

**THE GERMAN FACTOR IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE
IN LATE 19TH CENTURY**

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ABSTRACT

Germany was one of the powers in the rivalry of the European states in the Near and Middle East during the last two decades of the nineteenth century and gave new dimension to the Eastern Question, when it appeared on the scene as imperial Germany. Especially, after Bismarck's dismissal, Germany gradually abandoned its policy of restraint. After the 1880's, it actively began to get involved in the "Eastern Question." In addition to the early appearances of Prussian military reformers and agents, Germany's armaments industry, German banks, industrial firms, and railroad interests moved into the Ottoman Empire, and secured concessions, markets, and spheres of influence for themselves.¹

Key Words: Ottoman Empire, German Influence, Eastern Question.

**19. YÜZYIL'IN SONLARINDA OSMANLI DEVLETİNDE
ALMANYA FAKTÖRÜ**

ÖZET

19. yüzyılın son yirmi yılında, Yakın ve Orta Doğuda, Avrupalı devletler arasında meydana gelen rekabette, Almanya yeni bir güç olarak ortaya çıkmıştır. Sahnede sömürgeci bir Almanya olarak yerini alan Almanya "Doğu Sorunu"na yeni bir boyut kazandırmıştır. Özellikle Bismarck'ın düşürülmesinden sonra, Almanya göreceli bir şekilde çekingenlik politikasını terk etmiş ve 1880'lerden sonra aktif bir şekilde "Doğu Sorunu"na karışmıştır. Prusyalı askeri reformcuların yanı sıra şimdi Alman bankaları, Alman silah endüstrisi, demiryolu şirketleri hepsi Osmanlı Devletine gelerek kendileri için çok önemli olan imtiyazlar, pazarlar ve etki alanları oluşturmuşlardır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Osmanlı Devleti, Alman Nüfuzu, Doğu Sorunu.

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¹ For a general account of these issues see Ulrich Trupener, (1968), **Germany and the Ottoman Empire, 1914-1918**. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Introduction

Mainly, there are two historical opinions on the subject of the prewar relationship between Germany and the Ottoman Empire. While some scholars such as Henry Cord Meyer, *Mitteleuropa in German Thought and Action, 1815-1945*,² and Fritz Fischer, *Weltpolitik*,³ have suggested that Germany's general influence in the Ottoman Empire on the eve of World War I was not extraordinary, perhaps even on the decline, others such as W. W. Gottlieb, *Studies in the Secret Diplomacy during the First World War*,⁴ A. F. Miller, *The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Young Turk Revolution*, have concluded that by 1914 the Ottoman Empire was little more than a satellite of the Reich.⁵ In the following, I am going to concentrate briefly on the economic, political and military issues that can be outlined as follows: What was the German economic and financial power in the Ottoman Empire? (German Banks, Baghdad railroad project, trade, and industrial activity.) What were the German political influences in the Ottoman Empire? (Especially, German reformation of the Ottoman army.) What was the role of German religious, cultural and other special interest groups in the Ottoman Empire?

(interests of Zionist movement and Protestants and Roman Catholics of Germany).

Between 1865 and 1871 the political map of Europe changed dramatically. After its unification under Prussian leadership, the German Reich had become economically, technologically, and militarily one of the most powerful states in the world. Consequently, the "German Problem" came to the scene of the European balance of power, though Bismarck was quick to reassure the powers that Germany was not a threat to the concert of Europe.⁶ In the time

² Henry Cord Meyer, (1955), *Mitteleuropa in German Thought and Action, 1815-1945*. The Hague: Nijhoff.

³ Fritz Fischer, (1967), *Germany's Aims in the First World War*. New York: Norton.

⁴ W. W. Gottlieb, (1957), *Studies in the Secret Diplomacy during the First World War*. London.

⁵ Ulrich Trumpener, (1968), p. 6.

⁶ John Lowe, (1994), *The Great Powers, Imperialism and the German Problem, 1865-1925*. New York: Routledge, p. 2.

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of Bismarck's chancellorship (1871-1890), generally, it is argued that German foreign policy aimed at stabilizing international relations on the European continent and achieving relatively limited colonial gains abroad.⁷ However, Bismarck had picked up sizable pieces of colonial property mostly in Africa and the Pacific.

On the other hand, "German Imperialism" created another problem, after the emergence of Germany as a world power. After the fall of Bismarck in 1890, German foreign policy under the aegis of Kaiser William II (1888-1918) had become increasingly erratic. From 1896 onward, Germany became a prominent world power with its new colonial policy and *Weltpolitik*. Basically, the nation's growing economic ability, the Kaiser's ambitious foreign policy, and the popular support for this policy from nationalistic pressure-groups and some segments of the German business community and the radical demands for sweeping changes in the political system and social structure of the country caused the new expansionist colonial policy of Germany in the late nineteenth century.⁸

This is the time that German involvement in the Ottoman Empire could be seen, especially, by rising investments in and trade with the empire. Increasing European penetration of the Ottoman economy had resulted in the grant of substantial privileges to European nationals. Also, heavy borrowing from abroad since 1854 had contributed to its bankruptcy in 1879 and led to the creation of the Ottoman Public Debt Commission, which included representatives of the Great Powers. Therefore, the "Eastern Question" had become the problem of what the Great Powers should do about the disintegration of Ottoman Empire. In this regard, though in Bismarck's time Germany was not interested in the Middle East and disclaimed any interest in the Ottoman Empire, his successors could

⁷ Gerald D. Feldman, (1972), *German Imperialism, 1914-1918*. New York: John Wiley & Sons Inc., p. 1.

⁸ Mary E. Townsend, (1930), *The Rise and Fall of Germany's Colonial Empire, 1884-1918*. New York: The Macmillan comp., p. 176-182. Ulrich Trumpener. "Germany and the End of the Ottoman Empire." In Marian Kent, (ed.), (1984), *The Great Powers and the End of the Ottoman Empire*. London: George Allen & Unwin Pub., p. 112.

have not remained outside of the new dimensions of the Eastern Question and sought to extend German political and economic influence throughout the Ottoman Empire.⁹

During the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire attempted to find remedies for its social, economic, and political problems that resulted from the changing conditions of the century. Ottoman government conducted several reform activities ranging from the military level to the cultural level throughout the nineteenth century. The idea of "Modernization" or "Westernization" of the empire was the main determinant for all of the reform movements. Consequently, involvement of European Powers to those reform activities was inevitable and required by the Ottoman government according to general trend among the reformers. In this sense, from the 1830s onward, Germany and some of the Germans could be seen at work in the Ottoman Empire as "Modernizers". "Several Prussian officers, among them the future Field-Marschal von Moltke¹⁰, had worked as advisors or instructors in the Ottoman army. Between 1867 and 1875 about 750 Swabian religious dissidents, the "Templers," had moved to the Holy Land and built up several prosperous settlements. And, of course, German engineers and surveyors had been quite active in the Sultan's realm since the 1870s followed in due time by companies interested in railway construction."¹¹

Germany was represented by both an embassy and a consular office in Istanbul. Also there were several consuls and vice-consuls in the various regions of the Ottoman Empire. "From 1897 onward, the German embassy in Istanbul was headed by a succession of very capable men, namely Baron Adolf Marschall von Bieberstein (to 1912) who was regarded as the true architect of Germany's Middle Eastern policies prior to the war, Baron Hans von Wangenheim (to

⁹ John Lowe (1994) *The Great Powers, Imperialism and the German Problem, 1865-1925*. New York: Routledge, p. 21.

¹⁰ Helmuth von Moltke, (1969), *Türkiye Mektupları*. Çeviren: Hayrullah Örz. İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi.

¹¹ Ulrich Trumpener. "Germany and the End of the Ottoman Empire." In Marian Kent, (ed.), (1984), *The Great Powers and the End of the Ottoman Empire*. London: George Allen & Unwin Pub., p. 112.

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1915), Count Paul von Wolff-Metternich (to 1916), Richard von Kuhlmann (to 1917) and Count Johann Heinrich von Bernstorff (to 1918).¹²

German Economic and Financial Power in the Ottoman Empire before 1914

In the aftermath of the Industrial revolution, the change in inter-imperialist power balances was apparent. The Ottoman Empire was one of the areas where the conditions of rivalry were most intense. The geographical position of the Ottoman Empire, the enormous potential wealth of its dominions - agricultural wealth, vast resources of some of the most essential materials of modern industry: minerals, fuel, lubricants, abrasives- , and being both a satisfactory market for European products, and a rich field for the investment of capital were enough to arouse the cupidity of the Great Powers. Moreover, the political instability -both external and internal— of the Ottoman Empire was another aspect to create available conditions for intervention of European powers in the affairs of the empire on behalf of the financial interests of the entrepreneurs.¹³

It can be argued that one of the factors of the entry of Germany into the inter-imperialist race was the partitioning of the Ottoman Empire into spheres of influence by the European powers.¹⁴ Parallel with the developing available conditions of the Ottoman Empire for imperialism, German politics in terms of colonial policy and foreign relations was reshaped by the reign of William II in the late nineteenth century. By breaking the Bismarckian colonial tradition of caution, the Kaiser promoted the economic expansion of Germany to the Middle East for the sake of world power policy. Actually, early in the nineteenth century, the economic importance of the Middle East for Germany had already been recounted by some of the individual enterprises. Those activities of individuals prepared the way for a more stable element, the investors. Naturally, the traders

¹² Ibid. p. 114.

¹³ Edward M. Earle, (1966), *Turkey, the Great Powers, and the Bagdad Railway*. New York: Russell & Russell pub. p. 5-6.

¹⁴ Şevket Pamuk, (1987), *The Ottoman Empire and European Capitalism, 1820-1913*. New York: Cambridge University Press, p. 15.

followed the investors and during the period from 1888 to 1900, German economic expansion into the Middle East was very rapid. During this period (1888-1900), Germany's exports into the Ottoman Empire rose from 2,300,000 DM. to 30,400,000 DM., and her imports from 11,700,00 DM. to 34,400,000 DM.¹⁵

During the period before World War I, foreign investments in the Ottoman Empire can be grouped under two headings: (a) direct investments in enterprises and (b) lending to government.¹⁶ If we want to understand the nineteenth century imperialist rivalry in the Ottoman Empire, we have to look at the shares of the Great Powers in Ottoman external trade and in foreign investment. In this sense, during 1881-1914, parallel to the decline in the British share, and shares of French, German investors increased.¹⁷ "German investors not only collected the old issues being sold by the British bondholders, but, after 1888, they began to buy the new Ottoman issues in large amounts with the help of Deutsche Bank."¹⁸ As a result of these developments, by 1914 German capital had the second largest share with 21 percent of the total Ottoman debt after the French capital, and ahead of British capital which had declined to 14 percent from 33 percent in 1881.¹⁹

On the other hand, direct foreign investments in the Ottoman Empire were placed in infrastructure such as railroads rather than in production activities such as agriculture or industry.²⁰ Therefore, in 1888 a German group gained first concession for the construction of a railroad through Central Anatolia. "By 1914, more than 80 percent of German Direct investment in the Ottoman Empire had been placed in railroad construction, whereas only 40 percent of British direct investment and 60 percent of French direct investment had gone to railroads."²¹

¹⁵ Mary E. Townsend (1930), p. 210.

¹⁶ Şevket Pamuk, (1987), *The Ottoman Empire and European Capitalism, 1820-1913*. New York: Cambridge University Press, p. 55.

¹⁷ *Ibid.* p. 73.

¹⁸ *Ibid.* p. 74.

¹⁹ *Ibid.* p. 75,76.

²⁰ *Ibid.* p. 55.

²¹ *Ibid.* p. 79.

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In this process, the Deutsche Bank of Berlin was very important in organizing loans to the Ottoman government. Indeed, the Deutsche Bank played an important role in the steady expansion of all German economic activities in the Ottoman Empire.²² Whereas in 1898, "the trade and finance of the Ottoman Empire were practically monopolized by France and Great Britain. Germans were now by far the most active group in Istanbul and Asia Minor. Hundreds of German salesmen were traveling in the Ottoman Empire vigorously pushing their wares and studiously canvassing the markets to learn the wants of the people. The Krupp-owned Germania Shipbuilding Company was furnishing torpedoes to the Ottoman navy; Ludwig Loewe and Company, of Berlin, was equipping the Ottoman military machine with small arms; Krupp, of Essen, was sharing with Armstrong the orders for artillery. German bicycles were replacing American - made machines. There was a noticeable increase of German trade with Palestine and Syria. In 1899 a group of German financiers founded the *Deutsche Palastina Bank*, which proceeded to establish branches at Beirut, Damascus, Gaza, Haifa, Jaffa, Jerusalem, Nablus, Nazareth, and Tripoli-in-Syria.

Promoters, bankers, traders, engineers, munitions manufacturers, ship-owners, and railway builders all were playing their parts in laying a substantial foundation for a further expansion of German economic interests in the Ottoman Empire."²³

Bagdad Railway Project

Before World War I, the most visible and controversial aspect of Germany's economic penetration of the Ottoman Empire was the Bagdad Railway construction. Germany had already gained the concession for a railway construction in 1888 and had built rail connections from the Bosphorus to Ankara (completed in 1892) and Konya (completed in 1896). Between 1899 and 1903 the same German controlled Anatolian Railway Company got another concession from the Ottoman government to build and operate an extension of

²² Ulrich Trumppener, (1984), p. 116.

²³ Edward M. Earle, (1966), p. 37.

the line to Bagdad and Basra. The reasons for the construction of the railway by German capital were partly economic, partly political, and partly strategic for both Germany and the Ottoman Empire. From the Ottoman point of view, politically; first, the Ottoman government wanted to improve its administrative effectiveness in some part of the empire;²⁵ second, according to the foreign policy of Sultan Abdul Hamid, which was playing one power off against another, the prestige of Germany had been rising in the Ottoman Empire, especially, after the new Middle Eastern policy of William II. Economically, the Ottoman government thought that with the construction of railways, administrative effectiveness in the collection of taxes, the cultivation of new lands, and bringing the corps to the urban markets, and reaching to the major ports of export would improve.²⁶ Strategically, "the Bagdad Railway was the possibility of the Ottoman utilization for military purposes. In time of peace for purposes of maneuvers or the suppression of rebellion, in time of war for purposes of mobilization."²⁷

From the German point of view: politically; first, In the eyes of William II, the Ottoman Empire seemed as compensation for Germany's limited colonial opportunities outside of Europe. The Kaiser's eternal friendship and that of the German people to all Muslims, was based on the idea that in case of war they would start rebellions in the colonial territories of Germany's opponents, Russia and England.²⁸ In this sense, Kaiser wanted to use the Bagdad Railway Project for political ends. In 1898, Kaiser declared in his speech from the throne " I trust that my visit to the Ottoman Empire promises the ultimate drawing together of these two nations." Subsequently, he always referred to the Bagdad Project as "My Railway."²⁹ Economically, first, the construction and operation of the Bagdad Railway were profitable forms of investments for the German

²⁴ Ulrich Trumppener, (1984), p. 117.

²⁵ Şevket Pamuk, (1987), *The Ottoman Empire and European Capitalism, 1820-1913*. New York: Cambridge University Press, p. 134.

²⁶ *Ibid.* p. 134.

²⁷ Edward M. Earle, (1966), p. 83.

²⁸ Mary E. Townsend, (1930), p. 213.

²⁹ *Ibid.* p. 218.

enterprises. At the same time, it played a major role in providing inexpensive raw materials, foodstuffs and markets for manufacturers to Germany. Second, the importation of construction equipment and rolling stock from Germany gave way to the German companies to get benefit from the project.³⁰ Between 1910-13, for instance, the value of rail and cross-ties shipped from Germany to the Ottoman Empire amounted to over 19 million Goldmark. Under the German operation, the Bagdad Railway, on the eve of the war carried close to 600,000 passengers and 116,000 tons of freight annually.³¹ Third, after the turn of the century, Germany involved in the agriculture of the empire by the activities of the Anatolian Railway Company such as extending credit to middle farmers for seeds, land improvement schemes and irrigation projects.³²

Strategically, the Bagdad Railway was something more than a railway. It constituted one side of the great diplomatic struggle for the predominance of power and one element of the Anglo-German economic rivalry. The construction of the Bagdad Railway in the Middle East, which was a very important region for the British colonial interests, was a great menace to the British Empire in an era of universal preparedness for the expected great European war in which every nation would be obliged to fight for its very existence. In the eyes of the German military men, the construction of the Bagdad Railway in an era of intensive military and economic preparedness for a war would provide the utilization of economic influence for the promotion of strategic and diplomatic purposes. Also, it should be mentioned that the Bagdad Railway Project would serve to weld firmer the Austro-German alliance, because the railway was to run from Berlin to Bagdad, it also was to run from Vienna to Bagdad.³³

On the one hand, to the great mass of the German people the Bagdad Railway was a great patriotic adventure, a vast business and economic undertaking and little else. Consequently, the German people predominantly

³⁰ Şevket Pamuk, (1987), p. 68.

³¹ Ulrich Trumpener, (1984), p. 117.

³² Şevket Pamuk, (1987), p. 105.

³³ Edward M. Earle, (1966), p. 126, 127, 128.

applauded and acclaimed the project. "The great design came to be referred to as the 'B.B.B.' (Berlin- Byzantium- Bagdad) in Germany. The project speedily became an integral part of the national *Weltanschauung* — a means of enabling Germany to compete for the rich commerce of the Orient."³⁵ On the other hand, most of the Ottoman people favored Germans in the award of economic concessions, because of the rising prestige of Germany in the Middle East as a sincere and disinterested country in the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire. In the Ottoman public opinion, all those other powers were either imperialist (Great Britain and France) or enemy (Russia) of the Ottoman Empire.³⁶

The German Military Involvement

Starting in the 1890s, Germany systematically provided military equipment and training for the Ottoman army, eventually, creating a strong pro-German wing within the Ottoman army.³⁷ As early as in the nineteenth century some Prussian officers had been serving as advisors or instructors in the Ottoman army. From 1882 onwards, the German involvement in the military affairs of the Ottoman Empire had increased with the arrival of a small group of officers under Generalmajor Otto Kaehler. Following Kaehler's death, Lieutenant - Colonel Baron Colmar von der Goltz worked with great energy and enthusiasm during the next ten years, advising the Ottoman officers on general staff matters, military organization and training procedures.³⁸ Indeed, German military mission in the Ottoman Empire had increased parallel to the trade for military equipment with the empire. In this sense, Baron von der Goltz worked in Istanbul as a sales representative of the Krupp Company, and was able to keep the orders going to

³⁴ Mary E. Townsend, (1930), p. 217.

³⁵ Edward M. Earle, (1966), **Turkey**, the Great Powers, and the Bagdad Railway. New York: Russell & Russell pub. p. 123.

³⁶ Ibid. p. 65.

³⁷ Şevket Pamuk, (1987), p. 81.

³⁸ Ulrich Trumpener, (1984), p. 115, 116.

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the Krupp Company. The orders for military equipment from Germany had amounted to 5,9 million Mark in 1889 -by the time of William IPs first visit to the Ottoman Empire-- 13,1 million Mark in 1893, 6 million in 1894, and 12,2 million in 1895.⁴⁰ It is important to note that several prominent Ottoman generals of the twentieth century, including Ahmet İzzet Pasha, who served as War Minister in 1913-14, and Mahmut Şevket Pasha, who was the Grand Vezir in 1909-1913, were trained in Germany for extended period of time.⁴¹

In like manner, "several major armaments firms of Germany were particularly active and visible in prewar Ottoman Empire. From the 1880s on, Germany's two biggest artillery producers, the Krupp Company of Essen and Heinrich Erhardt's Rheinische Metallwaren- und Maschinenfabrik of Dusseldorf, sold hundreds of heavy and light guns to the sultan's armed forces, sometimes with the active assistance of German officers stationed in the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman navy also bought some of its ships from German yards, but until the outbreak of the war the German role in Ottoman naval procurement remained quite small."⁴²

On the eve of World War I, Prussianization of the Ottoman army under the supervision of German officers had disturbed foreign observers in Istanbul. But Germany's own military leaders were generally skeptical about the strength and preparedness of the Ottoman army. Especially, in 1913 a new military mission under General Otto Liman von Sanders resulted in a substantial increase of Germany's general influence in the Ottoman Empire. However, this had a little importance, from the German point of view, in the process of coming to a military alliance with the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, " the German-Ottoman

³⁹ İlber Ortaylı, (1981), İkinci Abdülhamit Döneminde Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda **Alman Nüfuzu** (*The German Influence in the Ottoman Empire in the Time of Abdulhamit II*) Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları, p. 68.

⁴⁰ Ibid. p.68.

⁴¹ Ulrich Trümpener. "Germany and the End of the Ottoman Empire." In Marian Kent, (1984), (ed), *The Great Powers and the End of the Ottoman Empire*. London: George Allen & Unwin Pub., p. 116.

⁴² Ibid. p. 118, 119.

alliance of 1914 was not the logical culmination of carefully laid German plans; it was a hastily made arrangement."⁴³

German Religious, Cultural and Other Special Interest Groups in the Ottoman Empire

Both the Protestants and the Roman Catholics of Germany were represented in the Ottoman Empire by numerous missionaries, nurses, social workers and teachers. German Protestant missions, for instance, were represented in the Holy Land as early as 1860. Also in 1869 Lutheran missionaries calling themselves *Templars* settled near Jaffa in Palestine.⁴⁴ The *Jerusalems-Verein* by 1902 maintained eight schools with over 400 pupils in the Holy Land.⁴⁵ Along with a general increase in missionary activity connected with the increasing imperial activities of, the German government, the German Catholics were also active especially in the Holy Land. German Lazarists, Benedictines, and Carmelites had established and maintained schools, hospitals, and dispensaries, as well as churches, in Syria and Palestine.⁴⁶

Following the creation of the Zionist movement in the 1890s, several German Jews founded agricultural colonies in Palestine. Later, they became an integral part of the German community in the Holy Land.⁴⁷ " Also active in the Holy Land was the *Hilfsverein der deutschen Juden* (Aid Association of German Jews), founded in 1901 by the cotton magnate Lames Simon and prominent journalist Paul Nathan. A willing instrument of German cultural propaganda in Eastern Europe and in the Middle East, the *Hilfsverein* sponsored educational programs among Jews in which at least part of the instruction would be conducted in the German language."⁴⁸

⁴³ Ulrich Trumpener, (1968), *Germany and the Ottoman Empire, 1914-1918*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 14.

⁴⁴ Edward M. Earle, (1966), p. 132.

⁴⁵ Ulrich Trumpener, (1984), p. 119.

⁴⁶ Edward M. Earle, (1966), p. 133.

⁴⁷ Ibid. p. 133.

⁴⁸ Ulrich Trumpener, (1984), p. 120.

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The German government did not overlook the political possibilities of those German religious activities in the Ottoman Empire. "Promotion of missionary activities might be made to serve a twofold purpose: first to win the support, in domestic politics, of those interested in the propagation of their faith in foreign lands -more particularly to hold the loyalty of the Catholic Center party; second, to further one other means of strengthening the bonds between Germany and the Ottoman Empire."⁴⁹

The visit of William II to the Ottoman Empire in 1898 had illustrated very well the religious aspects of modern imperialism. After his return home, he declared that "my visit would prove to be a lasting source of advantage to the German name and German national interests."⁵⁰ In the case of the Bagdad Railway Project, which promised to link Central European cities with the holy places of Syria and Palestine, German missionaries had supported enthusiastically German government's imperial activities around the Bagdad Railway line in the Ottoman Empire.⁵¹

German cultural influence in the Ottoman Empire did not begin with the impact of classical German philosophers such as Schelling, Hegel, Feurbach and Marx, and with the German literature and science. It was generally represented in the Ottoman Empire by the exploitation of archeological places, famous operas, and authoritarianism and militarism of the Germans. Moreover, German schools in the Ottoman Empire were very limited in the late nineteenth century, if we compare with French, American and English schools. In 1898, the total numbers of German schools in the ottoman Empire were as follows: a high school in Istanbul, a high school in İzmir (65 pupils and established in 1872), a high school in Beirut (45 pupils), a middle and a high school in Haifa (85 male

Edward M. Earle, (1966), *Turkey, the Great Powers, and the Bagdad Railway*. New York: Russell & Russell pub., p. 133.

⁵⁰ Ibid. p. 134.

⁵¹ Ibid. p. 131.

and 145 female pupils), a middle school in Selanik (158 pupils and established in 1885).⁵²

But, by the time of Bagdad Railway Project, German missionary activities increased in the central Anatolia, especially around the Bagdad Railway line. For instance, in 1910 *Daily Graphic* had reported that "German schools, hospitals and missionaries were stretching out at full length of the Bagdad Railway line."⁵³

"Closely allied with the spread of German missions was the propagation of *dus Deuschtum* —that is, the spread of the German language, instruction in German history and ideals, appreciation of the character of German civilization."⁵⁴ It is important to note that German missionary activities in the Ottoman Empire particularly centered in Palestine. Most of the German schools, hospitals, dispensaries, orphanages were established in Palestine rather than in the other parts of the Ottoman Empire. In all those schools, including religious Jewish schools, German was adopted as the official language. For instance, in 1910 100,000 out of 500, 000 Jews in the Ottoman Empire were speaking German.⁵⁵

Starting from 1890s, "some groups of German Zionists periodically attempted to secure official government support for their cause. Until the outbreak of the war the German government did occasionally lend its assistance to Jewish educational and charitable organizations in Palestine and elsewhere in the Ottoman Empire, and some high-ranking German figures did express great sympathy with the concept of further Jewish settlement in the Holy land, but no one in Berlin was prepared to endanger the Reich's relations with the ottoman Empire by any kind of overt support of political Zionism."⁵⁶

⁵² İlber Ortaylı, (1981) İkinci Abdülhamit Döneminde Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda **Alman Nüfuzu** (*The German Influence in the Ottoman Empire in the Time of Abdulhamit II*) Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları, p. 50.

⁵³ Ibid. p. 51.

⁵⁴ Edward M. Earle, (1966), p. 135.

⁵⁵ İlber Ortaylı, (1981), p. 113.

⁵⁶ Ulrich Trümpener, (1984), p. 120.

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In like manner, German Financial, educational and diplomatic support for the German Jewish population in Palestine was apparent after the 1890s. In 1897, for example, *Deutsche Orient Bank* founded a branch in Palestine as *Palestine Bank* with the 100,000 Mark fund in order to support German Jewish settlers in their efforts in agriculture and trade. Also German diplomats in Palestine were very active helping the Jewish immigrants to settle and to buy land in Palestine easily.⁵⁷

It is also interesting to note that "while Zionists were dreaming of large scale Jewish migration to Palestine, the ultra-nationalistic Pan-German League, founded in 1891, dreamed, at least for a while, of using Anatolia as settlement area for German farmers."⁵⁸

Conclusion

As we have examined so far, Germany behaved as a typical European power in relations to the Ottoman Empire in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In the political and diplomatic relations, German support was considerable, though for selfish reasons, when the Ottoman Empire needed an ally in the European arena. In this way, Germany was coming to the scene as a new competitor in the Middle East affairs. The preservation of the Ottoman Empire, as a basic German policy, was always associated with the idea of German economic extension in the Ottoman Empire. In short, Germany was serious and very strict in the advancement and protection of German economic interests in the Ottoman Empire, while on all other issues its attitude remained flexible.

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