

ESDP-NATO RELATIONS: CONSIDERATIONS ON THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

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ABSTRACT

The transition from the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) to an autonomous European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) has significant implications for the future architecture of European security. This paper presents an evaluation of these implications in three important dimensions. The first dimension of importance is the US attitude vis-à-vis the ESDP and whether the US is ready to accept the EU as an equal partner in international security affairs. The second important dimension is the internal coherence and thus the credibility of the EU concerning the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The concerns and the interests of the non-EU European NATO members especially Turkey constitute the final dimension.

KEYWORDS

ESDI; ESDP; CFSP; NATO; European Security; Ankara Reconciliation Document; Turkey-EU Relations; NATO-EU Relations.

The end of the Cold War strongly influenced the relations between the NATO allies. During the Cold War, NATO was united around a common goal, to defend the liberal world and win the struggle against the communist bloc. This integrating external threat has disappeared with the collapse of the communist bloc and the Soviet Union. This unexpected change has had serious effects on the European security system and NATO as well. In the post-Cold War period, the NATO allies have felt the ramification of various threats and interests. During this period starting with the early 1990s, NATO and the EU carried out some self-adaptive internal changes. NATO was obliged to change its strategic concept two times, at the Rome (1991) and the Washington (1999) Summits. And the European Communities created the European Union by including foreign policy, security and defense issues within their integration process. The common characteristic of these changes was the acceptance of NATO as the focal point of the European security architecture. This general trend started to change at the end of the 1990s. The members of the European Union had planned to stay in the NATO framework until the 1998 Saint Malo Declaration, which signaled a radical departure from the fundamental European security attitude during the Cold War.

The Franco-British bilateral reconciliation in Saint Malo, aiming to create an autonomous decision-making and military action capability on security issues inside the European Union, marked a historical change in the unfolding of European security. The "Franco-British summit joint declaration on European defense" adopted in Saint-Malo on 4 December 1998 was a shift of the EU's political intention from a NATO based security approach, called European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), towards an autonomous "Security and Defense Policy" (ESDP). In effect, this shift is a change of the EU's political will to accept NATO as the unique security and defense organization for Europe. The gradual emergence of an autonomous EU institutional and military capability on security and defense is implicit in the Saint-Malo Declaration.

This new phenomenon occurring in the European security environment of the post-Cold War era has had an considerable influence on the reshaping of the post-Cold War European security architecture and the transatlantic link. In other words, this new European security approach, emerged since Saint-Malo, had a blurring

impact on the European commitment to NATO and the transatlantic link. As a result, the transatlantic link and the future of NATO began to be questioned by the United States of America and the European Union.

This article will first analyze the dynamics of the transition from the ESDI project developing inside the NATO framework, to an autonomous European common policy on defense and security (ESDP). Secondly, the implications of that transition on EU-NATO relations and the prospects of the European security architecture will be assessed. To introduce a new dimension, this analysis will pay special attention to the policies pursued by the US and the EU in this field to the interests behind these policies. Lastly, the impact of the change in the European security system upon non-EU member NATO European allies will be evaluated.

1. An Initiative toward a European Pillar Inside NATO

The European Community launched in 1990 an effort to develop a common foreign and security policy inside the European integration process. During the negotiations of the European Council of Rome in December 1990, and the European Council summit of Maastricht in December 1991 aimed at preparing the Treaty on the European Union (TEU), the issue to give a security and defense dimension to the new European Union under the umbrella of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was one of the major topics of discussion. By working on the formulation of a new CFSP, the European Community was actually defining the future role of the emerging EU as an international political and security actor.

During the negotiations of 1990-1991, two divergent approaches emerged in the EC concerning the future structure of the security and defense dimension of the EU. A first group that included Britain, Portugal, and some smaller members such as Benelux countries refused to consider any European security initiative other than one in the context of a reinforcement of the European pillar of NATO. The views of this "Atlanticist" group were centered within the framework of NATO for security and defense affairs. On the other hand, "the Europeanists", led by France under President Francois Mitterand,

wished to complete the unfinished European integration process with the addition of a European foreign and security policy and to balance the overwhelming influence of the U.S. in the post-Cold War era.¹

A tendency to create a common security policy and a common European defense gained strength in the negotiations. Especially the *rapprochement* occurring between France and Germany (the Dumas/Genscher non-paper of 6 February 1991 and the common initiative of Mitterrand and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl of 14 October 1991) had at that time a favorable effect on a Common European defense. The discussions also extended to the issue of giving a new role to the Western European Union (WEU); to turn WEU the EU's defense component by clearly subordinating the WEU to the EU.²

At the European Council summit in Maastricht, the member states reached a *consensus* and adopted the famous article J4 of the Maastricht Treaty. This article stipulated that the European Union will have a "common foreign and security policy... including the eventual framing of a common defense policy which might in time lead to a common defense" (art.J4/1). The same article subordinated the WEU to the EU to implement decisions and actions of the Union that have defense implications (art.J4/2). The formulation of the security dimension of the EU and the creation of a linkage between the WEU and the EU raised the question of the future relations between the EU and NATO. The general vagueness of the TEU allowed the more pro-European (or anti-US) member states, such as France, to interpret the treaty as an endorsement of plans to develop a European security identity while, for others like Britain, the specific mention of NATO gave the impression that the CFSP was a means of strengthening what US President John Kennedy had dubbed the "European pillar" of NATO.³

On that subject, the EU members agreed that the security dimension of the European common foreign and security policy

¹S. Duke, "The European Security and Defence Identity", in U. Schumacher (ed), *Structure, Order, and Disorder in World Politics*, Berlin, 1999, p.115.

²J-M. Dumond, P. Setton, *La Politique Etrangère et de Sécurité Commune, La Documentation Française*, Paris, 1999, p.112-113.

³S. Duke, "The European Security and Defence Identity", p.117.

(CFSP) will not undermine the engagements taken within the framework of NATO. Especially the Declaration of the WEU on "the role of the WEU and its Relations with the European Union and with the Atlantic Alliance"⁴, which had been annexed to the Maastricht Treaty, closed the debate concerning EU-NATO relations. This declaration clearly defined future EU-NATO relations. In conformity with the position of Britain, article 4 of that declaration has defined "the WEU as a means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance". According to the article, "WEU will act in conformity with positions adopted in the Atlantic Alliance."⁵ Consequently, the European Union decided to continue with a NATO centered security policy. The emergence of the security and defense dimension of the EU was presented as a mean to reinforce the European pillar of NATO. In other words, the Maastricht Treaty launched a linkage process between the EU and NATO by keeping NATO at the apex of a network of new security arrangements in Europe.⁶

EU developments in the security field triggered a parallel debate within the Alliance. The concept of the "European security dimension" first appeared in the Final Communiqué adopted in Brussels on 17-18 December 1990.⁷ This was a quick reaction to the decisions taken at the European Council in Rome. The new security dimension and the future defense role of the EC/EU were also discussed at the Copenhagen meeting of the North Atlantic Council (June 1991). In its evaluation, the North Atlantic Council described this development as the creation of a "means to strengthen the European pillar within the Alliance and to enhance the role and the responsibilities of the European allies."⁸ The allies also adopted a Declaration entitled "NATO's Core Security Functions in the New Europe" to underline the "persistent core security function of NATO." Finally the new strategic concept of NATO adopted in Rome on 7-8 November 1991, stipulated that "the creation of a European identity in security and

⁴<http://www.weu.int/eng/comm/91-maastricht.htm>.

⁵Dumond and Setton, *La Politique Etrangère et de Sécurité Commune*, p.114.

⁶H. Sjursen, "Missed Opportunity or Eternal Fantasy? The Idea of a European Security and Defense Policy", in J. Peterson, H. Sjursen (eds.), *A Common Foreign Policy for Europe?*, London, 1998, p.101.

⁷<http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c901218a.htm>.

⁸<http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c910607a.htm>.

defense will underline the preparedness of the Europeans to take a greater share of responsibility for their security and will help to reinforce transatlantic solidarity". We can conclude that NATO's first reaction was to pursue the wording of the Maastricht declaration and to define the new security dimension of the EU as an instrument to reinforce the European pillar of NATO. However, the nature of that European security identity continued to be vague and unclear in legal terms.

Under these guidelines, the WEU and NATO worked together to define the necessary arrangements for WEU-NATO cooperation. These negotiations were concluded in 1996 at NATO's Berlin Ministerial meeting. In Berlin, NATO agreed to provide to the WEU, upon request, the command and material capabilities needed to implement a non-NATO military crisis response operation (non-Article 5 operations). The mechanism to accomplish this involved the introduction of a third concept, that of the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF). The CJTF concept was central to providing the operational link between EU's CFSP and NATO's ESDI.

At NATO's 1996 Berlin Ministerial meeting, the allies agreed to the general outline of a U.S. proposal for the CJTF.⁹ "The premise of the CJTF concept is that pre-designated command and staff officers can be detached from a NATO command to form the framework for an operational headquarters, with the needed fill-in staff to be drafted from other commands either as modules (that is, as groups of people who work together in specialized areas, such as military intelligence) or on an individual basis."¹⁰ Additionally ESDI would make NATO assets and capabilities available for future military operations commanded by the WEU. Such decisions would be made by *consensus* of the NATO allies on a case-by-case basis. To facilitate such operations, European officers in the NATO structure would, when appropriate, shift from their NATO responsibilities to WEU command positions.¹¹

⁹K. Donfried, P. Gallis, "European Security: The Debate in NATO and the EU", *CRS Report to Congress*, 25 April 2000, p.1.

¹⁰S. Croft, J. Howorth, T. Terriff, M. Weber, "NATO's Triple Challenge", *International Affairs*, No:3, 2000, p.512.

¹¹S. R. Sloan, *The United States and European Defence*, Chaillot Paper 39, Institute for Security Studies of WEU, April 2000, p.12.

At the 1999 Washington Summit, the NATO allies also agreed on the compromise that the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR), to be a European general, would coordinate cooperation between NATO and the WEU and would prepare plans for WEU operations through the CJTF.¹² These arrangements would permit the European allies to play a larger role in NATO's military command structures. Under the legal umbrella of ESDI and in the framework of the CJTF concept, the EU would have the means to carry out non-Article 5 operations by using NATO's assets and planning capability.

2. Change Toward an Autonomous European Security and Defense Dimension

A radical change occurred in the evolving of the European security dimension with the Franco-British Joint declaration on European Defense in Saint-Malo. The first overt use of the word "autonomous" in any European security blueprint was in Saint-Malo declaration.¹³ In December 1998, France and Britain stated in the Saint-Malo declaration "the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action backed up by credible military forces."¹⁴

The legal base of that development was laid down in the Amsterdam Treaty. Article 17/2 of the Amsterdam Treaty included the so-called Petersberg Tasks containing the humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping, tasks of combat forces in crisis management including peacemaking inside the European *acquis*. The Amsterdam Treaty also projected the possible integration of the WEU into the EU under the condition of European Council authorization (art 17/1). In reality, the Saint-Malo declaration was a compromise of the two

¹²P. Boniface, "The NATO Debate in France", NATO Conference on NATO Enlargement, 7 October 1997, at: <http://www.nato.int/acad/conf/enlarg97/boniface.htm>, p. 9.

¹³J. Howorth, "Britain, France and the European Defence Initiative", *Survival*, Vol. 42, No: 2, Summer 2000, p. 43.

¹⁴*Franco-British Summit Joint Declaration on European Defence*, Saint-Malo, 4 December 1998, para.2.

largest military powers of the EU, France and Britain, concerning the full and rapid implementation of the security provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty, including the future framing of a common defense policy.¹⁵ The big difference was that during the preparations of the Amsterdam Treaty, the EU major powers did not decide to create an autonomous security and defense dimension for the EU, but prepared the legal base for an eventual development in that direction. The Saint-Malo declaration was the first sign to move this political intention from theory to practice. The first article of the declaration stated that “the EU needs to be in a position to play its full role on international stage and this means making a reality of the Treaty of Amsterdam, which will provide the essential basis for action by the Union”. In reality, in adopting this principle, France and Britain unveiled their intention to put into practice these articles of the Amsterdam Treaty.

After the Saint-Malo Declaration, the 15 member states of the EU adopted the formula and declared their determination to develop an autonomous capacity to take decisions on security and defense issues at the EU summits in Cologne, Helsinki, Feira, and Nice. At Feira, the EU members announced that “these decisions will be taken within the single institutional framework and will respect European Community competences and ensure inter-pillar coherence”. These developments clearly indicated that the ESDP was emerging in the framework of the EU’s juridical order and within the EU’s *acquis*, unlike the ESDP which had been developing in the NATO framework.

In this context it is possible to say that the choice of the term “autonomy” was intentional and demonstrated the growing will of the EU to act separately from NATO. One gets the impression that this terminology was chosen in order not to use the term “independently” which is much more stronger than “autonomy”. In other words, the leaders of the EU, in their search to ensure the political control and the strategic direction of EU-led Petersberg type operations, decided to conduct such operations autonomously/independently.¹⁶

¹⁵A. J. K. Shepherd, “Top-Down or Bottom-Up: Is Security and Defence Policy in the EU a Question of Political Will or Military Capability?”, *European Security*, Vol.9, No:2 (Summer 2000), p.14.

¹⁶A. Moens, “Developing a European Intervention Force”, *International Journal*, Spring 2000, p.261.

The process of separation, launched with the Saint-Malo declaration ended with the incorporation of the WEU into the EU. At the WEU Ministerial Council meeting in November 2000 in Marseille, the WEU member states agreed to suspend the operational capacity of the WEU. The Nice summit of the European Council in December 2000, by creating new security and military institutions inside the EU, incorporated the organizational and operational capability of the WEU regarding the Petersberg missions into the EU. Thus the EU opted for a gradual withdrawal from operational matters and to remain a depository of Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty whose implementation remained within NATO. As a result, the WEU chose to be only a significant forum and a place of exchange on questions of security and defense for the members of Parliament of 28 countries within its Parliamentary Assembly.

The WEU was the main instrument of the ESDI aiming to construct a European pillar within NATO. WEU, in that context, was serving as a genuine bridge between EU and NATO, thus was both a practical tool for EU security policy and a buffer zone between NATO and the EU.¹⁷ The EU can hardly be able to play the role of the WEU in the ESDI system due to its *sui generis* legal characteristics. The *de facto* removal of the WEU's operational capacity means the *de facto* loss of an institutional framework for the realization of ESDI project as well. This clearly means abandoning the concept of the ESDI and the construction of a European pillar within NATO.¹⁸

On the other hand, starting with the Saint-Malo declaration the EU members in all official documents paid attention to reserve for NATO the first operation option. This was declared in the formula that "the EU will launch and then conduct military operations where NATO as a whole is not engaged". At first look, this "NATO first formula" can be seen as a legal assurance to keep NATO-centered security policies. However one must not forget that the major EU powers are at the same time the members of NATO, and that in NATO all decisions

¹⁷Ibid., p.255.

¹⁸Ç. Özen, "Consequences of the European Security and Defense Policy for the European non-EU NATO Members", *Ankara Review of European Studies*, Vol: 1, No: 1, Fall 2001, p. 144.

are taken by *consensus*. This means that a veto coming from any ally is enough to block the decision-making procedure inside NATO. Moreover, the "NATO first" formula does not remove the fact of the creation of a distinct and autonomous organizational and operational security and defense structure inside the EU. This new security structure apart from NATO bears a real potential to block its decision-making and operation capacity and ultimately to split the alliance. In other words, the NATO first formula adopted in the EU will not eliminate the EU's developing capacity as a new and potentially rival security actor.¹⁹

The EU has also changed its armament policy after the creation of its autonomous security and defense dimension. At the European Union summit in Helsinki in December 1999, the EU members agreed on a "Headline Goal" to improve military capabilities. The aim of this was to achieve the capability to form a rapid reaction force militarily self-sustaining with the necessary command, control and intelligence capabilities, logistics, other combat support services and additionally, air and naval elements.²⁰ The "Headline Goal" was a clear strategy to encourage EU members to integrate their defense spending and the European defense industry in order to give the EU an operational military capacity to carry out its own military interventions.²¹ The EU's "Headline Goal" project and the planning of a new European integrated military industry were a continuation of the Saint-Malo autonomy logic, which was also adopted as a principle in the Amsterdam Treaty. Article 17/1, para.4 of the Amsterdam Treaty stipulated that "The progressive framing of a common defence policy will be supported, as Member States consider appropriate, by cooperation between them in the field of armaments". By pursuing the political guideline of the Amsterdam Treaty in the armament field and by achieving the military capability defined in the "Headline Goal"

¹⁹See Howorth, "Britain, France and the European Defence Initiative", p.147 for the debate between EU and US concerning the question of the "right of first refusal" and the future of NATO.

²⁰D. S. Yost, "The NATO Capabilities Gap and the European Union", *Survival*, Vol: 42, No: 4, Winter 2000-2001, pp. 114-115.

²¹See F. Heisbourg, "Europe's Strategic Ambitions: The Limits of Ambiguity", *Survival*, Vol: 42, No: 2, Summer 2000, pp.12-13 for a detailed analysis on that subject.

concept, "the EU members have increased their efforts to encourage the restructuring of the European defense industry after Saint-Malo to make sure that the ESDP will have a solid basis for autonomous action and not be overly dependent upon external (mostly US) military infrastructure and equipment".²² This new military procurement planning for all 15 EU member state was a sign of differentiation of the European defense program from the "Defense Capabilities Initiative"²³ (DCI), designed to enhance European military capabilities within the Alliance. The question was whether the EU members will try to achieve the Headline Goal by providing significant new defense resources, or (more likely) will they seek to do so by re-allocating current defense resources at the expense of present commitments to NATO?²⁴ The potential menace is that this military differentiation, by creating Europe-only assets as opposed to alliance-wide assets,²⁵ can in the long run negatively influence the political coherence and the interoperability capability of NATO.

3. Diverging American and European Perspectives *vis-à-vis* the Post-Cold War European Security Architecture

The European initiative to include security and defense in the European integration process in the post-Cold War era provoked some suspicious and hesitant reactions from the American side. The feelings of suspicion and hesitation turned into genuine tension between the US and the EU when this initiative moved to autonomy aspect at the end of the 1990s. Implicit in the Saint-Malo process was the gradual emergence of an autonomous EU capability -- both institutional and military -- which was always likely to grow into something that the

²²P. Van Ham, "Europe's Common Defense Policy: Implications for the Trans-Atlantic Relationship", *Security Dialogue*, Vol: 31(2), p. 219.

²³DCI is a US proposal in the origin and approved by the allies in NATO Washington Summit in April 1999.
<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99s069e.htm>.

²⁴Croft, Howorth, Terriff, Weber, "NATO's Triple Challenge", p.516.

²⁵C. Kupchan, "In Defence of European Defence: An American Perspective", *Survival*, Vol: 42, No: 2, Summer 2000, p. 19.

Alliance in general and the US in particular would look upon with alarm.²⁶

At first look, it was difficult to observe this tension in the rhetoric used by both sides on that issue. However, a deeper analysis unveils this rhetoric and shows the reality. The reality is that the US and the EU have different positions *vis-à-vis* the ESDP. For the Americans, this could be an instrument of burden-sharing without affecting the central political and military role of NATO in the security field. For the EU members (some differentiations exist between them, but there is a clear *consensus* among them on the basic principles of the ESDP), this is the way to achieve a considerable political-strategic capability apart from the US in the international arena. These two different approaches deeply influenced EU-NATO relations as well.

The differentiation process between the US and the EU began with the 1991 Maastricht Declaration. This was the time the future role of NATO after the Cold War was being questioned. The US translated the wording of the Maastricht Declaration and of the Maastricht Treaty on the creation of a European security and defense dimension as a European request for consolidating the European pillar within NATO. The first sign of this “US based NATO understanding” of the emerging European security dimension was apparent in the NATO official documents and was labeled with a new NATO formulation: European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI). ESDI was initially conceived as a technical-military arrangement, which would allow the Europeans to assume a greater share of the burden for security missions through access to NATO assets and capabilities, which European member states did not possess.²⁷

In the American perspective, Europe had enjoyed for decades the luxury of focusing on economic and political integration while relying on its “American pacifier” for security.²⁸ In the post-Cold War era, as a continuation of this attitude, defense spending had steadily declined in the most EU countries. The EU leaders were reluctant even to raise

²⁶J. Howorth, *European Integration and Defence: The Ultimate Challenge?*, Chaillot Paper 43, Institute for Security Studies of WEU, November 2000, p.114.

²⁷*Ibid.*, p.13.

²⁸Kupchan, “In Defence of European Defence: An American Perspective”, p.29.

the issue of defense spending as they sought to cut social entitlements and to reform pension systems amid budgetary austerity.²⁹

Behind that American approach was the concern to see the EU become an economic challenger as well. Due to this, the USA argued that in the post-Cold War era the Europeans had to share the burden of the US in the security field and increase their defense spending and military capability. The Americans saw the emergence of the European security and defense dimension as an occasion to defend their burden-sharing thesis much more strongly and thus to control Europe's economic growth. Another issue raised by them was the priority of NATO in the security field. To keep the central role of NATO, *i.e.* the central role of the US in the security field, the Americans strongly emphasized the importance of the NATO-first principle. Used to a position of primacy within the alliance, they were reluctant to make room for a more self-reliant Europe.³⁰ They were pursuing a policy aimed at balancing the potential of a European economic challenge and not at creating a new political challenger. In the American view, a stronger Europe could actually become a strategic competitor of the US. Therefore, all issues must first be discussed on a transatlantic basis, and only if NATO (meaning the US) decides not to engage would a Europe-only dialogue and initiative be appropriate.³¹ As a result, the ESDI did not give rise to much alarm in the US because it was defined fully within the framework of the Alliance. On the other hand, defined as autonomous from NATO and within the EU framework, the ESDP was seen as a cause for alarm by most US commentators.³² US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott described this fact in 1999 by saying that: "We would not want to see and ESDI that comes into being first within NATO but grows out of NATO and finally grows away from NATO, since that would lead to an ESDI that initially duplicates NATO but that could eventually compete with NATO".³³

²⁹Ibid., p.21.

³⁰Ibid. p.29; Sloan, *The United States and European Defence*, p. 7-8.

³¹Kupchan, "In Defence of European Defence: An American Perspective", pp. 18-19.

³²Sloan, *The United States and European Defence*, p.18.

³³Ibid., p.19.

From the EU's perspective, the initiatives toward the creation of a European security and defense dimension was initially a maneuver to adapt the European integration process to the conditions of the post-Cold War era. In the early stage of that era, the political attitude of the UK in particular was to seek the preservation of the transatlantic link. In the second half of 1995, the British government actively began to search for ways to create a European security and defense identity within the framework of the Alliance, in a manner that would facilitate France's return to full military integration. The re-involvement of France in the Alliance, with a willingness and ability to participate in military interventions beyond national borders, was seen as the key to achieve a meaningful and coordinated European contribution to Post-Cold War security concerns.³⁴ The issue of the return of France to NATO's military structure and the progress of the European Union's security dimension were seen as complementary steps toward the restructuring of the post-Cold War European security architecture. Traditionally France's attitude *vis-à-vis* NATO has been critical. France has always raised serious criticisms about the political and military role of the US and the position and the nationality of the SACEUR inside NATO. In the process of its re-involvement, France sought a way to balance the role of the US and of the SACEUR (traditionally an American general).³⁵ During the negotiations, it requested that the command of the South European sector, located in Naples, be rotated between France, Italy, and Spain. The US refused to see this command, always held by an American and which included the command of the Sixth Fleet, assigned to the Middle East, controlled by a European.³⁶ The continuing controversies about the role of the DSACEUR and the AFSOUTH command hindered a positive conclusion of France's 1995 *rapprochement* process with NATO in 1997. The breakdown in the process of France's *rapprochement* also triggered the strengthening of the autonomist tendencies in the evolution of the EU's security and defense dimension.

On the European side, the question of how much longer the American military commitment will be present on the European

³⁴Sloan, *The United States and European Defence*, p. 11.

³⁵G. Parmentier, "Après le Kosovo: Pour un Nouveau Contrat Transatlantique", *Politique Etrangère*, 1/2000, pp.13-14, 24-25.

³⁶Boniface, "The NATO Debate in France", p.9.

security scene with its huge burden on American budget, is another critical aspect driving the EU toward the creation of the ESDP. In the post-Cold War era, the Europeans worried about the relevance of the American commitment to European security as it existed during the Cold War years.³⁷ The controversies that appeared especially during and after the Kosovo military operation between EU members and the US had a blurring effect on the European perception of the continuation of the American commitment to European security. This moved the Europeans to seek an integrated European defense capability that they could use within or outside of NATO as expressed in the ESDP.³⁸ American pressure on European allies to increase their defense spending and invest more in order to narrow the capability gap with the US played an important role in the European change of attitude toward an autonomous security and defense policy. The Franco-European project was predicated on the assumption that balance involved not only resources and military tasks, but also political influence and diplomatic leadership.³⁹ These two interlinked factors, American pressure for burden-sharing on Europe and European doubts about the continuation of American commitment to European security, have exposed the European tendency toward autonomy in an emerging security and defense policy of the EU. Considering these developments, the EU members found themselves making an increased effort to achieve a greater balance in influence and leadership with the US in post-Cold War European security.

4. Turkey's Reaction against the ESDP

The transition from ESDI to ESDP and the incorporation of the WEU into the EU deeply influenced the six European countries which are members of NATO but not of the EU. They were, at the time, the

³⁷R. Zadra, "Vers une Identité Européenne", in N. Gantz, J. Roper, (eds.), *Vers un Nouveau Partenariat: Les Relations Europe/Etats-Unis dans l'Après Guerre Froide*, Institut d'Etudes de Sécurité – UEO, Paris, 1993, p.84.

³⁸G. Adams "Fortress America in a Changing Transatlantic Defence Market", in B. Schmitt (ed.), *Between Cooperation and Competition: The Transatlantic Defense Market*, Institute for Security Studies of WEU, Chaillot Paper 44, January 2001, p. 5.

³⁹Croft, Howorth, Terriff, Weber, "NATO's Triple Challenge", p. 504.

Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Iceland, Norway and Turkey. These countries were also associate members⁴⁰ of the WEU. Iceland, Norway and Turkey gained the associate member status through an invitation issued in the 1991 Maastricht Declaration of the WEU, which was also annexed to the Maastricht Treaty. Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland acquired this status following a decision taken by the WEU Permanent Council on 23 March 1999, and their new status was confirmed by a declaration attached to the Bremen Declaration of the WEU Council of Ministers dated 10-11 May 1999.⁴¹

However, each of these six countries has been influenced in a different degree. It is possible to distinguish three categories. In the first category are the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. These three countries have been closest candidates for full EU membership. It meant that they have a chance to become full members of the EU before the full implementation of the ESDP. The second category includes of Norway and Iceland. These two countries decided voluntarily not to join the EU. They can be full members in a relatively short time, if they decided to do so. Their absence from the ESDP is the logical result of their own political choice and they know that to be part of it depends on their political will. In the third category is Turkey. This country has a position *sui generis* in the European integration process. It became associated to the EU in 1963, and applied for membership in 1987. Turkey is today among the candidate countries, which is the farthest from full EU membership. The obstacles preventing Turkey's membership are not the subject of this article, but they influence deeply the attitude of Turkey toward the ESDP.

Turkey has traditionally pursued a policy of inclusion in Western political and security systems. This is a key point to understand Turkey's foreign and security policy. Its membership in NATO since 1952, in this perspective, is of crucial importance for Turkey.⁴² This fact played a major role against the Soviet threat during

⁴⁰Associate members are not signatories to the modified Brussels Treaty or the WEU Treaty.

⁴¹A. Missiroli, "EU-NATO Cooperation in Crisis Management: No Turkish Delight for ESDP", *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 33, No. 1, p. 10.

⁴²A. Eralp, "European Security and Turkey", *Private View*, Spring 2000, p. 53; Hüseyin Bağcı, "Türkiye ve AGSK: Beklentiler, Endişeler" (Turkey and ESDP),

the Cold War years. However, from the Turkey's security perspective NATO's fundamental role in Turkey's foreign and security policy continues to have a central importance in the post-Cold War years. Surrounded by instable regions such as the Balkans, the Middle East and Caucasia, Turkey continues to accept NATO and its adherence to the Western European security system as the principal guarantor of its security. Turkey quite often uses this "privileged position" (membership to NATO) in its relations with its neighboring countries, which are in general quite problematic. Turkey perceives its place in NATO also as a channel of communication and a way to better explain its policies concerning bilateral regional disputes (such as its conflicts with Greece and Cyprus issue). By using this channel Turkey has found several times a way to prevent escalation in these issues and to keep its security by maintaining its foreign policy priorities.

The formulation of an autonomous European security and defense policy changed the position of NATO inside the Western security system and thus blurred Turkey's foreign and security perception *vis-à-vis* the developing post-Cold War security architecture. Turkey conceived the transition from ESDI to ESDP as a step toward its exclusion from the new European security architecture. For that reason it displayed a clearly negative attitude toward the EU's requests to use NATO assets and planning capacity after the Helsinki Summit (December 1999). In Turkey's perception, Helsinki was a definitive sign of rupture from the ESDI and a transition to an autonomous security policy inside the EU.

Another fundamental development increasing the degree of Turkey's reaction *vis-à-vis* the ESDP is the incorporation of the WEU into the EU. At the WEU Ministerial Council in November 2000 in Marseille, the WEU member states agreed to suspend the operational capacity of the WEU. The Nice Council in December 2000 adopted the inclusion in the EU of the appropriate functions of the WEU pursuing the guidelines defined in Marseille. Turkey conceived the WEU as a bridge between EU and NATO. The WEU would be a practical tool to facilitate the participation of the non-EU NATO members in the non-

in I. Bal (ed.), *21. Yüzyılın Eşiğinde Türk Dış Politikası*, (Turkey's Foreign Policy in the 21st Century), İstanbul, 2001, p.595; Ç. Özen, *La Turquie Devant le Défi Européen: Aspects Economique, Politique et Stratégique*, Ankara, 2000, p. 9.

article 5 operations conducted by the EU. The WEU has developed a differentiated and far-reaching system of participation in its decision-making processes for states that are not full members, such as Turkey. The Maastricht Treaty provided a legal basis for the non-EU NATO members to join to the WEU as associate members and participate fully in the WEU's activities. Especially after the WEU's Ministerial Councils of Berlin in July 1997 and of Erfurt in November 1997, the associate members obtained the right to participate fully, in accordance with their statute, in all Petersberg missions carried out by the WEU.⁴³ With the incorporation of the WEU into the EU, Turkey suffered a net loss regarding the degree of its participation in security and defense matters.⁴⁴ In those days Turkey's Defense Minister Sabahattin Çakmakoglu stated that "Turkey could block the use of NATO equipment and forces by the ESDP if it is not allowed to take part in the new force",⁴⁵ and Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit raised his criticisms of ESDP by saying that "Turkey has received unfair treatment from the EU over the ESDP so far."⁴⁶

One of the Turkey's concerns about the ESDP has been related with its security interests in its surrounding area. Turkey is concerned with the possibility of the ESDP being used against its interests in areas it regards as its security interests. In other words, Turkey is concerned that without its full involvement, the EU-performed Petersberg type operations might take place in its neighboring regions and conflicts such as the Cyprus, and Turkish-Greek bilateral disputes, Northern Iraq and developments leading toward a Kurdish State, and the Armenia-Azerbaijan territorial dispute over Nagorno-Karabag. The clear sign of that concern is Turkey's request of a commitment from the EU that "ESDP would not be used in disputes between NATO allies" and that "ESDP would not be used in any condition or crisis against Turkey".

⁴³See Missiroli, "EU-NATO Cooperation in Crisis Management: No Turkish Delight for ESDP", for details on this issue.

⁴⁴P. Schmit, "ESDI: Separable but not Separated?", *NATO Review*, Spring/Summer 2000, p. 13.

⁴⁵*Turkish Daily News*, 23 November 2000.

⁴⁶*Turkish Daily News*, 25 November 2000.

These concerns have also been reflected in the "Ankara Document"⁴⁷ finalized on 26 November 2001 between US, UK and Turkey and approved by the Turkish Government on 29 December 2001, aiming to remove Turkey's veto on ESDP-NATO cooperation. A security pledge assuring Turkey on this issue is included in the Ankara Document. In this Document, an intense consultation mechanism with Turkey covering all phases and stages of an eventual operation not involving NATO assets and unrolling in Turkey's geographic proximity and related with its security interests, has also been adopted by these three countries.⁴⁸

Greece, annoyed by the security pledge included in the Document, raised some concerns and criticisms about the Ankara Document. The Greek objection centered mainly on the assurances given in the Ankara Document that ESDP would not use automatic access to NATO assets to undermine Turkey's interests. Greece wanted to include a similar assurance in the official texts to protect Greek geographical and strategic interests. According to Greek officials, to meet Greek security concerns was a question of reciprocity.⁴⁹ In Brussels on 24-25 October 2002, the EU leaders worked out the terms of what they considered an adequate reconciliatory text. In an annexed document to the Presidency Conclusions adopted after the Brussels European Council meeting, the EU included an article providing that NATO's military crisis management will not undertake any action against the EU or its Members States. This was a clear diplomatic gesture without substance aiming only to satisfy Greek public opinion. It was unthinkable that NATO, an international organization taking its decisions on the basis of *consensus* rule, could ever adopt a decision against one of its members. The Brussels Document also stipulated that any type of action should comply with the principles of the United Nations Charter, especially the peaceful settlement of disputes and refraining from the threat or use of force, in reference to the Aegean

⁴⁷The Ankara Document is a set of principles adopted by the US, UK and Turkey to find a solution to the issue of participation of 6 non-EU European NATO allies to the EU conducted operations and by to remove the Turkish veto of the use of NATO planning capacity and NATO assets during this kind of operations.

⁴⁸Interviews with officials in the Turkish Foreign Ministry.

⁴⁹*Financial Times*, 28 May 2002; 21 June 2002.

disputes between Greece and Turkey. The rest of the document was an adoption of the guidelines defined in the Ankara Document.

At the EU Copenhagen Summit on 12-13 December 2002, Turkey accepted the Brussels document proposed by the EU under the condition that the “the countries which will be new members of the EU, especially Cyprus, should not use NATO capabilities automatically”.⁵⁰ The EU, in an annexed declaration to the Conclusions of the Copenhagen Summit, pledged that “only the EU members which are also either NATO members or parties to the NATO’s Partnership for Peace program will be part of ESDP-NATO security cooperation and Berlin plus arrangements”.⁵¹ In other words the EU has agreed that Cyprus will not take part in EU military operations conducted by using NATO assets and planning capacity. One must add that this is strictly limited to ESDP-NATO joint operations. On the other hand, the same declaration assured the right of full participation of Cyprus in the autonomous ESDP operations conducted without NATO. After the Copenhagen Summit, a joint meeting of the North Atlantic Council and the EU Political and Security Committee held on 16 December 2002 adopted a declaration on ESDP. This joint declaration provided the legal base for the EU’s assured access to NATO’s planning capabilities⁵² and ended the deadlock blocking the use of NATO planning capacity by the EU in the framework of its ESDP.

These developments clearly show that the evolution of an autonomous European security and defense policy is and will continue to be linked to NATO-EU relations in the near future. Considering the lack of capability of the EU to conduct a major operation, the need for EU-NATO cooperation and the importance of ESDP-NATO joint operability capability will continue. Through this procedure Turkey will necessarily keep its strategic importance. Its security concerns, as expressed during the negotiation process of the Berlin plus arrangements, will continue to play a major role with regard to EU-

⁵⁰*Turkish Daily News*, 29 October, 2002.

⁵¹*Declaration of the Council Meeting in Copenhagen* on 12 December 2002, and *Presidency Conclusions of Copenhagen European Council*, 12-13 December 2002.

⁵²*EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP*, 16 December 2002, <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-142e.htm>, 20.12.2002.

NATO relations on security issues. In conclusion, Turkey will also continue to remain an important factor in the development of the future European security architecture.

5. Considerations Concerning the Future of the European Security Architecture

To be able to project the eventual path of development of the European security architecture and of EU-NATO relations in the post-Cold War era, especially after the ESDP, one must look at what is not being said instead of the official texts and declarations. At first glance, one can observe the Turkish-Greek dispute and the Turkish concerns about the development of the ESDP as the primary obstacle impeding the progress of ESDP-NATO relations and thus the formation of a new security structure in Europe. However, the growing US concerns over the developing autonomous security and defense aspect of the EU also play a substantial role in the EU-NATO disputes. The evolution of the ESDP increased the American worries about the future of the European security architecture and especially the future of transatlantic cooperation in security matters. In the period that followed the Second World War, it suited the US to have a hegemonic leadership in the Western World. The American leadership in the Western World on security issues began to be questioned by the European side in the 1990s. The ESDP and its autonomous character from NATO reflects a concrete sign of European differing attitude.

At this point, the question of whether the US is ready to share its leadership and to accept that the EU will gain a new and "autonomous" political and security role outside the European theater, will play a substantial role in the evolution of a new security architecture. If the US is ready to accept the EU as an equal security partner, EU-NATO relations and the new institutional framework of European security will undoubtedly will be different. Needless to say, this will contribute a great deal to solve the debate concerning EU-NATO cooperation and to build a common frame to conduct an operation. Actually the

American attitude *vis-à-vis* the ESDP is not very positive.⁵³ American hesitations concerning the “autonomy” approach of the EU will naturally make it more difficult to build a solid and cooperative European security architecture.

On the other hand it is highly possible that in the future the “autonomy” concept will change into “independence”. Certainly the determinant of this transformation will be the EU’s capacity to overcome its internal fragilities. The first weakness is the lack of capability. The EU still has a crucial need to turn to NATO and especially to American assets and planning capability to conduct a medium scale operation. It is for this reason that the EU is requesting automatic access to NATO capabilities. The second weakness is the decreasing defense spending of major EU powers. The transition to the Euro and the strict rules of the “Stability and Growth Pact” reinforce this tendency. The last weakness is the lack of political coherence among the EU members on the major issues of the world agenda. This fact has also been supported by the nature of the decision-making process of the EU on foreign and security policy. The EU’s autonomist approach bears the potential to weaken NATO. NATO is an organization keeping European allies and the US together in a single institutional framework to safeguard common values and political aims by political and military means. The transatlantic cooperation and the American commitment to European security consist of the NATO assets. These assets greatly helped to keep stability and peace in Europe during the Cold War years. The weakening of NATO, without building a new security framework in its place, will create serious vulnerabilities in European security in the future. The solution of that problem is closely linked to the EU-US dialogue and to the progress of ESDP-NATO relations.

The progress of EU-US relations toward a dialogue between equals will raise a substantial question on security matters. Who will decide in a crisis situation? NATO or the EU, or NATO and the EU together in a new kind of institutional framework? The discussions on the right of “first refusal” are a different way of formulating this

⁵³Paul Cornish, Geoffrey Edwards, “Beyond the EU-NATO dichotomy: the Beginnings of a European Strategic Culture”, *International Affairs*, Vol: 77, No: 3, July 2001, p. 502-503.

question. President Clinton had addressed the NATO-EU relationship, calling for NATO to be guaranteed the "right of first refusal" when missions were being considered.⁵⁴ In theory NATO and EU documents actually give the first refusal right to NATO. In the Washington Summit Communiqué (24 April 1999), NATO declared that the autonomous action capacity of the EU could be acknowledged only "where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged" (para.9/a). On the EU side, the Presidency Report to the Nice European Council (7-8 December 2000) adopted exactly the same wording of the NATO document.⁵⁵ In practice, the EU indeed acquires the "right of first refusal". The engagement of NATO as a whole will depend on the EU countries, which are at the same time NATO members. For example, an EU country which prefers an EU-led operation can block the decision within NATO and impede the engagement of the Alliance.⁵⁶ The internal fragilities of the EU will actually limit the free use of that right by the EU. However, it is difficult to guess the prospective European approach on the question of "first refusal right". Kupchan defines this fact by saying that "... Washington is justified in calling for full transparency and insisting that a thorough transatlantic discussion before deciding definitively who is best placed to take the lead if military action is necessary."⁵⁷ In reality the "first refusal" question will shape the substance of future European security architecture and of EU-US relations.

If a satisfactory solution cannot be reached for both the US and the EU, the world may face a unilateralist American security policy. Some analysts argue that one probable conclusion of the persisting differentiation process between the EU and the US could be a new American isolationism.⁵⁸ However, the American strategy of pre-emptive strike evolving after the September 11 attack can hinder the Americans in favoring a unilateralist approach rather than isolationism on international security issues. Isolationist or unilateralist American

⁵⁴Ibid., p.502.

⁵⁵"...In developing this autonomous capacity to take decisions, where NATO as a whole is not engaged..."

⁵⁶Özen, "Consequences of the European Security and Defense Policy", p. 141.

⁵⁷Kupchan, "In Defence of European Defence", p. 23.

⁵⁸Jolyon Howorth, *European Integration and Defence: The Ultimate Challenge?*, p. 4.

security policies can have a very negative impact on the effectiveness of NATO and of European security in the post-Cold War era.

The non-EU European NATO allies will also have a say in the construction of a new security architecture in Europe. Turkey in particular will have a considerable impact on the process of constructing a new security architecture in Europe. As a NATO member and a strategic partner of the US, Turkey will, no doubt, look for a way to influence the evolution of EU-NATO relations according to its strategic interests and to safeguard its institutional assets gained during the Cold-War years.

6. Conclusion

The development of ESDP-NATO relations will shape the future architecture of European Security. The autonomist character of ESDP constitutes a challenge to NATO's central role and especially to the leadership of the US in the Western World of the Cold War years. The new situation is obviously based on the search by European side to achieve a balanced relationship in the security field in the post-Cold War years. The emergence of an autonomous European security and defense policy had a deep impact on the European security architecture. It is hard to believe that it will be possible to continue to live with the institutional framework created during the Cold War. In the forthcoming years, we will undoubtedly witness the creation of a new security architecture in Europe.

Three factors will play a substantial role in the shaping of this future security architecture. The first factor is the US attitude *vis-à-vis* the ESDP and its developing autonomous character. The question is whether or not the US is ready to accept the EU as an equal partner in international security affairs. Secondly, the internal coherence and external credibility of the European Union regarding the Common Foreign and Security Policy will play an important role in the evolution of the new European security architecture. Thirdly, the criticisms of the non-EU European NATO members, especially those of Turkey, will also influence the development of Europe's future security relations.

In conclusion, the success of building a firm European security architecture is closely tied to a fruitful EU-US cooperation and a mutual understanding between the EU and the US in the post-Cold War era. To a lesser extent, the inclusion of all European countries and especially the NATO allies will also help to reach that goal. In this manner, a self-examination of the US is very important in the years to come. If the US does not accept a balanced relationship with the EU and continues to stress the imbalance of military capacity or attempts to pursue an unilateralist policy, the cooperative climate on international security issues and the hope to create a new and solid European security architecture will collapse. On the other hand, if the EU aims to have a considerable place and weight on the international scene on security issues, it must find the way to speak with one and strong voice in the world arena and to reinforce its security policies with a credible military capability.