Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) in the Maritime Domain[*]

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Abstract

In its current sense, one of the military functions, which is named as Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC), has emerged as a result of operational requirements during the peace operations in the Balkans in the 1990s. In this period, CIMIC was needed to establish liaisons with civilian actors, especially to coordinate humanitarian affairs with military operations and to facilitate cooperation if possible. Current changes in the execution of military operations have obliged changes in CIMIC support as well. These changes brought the assumption that CIMIC is not only applicable during an operation but also prior to the operation during the planning process. However, CIMIC has largely been applied for land-focused operations. The maritime domain, which includes a wide variety of actors and topics, has been ignored by the CIMIC perspective. This article explains how CIMIC can contribute in the maritime domain for maritime security efforts.

Keywords: Civil-military cooperation (CIMIC), Comprehensive approach, Maritime security.

Öz

Askeri bir fonksiyon olarak Sivil-Asker İş Birliği (SAİ), günümüzdeki anlamıyla, 1990'larda Balkanlarda icra edilen barış harekâtları esnasında bir ihtiyaç olarak ortaya çıkmıştır. Anılan dönemde, SAİ'ne, harekât alanındaki sivil aktörler ile irtibat tesis etmek, bu irtibat vasıtasıyla özellikle insani yardım faaliyetleri ile askeri harekâtın eşgüdümünü sağlamak ve mümkün olan durumlarda ve belirli alanlarda sivillerle iş birliği ortamının oluşturulmasını sağlamak için başvurulmuştur. Değişen harekât ortamına uygun şekilde, SAİ'nin katkı sağladığı alanlar da günümüzde çeşitlenerek artmıştır. Konuların çeşitlenmesiyle birlikte yapılan değerlendirmelerde, SAİ'nin sadece harekât esnasında değil harekâtların öncesinde planlama aşamasında da önemli katkısının olacağı anlaşılmıştır. Buna karşın SAİ, kara harekâtlarında uygulanagelmiştir. İhtiva ettiği aktör ve konu çeşitliliği bakımından, deniz alanının oldukça kapsamlı bir ortam sunması SAİ açısından göz ardı edilmiştir. Bu makalede, deniz alanının sağladığı kapsamlı ortamda SAİ'nin deniz güvenliği çabalarına nasıl katkı sunabileceği açıklanmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Sivil-Asker İş Birliği (SAİ), Kapsamlı Yaklaşım, Deniz Güvenliği.

Introduction

Maritime Security is one of the topics currently being studied intensively within the military, private sector, and related academic environments. This is not surprising because 80% of the world's population lives within 100 km of the coast, and 90% of world trade is carried by ships along the highways of the sea or the sea lanes of communication. While these studies have examined maritime security through its importance, in the end they emphasize more or less two similar points:

- A lack of coordination and cooperation between related actors who share the same maritime environment.

- The requirement for an inclusive and comprehensive approach to maritime security.

The maritime domain includes a wide variety of sectors and actors. This variety indicates the need for an inclusive and comprehensive approach to maritime security. Naturally, such an inclusive and comprehensive approach requires establishing liaisons with different stakeholders, being aware of each other's activities and structures, and seeking for opportunities to coordinate, cooperate, and collaborate. This kind of approach has effectively been applied through Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), presently in the land-focused domain. Meanwhile, the fact remains that maritime security offers opportunities for just such a comprehensive approach, and CIMIC might be the tool for it.

With this study, firstly it is going to be revealed why the maritime domain requires a comprehensive approach for maritime security. Following this, CIMIC is going to be introduced as it has been conceptualized and applied within NATO. At this step, it is going to be claimed that CIMIC is not the same as when it emerged in the 1990s. While doing this it will be revealed how CIMIC has evolved over the years, from its emergence until today, as a response to developments in the security environment. In the last step, NATO's efforts will be argued for maritime security in relation to merchant shipping as an example of civil-military cooperation. In the conclusion section, proposals for better civil-military cooperation in the maritime domain will be provided.

1. Comprehensiveness of Maritime Security

Here in this section, maritime security is going to be examined by approaching from two directions, mainly through Bueger's studies.[1] First one accepts that the threats and risks in the maritime domain are directly related to human beings. Thus while we are talking about maritime security, we are in fact mentioning human security as well.

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[1] Christian Bueger, "What is Maritime Security?", *Marine Policy*, 2015, Vol.53, 159-164; Christian Bueger and Timothy Edmunds, "Beyond Seablindness: A New Agenda for Maritime Security Studies", *International Affairs*, 2017, 93:6, 1293-1311.

This means that maritime security is not equal to just defending territorial waters or exclusive economic zones of the state, as Bueger indicated.[2] The second one is that the threats and risks are complicated, multifaceted, and unpredictable. This is because they are not purely military and thus cannot be countered by military means alone.[3]

When we consider these two above-mentioned phenomena, we can see that the maritime domain has changed in terms of security. As quoted by Bueger and Edmunds[4], this assumption has also been emphasized by Admiral Michael Mullen, Chief of Naval Operations for the US Navy who stated that the "sea-power discussion has been about big-ship battles and high-tech weapons, but now we face new challenges." Before, the sea was a chaotic arena in which sea power was determinant, but now it includes opportunities for humanity and brings new risks and threats.[5]

These new risks and threats are widely known as hybrid threats and hybrid warfare. Admiral (Ret.) James Stavridis talked about hybrid warfare at sea. According to Stavridis, the fundamental idea of hybrid warfare is to create conditions for a limited and quick military operation at the tactical level. With this kind of operation, the aim is to gain operational and strategic impact[6]. Hybrid warfare is an asymmetric action applied to exploit differences and attack the target's vulnerabilities and weaknesses.[7] In this kind of action/operation, a

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[2] Bueger, "What is Maritime Security?", p. 160-162.

[3] Bueger and Edmunds, "Beyond Seablindness: A New Agenda for Maritime Security Studies", p. 1300.

[4] Ibid., 1298.

[5] Lutz Feldt, "The Importance of the Global Maritime Domain for World Politics and Security", *ISPSW Strategy Series*, October 2015, Issue No.382, 1-10, p. 3.

James Stavridis; "Maritime Hybrid Warfare Is Coming", Proceedings, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2016/december/maritime-hybrid-warfare-coming, December 2016, (Access Date: 30 May 2019).

[7] Lutz Feldt, "Maritime Hybrid Risks and Threats: Consequences for Harbours, Navies and Maritime Services – A European View", *ISPSW Strategy Series: Focus on Defense and International Security*, January 2019, Issue No.596, 1-10, p. 1-3.

combination of threats, risks, and challenges are used known as hybrid threats. From this perspective hybrid threats in the maritime domain may include: commercial vulnerabilities in attacking vessels and ports, cyber-attacks, territorial vulnerabilities, disrupting communication between ships and operation centers, threats to maritime security forces, and disinformation.[8] Within this context, to be able to counter these new risks, threats, and challenges that are in the form of hybrid threats and hybrid warfare, actors need to create an environment to enable working comprehensively together.[9]

In fact, these developments at sea had been predicted, and maritime security was put on the agenda of states such as the USA, UK, France, and India and by organizations and initiatives such as NATO, the European Union, the African Union, the G7 declaration, Our Ocean conferences, and the Independent World Commission on the Oceans (IWCO).[10]

As can be seen, a number of actors are aware about threats in the maritime domain and maritime security, but what indeed is maritime security? Bueger developed a matrix to be able to understand the maritime security environment. According to this matrix, maritime security has four pillars: sea power, marine safety, blue economy, and resilience[11]. According to Bueger and as shown in the matrix below, sea power directly relates to national security, blue economy is in the area of economic development, marine safety is about the marine environment, and resilience indicates human security. Yet when one

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[8] Chris Kremidas-Courtney; "Countering Hybrid Threats In The Maritime Environment", *Center for International Maritime Security*, http://cimsec.org/counter ing-hybrid-threats-in-the-maritime-environment/36553, (Access Date: 20 May 2019).

[9] Lutz Feldt, Peter Roell and Ralph D. Thiele; "Maritime Security – Perspectives for a Comprehensive Approach", *ISPSW Strategy Series: Focus on Defense and International Security*, April 2013, Issue No.222; James Stavridis, "Maritime Hybrid Warfare Is Coming"; "Beyond Seablindness: A New Agenda for Maritime Security Studies"; Kremidas-Courtney, "Countering Hybrid Threats In The Maritime Environment".

[10] Bueger and Edmunds; "Beyond Seablindness: A New Agenda for Maritime Security Studies", p. 1293-1297.

[11] Bueger; "What is Maritime Security?", p. 160.

considers these pillars with their sub topics, all other topics apart from sea power relate to human security.


Figure 1. Bueger's Maritime Security Matrix.

With a view through the perspective of national security, sea power has the utmost importance during both peace and crisis times in naval warfare, in securing the sea lanes and communication, and for deterrence in the maritime domain.[12] Marine safety, the blue economy, and resilience belong to human security. They include ship safety, marine installations, maritime professionals and marine environment, sustainable fishery, resources for fossil fuels and sea-bed mining, coastal tourism, food security, and safe employment.[13]Additionally, protection of cultural assets, status of women in the maritime domain, and the fight against maritime corruption may also be considered part of the maritime security agenda from the perspective of human security.

Another study on understanding maritime security indicated maritime security to be related to "international and national peace and

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[12] Ibid.
[13] Ibid., p. 161.

security" and "sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence" and maritime security to include security of the sea lines of communications, protection from crimes at sea, security of resources, environmental protection, and the security of seafarers and fishermen.[14]

Different views are found on maritime security. On this point it can be easily claimed that security assumptions have changed in the maritime domain. New threats cannot be seen just from the perspective of national security or only be countered by military means. Within this context, providing maritime security requires a comprehensive approach in which co-existing actors seek to coordinate, cooperate, and collaborate. Some examples from current developments can be examined at that point.

It is known that the prosperity and welfare of society depends on the functioning of sea-borne trade, free access to marine resources, and freedom of navigation.[15] Let one assume that global trade is threatened by piracy in certain parts of the world. The naval defense of shipping lanes becomes a matter of national security. Meanwhile, looking from the perspective of human security, this effort can also provide a safe and secure environment for fisheries, which is directly related to the resilience and development of local populations. For this reason, the African Union's 2050 Africa's Integrated Maritime Strategy (2050 AIM Strategy) placed *blue growth* at the heart of its narrative.[16] In this scenario states, navies, fishermen, companies, organizations, and populations have something to say, contribute, and expect.

This example has two major issues: defeating piracy and contributing to the safety of the marine environment. Defeating pirates is an issue of national security that requires simultaneous cooperation

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[14] Feldt, Roell and Thiele; "Maritime Security – Perspectives for a Comprehensive Approach", p. 2-3.
[15] Feldt, "The Importance of the Global Maritime Domain for World Politics and Security", p. 1.
[16] Bueger and Edmunds, "Beyond Seablindness: A New Agenda for Maritime Security Studies", p.1299-1300.

between multiple actors. For example, Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia combated piracy in their region by conducting joint operations, patrols, and sea/air surveillance.[17] In this example we come to the safety of the maritime environment and can say that the protection and sustainability of fisheries, for example, underpin the livelihoods of millions of people living in coastal regions. This is not only about providing food and sustaining local/regional trade but also about employment so as to avoid having people join in piracy and criminality.[18]

Another example can be given from search-and-rescue (SAR) activities, especially from the Mediterranean. During SAR efforts off the coast of Italy, a number of different organizations were active, such as the Migrant Offshore Aid Station (MOAS), Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), Sea-Watch, SOS-Méditerranée, Sea-Eye, Pro-Activa Open Arms, Jugend Rettet, the Lifeboat Project, the Boat Refugee Foundation, Save the Children, and Mission Lifeline.[19] Some of these organizations coordinated their efforts with the Italian authorities (i.e., Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC) of Rome [run by the Italian Coast Guard] and Ministry of Interior.[20]

As stated in these studies and depicted in the examples, actors need to be aware of their efforts and understand their roles, mandates, and aims. Yet the obvious fact is that military and civilian assessments considerably differ from each other, as well as their way of planning and acting.[21] From the military aspect, an interface between military

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[17] Feldt, Roell and Thiele, "Maritime Security – Perspectives for a Comprehensive Approach", p. 2-3.
[18] Bueger and Edmunds, op. cit., p. 1300.
[19] Paolo Cuttitta, "Repoliticization Through Search and Rescue? Humanitarian NGOs and Migration Management in the Central Mediterranean", *Geopolitics*, 2018, Vol. 23, No. 3, 632–633; Eugeion Cusumano and James Pattison; "The non-governmental Provision of Search and Rescue in the Mediterranean and the Abdication of State Responsibility", *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 2018, Vol. 31, No. 1, 53.
[20] Paolo Cuttitta, op. cit, p. 642.
[21] Feldt, "The Importance of the Global Maritime Domain for World Politics and

and non-military actors is needed to be able to facilitate this issue. Within this context, CIMIC is the best candidate to set this interface.

2. Definition of Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC)

Although CIMIC is a military function, understanding of it is unfortunately really quite limited, even within military staff. CIMIC was a very attractive topic during the 1990s and early 2000s within NATO. Later on, it appeared to start losing importance, but with the rise of new threats (i.e., hybrid threats), CIMIC regained important.

CIMIC as defined in the Allied Joint Publication (AJP-3.19), which is the NATO military doctrine on CIMIC from November 2018, is "a joint function comprising a set of capabilities integral to supporting the achievement of mission objectives and enabling NATO commands to participate effectively in a broad spectrum of civil-military interaction with diverse non-military actors."

This definition clearly indicates three points:

1. *Diverse non-military actors* means that actors other than military and different from one another are present.

2. *A broad spectrum of civil-military interaction* means that the military engages with these actors for different purposes.

3. S*upporting the achievement of mission objectives* means that engaging with these different actors may support achieving mission objectives.

At this stage and moving from the first point, it must be defined who these actors in the area are. As generally accepted, these actors include:

- International organizations (IOs),
- Non-governmental organizations (NGOs),
- Government organizations (GOs),

Security", p. 7.

- Local authorities,
- Indigenous populations,
- Refugees/internally displaced persons (IDP), and
- Private sector.

This clearly indicates that the civilian environment is not composed only of the population and NGOs. This also helps one understand that this wide variety of actors can affect military missions from both positive and negative aspects.

These actors are natural members of the crisis or conflict area. In all cases, local authorities, indigenous populations, and refugees/IDPs already exist; the rest arrive and become involved long before the military. For example, on the first day of NATO's Kosovo Force (KFOR) deployment on June 11, 1999, hundreds of thousands of people had already fled their homes; more than 500 international and non-governmental organizations had already deployed to and were operating in Kosovo.[22] The organizations had successfully accomplished their mission in bringing the conflict to an end, providing humanitarian assistance to affected people, and identifying and applying measures for quick development. The military contributed directly and indirectly to their efforts through CIMIC in many cases. To be able to contribute so, the military needs to know who is who in the battlefield and needs to establish liaisons with non-military actors. Liaison is the primary function and mission of CIMIC.[23]

Here CIMIC should be broadly stated as being just the enabler for the military to enter the civilian environment by defining non-military actors. In this environment, non-CIMIC military units and functions need to engage with non-military actors for various purposes. For example, transportation and logistics branches need to know the

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[22] Larry Wentz (ed.), Lessons from Bosnia: *The IFOR Experience*, Washington, National Defense University Press, 1998, p. 135.
[23] NATO, *Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-3.19 Civil-Military Cooperation*, November, 2018.

conditions of the roads, seaports, and airports; thus they need support from the Ministry of Transportation and related IOs and NGOs in the country. Another issue is the coordination of movement and transportation. Main and alternative routes should be defined, and using routes must be coordinated with the related actors. These actors are mainly the military, humanitarian organizations, government, and locals. This is the second core function of CIMIC: Support to the Force. This helps the military de-conflict actions, avoid duplication of efforts, and provide economy of resources.

A number of functions should be covered by non-military actors in a conflict/crisis area, but sometimes these functions need to be covered by the military, especially when no civilian authority is present. Though not limited to, some of these areas include: humanitarian assistance issues, gender issues, status of children in an armed conflict, protection of cultural assets, protection of civilians, environmental protection, and civil preparedness. These areas can be covered by CIMIC by conducting CIMIC projects, providing awareness, reporting developments, and liaising with related stakeholders. The military can contribute to civil situations only when really necessary with its limited resources. As such, the third and final function of CIMIC is support to civil actors and their environment.

During the crisis in the Balkans at the beginning of the 1990s, the first example of CIMIC was observed. These examples were the first applications of CIMIC as a NATO concept. In the post-conflict reconstruction efforts, support to civil actors and their environment held priority. That is why this generally became known as CIMIC. This early concept was developed after the case of Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, the military experienced CIMIC within provincial reconstruction teams (PRT). CIMIC was again in the foreground in the post-conflict situations but in a different way. In this case, civilian and military stakeholders worked together closely. Now, however, we are experiencing another CIMIC concept, which is the main facilitator of the comprehensive approach (CA).

CIMIC efforts during the Balkan crisis were applied in the post-conflict reconstruction process. Afterwards, CIMIC efforts in

Afghanistan were again related to reconstruction but were applied while the kinetic operation was still ongoing, and this provided some opportunities to the military. Currently, militaries need to know about the civil environment to be able to understand the root causes of a crisis or conflict, to be able to conduct better planning, and to be able to contribute to the efforts of the international community. This requires militaries to comprehensively engage with the civilian environment prior to a mission, and here the main facilitator is CIMIC.

CA emerged as an idea that aimed to bring the military and other stakeholders from a wide spectrum of the civilian environment, such as IOs, GOs, NGOs, and actors from the private sector. The object was to contribute to providing stability and sustaining a safe and secure environment by coordinating the efforts of different stakeholders.

The concept of CA was raised for the first time in 2004 within NATO, but so far no definition has been provided, deliberately. This frees NATO from owning the concept and allows it to present CA as an effort of the international community, which means NATO is just one of the actors that can contribute to providing security and stability as a member of the international community (IC).

NATO began preparations against hybrid threats and hybrid warfare in 2006 by accepting CA during the Riga Summit; so far, however, this approach is still underdeveloped. In the 2006 Riga Summit, heads of states and governments agreed that cooperation with non-military actors is a requirement in applying NATO's crisis management system. They also agreed that the related non-military actors' contributions must be provided at all levels in planning and in executing ongoing and future operations. This initiative was when CA emerged. NATO deliberately accepts no single definition of CA. NATO wants it to remain as an understanding instead of a set of rules to be followed.

NATO's New Strategic Concept, adopted at the Lisbon Summit in 2010, underlined that lessons learned from that crisis, and NATO operations show that effective crisis management calls for a comprehensive approach involving political, civilian, and military

instruments. Military means were stated to be insufficient on their own for meeting the many complex challenges Euro-Atlantic and international security face.[24] A recent study of member perspectives regarding CA found three consistent themes:

- Coherent application of national instruments of power,
- Comprehensive interactions with other actors, and
- Comprehensive actions in all domains and elements of a crisis.[25]

NATO is working on a comprehensive conceptual framework for identifying and discussing such threats, as well as the possible multi-stakeholder responses. In essence, the hybrid threats faced by NATO and its non-military partners require a comprehensive approach that allows for a wide range of responses, kinetic and non-kinetic, by military and non-military actors.[26] Such a response will have to be in partnership with other stakeholders, such as international and regional organizations, as well as with representatives of business and commerce.[27]

3. Maritime Security and Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC)

Areas of shared interest exist for the military. These related areas can be divided into two groups: directly-related and indirectly-related. Directly-related areas may include port security, anti-piracy, anti-terrorism, and anti-proliferation. Indirectly-related areas may include military assistance in humanitarian emergencies (MAHE), disaster relief, civil emergency planning, host-nation support, search and rescue, protection of critical infrastructure, and capacity building and training.

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[24] NATO, *NATO's New Strategic Concept*, 2010.
[25] M. Aaronson et.al. "NATO Countering the Hybrid Threat", *Prism,* 2011, Vol.2, No.4, 111-124, p. 115.
[26] NATO, "Updated List of Tasks for the Implementation of Comprehensive Approach Action Plan and the Lisbon Summit Decisions on the Comprehensive Approach", dated to 4 March 2011.
[27] S.D. Bachmann, "Hybrid Threats, Cyber Warfare and NATO's Comprehensive Approach for Countering 21st Century Threats-Maping the New Frontier of Global Risk and Security Management", *Amicus Curiae*, 2011, Issue 88, 24-27, p. 25.

These are some of the main areas in which the military operates actively with other international and non-governmental organizations, such as the International Maritime Organization, International Chamber of Shipping, European Union, and African Union. Liaising, coordinating, and cooperating with these actors provide opportunities to all sides for better planning, avoiding duplicate efforts, conserving resources, and reaching an end state that is likely to be the same for all actors.

CIMIC as an interface can be the main facilitator in liaising, coordinating, and cooperating with these actors by monitoring the current maritime security environment, defining related actors, establishing liaisons with them, and creating conditions for information exchange. This can help military decision-makers better understand the security environment and root causes of the tensions and conflicts. At the onset, however, this requires being aware of the situation and the maritime domain. These awareness efforts should start by coordinating with commercial shipping agencies.[28]

Very important within this framework are NATO's long-term efforts, Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping (NCAGS), Allied Worldwide Navigational Information System (AWNIS), and NATO Shipping Center (NSC). The first two initiatives are composed not just of NATO nations but also of partner nations, non-NATO nations, and other regional shipping organizations. NCAGS and AWNIS contribute to the comprehensive approach through their close cooperation with CIMIC. NCAGS and AWNIS's inherent relationships with the merchant shipping industry facilitate the de-confliction of military and commercial shipping operations by coordinating with military and non-military stakeholders, which includes military maritime security agencies, government departments and agencies, law enforcement agencies, and international and non-governmental organizations.[29]

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[28] Feldt, Roell and Thiele, "Maritime Security – Perspectives for a Comprehensive Approach", p. 19.
[29] NATO, *Allied Joint Publication (AJP)*.

NATO joint efforts in this regard are supported by NCAGS and AWNIS through their:

- support in commercial shipping which contributes to free flow of trade, improved safety and security, and advice and guidance on maritime security risks, as well as

- contributions to the commander's freedom of maneuvers and efficient use of military resources by de-conflicting military and commercial maritime operations.[30]

The NATO Shipping Centre (NSC) is an integral and permanent element of the NATO maritime command headquarters and provides the primary point of contact between NATO and the merchant shipping industry. The NSC provides fused information and operational support for all national and multinational operations worldwide as directed. The NSC implements NCAGS and AWNIS on a daily basis through interfaces with the maritime industry and provides and maintains global situational awareness to them in support of NATO operations.[31]

Conclusion

As a military function with dedicated capabilities, CIMIC is the manager of the civil-military interface. This interface was created by the military during land-heavy operations as a requirement. However, civil-military interface is somewhat natural, and being in relations with non-military actors is a part of the daily duty of military actors in the maritime domain. Nevertheless, this responsibility needs to be pulled away from a daily-duty form; the civil-military interface in the maritime domain must be organized and managed by dedicated staff. Here are some points for a better maritime CIMIC:

- Establish a maritime CIMIC with dedicated staff who will help militaries prepare and plan even in peace time.

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[30] Ibid.
[31] Ibid.

- This should cover creating conditions and facilitating information and experience-sharing with related non-military actors, including academia and the private sector.

- These conditions can be easily created by inviting these actors to trainings and exercises and conducting capacity-building projects.

- While conducting academic studies on maritime security, militaries can contribute by indicating how maritime threats and risks are interconnected.

- Militaries may provide information for security-sector reform in the maritime domain.[32]

- Militaries can establish a "*lessons identified and lessons learned*" and "*operation assessment and evaluation*" mechanism open to respective non-military actors.

- While doing these things, militaries should respect the primacy of non-military actors.

This will help militaries understand the civilian environment and become aware about other actors' capacities and capabilities, decision-making processes, structures, and mandates. This awareness will help in planning activities better by avoiding duplicate efforts and conserving resources, as well as delivering the situation to the relevant civilian authorities in a short time.

Özet

Soğuk Savaş sonrasında Yugoslavya'nın dağılma süreciyle tetiklenen silahlı çatışmalar yeni düzenin ilk krizlerine örnek teşkil etmiştir. Uluslararası askerî müdahale kararının alınmasıyla birlikte NATO üyesi olan ve olmayan ülkeler askerî destek sağlamış ve krizlerin çatışma safhası kısa sürede sona ermiştir. Bu harekâtlar NATO terminolojisinde "*5. Madde Dışı Harekâtlar*" ya da bilinen

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[32] Bueger and Edmunds, "Beyond Seablindness: A New Agenda for Maritime Security Studies" p. 1294.

adıyla "*Barış Harekâtları*" olarak anılmaktadır. Barış Harekâtları'nın en temel özelliği, silahlı çatışmaların kısa sürede sonlandırılmasına rağmen insani sorunun bir türlü çözülememesi, askerlerin daha çok siviller tarafından yerine getirilen görevleri üstlenmeleri ve bunun sonucunda bir sivil-asker arayüzünün oluşmasıdır. Bu arayüz, daha çok uluslararası sivil toplumun üyeleri olan aktörler, yerel halk ve askerlerin içinde olduğu bir ilişkiler ağıdır. Sivil-Asker İş Birliği (SAİ) ile belirli bir çerçevede ve bir amaç doğrultusunda bu ilişkiler ağının yönetilmesi hedeflenmektedir.

SAİ'ne, 1990'larda daha çok insani yardım faaliyetlerini koordine etmek için başvurulmuştur. Günümüzde değişen harekât ortamı ve tehdit ve riskler ile SAİ'ne atfedilen konular da değişmiştir. Bunların başında toplumun bir şok karşısında yeniden toparlanma kabiliyeti yani dirençlilik (resilience) ve sivil hazırlık gelmektedir. Diğer konular ise kültürel varlıkların korunması, silahlı çatışmalarda kadınların ve çocukların durumları gibi konulardır.

Hem ilgilenilen konular hem de ortaya çıkan aktörler açısından bakıldığında ve sorunlara kapsamlı bir yaklaşımla eğilmek gerektiği kabul edildiğinde barıştan itibaren sivil durum değerlendirmesi yapmak, ilgili aktörlerle irtibat tesis ederek bilgi alışverişinde bulunmak ve mümkün olduğunda planlamaları birlikte gerçekleştirmek problemlere daha uygun çözümler getirilmesine katkı sağlayabilir.

Bütün bunlar çerçevesinde, deniz alanında deniz güvenliğinin sağlanmasında da aynı yaklaşım gerekli ve geçerlidir. Deniz alanı çok çeşitli aktörler ve faktörler ihtiva etmektedir. Bu durum günümüz tehdit ve riskleri göz önüne alındığında deniz güvenliğinin sadece savaş gemileri ve askerler tarafından sağlanamayacağını göstermektedir. Deniz güvenliğinin sağlanmasında katkısı olacak aktörlerin belirlenmesi, irtibata geçilmesi, aktörlerin birbirini anlaması ve ortak bir paydada buluşarak tam bir iş birliğine gidilmesi uzun bir süreçtir. Bu süreci başından beri yönetebilecek olan ise SAİ'dir.

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