ARAP AYAKLANMALARININ İSLAMİ HAREKET ÜZERİNDEKİ ETKİLERİ: TUNUS, MISIR VE ÜRDÜN İHVAN'INDAN DERSLER

ÖZ

Arap ayaklanmalarından sonra İslami hareketlerin Ortadoğu'nun büyük ve karmaşık yapısının ayrılmaz bir parçası olduğu hususunu ve artan İslami aktivizmin irdelenmesi gerekliliğini ortaya koydu. Bu makale, Ortadoğu'da İslami hareketin ve Ihvan'ın yekpare olmadığını ve örnek ülke analizleri ile anlaşılabileceğini öne sürmektedir. Ayaklanmaların ardından ortaya çıkan en önemli konulardan birisini otoriter yapıların yerini siyasal çoğulculuğa bıtakıp bırakmayacağı yönünde olmuştur. Bu çerçevede, İhvan'ın Mısır ve Tunus'ta yürüttüğü siyasal pratikler birbirinden farklılık göstermekte olup, Ürdün ise bahse konu iki ülkenin melez bir örneğini teşkil etmektedir. İhvan içerisindeki bu farklı tutumlar İslami hareketin, ılımlılık-dahil etme hipotezi üzerinden yeniden düşünülmesi ihtiyacını doğurmştur.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Islami aktivizm, Müslüman Kardeşler, Arap ayaklanmaları, ılımlılık-dahil etme, demokratikleşme, Mısır, Tunus, Ürdün

تأثير حركات التمرّد العربية على الحركات الإسلامية : دروس من الإخوان المسلمين في تونس ومصر والأردن.

نور كوبرولو

خلاصة :

اظهرت الحركات الاسلامية التي اعقبت احداث التمرد العربية كونها جزءا لا يتجزّأ من هيكلية الشرق الأوسط الكبيرة والمعقّدة، بالاضافة الى اظهارها ضرورة البحث عن الفعاليات الاسلامية المتزايدة. ويتبنّى هذا المقال فكرة عدم كون الحركات الاسلامية في الشرق الأوسط متلازمة مع حركة الإخوان المسلمين. ويعطي المقال نماذج تحليلية عن الوضع في عدد من الدول لتوضيح وتأكيد هذه الفكرة. على ان احد اهم امواضيع التي طرحت نفسها بعد احداث التمرّد هذه، هو عدم اتاحة الانظمة المستبدّة الفرصة للانظمة المستندة على الأغلبية السياسية لتحلّ محلّها. وفي هذا الإطار، فان الفعاليات السياسية التي مارستها حركة الاخوان المسلمين في مصر وتونس، تختلف احداها عن الأخرى. اما الأردن، فإنه يمثّل نموذجا هو مزيج بين الدولتين المشار اليهما. ان هذا الموقف المختلف داخل حركة الاخوان اظهر ضرورة اعادة التفكير مجددا حول الحركات الاسلامية بما فيها المعتدلة منها.

الكلمات الدالّة : النشاطات الاسلامية، الاخوان المسلمون، حركات التمرد العربية، الاعتدال، التحوّل الى الديمقراطية، مصر، تونس، الأردن.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE ARAB UPRISINGS ON THE ISLAMIST MOVEMENT: LESSONS FROM IKHWAN IN TUNISIA, EGYPT AND JORDAN

ABSTRACT

After the Arab uprisings, it has become apparent that Islamists are an integral component of the huge and complex structure in the Middle East, and the recent growth of Islamist activism in the region needs to be addressed. To that end, this article will argue that Islamists and the Ikhwan in the Arab Middle East do not form a monolithic entity and need to be on a case-by-case basis. Following the uprisings one of the key questions regarding Islamist parties has been centered on whether or not affected states will shift from authoritarianism towards political pluralism. The political practices of the Ikhwan movement in Egypt and Tunisia have exhibited clear cut differences from those of their predecessors, while the case of the Ikhwan in Jordan may be seen as a hybrid of the Egyptian and Tunisian cases that has brought the question of the 'moderation-inclusion hypothesis' back to the surface.

Keywords: Islamist activism, Muslim Brotherhood, Arab uprisings, moderation-inclusion, democratization, Egypt, Tunisia, Jordan

Nur KÖPRÜLÜ*

* The Near East University, Department of International Relations.

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The social movements that first erupted in Tunisia then spread around the Arab world to Egypt, Yemen, Algeria, Bahrain and Syria have initiated debate over the stability and legitimacy of the existing regimes. Although the uprisings broke out over economic crisis, as exhibited in the public's struggle with growing unemployment, what began as rallies escalated to calls for reformation and political transformation.

At the beginning of the so-called 'Arab Spring' it seemed that Islamists would come to power with a linear increase in political pluralism. Islamists – particularly the Muslim Brotherhood Society (*al-Ikhwan*) – with their history of quick and effective organization and mobilization, were actually late participants in the public rallies, but the domino effect of the upheavals ultimately positioned them as an integral part of the emergent regional social structure. The key figure of the Islamist movement in the Middle East -i.e. Ikhwan candidate Muhammed Morsi- also achieved a high-profile presidential victory in Egypt.

The decline of Arabist and Baathist ideologies and identities, which can be traced to the late 1970s and early 1980s, has led to a resurgence in Islamist activism in the Middle East. Egypt's peace-making with Israel in 1979 led to a debate on the decline of Pan-Arabism and resulted in the emergence of a new order in the Middle East, i.e. the Camp David Order. The Iranian Revolution and its Shi'a character were also instrumental to the increase in Islamist activism in the region. Meanwhile, the trend towards democratization by the late 1980s foreshadowed an Islamist rise to power in more democratized or pluralist societies. One of the main reasons for this was the weakness of the opposition around the region. In addition, Islamist movements, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood Society, had been established as charity organizations in most Arab countries, and were thus able to continue their activities even under martial law and during states of emergency.

Perhaps it is too early to think of the upheavals as revolutions, or to credit them with enacting lasting structural change; instead, the post uprising period may be characterized as an era of transition. Nevertheless, related studies have revealed two main characteristics about this moment in the history of the Arab world: first, the social movements in the region are clear indicators that a process of change is underway within the structures of Arab regimes; and second, in many cases, Islamist movements and parties have become important actors in the political arena.

Ikhwan after the Uprisings: A testimonial to the integration of moderates?

With the onset of the Arab social upheavals, moderate or centrist Islamists, specifically Ikhwan-affiliated Islamists, emerged as willing ac-

tors within the political systems -if not with the ruling regimes- exhibiting a variety of *political practices*. Fawas Gerges analyzes the patterns of behavior among two main groups of Islamists in the Middle East -moderates/modernists and *Salafi Jihadis*- during this moment:

> most [Islamists] are centrist and modernist and accept the rules and procedures of the democratic game, in shaping the future political trajectory of their societies. In contrast, the Salafis and Islamic ultraconservatives in general, who believe that Islam controls all social spheres and regulates the whole of human life, are a sizeable minority.[1]

The resurgence of the Islamist movement especially in Egypt and Tunisia uncovered the very old discussion of whether or not Islam is compatible with democracy. For instance, according to Esposito and Piscatori, "ideas of some theoreticians and leaders of political Islam can contribute to a reconceptualization of the democratic ideal and help correct some of the 'defects' of Western democracy". Samuel Huntington, Bernard Lewis and Francis Fukuyama, meanwhile, take the approach that the goals of the movements and parties "identified with political Islam [are] 'undemocratic' or even 'anti-democratic'".[2]

As Katerina Dalacoura puts forward, "None of the 2011 uprisings in the Arab Middle East was led by Islamist movements or had a predominantly Islamist agenda".[3] Nevertheless, in most cases Islamists have been seen as the main beneficiaries of the revolts, and after four years their integral position among the emergent factions is evident. The 6 April and 'We are all Khaled Said' groups and the trade unions in Egypt; workers, members of the middle class, liberals and a wide range of protestors in Tunisia; Jordanians comprising different socio-economic segments of the society, as well as those of Palestinian descent (although with a minimum impact), they all gathered at public rallies in the zeitgeist of the Arab uprisings.

Tunisia: Transition to democracy and the role of Ennahda

In the aftermath of the Arab uprisings Tunisia's democratic transition has shown itself to have the greatest chance of success.[4] The *Union Générale des*

1 Fawas Gerges, "The Islamist Moment: From Islamic State to Civil Islam", *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 128, No. 3, 2013, p. 389.

2 Ibid.

3Katerina Dalacoura, "The 2011 uprisings in the Arab Middle East: Political Change and geopolitical implications", *International Affairs*, Vol. 88, No. 1, 2012, p. 74.

4 "Tunisia stands out as an exception in the region. Its political evolution stands in stark contrast to many of the region's tragic turmoils: Egypt's return to military authoritarianism, Syria's civil-war slaughter-house, and Libya's utter chaos." http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/dec/26/guardian-view-tunisia-transition-success-story

Travailleurs Tunisiens (UGTT), the country's main trade union, took a leading role at public rallies in the aftermath of the self-immolation of Mohammed Bouazizi. With the downfall of Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali and his 24-year rule on 14 January 2011, the Tunisian endeavor toward democratization began. The multiparty elections held on 23 October 2011 culminated in the victory of Ennahda (Tunisian Ikhwan), which won a legislative majority, taking 90 out of 217 seats. The second winner of the elections was the Nida Tunis (Tunis Calls) Party, which can be characterized as a liberal coalition comprising the members of the old *al-Dustur* Party of Habib Bourguiba and former-President Ben Ali's Constitutional Democratic Rally (CDR), as well as secular leftists and progressive liberals with ties to the ousted regime.

The Tunisian experience has demonstrated that democratization will integrate Islamists into the emerging political system. Ennahda (the Renaissance Party), the country's main Islamist movement, "stands out among its Arab counterparts by virtue of its pragmatism, efforts to reach out to other political forces, and sophisticated intellectual outlook. Some secular parties have sought … to build bridges with the movement".[5] Ennahda was founded in 1981, and was barred from participation in the 1989 elections by President Bin Ali. Ennahda was recognized as a terrorist organization by the ruling regime, and many of its members and sympathizers were imprisoned.[6] Ennahda's leader Rashid El-Ghannushi, who had been in exile in London, came back to Tunisia right after the outbreak of the protests. Ghannushi has traditionally been considered as a moderate Islamist, and Tunisian Ikhwan under him has demonstrated an approach distinct from that of its Egyptian counterpart, the Freedom and Justice Party.

Ghannushi, whose party represents a *mehcer* (migrant) character among Islamist movements in the region, rejects extremism. "The type of state we want is one that doesn't interfere in people's private lives," he has explained, "The state should not have anything to do with imposing or telling people what to wear, what to eat and drink, what they believe in, what they should believe in."[7] This moderate character is central to understanding the compromises made during both the constituent assembly elections of 2011 and the recent presidential elections. In an interview with Al Jazeera, Ghannushi has also underscored his position on the highly debated issue of Islam and democracy:

> For more than a quarter of a century, I have continued to affirm that democracy and Islam are integral, not conflicting principles. Democracy thrives with Islam and Islam thrives with democracy. They are intimate and co-exis-

5 "Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (IV): Tunisia's Way", *Middle East/North Africa Report* No. 106, 28 April 2011, p. ii.

6 "Tunus Kurucu Meclis Seçim Sonuçları: Bir Devrimin Ardından Kazananlar ve Kaybedenler", *ORSAM*, 23 Ekim 2011; orsam.org.tr

7 "Rashid Ghannushi on Britain, Islam and Democracy", http://www.bbc.com/news/world-16932923

> tent couples and friends. Therefore, we Islamists do not face any difficulty or religious taboo when we advocate an Islamic democracy.[8]

As reported by the BBC, Ghannushi "goes back to the values of the Koran rather than a literal reading of it. He then argues that these values – such as justice, public consultation and human rights – are encapsulated in modern democratic states."[9] In the aftermath of the uprisings, Ennahda was thus viewed as a viable alternative for Tunisians seeking more accountable government, freedom and justice.

Following a collapse in the national dialogue between the ruling party Ennahda and the opposition, Tunisians went back to the ballot box on 26 October 2014. This time, the Nida Tunis Party captured the most parliamentary seats – 85 out of 217 – leaving Ennahda second in the legislature, this time with 69 seats. Nida Tunis, which had run on an explicitly anti-Islamist platform, won the right to name the prime minister and lead a coalition government.[10] This shaped Ennahda's role in the subsequent presidential elections.

"In the context of the meagre harvest of the Arab Spring, Tunisia remains the last hope for a successful democratic transition. The country and its allies have every reason to ensure that Tunisia continues on its exceptional course".[11] The role of Ennahda during the recent presidential elections strengthens this argument. Following the success of Nida Tunis in the October parliamentary elections, Beji Caid Essebsi, former parliamentary speaker under President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali, became the Nida Tunis presidential candidate. With the combined support of leftist and rightist seculars, Essebsi took 55.6% of the vote, defeating incumbent Moncef Marzouki.[12]

Ennahda had decided to remain neutral in the presidential elections process. One reason for this was the loss of one-quarter of its vote in the 26 October elections from its 2011 results, giving Nida Tunis the seats necessary to form the government. Upon election, Essebsi announced his party would not join Ennahda in any form of coalition. As a result, the only political role that Ennahda appeared to be left with at first glance was that of key opposition in the legislature. Neutrality continues to be Ghannushi's approach for the moment, which takes the form of tacit support for Marzouki.

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8 http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2012/09/2012913653599865.html

9 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-16932923

10 "Tunisia election results: Nida Tunis wins most seats, sidelining Islamists", *The Guardian*, 30 October 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/30/tunisia-election-results-nida-tunis-wins-most-seats-sidelining-islamists and http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2013/10/tunisia-protests-urge-government-resignation-201310237252412657 3.html

11 "Tunisia's Elections: Old Wounds, New Fears", *International Crisis Group Middle East & North Africa Briefing,* No. 44, 19 December 2014.

12 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-30639792

Ennahda has been classified by Olivier Roy and Asaf Bayat as "*post-Islamist* amongst its supporters, candidates and voters".[13] Recognizing it was at risk of losing ground, the party has opted to compromise with the other actors involved in Jasmine Revolution. As Tarek Chamkhi observes,

> The Ennahda-led government in Tunisia (from December 2011 until January 2014) showed utmost respect to [a] historic agreement and towards the toleration principle. Ennahda's contribution to the National Constituent Assembly was 42 women – a larger percentage than all of the secular parties combined.[14]

Here Chamkhi excludes the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood from the 'neo-Islamist' category that emerged with the Arab uprisings due to the party's "tendency towards autocracy and refusal to cooperate with the opposition".[15]

Egypt: The Fear of the Past

For Marc Lynch, the "unified narrative of change, and the rise of a new, popular pan-Arabism directed against regimes, is perhaps the greatest revelation of the uprisings".[16] Egypt's *Kefaya* (Enough) movement was in many ways the first sign of the Arab uprisings. Merging young Egyptians, liberals, Nasserists and Muslim Brothers, *Kefaya* helped to carve out a public space for political and social contestation. As he put it, "the uprisings were not only about jobs and bread, but about making sure the people deserved bread".[17] For Fuad Ajami, "the region's exceptionalism was becoming not just a human disaster but a moral embarrasment"; he argues that, "from Cairo, the awakening became a pan-Arab affair, catching fire in Yemen and Bahrain".[18] In this sense, it can be said that the future of uprisings in Egypt will, in one way or in another, determine the nature of transition in the region.

The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt formed the Justice and Freedom Party and joined the November 2011 elections, similar to the case of Tunisia. The Muslim Brotherhood Society (Ikhwan) had been established in Ismailiyya, Egypt in 1928 by schoolteacher Hasan al-Banna with the aim of building a "transnational" Islamic state.[19] At that time, although Ikhwan's ideology conflicted with secular ideology, al-Banna's rejection of the use of violence in

13 Tarek Chamkhi, "Neo-Islamism in the Post-Arab Spring", *Contemporary Politics*, Vol. 20, No. 4, p. 460. Emphasis added.

14 Ibid, p. 465.

15 Ibid.

16 Marc Lynch, "The Big Think Behind the Arab Spring", *Foreign Policy*, December 2011, Issue 190, pp. 46–47.

17 Ibid.

18 Fouad Ajami, "The Arab Spring at One", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 91, Issue 2, March/April 2012, pp. 56–65.

19 Chamkhi, p. 455.

political *jihad* (struggle) marked the Brotherhood out as peculiarly moderate. Ikhwan's will to engage the political scene was set back primarily by the 1952 Free Officers coup d'état and the newly established structure of Nasser's civil and military bureaucracy.

Consequently, the resurgence of the Brotherhood has alarmed secular groups around the country, although the downfall of Mohamed Morsi, the first elected president of Egypt, cannot be reduced simply to a secular-Islamist cleavage or a tension between the old ruling regime and the Muslim Brotherhood.[20] In fact, the new constitution retained an article from the old constitution stipulating that 'the principles of Islamic law are a main source of legislation', a provision none of the opposition leaders have rejected. From this, a new article has been added to the constitution which "defines those principles as the established schools of Sunni Muslim scholarship".[21]

Thus, it was not secularism that led the opposition to move against Ikhwan, but rather the lack of compromise by the new leadership under Morsi in the making of the new charter. For instance, according to Hamdeen Sabahi, a leftist and former presidential candidate, "This is a constitution that lacks the most important prerequisite for a constitution: consensus … This means we can't build our future based on this text at all".[22] In this regard, Morsi's position during his one-year term demonstrated that the resurgence of Salafi Islamists under the al-Nour Party caused a fear of losing the ground gained by the Freedom and Justice Party; this led them to rapidly launch reforms without the adequate popular support and will of the people, unlike the case of Tunisia.

After the coup on July 4th, General Abdel-Fatah al-Sisi announced, "We will build an Egyptian society that is strong and stable; that will not exclude any of its sons".[23] The overthrow of Morsi affected more than his own political influence; the exclusion of Muslim Brotherhood members from the political scene cut the party off from the influence it had accumulated over its 85-year history. It is important to note here the trepidation many Egyptians felt over the possibility of moving directly from one long-term authoritarian regime to another. They did not want to topple Hosni Mubarek only to take a step backwards with Morsi, despite the still-vital presence of the army as a guardian of stability. Dalacoura observes a fundamental difference between Egypt and Tunisia here:

20 Meliha Benli Altunışık, "Mübarek Sonrası Mısır", *ORSAM Yazıları*, 6 Şubat 2013.

21 "Egypt Opposition Gears Up After Constitution Passes", *The New York Times*, 23 December 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/24/world/middleeast/as-egypt-constitution-passes-new-fights-lie-ahead.html?_r=0

22 Ibid.

23 "Mohammed Morsi ousted in Egypt's second revolution in two years", *The Guardian*, 4 July 2013.

> In Tunisia and Egypt, where the regimes were overthrown without outside intervention (as occurred in Libya), the security services stood aside and did not attempt to crush the protestors – for reasons which are still obscure – while the army was impelled by popular mobilization to move against the president. In Tunisia, the army refused to open fire on the demonstrators and was instrumental in pushing Ben Ali out. … In Egypt, the army's position during the protests was ambivalent, but it eventually opted to remove Mubarek.[24]

Jordan: Ikhwan and the Monarchy

The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan was neither bypassed nor suppressed by the Arab uprisings. Nevertheless the trend towards democratization has been underway in the Kingdom since 1989 after public unrest in the city of Maan, although the opposition has not been satisfied with the stagnant pace of reform. Political parties were legalized with a new Political Parties Law in 1992, at which point the Jordanian Ikhwan formed its political wing, i.e. the Islamic Action Front (IAF). Since then the Front has been regarded as the country's key political party, having the largest capacity for mobilization and organization.

With the onset of the upheavals in Jordan, King Abdullah II pursued a policy of reshuffling the government to contain the growing opposition. He first appointed Marouf al-Bakhit as prime minister in 2011, then replaced him with Awn Shawkat Khasawneh the same year. The Kingdom also attempted to rebuild its ties with the Brotherhood, meeting with IAF members to put forward liberalization reforms. Its new policy of rapprochement with the IAF marks a significant step forward in Jordanian politics given the Front's boycott of the 2010 parliamentary elections. The Muslim Brotherhood (and the IAF) had boycotted the 2010 elections on the grounds that the prevailing system was not moving Jordan's democracy ahead. According to Zaki Bani Rsheid, deputy head of the Brotherhood, their decision not to participate in the elections was related to a countrywide lack of confidence that a change would occur.[25] For that reason, the Kingdom pursued a policy of integrating the IAF into the elections that were scheduled to be held on January 23, 2013. However the Ikhwan and the Front decided not to join the early elections after the public rallies.

The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan was established by Abu Qura in 1947; he was succeeded by Abd al-Rahman Khaliaf. In 1953 Khaliaf mobilized the Brotherhood into a 'national movement' with branches and activities within Jordan and elsewhere.[26] The Ikhwan in Jordan did not attempt to change the

24 Dalacoura, p. 70.

25 Interview with Muslim Brotherhood Leader, Zaki Ben Irsheid, Amman, Jordan, November 9, 2010.

26 As'ad Ghanem and Mohanad Mustafa, "Strategies of electoral participation by Islamic movements: the Muslim Brotherhood and parliamentary elections in Egypt and Jordan, November 2010", *Contempo-*

regime; their focus has traditionally been on practical changes, which have not been contradictory to the preferences of the Hashemite monarchy.

In 1994, the Ikhwan established a new "General Guide". Under the leadership of Abd al-Majid Dhunaybat, and at the onset of Jordan's peace making process with Israel, the non-confrontational relations between the party and the throne entered a new era. The party's opposition to normalization of relations with Israel produced friction with the monarchy, called the King's peace. Although it had boycotted the 1997 elections, the Ikhwan decided to participate in the 2003 elections, issuing a *fatwa* encouraging participation.[27]

The main turning point in Jordan's Spring occurred on 24 March 2011 when thousands of demonstrators reached the capital city of Amman calling for efforts against unemployment and corruption, as well as asking for more political reforms. A fundamental difference with the cases of Tunisia and Egypt can be seen in the slogans used during the Jordanian protests, which did not call for the regime/monarchy to be deposed. Instead, the demands were centered on 'bread and freedom'.

The overnight protest in Amman on March 24, which resulted in one death and over 100 injuries, had two significant outcomes. The first was the founding of a group called the National Front for Reform, comprising leaders of the IAF, leftist parties, and trade unions, along with independent Jordanians and Jordanians of Palestinian origin.[28] Since the onset of the Arab Spring, this group has alleviated the major areas of contention between Palestinians and Jordanians. Second, during the same period, the Hashemite monarchy took significant steps to initiate a comprehensive reform program; the National Dialogue Committee (NDC) was thus established with the aim of revising the controversial electoral law. Unfortunately, the protests became prolonged as the reform process came to a standstill, and King Abdullah eventually replaced Marouf Bakhit's government in response to growing public discontent.

An 1993 amendment to the electoral law is a key issue on the IAF's agenda, as well as that of the opposition, over claims that it disproportionately represented the rural south of the country and its centers of Maan, Karak and Tafila.[29] There are two main elements in the debate over the electoral law: first, the urban areas, which are located mainly in the north, are heavily populated by Jordanians of Palestinian origin, who have been regarded as the main threat to the longevity of the monarchy since the Black September/*Fedayeen*

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rary Politics, Vol. 17, No. 4, December 2011, p. 402.

27 Ibid, p. 404.

28 "Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (IX): Dallying with Reform in a Divided Jordan", *International Crisis Group Middle East & North Africa Briefing,* No. 18, 12 March 2012.

29 Russell E. Lucas, *Institutions and the Politics of Survival in Jordan*, (New York: State University of New York Press, 2005), p. 19.

episode of 1970–71. In the aftermath of the civil war, Palestinians were not only seen as a threat to the monarchy, but were also identified as the main obstacle to unifying the opposition. The second factor is a matter of rural-urban cleavage. Although Jordanians make up the political majority, the economy is dominated from the urban centers of the north, which are disproportionately populated by Jordanians of Palestinian origin. The Hashemite monarchy has historically acquired its political legitimacy primarily from the rural areas of the south, which are heavily populated by Bedouins.

The combination of these elements has made bedfellows of the IAF and Jordan's Palestinian population; since the electoral law amendment and the Kingdom's normalization of relations with Israel, they have become the party's primary support base. And although the IAF has historically maintained cordial ties with the monarchy and has never been banned or suppressed,[30] the organic relationship between Jordan's Ikhwan and Hamas is a matter of concern for the present government. These socio-economic and political cleavages were manifested during the uprisings.

In May 2012, hundreds of Jordanians – mostly Islamists and youth activists – marched in Amman after the Friday prayer, calling for the cancellation of the Jordan-Israeli treaty, as well as for an elected government and comprehensive reform. The march against Israel was actually a reaction to new Prime Minister Tarawneh's statement that 'he would sign a Jordanian-Israeli treaty again'.[31] It was a clear indicator that tensions between the opposition (mainly Islamists) and the regime had resurfaced over the issue of relations with Israel. At the same time, the banners held by demonstrators that asked for an elected government highlight the effects of the Arab Spring within Jordan. During this very critical moment, most Ikhwan members took a moderate and cautious position. According to Larbi Sadiki,

> Jordan's formidable Ikhwan [is] diverse, and boasts at least four currents. Three of these share a platform of "moderation" – favoring gradual, peaceful and bargain-based political reform, in conjunction with the government, not without or against it.[32]

Nevertheless the IAF is currently not represented in the parliament due to their boycott of the early-2013 elections; they still represent the main opposition in the country demanding a real political reform process, however. In this respect, Jordan offers an exceptional case where the Ikhwan has historically established close ties with the regime, despite current tensions. For Ghanem

30 Jillian Schwedler, *Faith in Moderation:*, *Islamist Parties in Jordan and Yemen*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 199.

31 "Hundreds of Jordanians protest Israel peace deal", *The Jerusalem Post*, May 4, 2012.

32 Larbi Sadiki, "Jordan: Arab Spring Washout?", http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/01/201319134753750165.html

and Mustafa, "the character of both sides – the regime and the Muslim Brotherhood – was the key factor explaining the structure of their relationship".[33] Thus, the newly emerging structure of relations between them will also help the Ikhwan movement in the region to re/construct its role within the changing environment of the Middle East by taking into consideration the resurgence of *Salafi Jihadism*.

The Moderation-Inclusion Hypothesis Revisited

The nature of the Arab uprisings has demonstrated that the Islamist movement in the region is not monolithic, and that Islamist groups and the Muslim Brotherhood in each Arab country should be analyzed separately, according to the dynamics between each regime and each Islamist faction, and according to the historical particularity of each country. The discourses and practices implemented by Islamists following the Arab uprisings have also differed. For instance, in the case of Syria a lack of unity among the opposition – in contrast to the case of Egypt – and the relative absence of public space for the Muslim Brotherhood to operate are a key reason the riots devolved into sectarian conflict. The repressive policies of Hafız al-Assad under Baath rule had closed nearly all avenues for the mobilization of an opposition, especially the Ikhwan. In contrast, Islamist parties in Jordan and Morocco are able to act within the political system, and what the Arab uprisings brought them was a call for more political reform. According to Fawas Gerges,

> In Tunisia, Ennahda has undergone a more-rapid shift than the [Egyptian Muslim] Brotherhood toward modernity and pluralism through the work of its more-youthful members ... Similarly, the moderate youth in Morocco have built a critical mass within the Party of Justice and Development.[34]

The cases of Jordan and Egypt also show that differences in their historical trajectories, as well as in their relationships with the ruling elite, play a determining role in the political agendas of Islamist parties. According to Asad Ghanem and Mohanad Mustafa, "Both [the] Muslim Brotherhood movement in Egypt and in Jordan, support the idea of participating in national elections, while they differ in the level of expectation from such involvement in the political process in their societies", though in the Jordanian example, the Brotherhood "wants to transform its public influence to political power".[35] The regime in Jordan has launched reforms to ensure its survival, although these have been characterized as 'cosmetic democratization', 'defensive democratization' or a symbolic 'façade democracy'.[36] Jillian Schwedler argues

33 Ibid, p. 403.

34 Fawas Gerges, p. 396.

35 Asad Ghanam & Mohanad Mustafa, "Strategies of electoral participation by Islamic movements", p. 396 and p. 397.

36 Glenn Robinson, "Defensive Democratization in Jordan", *International Journal of Middle Eastern*

that Jordan after the Arab uprisings has become '*more liberal and more authoritarian*' at the same time.[37] Thus, the varying characters of both the regime and the Muslim Brotherhood in each country have always been the key to restructuring their relationships.

The shifts that have occurred in Jordan and Egypt have once again brought questions to the surface about whether such parties become more moderate when they are included in the political arena. As Jillian Schwedler argues, "The most common formulation of this [inclusion-moderation] argument is that institutions shape political behavior by creating constraints and opportunities, which in turn structure the choices available to political actors".[38] She also added that "moderation may have little to do with whether political actors have actually *changed their positions on particular issues* … That is, inclusion may not turn radicals into moderates, but rather deny radicals the support base that provides political advantage".[39] This hypothesis is applicable to Egypt, Tunisia and Jordan despite their divergent political trajectories. In all three cases, the Ikhwan, as the main Islamist movement, prefers to act within the political arena, accepting the rules and values of the political systems, if not the regimes. The main difference between Egypt and Tunisia, as compared to Jordan, is that Jordanians do not call for the Hashemite monarchy to be deposed. The Jordanian Ikhwan thus occupies an exceptional case in the region, at least for the time being, and has instead established close ties with the ruling regime. In this respect, Ikhwan can be said to represent moderate Islamism in all three cases (if indeed such a label is required), as opposed to the system having turned them into moderates. In addition, the existence of Ikhwan is also central to the normalization of relations between Islamists in general and the political systems of each country in particular. In other words, the growing influence of radical and *Jihadi Salafis* can be minimized with the inclusion of the moderates within the political arena. Ikhwan's rejection of the use of force (with the exception of Hamas) is a crucial distinction that needs to be drawn between *Jihadi*s and the Brotherhood.

Conclusion

The issue of how to characterize the Arab Spring has incited a great deal of debate over the last four years. It has been labeled as a revolt or a crisis, often a 'spring' and mostly an uprising. In this article, the term uprising has been chosen to describe events in the Arab world dating back to 2011, since the political situation in the region is still in transition and no structural transformation has yet occurred. Still, the events have had particular ramifications

Studies Vol.30, 1998, pp. 387-410.

37 Jillian Schwedler, "The Political Geography of Protest in Neoliberal Jordan", *Middle East Critique*, Vol. 21, No. 3, Fall 2012, pp. 259–270.

38 Jillian Schwedler, *Faith in Moderation,*, p. 11.

39 Ibid, p. 13.

and implications in each country, which speak to the question of 'whether the Arab world is a *unified* entity or not'.[40] Dalacoura's description, "a series of interconnected yet diverse events" reminds us that it is imperative to analyze each case individually, if comparatively; this has explanatory power regarding Muslim Brotherhood practices in various political arenas. The cases of Tunisia, Jordan and Egypt have additionally shown that the integration of Islamists into politics weakens the hypothesis that Islam and democracy are incompatible.

Instead, it has become apparent that the definition and composition of Islamist activism in the region is not unified at all. But the path Rashed Ghannushi of Ennahda is walking may be seen as an attempt to outline discourses and practices for the integration of Islam, democracy and human rights.

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