Japan and other states in Asia. Thus, Japan will depend on US military projection. A weaker US military presence in Asia might tempt Japan and China to pursue nationalistic foreign policies, which could lead to an international crisis involving Japan and China as well as the buffer states in between. Close Sino-American relations contribute to Japanese moderation and good Sino-Japanese relations. Given the mutual fears and tensions between China and Russia, the US must operate as the guarantor of the equilibrium between China and Russia: when any of these two geopolitical actors threatens to become dominant in Eurasia, the US must support the other side in order to maintain the equilibrium.

However, apart from the above-mentioned geopolitical actors, there are other states that cannot themselves change the geopolitical image of the post-Cold War world, but their geographical position and its impact on the behaviour of geopolitical actors give them special significance in the New World Order. These states are Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Turkey, Israel, Iran and South Korea.

The independence of Ukraine from Russia deprives the latter of the possibility of becoming a Eurasian empire since Ukraine is a state of 52 million people, it has significant natural resources and controls Russia's access to the Black Sea and Central Europe.7 The Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and Ukraine, agreed in Madrid on 9 July 1997, contains a variety of areas of consultation or co-operation between NATO and Ukraine, including political- and security-related subjects, conflict prevention, crisis management, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, disarmament and arms control issues, combating drug-trafficking and terrorism, defence planning, science and technology issues and environmental security issues. In addition, at the 1999 Munich Conference on Security Policy, the US Secretary of Defence, William S. Cohen, stated, "There can be no stability throughout the continent without a stable Russia and a stable and prosperous Ukraine as well."

An independent Azerbaijan, connected to the West by oil pipelines, would deprive Russia of oil resources and could give the West access to the rich energy resources of Central Asia.8

Even though Turkey has some domestic problems, it plays a stabilising role in the Black Sea, controls the exit from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, balances Russia's influence in the Caucasus9 and offers important services within NATO.

Israel is very important for the pursuit of US foreign-policy goals in the Middle East and, together with Turkey, it tries to counter Islamic fundamentalism and political extremism and to maintain order in the Eastern Mediterranean by creating a system of bilateral co-operation in the fields of defence and intelligence.

Moreover, although Iran is inimical to the West and especially to the US, it deters the expansion of Russian influence in the Persian Gulf, which would challenge American interests in the area.

Finally, the strong ties between South Korea and the US allow the US to offer military protection to Japan from abroad. The growing economic power of South Korea increases its significance as a US ally.10

The preceding geopolitical analysis of the post-Cold War world points toward the creation of a global security system. In Europe, the strengthening of West European and Atlantic institutions' ties with Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Ukraine deters a German or Russian pursuit of imperialistic goals and encourages the maintenance of order in Eurasia. This is the main purpose of the eastward enlargement of NATO. Additionally, in Asia, there are two major balances of power: one between Russia, Japan and China in north-east Asia and the one between Russia, China and India in south-east Asia. The role of the US with respect to those balances of power is to protect potential victims against potential predators. Therefore, the global security system of the post-Cold War era is based primarily on an expanded NATO, Russia (co-operating with NATO within a viable and mutually agreed institutional framework), China, Japan and possibly India. Henry Kissinger maintains that, after the end of the Cold War, what "America must master is the transition from an age when all choices seemed open to a period when it can still accomplish more than any other society if it can only learn its limits."11

DETERRENCE OF REGIONAL AGGRESSORS IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

In the post-Cold War era, the best way of deterring major wars between the principal geopolitical actors is the creation of the global security system that we mentioned above. Moreover, an intercontinental deal between an expanded NATO, Russia, China, Japan and possibly India, which would gradually give rise to a more formal structure, could play a decisive role in the deterrence of regional aggressors globally.

US foreign policy must strike a balance between its idealism and realpolitik. In Kissinger's words, this means, "There is a margin between necessity and accident, in which a statesman by perseverance and intuition must choose and thereby shape the destiny of his people. To ignore objective conditions is perilous; to hide behind historical inevitability is tantamount to moral abdication."12 International problems must be tackled on a case by case basis as components in a geo-strategic equation. Moralistic or legalistic approaches fail to identify the particular characteristics of each international problem and thus lure one into failure, since they tend to lead to the exchange of a lesser evil for a

greater one. For instance, Jeanne Kirkpatrick argues, "[The] Carter administration ... wanted to bring about moderate and democratic regimes in Iran and Nicaragua. And they had followed certain policies in the effort to bring about more moderate and democratic regimes. But what they produced were the more repressive, hostile regimes of the Ayatollah Khomeini and the Ortega brothers."13

Balance-of-power arrangements best serve the pursuit of international security. Kissinger argues that, when working properly, the balance-of-power system is "meant to limit both the ability of states to dominate others and the scope of conflicts ... a balance-of-power arrangement cannot satisfy every member of the international system completely; it works best when it keeps dissatisfaction below the level at which the aggrieved party will seek to overthrow the international order."14 Thus, US foreign policy should be based on the ideals of freedom and order, but it should pursue them by examining the geopolitical environment characterising each segment of space-time. In particular, the post-Cold War international system obliges the United States, for the first time in its history, to found its foreign policy on the maintenance of balance-of-power arrangements, since the global security system of the post-Cold War era should be based on NATO, Russia, China, Japan and India.

In addition to working towards the creation of the global security system that we have already discussed, the United States should take more short-term measures too. First, regional aggressors are difficult to deter if they expect their hold on power to erode if they do not take risks. Thus, the US deterrent strategy must be credible; namely, the adversary must believe that the US has both the intention and the capability of doing what it threatens to do.

The US's ability to deter risk-taking aggressors cannot easily extend much beyond those situations in which important US interests are at stake (e.g. Korea and the Persian Gulf) and a few others in which US deterrent capabilities themselves are enough to dissuade an adversary from aggression. It goes without saying that the US should pay special attention to the maintenance of order in states that have crucial geopolitical advantages, such as Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Turkey, Israel, Iran and South Korea, and it should treat them as the major units of regional security systems.

A major deterrence enhancement for the US is intelligence. Technical intelligence (e.g. satellites, devices for electronic warfare, etc.) makes smart weapons smart, makes the monitoring of sanctions imposed on aggressors possible and allows the US to know as much about an adversary's arsenal and location as possible. Human intelligence provides necessary information about details regarding an adversary's intents and the scale and pace of an adversary's nuclear, chemical or biological programme. The Gulf War of 1990-91 is a characteristic case in point.15

In addition, NATO must be adjusted and transformed to meet new challenges and it must prepare its forces to protect its common interests. It must be prepared to endure the stresses and the strains of operations such as those found in Bosnia during the Yugoslav War. As Bosnia proved, there were no pre-existing communications, no pre-existing logistics, no headquarters or other necessary elements of infrastructure. Thus, the defence capabilities of NATO must be transformed to meet the challenges of regional security in the post-Cold War era.

Moreover, the regulation of the arms trade could make a substantial contribution to the deterrence of regional aggressors. The first major step towards that end was taken when seven Western industrialised powers agreed in the April 1987 Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) not to spread to the developing world ballistic missile technology with a range above 300 kilometres and a payload of over 500 kilograms. The MTCR, which in 1991 had 15 formal adherents, has gradually

started monitoring the proliferation of cruise missiles too. Moreover, an agreement concluded by twenty-seven states in April 1992 is designed to limit the sale of dual-use machinery and materials suitable for the production of nuclear weapons, but its enforcement is voluntary (i.e. evasion is almost certain). Thus, in addition to formal agreements for the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the intelligence community plays a crucial role in the struggle against the proliferation of these weapons. Given that the information revolution gives black-market proliferators of weapons of mass destruction several advantages (e.g. it facilitates communication), formal agreements are not enough since they cannot tackle the problem effectively. It is the intelligence community that has the capabilities and the flexibility necessary to tackle the problem of proliferation in a decisive way. Since the information revolution has transformed the problem of proliferation into a problem of information, the role of the intelligence community is a key one.

As far as weapons of mass destruction are concerned, it must be stressed that, even though nuclear weapons may remain relatively limited in years to come, states may be tempted to develop chemical and biological weapons, which are less costly and easier to conceal. In a recent collection of studies on twenty first century warfare issues,16 a US Air Force medical officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Robert Kadlec, wrote that, under favourable meteorological conditions, 100kg of anthrax bacillus dropped by night on a city the size of Washington would cover an area of 300 square kilometres and could kill between one and three million people.

The danger of chemical and biological weapons increases because of the difficulty of prohibiting them. These weapons are easy to produce-in many cases, all that is needed is a rudimentary laboratory in a bathroom. Hence, it is very difficult for international inspection to be as effective as that imposed on signatories to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. For this reason, regular inspections should be carried out covering each state's military facilities, its chemical, pharmaceutical and food factories as well as every governmental building that could be used for those purposes. However, because biological agents can be produced in nondescript premises and biological weapons can be used for terrorist purposes,17 the role of human intelligence is of vital significance.

Thus, the various international non-proliferation treaties must provide adequate control measures for chemical and biological weapons and must be substantially amended and extended to non-governmental organisations as well as states. Additionally, preventive strikes, such as the Israeli bombing of the Iraqi nuclear reactor at Osirak in 1981, may occasionally be useful if there is no risk of causing a major nuclear disaster.

In our analysis of regional security, we must not be oblivious of the fact that the potential users of weapons of mass destruction are mainly individual desperados and Third World states or movements opposed to the West. Therefore, in addition to trying to minimise the potential aggressors' capabilities of realising their threats, the West must try to modify the potential aggressors' intents by using diplomacy as a means of spreading prosperity. The British former Foreign Secretary, Sir Malcolm Rifkind, made a speech to the London diplomatic corps at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office on 11 June 1996, where he argued, "[A] peaceful world is one where nations can trade and do business freely to advance their own prosperity."18 Therefore, the industrial democracies must offer the necessary aid to the developing world in a way that encourages self-help and the successful integration of the developing states into the world economy, thus preventing corruption and the creation of a dependency culture. As Rifkind put it, "First, we must focus aid on those ready to make best use of it. Second, we must give developing countries a chance to secure their own future. Above all they need markets for their goods, and a real opportunity to build their prosperity."19

1. The term is used in the spirit of K.N. Waltz, op. cit. (fn. 1), pp. 74-77 and 127-128.
2. See S.M. Walt, 'Revolution and War', World Politics 3, 1992, pp. 321-368.
3. See M. Webber, CIS Integration Trends, London, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1997.
4. See: J. Frankel, International Relations in a Changing World, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1988; S. Dalby, 'Security, Modernity, Ecology: the Dilemmas of Post-Cold War Security Discourse', Alternatives, 17, 1992, pp. 95-134.
5. The post-Cold War international system is one of multilevel interdependence. At the military level, the international system is unipolar since there is no other military power comparable to the United States. At the economic level, the international system is tripolar consisting of an Asian bloc formed around the yen, a Western Hemisphere bloc around the US dollar and a European bloc clustering around the ECU or the German mark. At the level of transnational interdependence, the international system shows a diffusion of power.
6. Z. Brzezinski, in Out of Control-Global Turmoil on the Eve of the 2lst Century (New York, Macmillan, 1993), argues that the "transformation of America from a society dominated-and shaped-by a white Anglo-Saxon Protestant culture into a global mosaic inevitably will involve a profound shift in values and perhaps some further loss of social cohesion. While such a change may generate new creativity and dynamism ... it is also likely to be disruptive, even potentially divisive ... the new mosaic could generate within America even escalating urban guerrilla warfare." (pp. 114-115.)
7. See T. Bukkvoll, Ukraine and European Security, London, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1997.
8 See: R.J. Martin, The Economy and Foreign Relations of Azerbaijan, London, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1996; G. Bondarevsky and G. Englefield, Boundary Issues in Central Asia, London, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1996.
9. See P. Baev, Russian Policy in the Caucasus, London, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1996.
10.See G. Segal, Rethinking the Pacific, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1990.
11. See H. Kissinger, Diplomacy, New York, Simon & Schuster, 1994, p. 834.
12. See H. Kissinger, White House Years, Boston, Little, Brown and Co., 1979. p. 55.
13. See J. Kirkpatrick, interview, U.S. News & World Report, 10 March 1986, p. 36. It is a mistake on behalf of the West (especially the EU) to adopt the view that modern societies are supposed to diffuse the values of the Western democracy in the developing countries without bearing in mind historical necessities. For instance, in the 1990s, the army is the most modernised authoritative agency in Turkey's transitional society. In Turkey, the army can provide a sense of citizenship, an appreciation of political action and can lead to a more responsible nationalism since it counters Islamic fundamentalism and aims at the modernisation of Turkey by introducing and consolidating Western economic, social and political institutions. In general, following Jeanne Kirkpatrick's 'Dictatorships and Double Standards', Commentary 68, 1979, pp. 34-45, we can argue that authoritarian regimes (on the right) that are allies of the West should be differentiated from and considered to be 'better' than totalitarian regimes (i.e. regimes based on left-wing ideologies or religious fundamentalism) mainly because authoritarian systems are putatively susceptible to incremental democratisation/modernisation-a disposition for which their enmity to communism/fundamentalism served as a predominant piece of evidence.

14. See H. Kissinger, op. cit. (fn. 14), p. 21.
15. See R. Gates, interviewed by B. van Voorst, Time, 20 April 1992, pp. 39-40.
16. See B. Schneider and L. Grinter (eds.), Battlefield of the Future: 21st Century Warfare Issues, Air War College Studies in National Security, No. 3, 1995.
17. A characteristic example of bio-terrorism is the Aum Shinri Kyo sect attack on the Tokyo subway on 20 March 1995.
18. See M. Rifkind, 'Diplomacy and the Spreading of Prosperity', Survey of Current Affairs 26, 1996, p. 232.
19. See M. Rifkind, ibid., pp. 232-233.