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When do Civil Wars Breed Ethnic Cleansing? The Cases of Lebanon and Yugoslavia

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Abstract

Civil wars are episodes when ethnic violence is likely to be observed. However, while some civil wars lead to extreme forms of violence such as ethnic cleansing, this is not always the case for every civil war. Then why do some civil wars breed ethnic cleansing and not others? What sort of factors that are related to the context of the civil war and the involved actors shape the likelihood of an ethnic cleansing? Which theories of political conflict explain these diverging outcomes better? Based on two prominent civil wars of the last century, the Lebanese Civil War and the Yugoslav Wars, this article tests the hypotheses on political opportunities and grievances in order to explain why the latter led to an ethnic cleansing while the former did not. Based on the systematic tests of these theories in comparative case studies, the study finds that factors related to political opportunities such as regime change and political and military dominance are more useful in explaining the variation between the two cases whereas the factors that correspond with grievances such as economic dominance and hatred do not explain the outcomes.

Keywords
Civil Wars, Ethnic Violence, Political Opportunities, Grievances, Yugoslavia, Lebanon

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İç Savaşlar Ne Zaman Etnik Temizlik Doğurur? Lübnan ve Yugoslavya Vakaları

Öz

İç savaşlar etnik şiddetin potansiyel olarak görülebildiği süreçlerdir. Ancak, bazı iç savaşların sonucu olarak etnik temizlik gibi aşırı şiddet olayları görülse de bu durum her iç savaş için geçerli değildir. Öyleyse, neden bazı iç savaşlar etnik temizliği doğururken diğerleri doğurmaz? İç savaş ve ona dahil olan aktörlerle ilgili hangi faktörler bir etnik temizlik olma olasılığını şekillendirir. Siyasal çatışma teorilerinin hangileri bu farklı sonuçları daha iyi açıklar? Geçtiğimiz yüzyılın iki önemli iç savaşı, Lübnan İç Savaşı ve Yugoslav Savaşları, üzerinden bu makale, bu savaşların ikincisinin bir etnik temizliğe yol açarken ilkinin yol açmamış olduğunu açıklamak amacıyla, siyasal fırsatlar ve toplumsal sıkıntılar ile ilgili hipotezleri test etmektedir. Bu teorilerin karşılaştırmalı vaka analizleri çerçevesinde sistematik testlerinden hareketle bu çalışma, rejim değişimi ve siyasal ve askeri hakimiyet gibi fırsatlarla ilintili faktörlerin iki vaka arasındaki farklılığı açıklayabildiğini, ancak ekonomik hakimiyet ve nefret gibi toplumsal sıkıntılarla alakalı faktörlerin sonuçları açıklayamadığını bulmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler
İç Savaşlar, Etnik Şiddet, Siyasal Fırsatlar, Toplumsal Sıkıntılar, Yugoslavya, Lübnan

Introduction

Episodes of ethnic violence are particularly more common in times of armed conflict (Harff, 2003; Straus, 2010). Ethnic cleansing, the most extreme form of ethnic violence, occasionally takes place during times of civil wars, as observed in Rwanda and Darfur. However, not all civil wars create the conditions for an ethnic cleansing. There seems to be a link between civil wars and ethnic cleansing but why is the latter witnessed in some civil wars but not in others? What sort of factors that are related to the context of the civil war and the involved actors shape the likelihood of an ethnic cleansing? Is the ethnic cleansing an outcome of the underlying grievances between the groups or is it a by-product of the opportunities that the conditions of certain civil wars create?

To answer this question, I examine two prominent civil wars of the late 20th century in two turbulent regions, namely the Lebanese Civil War and the Yugoslav Wars. I explore why the Bosnian War in Yugoslavia led to an ethnic cleansing, but the Lebanese Civil War was not followed by one? By a systematic testing of prominent theories in the literature, I find that changes in opportunity structures explain the occurrence of ethnic cleansing in a context of civil war better than the underlying grievances. Based on the comparative case studies, I argue that the relative democratization in Yugoslavia prior to the civil war which created conditions for the rise of nationalistic leaders and the political and military dominance of one side over the other provided the capacity to carry out the ethnic cleansing. In the Lebanese case, the absence of a regime change and relative balance of power prevented an outcome of wide scale ethnic cleansing. Further, I argue that the arguments on grievances such as economic dominance and ethnic hatred fail to explain the variation between the Lebanese and Yugoslavian cases.

What is Ethnic Cleansing?

Special Rapporteur of the Commission for Human Rights Tadeusz Mazowiecki defined ethnic cleansing in his report on the Former Yugoslavia as *"... a systematic purge of the civilian population based on ethnic criteria, with the view to forcing it to abandon the territories where it lives."*(Mazowiecki, 1994:44) For another definition, ethnic cleansing is the expulsion of undesirable people from where they live (Bell-Fialkoff, 1993). Bulutgil (2017:169) defines ethnic cleansing as "*deportations or killings that victimize a substantial segment of*

an ethnic group on a state's territory." In this sense, ethnic cleansing can be in violent or non-violent forms. The latter forms can be detainment, removal from public offices and even forced assimilation. However, these are the forms of cleansing which have distant effects. The violent forms such as deportation, murder, rape, direct attacks to civil targets and genocide are more precise and effective for short term accomplishment of the objective. The human history has demonstrated some forms of ethnic cleansing (Lieberman, 2010), but several scholars argue that ethnic cleansing is a modern phenomenon (Mann 2005; Naimark, 2001)[1] as a nation-wide systematic undertaking of ethnic cleansing is a product of modern nation-states (Ther, 2014).

The concept of ethnic cleansing is sometimes used as equal to genocide (Hayden, 1996). However, there is a nuance between the two concepts and the distinction between the two lies in the intentions. The intention in genocide is the extermination of an ethnic or religious group; however, an ethnic cleansing is not necessarily the destruction of people. Rather, it is generally the consolidation of power over a territory by removing an ethnic or religious group (Naimark, 2001). The process of removal might be by murdering the people or through other means. However, not every ethnic cleansing contains genocide as an ethnic cleansing can be conducted by deportation, assimilation or other means as emphasized.

Opportunities and Grievances as Potential Factors behind Ethnic Cleansing

The main arguments in the literature on political violence are classified under two major categories: grievances and opportunities (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Fearon & Laitin, 2003; McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1996). According to the arguments based on the former, a certain group develops grievances toward the other and this becomes the cause for different forms of contention from protesting to violence. While these underlying grievances or tensions might be core factors, such grievances do not always translate into violence, let alone ethnic cleansing. After all, grievances are pretty much everywhere; yet, we see a rather limited number of ethnic violence. For that, the scholars argued that to translate these grievances into action, there needs to be certain conditions that allow violence, that are opportunities (McAdam, 1982). Therefore, actors that can find a new opening in the opportunity structure and have means to carry out the actions can be more prone to commit ethnic violence. While opportunities are not a cause for violence per se, they are the factors that create an environment for the violent actions to take place.

1 Although the essence existed, ethnic cleansing is named in this way only recently (Bell-Fialkoff, 1993; Booth Walling, 2001). Despite the fact that there were some similar usages of ethnic cleansing in German language against Jews and in Russian against Chechens, the concept became more prominent with the Yugoslav Wars. (Conversi, 2006)

This distinction between opportunities and grievances is an overarching classification that applies to different forms of violence. Therefore, several arguments that are proposed for ethnic cleansing also fall within the boundaries of these two concepts. In this section, benefitting from arguments about other forms of violence and with a particular focus on the ones that were proposed for ethnic cleansing, I present several hypotheses on why ethnic cleansing can take place in a context of a civil war. For opportunities, I focus on the arguments about the process of democratization and political and military dominance. For grievances, scholars proposed economic dominance and ethnic hatred as potential causes for ethnic violence.[2]

Bulutgil (2018:1) explains that the literature proposes two approaches regarding the onset of ethnic cleansing. The first is about the role of pre-war conditions. The opportunities and grievances framework that I discuss in this section falls into that category. The second is about understanding the role of wars. The studies see wars either as strategic environments (Downes, 2006; Valentino, 2004) or transformational processes that lead to ethnic cleansing (Bulutgil, 2015; Midlarsky, 2005). Studies that see wars as strategic environments focus on factors such as the type of war, the behavior of minority ethnic groups or who the perpetrators are (Mann, 2005; Straus, 2010; Valentino, 2004). Even though these arguments are valuable, studies claim that they fall short as states diverge in their behavior during comparable war contexts (Straus, 2012; Bulutgil, 2018).

The studies that see wars as transformational processes provide the background for this study as they connect the pre-war conditions to the outcome of ethnic cleansing in a war environment. Since this study aims to explain why ethnic cleansing takes place within a civil war context, while keeping war constant, I aim to understand which pre-war conditions become drivers of ethnic cleansing during a civil war. Therefore, some underlying factors can transform when the war starts due to several factors and lead to ethnic cleansing. In the rest of this section, I provide hypotheses for these potential pre-war factors that can lead to ethnic cleansing.

First, there is a vast literature on the relationship between regime change, democratization, and conflict. Studies argue that democratic regimes are usually less prone to different forms of violence, whether it is interstate war, civil war, genocide, or others (Mansfield & Snyder, 1995, 2008). For that, it is argued that in democracies, the government does not let its people suffer the kind of violence that is observed in authoritarian regimes (Rummel, 1997).

2 Here I am not presenting all the arguments within opportunities and grievances frameworks as the literature is rich with arguments. I particularly focus on the ones that are related to ethnic cleansing and the ones that have been proposed for these cases. For broader discussion on opportunities and grievances, see Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Harff & Gurr, 2004.

Democracy as a regime type may have a lower likelihood to be involved in conflict; yet the path to democracy has different consequences.

Regime change creates volatility and instability in the political system and society; thus, it can lead to the emergence of conflicts. Transitioning regimes are more prone to conflict than stable autocracies and stable democracies (Hegre, Ellingsen, Gates, & Gleditsch, 2001). Cederman et al. (2008) state that democratization is prone to cause both interstate and intrastate wars. Although stable democracy brings more stability and less violence, the period before reaching that capacity is an agonizing period.

How does a regime change lead to violent conflicts? Mansfield and Snyder (2002, 2008) describe the causal mechanism between democratization and violence over weak institutions and nationalist sentiments. According to that, when the transition first takes place, the state authority is weakened and the democratic institutions are not well developed. In such a situation, elites or leaders can use nationalist sentiments (or ethnicity or sectarianism in case of civil wars) to instigate violence. Hegre et. al. (2001), as well, emphasize the non-consolidated institutions in the transitional regimes as the causal mechanism between transition and violence but it is even less discussed than Mansfield and Snyder. According to Gleditsch and Ruggeri (2010), transitions cause state weakness and creates a window of opportunity which leads to violence. In short, these arguments suggest that times of transition create uncertainties, weak institutions and a gap in state's authority that can turn into a window of opportunity for actors to carry out their violent actions.

Several proponents of this argument also link democratization with nationalism, claiming that democratization causes ethnic conflict in ethnically or religiously diverse societies (Horowitz, 1993; Wilkinson, 2004). Societies which contain different ethnic minorities are more likely to have violent transitions. In these periods, the political elites use ethno-nationalist discourses to instigate the people and conceal their shortcomings (Offe, 1992). One of the most prominent arguments for that is offered by Michael Mann who focuses on the politicization of nationalism. For him, when the ethno-nationalist ideas rise and become the primary ideology in a diverse society, it becomes more likely to end with ethnic cleansing. In these cases, ethnicity trumps class as the main form of social stratification. Accordingly, he claims that when the notion of people, or *demos*, in democratizing societies is replaced by the notion of *ethnos,* in other words, when the ethnic identity comes before the consciousness of being a community, it can lead to ethnic cleansing (Mann, 2005, pp. 3-4).

Here we should keep in mind the role of democratization and war as transformative forces for nationalism. The nationalist ideas can always exist in a society; however, when these are not the main cleavages, it is less likely to see

them as the outcome of ethnic cleavage (Bulutgil, 2015). However, democratization and the subsequent overhaul of the political elites can allow nationalist leaders to rise and lead to increasing politicization of nationalist discourse. The war environment bolsters this further and help political leaders to target certain minority groups as part of their political project. Therefore, a pre-war regime change from autocracy to democracy can create instability and lead even to ethnic cleansing by instigating some underlying ideologies such as nationalism.

> ***H_1:*** *Regime change as a democratization process increases the likelihood of ethnic cleansing in the context of a civil war by instigating nationalism.*

While democratization might lead to ethnic cleansing by creating opportunities, domination of one group over other group(s) is another factor for opportunities. In highly diverse societies, if there is a balance of power between groups and none of them have domination over others, it is less likely to have ethnic or religious conflict. One study shows that in highly unequal societies the groups which are on the two edges of the power scale fight more often than those groups in the middle (Cederman, Weidmann, & Gleditsch, 2011). Also it is possible that an ethnic dominance which is translated into a political hegemony of the majority over minority can turn into a civil war (Kalyvas & Sambanis, 2005). Findings in another study show that political and social equalities are more likely to decrease the possibility of violence. However, serious inequality in these aspects can provoke ethnic violence (Besançon, 2005).

While different forms of inequality in diverse societies and dominance of a party over other(s) can be a driver of ethnic cleansing, it is helpful to make a distinction between forms of dominance because they might have different effects on different cases. Political and military dominance is an important factor for the perpetrators to have an opportunity to carry out cleansing. In some diverse societies, positions in political and military offices are distributed proportionately, but not in others, as one group may dominate these positions. Also, the number of military forces that take place in the civil war can also be an effective factor considering domination in the battlefield as another form of domination.

Having a political and military dominance is an opportunity for the perpetrator to commit violence. Carrying out an ethnic cleansing requires the political and military capacity as it is an overwhelmingly large operation. Holding political positions can give the perpetrator group a command on the state resources and military dominance provides the overwhelming force on the ground. A group that lacks this capacity is less likely to commit ethnic cleansing as such. Yet, if a group has the capacity through dominance in political and military spheres, this means it has the opportunity to commit ethnic

cleansing. Therefore, it is more likely for the dominating party to be a perpetrator of an ethnic cleansing.

> ***H_2:*** *The pre-war dominance of one group over other(s) in political and military positions increases the likelihood of an ethnic cleansing. In return, the lack of such a dominance hinders the possibility of such an outcome.*

While regime change and political and military dominance are factors that can provide opportunities for the perpetrators to carry out ethnic cleansing, economic inequality and hatred can be causes for grievances. While uneven distribution of political and military positions creates domination on the elite-level,[3] an imbalanced economic distribution creates a domination on the societal-level and affects the daily life of everyday people, potentially leading to societal-level grievances.

According to Gurr (1970), the main determinant of political violence is the grievances that originate from relative deprivation. An interaction of psychological and societal factors generates relative deprivation, which is defined as the discrepancy between ought and is. In other words, if a person perceives to have (or to be capable of) less than what he/she expects to have, this perception leads to relative deprivation. When society provides less than what the individuals expect, this generates the feeling of relative deprivation, and in return, grievances.

Furthermore, socio-economic differences and inequality is an important source of relative deprivation and economic grievances. Especially with the rise of capitalism and globalization, socioeconomic differences between ethnic groups have become more important. Amy Chua (2004), in her book *World on Fire*, explains how the free-market democracies provoke ethnic violence. She states that ethnic minorities in some societies dominate the ethnic majority. She calls these minorities market dominant minorities. In that sense, free market turns into an engine that creates ethnic hatred and ethnic conflict. The introduction of democracy to such a tense society leads the ethnic majorities to conduct violent actions against minorities.

Therefore, there are two testable aspects of economic dominance when it comes to ethnic cleansing. First, if one group economically dominates the other(s), that group can become a target for violence, ethnic or otherwise. Second, if one group is significantly dominated in comparison to its proportion in the society, this creates the perception of relative deprivation and that aggrieved group can become the perpetrator of an ethnic cleansing.

> ***H_3:*** *The pre-war socioeconomic domination of a group over other(s) create grievances that can cause ethnic cleansing. While the dominant group is the potential target, the aggrieved group is the potential perpetrator.*

3 For a discussion on rationalist explanations and the perpetrators, see (Straus, 2010).

Another factor that is commonly cited as a source of grievances for the emergence of ethnic cleansing is hatred and fear. For example, Robert D. Kaplan (1994), in *Balkan Ghosts,* posits that the conflict between the Balkan peoples is based on ancient hatred. According to this primordialist nationalist idea, antagonism and hatred cannot be eliminated; yet, it can only be hidden occasionally (Sadowski, 1998). In an emotion-based theory of ethnic conflict, hatred is seen as a potential motive for the aggression against an ethnic group when a structural change takes place (Petersen, 2002).

Similar to hatred, fear and insecurity are seen as two important motives for the ethnic cleansing. The fear of people about their future dictates their acts. If the people start to fear from the other groups, the situation can turn into a security dilemma. This leads to mobilization of parties to protect themselves. In a context with ethnic and religious divisions, as a result, ethnic nationalism rises. Since the people think that they can become secure when they constitute the only ethnic group in the society, they launch ethnic cleansing. In this sense, ethnic violence is a bottom-up process for this interpretation (Lake & Rothchild, 1996).

Therefore, hatred and fear are important emotions that can trigger ethnic cleansing. In that sense, the expectation is that rising hatred toward the other group and fear from it makes that group more violent to the other. This shapes my last hypothesis.

> ***H_4:*** *The presence of ancient ethnic hatred and the fear between the peoples lead to ethnic cleansing when turbulent times come.*

Why the Lebanese Civil War and the Yugoslav Wars?

The previous sections provided a general background for civil wars and ethnic cleansing and presented the hypotheses on opportunities and grievances to be tested. In order to test these hypotheses, I turn to two recent episodes of civil wars, that are the Lebanese Civil War and the Yugoslav Wars, as they are good cases to allow a comparison as explained below.

Both Lebanon and Yugoslavia were highly diverse societies. The division in Lebanon was based on religion and sects whereas the division in Yugoslavia was based on ethnicity and religions. In Lebanon, there were 17 constitutionally recognized sects (Abraham, 1996). The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was divided into six Socialist Republics (Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro and Slovenia) and two autonomous provinces (Kosovo and Vojvodina) (Woodward, 1995).

Beyond the common diverse composition, another commonality between the two societies was ongoing conflicts and polarization. Although the peoples lived together in the same cities and even in the same neighborhoods, there had been conflicts between groups from time to time. The Lebanese society had experienced another civil war in 1958. Although the stability was restored

through a series of reforms after the civil war, the politics was ineffective and went into a deadlock in the early 1970s (Makdisi, 2004). Following a dispute in the southern city, Sidon, in early 1975 (Gilmour, 1983), civil war erupted with a Maronite attack to a bus carrying civilian Palestinians in East Beirut (Rowayheb, 2011).

The tensions in Yugoslavia rose in WWII. Croats who aligned with Nazi Germany massacred Serbs in 1941. Josip Tito, as a champion figure of Yugoslavia who ruled the country about three decades, forbade ethnic nationalism (Chua, 2004) and this act of preventing ethnic conflicts was seen as one of the most important successes of socialist Tito rule (Mann, 2005). After the death of Tito, ethnic problems started in the 1980s (Weitz, 2003). Nationalist policies replaced the socialist policies with a shift in the grammar of policy making (Fraser, 1997). The rising leaders in the late 1980s, Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia and Franjo Tudjman in Croatia, bolstered nationalistic ideas across their communities. The Yugoslav Wars started after the independence of Croatia and Slovenia while the Bosnian part of the wars started with Serbian attacks following Bosnia and Herzegovina's proclamation of its independence in 1992.

Furthermore, the two civil wars resemble in terms of having multiple powers involved. Unlike some civil wars that take place between a government and an insurgent group, these two civil wars involved multiple actors. In the Lebanese Civil War, even though there were two main camps, several groups changed sides in different phases of the war and some intra-group fighting was observed. Yugoslavian Wars, on the other hand, was a scene in which different actors fought against each other in different periods. In terms of being based on ethno-religious divides, taking place in heterogeneous societies and having multiple actors involved, these two civil wars provide a good case to compare. In this study, I focus on the Bosnian War under the broader Yugoslav Wars.[4]

There can be concerns about classifying the Bosnian War as a civil war rather than an inter-state one since Bosnia had proclaimed independence by then. However, as Milosevic claimed *"Izzetbegovic will get recognition, but he'll never get a state"* (LeBor, 2002:176). As he points out, the civil war in Bosnia was not only the war of the Bosnian Serbs but of all Serbs in Yugoslavia because they did not acquiesce to the independence of Bosnian Muslims.

There are two points supporting this. First, the aim of Bosnian Serbs, especially of their leader Radovan Karadzic, was the annexation to Greater Serbia (Kalyvas & Sambanis, 2005). Second, Serbs in Serbia were directly involved in the war not as a third party but as a primary party side by side with Bosnian Serbs. This means that the Bosnian Serbs were not autonomous at all, but a

4 A form of ethnic cleansing targeting Croatians was conducted by Serbs in 1991 as well, but I focus on the Bosnian War because it was the most brutal and best-known case among them.

client of Milosevic and the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) and the war was controlled from Belgrade (LeBor, 2002). For that, the country for the comparison of pre-war conditions should be Yugoslavia, not Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The Bosnian ethnic cleansing is maybe the one most commonly emphasized, considering that the concept became famous with the Bosnian case. As Mann (2005:356) points out, *"the ethnic wars of Yugoslavia imprinted the term ethnic cleansing on global consciousness."* The State Failure Problem Set of the Political Instability Task Force (PITF) of Polity Project shows the presence of an ethnic cleansing in the Bosnian case and casualties ranging from 15,000 to 130,000 in different years, while classifying the Muslim residents of Bosnia as subjects to ethnic cleansing (Political Instability Task Force (PITF), 2019). However, there is no record in this dataset for the Lebanese case showing the existence of a genocide or ethnic cleansing as well as in other resources. There were well-known massacres during the Lebanese Civil War, such as Sabra and Shatila; however, these are massacres rather than systematic forms of mass ethnic violence that can be classified as ethnic cleansing.

Bulutgil (2015:583) measures the occurrence of an ethnic cleansing "*as an event in which a state exterminates or forcefully and permanently deports at least 20% of an ethnic group on its territory from their current location to another.*" Population displacement was quite common in Lebanon during the civil war as many people moved to cities and migrated abroad. However, none of the groups had the extermination or deportation of 20% of its population by the hand of another group.

There is one major study that refers to the presence of the cases of ethnic cleansing in Lebanon (Hägerdal, 2017). While this study follows a sound operationalization of ethnic cleansing as the forced displacement of a group by another, the different unit of analysis of this study shows why this study stands alone. Unlike most other studies that look at country-group level ethnic cleansing, Hagerdal looks at ethnic cleansing in village/neighborhood-group level. Therefore, rather than showing if a group was subject to ethnic cleansing in the national level, the study explores whether a group was removed from village or neighborhood. The coding of this study shows just fifteen villages or neighborhoods were ethnically cleansed as the rest were either subject to selective violence (ninety-three areas) or had no violence. Furthermore, these village or neighborhood level cleansings took place by the hands of different groups. This further shows that despite local variation across Lebanon, ethnic cleansing was not a nation-wide event that targeted a specific population, unlike in Yugoslavia.

Case Studies and Theory Testing

The classifications in several datasets and the background of the cases discussed above show that these are two civil war cases that are fairly comparable yet ended with different results. In order to understand why an ethnic

cleansing was experienced in the Yugoslav Wars but not in the Lebanese Civil War, this section will provide a systematic testing of the aforementioned hypotheses.

Democratization and Regime Change in Lebanon and Yugoslavia

When the French rulers retreated from Lebanon in 1943, an unwritten agreement called the National Pact was made. This pact, first, created a proportional system between sects and, in consequence, started a consociational system which is derived from the pluralist theory (Dekmejian, 1978).[5] After the first civil war in 1958, more pluralist reforms called Chehabist Reforms were enacted by then President Fouad Chehab. Until today, Lebanon has a similar, yet modified, electoral system that is considered as a pseudo-democracy.

In Yugoslavia, there was no democracy under the communist regime and Tito. What Tito had done was only an illusion of decentralization because the regime, in fact, was an authoritarian one with a fairly powerful center. After Tito's death, with the decline of the Soviet threat and the winds of change in the communist world, Yugoslavia took a serious step toward economic liberalization and democratization in the 1980s (Somer, 2002). Relatively freer elections took place in the late 1980s. This did not create an exact regime change but at least was seen as a beginning of one.

In order to observe the regime change in these two cases, I look at the democracy scores of the two countries in Freedom House, Polity Project IV and the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. Since Freedom House starts with 1972, it gives only a partial idea about democratization in Lebanon before the civil war, as it is necessary to explore several years in order to detect a change.

Table 1. Freedom House scores (1973-1991)[6]

Country	1974			1975			1978			1989			1991		
	PR	CL	Type	PR	CL	Type	PR	CL	Type	PR	CL	Type	PR	CL	Type
Lebanon	2	2	F	2	2	F	Not Relevant			Not Relevant			Not Relevant		
Yugoslavia	6	6	NF	6	6	NF	6	5	NF	5	5	NF	5	4	PF

PR: Political Rights CL: Civil Liberties NF: Not Free PF: Partially Free F: Free

As seen in Table 1, both political rights and civil liberties scores of Lebanon in Freedom House in three years right before the civil war are 2 which make Lebanon a free democracy. Table 2 shows that in Polity Project IV, the democracy/autocracy scores of Lebanon were 4/2 until 1970 and they become 5/0

5 The purpose of the consociational system in Lebanon was to have a reasonable power-sharing in a democratic system. While such a system has successful examples such as the one in Belgium, it has failed to generate a well-functioning consociational democracy in Lebanon until today. For more, see Lijphart, 1969, 1977.

6 In Freedom House scores, lower numbers indicate a more democratic system. See Freedom House, 2013.

after that year, which also indicates a fair democracy in the country. However, the scores for Yugoslavia were not as positive as those for Lebanon. The Freedom House scores of Yugoslavia starts with 6 to 6 in political rights and civil liberties and gets better after 1980. Right before the outbreak of the civil war, its scores reach 5 to 4. This brings Yugoslavia from a "not free" position to a "partial free" position. The democracy scores of Yugoslavia in Polity Project IV support the Freedom House scores. According to that, until 1980 the democracy score of Yugoslavia is 0 while the autocracy score is 7. After 1980, these scores became 1 and 6 and the polity score increased from -7 to -5.

Table 2. Polity IV political regime characteristics scores (1958-1991) [7]

Country	1958			1964			1970			1974			1980			1984			1989			1991		
	D	A	P	D	A	P	D	A	P	D	A	P	D	A	P	D	A	P	D	A	P	D	A	P
Lebanon	4	2	2	4	2	2	5	0	5	5	0	5	NR			NR			NR			NR		
Yugoslavia	0	7	-7	0	7	-7	0	7	-7	0	7	-7	1	6	-5	1	6	-5	1	6	-5	0	5	-5

D: Democracy A: Autocracy P: Polity Score NR: Not Relevant

Finally, Figure 1 shows the changes in the regime scores in these two countries, based on the V-Dem dataset (Coppedge et al., 2019). In the graph, the dashed horizontal black lines indicate the decade before the onset of the Lebanese Civil War and the dashed horizontal gray lines show the period before the Yugoslav Wars. As seen, neither the democracy score nor other indicators related to the openness of the political system shows a significant change in the Lebanese case. Even though there is a slight increase and decline in Lebanon's democracy score during the decade prior the war, this is not in a level to change the regime type, as the changes are within the confidence intervals. For the Yugoslav case, though, the graph shows a significant change in the political system. While the Yugoslav regime was a pretty close one in 1980, it became fairly open (while still autocratic) by 1992. The same changes are observed in the aspects of the regime such as civil liberties, media and freedom of expression, that allowed political leaders to become more able to use instigating language for nationalistic ideas.

7 According to Polity Project, Democracy and Autocracy scores run from 0 to 10 and Polity score is calculated by subtracting autocracy score from democracy score. (P = D – A). Therefore, higher numbers in Polity score indicate a more democratic regime. See Marshall & Cole, 2011.

Figure 1. *V-Dem political regime scores*



In order to understand the regime-change in these countries, looking merely at numbers is not enough, as these scores should be reviewed in the light of the events of the time. Lebanon was already an electoral pseudo-democracy and in the late 1960s, it became relatively more democratic. Thus, even though we can talk about the relative opening of the regime in Lebanon based on Freedom House and Polity datasets, this process was not necessarily a real regime change. Rather, it was a process of deepening certain democratic institutions. On the other hand, for Yugoslavia, although there was no ultimate breakaway from autocracy, that small change towards democracy meant a lot since it was a long-term consolidated autocratic regime. This political opening in Yugoslavia was not just a consolidation of democracy but contrarily was a start of a potential regime change in the country. As Mansfield and Snyder argue, regime change toward democracy is not a painless, one-day process; it takes time to break away from the old regime (Mansfield & Snyder, 1995). What Yugoslavia experienced in the 1980s was exactly this process.

Especially the election processes in Yugoslavia in the late 1980s reflect the link between regime change/democratization and the rise of nationalism. Milosevic's trip to Kosovo in 1987 and the positive affinity of the Serbs of

Kosovo towards him during the trip, for instance, showed Milosevic's change of discourse and interests which came with democratization. After that, Milosevic assumed a pro-Serb discourse and mobilized the people by promoting Serbian nationalism. The emphasis of Greater Serbia was another form of this nationalism (Mann, 2005). The same nationalist attitude was seen in the discourse of Tudjman as well. As an imprisoned politician by Tito because of his nationalist ideas, Tudjman embraced a pro-Croat nationalist discourse at that time. He emphasized the self-determination of Croats and said that the fate of Croatia could be determined only by the Croats (Hayden, 1996). At the wake of this rising nationalism with democratization, the 1990 elections became a turning point for Yugoslavia. The victories of nationalists in federal republics were followed by the independence and recognition of Slovenia and Croatia as nation-states.

Furthermore, democratization along with the subsequent independence movements created an environment of instability that paved the way for civil war and subsequent ethnic cleansing. In a stable time, there would not be a similar opportunity for leaders to initiate such actions. However, with the changing environment and the increasing uncertainty coming with democratization, the actors found the opportunities to carry out ethnic cleansing in the context of a civil war.

Political and Military Domination in Lebanon and Yugoslavia

The consociational system of Lebanon aimed a proportional share between the sects in the governmental and public offices. The electoral system, accordingly, was designed for the fractionalization of power by giving a pre-designed number of seats to each religious group. The distribution was done according to the results of the 1932 census (no official census has been conducted since). Accordingly, the number of deputies has been estimated as the multiplication of 11 because of the 6:5 ratio in the parliament between Christians and Muslims. Each sect had a certain number of seats designated under the Christian and Muslim seats of the parliament (Suleiman, 1967). For example, with the total number of seats had been fewer before, it had reached 99 before the war, all distributed proportionately (*Qawanin Al-Intikhab Ba'da al-Istiqlal: Qanun 1960*, 1960).

Table 3. Proportion of ethno-religious groups in high political offices (Lebanon)[8]

Sect	1932 Census (%)	Parliamentary Representation (%)	Cabinet Representation (%)	Cabinet Posts (%)
Maronite	28,7	30,3	25,9	25,5
Sunni	22,5	20,2	23,7	24,7
Shiite	19,5	19,2	14,1	13,3
Greek Orthodox	9,7	11,1	12,3	12,6
Greek Catholic	5,9	6,1	11	11,1
Druze	6,7	6,1	11,9	11,6
Armenians	4	5	1,1	1,1
Protestant	1,7	1	n/a	n/a
Minorities	n/a	1	n/a	n/a

The National Pact also made a distribution between the highest positions of the state. Accordingly, the president was a Maronite, the prime minister was a Sunni, and the head of the parliament was a Shiite. A similar proportional representation was obligatory for cabinets and civil service as well (Suleiman, 1967). The distribution of power aiming to prevent the emergence of a hegemonic group also hindered the possibility of the members of the cabinet to work as a unit (Suleiman, 1967). Table 3 shows a slightly higher representation of Sunnis in the cabinet before the civil war; however, the ratios were not far off from the expected distribution. Furthermore, Christians' permanent hold of the presidency provided a balanced distribution.

Since the creation of Yugoslavia after WWI, Serbs had been the most dominant community in the society. They had majority not only in the society but also in state offices too. This continued both in the interwar era and the socialist period. Although Tito was a Croat and officially forbade nationalism, the Serbs had a privileged position in the society and Belgrade was the capital of the Republic (Mann, 2005). Also, although there was not a written document for it, top positions in the bureaucracy, ideally, had to be distributed in respect to the parity principle. However, this was not the case; Serbs and Montenegrins were generally overrepresented in the offices (Kalyvas & Sambanis, 2005).

Table 4. Proportion of ethnic groups in high political offices (Yugoslavia)[9]

National Group	1991 Census (%)	Positions Occupied in 1990 (%)	Positions Occupied in 1990 (nominal)	Position/ Population
Serbs	36,2	43,5	17	1,2
Croats	19,7	20,5	8	1,04
Muslim Bosnians	10	5,12	2	0,5
Albanians	9,3	2,5	1	0,26
Slovenes	7,5	10,25	4	1,36
Macedonians	5,8	12,8	5	2,2
Montenegrins	2,3	5,12	2	2,22
Others	9,2	n/a	n/a	n/a

8 The data is retrieved from (Dekmejian, 1975).

9 The census data is reported by (Woodward, 1995) and the data on political positions is reported by (Szayna & Zanini, 2000).

According to Szayna and Zanini (2000), among the thirty-nine positions in high offices such as Yugoslav State Presidency, Federal Executive Council, Yugoslav Federal Assembly, Yugoslav Federal Chamber, LCY Presidium, Federal Secretariat for National Defense and Secretariat for Internal Affairs, 17 offices were held by the Serbs, which constituted the highest number. This proportion, compared with the national composition of the state in 1991 census, shows that Montenegrins, Serbs, Macedonians and Slovenes were overrepresented (see Table 4). However, the number of Macedonian, Slovene and Montenegrin officials was significantly small. Surely, in this kind of a small sample, just one official might reflect a serious overrepresentation. However, beyond the percentages, as the nominal number of Serbs was relatively higher, the high ratio of Serbian officials is not deceptive. This overrepresentation of Serbs –both in terms of ratio and number- indicates their dominance. On the other hand, most underrepresented ethnic groups were Albanians and Muslim Bosnians, which shows the relation of dominance between Serbs and Bosnians. In addition to this, the communist party membership is another indicator showing the domination of Serbs in the political arena while they constituted more than half of the party members (Vucinich & Tomasevich, 1969).

The military domination of the parties, on the other hand, can be examined both in terms of the army and the militias who participated in the battlefield. The Lebanese Army before the civil war had almost 20000 soldiers. The Muslims (52%), especially the Shiites, were slightly more populated than Christians in the level of soldiers (Gilmour, 1983). Still, the army had a pro-Maronite structure. The main reason for that is seen in the higher levels of the army. The Christians constituted 56% of the non-commissioned officer's level and 58% on the officer's level. More importantly, the two highest positions in the army, namely the Commander of the Armed Forces and the Chief of Military Intelligence were Christian based on the consensus of the National Pact (Gaub, 2007). Because of this slight dominance in the higher levels of the army and pro-Maronite attitude, the Army had a Christian image.

The number of militias in the civil war is quite controversial. Since the war continued for 15 years and different groups (even different states) were involved in the war, it is difficult to classify the parties into two groups. Another reason for this is that some groups changed sides in the course of the war. However, with a rough distinction, there were two main groups which were the right-wing Christian Lebanese Front and the left-wing Muslim Lebanese National Movement. It is reported that the Christian Front had about 25,000 deployed men whereas the Muslim Front had more than 30,000 with the addition of Palestinians (Smith & Collelo, 1989). However, the addition of an important group of soldiers of the Lebanese Army to the Christian Front and the Israeli involvement made the Christian Front relatively more advantageous. Still, there was no absolute military domination by one side over the other during the war.

As in the Lebanese case, the most crowded group of Yugoslavia had dominance in the National Army. The Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) was considered as a pro-Serb army (O'Ballance, 1995). In 1981, 60% of the officer corps in the JNA were Serbs. This makes an overrepresentation by a ratio of 1.51 at that time (Mann, 2005). Also, at the wake of the war, it was recorded that almost 55,000 of a total 80,000 soldiers in the JNA were Serbs (LeBor, 2002). At the beginning of the war, the Serbs had a military superiority over the Bosnians. Even though the Bosnian troops reached a relative military parity with the Serbs, the latter had a military superiority in the earlier part of the war when most brutal episodes of the ethnic cleansing took place (Kalyvas & Sambanis, 2005).

The numbers for both cases represent a difference between them in terms of political and military dominance. For political dominance, although they both have a proportional parity principle, it was not implemented in Yugoslavia while it was cautiously implemented in Lebanon. This proportional system in Lebanon prevented Maronites to impose their hegemony politically although they were the biggest group in the society. On the other hand, Serbs, had a political and bureaucratic dominance over other groups, especially over Bosnians, along with their high ratio in the population. For the military dominance, the majority group had dominance in the army in the pre-war period. While there was rather a parity between the groups in the Lebanese Civil War, the Bosnians could only balance the Serbian troops later in the war in Yugoslavia. Therefore, Serbs had a political and relative military dominance that gave them the capacity and means to carry out ethnic cleansing; whereas no party was as dominant in Lebanon to have such an opportunity.

Socioeconomic Dominance and Grievances in Lebanon and Yugoslavia

The Lebanese society was primarily an agricultural and clientelistic society. However, in the second half of the 20th century, while there was an economic boost in the country, the importance of agriculture started to decrease. In the early 1970s, sharecropping nearly disappeared (Traboulsi, 2007). The main reason behind this economic boost was the rise of industry and services. In 1974, agriculture constituted 9% of GDP, whereas industry was 17% and services sector was 74% of the GDP (Odeh, 1985).

This proportion of the sectors gives an idea about the socioeconomic situation of the society because in the 1970 Christian/Muslim ratio in industry was 10:2, in finance 11:2 and in services 16:2 (Traboulsi, 2007). On the other hand, there was an uneven development between the regions. Mount Lebanon, where the inhabitants are dominantly Maronites, became the most developed region. The least developed regions were the agricultural regions like Beqaa and South Lebanon which are dominantly Shiite and Sunni Muslim respectively (Odeh, 1985). These distributions between regions and sectors

give a general scheme about the socioeconomic distribution between the groups.

Based on this socioeconomic distribution, there should have been economic grievances on the part of the Muslims against the Maronite Christians. If such grievances had led to ethnic/sectarian violence, then we would have seen violence undertaken by the aggrieved Muslims against economically dominant Christians, particularly the Maronites. However, despite the severity of the war and toll on both sides, we did not observe an ethnic cleansing or similar systematic ethnic cleansing by Muslims against Maronites.

Table 5. Income distribution in Yugoslavia[10]

Region	1990 Income per Capita (current US$)	Relative Income 1988	Relative Income 1990
Bosnia	2,365	76.2	67.8
Montenegro	2,484	73.9	71.1
Croatia	4,468	116.0	127.8
Macedonia	2,282	64.2	65.3
Slovenia	7,611	198.3	217.7
Serbia	3,379	90.5	96.7
Kosovo	854	38.1	24,4
Vojvodina	4,321	113.6	123.6
Yugoslavia	3,496	100.0	100.0

The socioeconomic conditions of ethnic groups in Yugoslavia do not support the arguments about economic grievances argument either. Table 5 shows the income distribution between the regions in 1990. As seen, Slovenia was by far the richest region in Yugoslavia, followed by Croatia. While the income per capita in Serbia was almost equal to the Yugoslavia average; it was below average in Bosnia, Montenegro and Macedonia.

Other studies refer to this uneven distribution of income in Yugoslavia in the advantage of Slovenia and Croatia as well (Cederman et al., 2011; Moghalu, 2006). For example, Szayna and Zanini compare different ethnic groups in terms of socioeconomic status stratification in the late 1980s. According to their metric showing socioeconomic distribution, while Slovenes and Croats had the highest socioeconomic status, Serbs were still on the positive side. Muslim Bosnians and Albanians, on the other hand, constituted the lower strata of the society (see Table 6).

10 The income data is reported by (Kalyvas & Sambanis, 2005: 196).

Table 6. Status stratification in Yugoslavia[11]

Ethnic Group	Status
Slovenes	+ +
Croats	+ +
Serbs	+
Montenegrins	+
Macedonians	-
Muslim Bosnians	- -
Albanians	- -

++ = high status; - - = low status

When we consider these distributions in regard to economic grievances argument, we expect economically suppressed groups to rebel and conduct ethnic cleansing. We would also expect the economically dominant groups to be targeted by ethnic cleansing. However, in the Lebanese case, the ethnic cleansing was not a product created by either Shiites which were economically weak or by Maronites who were economically dominant. It was a collective thing created by different parties of the war in common and did not become as systematic. In the Yugoslavian case, on the other hand, if the majoritarian group attacked the richest group as the grievances argument suggests, the expectation would be for Serbs to attack Slovenes. However, contrarily, Serbs allowed Slovenes to be independent. We could also expect the poorer Bosnians to commit ethnic cleansing against more dominant groups such as Slovenes or even Serbs, as they were economically aggrieved. Yet, the ethnic cleansing was conducted by economically rather well-off Serbs targeting economically weak Bosnians. Hence, this argument does not explain the ethnic cleansing against Bosnians in Yugoslavia in the framework of the economic grievances argument.

Ethnic Hatred, Fear, and Trust in Yugoslavia

Although there is a group of scholars asserting the existence of ethnic hatred in Yugoslavia (Kaplan, 1994), other scholars emphasize the harmony between the communities in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Cigar, 1995). Ethnic hatred and fear are negative sentiments that can lead people to violence. On the other hand, trust is the opposite of the two; because when there is trust between the groups, the fear of insecurity disappears and the ethnic hatreds are controlled, even if they exist. Thus, the existence of trust is an indicator of a retrospective feeling of security and harmony.

Table 7 shows the ethnic diversity, interethnic trust in 1989, the percentage of displaced people and support for Ante Markovic in the 1990 elections.

11 The social stratification classification is reported by (Szayna & Zanini, 2000: 94).

The table exhibits that Bosnia, the most diverse region in Yugoslavia, had the highest score in tolerance and interethnic trust. This score did not distinguish between different groups within Bosnia and covered all of Muslims, Serbs and Croats living in Bosnia, which is a good indication that different groups lived in a relative trust despite high diversity. Also, the third column that illustrates the support for Markovic is another indication of the support for diversity, since he was the last prime minister of Yugoslavia who wanted to keep diversity within Yugoslavia.[12] While support for Markovic was high across different regions, the highest support was observed in Bosnia.

Table 7. Diversity and tolerance index (Yugoslavia)[13]

Region	Diversity Index	Tolerance	Support for Markovic	Total Displaced by 1999/ Population in 1981
Bosnia	.64	3,88	93	0.60
Vojvodina	.61	3,83	89	n/a
Croatia	.45	3,63	83	0.07
Montenegro	.45	3,45	n/a	n/a
Macedonia	.41	2,53	89	0.08
Kosovo	.39	1,71	42	0.50
Serbia	.27	3,28	81	n/a
Slovenia	.19	2,67	59	n/a
Average	.42	3,28	n/a	n/a

The scores in Table 7 show that there was a relatively high trust between the ethnic groups in Yugoslavia. Especially in the ethnically most diverse regions, the trust score was generally higher. This notion of trust between the ethnic groups indicates, at the very least, the ancient hatreds and fear of insecurity were not so common. Thus, these findings do not support the argument that ethnic hatred created the ethnic cleansing in Yugoslavia. As there is no clear data showing levels of trust and hatred between groups in Lebanon, this section did not cover that case. However, since the argument is falsified in the Yugoslav case, which is the positive case, the Lebanese case would not provide an extra value to support the argument.

12 Ante Markovic was the prime minister of Yugoslavia prior to the onset of the war. A Bosnian-Croat, he believed in reforms within Yugoslavia and was strongly opposed by Slobodan Milosevic. Therefore, support for a pro-Yugoslavia prime minister is considered as a proxy against underlying hatred argument. It shows that despite grievances, an anti-nationalist leader was fairly popular.

13 The first two columns are retrieved from (Hodson, Sekulic, & Massey, 1994: 1548). The tolerance measure is based on a survey conducted in 1989-1990. The authors find that diversity is one of the best predictors of tolerance in former Yugoslavia. The last two columns are from (Somer, 2002: 108).

Conclusion

The previous section shows that the grievances hypotheses which are related to socioeconomic domination and ethnic hatred/fear are not supported by the findings. The hypotheses pertaining opportunities such as democratization and political and military dominance, on the other hand, are supported by the systematic case comparisons as summarized in Table 8.

The expectation for the socioeconomic domination argument was that the economically suppressed groups would pay back when the domination created an ethnic hatred. However, both in Lebanon and Yugoslavia, the majority groups were not socioeconomically the weakest groups. Ethnic hatred and fear arguments are also falsified. The interethnic trust scores in Yugoslavia do not support the claim of ancient hatreds.

Table 8. Overview of hypotheses

	Hypothesis	Association with Ethnic Cleansing	Lebanon	Yugoslavia	Supports or not?
Opportunities	Democratization / Regime Change	Positive	No regime change	Yes, in the form of regime change	Supports
	Political / Military Domination	Positive, perpetrator dominant	No	Yes	Supports
Grievances	Economic Domination	Negative, victim dominant	Yes	No	Does not support
	Ancient Hatred / Fear	Positive	N/A	No	Does not support

The case comparisons on Lebanon and Yugoslavia, on the other hand, support the hypotheses about opportunities, that are a regime change toward democracy and political and military dominance. Freedom House, Polity, and V-Dem scores indicate that there were some increases in democracy scores in both countries before the onset of the civil wars; yet the observed increase in Yugoslavia was in the form of a regime change, creating instability, unlike the one in Lebanon. Also, the distribution of political and military positions in Yugoslavia and Lebanon supports the hypothesis as well. Serbs in Yugoslavia, who were historically the dominant group of the nation, had a political domination over other ethnic groups, especially over Muslim Bosnians who later became the victims of the ethnic cleansing.

As emphasized before, the two societies were ethnically/religiously diverse societies; polarization emerged between the parties before the civil war and

more importantly inter-group violence started with the civil war. When these common conditions were combined with democratization and political and military dominance, the civil war in Bosnia turned into an ethnic cleansing. While no group had found such a dominant force and uncertainty to operate for ethnic cleansing in Lebanon, the Serbian political elites who were already dominant in the society promoted the ethno-nationalist ideas. With democratization and instability, both these political elites and the leaders who made public speeches embraced the nationalist ideas and used a rhetoric to instigate violence against minority groups. This outcome of democratization and political and military dominance in the turbulent period created by the civil war caused one of the most devastating events of the 20th century.

These findings also provide a theoretical contribution. Falsifying the hypotheses on grievances does not mean that there were no grievances underlying ethnic cleansing. Surely, there were grievances both in the Lebanese and Yugoslavian cases that facilitated the process of civil war, and potentially, ethnic and sectarian violence. However, these findings indicate that grievances by themselves are not enough to generate a systematic ethnic cleansing. For such an overwhelming systematic violence to take place, there needs to be certain opportunities that can translate the underlying grievances into action. When conditions such as a transition and a war environment provided opportunities, the underlying grievances were disinterred and transformed into action. With the political and military dominance that allowed for large-scale operations, it was possible for the Serbs to carry out an ethnic cleansing. On the other hand, it is difficult to speculate what would happen in the Lebanese case had there been the opportunities; yet, we can argue based on the Bosnian example that the presence of opportunities is an important factor for an ethnic cleansing to take place in the context of a civil war.

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