Rethinking State-Society Relations in Syria until 1970: What Does the Center-Periphery Model Tell Us?

*Nuri SALIK**

Abstract

This study aims to analyze, in a historical perspective, the state-society relations in Syria within the framework of the center-periphery model introduced by Edward Shils. The article argues that Shils's model is a useful approach to understand the state-society relations in Syria during the Ottoman, mandate and independence periods. In the article, Shils's concept of the center both as a culture and institution, and concept of the periphery are reevaluated in a dynamic way. In this regard, it is observed that there are changes and tensions not only between the center and the periphery but also among different groups within the center and the periphery throughout the period examined in the article. The article also suggests that the center-periphery model should be supplemented with class analysis in order to understand politics of Syria from independence in 1946 to Hafez al-Assad's Corrective Revolution in 1970.

Keywords: Syria, Syrian Politics, the Ottoman Empire, Center-Periphery Model, State-Society Relations

1970'e Kadar Suriye'de Devlet-Toplum İlişkilerini Yeniden Düşünmek: Merkez-Çevre Modeli Bize Ne Söyler?

Özet

Bu çalışma, Edward Shils tarafından başlatılan merkez-çevre modeli çerçevesinde, tarihsel bir perspektiften, Suriye'de devlet-toplum ilişkilerini incelemeyi hedeflemektedir. Makale, Suriye'de devlet-toplum ilişkilerini Osmanlı, manda ve bağımsızlık sonrası dönemlerde anlamak için Shils'in modelinin kullanışlı bir yaklaşım olduğunu savunmaktadır. Makalede, Shils'in kültür ve kurum olarak merkez

* ***Research Assistant, Department of History, Yıldırım Beyazıt University, Ankara, Turkey.***

Nuri Salık, Rethinking State-Society Relations in Syria until 1970: What Does the Center-Periphery Model Tell Us?,
Ortadoğu Etütleri, Volume 5, No 2, January 2014, pp.115-140.

kavramı ve çevre kavramı dinamik bir biçimde yeniden değerlendirilmiştir. Bu açıdan, makalede incelenen dönem boyunca sadece merkez ve çevre arasında değil, merkez ve çevre içerisindeki farklı gruplar arasında da gerilimler ve değişimler gözlemlenmiştir. Makale ayrıca Suriye'nin 1946'daki bağımsızlığından 1970'te Hafız Esad'ın Düzeltici Devrimi'ne kadar Suriye politikasının anlaşılması için merkez-çevre modelinin sınıf analiziyle desteklenmesi gerektiğini tavsiye etmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Suriye, Suriye Siyaseti, Osmanlı Devleti, Merkez-Çevre Modeli, Devlet-Toplum İlişkileri

اعادة التفكير فى علاقة الدولة والمجتمع فى سوريا حتى عام ١٩٧٠: ماذا يخبرنا نموذج المركز والهامش؟

ملخص

تهدف هذه الدراسة إلى التحليل، من منظور تاريخي، لعلاقة الدولة والمجتمع فى سوريا ، من خلال

استخدام الإطار النظري لنموذج المركز والأطراف لصاحبه "إدوارد شيلس".

تبرهن هذه الدراسة على أن نموذج "شيلس" مفيدا لفهم علاقة الدولة والمجتمع فى سوريا أثناء الحقبة العثمانية والإحتلال الفرنسي ومرحلة الإستقلال.

فى هذه الدراسة يعاد تقييم كل من مفهوم المركز ،سواء بوصفه ثقافة أو بوصفه مؤسسة، ومفهوم الأطراف ،بطريقة ديناميكية وفقاً لنموذج "شيلس" . ويلاحظ فى هذا الصدد وجود تغييرات وتوترات ليس فقط بين المركز والأطراف، ولكن أيضا بين جماعات مختلفة داخل نطاق المركز والأطراف على مدار الفترة الزمنية التي تعتبر موضع للإختبار فى هذه الدراسة.

توصي الدراسة أيضاً بأهمية أن يُلحق بها تحليل طبقى للوصول إلى فهم السياسة السورية منذ مرحلة الاستقلال فى عام ١٩٤٦ حتي ثورة التصحيح بقيادة حافظ الأسد فى عام ١٩٧٠.

كلمات مفتاحية: سوريا ، السياسة السورية، الإمبراطورية العثمانية، نموذج المركز والأطراف ،علاقة الدولة والمجتمع.

Introduction

Center-periphery model, which was introduced by American sociologist Edward Shils, is an analytical tool to understand the state-society relations. The main aim of this article is to apply the model to the case of Syria in a historical perspective. The article does not take Shils's center-periphery model as a frozen theoretical framework but it will try to grasp vertical and horizontal changes and tensions within the center and the periphery from Ottoman Syria to the independent state of Syria. In the article, a special attention will be paid to the historical formation and transformation of the center and the periphery in Ottoman Syria, which directly affected the state-society relations in the mandate and independence periods.

In the article, the central value system of the Syrian society (cultural dimension of the center) will be defined as Islam during the Ottoman Empire. However, in opposition to Shils's understanding, the central value system of the society will not be considered as unchanging. In this sense, it will be explained that the Islamic central value system of the society amalgamated with Arab nationalism during the mandate and independence periods. Besides, the center-periphery relations in post-independent Syria will be analyzed in terms of class relations. It will be pointed out that the struggle for power to control the state (institutional dimension of the center) among civilian and military Sunni factions coming from different classes after independence led to the ascendance of heterodox minority groups and reconfiguration of the center-periphery relations. Within the context of the Arab Spring, the center-periphery model provides us with deep insights about the historical roots of the confrontation between Sunni and heterodox minority communities of the Syrian society.

Theoretical Perspective: The Center-Periphery Model

According to Edward Shils, each society has a center. Shils explains that center is not a spatially located phenomenon and centrality has nothing to do with geography or geometry. Center is basically a central zone in the structure of society. He points out two dimensions of the concept of center. The first is the cultural dimension which he considers as the sphere or order of symbols, values and beliefs which govern the society. This realm is composed of what the people in the society believe sacredly and it mainly refers to

religion even if a society was a secular one. The second is the institutional dimension of the center, which is defined as phenomenon of the realm of action. The institutional dimension is built upon the central cultural values and beliefs of the society. In Shils's conceptualization, the institutional dimension of center basically refers to the state and the authority. He says that ''the center consists of those institutions (and roles) which exercise authority-whether it be economic, governmental, political, military and of those which create and diffuse cultural symbols -religious, literary, etc.- through churches, schools, publishing houses, etc.''[1] According to Shils, these two kinds of centrality -cultural and institutional- are interrelated and support each other. The appreciation of the central value system of the society through the use of some symbols by the authority directly contributes to its legitimatization.[2]

Even though each society has both cultural and institutional center, society is not a unitary system. Groups who are away from the central value system in terms of institutional domain and exercise of authority are classified as ''periphery''. If the central institutional system is not comprehensive and there is a lack of participation to the institutional domain, the central value system becomes more detached from other parts of the society. If the central institutional system becomes more comprehensive, the tension between the center and the periphery reduces. As we clearly understand from his approach to the center and the periphery, Shils considers center as a dynamic force and periphery as a passive receiver of the center.[3] In this article, the periphery is not considered as a passive bearer of the center. On the contrary, it is evaluated as a dynamic force which has power to influence and replace the institutional center in Syria.

Şerif Mardin[4] and Metin Heper[5] have applied Shils's center-periphery model to modern Ottoman and Turkish politics. Even though

1 Edward Shils, *Center and Periphery, Essays in Macrosociology* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1975), p. 39.

2 ibid., p. 3-10.

3 ibid., p. 12-13. For an assessment of Shils's center-periphery model, see Joel S. Migdal, *State in Society, Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 43-47.

4 Şerif Mardin, "Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?", *Daedalus*, Vol. 102, No. 1, Post-Traditional Societies, Winter 1973.

5 Metin Heper, "Center and Periphery in the Ottoman Empire: With Special Reference to the Nineteenth Century", *International Political Science Review*, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1980.

both Mardin's cultural and Heper's institutional approaches mention the heterogeneity of the periphery, they do not clarify what they mean by this heterogeneity. At this point, Levent Gönenç introduces two concepts to analyze heterogeneous nature of the periphery: the first is the close periphery and the second is the remote periphery in relation with the center. If some peripheral groups have close relations with the institutional domain of the center (the state) and its values, these groups can be described as ''close periphery'' of the society. If some peripheral groups clash with the central value system of the state, pursue their own value system and want to change it, these groups are named as ''remote periphery''.[6] By depending upon the Shils's framework, the present article will benefit from the concepts of the close and the remote periphery in order to understand the state-society relations in Syria.

Center-Periphery Relations in Ottoman Syria: the State, the *Ayan*s and the Others

From Shils's perspective, the basis of the central value system of the Ottoman society can be defined as Islam.[7] The cultural dimension of the center directly reflected in the institutional sphere of the center (the state) represented by the Ottoman dynasty. The sultans always used ''symbols'' of the Islamic central value system in order to legitimize themselves in the eyes of their flock. To illustrate, they used the title of caliph and assumed the role of protecting Islam against the Christian world.[8] When the Ottomans conquered the Syrian territories in 1516, they utilized similar Sunni-Islamic symbols in order to legitimize the state in the eyes of the Syrian people.[9]

According to Mardin, one of the dimensions of cleavage between center and periphery in the Ottoman Empire was the power of the pre-Ottoman nobility (powerful families) and the existence of religious heterodoxy in the provinces. The state aimed to prevent the outbreak of rebellions in the periphery through a decentralized sys-

6 Levent Gönenç, "2000'li Yıllarda Merkez-Çevre İlişkilerini Yeniden Düşünmek", *Toplum ve Bilim*, Vol. 105, 2006, p. 132-133.

7 ibid., p. 133.

8 For detailed information about the legitimization symbols and practices of the Ottoman sultans, see Colin Imber, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu, 1300-1650 İktidarın Yapısı* (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2006), p. 148-163.

9 Bruce Masters, "Ottoman Policies toward Syria in the 17th and 18th Centuries" in Thomas Philipp, *The Syrian Land in the 18th and 19th Century: The Common and the Specific in the Historical Experience,* (Stuttgart: Steiner, 1992), p. 15-16.

tem, which paved the way for the emergence of a loosely related world between center and periphery.[10] Similarly, Sultan Selim established a loose Ottoman rule in Greater Syrian territories[11] (today's Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Israel and occupied territories of Palestine) after the conquest. He accepted the status quo established by the Mamluks in the city centers as well as in the mountainous areas and deserts, where local chiefs were confirmed as ruling elites.[12] The first clash between the center and the periphery broke out with the death of Sultan Selim in 1520, since Syria was hotbed of pre-Ottoman nobility and religious heterodoxy. Janbirdi al-Gazzali, who was the governor of Damascus and representative of the pre-Ottoman nobility, rebelled against the Ottomans and wanted to seize all Syrian provinces. After the suppression of Janbirdi's rebellion by the Ottoman army, the Ottoman administration (including *timar*) was imposed on the Syrian provinces.[13]

In the Ottoman Empire, the application and maintenance of the land tenure system (*timar*) was the most significant aspect of the state's control over the periphery. Mardin says that the state's control over the land system, in which lands were owned by the sultan himself, was one of the dividing lines between the center and the periphery.[14] Similar to Mardin, Heper also explains the state's tight control over the land system as a significant institutional aspect of the center-periphery relations.[15] On the other hand, starting with the second half of the 16th century, the Ottoman Empire began to experience a transformation period due to some internal and international challenges, which led to decentralization of the Empire.[16] The decentralization process was characterized by the transformation of the land tenure system from *timar* (fief) to *iltizam* (tax-farming) and then *mâlikane* (lifetime tax-farming), and the emergence of new local forces, including pasha and vizier households, the *ulema* and

10 Mardin, "Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?", p. 170-172.

11 The Ottomans divided Greater Syrian territories into four provinces: Damascus, Aleppo, Tripoli and Sidon. See Masters, "Ottoman Policies toward Syria in the 17th and 18th Centuries", p. 11-15.

12 Zeine N. Zeine, *Arab-Turkish Relations and the Emergence of Arab Nationalism* (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1981), p. 11-12.

13 Jane Hathaway, *Arab Lands under Ottoman Rule, 1516-1800* (London: Pearson Longman, 2008), p. 52-53.

14 Mardin, "Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?", p. 173.

15 Heper, "Center and Periphery in the Ottoman Empire: With Special Reference to the Nineteenth Century", p. 83-85.

16 Hathaway, *Arab Lands under Ottoman Rule, 1516-1800,* p. 62.

the janissaries in the provinces against the central authority of the sultan. Syria was profoundly transformed by the decentralization process in which the *timar* order deteriorated and new local forces emerged across the region at the expense of the center during the 17th century. This development resulted in the outbreak of peripheral uprisings of Fakhr al-Din Ma'n II, Ali Pasha Janbulad and Abaza Hasan Pasha in Greater Syrian territories.[17]

In the 18th century, power balance between the center and the periphery obviously tilted towards the periphery. Ottoman sultans lost their central control in the provinces and the *ayan*s or local notables emerged as the most influential political actors in the provinces.[18] Similar to other parts of the Empire, the ongoing transformation of the state led to the strengthening of the urban Sunni notables of Syria (the *ayan*s and the *ulema*) as a peripheral force in the 18th century. Especially, the implementation of the *mâlikane* contributed to the rise of the urban notables. The *mâlikane* system created a mutual dependence between the center and the periphery and reduced the tension between them considerably. The Sublime Porte recognized the decentralized system and began to rule the provinces through the *ayan* households. In turn, the center granted the *ayan*s with the official posts and *mâlikanes*.[19] Albert Hourani conceptualized the collaboration between the center and the periphery in the 18th century as ''the politics of notables'', in which the notables were accepted by the state as the natural leaders of the provincial society, who can play intermediary political role between the government and the people within certain limits.[20] The local notables were not an alternative power center to the state and their main aim was to fill the power vacuum in the provinces and enrich themselves at the expense of both the state and the peasantry.[21] One of the best examples of the politics of notables in Syria was al-Azm family of

17 ibid., p. 64-72.

18 William L. Cleveland and Martin Bunton, *A History of the Modern Middle East,* 4th ed. (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 2009), p. 58; Hathaway, *Arab Lands under Ottoman Rule, 1516-1800*, p. 79-81.

19 Donald Quataert, *The Ottoman Empire 1700-1922* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 48-49.

20 Albert Hourani, "Ottoman Reform and the Politics of Notables", in Albert Hourani (ed.), *The Emergence of the Modern Middle East* (London: St. Anthony's College, Oxford, 1994), p. 40-45.

21 Heper, "Center and Periphery in the Ottoman Empire: With Special Reference to the Nineteenth Century", p. 88.

Damascus who ruled in different parts of Syria in collaboration with the center during the 18th century.[22]

The politics of notables was a watershed in the relationship between the center and the periphery in Syria. In Gönenç's conceptualization, the alliance between the state and the Sunni local notables (the *ayans* and the *ulema*) made these notables ''the close periphery'' of the Syrian society.[23] Naturally, heterodox minorities (the Alawites, the Druzes and the Ismailis) and non-Muslims were subordinated to ''the remote periphery'' status in the society since the 18th century. The urban Sunni elites were favored by the center as they were sharing the same beliefs and values (Sunni Islam) of the Empire, even though they were excluded from high culture of the Ottoman bureaucracy. The closeness between the urban notables of the society and the state accelerated the ''institutional cooperation'' between them despite an unofficial one. Unless the center intervened at the expense of the local notables, the close peripheral forces allied with the center and helped the sultan in the administration of the Syrian provinces.

The Ottoman Empire's dependence on the Sunni-Muslim community of Syria in economic and political domains forced other non-Sunni and non-Muslim sects to live within a Sunni dominated society.[24] We can claim that cultural differences between the Muslim heterodox groups and the state hampered institutional cooperation between the center and the remote periphery. In addition to this cultural difference, geographical and topological location of these heterodox groups saved them from the center's influence, which contributed to development of their social and tribal solidarity. The relationship between the Sunni majority of the Syrian society (the close periphery) and heterodox minority groups were not also good, since the Sunni landlords despised the Alawites and other sects as heretics and exploited them.[25] The Sunni-Muslim domina-

22 For detailed information about the rise of al-Azm family in Syria, see Abdul-Karim Rafeq, *The Province of Damascus, 1723-1783* (Beirut: Khayats, 1966).

23 Some of the urban Sunni notable families were al-Azm, al-Yusuf, al-Ajlani, al-Ghazzi and al-Kaylani families. For detailed information, see Philip S. Khoury, *Urban Notables and Arab Nationalism: The Politics of Damascus, 1860-1920* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).

24 John F. Devlin, *Syria: A Modern State in an Ancient Land* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1983), p. 26.

25 Moshe Ma'oz, *Asad: Sphinx of Damascus: A Political Biography* (New York: Grove Weiden-

tion over the heterodox sects of the society was directly reflected in the socio-economic life and politics was shaped by the urban Sunni elites for a long time which created an obscure horizontal tension between the close and the remote peripheries of the society.

At the beginning of the 19th century, the center insisted on launching a series of centralization and modernization initiatives due to the decline in the power of the state vis-à-vis the periphery. Syrian territories were directly affected by the center's centralization and modernization measures, which created a vertical tension between the center and both the close and the remote peripheries of the society in the 19th century. The Ottomans aimed to reverse decentralization process in the Arab provinces and wanted to establish a direct contact with its population at the expense of the local notables especially by implementing the Land Code of 1858. Nevertheless, attempts at bringing central authority to the central cities such as Aleppo, Damascus, Tripoli and Jerusalem failed and resulted in the outbreak of many popular rebellions which ended with the expulsion or death of Turkish pashas.[26] The center could not neutralize the close periphery and acknowledged the power of urban Sunni notables in order to implement the reforms during the 19th century. Accordingly, the center relied on the urban Sunni notables in newly established governing bodies (*meclis*), which facilitated the close periphery's acquisition of authority in the Syrian provinces officially.

Moreover, the Ottoman control over mountainous areas of Syria and Palestine was very weak such as in Jabal Druze, Latakia, Jabal Nablus and the mountains around Jerusalem where local chiefs ruled independent of Istanbul during the course of the 19th century. This made the tension between the remote periphery and the center unavoidable. The Ottoman Empire launched military expeditions to the Jabal Nusayriya region and Jabal Druze region several times. Even though the Ottoman army succeeded in penetrating to the Alawite region, the Druze region fought successfully against the Ottoman army.[27] Despite small successes, the center could not establish a full-scale control over the remote periphery in the 19th century.

---

feld, 1998), p. 2-3. Also see Nikolaos van Dam, *The Struggle for Power in Syria, Politics and Society under Asad and the Ba'th Party* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2011), p. 7-11 and Itamar Rabinovich, "The Compact Minorities and the Syrian State, 1918-45", *Journal of Contemporary History*, No. 4, 1979, p. 693-695.

26 Moshe Ma'oz, *Ottoman Reform in Syria and Palestine 1841-1860: The Impact of the Tanzimat on Politics and Society* (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 6-10.

27 Ma'oz, *Asad: The Sphinx of Damascus: A Political Biography*, p. 3-4.

Another significant development of the 19th century was the state's efforts to build a new central value system for the society instead of Islamic values in order to prevent the dismantling of the state. The Ottoman Empire's attempt at creating a modern community based on the equal citizenship of Muslims and non-Muslims through *Tanzimat* and *Islahat* Decrees as well as imposing a new identity over the society (Ottomanism) deeply affected the Syrian society and created a horizontal tension within the periphery. When the center imposed new secular regulations in favor of non-Muslims (especially Christians) to appease the demands of the European powers, brutal inter-communal conflicts broke out in Syria such as the 1850 Aleppo events, the Nablus riots in 1856 and the massacres of the Christians in Lebanon and Damascus in 1860.[28] When the Christians and the Jews began to enjoy equality provided by the state publicly and replaced Muslims in the economic domain, they were attacked by the local notables, the *ulema* and the masses who considered their actions as a threat to the Islamic central value system of the society and their economic domination.

During the rule of Abdulhamid II, the urban Sunni notables such as al-Abid and al-Azm families realigned with the center since the state returned back to Islamist policies towards the Arab population.[29] Abdulhamid incorporated the urban Sunni notables into the state mechanism by employing them in the bureaucracy and in the provincial administrative posts, and by taking their sons into the modern schools in Istanbul.[30] Acquainted with modern political ideas in these schools, the sons of the local notables later formed the backbone of nationalist bureaucratic and military cadres of Syria during the mandate and post-independence periods.[31] This situation caused a polarization within the close periphery of the Syrian society which divided along with the first generation of traditional

28 Veysel Ayhan and Özlem Tür, *Lübnan: Savaş, Barış, Direniş ve Türkiye ile İlişkiler* (Bursa: Dora Yayıncılık, 2009), p. 39-44; Albert Hourani, *A History of the Arab Peoples* (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1991), p. 277-278.

29 Khoury, *Urban Notables and Arab Nationalism: The Politics of Damascus, 1860-1920,* p. 56.

30 Jens Hanssen, "Practices of Integration - Center-Periphery Relations in the Ottoman Empire" in Jens Hanssen, Thomas Philipp and Stefan Weber, *The Empire in the City: Arab Provincial Capitals in the Late Ottoman Empire*, (Beirut: Ergon Verlag Würzburg in Kommission, 2002),p. 70-73; Hasan Kayalı, *Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1918* (California: University of California Press, 1997), p. 35-36.

31 Albert Hourani, "The Ottoman Background of the Modern Middle East," in Albert Hourani (ed.), *The Emergence of the Modern Middle East* (London: St. Anthony's College, Oxford, 1994), p. 18.

urban Sunni elites and second generation nationalist urban Sunni elites.[32]

When Abdulhamid was dethroned by the Young Turk Revolution in 1908, the honeymoon between the state and the Arabs began to wither away. Even though there were good relations between the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) and Syrian people at the beginning, the Arabs were disappointed by the Turkification and ruthless centralization policies of the new regime.[33] The tension between the new center (secular-nationalist military bureaucracy) and the members of the second-generation of nationalist urban Sunni notables of the close periphery was unavoidable. Therefore, Syria became the hub of nationalist and separatist activities during the First World War. Expectedly, after the demise of the Ottoman rule, the Arab nationalism became the dominant ideology among political groups in Syria.[34] The rise of Arab nationalism definitely transformed the central value system of the society and nationalism amalgamated with the pre-existing Islamic value system of the society during the mandate and post-independence periods.

Center-Periphery Relations under the French Mandate: 1920-1946

French mandate was imposed on Syria in 1920 and 400-year-old institutional center (the Ottoman Empire) was replaced by an imperialist power. French authorities were well aware of the horizontal tension between the close periphery (the Sunni elites) and the remote periphery (the Alawites, the Druzes, the Ismailis as well as other non-Muslim communities). They utilized divide and rule policy in line with sectarian lines by separating Syrian territories into four administrative units (states): Damascus, Aleppo, Alawite and Druze states. By doing so, France aimed to consolidate sub-state identities of the Syrian communities and prevented the strengthening of

32 Khoury, *Urban Notables and Arab Nationalism: The Politics of Damascus, 1860-1920*, p. 64-65; Mardin, "Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?", p. 176.

33 Heper, "Center and Periphery in the Ottoman Empire: With Special Reference to the Nineteenth Century", p. 89-96; Mardin, "Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?", p. 177-181. Also see Hasan Kayalı, *Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1918* (California: University of California Press, 1997).

34 Itamar Rabinovich, "Syria and the Syrian Land: The 19th Century Roots of 20th Century Developments", Thomas Philipp, "The Syrian Land in the 18th and 19th Century: The Common and the Specific in the Historical Experience" (Stuttgart: Steiner, 1992), p. 47.

Syrian national identity. Besides, France obviously favored Christian communities of Syria by expanding their autonomy, giving them right to be represented in official institutions. They also benefited from the French mandate in economic domain which contributed further to communal separation in Syria.[35]

Another factor that prevented the establishment of political community in Syria was the French policy of recruiting heterodox rural minorities (the remote periphery) into the army. France established Homs military academy in 1920 to train military officers to protect French interests in Levant. French authorities deliberately discouraged the Muslim population from joining the academy and the army, while encouraging the non-Sunni groups through military academy and *Troupes Spéciales du Levant*. Children of the rural lower classes or heterodox minorities, especially the Alawites, found the easiest way of upward social mobilization in the society.[36] The social composition of the military academy and *Troupes Spéciales* had long-lasting implications on Syrian politics after Syria's independence. The future army corps, with rural compact minority backgrounds, brought the army to the political scene and destructed the dominance of Sunni urban elites in Syrian politics after the Baathist coup of 1963.[37] By doing so, France paved the way for the remote periphery's entrance to the institutional domain of the center (the state/authority) via the army.

After the suppression of the Great Revolt in 1927[38], second generation urban Sunni elites established a new nationalist coalition, the National Bloc (*al-Qutla al-Wataniyya*) in 1928 to negotiate peace and independence with France. The leading figures of the Bloc were mainly well-educated members of the urban families, who had participated in nationalistic activities against the CUP before 1914.[39] The National Bloc developed a political strategy, called as honor-

35 Itamar Rabinovich, "The Compact Minorities and the Syrian State", p. 696-700; Ma'oz, *Asad: The Sphinx of Damascus: A Political Biography*, 8-12, also see Moshe Ma'oz, "Attempts at Creating Political Community in Syria", *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 26, No. 4, 1972, p. 396-397.

36 Amos Perlmutter, "From Obscurity to Rule: The Syrian Army and the Ba'th Party", *The Western Political Quarterly*, No. 4, 1969, p. 830.

37 Van Dam, *The Struggle for Power in Syria, Politics and Society under Asad and the Ba'th Party*, p. 26-27.

38 For detailed information about the Great Revolt see Philip S. Khoury, *Syria and the French Mandate: The Politics of Arab Nationalism, 1920-1945* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1987), p. 151-219.

39 ibid., p.251.

able cooperation, to maintain the balance between France and the Syrian people similar to the politics of notables.[40] The Bloc aimed to lead the Syrian society and force France to recognize their intermediary role between the society and France.[41] France accepted the role of the urban Sunni elites in leading the society until 1946 and in this regard prepared them for the institutional center for the aftermath of the mandate.

Between 1920 and 1946, while the Arab nationalist sentiments were growing within the Syrian society, the central value system of the society involved strong Islamic values. The existence of the Islamic values reflected in the Constitution of 1930 which affirmed the political superiority of Muslim community over other stratas of the Syrian society.[42] Besides, the Islamic and conservative political identity of the Syrian society was supplemented with the Arab nationalism under the leadership of the National Bloc. It can be argued that the French mandate authority (the center) between 1920 and 1946 established a dual relationship with the close and remote peripheries of the Syrian society. On the one hand, France negotiated the peace agreement with urban Sunni elites and allowed their domination over the land system, on the other, it showed the remote periphery the way of institutional domain of the center by recruiting them into the army.

Reconfiguration of Center-Periphery Relations amid Turbulent Political Environment: 1946-1970

It has to be admitted that Shils's center-periphery model and Gönenç's close and remote periphery conceptualizations blurred due to instability and political turmoil after independence. In this period, we see power struggle among different factions of civilian politicians and the army officers rather than the tension between the center and the periphery in Syrian politics. In this regard, the center-periphery model has to be supplemented with class analysis to analyze intra-central power struggle between 1946 and 1970. We can argue that ''the struggle for power'' among different factions can be defined as ''the struggle for the institutional center or the state'' within the framework of Shils's model. Intra-central conflict among

40 ibid., p. 539.

41 Philip S. Khoury, "Continuity and Change in Syrian Political Life: The Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries", *The American Historical Review*, No. 5, 1991, p. 1389-1390.

42 Ma'oz, *Asad: The Sphinx of Damascus: A Political Biography*, p. 16-17.

urban Sunni groups and the Sunni army officers between 1946 and 1963 weakened the center and paved the way for the ascendance of the remote peripheral groups especially the Alawites in Syrian politics after the Baathist coup of 1963. The upward mobilization of the Alawites culminated in their complete dominance of the institutional center with the Corrective Revolution of Hafez al-Assad in 1970. With the rise of rural heterodox groups, we see reconfiguration of the center-periphery relations and the emergence of tension between the state and the society due to secularization policies of the new regime between 1963 and 1970.

When Syria gained independence in 1946, the central value system of the society was composed of both conservative and nationalistic elements. It can be claimed that Arab nationalism came to the fore due to the Syrian society's hunger for real independence after the retreat of imperialism. However, it would be a mistake to assume that Syrian society underwent an entire secularization process due to the rise of Arab nationalism. The cultural dimension of the center was represented in institutional center (the state) by the close peripheral groups (urban Sunni notables). The National Bloc of urban Sunni notables (the close periphery) dominated the institutional center since they had close relations with the state mechanism since the 19th century onwards. On the other hand, there were several factions within the National Bloc since its formation during the mandate rule. Immediately after the independence, the Bloc divided into two camps through the geographical lines of Damascus and Aleppo: the Damascus based National Party (*Hizb al-Watani*)[43] and the Aleppo based People's Party (*Hizb al-Shab*).[44]

The parties of the traditional urban classes were also controlling the economy of Syria which mainly depended on agriculture. The monopoly of urban elites on both economics and politics had begun to create a middle-class and rural opposition to them during the mandate period. After independence, the new opposition crystallized in the form of radical-secular parties such as the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP) of Antun Saadeh, the Baath Party of Michel al-Aflaq and Salah al-Din Bitar, and Youth Party of Akram al-Hawrani (which later transformed into the Arab Socialist Party)

43 Derek Hopwood, *Syria 1945-1986: Politics and Society*, 2nd ed. (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989), p. 31.

44 Andrew Rathmell, *Secret War in the Middle East: The Covert Struggle for Syria, 1949-61* (London: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 1995), p. 9.

against the traditional urban classes. The common point of these parties was their infiltration into the army ranks.[45] Nonetheless, it cannot be claimed that there were no Sunni groups in these radical parties. The challenge of the rising urban middle and rural classes, which were composed of Sunni and non-Sunni elements, against the traditional aristocratic parties blurred the line between the close and the remote peripheries after independence.

All of these parties aimed to create a new political identity for the Syrian society based on secularism and nationalism. The secular outlook of these parties, especially secular-nationalist and socialist program of the Baath Party, attracted the rural heterodox communities due to the traditional hostility between the Sunni (urban) and non-Sunni (rural) communities of Syria.[46] Especially, the Alawites considered the Baath doctrine as an autonomous sphere out of Islamic-nationalist ideology of the Sunni community. While there were profound changes in the society and in politics, the defeat of the Syrian armed forces against Israel in the Palestine battlefield in 1948 prepared the ground for the army's interference in politics through the first coup d'état of the Middle East under the leadership of General Husni al-Zaim on 30 March 1949. The coming of the army into the political scene can be explained as an intra-central conflict between the army and civilian politicians for the institutional domain of the center.

Conspiring army officers under Zaim were imbued with the nationalist-socialist ideas of Akram al-Hawrani, who became Defense Minister after the coup.[47] Even though the coup did not have any sectarian orientations, it was an important blow to the power and legitimacy of the traditional urban Sunni notables. Besides, the coup taught the rising middle and rural classes how to seize the power and influence Syrian politics.[48] Inspired by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Zaim planned to launch a series of secularization reforms in the country. According to Gordon Torrey ''the public (Syrian society)

45 For detailed information about these parties see, John F. Devlin, *The Ba'th Party: A History from its origins to 1966* (Standford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1976).

46 For detailed information about the social obstacles to a normal growth of the Baath Party, see Van Dam, *The Struggle for Power in Syria, Politics and Society under Asad and the Ba'th Party*, p. 15-26.

47 Patrick Seale, *The Struggle for Syria: A Study of Post-War Arab Politics 1945-1958* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1986), p. 44-45.

48 Nabil M. Kaylani, "The Rise of the Syrian Ba'th, 1940-1958: Political Success, Party Failure", *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, No.1, 1972, p. 11-12.

was in a mood receptive to most changes, but not toward those which radically affected the fabric of its culture.''[49] What Torrey described as ''the fabric of the society's culture'' can be evaluated from Shils's perspective as the ''the central value system of the society (the cultural domain of the center)''. To illustrate, when Zaim wanted to prohibit the veil of women, he was resisted by the people and he retreated from his decision.[50] This shows the continuation of Islamic central value system of the Syrian society after the independence.

Zaim's despotic measures alienated not only the society but also most of his previous allies: Hawrani, the SSNP and the Baath Party. Finally, Zaim's foreign policy maneuvers led to his ouster by a bloody coup d'état under the leadership of Colonel Sami al-Hinnawi on 14 August 1949.[51] After the coup, one of the leading figures of the pro-Iraqi People's Party of Aleppo Hashim al-Atasi formed a government including Michel al-Aflaq as Minister of Education and Akram al-Hawrani as Minister of Agriculture.[52] The attendance of representatives of radical parties in the government along with the traditional urban Sunni elite explains how the struggle for the center was fought among different classes.

Political turmoil in the country resulted in the third coup of the same year under Adib al-Shishakli, who was a close friend of Hawrani, on 19 December 1949 against Hinnawi and pro-unionists civilian and army officers.[53] With this coup, pro-Saudi-Egyptian and anti-Iraqi civil politicians and military wing of the army dominated the institutional domain of the center. On the other hand, pro-Iraqi unionist politicians and the military faction were still powerful in Syrian politics and Shishakli could not neutralize the power of these groups in the parliament and in the army until his second coup d'état on 29 November 1951. While there was a fierce struggle for power among rival factions after the first coup of Shishakli, a new constitution was accepted on 5 September 1950. When proposed new constitution was declared, a fierce debate broke out between different groups in the parliament as to the relationship between the state and reli-

49 Gordon Torrey, *Syrian Politics and the Military, 1945–1958* (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University, 1964), p. 73-74.

50 ibid., p. 129.

51 ibid., p. 138.

52 Seale, *The Struggle for Syria: A Study of Post-War Arab Politics 1945-1958*, p. 76-77.

53 Torrey, *Syrian Politics and the Military, 1945–1958*, p. 161-163.

gion. After long debates, the following pieces were added to Article 3 of the Constitution: ''the religion of the president is Islam, Islamic jurisprudence is the main source of legislation, freedom of belief shall be maintained, and the personal laws of religious sects will be preserved and observed''. These articles were reflecting the view of a large proportion of the Syrian people.[54]

After his second coup in November 1951, Shishakli established a dictatorship in Syria and dominated the institutional domain of the center. He assumed monopoly of power and banned all political parties including the parties of his allies (the Baath and Hawrani). To fill the political vacuum in Syrian politics, he introduced his army-dominated party Arab Liberation Movement (ALM) in August 1952.[55] Similar to Zaim, Shishakli alienated all political groups, from the traditional parties of urban Sunni notables to the Baath Party, which prepared the way for his downfall with a bloodless military insurrection in February 1954. With the fall of Shishakli, the relentless struggle for power to dominate the institutional domain of the center reemerged among civilian and military factions coming from different classes. After 1954 elections, we see the rise of radical leftist parties and their struggle with the right-wing traditional parties of the old-guards (the NP and the PP) as well as their rivalry among themselves. These rivalries culminated in the ascendance of the leftist forces (the Baath Party and the Syrian Communist Party) in Syrian politics, which opened a new era in factionalist rivalry until the union with Gamal Abd-al Nasser's Egypt in early 1958.[56] It also has to be stressed that between 1954 and 1958, neither civilian nor military factions had sectarian aims in their struggle for power.

The fierce struggle for power between Syrian political groups finally resulted in the establishment of the United Arab Republic (UAR) between Syria and Egypt in 1958. During the union with Egypt between February 1958 and September 1961, the Syrian politics and the institutional center were dominated by the charismatic leadership of Nasser and his entourage. After the union, Nasser successfully neutralized all political actors in Syria: the army, the Syrian Communist Party, the Baath Party and the traditional parties (the

54 Radwan Ziadeh, *Power and Policy in Syria: Intelligence Services, Foreign Relations and Democracy in the Modern Middle East* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2011), p. 136.

55 Kamel S. Abu Jaber, *The Arab Ba'th Socialist Party: History, Ideology, and Organization* (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1966), p. 31.

56 See Seale, *The Struggle for Syria: A Study of Post-War Arab Politics 1945-1958*, p. 245-246 and Malik Mufti, *Sovereign Creations: Pan-Arabism and Political Order in Syria and Iraq* (New York: Cornell University Press: 1996), p. 82.

People's Party and the Nation's Party).[57] One of the most significant developments of the UAR was the establishment of the secret military organization by the Baathists coming from heterodox minority origins. The young military officers of the Baath, who were sent to Egypt after the formation of the UAR, were not happy with the UAR experiment and policies of veteran Baathist leaders, Aflaq and Bitar. For this reason, these young military officers mostly captains and majors coming from villages or rural towns and belonging to the heterodox sects, established a clandestine society or the Military Committee (*al-Lajna al-Askariya*) in 1959. The Committee consisted of five officers; there were three Alawites, Lieutenant Colonel Muhammad Umran, Major Salah Jadid, Captain Hafez al-Assad; and two Ismailis, Captain Abd al-Karim al-Jundi and Major Ahmad al-Mir.[58] The Military Committee became the dynamic force in Syrian politics after the 1963 coup and completely dominated the institutional domain of the center after the Salah Jadid's coup in 1966.

The unhappy UAR experience ended with the 28 September coup in 1961, which opened the era of secessionism between 1961 and 1963. After the coup, Syria was declared as an independent state. The secessionist period was marked by intense political instability and factionalism among the civilian politicians and the army. The leadership of the 1961 secessionist coup was composed of a coalition between the army (the Damascene officers) and traditional urban notables who suffered from Nasser's land reforms. However, the secessionist regime could not bring stability to Syria due to Nasser's propaganda campaign for reunification in the age of pan-Arabism and cleavages between the rival military and civilian camps of the new regime.[59] The secessionist regime ended with a coup d'état under the leadership of the Military Committee, the Nasserites and group of independent army officers on 8 March 1963.[60] After the coup, the power of the traditional Sunni urban notables disappeared and they were obviously subordinated to the peripheral status vis-à-vis the Alawites. The Baathist Military Committee monopolized power in the institutional center, which ushered in a new wave of power struggle among Baathist officers until Hafez al-Assad's Corrective Revolution in 1970.

57 Mufti, *Sovereign Creations: Pan-Arabism and Political Order in Syria and Iraq*, p. 122-125.

58 For social origins of the Military Committee, see Hanna Batatu, *Syria's Peasantry, the Descendants of Its Lesser Rural Notables, and Their Politics* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1999), p. 144-155.

59 Itamar Rabinovich, *Syria under the Ba'th 1963-66: Army-Party Symbiosis* (Jerusalem: Israel University Press, 1972), p. 26.

60 Rabinovich, *Syria under the Ba'th 1963-66: Army-Party Symbiosis*, p. 43-47.

Why did the Alawites and other heterodox groups become dominant political force in the institutional center after 1963? As already mentioned above, since the French mandate the remote periphery of the Syrian society (heterodox minority groups) penetrated into the army ranks. During the course of 1950s and 1960s these officers did not directly engage in the factionalist game and rivalry in the Syrian army. While the rival Sunni senior military officers were purging each other after gaining the stronghold in the army, the upper army ranks began to be filled by these non-Sunni officers. This trend reached its climax between 1961 and 1963 when Sunni Damascene and non-Damascene officers were struggling to dominate the army. Their rivalry caused ongoing purges from important military posts which opened the way of non-Sunni officers. Especially after the March 1963 coup, members of the Military Committee called non-Sunni officers from their family, tribe and region to fill the positions left by the Sunni officers. Besides, a great number of Alawite, Druze and Ismaili officers were recruited for the army. After the abortive coup of Jasim al-Alwan on 18 July 1963, the Alawite Baathist officers found the opportunity to purge remaining Sunni officers from the army, which caused distrust among some components of the Sunni population against the military Baathists coming from heterodox origins as explained by Nikolaos Van Dam.[61]

While class relations were much more explanatory for evaluating Syrian politics until 1963, the center-periphery tension began to reshape Syrian politics after the 1963 coup.We witness again a struggle for power to take the control of the institutional domain of the center (the state) among the civilian and military members of the Baath Party between 1963 and 1970. After the March 1963 coup, the Military Committee under the leadership of Amin al-Hafiz, Muhammad Umran, Salah Jadid and Hafez al-Assad became the most significant political group in Syrian politics. Among them only Amin al-Hafiz was Sunni and other three officers were Alawites. While the Military Committee became the dominant political force in Syrian politics, veteran civilian Baathist leaders (Michel al-Aflaq and Salah al-Din Bitar) turned out to be puppets at the hands of military Baathists. After the 1963 coup, the first rivalry to control the institutional domain of the center emerged between Amin al-Hafiz

61 Van Dam, *The Struggle for Power in Syria, Politics and Society under Asad and the Ba'th Party*, p. 27-30. Also see Hanna Batatu, "Some Observations on the Social Roots of Syria's Ruling Military Group and the Causes for Its Dominance", *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 35, No. 3, 1981, p. 331-344.

and Muhammad Umran. Muhammad Umran's open Alawite sectarianism was challenged by Amin al-Hafiz, Salah Jadid and Hafez al-Assad together and he was forced to flee to abroad. Soon after Umran's expulsion from the country, the second cleavage among the Military Committee broke out between Salah Jadid (Chief of Staff) and President Amin al-Hafiz. In this rivalry, Hafez al-Assad as the Commander of the Syrian Air Force and some Druze officers supported Jadid who carried out a bloody coup against Amin al-Hafiz on 23 February 1966. After the successful coup of Jadid, traditional leadership of the Baath Party (Bitar and Aflaq) fled to abroad which transformed the Baath Party to the neo-Baath Party as conceptualized by Avraham Ben-Tzur.[62]

After the 1966 coup, there emerged another cleavage between Selim Hatum (Druze) and Salah Jadid (Alawite) to dominate the institutional domain of the center. Hatum had actively participated in the 1966 coup against Amin al-Hafez and began to organize his military organization recruited from the Druze community. His Druze-led move against Jadid was countered by the Alawites of the Military Committee, Salah Jadid and Hafez al-Assad. After his abortive coup attempt in August 1966, Hatum mocked the sectarian nature of the Baath regime as follows: ''the Baath Party's slogan one Arab nation with an eternal mission turned to one Alawite state with an eternal mission.''[63] After the Hatum event, a dozen of Druze officers were purged from the army, which made the Alawite community the strongest group within the army ranks. The last cleavage within the Military Committee broke out between two Alawites (Salah Jadid and Hafez al-Assad) who sought to control the institutional domain of the center. The final power struggle among the members of the Military Committee was won by Hafez al-Assad on 13 November 1970, which opened the era of Assad dynasty in Syrian history.[64]

Between 1963 and 1970, one of the remote peripheral groups, the Alawites, became the institutional center in Syria via the army for the first time in Syrian history. After 1963, we observe not only inter-

62 Avraham Ben-Tzur, "The Neo-Ba'th Party of Syria", *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 3, No. 3, 1968, p. 161-181.

63 Daniel Pipes, "The Alawi Capture of Power in Syria", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 25, No. 4, 1989, p. 444.

64 For detailed information about the chaotic phase of Syrian history between 1963 and 1970, see Van Dam, *The Struggle for Power in Syria, Politics and Society under Asad and the Ba'th Party*, p. 34-74 and Ma'oz, *Asad: The Sphinx of Damascus: A Political Biography*, p. 31-40.

central clashes among the Baathists but also a tension between the new center and the periphery. The secular-nationalist outlook of the Baath Party and non-Sunni character of the leading army officers were regarded as a threat to one of the dimension of the central value system of the Syrian society (Islam). Liquidation of power of the Sunni notables in the institutional domain was another factor for mass Sunni grievances and opposition against the Baathist regime. While there was a fierce competition among rival military Baathist groups to seize the power in the center (the state), there emerged an uprising in Hama in April 1964 under the leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood, which was backed by the previous center (the traditional urban notables) and the *ulema*, who opposed the secular reforms of the Baathist officers to separate Islam from Arabism, and Islam from the state.[65]

In the spring of 1967, a similar event took place and groups composed of merchants, the *ulema* and others launched anti-regime protests in Damascus streets due to radical and uncompromising secularization projects of the neo-Baathist regime.[66] We can claim that the Syrian society continued to be a conservative society, though we cannot measure to what extent the society backed the uprisings of Hama and Damascus. But still, it can be argued that whether backed by the whole society or not, some people managed to derive political power from the central value system of the society. Undoubtedly, the consolidation of the new Alawite center under the leadership of Hafez al-Assad opened a new era in the state-society relations in Syrian history.

Conclusion

In conclusion, this article has showed that the center-periphery model of Shils can be applied to the Syrian case in order to analyze the state-society relations if it is reconsidered as a dynamic framework for analysis. In the article, the center has been explained in terms of both institutional domain (the state) and cultural domain (central value system of the society). The article has explained the transformation in the cultural domain of the center in Syria from Is-

65 Ziadeh, *Power and Policy in Syria: Intelligence Services, Foreign Relations and Democracy in the Modern Middle East*, p. 138-139; Ma'oz, *Asad: The Sphinx of Damascus: A Political Biography*, p. 150; Ma'oz, "Attempts at Creating Political Community in Syria", p. 402.

66 Raymond Hinnebusch, *Syria: Revolution from Above* (London and New York: Routledge, 2001), p. 50.

lam to amalgamation of Islam and Arab nationalism during the mandate and independence periods. Besides, Levent Gönenç's conceptualizations of the close and the remote periphery have been adopted to clarify the heterogeneity of the peripheral communities of the Syrian society.

In the article, not only the tension between the center and the periphery but also intra-central and intra-peripheral tensions have been explored during the period examined. The article also supplemented the center-periphery narrative with class analysis to understand the fierce struggle for power among different factions to dominate the institutional center from 1946 and 1963. After the Baathist coup of 1963, the heterodox minority groups, especially the Alawites, dominated the institutional center and Sunni groups were subordinated to peripheral status for the first time, which led to the alienation of some segments of the society from the Baathist regime. Finally, the article has analyzed intra-central clashes among Alawite Baathists as well as the tension between the new secular-socialist institutional center and the Sunni-Muslim periphery that represented the central value system of the society.

Bibliography

Abu Jaber, Kamel S., *The Arab Ba'th Socialist Party: History, Ideology, and Organization* (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1966).

Ayhan, Veysel and Özlem Tür, *Lübnan: Savaş, Barış, Direniş ve Türkiye ile İlişkiler* (Bursa: Dora Yayıncılık, 2009).

Batatu, Hanna, *Syria's Peasantry, the Descendants of Its Lesser Rural Notables, and Their Politics* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1999).

_____, "Some Observations on the Social Roots of Syria's Ruling Military Group and the Causes for Its Dominance", *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 35, No. 3, 1981, pp. 331-344.

Ben-Tzur, Avraham, "The Neo-Ba'th Party of Syria", *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 3, No. 3, 1968, pp. 161-181.

Dam, Nikolaos van, *The Struggle for Power in Syria, Politics and Society under Asad and the Ba'th Party* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2011).

Devlin, John F., *Syria: A Modern State in an Ancient Land* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1983).

_____, *The Ba'th Party: A History from its origins to 1966* (Standford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1976).

Gönenç, Levent, "2000'li Yıllarda Merkez-Çevre İlişkilerini Yeniden Düşünmek", *Toplum ve Bilim*, Vol. 105, 2006, pp. 129-151.

Hanssen, Jens, "Practices of Integration - Center-Periphery Relations in the Ottoman Empire" in Jens Hanssen, Thomas Philipp and Stefan Weber, *The Empire in the City: Arab Provincial Capitals in the Late Ottoman Empire*, (Beirut: Ergon Verlag Würzburg in Kommission, 2002), pp. 49-74.

Hathaway, Jane, *Arab Lands under Ottoman Rule, 1516-1800* (London: Pearson Longman, 2008).

Heper, Metin, "Center and Periphery in the Ottoman Empire: With Special Reference to the Nineteenth Century", *International Political Science Review*, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1980, pp. 81-105.

Hinnebusch, Raymond, *Syria: Revolution from Above* (London and New York: Routledge, 2001).

Hopwood, Derek, *Syria 1945-1986: Politics and Society*, 2nd ed. (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989).

Hourani, Albert, *A History of the Arab Peoples* (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1991).

_____, "Ottoman Reform and the Politics of Notables", in Albert Houran (ed.), *The Emergence of the Modern Middle East* (London: St. Anthony's College, Oxford, 1994), p. 36-66.

_____, "The Ottoman Background of the Modern Middle East", in Albert Hourani (ed.),*The Emergence of the Modern Middle East* (London: St. Anthony's College, Oxford, 1994), pp. 1-18.

Cleveland, William L., and Bunton, Martin, *A History of the Modern Middle East,* 4th ed. (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 2009).

Colin, Imber, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu, 1300-1650 İktidarın Yapısı* (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2006).

Kayalı, Hasan, *Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1918* (California: University of California Press, 1997).

Kaylani, Nabil M., "The Rise of the Syrian Ba'th, 1940-1958: Political Success, Party Failure", *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, No.1, 1972, pp.3-23.

Khoury, Philip S., *Syria and the French Mandate: The Politics of Arab Nationalism, 1920-1945* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1987).

_____, *Urban Notables and Arab Nationalism: The Politics of Damascus, 1860-1920* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).

_____, "Continuity and Change in Syrian Political Life: The Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries", *The American Historical Review*, No. 5, 1991, pp.1374-1395.

Ma'oz, Moshe, *Ottoman Reform in Syria and Palestine 1841-1860:The Impact of the Tanzimat on Politics and Society* (London: Oxford University Press, 1968).

_____, *Asad: Sphinx of Damascus: A Political Biography* (New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1998).

_____, "Attempts at Creating Political Community in Syria", *Middle East Journal* Vol. 26, No. 4, 1972, pp. 389-404.

Mardin, Şerif, "Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?", *Daedalus*, Vol. 102, No. 1, Post-Traditional Societies, Winter 1973, pp. 169-190.

Masters, Bruce, "Ottoman Policies toward Syria in the 17th and 18th Centuries" in Thomas Philipp, *The Syrian Land in the 18th and 19th Century: The Common and the Specific in the Historical Experience,* (Stuttgart: Steiner, 1992), pp. 11-21.

Migdal, Joel S., *State in Society, Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

Mufti, Malik, *Sovereign Creations: Pan-Arabism and Political Order in Syria and Iraq* (New York: Cornell University Press: 1996).

Perlmutter, Amos, "From Obscurity to Rule: The Syrian Army and the Ba'th Party", *The Western Political Quarterly*, No. 4, 1969, pp.827-845.

Pipes, Daniel, "The Alawi Capture of Power in Syria",*Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 25, No. 4, 1989, pp. 429-450.

Quataert, Donald, *The Ottoman Empire 1700-1922* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

Rabinovich, Itamar, *Syria under the Ba'th 1963-66: Army-Party Symbiosis* (Jerusalem: Israel University Press, 1972).

_____, "The Compact Minorities and the Syrian State, 1918-45", *Journal of Contemporary History*, No. 4, 1979, pp.693-712.

_____, "Syria and the Syrian Land: The 19th Century Roots of 20th Century Developments"in Thomas Philipp, *The Syrian Land in the 18th and 19th Century: The Common and the Specific in the Historical Experience,* (Stuttgart: Steiner, 1992), pp. 43-54.

Rafeq, Abdul-Karim, *The Province of Damascus, 1723-1783* (Beirut: Khayats, 1966).

Rathmell, Andrew, *Secret War in the Middle East: The Covert Struggle for Syria, 1949-61* (London: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 1995).

Seale, Patrick, *The Struggle for Syria: A Study of Post-War Arab Politics 1945-1958* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1986).

Shils, Edward, *Center and Periphery, Essays in Macrosociology* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1975).

Torrey, Gordon, *Syrian Politics and the Military, 1945–1958* (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University, 1964).

Zeine, Zeine N., *Arab-Turkish Relations and the Emergence of Arab Nationalism* (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1981).

Ziadeh, Radwan, *Power and Policy in Syria: Intelligence Services, Foreign Relations and Democracy in the Modern Middle East* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2011).