Journal of American Studies of Turkey
7 (1998) : 69-80.

James Adams's *The New Spies: Exploring the Frontiers of Espionage*: A Review Essay

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In retrospect, it seems that the notorious American double agent Aldrich Ames was imprisoned for life in 1994 as much out of ticklish spitefulness as on account of any sort of just apportionment of punishment for miscreant deeds. Most of the dozen or so United States intelligence assets in the old Soviet Union, compromised by Ames's blasé consumerist approach to the Great Game, would be useless now anyway.

Considering Ames's blatant intellectual swagger, it is possible that a balanced, democratic judgement on his acts would have sentenced the superannuated delinquent to an indefinite term as a minimum-wage fry cook in a hamburger palace for as long as it might take him to repay income tax on his millions in quittance from Moscow. An equal justice might have doomed Ames's spendthrift wife and co-conspirator, Maria del Rosaria Casas Ames, to remain in the United States and shop exclusively at Wal-Mart stores for the rest of her natural life. It may be that such condign chastisements as are here proposed would effect a more corrigible reform of the curiously named intelligence community than the sentences actually pronounced on the Ameses are likely to achieve.

In the United States, the garish Ames case marks a fitting end to the Cold War of tawdry East-West espionage. We are now entering a new age of secret and not so secret reconaissance of new hazards to established power, requiring reforms of tradecraft, organization and perspective, advances James Adams in *The New Spies: Exploring the Frontiers of Espionage* (1995). Adams's kaleidoscopic book is a timely excursion into the practices, structures and outlooks of American, British and Russian intelligence services based on his interviews with prominent intelligence officers in those countries, as well as on prodigious research into the record of relevant events. His dangerous post-Cold War scenarios unfold into new but disorderly realms of politically destabilizing inane terrorists, megalomaniacal nuclear proliferators, murderous ethnic hotheads, shady financial confidence artists, nerdish industrial spies, slimy drugs traffickers and contemporary soulless Frankensteins who concoct bacteriological pathogens and chemical weapons. It is not a pretty picture. Still, much of what he tells us could, and often does, appear in popular newspapers, magazines and journals of the day.

Everything in the furtive world of espionage has not changed for the worse. The practice of secret intelligence, as of old, still provides its interested spectators occasional scenes of comic relief. Late in 1997, for instance, the Japanese prime minister was constrained to admit a decade-old romance with a female diplomatic interpreter who inconveniently turned out to be a Chinese spy (Jordan and Sullivan 4). From another report of the same vintage, it appears that Boris Pasternak's "longtime mistress, muse and literary assistant" was also a KGB informer (Stanley 1, 8). If this tacky demise of Dr. Zhivago's original "Lara" fails to amuse, consider that the Russian wife of 20th-century Britain's "most notorious traitor," Kim Philby, and several of his former Soviet espionage pupils in Moscow, have recently published a book of their memoirs with the kitschy title *I Did It My Way: Kim Philby in Espionage and Life*. The title was chosen, said a former Philby student at a press conference, "because Philby loved to listen to Frank Sinatra singing My Way" (Meek 2).

No list of silly spy stories can properly exclude mention of the hard-working, creative peculators whose stock-in-trade is the sort of imaginative disinformation occasionally featured in John le Carré's brilliant tales of the clandestine intelligence netherworld. If report of one case is to be believed, Israel's legendary Mossad was badly taken in by one of its own. It is also possible that the December 1997 news story out of Jerusalem is itself a product of evocative disinformation. (Schmemann, "Word Gets Out That Mossad Spymaster Made Up Reports About Syria" 5; "Swiss Seek Apology on Spying, Israel Silent," A1, A2; Contreras 16; Schmemann, "Another Black Eye for Mossad" 1, 5).

In a more serious vein, Adams contends that lingering ethnic rivalries are among the most difficult challenges to the ingenuity and effectiveness of bureaucratically competitive intelligence agencies. For example, up to 1994, the activities of 14 separate British army, MI5 and Ulster intelligence units made for often ineffective sleuthing amid Northern Ireland's political strife. The Irish Republican Army (IRA) was able to evade most attempts at penetration of its ranks through its decentralized organization of self-sufficient functional cells. Adams writes that a major obstacle to the success of anti-IRA forces is the refusal of both intelligence and police agencies to yield turf and perquisites to a centrally organized British version of the American Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). In light of the often competitive practices of intelligence bureaus in the United States, including the FBI, Adams's admonition in this case is perplexing.

In a surprising admission, perhaps linked to suspicions in some quarters about its possible ties to alleged Nicaraguan Contra drug dealers in Los Angeles, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) removed its chief of Latin American espionage from his post, for endeavors to aid a friend and former colleague who had been arrested for violating narcotics laws in the Dominican Republic ("CIA Demotes Top Aide Who Helped Friend Linked to Drugs" 3; "Away From Politics" 3). Considering the

expense and lack of results of America's drug policies towards Latin countries, there is more than a little irony in this tale.

Drug trafficking is a relatively new and somewhat challenging brief of the West's intelligence agencies. According to Adams, an important impediment to the effectiveness of their operations may be that huge amounts of anti-drug funds lately available to interested agencies have discouraged cooperative endeavors among them. In the US, for example, the FBI, the CIA, and units of the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Defense and State departments, the National Reconaissance Office and the National Security Agency own discrete pieces of the official anti-drug budget allocations with little in the way of incentives to develop cooperation among their intelligence gatherers.

Adams reports that since 1986, Latin American drug traffickers have been shipping narcotics to several recently accessible Eastern European venues. Not only are local markets there lucrative in themselves, but the Eastern European nests also serve as transit points to Western European dealers as well as offer new outlets for legitimate investments (laundering) of drug profits. In this connection, Adams offers some intriguing statistics that show that 8,500 Colombians visited Prague in 1992 alone, while about 15,000 Indians now live in Warsaw, and some 10,000 Iranians reside in Sofia.

While most European heroin imports still come from Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan and Turkey, Adams argues cogently that, lately, former Soviet intelligence networks are being used to smuggle the product into Europe from the more than 100,000 poppy fields in Russia alone. Ominously, Adams concludes that prospective NATO membership for Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, and Turkey's eventual acceptance by the European Union are events unlikely to stop the tide of illicit drugs westward or to prevent practical control of these governments by crime syndicates.

It was reported early in February 1998 that a secret official investigation of a Reuters Holdings subsidiary in New York City found that Reuters Analytics, Inc. contracted with a computer company in the US to conduct surreptitious electronic break-ins of rival financial data consultants, Bloomberg. The ostensible aim of the alleged invasions of Bloomberg's data files was theft of valuable proprietary information about financial data software used by Bloomberg (Eichenwald 9; Reeve, Moss and Doder 20-22; Reeve 23-24).

Although the Reuters/ Bloomberg affair is so far a private conflict, it seems clear that what is called industrial espionage is an important preoccupation of many governments friendly and unfriendly to one another. Adams maintains that the French secret service, the DGSE, for example, places a high priority on economic espionage in both the US and the UK with the aim of maintaining France's technological prowess on the cheap. With their economy a shambles, the Russians

also have an urgent incentive to practise industrial and technological spying. By Adams's account, the Cold War's bad guys in the old Soviet Union managed to steal plans for the British "Harrier" jet aircraft, the Americans' "AWAC" aircraft locator technology, and the B-1 bomber, as well as various torpedo and air and ground RADAR designs. Their techno-sleuths saved the Soviets billions of rubles in research and development costs, and some of the same successful industrial gumshoes are still active in the trade.

By Adams's careful estimates, 20 governments are currently embarked on efforts to filch industrial and technological tradecraft from private businesses and public agencies in the US. This list of poachers includes techno-spies from Brazil, China, France, India, Israel, Japan, South Africa and South Korea. As recently as 1992, for example, a South Korean company had a technician employed by General Electric on a million dollar annual retainer in exchange for his providing trade secrets about producing synthetic diamonds. Not at all tongue-in-cheek, Adams's book thoughtfully includes the British Security Service's "Security Advice for Visitors in China" (1990) prepared by MI5 specifically with the travelling trade secrets-conscious businessperson in mind. This British cousins' helpful admonition arrived in America not a moment too soon. In November 1997, a retired Eastman Kodak company manager admitted violating the American Economic Espionage Act of 1996 by stealing certain proprietary formulae and blueprints and selling them to Chinese interests (Nelson 3).

Adams's discussion of international terrorism is also timely and thorough. It may be true that the Iranian regime of President Mohammed Khatami has ushered in an era of "democratic peace," as a prominent scholar suggested to conferees in Williamsburg, Virginia, early in February 1998 (Boustany 7). Still, the US government, while seemingly hopeful of liberalizing trends in Teheran, considers what it calls "the issue of Iran's support of terrorism" a major obstacle to normal ties with that country's government. Changes are coming to Iran's government policies and structures, but they are halting and gradual.

Adams indicates that the rash of terrorist attacks that broke out in the late 1960s caught the Western intelligence services without sources, archives and technical equipment essential to generate information about terror groups and their aims, methods and supporters. He asserts that American intelligence agents pragmatically tried to purchase valuable catch-up time in the 1970s by making a useful deal with Abu Hassam Salameh, one of Yasser Arafat's top aides and the author of the murders of Israeli athletes at the 1972 Munich Olympic Games. The Americans gained access to Salameh's boss, and Arafat responded by behaving less like a terrorist and more like an ambitious politician. Unfortunately for the longevity of the accord, an Israeli hit squad murdered Salameh in 1979—the year of the Iranian Revolution and the American hostages crisis. (See Weiner, "CIA Is Training Palestinian Forces" 7; Weiner, "Spy Fiction in Carolina—What Training Base?" 3). At the same time, Adams writes, the US possessed no human intelligence sources

or assets on the ground in Palestine, Lebanon and Iran. The situation has not improved much since then, though not for want of trying—if we are to believe the recent report of a former United Nations weapons inspector in Iraq. Indeed, one of Adams's principal nostrums for reform of American intelligence agencies is a redoubled effort at developing human, as opposed to technical, sources of information in the Middle East. Deporting to Iraq former CIA-recruited resistance fighters who have worked to overthrow Saddam Hussein may not be a useful first step in accumulating reliable eyes and ears in Iraq. (Weiner, "U. S. May Deport Iraqis Who Worked for CIA" 6; Weiner, "Ex-CIA Chief Offers To Defend 6 Iraqis" 6).

Perhaps the most striking fact that Adams's research into terrorism brings to light is that it was the US's financing and training in Afghanistan, during 1979-1989, of anti-Soviet Muslim fundamentalists that produced many of the current generation of what Adams describes as "fanatical terrorists who are lately the subjects of frequent American official anxiety and wrath." During the 1980s, it appears to have occurred to no one in Washington's intelligence organizations that the anti-Soviet *mujahedeen* in Afghanistan might be anti-American as well. Adams maintains that after 1989, American money was used by some successful and enterprising wartime survivors for investing in the international drug traffic and the armaments trade. In Adams's account, among other negative results, American military assistance funds to Muslim fundamentalists in Afghanistan are directly responsible for the virtual conquest of northern Pakistan by "drug-financed guerrilla cadres." It is as good an explanation of Pakistan's current plight as any, and likely better than most.

Most of Adams's readers will be relieved to find that he thinks there is not—and never was—a centrally scripted, worldwide terrorist conspiracy as suggested in Claire Sterling's *The Terror Network* (1981). No doubt, the same audience will be less heartened to learn that Adams agrees with the assessment of Charlie Allen's Warning Center at the CIA in its prediction of the gradual spread of Islamic fundamentalism throughout North Africa. Allen has a solid track record behind him as it was his branch that first "raised the warning flags about Saddam's forthcoming invasion of Kuwait, and ... about Algeria in the summer of 1992." Perhaps one explanation for the ostensible inability of Western governments to publicly identify the authors of what seems to be the contemporary bloodbath in Algeria is that "at the heart of the fundamentalist army are 1,000 veterans of the Afghan War" (Adams 187; "United Nations Catalogs Atrocities in Annual Meeting" B2).

Adams's solution of the problem of fundamentalist terrorism is to somehow mount a full-fledged attack on what he thinks are "the basic underlying problems" of corruption and social injustice in the Middle East (190). Easy for him to say! If that is what is required to muzzle terrorism, at least from a Western perspective, there may be no solution to the problem in the Middle East and elsewhere. In this connection, it is worth noting that the CIA's recent tactic has been to quietly

coordinate its anti-terrorist campaigns by sharing its superior intelligence products with cooperative governments in a kind of preventive-strike policy.

Among intelligence experts, careful attention to armaments proliferation is usually focused on what are called weapons of mass destruction; but the definition of mass destruction is open to variable interpretation. How much destruction must take place before the results are viewed as massive? More than 80,000 persons have been slaughtered in Algeria since 1992 by people whose chief implements of assault are knives. Then, too, Adams reports that the Russian government of President Boris N. Yeltsin now employs huge shipments of what are commonly called conventional weapons to such countries as Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines as a means of paying for Russia's outstanding trade debts. ("Report Says Over 3,700 Women Killed in Algerian Strife" B2; "Algeria Polls Hold Hope for Change" B1, B3).

Lately, prominent American politicians, generals and ideologues have characterized proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as "the gravest security problem still before us," but Adams states that as recently as 1991 the US sold $23.3 billion worth of sophisticated conventional weaponry to Israel, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. At this writing, the latest arms exports figure available is for 1997. In that year, for the seventh year in succession, the US led all other arms exporters with 44% of the world's military sales market for a whopping total of $34.6 billion in military exports. As a consequence, Washington is hard put to justify its complaints to China, Russia and North Korea about their voluminous arms sales to Iran.

On a related front, there is much debate about the actual contents of Iraqi arsenals, although British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook seems to believe that "Saddam Hussein possesses chemical agents and biological weapons on an industrial scale." By contrast, Turkish State Minister Sükrü Sina Gürel has said he thinks that Iraq is no threat to Turkey even with chemical and biological weapons in its armory. (Fairhall, Borger and Black 1; "Yilmaz: Turkey Won't Take Risks" A2). Nevertheless, the dogged insistence of the United States on breaking open Iraq's secret bastions of weapons caches is rooted in a longer term American policy aim to "fit Baghdad into an international arms control system" against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Clearly, Saddam Hussein's past reluctance to offer wholehearted cooperation to the UN weapons inspection teams assigned to tour his country's likely centers of weapons production has wrought grave damage to his people's economy and standard of living since 1991 (Fitchett, "West Seeks Lasting Curbs on Iraq" 6).

The weapons inspection regime in Iraq that began in 1991 was still incomplete, as these lines were written, because of Baghdad's predictable duplicity and procrastination, according to Richard Butler, former head of the United Nations inspection teams in Iraq. Consequently, at first the inspectors had to rely heavily on relevant clues offered by military intelligence agencies of Western and Middle

Eastern governments in the Persian Gulf War coalition that defeated Iraq in 1991. Iraq always denied manufacturing chemical weapons, but Butler's sleuths found four tons of VX, a potent nerve gas, stored in Iraq. Biological weapons are probably more dangerous than chemical agents because their effects are harder to control and to combat. Experts on biological pathogens disagree about whether they are difficult to produce in quantity, but nobody disputes their potentially horrific effects. (Broad and Miller 2; Smith, "Experts Invited by Iraq Back UN Claims on Weapons" 1, 7).

Ironically, as Adams explains, American intelligence reports were crucial to Iraq's survival during its 1980-1988 war with Iran. Still, in November 1988 the CIA's Warning Center cautioned the National Security Council that Saddam Hussein might have dangerous geopolitical ambitions in the region. Charlie Allen went as far as to hire a high-powered attorney out of fear of being sacked for bucking Washington's received wisdom on the subject of Iraq. In Adams's view, the key point is that, at the time, political officials were satisfied with profitable exports to Iraq of ostensibly dual-use armaments and nuclear technology equipment. In any case, Adams reports that, by 1990, the United States had no human intelligence assets on the ground in Iraq. In fact, it is now known that, in 1990, Saddam's own intelligence agency was able to sound out Western assessments of Iraq's missile strength and locations, as well as American military deployments in the Persian Gulf region (Cowell 11).

Since 1991, although Saddam Hussein has been able to rebuild his tattered forces by purchases through front companies in France, Germany and Jordan, Adams thinks that Iran is now a more dangerous player in the Middle East than Iraq. He states that Iran's current political objective is exactly what it was in the days of Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlevi's reign. Adams reports that in 1992 alone, Iranian weapons purchases totaled $33.4 billion in value. At the time, Iran's foreign debt was $30 billion and its unemployment rate exceeded 25% of its working population. The Iranians are clearly desirous of acquiring state-of-the-art nuclear technology; but their Russian suppliers have observed that Iranian technical know-how and organizational skills are such that Russians will likely take over construction of reactor facilities at Bushehr (Hoffman 5).

According to Adams, Israel's Mossad believes that Iran has been building chemical and biological weapons factories since 1990, a major incentive for Saddam Hussein to resist the United Nations' efforts to unmask Iraq's own similar projects. In fact, it is probably true that all of the Middle East's major governments are dabbling in chemical and biological weapons researches in violation of the Chemical Warfare Treaty of 1925 and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972. Adams also offers the words of three defectors from the program that Russia is pursuing on biological pathogens that it has adopted some of the same techniques of hiding the work that are being used by Iraq (Smith, "Russian-Iraqi Evasion of Sanctions

Suspected" 1, 9; Weiner, "Defector Details Soviet Germ Project" 5; Gordon A1, A5).

Another source of both chemical weapons and American anxiety over them is Libya. Recent speculations have centered on a massive pipeline construction project planned to run through underground tunnels from Tarhuna, near the country's northwestern coast, to Kufra in its southeastern desert near Egypt. American experts on Libyan politics think that the 2,000 miles of underground tunnels to be built could usefully store large caches of chemical and biological weapons and rocket missiles out of sight of the prying eyes of spy satellites overhead. This scenario is suggested by the fact that the tunnels begin at Tarhuna, site of an advanced chemical weapons plant. Colonel Muammar Gadafy insists on calling the planned tunnel system the Great Man-Made River project, and maintains that its pipes and pumps will eventually make the desert bloom. Some Europeans, who have worked at the project, have offered a less benign explanation of the endeavor. "If Saddam Hussein said he was building a four meter ... pipe to 100 miles from Kuwait, 100 miles from Iran, 100 miles from Turkey, for the purpose of moving water, would you believe him?" one engineer, said to be knowledgeable, is reported to have mused. (Bonner 7; Black 6).

If the pipeline construction is indeed a reality, then Gadafy has good reason to bury his military secrets in desert sands. Early in this decade, Dr. George Carver, formerly a deputy director of the CIA, revealed the existence of a photographic archive snapped from U-2 spy planes and KH-9 photoreconaissance satellites that depict what some sensible observors think may be the structural outline of an ancient vessel buried under an icecap on Mount Ararat in Turkey. In a similar exercise in the uses of advanced photography, certain RADAR mapping techniques have also successfully penetrated desert sands in Egypt to chart the ancient course of the Nile River (Reeve, "And the Ark Rested in the Seventh Month, on the Seventh Day of the Month, upon the Mountain of Ararat" 34-35; Wilford 3). However, photoreconaissance is still a weak tool against the determination of governments to develop noxious weapons. It is true that the US and Great Britain have had some successes denying exports of materials for nerve gases and rocket fuel products to Libya. Nevertheless, besides Libya, Adams names 30 other governments in Africa, Asia and Latin America suspected of trying to develop chemical weapons.

As late as 1992, the Director of the CIA, Robert Gates, thought that the US was safe from threats of chemical and biological weapons. Four years later, the US Marine Corps' Chemical/Biological Incident Response Force "made its quiet debut at the 1996 Summer Olympic Games in Atlanta." In January 1997, the Marines' unit attended the second inauguration of President Bill Clinton. A year later, the US Defense Science Board recommended a 1,000% increase in intelligence funding for research and operations against germ warfare hazards, and proposed enhancing official bribes to unemployed Russian bacteriologists to keep them from hiring out

to foreign governments. However, this program and its newer companion dealing with Russia's weapons producing closed cities are not without their problems. (Graham 3; Hoagland 8; "Science in Russia: The Diamonds in the Rubble" 27).

In the related matter of nuclear weapons proliferation, a treaty ratified by 140-odd governments is designed to limit possession of nuclear weapons to the US, the UK, Russia, France and China. Since a number of treaty signatories appear to have ignored the agreement, in 1987 the US, Canada, France, Great Britain, Germany, Italy and Japan created a Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) to try to curb exports of equipment for missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons. Thus far, the success of the MTCR seems to be indifferent, especially in light of India's and Pakistan's new status as members of the nuclear club. The CIA has established a Non-Proliferation Center, but it is difficult to see what intelligence collection alone can do to halt the spread of nuclear arsenals in countries other than the declared five. On the other hand, Adams reports that in 1993, President Clinton encouraged the CIA to give thought to a return to its Cold War policy of the covert overthrow of undesirable governments. The idea is to try to bend international political conditions in directions favorable to the US without resort to military force (see Thomas, Dickey and Vistica 19; Dickey, Dennis, Vistica and Watson 12; Bush and Scowcroft 433, 463-464). Curiously, in 1992, the head of Russia's security service told Adams that he specifically rejected covert interventions into the affairs of foreign governments as being "not our business." The simple fact is that quietly mounting and sustaining covert operations is not so easy as it was in the early years of the Cold War (Adams 72-73).

Nobody knows the actual number of nuclear weapons in existence. (As good a guess as any may be found in "Appendix 11A. Tables of Nuclear Forces" by Norris and Arkin 394-401. Only weapons of the then five declared nuclear powers are included in the inventory.) No intelligence officer is likely to be so naive as to think that the proliferation of biological, chemical and nuclear weapons can be stopped. Conversely, it may be possible to neutralize the policies of some governments, other than the five declared nuclear powers, in possession of such weapons. As Adams points out, if a target is easy and obvious—such as Libya has been—military action might succeed in curbing nuclear weapons projects for a time in states other than the declared five. But even obvious targets present difficulties. No one would suggest that finding—much less destroying—Iraq's weapons facilities will be either easy or successful. Adams tells us that it took Allied intelligence operatives seven months, in 1991, just to locate the head of Iraq's nuclear programs.

Another sticky problem for a militant non-proliferation regime arises when the targets in view are chemical or nuclear sites. The poisoning of soldiers and civilians directly as results of attacks on such arms sites is a very serious issue. Adams offers the Pentagon's plans to attack North Korea's nuclear site in 1992 as an example of a military strike fraught with severe radiation hazards. President Ronald Reagan's

famous Strategic Defense Initiative, or space-based anti-ballistic missile system "Star Wars," would have posed a titanically threatening radiation fall-out danger (see Broad 81-82.) Then, too, if the military target happens to belong to a powerful government, such as China's, or a friendly one, such as India's, appeasement to achieve accord on non-proliferation seems to work best (Harrison 12; Dugger 6; Fitchett, "A new China Embracing Nuclear Non-proliferation" 1, 4).

There may also be some new and ingenious routes around the unacceptable hazards of military attacks. For instance, Adams cites a paper that was read, appropriately, at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, D. C., in 1993, to illustrate recent thinking in some quarters about what are called non-lethal methods of undermining the military capabilities of allegedly rogue states (see also Pilat). Included in the allegedly non-lethal technology offered by Joseph Pilat are techniques that disrupt an enemy's communications, materials and information systems such as those that introduce computer viruses and electromagnetic disturbances, jellify fuels, stall engines, weaken aircraft frames, crystallize tires, and spray polymer adhesives on airfield runways. Adams affirms that the first such non-lethal device was used against Iraq in the Persian Gulf War of 1991. Called Kit-2, it employed Tomahawk missiles equipped with thousands of metal strips that were aimed at Baghdad's electrical generators. It worked wondrously. However, Adams seems to have forgotten that the British air ministry developed essentially the same technique—called WINDOWS—to confuse German defensive RADAR in British air raids over Europe during World War II (Mahoney 336). Although Adams does not say so, it is also possible that none of the five declared nuclear powers has a present interest in further reducing its nuclear arsenal until states such as Iran, Iraq and North Korea can be brought into reliable compliance with treaties banning weapons of mass destruction. Obviously, the eventuality and efficacy of an international regime of non-proliferation depends upon a much higher level of Great Power cooperation in that field of endeavor than has been experienced up to the present.

Ultimately, the science and art of secret intelligence may depend for their own efficacy on timing. The technological sophistication and the doomsday character of some 21th-century armaments, and the accelerated speed of events in our times combine to propel otherwise conscientious, archives-bound intelligence analysts towards a discomfiting intellectual state within close range of snap decisions. There is more than a coincidence in the chronological conjunction of the Iranian army's "engine test for a new generation of ballistic missiles" on 15 December 1997, of the visit to Turkey during the preceding week of the Israeli defense minister, and of the press reports of the Israeli government's new nuclear war policy of "launch-on-warning" on 19 December 1997. (Akinci A1, A2; "Iran Says It Will Build a Longer-Range Missile" A11; Fitchett, "Israeli Reaction to Iran's Buildup is Heightening Nuclear Fears in the Mideast" 6). American policy has sought to redirect such tendentious forces towards irenic paths of coexistence.

Not surprisingly, Adams's catalogue of reforms, intended to reinvigorate American intelligence to a high state of predictive readiness, highlights reductions in numbers of deskbound analytical staff, increases in numbers of human sources in situ, and an end of the pervasive and administratively suffocating culture of secrecy. In short, Adams's prescription for the next century's intelligence agencies describes a streamlined, prioritized, expert cadre of dedicated professionals who can supply "the information which somebody in government decides he or she needs" quickly and accurately (xxviii).

Such a sweeping reform of American intelligence organization and direction as Adams counsels is unlikely, thanks to the legendary bureaucratic and propagandistic artfulness which, he recognizes, suffuses the intelligence corps. Still, it may be that Clio, the Muse of History, is even now at work to foster great changes. Perhaps recent political embarrassments in Washington will impel more substantive measures of reform than the government's intelligence oligarchs would themselves countenance (Hosenball and Isikoff 30-31). It is important to remember, however, that quick delivery of accurate intelligence guarantees nothing.

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