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Teşekkür

Introduction

This volume is a byproduct of a conference that was organized by Professor Gustavo Gozzi from Bologna University in university's Ravenna Campus by Thursday, 26th May 2016, titled "Migrations and the Future of the Euro-Mediterranean Relationships for the Project of a New Partnership". The conference papers were quite satisfying therefore we decided to use them to good account and publish a journal volume. Some of the paper presenters did not send their papers to be published for different reasons. We also asked for contribution of some other scholars who did not take part in the conference but work on Mediterranean related topics. At the end the volume could be possible. We would like to thank all contributors.

I would like to give reader a personal account of my interest to the study of Mediterranean. This would, I assume put things into a better shape to approach and to understand the topic. Every topic, issue has their own unique story, reason of existence and development. Next to these reasons each of us have our own stories through which we get connected to the topics that we study, spent our times.

Before June 2005, I had no national or international academic interest to Mediterranean studies. My nonacademic interest was limited to going to the Mediterranean seaside and having my holidays there. By 2005, I was invited to a Forum in Tarragona Spain. The Rectors and representatives of 32 Universities from 17 countries convened at the **Mediterranean University Forum** in Tarragona, 2-3 June 2005. The forum members underlined the fact that it has come the time to create a "Euro-Mediterranean Area of Higher Education and Research" (Lymouris, 2011, p. 288). It was during the forum when I was personally and directly exposed to the idea of a Mediterranean Union formulized by the EU's Mediterranean members.

At the beginning, I did not find this interesting at all. The idea did not attract me. However, we were invited to the forum to represent our university, therefore I started to think about it. [1] The Forum was quite an interesting experience for me. During the forum, we met representatives of several European Universities which were trying to convince non-European Mediterranean University representatives to tune in their systems to the European University system in order to make it compatible with the EU system. If they could make it compatible with the EU, then some financial schemes would be put to work and non-European Mediterranean countries and their universities would benefit from these schemes. That was the offer.

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1   So we can quickly conclude that conferences are not useless time consuming activities. In order to introduce an item to the attention of public they are quite functional.

I remember one professor from Egypt reacted to the proposal angrily. He basically said that in order to come to Tarragona he had to spend two to three weeks to get visa from Spanish Consulate in his country. Why should his country tune in their higher education systems to European system? They had a working higher education system and there was no benefit for them to tune in their systems to EU system. He was, i assume, meaning that Europeans were basically trying to create a sort of neo-colonial relationship with the non-European Mediterranean countries. It was not a sincere, fair and just proposal of equal partners given the existing circumstances. I find him right. I did also spend some time in front of the consulates to get visa and I was quite angry to this unfair practice of European governments, too.

Turkey had a different position than the other non-European Mediterranean countries. Turkey was and still is a candidate country to the EU membership and Turkish governments when they were invited to Euro-Mediterranean initiatives were quite concerned and reluctant. They were thinking that EU was trying to sidetrack Turkey through such an initiative. Instead of giving an already offered accession process the EU was trying to convince Turkey to take part in a proposed Euro Mediterranean scheme which was simply designed to control and orchestrate non EU member, Mediterranean countries. This was how the EU proposals regarding Mediterranean perceived with suspicion by Turkish Governments.

Even though Turkish Government was distant to the idea of a Mediterranean Union, we, as a small team from Marmara University headed by our rector, accepted the offer of the forum and participated to the meetings. Our then Rector, Prof.Tunç Erem took the Forum quite serious and made a few important interventions to the final text of the Tarragona Declaration that Forum debated and announced. So this became my first encounter with the idea of a Mediterranean Union.

A couple of years later, I received an invitation from Prof.Gozzi to participate a conference in Ravenna, Italy and talk about the idea of a Mediterranean Union from Turkish perspective. I had to prepare a speech. This pushed me to think about the issue more seriously. That was how I got hooked with the Euro Mediterranean idea and projects. [2]

That was my second out of Turkey Mediterranean experience and I felt one more time in love with the cities and cultures scattered around Mediterranean. I myself lived in Antioch for a while during my university education years from where St.Paul sailed to Cyprus to did his missionary activities. I did some part of my military service in İzmir. Antioch, İzmir, Tarragona, Barcelona, Ravenna, Bologna, later I added Salonica to my visited Mediterranean cities collection. This is how I deeply felt that there is something Mediterranean as a distinct existence with common values, living styles, architecture, cousin and many more cultural characteristics.

In order to take an idea serious, you need to get personally connected with it. You need to make business, frequent travels. Chat people from different cities. I still remember my conversations with a restaurant owner in Salonica who learned Turkish from "gastarbeiter" in Germany or a

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2   It can be concluded that Conferences are useful for the introduction of an idea. Repeating events and conferences are much more useful and functional for that purpose.

conversation with a taxi driver in Tarragona who angrily warn me when I made a compliment and told him "Spain was a beautiful country" that "It is Catalonia not Spain". I was not aware of the level of tension even though I knew that there was a problem there. That was the moment when I felt the seriousness of the tension in Catalonia.

When I visited Ravenna for the first time, I personally discovered the fact that this city was the first capital of the Eastern Roman Empire and the big decision that basically separated the architectural understandings of Eastern Church and Western Church was taken there. Seeing smaller versions of St. Sophia in Ravenna was a real experience. I immediately though that why Istanbul and Ravenna are not considered together when the municipalities make their tourism related planning. Perhaps they did. If not, they should definitely consider this point.

While I was working over the question that I was asked to make my presentation, I started to read Fernand Braudel again. He put things into a historical perspective and show me Mediterranean as a single big non homogeneous space. I read about the Roman, Carthagen and Ottoman Mediterranean. I recognized the importance of Mediterranean for the development of human civilization one more time.

There was a simple and sharp sentence in almost every history book. After the discovery of alternative routes through Bay of Good Hope by **Bartolomeo Dias de Novais** in 1488 and discovery of Americas by Christopher Columbus in 1492, Mediterranean gradually lost its primary position in World History. That was a cool true sentence. Mediterranean is just a sea if humans around it could not use it to navigate and get connected make trade, tourism etc… it is just a dead end if you cannot find a ship and continue with it. It provided humanity great advantages during the ancient times as the ships were providing them a huge capacity to carry goods and people. Such a capacity was not available on road transportation. It was much more difficult and expensive if not impossible. If they knew how to navigate only burden was the mother nature.

One should also not underestimate to protected and fertile nature of the Mediterranean basin for human societies and civilizations. Especially after seeing fatal hurricanes that hit the US and other countries around the Oceans it is much better understood. A civilization could not be created and kept alive for long if it was hit by hurricanes as it is today during the ancient times. Gerald Haug of the Geo Forschungs Zentrum in Germany, who studied geological records of monsoons over the past 16,000 years claimed to found a correlation between climate extremes and the fall of two great civilizations: the Tang dynasty in China and the Maya of South America. [3] Mediterranean was an incubator for many civilizations for thousands of years. Our knowledge today mostly owes to history of civilizations that raised and fall around the Mediterranean.

To conclude, this special issue on Mediterranean is a result of Prof.Gozzi's and my personal encounters and engagements with the idea of Mediterranean. There is something that we call Mediterranean culture, Mediterranean cousin, holiday, climate, life style etc.. Mediterranean as a

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3   https://www.newscientist.com/article/dn10884-collapse-of-civilisations-linked-to-monsoon-changes/,   4.1.2007,
     Access: 18.1.2018.

political unit does not exist for the moment. Perhaps it is worth to work over it as non-Mediterranean political projects did not bring us peace and welfare yet. Many would immediately agree that Mediterranean life style is much more preferable than the non-Mediterranean ones. As a political scientist I would claim that everything including the life style is a direct or indirect function of politics. So if we want continuation and betterment of our smooth pleasant Mediterranean life styles it is time to bring politics and economics of this lifestyle and culture forward. I hope this volume would be one of those initiatives that encourage us to think more about Mediterranean.

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İçindekiler / *Contents*

Power and Integration. An Historical Overview on Euro-Mediterranean Relations

Kuvvet ve Entegrasyon: Avro-Akdeniz İlişkilerine Tarihsel Bir Bakış

Massimiliano TRENTIN[*]

Abstract

This contribution aims to analyze the power relations underlying the international relations of the Mediterranean space since the late XIX century in order to assess if and how the most recent initiatives implemented by the European Union (EU) represent continuity or discontinuity with the modern past. The main idea is that the European Union has tried to shape the Mediterranean space along its basic preference for free access to the markets of the southern and eastern countries of the Mediterranean, similar to what European powers did in late XIX and early XX century: the liberal order of the "Levantine" period combined the patterns of cooperation and consent, which were needed to foster market and elite integration, with those of conflict and coercion, which in turn were required to enforce the European-led economic and political order against restive and opposition forces. Compared to the past, however, the European Union has succeeded only partially in enforcing a "neo-liberal order" because it lacks meaningful political and military capacity for coercion against partners and rivals. The current crisis of liberal forces across Europe and the Mediterranean has enhanced those forces advocating a return to "state sovereignty" and control over flows of people, goods and ideas. This might recall the early postcolonial period of the 1950s and mid-1970s where the states struggled either to retain power and wealth, or overcome related asymmetries, by standing firm and "tough" in negotiations and resisting foreign interventions. However, if the centralized state was the main political and institutional driver of that period, it is highly difficult that today current states might effectively claim a monopoly over the economy and the public space on highly differentiated, secularized and interconnected societies like the Mediterranean ones.

Keywords: Integration, European Union, Euro-Mediterranean, Space, Power

Öz

Bu makale, Avrupa Birliğinin son zamanlardaki girişimlerinin geçmişle bugün arasında bir süreklilik mi yoksa kopuş manasına mı geldiğini anlamak için Akdeniz alanının arka planında işleyen güç ilişkilerinin uluslararası ilişkilerini analiz etmeyi amaçlar.
Temel fikir, Avrupa Birliğinin Akdeniz alanını Güney ve Doğu Ülkelerinin pazarlarına serbestçe erişebilmek amacıyla, tıpkı 19. ve 20. Yüzyılda Avrupalı güçlerin yaptıkları gibi şekillendirmeyi

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amaçladığıdır. Levanten döneminde, piyasa elit entegrasyonunu güçlendirmek için ihtiyaç duyulan işbirliği ve rıza unsurları, Avrupa liderliğindeki ekonomik ve siyasi düzeni muhalif ve direnen güçlere kabul ettirmek için kullanılan, zorlayıcı ve çatışmacı öğelerle, birleştirilmişti. Geçmişle karşılaştırıldığında Avrupa Birliği, diğerlerini, neo-liberal düzene uyuma zorlama konusunda, sadece kısmi bir başarı elde etmiştir. Tam başarılı olamamasının nedeni Avrupa Birliği'nin ortaklarını ve rakiplerini zorlayacak anlamlı bir siyasi ve askeri kapasitesinin olmamasıdır. Avrupa'daki ve Akdeniz'deki liberal güçlerin karşı karşıya olduğu kriz "devlet egemenliğine" ve insanların, malların ve fikirlerin akışı üzerinde kontrol tesis edildiği döneme geri dönülmesi gerektiğini savunan güçleri büyütmüştür. Bu durum 1950lerdeki ve1970lerin ortalarındaki koloni sonrası dönemi çağrıştırır. Bu dönemde devletler ellerindeki gücü ve zenginliği korumak veya bununla ilgili asimetrilerin üstesinden gelebilmek için müzakerelerde sıkı ve sert pozisyon almışlar ve dış müdahalelere karşı direnmişlerdir. Unutulmamalıdır ki, merkeziyetçi devlet o dönemin temel siyasi ve kurumsal itici gücüdür. Günümüzde ise, Akdeniz'deki gibi birbirine bağlanmış, laikleşmiş ve farklılaşmış toplumlara sahip devletlerin ekonomi ve kamusal alan üzerinde tekel olma iddiasını sürdürebilmeleri oldukça zordur.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Entegrasyon, Avrupa Birliği, Avro-Akdeniz, Bölge, Kuvvet

Introduction: The European-Led Levantine Mediterranean

The Mediterranean space might be described as one of the "densest" spaces in world history because of the intensity of the flows of people, goods and ideas among the different social units that came into contact through its seas and shores (Braudel, 1985, p. 8)[1]. Here, conflict and cooperation, as patterns of interaction characterized the relations between those political units which acted upon the Mediterranean space during the last two centuries: namely, the European states, which evolved into a unique combination of nation and imperial states, and the Ottoman Empire, whose successors are the current Turkish and Arab states. The Kingdom of Morocco enjoyed the peculiarity of full independence from the Ottomans but followed a similar path as far as relations with European states are concerned since the late XIX and early XX century. Though it might be challenging in theory, the historical praxis has shown that both conflict and cooperation could reflect the international relations of the Mediterranean space at the very same time, for the very same actors. Ultimately, so far conflict and cooperation have proved not to be mutually exclusive patterns of interaction: better, cooperation has taken place as the result of either an asymmetry of power which institutionalized European dominance and leadership or a balance of power which let Turkish and Arab leaders assert their own priorities towards the northern partners. In all cases, cooperation has mostly been unavoidable for all parties concerned. The question was thus about the conditions for relationship and partnership.

Along with the territories of the Balkans, the Mediterranean sea has been the space where European powers interacted most with the authorities and subjects of the Ottoman Empire. For the most important imperial states of Europe in the XIX century, namely Great Britain, France

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1   The literature on the history and features of the Mediterranean space is immense and cannot be reviewed here. For this reason, I would refer only to those works focused on specific features of the international relations in the Mediterranean.

and the Tsarist Empire as well, the Mediterranean basin was a space to assert their legitimacy as continental and world powers. So called "latecomers" like Germany and Italy followed similar rationales as they approached Ottoman and local authorities in the Mediterranean basin (Carperntier, Lebrun, 2001, p. 213, 307). The "sea-in-between" still provided the fastest route for the colonial jewels of the British Empire, that is India and South East Asia, or the contested wealth of Chinese lands and society. Indeed, the control of the "enlarged" Mediterranean space, from Gibraltar to Suez and Aden was functional to the exercise of power on a global scale for Europe (Di Nolfo, 2012, p. 9). The imperialist expansion of European powers increased the east-west, horizontal dimension of the Mediterranean space as the worthy passage to South and East Asia (Arrighi, Ahmad, Shih, 1999, p. 220). The value of stability of trade routes increased along with the industrial revolution in Europe which, coupled with imperialism, re-balanced the wealth exchange with Asia and enforced industrial manufacturing products into the latter's consumption patterns. Within the framework of the so-called "European Concert" of powers, Great Britain could foster the point of leaving the Ottoman Empire in place as long as it remained subaltern to European powers in terms of economic penetration and strategic interests. Hence, European rivalry against the Sublime Door could continue on the "margins", as in Algeria from 1830 or in the Balkans as long as it did not involve the generalized collapse of the Ottomans.

The generalization to all European countries of the clauses of the Balta Liman Agreement, negotiated by the British with the Ottomans in 1838 in exchange for military security against their ambitious Egyptian province, appeased imperialist rivalry and contributed significantly to the movement of the Ottoman economy and society towards a kind of "periphery" within the new international division of labour (Puryear 1969, p. 83; Pamuk, Williamson, 2009, p. 5). Since the second half of the XIX century, the balance of payments between European and Ottoman empires proved negative for the Sublime Door and its provinces, whose production faced the massive inflows of European goods not compensated by proportional exports or financial investments. Moreover, though some local manufacturing could resist European competition as for domestic consumption, the exports of the Levant and Egypt turned increasingly towards raw materials (cotton, flour), whose value proved to be anyway lower than the intermediate and consumption goods imported from Europe (Owen, 1981; Pamuk, Williamson, 2009). Slowly but steadily, the bulk of the economy of the South and East Mediterranean shifted to raw materials export, transit trade and consumption, with the related social and political rise of large landowners and trade intermediaries, who often came to be the same persons or belong to the same influential families and communities. Urban centres on the coasts of the Mediterranean sea, like Algiers, Oran, Tunis, Tripoli, Alexandria, Haifa, Beirut and Izmir flourished as long as they became "hubs" for transit and retail trade, and terminals for the transport of goods from the rural inland to the sea and eventually Europe. Inland urban centres could retain their status as consumption spaces and as long as they maintained control over peasantry in the productive plains and contained the restive nomads of the deserts (Laurens, 2010; Quataert, 1994, p. 764). The deficit against Europeans was to be paid by increasing taxation at home and by external borrowing which both slowly undermined the financial and political legitimacy of the Ottoman central authorities. The

bankruptcy of the Ottoman Empire in 1878 and the Egyptian province in 1880 transferred de facto the ultimate control of finances into British and French hands, whose primary goal was keeping these territories to serve their debt. This meant harsh "austerity" over communities, and the peasantry in particular, but not to the point of "killing" the indebted partner, which was still worth enforcing for wealth transfer as well as to prevent the disruption of trade routes (Thobie, 1985, p. 72).

The so-called *Levant*, originally describing the eastern territories of the Mediterranean, and Egypt became an integrated space but subaltern to European economies and powers (Pamuk, 1987, p. 55, 82; Laurens, 2010, p. 33). However, the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean were *subaltern* to Europe for two reasons. On the one hand, most of the wealth generated in this space was transferred to Great Britain, France, Germany or Russia by way of a division of labour where the ultimate recipients of profits were located in Europe, though local intermediaries could retain a significant share (Wallterstein, Decdeli, Kasaba, 1987, p. 96). On the other hand, European governments could enforce their interests, economic or political, by way of direct control over state institutions like France in Algeria (1830), its *protéctorats* in Tunisia (1881) and Morocco (1912), Great Britain's *protectorate* in Egypt since 1882, Italian colonialism in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica since 1911, the sectarian *condominium* in Mount Lebanon or the enforcement of debt servicing on Ottoman central finances since 1878 (Thobie, 1985, p. 128; Laurens, 2007). This was the time when Ottoman society experienced a double divergence in social conditions, namely in public health and income: on the one hand, health, education and income were concentrated in a tiny group of communities, mostly linked to European networks, whereas the peasantry and public officials experienced a decline in wealth and social status; on the other hand, Ottoman societies began lagging far behind the social conditions that Europe began to improve since the mid-XIX century (Quataert, 2005, p. 115-118).

The increasing rivalry between European powers in the Mediterranean space during the early XX century reached an apex with the First World War when Great Britain, France and Tsarist Russia rallied against the alliance between the Ottomans, the German Reich and Austro-Hungarian Empire. The final demise of the Ottoman Empire led to the formal fragmentation of the south and east Mediterranean territories into different legal and political spaces. As a matter of fact, the Great War accelerated the process of subaltern integration of the Arab and Ottoman Mediterranean space into imperial Europe but also provided a first, major opportunity for local, autonomous forces (Corm, 2002, p. 87, 228). European powers faced two different, but converging, factors that eroded their capacities, and capabilities, to implement the full subjugation of the communities. First, the strengthening of nationalist and local communities' claim for independence, from the macro-evidence of the Turkish war of liberation against Europeans and later establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923, to the never-ending protests, revolts and insurgencies in Arab lands during the 1920s and 1930s (Gelvin, 2016, p. 189; Chalcraft, 2016, p. 198). Second, the open opposition and reluctant support for such European encroachment in the Mediterranean by two rising forces on the international stage, namely the Soviet Union and the United States of America. A major feature stood out in this process of reconfiguration of the politics of the

Mediterranean space: the adoption by independence movements across the Arab and Turkish worlds of concepts and institutions, like the "nation", the "nation-state" and "modernity" born out of the recent history of continental Europe in order to assert the legitimacy of their projects and their integration in the international community on an equal footing (Hilane, 1969, p. 98). Both business elites moved north and south while plebeian groups migrated from Europe to Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt and later Libya (Petricioli, 2007,; Owen, 1989, p. 32). Political ideas like liberalism, constitutionalism and nationalism were "translated" by Ottoman, Turkish and Arab movements all advocating their own pattern of reform (Tibi, 1987, p. 95-122; Schumann, 2010, p. 13, 113; Abdel-Malek, 1970, p. 12, 28).

The Option of a Postcolonial, Sovereign Mediterranean: 1950s-1970s

World War Two once again accelerated those patterns of development that had characterized the past decades, namely the demise of the European empires, decolonization and the bipolar competition of the Cold War. Despite their military victory against fascism in Italy and Nazism in Germany, both Great Britain and France had exhausted their finances in the war efforts and it did not take long for nationalist movements in the Arab world to shift their allegiance to the two rising superpowers, namely the United States of America and, to a lesser extent, the Soviet Union. The overall result was first the dismantling of the European institutional spheres of influence in the Arab Mediterranean. From the end to the Mandates in the Levant between 1946 and 1948, to the access to full independence of Libya in 1951, of Tunisia and Morocco in 1956 and finally of Algeria in 1962, all these newly established countries were recognized full sovereignty along the standards of the United Nations. However, most of the conservative or liberal nationalist forces which governed the states were far from advocating a clean break in relations with Europe: rising mostly from wealthy educated families engaged in trade and business with their northern partners they supported bilateral treaties of friendship which guaranteed the free flow of goods, capital and people across the Mediterranean (Hilane, 1969, p. 142; Corm, p. 243). On their part, European political forces devoted most of their attention to three main interrelated processes: first, the material and social reconstruction from the ruins of WWII; second, the system of Cold War alliances in setting domestic economic and institutional development; the integration process in Western Europe, which implied a major re-orientation of political and economic energies towards the continent.

The process of economic integration taking speed first in Western and later in Eastern Europe contributed to the marginalization of the Mediterranean basin as a prominent space for growth and development. Actually, the *Trente Glorieuses* of Western Europe centred first and foremost on the continental and transatlantic dimensions, with the south and east Mediterranean as a function of the latter: in particular, providing cheap labour and energy, or marginal consumption markets at best (Berend, 2006, p. 190). If the Cold War helped the demise of European imperialism in the Mediterranean by supporting nationalist movements through arms and diplomacy and unlocking colonial markets, it also introduced new lines of fracture between US and Soviet allies, which

risked a new militarization of the Mediterranean space as well as the disruption of economic relations by way of sanctions and divergence in trade regimes. More often then not, the impact of the Cold War was the consolidation of territorial and political disputes among regional states (Pedaliu, 2016, 30; Trentin, Gerlini, 2012, p. 18). Eventually, despite attempts by France and Great Britain to retain their colonial empires, relations with former subjects shifted from exclusiveness to partnership (Elwood, 2012, 219; Bagnato, 2006, p. 180, 200). Except for Yugoslavia, lying on the shores of the Adriatic sea, Eastern European countries enforced their reconstruction on a national basis, and on the close relations with the Soviet Union, with programmes for regional integration playing a minor, if not marginal role (Berend, 2006, p. 150).

As a matter of fact, the first post-colonial phase of the late 1940s and early 1950s saw the convergence of Western European governments and the new Arab ruling elites on the basis of liberalism in economics and conservatism in society. However, those Arab elites which had previously banked on popular mobilization against European rule, found it increasingly difficult to match the claims and discourse for independence while retaining the patterns of social relations which had consolidated under European colonialism. Moreover, the experience of war efforts showed the pros of state intervention in planning the patterns of production, distribution and consumption (Vitalis, Heydemann, 2000, p. 100; Toninelli, 2002, p. 38). Alongside the Soviet Union and socialist forces, the United States also supported state intervention as a major engine for growth and "modernization", which found receptive ears among the ranks of the fast-growing state bureaucracy, civilian and military as well (Kingston, 1996, p. 12). The unwillingness or incapacity to match political sovereignty with social justice for the subaltern groups provided a major field of action for a new wave of nationalist forces in the Arab world that banked on the mobilization of both the salaried middle class and peasantry to challenge the "old" nationalists and grasp state power through an alliance with military officers. Despite their differences, the rise of Nasserism in Egypt from 1954-1956, Baathism in Syria from the mid-1950s and left-leaning brands of Arab nationalism in the Maghreb gave priority to *inward*-oriented development programmes that would satisfy popular demands for justice and upward mobility. The adoption of various patterns of import-substitution-industrialization (ISI), the nationalization of foreign trade and later on of natural resources like oil and gas were all intended to shift attention to the development of domestic production forces and consumption: external economic relations were to serve the needs of domestic development rather than the other way around, and the struggle to diversify foreign partnership beyond former imperial masters followed the same rationale (Richards, Waterbury, 201). Urban centres on the shore of the Mediterranean continued to attract considerable investments and retained their political relevance but development plans increasingly focused on the rural countryside of the interiors: agrarian reforms became the political hallmark of populist nationalism and, coupled with the expansion of public education and state employment, they provided effective opportunities for upward social mobility for traditionally marginalized communities.

On the whole, the consolidation of populist, modernizing nationalism in the Arab world and the process of European integration in the northwest of the continent put an end to the Mediterranean

of the *Levant*. The irony was that the ensuing fragmentation occurred at the very moment when most of the Mediterranean countries endorsed similar patterns of development: the central state as the main engine for modern development of politics and society, and the mixed-economy, where state intervention in production was pervasive but not exclusive and, compared to the socialist states, fell short of effective planning in distribution and consumption (Bourgey, 1982, p. 23).

Against the background of the fragmentation of the Mediterranean space, new efforts were made to mend fences: in particular by those countries that had more stakes in the role of the Mediterranean as an open space for the exchange of goods, capital and people throughout the 1960s and 1970s (Trentin, 2012a, p. 287; Rey, Stiegler, 2017). Among these, some took the lead, like Nasser's Egypt and Tito's Yugoslavia in the early 1960s: the establishment of the *Non Aligned Movement* in Belgrade in 1961 exceeded the boundaries of the Mediterranean as it referred straight to the dynamics of the *global* Cold War. However, both Tito and Nasser shared the belief that both countries needed to set the Mediterranean free of the disrupting impact of the Cold War in order to continue trading and exchanging across the sea. After all, Yugoslavia was a socialist country which was one of the first recipients of US aid under the Marshall Plan of 1947, and later traded mostly with countries of the European Communities (EC): the Adriatic sea was a vital space for exchange (Kullaa, 2012). Egypt and other postcolonial Arab countries were in a similar situation: they could diverge in terms of international alliances and political orientation but were all closely bound to the Western and Eastern European markets in terms of production and consumption items. The principles of Neutrality, originally set by India's leader Jawarlal Nehru, were translated into "Positive/Active Neutrality" by Gamal Abd al-Nasser and finally established into the Non Aligned Movement: these were all meant to legitimize the possibility for postcolonial states to pursue their own patterns of political and economic development, as well as to diversify their international relations by way of establishing partnerships beyond strategic alliances with the Cold War superpowers, the European Communities, the CMEA or the Arab League; sovereignty here met diversification, which implied the existence of a viable space to practise them: here in the Mediterranean (Byrne, 2012, p. 14, 20).

The central state, or intergovernmental organizations, were appointed to act as the prime actors and ultimate guarantors of the "postcolonial" integration of the Mediterranean space. If during the Levantine period, multiple legitimate actors like nation-states, empires, religious communities and private business networks characterized this space, the central states now concentrated on the legitimacy to deal with foreign actors on the basis of exclusive representation of the new political unit of the "nation": international organizations and transnational networks, like the EC, the Arab League or Party and business organizations, might intervene only with the approval of the related states. On the one hand, as for legal and political affairs, the state centralized and monopolized jurisdiction over its citizens and all people residing and passing through its territory. The previous system of confessional or foreign tutelage over certain Ottoman subjects was dismantled according to the principle of exclusive sovereignty of the single state over territory and population (Gozzi, 2015, p. 160). Though conferences and meetings among different political

parties continued to take place, the consolidation of one-party or hegemonic-party systems across the Arab countries conflated political representation and exchange to ruling forces. On the other hand, as for economic affairs, public and state enterprises covered a large share of economic activities in all the Mediterranean countries, which partially eased the difficulties connected to the synchronization between private and public business on planning, supply and payments. The state largely financed trade exchange and major deals in the form of granting loans to foreign consumers, providing state-guarantees to the domestic exporter or arranging clearing agreements. The energy commodities, like oil and later gas, were considered so strategic by producing and consuming countries around the Mediterranean that central states either established national companies or nationalized the private ones operating in their territories from the 1960s to the early 1970s: though public, semi-public or private, all companies were closely connected to governmental policies and could operate only along the lines of the latter (Trentin, 2012b, p. 292; Owen, Pamuk, 1998, p. 93). Despite all its limits and disrupters in the Mediterranean space, the 1960s recorded a remarkable convergence of income-distribution among countries in the north, south and east of the Mediterranean: the Gini Index of Bi-polarization stood at 0.06 compared to the later increase to 0.9 during the 1980s (Esteban, 2002, p. 18).

The energy shocks of the 1970s marked a transitional phase from the state-centric system of relations in the Mediterranean to the following European-led selective integration. In fact, the massive transfer of financial wealth from energy-consumers to energy-producing countries (oil and natural gas) provided selected Arab states in the Mediterranean with huge resources to invest domestically and internationally. At home, they basically led to the expansion of the public sector in production but foremost in social services and administration. At the Arab level, oil-rich states invested and provided loans to their "have-not" neighbours, which in turn had to open up their markets to foreign investors but at the same time continued to fund the deficit of their public sectors along the populist social contract or out of fear for popular unrest. If new spaces and opportunities were offered to private activities in economics as well as foreign investors, the state maintained its supremacy as domestic employer and economic partner (Richards, Waterbury, 1998, p. 201). Out of necessity, the energy-consuming Western European countries began to act collectively vis-à-vis their southern partners from 1972, when the European Communities launched the *Global Mediterranean Policy* (GMP) and the Euro-Arab Dialogue from 1974 (Calandri, 2009, p. 104). By the first initiative, the EC recognised that *laissez-faire* and *free-trade* had to be complemented by robust state-to-state partnership for economic development in the Mediterranean south, so that the *Cooperation Agreements* signed by the EC and single Arab states and Israel from 1976 to 1978 actually institutionalized public intervention as the main driver for inter-Mediterranean development and political stability; they also provided the institutional basis for the "shallow integration" for the decades to come (Trentin, 2012b, p. 225; Ayadi, Sessa, 2017, p. 16)[2]. Moreover, the first signs of the crisis of the Fordist, Keynesian pattern of development

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2   Officially charged with more political content, the Euro-Arab Dialogue bore less fruit as soon as Arab states' solidarity in the Arab-Israeli conflict was disrupted by Egypt's signing of the Peace Treaty with Israel in 1979 and the EC made it clear that they could only support the recognition of the Palestinian national rights to their own state (Labate, 2016, p. 186); "Shallow integration refers to the simple liberalisation of trade through the dismantling of

among EC core members was met with the first round of containment of migration flows from the Arab countries and Turkey (Paoli, 2015, p. 127).

The EU-Led Neo-Liberal Integration of the Mediterranean

The "Embedded Liberalism" of the 1970s unravelled by the mid of the 1980s when the decline of energy prices brought the redistribution system of oil rents within and among countries in the south and east of the Mediterranean to an abrupt halt. No longer able to fund their current account deficits by external borrowing, Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Turkey and later Algeria all had to ask for debt rescheduling and accept the financial austerity prescribed by foreign creditors and the related International Economic Organizations (IEO), like the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank (Harrigan, al Said, 2009, p. 10). As for the EC, the shift to so-called neoliberal doctrines for development came as early as 1985 with the Commission headed by Jacques Delors which stated that the EC would work with the IEO, and southern partners should align to the "discipline of competition": aid and investments would come with market liberalization and privatizations, and the EC would foster its own private companies to enter those markets in order to face off US and Asian competitors (Trentin, 2015, p. 101). Arab states began a slow but steady process of adjustment to the new rules of neoliberalism[3]: the public sector was contained and later downgraded in terms of efficacy in production as well as delivery of services by curtailing funds, while private enterprise was prized as long as it was allied with political leadership; public monopolies were transformed into private ones, which struck major alliances with those foreign companies that were eager to enter the enlarging markets of the Arab countries and Turkey (Guazzone, Pioppi, 2009, p. 5-7; Hinnebusch, 2003, p. 204). Slowly but steadily the social constituencies of the Arab regimes began to move from popular, "plebeian" groups and classes towards wealthy, upper-class groups whose economic stakes and social status were strongly tied to their access to political ruling elites as well as international markets. Countries aligned with the European Communities and the United States moved first along this path: Egypt began implementing real structural reforms since the mid-1990s after the rents originated by the US-sponsored peace agreement with Israel in 1979, the re-establishment of good relations with Gulf Monarchies from 1984 and the rewards for participating to the II Gulf War in 1991 were not enough to fund public deficits and external debt. Tunisia and Morocco could not bank on the Egyptian "geopolitical" rents but could rely the political stability of the

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tariffs between partner countries. Deep integration refers to the convergence of market conditions between partner countries, pursued through the dismantling of non – tariff barriers to trade and the approximation of regulatory frameworks" (Ayadi, Sessa, 2017, p. 16).

3   As for a definition of "neoliberalism" I refer to David Harvey: "Neoliberalism is in the first instance a theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade. The role of the state is to create and preserve an institutional framework appropriate to such practices. [...] Furthermore, if markets do not exist (in areas such as land, water, education, health care, social security, or environmental pollution) then they must be created, by state action if necessary. But beyond these tasks the state should not venture (Harvey, 2005, 2).

new leadership by Ben Ali in Tunis and the monarchy in Rabat in order to relaunch their deeper connections with the European Communities and attract industrial and agricultural investments in their territories (Owen, 2004, p. 113). Having contained political opposition by the military coup in 1980, Turkey's conservative leadership embarked on structural adjustments throughout the decade, whose premium for the private sector was fostered by the decision in Ankara to increase its presence in Central Asia after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and later on in Iran and Arab countries: private enterprises as well as the championing of a moderate, liberal Islam would become the hallmarks of Turkish projection beyond Anatolia, and beyond the close ties with the European Communities (Aydin, 2005, p. 43, 51; Pamuk, 2008, p. 266). Worth mentioning was the case of Algeria that tried and failed to shape a political answer to the economic crisis of the mid-1980s: the ruling elite first by mobilized enlarged participation to the forces of Political Islam in 1988 and then, once these threatened the armed forces, the latter resorted to coercion, engulfing Algeria in a bloody civil war from 1991. The experience of Algeria in the 1990s would prove incisive for Euro-Mediterranean relations insofar as it led European and Arab elites to converge on and reward accordingly the containment and rejection of Political Islam in the name of political "stability" in the area (Martinez, 2000, p. 220).

The combination of financial austerity, liberalization and privatizations, however, did not live up to the expectations of a major boost in economic exchange between the EC and its Mediterranean partners. As a matter of fact, the low rates of growth experienced by most of the countries concerned proved problematic: first, they limited the overall volume of foreign trade; second, partners in the South registered rising deficits in their current accounts, not compensated by proportionate financial inflows from the North, namely FDI, loans or grants; the exchange concentrated on sectors which would not create many employment opportunities for local labour while migrations to the EC, with the related remittances, become the more and more selective due to crisis and legal restrictions in Europe (Trentin, 2015, p. 106; Ayubi, 1995, p. 5). Overall, the poor economic results of the early structural adjustment of the early 1990s led to a partial reassessment by the EC in the mid-1990s. The collapse of the socialist camp in Central and Eastern Europe shifted the primary focus of the EC towards the enlargement to the former socialist republics and the deepening of their institutional and economic integration with the founding of the European Union (EU) in Maastricht in 1992 and the Single Market in 1993. However, the contemporary crisis in the Mediterranean area obliged engagement towards the south by launching the *Euro-Mediterranean Partnership*, or "Barcelona Process" in 1995 (Calandri, 2009, p. 113-115). This would prove a compromise between previous initiatives: on the one hand, it continued unabated on the promotion of neoliberal reforms in the south and east of the Mediterranean as the only solution to the economic crisis and integration into "globalization"; on the other, it recognized the weakness of the private sector as a driver of growth and integration, and provided major aid and public guarantees for investments through the *MEDA* programmes for those partners that would sign the *Association Agreements*. Moreover, the centrality of the economic dossier was accompanied with initiatives on the "social" and "cultural" level in order to contain the negative

repercussions of neoliberal adjustment and to promote the principles, institutions and practices of liberal democracy in the region.

If the United States set themselves as the major military and diplomatic power during the 1990s in the Balkans, the Middle East and North Africa, and consequently in the Mediterranean space, the EU was the major reference for trade, finance and patterns of economic and institutional development. The Mediterranean space was a terrain to prove the "civil", "soft" features of European power in globalization (Cavatorta, Vincent, 2010; Adler, Crawford, 2004). Except for Libya and Syria, all countries signed the *Association Agreements* with the EU, which were set to construct a free-trade area within the mid-2000s as well as lead to a major integration and convergence between the southern and northern shores of the Mediterranean as for wealth and institutions. In terms of power relations, the initiative fitted well into the category of a hegemonic effort by the EU to integrate the Mediterranean space by delivering its own patterns of liberal institutions and neoliberal economics as "suitable" for the region (Ayadi, Sessa, 2017, p. 18-19), and fostering the construction of a social constituency of wealthy, liberal-minded elites which would lead the process in their own countries, both out of conviction and material interests. State sovereignty was still the basis for Euro-Mediterranean relations as long as it was necessary for negotiating and signing the agreements that would grant the legal and institutional frameworks for specific partnerships. However, the central state was not considered the main driver or political guarantor of reciprocity in partnership and integration: quite the contrary, along with the neoliberal discourse, the state and the public represented obstacles to economic and social integration because they were the "bulk" of conservative officials, or defenders of the status quo (Hinnebusch, 2012, p. 21).

Through the granting of European funds first to economic initiatives and then to institutional and cultural projects, trade exchange was back on the rise from the late 1990s together with the exchange of people through programmes of education and academic partnerships. This new round of integration actually benefitted the elites of the Arab countries since middle-income people were de facto excluded from those international partnerships. Moreover, the economic results were far from obvious. In fact, the increase in exchange and investments continued to be a percentage of the overall increase in international trade of the EU with neighbouring countries in Eastern Europe as well as with other partners in East Asia or North and South America. At the same time, the initiative did not stop the process of divergence in income levels between the shores of the Mediterranean basin, not to mention the explosion of income disparities within single countries: bipolarization of income between the north and south of the Mediterranean increased to 0.12 and 0.13 in 1990 and 1998 respectively, and the Gini Index set high at 0.34 for Arab countries (Esteban, 2002, p. 5, 20; Aita, 2011, p. 177, 205). Finally, the slow path in adoption of institutional reforms by Arab partners in terms of trade liberalization and standards of conduct proved to be a constant source of dismay and contempt among EU officials, which hoped to move from "shallow" to "deep" integration. The limited results in economic performance and integration along EU standards provided the background for those forces arguing for a stauncher approach towards the Arab partners in terms of conditionality. The attacks led by radical jihadi

groups against the US in 9/11, 2001, Madrid in 2003 and London in 2005 added to the arguments for reassessing relations with the Arab countries and shifting priority to security and military partnership (Hollis, 2013, p. 352; Ben Achour, 2012, p. 33).

The poor results scored by the new round of European-led integration of the Mediterranean space led to different reappraisals of the European initiatives. First, in 2003 Brussels launched the *Neighbourhood European Policy* that focused on bilateral relations between the EU and single partners, hardened conditionality on economic cooperation, and excluded any future possibility of access to the EU. While the EU was strengthening its hand in the Mediterranean, Arab partners and Turkey began to assert their own claims for reciprocity in relations by diversifying their partnership towards other countries that were entering the Mediterranean markets: in particular, East Asian economies, like China, Korea and Malaysia increased their trade exchange and investment in the region, and supplied both low and medium-level technology products. A special role was played by Gulf countries whose surplus in hard currencies, earned by high energy prices, allowed them to invest massively in the Arab and Turkish markets, in particular in real estate, luxury tourism, transport facilities, information technologies, finance and banking. Though remaining the first economic partner for Maghreb countries and Turkey, the EU faced more competition than ever (Anima-Investmed, 2010). In sharp contrast with the previous energy shocks of the "long Seventies" (1969-1986), the more recent third "shock" (2001-2014) led to a process of both diversification of international economic relations of the Middle East and North Africa and a slight increase in economic integration among the GCC and Mashreq countries (World Bank, 2010). The ascendance of the East Asian economies provided an opportunity for Arab Mediterranean elites and Turkey to assert their autonomy against the European partners (Trentin, 2014, p. 75). A symbolic turn came with the political defeat suffered by Israel and its Western allies during the conflict in Lebanon in summer 2006 against Hizb'allah, and the US failure in turning Iraq into a stable and reliable ally, which was narrated as a momentous event for the forces of independence in the region. Against this trend, France advanced the proposal of the *Union for the Mediterranean* in 2007 that would re-assert the primacy of state institutions, intergovernmental dealings and multilateralism in the Mediterranean space in order to secure the legitimacy of ruling elites under mounting pressure from popular politics, the forces of Political Islam and international competition (Aliboni, 2008).

The unexpected eruption of popular uprisings across the Arab world as well as the social tensions fostered from Greece to Spain by the global economic crisis of 2008 exposed all the difficulties and limits of the patterns of development set out in the Mediterranean space in the last decades. Limited and unstable rates of growth, unprecedented concentration of wealth, dispossession and exclusion of middle and popular classes from wealth and power provided the context over which collective action took space and obliged the EU and ruling elites in the Arab world to reassess their policies again (Heydemann, 2013, p. 69). Though foreign relations were not high on the agenda of groups and movements of the Arab uprisings between 2011 and 2013, the return of popular and middle classes to the political stage had major consequences for international relations as well, and in particular for the Mediterranean space. In fact, the political support and economic

collusion of European elites with former partners in Egypt and Tunisia led new actors in power to claim a major autonomy and reciprocity across the Mediterranean (McMurray, Ufheil-Somers, 2013). In both countries, the role of social, collective movements like trade unions and NGOs during the momentous events of the uprisings forced domestic elites and European partners to face the challenge of combining social and economic development. However, neither the EU nor the elites provided comprehensive solutions besides reasserting the validity of former patterns of development. This was adamantly clear in the EU policies after the 2011 Arab uprisings. After the initial stress on the support for "democracy" in March 2011, later documents confirmed the predominance of free-market economics and procedural democracy, to get back finally to the priority of "stabilization" against security threats: the EU looked for partners of whatever kind in the struggle against radical, jihadi movements and the containment of migratory flows (Teti, 2016, p. 1-4; Furia, 2012, p. 83). As such, the EU aligned with existing political regimes, from constitutional to absolutist monarchies, like Morocco, Jordan and the Gulf states, from constitutional to military-led republics, like Tunisia, Turkey, Egypt and Algeria. Programmes and funding for civil society and the promotion of democracy were curbed in line with desires by Arab governments and Turkey to reassert the primacy if not monopoly of the central state in the construction of foreign relations (Lynch, 2016, p. 75). Thus, within the Mediterranean space, the EU would support a system of international relations where the central state would uphold the role of institutional reference in security matters, while the "markets", namely private entrepreneurs, would act as the privileged actors for economic and social development (Teti, 2015, p. 22-23). As a matter of fact, strong neoliberal continuity characterized the EU response to the Arab uprisings and their subsequent development.

Preliminary Conclusions: the Uneasy Combination of Sovereignty and Neoliberalism

Currently, the Mediterranean space is experiencing a transformation phase where traditional powers are faltering while others are still entering the stage. The United States of America has lost the upper hand it enjoyed since WWII in diplomacy and military affairs after the failed campaigns in Iraq and Libya. The EU has retained most of its economic influence as a major trade and financial actor but suffers from a legitimacy crisis as a pole of attraction for stability and prosperity, both within and without its near borders. China and Russia have entered the stage, as military-diplomatic and economic partners respectively, but still as *counter-partners* to the main Western protagonists. Forces of Political Islam have made significant inroads in the Mediterranean, in Turkey, Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt but their record in government is still limited and highly disputed. As a consequence, competition has increased on the Mediterranean space among contending visions of partnership: one based on hegemonic integration, along the patterns set by the more powerful partner, namely the EU; another based on state sovereignty, where every single country retains its peculiar features in politics and economics, and negotiates the scope and depth of cooperation with those partners they praise for specific resources or assets.

Despite their differences, Islamist and nationalist forces in the Arab countries of the Mediterranean and Turkey have recently moved towards re-asserting their sovereignty against so-called interference from external actors: from the EU to the US, Russia and China, depending on the issue at stake (Hinnebusch, 2012, p. 28). Europe remains divided on the issue: on the one hand, the European Union has continued with the imperial practice of convergence through assimilation of the subaltern partners to its own standards of conduct, delivered as the most effective recipe for development. On the other, populist right-wing movements across Europe claim a return to national sovereignty against elites and foreigners, which might converge with trends in the South of the Mediterranean if they were not framed in confrontational racist terms against Muslim people. In fact, essentialist narratives over the "other" identities are widespread in both Europe and the Arab and Turkish Mediterranean, fuelling exclusion and mutual animosity (Gozzi, 2012, p. 13).

Against the brief historical background set above, one might argue that in the previous two centuries the integration of the Mediterranean space was led by the European partners through liberalism and imperialism in the late XIX century, and neoliberalism and US brokerage in the late XX century: in both cases, the Arab and Turkish partners were placed on a subaltern status through the disruption of their political and social institutions. In this case the *Levantine* and neoliberal integration implied and sustained wide divergences in power and wealth distribution within subaltern countries and between these latter and Europe. In between, during the high times of nationalism and post colonialism in the mid XX century, the Mediterranean saw a convergence among partners for institutional and economic development (like, the central state and industrialization) and the parallel disintegration of the Mediterranean space into several, smaller political and economic units. During the 1970s, attempts were made to combine the re-integration of the Mediterranean as a common space of cooperation with respect for sovereignty and reciprocity, with notable results only as for commerce.

Today, like the late period of *Levantine* integration of the Mediterranean in the early XX century, we have witnessed the massive entry of social movements, north and south, that confront the imbalances of neoliberal integration and political subalternity. Yet, on the one hand they have not resulted in major changes in Euro-Mediterranean relations either because they have been repressed or because they focused collective action mainly on domestic issues. On the other hand, those forces in power that have supported "sovereignty" and questioned current Euro-Mediterranean relations have done so mainly along identity lines, either "European" or "Islamic" ones, which disrupt the commonalities that still feature the Mediterranean space. Last but not least, the question whether sovereignty in the XXI century would still be encapsulated into the centralized state as before, or whether it would assume new shapes that suit the multiple, shifting boundaries of the "people" in the Mediterranean space is still open to debate and political action.

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Critical Perspectives on Euro-Mediterranean Relations after the "Arab Spring"

Arap Baharı Sonrası Avro-Akdeniz İlişkileri Üzerine Eleştirel Bakışlar

Gustavo GOZZI[*]

Abstract

The essay points out that the transformations caused by the uprisings of the "Arab Spring" imply the necessity of rethinking the history of the Euro-Mediterranean relations – since the Treaty of Rome (1957) until the Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2015 – and of reconsidering their future perspectives. In these relations the cultural legacy of colonialism is still very strong through the influence that the western powers have continued to exercise towards the postcolonial States both in Africa and the southern shore of Mediterranean. In particular the study outlines the colonial concerns that played central role in the establishment of the EEC in 1957 through the association agreements with the postcolonial States in the frame of the project called "Eurafrica".

The overcoming of the colonial heritage ought to radically change the European protectionist policies and the conditionality clause towards the countries of the southern shore of Mediterranean in order to realise a condition of interdependence and a real partnership of equals in the common space of Mediterranean. In this perspective, a different migration policy which considers the migrant as a transnational actor able to contribute to the development of both his country of origin and of the receiving one is also necessary.

Keywords: Euro-mediterranean, Arab Spring, Migration, Colonialism, Eurafrica, Mediterranean Partnership

Öz

Makale "Arap Baharı" ayaklanmaları ile başlayan dönüşümün, Roma Anlaşmasından 2015'de Komşuluk Politikasının gözden geçirilmesine kadar olan döneme dair Avrupa-Akdeniz İlişkileri tarihini ve bu ilişkilere dair gelecek perspektiflerini yeniden düşünme ihtiyacı doğurduğuna işaret etmektedir. Avrupa Devletlerinin Afrika ve Akdeniz'in Güney kıyılarında yeralan koloni geçmişi olan devletler üzerindeki etkisi çok yüksek olduğundan kolonyalizmin kültürel mirası halen oldukça güçlüdür. Makale, "AvroAfrika Projesi" çerçevesinde eski koloni devletleri ile imzalanan ortaklık anlaşmalarının, 1957'de AET'nin kuruluşunda oynadığı önemli role vurgu yapmaktadır.

Kolonyal mirasın üstesinden gelmek için Avrupa'nın, Akdeniz'in güney kıyılarındaki ülkelere yönelik korumacı politikalarının ve koşulluluk ilkesinin radikal bir biçimde değiştirilmesi gerekmektedir.

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Akdeniz'de gerçek bir ortaklığın ve karşılıklı bağımlılık koşullarının oluşabilmesi için bu gereklidir. Bu perspektiften bakıldığında, göçmeni, hem menşe ülkesinin hem de kendisini kabul eden yeni ülkenin kalkınmasına katkıda bulunan ulusaşırı bir aktör olarak gören farklı bir göç politikasının da geliştirilmesi gerekir.

Anahtar kelimeler: Avro-Akdeniz, Arap Baharı, Göç, Kolonyalizm, Avro-Afrika, Akdeniz İşbirliği

Introduction: Euro-Mediterranean Policies and Forms of Colonialism

The object of this essay regards three aspects of Euro-Mediterranean relations: firstly, the period from the establishment of the European Economic Community (EEC) up to the beginning of the "Arab Spring"; secondly, the new EU policies after the uprisings of the "Arab Spring", and thirdly, the new EU perspectives after the failure of the "Arab Spring" with the exception of Tunisia. In particular the essay analyzes the review of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2011 and in 2015 after the end of the "Arab Spring"'s uprisings.

Since World War II, in the era of decolonization, Europe has held itself out as a "civil power" intent on keeping the peoples of the Mediterranean's southern shore in a state of dependence by making its aid to development conditional on their adoption of Western-style forms of democratic government and human rights protection. We have to introduce a historical perspective in order to understand this continuity.

At the time the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was established, in 1951, France was firmly in control of its colonies and protectorates, so much so as to lead Schuman, Foreign Minister of France, to predict that these countries, too, could themselves be part of the new European Community. That actually happened, for example, with Algeria, which in 1957 was integrated into the European Economic Community (EEC) under Article 227 of the Treaty of Rome (the founding treaty of the European Economic Community), which was signed in the same year and came into force the following year, in 1958 (Isoni, 2013, p. 9)[1]. In the light of the complementary relation between former colonies and the metropolises, Article 3 of the Treaty introduced *the principle of association* for the purpose of increasing trade and pursuing economic

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1   I will be drawing on this clear-sighted article in reconstructing the origin of Euro-Mediterranean policies. Article 227 declares: "1. This Treaty shall apply to the Kingdom of Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, the French Republic, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands. 2. With regard to Algeria and the French overseas departments, the general and particular provisions of this Treaty relating to the free movement of goods; agriculture, save for Article 40(4); the liberalization of services; the rules on competition; the protective measures provided for in Articles 108 ["where a Member State is in difficulties or seriously threatened with difficulties as regards its balance of payments"], 109 ["where a sudden crisis in the balance of payments occurs"] and 226 ["in the course of the transitional period, where there are serious difficulties which are likely to persist in any sector of economic activity"]; the institutions, shall apply as soon as this Treaty enters into force." The EEC was to ensure the possibility of the economic and social development of the regions concerned. In addition, the overseas countries and territories would be the subject of "the special arrangements for association."

and social development.[2] The purpose and content of such association is set out in greater detail in Articles 131–136. [3] This provision was expressly requested by France as a condition for signing the founding treaty and was aimed at those non-European countries and territories that were bound to certain member states by so-called "special relations"—*the coded language by which Article 131 referred to certain relations of manifest colonial dependence* (Martines, 1991, p. 404).

Starting from 1961 a subsequent series of agreements was initiated with almost all the Mediterranean countries, under which the EEC countries would buy raw materials from these non-European countries while selling them European industrial products (Isoni, 2013, p. 10). The first association agreements were reached with Greece in 1961 and Turkey in 1963. They were followed in 1965 by a mixed agreement – both commercial and of technical cooperation – with Lebanon. In 1969, two commercial agreements were signed with Tunisia and Morocco.

This was *a strategy designed to exploit commercially developing economies*, while protecting the European economy by making sure that agricultural products and other commodities and manufactured goods coming from those economies would not enter the EEC if they were in competition with European goods and commodities (Pocar, 1981, p. 5-17).

We can see, then, the need for a historical reconstruction that reveals how *development discourse is continuous with colonial policies*, and the way in which this continuity has made it possible to promote ideas of Western superiority, difference, and inequality (Kothari, 2005, p. 63).

Eurafrica

It is necessary to outline the colonial concerns that played central roles in the establishment of EEC in 1957. Indeed, it is important to acknowledge the relevance of the colonial legacy in contemporary EU politics and, at the same time, the centrality of Africa for European integration. According to Hansen and Jonsson, the relation between European integration and colonialism must be established and analyzed (Hansen and Jonsson, 2014, p. 5).

The Eurafrica project was created in 1957 through the establishment of the European Economic Community (EEC). When it was set up the Community comprised not only Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands and West Germany, but also all the colonies of the Member States. Hansen and Jonsson point out that the name "Overseas Countries and Territories" included Belgian Congo and French West and Equatorial Africa, while Algeria, that in that period was part

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2   Article 3 reads as follows: "For the purposes set out in the preceding Article [namely, "establishing a Common Market and progressively approximating the economic policies of Member States"], the activities of the Community shall include [...] (k) the association of overseas countries and territories with the Community was set up with a view to increasing trade and to pursuing jointly their effort towards economic and social development."

3   Article 131: "The Member States agree to associate with the Community the non-European countries and territories which have special relations with Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom." The association had the objectives of applying to the trade with the countries and territories the same treatment as the Member States accorded each other and of realizing the investments required for the progressive development of those countries and territories (Art. 132).

of metropolitan France, was formally integrated into the EEC. In the European political debate it was clear that Eurafrica was "indispensable for Europe's geopolitical and economic survival" (Hansen and Jonsson, 2014, p. 8).

During the Cold War, Europe was constrained between the two imperial blocks: East and West. In this situation, Africa was considered a solution in terms of territories and resources that could be attained through the union of all colonizing nations that merged their colonial possessions for the common good.

The Eurafrica project was implemented, as we have emphasized, through the process of association of colonial territories to the Common Market of European States. As Hansen and Jonsson state, the EU (or better the EEC) "would not have come into existence…had it not been conceived as a Eurafrican enterprise in which colonialism was Europeanized" (Hansen and Jonsson, 2014, p. 13).

For the African States that gained independence, the Eurafrica project allowed the political elites of those States to reach a compromise with their previous colonial rulers, but that happened at the cost of the majority of African peoples. The postcolonial State continued to apply institutional structures that had been created by colonial rule and grounded on the procedures of the colonial administration. The postcolonial State conducted economic activities and trade according to the old patterns. This has been the function of the association agreements of the EEC (Hansen and Jonsson, 2014, p. 15). Through these agreements Europe continued to maintain control over the resources of the African continent.

In about the mid-1960s, Eurafrica was substituted by the project of development, aid and diplomatic relationships. When in 1963 18 independent African States decided to maintain their association with the EEC in the frame of the Yaoundé Convention, the fears that the African States could leave the EEC vanished definitively. These African States subsequently opted for association with the EEC through the Lomé convention (1975-2000) and then through the Cotonou Agreement (2000).

The African Association with the EEC continued with the approval of the Youndé Convention, although with nominally independent African States[4]. But the "spirit" of association with the EEC was still in the frame of the old colonial paradigms. In the Fifties and afterwards the economy of Europe needed the markets and the resources of Africa through a relationship of geopolitical complementarity.

The Eurafrica project represented an alternative to the perspective of pan-Africanism. According to Nkrumah, the first president of independent Ghana, the Treaty of Rome could be considered

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[4]   In 1963 18 ex-African colonies entered the EEC on the ground of treaties of associations. In 1964 and 1965 there was the establishment of trade relations with Israel and Lebanon and 1969 there were the treaties of associations with Tunisia and Morocco and in 1970 with Cyprus and Malta.

the Treaty of the Berlin Congress in 1885 (Hansen and Jonsson, 2014, p. 270). Its meaning signified the advent of neocolonialism in Africa.

Frantz Fanon declared that the Eurafrica project was one of substituting Africa as "a hunting ground of France"into "a hunting ground of Europe" (Fanon, 2006, p. 126). But most of the African leaders followed Houphouët-Boigny, the first president of Ivory Coast, who called for Eurafrican interdependence.

Briefly, it could said that the association of African colonies with the EEC represented a strong obstacle to the realization of African integration and unity (Wallerstein, 2005, p. 129-51). According to Obadiah Mailafia, the "coercive association" of African independent States with the EEC "was oriented toward financing of infrastructures and was markedly biased against industrialization […] association did not mark a major departure from the historical pattern of colonial development" (Mailafia, 1997, p. 60). The African territories had remained "agricultural appendages to Europe" (Coryell, 1962, p. 13).

From the Global Mediterranean Policy to the Project of a Mediterranean Partnership

In the early 1970s – when the problem emerged of supplying oil to the European countries and of expanding the European Community by including Great Britain, Ireland, and Denmark (which occurred in 1973) – Europe's Mediterranean policies saw a turning point. At the Paris summit of 1972, a *Global Mediterranean Policy*[5] was set out that would enable developing Mediterranean countries and industrialized European economies to enter into global cooperation agreements.[6]

The long-term objective of the cooperation agreements was the realization of a free trade Mediterranean area, free access to the European market for industrial products, except textiles and refined petroleum; better access to agricultural products of the Maghreb and a 20-80 percent custom decrease (Zank, 2009, p. 130). Around the mid-seventies, in 1973, the three countries of Maghreb – Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia – signed cooperation agreements with Europe, followed in 1977 by cooperation agreements with Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria.

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5   On the Global Mediterranean Policy and the subsequent cooperation agreements with Egypt, Syria and Jordan in 1977 see Trentin (2012). Despite the proposal of establishing a free-trade area, some items produced by the Arab countries – for instance textiles – were excluded from a reduction in custom tariffs. Moreover the EEC financed the purchase of European machinery by Arab partners that would export semi-finished goods into the EEC (Trentin, 2012: 228-229).

6   The new agreements would be modelled on the New International Economic Order (NIEO) adopted in 1974 by the UN General Assembly and conceived as an instrument through which to aid the transition from a right to decolonization to a right to development (Isoni, 2013: 12). With regard to the NIEO see Noudehou (1990: 31). The NIEO ought to represent an alternative, in particular in the field of the treatment of foreigners and of foreign investments, to the international law that "has served almost as a stronghold from which to preserve a system suited to protecting as far as possible the interests of the Western economic powers" (Angioi, 2006: 60; my translation).

On the ground of these agreements, the European tariffs were lowered between 30 and 100 percent for 86-89 percent of agricultural produce. Compared with the agreements signed in 1969, Tunisia and Morocco obtained tariff reductions of 30-40 percent for their exports. However, there were quantitative restrictions on wines, potatoes, oranges and tomatoes (Zank, 2009, p. 131).

But this new European policy was once more informed by a *neocolonial perspective*, for it all revolved around the notion that European commodities came first, followed by those from the Mediterranean countries, in turn "conceived as mere suppliers of raw materials and as markets for European goods. The policy built on this idea thus had a twofold effect, for on the one hand it kept in place *a model of asymmetric economic relations*, and on the other it prevented the Mediterranean countries from developing those production sectors—especially textiles and agriculture—that would have had considerable advantages over their European counterparts" (Isoni, 2013, p. 13; my translation).

It bears recalling in particular that the protectionist measures adopted in the 1980s under Europe's Common Agricultural Policy were aimed at protecting the agricultural sectors of the European countries of the Mediterranean that were then joining the economic community, namely, Greece in 1981, followed by Spain and Portugal in 1986.

With the end of the Cold War, a new landscape came into view, making it possible to rethink Euro-Mediterranean relations. However, looming over the whole policy debate was the question of *security*, which itself had to be reframed in the light of the new global order that would take shape in the 1990s once the political hostility between the Soviet bloc and the Western powers had been overcome.

In 1990, the EEC launched the *Renewed Mediterranean Policy*, which introduced two new policy areas: environmental protection and the development of human resources. An innovative component of this new strategy was the launch of decentralized cooperation policies that would also involve participants in civil society through so-called Med programs (Med-Campus, Med-Urbs, Med-Invest) designed to address the shortcomings of the bilateral agreements between states (Isoni, 2013, p. 17).

However, these policies failed to close the gap between the economies of the European countries and those of the countries along the Mediterranean's southern shore, as was evidenced by the Mediterranean migratory flows into Europe. A new phase thus set in, driven by the attempt to see the Mediterranean as a complex reality in which the future of Europe inevitably had to be conceived as bound up with that of the Middle Eastern Mediterranean countries. And so in 1995, under this new vision, came a proposal to establish a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), that was launched by the Conference held in Barcelona on the 27th and 28th November 1995 (European Commission, 1995).

The idea of a partnership dates back to the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 and is based on the principle that "any scheme of objectives and actions should not come as an imposition but

should rather result from a process of negotiation understood as a concerted effort that proceeds from a common ground. This requires a context where different actors have different claims and concerns but ultimately recognize that they are acting in pursuit of a common set of objectives and interests" (Angioi, 2007, p. 77; my translation).

Even so, it must be underscored that *the north-south partnership is still a partnership among unequal parties*. This inequality is expressed in particular in the *principle of conditionality*, which I will expand on shortly.

From a legal point of view, a trade and development partnership is meant to facilitate an *association* among countries, which in turn is understood as a "primary normative tool of EU foreign policy" (Raux, 2000, p. 97) and "is used when the partnership to be established between countries requires a particularly structured and complex system of relations" (Angioi, 2007, p. 80; my translation).

From a political point of view, the basic content of a trade partnership agreement is the *nexus between democracy and development*. Indeed, the view that has taken hold in European policy is that development cannot be pursued without also advancing the interests of democracy and the protection of human rights. But a close analysis of Euro-Mediterranean relations in the 1990s and of their future prospects will make it possible to deconstruct the nexus between democracy and development and bring out its deep ambivalences.

To see the deep ambiguity of the process promoted by the European countries in their effort to democratize the southern Mediterranean countries, we need only consider that, on the one hand, the European countries were requiring democratization as a condition for granting foreign aid (this is the *conditionality* clause), but at the same time they were supporting the antidemocratic elites in the Arab-Muslim countries to which they were giving aid.

Figuring as an "essential element" in the Euro-Mediterranean accords was the provision that relations among the parties were contingent on their respect for human rights and the guarantee of democratic principles. This formed the basis of the *conditionality clause*, which applies in the event of any human-rights or minority-rights violations, "but no sanctions were provided for such violations, much less was the suspension clause made effective" (Angioi, 2007, p. 335; my translation). The reason for such laxness is that the EU did not in such cases intend to void the accords en bloc: by and large, the idea was rather to suspend only *some* of their provisions, especially those relative to the disbursement of European funds.

Furthermore the democratization required as a condition for foreign aid also resolved itself into an effort to *Europeanize* the institutions of the Arab-Muslim countries. The process of Europeanization was launched by the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2003-2004 and meant assistance to the Arab countries "in adapting to the complex market regulations of the EU" (Zank, 2009, p. 137), in order to offer them "a stake in the Internal Market" of the EU. But on the one hand, the *adaptation* caused an increase in the numerous Islamic movements that resisted

Europeanization and, on the other, entailed a deep *asymmetry* in the relations between the EU and the North African countries, in that "the main supervisory bodies and the dispute-settlement institutions such as the European Court of Justice are all EU institutions. Countries outside the EU have to adapt" (Zank, 2009, p. 138). Indeed the ENP was a *Eurocentric* policy. These two aspects, namely, *democratization/conditionality* and *Europeanization*, can be described as the *two defining traits of neocolonialism*[7].

What Future for Euro-Mediterranean Relations after the "Arab Spring"?

The Arab revolutions have paved the way for a radical transformation of Euro-Mediterranean relations. Before the "Arab Spring", the southern Mediterranean countries, in search of legitimation by the EU, had acquiesced in trade agreements that worked to their detriment. This led to lower export revenue, coupled with an "absence of competitiveness of their manufactured products on European markets on the one hand, and the maintenance of barriers against agricultural products on the other" (Mouhoud, 2012, p. 42).

Furthermore, within the system of Euro-Mediterranean relations, the Arab Mediterranean states had agreed to repress their own flow of migration and that of migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa. The new situation brought about by the Arab uprisings has meant that neither the ENP nor the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), introduced in 2008, can be accepted any longer, for they both entail a legitimation of Arab autocratic regimes. What kinds of prospects are the Arab states now looking at?

As regards the prospect of development in the Arab world, significant improvements can already be attributed to the free trade agreement signed in Cairo in 1996, which set up the so-called Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA). Indeed, GAFTA, which now includes 17 Arab countries, already increased intra-regional trade by 26.6% from 1997 to 2007 (Abedini and Péridy, 2008, p. 848-872)[8].

But the most important transformations will concern Euro-Mediterranean relations. When the 2011 uprisings spread across North Africa, the EU reconsidered its relations with the Arab countries by framing new priorities for its initiatives. *But, as noted, the criteria for Euro-Mediterranean policy need to be revisited so as to put on an equal footing the asymmetric relations they continue to support.*

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7   This continuity between the colonial past and the later development policies has also been pointed out by E. Tourme-Jouannet, who also observes that "development studies are the direct continuation of colonial law studies" (Tourme-Jouannet, 2013: 11).

8   GAFTA was designed to close the gap between the aim of greater internationalization for the Arab economies and the reality of limited regional integration. To this end, GAFTA removed tariffs and other trade barriers, but it still falls in the category of a traditional trade agreement by reason of its exclusive focus on the exchange of goods and commodities (Romagnoli and Mengoni, 2014: 209).

Euro-Mediterranean policies have so far been framed in keeping with a specific hierarchy of three basic priorities (Cassarino, 2012, p. 5ff). In the first place, the North African countries have been requested to curb the flow of illegal migration. In the second place, as a result of the security paradigm that took hold in the wake of 9/11, the southern Mediterranean countries have found themselves under pressure to promote policies for the fight against terrorism, while sidelining democratization and human rights policies. In the third place, the dominant concern with stability has favoured authoritarian regimes, which have accordingly seized the opportunity to present the stability paradigm as an expression of "good governance", all the while translating that paradigm into forms of government control of the economy, thus excluding the possibility of fostering a free market economy.

The deep transformations that have taken place in North Africa have imposed a new hierarchy of priorities among Euro-Mediterranean relations. In the wake of the "Arab Spring", the focus of the European response to the transformations of the Arab world was laid out in two documents issued in 2011 by the European Commission and the High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. The two documents were entitled *A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean* and *A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood: A Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy*[9].

In the first place, the ENP review has implied that the EU recognized the need to provide its neighbours with greater resources. Under the review plan, foreign aid was to be increased to 1.2 billion euros by 2013; another 1 billion euros was to be lent by the European Investment Bank (EIB); and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development was to initiate further programs with an initial outlay of 1 billion euros.

The aid has been used to grow the economy and improve society by helping small to medium-sized enterprises and providing microcredit, reducing economic disparity, and launching pilot projects for agricultural and rural development. Furthermore, in the medium to long term the common objective with the Southern Mediterranean countries is the establishment of so-called Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas, where to conclude Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (DCFTAs) with the aim of finally making good on the ENP's broken promise to enable neighbouring countries to participate in the EU single markets (Colombo and Tocci, 2012, p. 87).

If the EU's current economic and political crisis and the uprisings in the Arab countries had taken their full course, an opportunity would have been opened to renegotiate the "free trade agreement with the EU demanding both the opening of the EU agricultural markets and a *temporary asymmetry* to the benefit of MENA (Middle East and North Africa) countries" (Mouhoud, 2012, p. 43-44).

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9   European Commission and the High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, COM (2011) 200, and European Commission and the High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, COM (2011) 303.

But a closer analysis of the documents issued by the EU after the Arab uprisings – that is *A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity* and *A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood* – suggests that the EU's policy towards the southern shore of Mediterranean has not changed.

The core of the ENP review in the latter document lies in *a new framing of the conditionality principle* based on the concept of "deep democracy," consisting in free elections; the protection of freedom of expression, assembly, and association; the fight against corruption; and the introduction of the rule of law; among other elements. The means identified to achieve these objectives consists in offering incentives in the form of foreign aid, better trade relations, and greater mobility (Balfour, 2012, p. 64).

However, the conditionality principle at the core of a new ENP clashes with some limits that can hardly be overcome. In the first place, as noted, the principle is grounded in an asymmetric relationship with the EU aimed at influencing the transformations of the Arab countries, and that stands in contrast to the strong defence of the sovereignty principle inherited from the postcolonial Arab world. In second place, in reviewing the conditionality principle, the EU has to redefine the "ethical standards" of its policy in the light of the support it has given to authoritarian Arab regimes. And, finally, a new system of Euro-Mediterranean relations ought to acknowledge the lasting "unacknowledged cultural legacy of colonialism" (Halliday, 2005).

"*Interdependence, rather than conditionality* based on an asymmetry of power, and reference to universal principles, rather than to standards of democracy, make it legitimate to support them abroad [...]. And identifying common interests and concerns that reflect the demands of the people in this common Mediterranean space may be a way to establish a new dialogue with a changing Arab world" (Balfour, 2012, p. 68; italics added).

Moreover the DCFTAs require once again the *adaptation* of the southern Mediterranean countries to the EU's criteria of the single market, as it was in the frame of the ENP.

A new season could have opened up for Euro-Mediterranean relations. But the upheaval and disorder currently ravaging the Middle East, with their global repercussions, are dashing all hopes in that regard. It bears pointing out here that while the Arab revolts have made for an extraordinary opportunity to rebuild Euro-Mediterranean relations, the current economic crisis in the EU is preventing the EU from playing an active role in bringing about authentic change in the southern Mediterranean countries (Paciello, 2013, p. 83).

In fact, the enduring crisis has only intensified competition among EU Member States, while calling Europe's common trade policy into question. In addition, the economic crisis has effectively caused trade negotiations with the southern Mediterranean countries to grind to a halt, with the single exception of the DCFTA being negotiated with Morocco as of 2013. What is more, the European crisis has prompted Egypt and Tunisia to diversify by seeking out new

trading partners, and so far they have forged closer trade relations with Turkey and the Persian Gulf countries, especially Qatar and Saudi Arabia.

The EU does not seem to have learned from the failures of the past, for it keeps rehashing its traditional trade policy. Even the policy based on conditionality, if unaccompanied by real economic incentives, is making it harder and harder for the EU to bring about political change, especially in view of the fact that non-European actors such as Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey are offering resources without demanding that changes be made to the political framework (Paciello, 2013, p. 88).

Precisely at a time when a bold transformation of Euro-Mediterranean relations is looking increasingly necessary, the economic downturn appears to be making the EU powerless to come forward with a partnership proposal that can work to the mutual benefit of both the EU and the Arab countries.

The 2015 ENP Review

Now after the failure of the "Arab Spring", with the exception of Tunisia, the EU's policy towards the Mediterranean countries assumes new criteria. This new perspective is expressed in a document of the European Commission and the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy entitled *Towards a New European Neighbourhood Policy* issued in 2015, in which the EU considers the results and the validity of the ENP. The ENP evolved into the creation of the UfM in 2008 and the realization of the Eastern Partnership in 2009.

Moreover, the neighbouring countries now have the perspective of the creation of DCFTAs, as well as Mobility Partnerships. As we know, the ENP was reviewed in 2011 to devise a response to the uprisings of the Arab springs. But these processes of transition have had different conclusions in the Arab countries and it is for this reason that this document once again critically analyses the validity of the ENP[10]. The EU has used the ENP as a tool on an annual basis to favour and assess the efforts for the reforms in every country, in particular as regards the field of the governance, on the ground of action plans stipulated with the individual partners.

An important consideration of the document outlines the fact that, although the ENP covers 16 neighbouring countries, it is also necessary to address *the neighbours of the neighbours*, thereby redefining the Mediterranean area that also comprises relations with Russia, with partners in Central Asia, in Africa and with the Gulf countries. In this perspective the representation of the Mediterranean area appears flexible according to the policy definitions of the EU.

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10   European Commission and the High Representative of the European Union for foreign Affairs and Security Policy (2015) Towards a New European Neighbourhood Policy, JOIN (2015) 6 final, Brussels, 4th March 2015, p. 3. With regard to this document see Lannon (2015: 220 ff).

This paper makes mention of unsolved problems: *how can the ENP sustain the management of migration flows and, furthermore, how can the EU foster a sustainable economic and social development in partner countries of the ENP?*

Very significant and innovative is the perspective of the promotion of *regional cooperation* that could be more adequately accomplished through collaboration with other regional actors (Council of Europe, OSCE, League of Arab States, Organization of the Islamic Conference, the African Union).

The Member States of the EU outline four priority areas that need further consultation and reflection: *Differentiation, Focus, Flexibility, Ownership & Visibility.*

As regards *Differentiation*, in relation to the countries of the southern shore and considering their different processes of transformation, the document asks whether the ENP ought to adopt a kind of "variable geometry" with different levels of relationships with the partner countries. In the European Council conclusions on the review of the ENP of 20/04/2015, the Council stresses that the European policy should be capable of responding flexibly to the changing situation in the region, "challenges and crises while preserving its continuity and predictability"[11].

The second point – *Focus* – entails the need to assess the specific interests of the EU and of the different neighbouring partners. On the ground of informal consultations, it emerges that the EU and the neighbouring partners have strong common interest in the following areas: promoting trade and an inclusive and sustainable economic development; energy security; protection against security threats deriving from conflict situations; the capacity to tackle governance challenges; cooperation in the field of migration and mobility.

As regards *Flexibility*, the EU has utilized a plurality of tools with many ENP partner countries: in particular Association agreements or Partnership and Cooperation Agreements.

Financial resources have already been assured to ENP partner countries and a further EUR 15 billion will be provided for the period 2014-2020. There will be a mid-term review in 2017 that will represent an opportunity to implement the funds of the European Neighbourhood Instrument in relation to the changing developments of the region[12].

Lastly, in relation to the forth point – *Ownership & Visibility* – the document points out that one of the main criticisms levelled against the ENP is the limited sense of ownership with the partners and a weak awareness of the aims of the policy and its impact. Efforts are needed to improve both the ownership of this policy by the partners and the communication of its objectives and results.

A new document of the European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy entitled *Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy*

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11   European Council (2015), Council conclusions on the Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy, 20th April 2015, p. 1.

12   Towards a New European Neighbourhood Policy, JOIN (2015) 6 final, Brussels, 4th March 2015, pp. 8-9.

states that "the current review of the ENP is to propose how the EU and its neighbours can build more effective partnerships in the neighbourhood"[13].

The review of the EN, proposed by President Juncker and requested by EU Member States, has brought over 250 responses to the public consultation from Member States, partner governments, EU institutions, international organizations, social partners, civil society and so on. The review confirms the "need for change in the ENP both in substance and in methodology".

The document acknowledges that the incentive-based approach ("More for More") has been successful in fostering the reforms in the fields of good governance, democracy, rule of law and human rights, but it has not been a sufficiently strong incentive where there has not been the political will. In these cases the EU will explore alternative ways through the engagement of civil, economic and social actors.

As regards the possibility of stipulating agreements with highly relevant partner countries is the hypothesis on the part of the EU to assume greater flexibility. So there will be neighbours that have accepted a path of close economic integration with the EU, through the implementation of association agreements on a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area, such as Morocco and Tunisia with which negotiations have just been launched. But a number of partners do not currently wish to pursue such a model. For them the EU will try to propose attractive alternatives, through different kinds of agreements, in order to promote integration and foster trade and investment relations.

It looks as if the EU is aiming at the realization of an increasing flexibility with the neighbouring countries. But this is a very uncertain perspective without a clear and common strategy. The same is happening in the field of migration.

Migration in the Mediterranean Area

An important chapter in Euro-Mediterranean relations concerns the large flows of migrants from the Mediterranean's southern shore into Europe. The problem, as is evident, is closely bound up with that of redefining Euro-Mediterranean relations.

On November 18, 2011, the European Commission issued a document entitled *The Global Approach to Migration and Mobility* (GAMM), and in that connection it stated: "The Arab spring and events in the Southern Mediterranean in 2011 further highlighted the need for a coherent and comprehensive migration policy for the EU"[14]. The document lays out a set of recommendations as follows, with an emphasis on what it terms the four pillars of the GAMM:

13   European Commission and the High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy, JOIN (2015) 50 final, Brussels, 18th November 2015, p. 2. See Lannon (2015: 224).

14   European Commission (2011) The Global Approach to Migration and Mobility, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee, and the Committee of the Regions, COM (2011) 743 final, Brussels, 18th November 2011, p. 2.

The GAMM should be based on *four equally important pillars*:

(1) organizing and facilitating *legal migration and mobility*;

(2) preventing and reducing *irregular migration* and *trafficking in human beings*;

(3) promoting *international protection* and enhancing the external dimension of *asylum policy*;

(4) maximizing the *development impact* of migration and mobility.

The GAMM should be *migrant-centered*. It is to be based on the principle that the migrant is at the core of the analysis and all action and must be empowered to gain access to safe mobility.

The *human rights of migrants* are a cross-cutting issue in the GAMM, as this dimension is relevant to all four pillars. The GAMM should strengthen respect for fundamental rights and the human rights of migrants in source, transit and destination countries alike. In particular, in regard to the fourth pillar, "the EU should reinforce its support for capacity-building in partner countries. Coordination and coherence between national migration and *development policies* …should be strengthened… Successful mainstreaming of migration in *development thinking* requires making it an integral part of a whole range of sectoral policies (on agriculture, health, education, etc.)" (European Commission, 2011, p. 19).

But the EU is not expressly committed to a global approach to migration processes and still seems stuck on a policy of keeping migrants in check and even subduing them (Lavenex and Stucky, 2011, p. 116-142). Moreover, despite the attempts in the 1999 Tampere Summit and the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam to achieve an integrated European migration policy[15], *we have to recognize that European migration policies are still essentially shaped at the national level*. The European countries' attitudes regarding migration processes are indeed quite different. There are the positions of "the North European countries, including France and Germany, for which Schengen's border and policing arrangements do not guarantee enough security". Then there are the "Southern European countries that …want the right to make exceptions to the EU's 'Dublin regulation' on asylum, which stipulates that they must care for all asylum seekers who reach their shores first without sending them on to the richer countries further north" (Brady, 2012, p. 276). These differences are at the root of the EU impasse and of its inability to form a coherent and common policy on migration processes.

But in the face of the deep transformations in the North African and Middle East countries, a new migration policy is necessary to redefine the founding principles of Euro-Mediterranean relations in such a way as to embrace a *co-development* approach on which migrants are regarded as transnational actors contributing to the development both of their countries of origin and of the ones they migrate to. European people ought to emphatically underscore the role of migrants

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15   See Treaty of Amsterdam, Part One, Article 2(15), amending Part Three of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, and in particular Title IIIa (Visas, Asylum, Immigration and Other Policies Related to Free Movement of Persons), Arts. 73i, 73j, and 73k.

as fundamental actors in development, in such a way as to counteract the priority the European countries allot to security.

The document of the European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, *Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy*, issued on 18th November 2015, states that the ENP will reflect an intensified cooperation on both regular and irregular migration. The European Council conclusions of 25-26 June and 15-16 October, the High-Level Conference on the Eastern Mediterranean/Western Balkans Route of 8th October and the Valletta Summit on Migration of 11-12th November of the same year had all confirmed the new political impetus of deeper cooperation[16] with ENP partners. But this concept of cooperation is grounded on the purpose of introducing criteria of differentiation among the migrants. Indeed, the EU aims to promote better tools *to identify skill gaps in the European labour market* and encourage the recognition of qualifications of third country nationals working in the EU. In March 2016, the Commission planned to improve and further facilitate the entry and residence of highly skilled third-country nationals in the EU. From this perspective the EU will cooperate with the ENP countries to encourage and make progress on facilitating recognition of skills and qualifications[17]. It is clear that there is only a *functional* approach to migration in relation to the needs of the European labour market. There is no idea of humanitarian aid!

Furthermore, the document seemed to assume the perspective of *co-development*, because there is the declaration that more effective ways of building links with diaspora communities and of working on circular migration will be sought. The EU should also promote migration schemes in small and medium-size enterprises and training programmes for entrepreneurs in European countries.

Moreover, the EU will create a new start-up fund to provide capital to promote "brain circulation" in order to sustain migrants returning to their countries of origin. This could help the migrants contribute with the acquired skills to the economic and social development of their countries. *In short, on the one hand, the EU adopts a functional approach to the European labour market and, on the other, it sustains the project of migrants returning to their own countries.*

Finally the document points out that the EU will continue to foster a realistic and fair narrative on migration and to combat vigorously all forms of racism and discrimination promoting intercultural dialogue, cultural diversity and mutual understanding. However the perspectives of this EU's policy are very difficult to be realized in front of the nationalist and populist resistance of many European civil societies, in particular in Eastern European countries.

But to date only the EU-Turkey agreement has been subscribed, on 19th March 2016. On the ground of this agreement, following on from the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan of 29th November

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16   Concrete actions of international cooperation at all levels ought to be grounded on the traditional EU's commitment to human rights standards (Abdel Aziz, 2016: 112).

17   European Commission and the High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (2015) Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy, JOIN (2015) 50 final, Brussels, 18th November 2015, p. 16.

2015 and the 7th March EU-Turkey Statement, the European Union and Turkey have decided to stop the irregular migration from Turkey to Europe. The agreement aims to combat people smuggling and to break off the irregular routes to the EU, in the frame of EU and international law[18].

In particular the EU and Turkey have agreed that: – all irregular migrants from Turkey to Greece will be returned to Turkey from 20th March 2016;

for every Syrian being returned to Turkey from Greece, another Syrian, who has received the status of refugee, will be accepted in Europe. The legal basis on which irregular migrants will be returned from the Greek islands to Turkey is the bilateral readmission agreement between Greece and Turkey, that from 1st June will be substituted by the EU-Turkey readmission agreement. The number of migrants that ought to be accepted in the EU amounts about to 72,000 (D'Argenio, 2016, p. 2), but – as we know – some European countries, namely Central and Eastern European countries, have refused to accept migrants.

The EU will disburse € 3 billion in the frame of the Facility for Refugees in Turkey[19] programme and will add € 3 billion more to the end of 2018. But the main question is whether the protection of human rights will be assured. There is the risk indeed that there could be collective expulsions that are prohibited on the ground of the art. 4 of the IV Protocol of the European Convention on Human Rights. Moreover, migrants that have the right to international protection, but that arrived irregularly in the Greek islands, will also be returned to Turkey.

Furthermore, the procedures for receiving the status of refugee must be guaranteed[20] and the human rights of migrants be protected in Turkey too, as regards for instance the right of children to education.

So the national politics of European countries on the one hand, and the difficult implementation and the limits of the EU-Turkey agreement, on the other, demonstrate the absence of a clear strategy of European politics in the field of migration, that represents no emergency question, but a structural problem that will face the EU for a long time to come[21].

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18   European Commission, EU-Turkey Statement: Questions and Answers, Brussels, 19th March 2016, [Online], Available: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-963_en.htm, p. 1.

19   European Commission, The EU-Turkey Cooperation: A € 3 billion Refugee Facility for Turkey, Brussels 24 November 2015.

20   Turkey does not fully apply the UN Convention on refugees with the consequence that people returned to Turkey are left without international protection (Pierini, 2016: 79).

21   The immigration crisis is the most decisive for the EU's identity because it represents the crisis of the European values of solidarity and human rights and has driven "its populist and nationalist movements" (Borrell, 2016:88). Questionable seems to be the Memorandum of Understanding signed on the 2nd of February 2017 by the Italian Government and Fayez al-Sarraj, Chairman of the Presidential Council of Libya and Prime Minister of the Government of National Accord of Libya. The Memorandum starts a politics of cooperation to stem the illegal migrant flows (art. 1), together with the fostering of a Euro-African cooperation to eliminate the causes of migrations through the realization of strategic projects of development with African countries. The Malta Declaration, issued by the European Council on 3rd February, approved the Memorandum of Understanding between Italy and Libya. The Declaration states the priority of disrupting the business model of smugglers through an integrating approach

Conclusions

At the end of this essay it is necessary to introduce some short considerations about the future of the European identity.

After the uprisings of the "Arab Spring" that have caused the crisis of the Euro-mediterranean relations, now the future of the European Union is represented by the necessity of a new policy for the Mediterranean area.

The Mediterranean represents indeed an opportunity and above all a necessity for the safeguard of the European identity. Through the integration of large masses of migrants – instead of a policy of mere containment of migration – the European Union could sustain its economy and maintain its level of social security; and through projects of cooperation with the countries of MENA area that offer conditions of stability, and with the African countries that are at the origin of the huge flows of migrations, the EU could contribute to create an area of common prosperity against the perspective of instability and the challenges of terrorism.

Without this change of political perspective, the risk is a deep economic and political crisis of the EU and of its cultural identity.

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involving Libya and other countries and, at the same time, outlines the need to support the development of local communities in Libya in order to improve their socio-economic situation and "enhance their resilience as host communities" (Malta Declaration by the members of the European Council on the external aspects of migration: addressing the Central Mediterranean route, 03/02/2017, Available: http://www. consilium.europa.eu/en//press-releases/2017/02/03-malta-declaration/).

However it is important to point out with approval the criticism expressed against the Malta Declaration by the UNHCR representative for South Europe, who has declared that it is unacceptable to consider the migrants "illegal", because the majority of them are people that have the right to receive the status of refugees. Moreover Libya, that has not signed the Geneva Convention, is no safe haven and in its migrant centres there offer no guarantee of rights. (See la Repubblica, 4th February 2017, p. 11).

We are still very far from a fair solution for the epochal question of migrants!

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Geographical Imaginations of the Mediterranean Along Dichotomies of East-West/North-South

Doğu-Batı/Kuzey-Güney İkilikleri Çerçevesinde Coğrafi Bir Tahayyül Olarak Akdeniz[*]

Sezgi DURGUN[**]

Abstract

This article endeavours to analyse the European and Turkish discourses regarding the concept of the "Mediterranean" and its variations both in temporal and spatial terms. The theoretical inspiration of this article comes from the "geographical imagination as a way of thinking about world politics and considering the relative importance of places and the relationships between contested narratives of a specific region or territory". Hence this study will examine different geographical imaginations of the Mediterranean region that are projected onto both Turkish and European political discourse. The perspective which is engaged here involves the historical geography, or *geosophy* put forward by J. K. Wright (1946) who assumed that geographical knowledge is not only a knowledge of physical characteristics and natural resources, but is also something being defined and redefined by the political imagination of the perceiver. So in this article a "*geosophical*" perspective will be applied to the Mediterranean region that plays both a historical and strategic role in Euro-Turkish relations.

Keywords: Mediterranean, Geosophy, Geographical Imagination, East-West/North South Dichotomy, Political Geography

Öz

Bu makalede Avrupa Birliği ve Türkiye'nin siyasal söyleminde "Akdeniz" kavramı mekânsal ve tarihsel boyutlarıyla ele alınıyor. Makalenin teorik zemini dünya siyasetinde coğrafi imgelemin oynadığı rollerden ilham alıyor. Bir tahayyül olarak coğrafi anlatılar zaman zaman örtüşen zaman zaman çatışan eksenlerde karşımıza çıkabiliyor; makalede Akdeniz örneğine bakarak Avrupa ve Türk söyleminin bu bölgeyi nasıl tahayyül ettiği tarihsel ve siyasal anlatıların nerelerde çakışıp nerelerde birbirinden ayrıldığı konu edilmekte. Konuya yaklaşım şekli J.K Wright'in "jeozofi" olarak adlandırabileceğimiz perspektifinden güç alıyor. Jeozofik yaklaşım sayesinde coğrafi epistemolojinin sadece fiziksel ve doğal kaynaklardan ibaret olmadığı, insan tahayyülünün de coğrafi bilginin şekillendirici bir parçası olduğu tartışılıyor. Böylelikle AB – Türkiye ilişkilerinde önemli rol oynayan "Akdeniz" anlatısı ve bu bölgeye dair stratejiler iki farklı açıdan tartışmaya açılıyor.

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The most fascinating terrae incognitae of all are those that lie within the hearts and minds of men.

J.K. Wright (1946, AAG conference presidential address, USA)

Introduction

When the above-mentioned notion "terrae incognitae in the hearts and minds of men" was expressed (Wright 1947, p. 37/1-15), there was not even a trace of Edward Said's "imaginative geographies", or Benedict Anderson's "imagined communities". For these terms to come forward we had to wait for historical processes and new theoretical paradigms such as critical geopolitics[1] that would make room for deconstructing various types of political identifications, nationalisms, and colonization. In particular, when "world maps" started to be seen from a critical viewpoint (Harley 1988, p. 289-290), doubts were cast on images of the world that were once taken for granted. Hence these processes invite us to think more critically about the relationship between geography and politics.

One may assume that what might have inspired J. K Wright's idea of "terrae incognitae" was his reflection on how powerful human imagination would be in shaping the external reality. We may also assume here that the philosophical background of this argument may stems from Immanuel Kant, who was lecturing on geography besides philosophy at the University of Königsberg. Among the philosophers, Kant stands out not only for initiating the tradition of the Enlightenment, but also as a pioneer in synthesizing the anthropological perspective with the discipline of geography. His most powerful argument is that the perceiving mind has an imprint on the thing perceived. According to him, the knowledge of the world or cosmology (*Welterkenntniss*) is a combination of physical geography (object of external sense) and anthropology (as an object of inner sense) (Kant 1801).

We may argue that J. K. Wright is one of the outstanding geographers who follows a Kantian line of thought and combines philosophical thinking with geography as giving birth to "geosophy" (in his terminology). He gives the early hints of critical geography since he is well aware of the potential constructive nature of geographical imagination and the political role of the thinker. Hence Wright's "argument of terrae incognitae" marks the premature predictions that political geography would play a transformative role in the future of the social sciences.

Hence from the 1970's on, the discipline of geography became more included in interdisciplinary studies (local governments, urban sociology, spatial politics, international migration, *glocalism*, etc.) Hence, in recent studies space is no longer perceived as a passive physical background in politics, but becomes an active variable that brought about the discussion over the relation

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1   Critical geopolitics is a platform that emerged in the 1990s at the interface between Political Geography and International Relations. See Agnew, J. (1998); Tuathail, G. (1996); Ó Tuathail, G. et al. (2006).

between the perceiver and the perceived space. Since the 1980s, discussions over "space-place" have gained ground. In this context, space is not seen as a naturally given condition but a vibrant phenomenon that is rooted in *long durée* human experience. This perspective plays an important role in the constructivist's analysis of nation building as well as "boundary/identity" studies. Hence from the 1970s onwards there has been a growing interest in critical studies regarding space and world politics. Within this context geographical imagination is often used as a term to embrace a variety of meanings, including individual mental images and socially produced discourses on cultures, spaces, and differences. There is also a growing academic interest in critical geopolitics that questions long-standing "geopolitical dogmas" in Turkey[2].

Geographical imagination assumes that how people see the world is influenced by many factors, including social class, education, and personal and political philosophies. Even the particular moments in history in which people live also play a major role in how they view the world around them[3]. As Massey (2006) argues:

> "*We carry around with us mental images of the world, of the country in which we live (all those images of the North/South divide), of the street next door.[…]All of us carry such images, they may sometimes be in conflict or even be the cause of conflict, and digging these things up and talking about them is one good way to begin to examine what it means to think geographically*".

Moreover, Derek Gregory (1994) explains that the "geographical imagination" has a significant role in shaping much of the world's social and spatial thought. Through the geographical imagination, people (both individually and collectively) develop a sense of boundaries, which separate "our territory" from theirs.

Turning back to Wright, what he meant by historical thinking on geography (or "geosophy" in his terms) is the "subject is usually understood to deal with the record of geographical knowledge as acquired through exploration and field work, and as formalized and made into a discipline, and most of the work that has actually been done in the field has been restricted to the core area of geographical knowledge to the exclusion of its peripheral zone." As Wright (1947) adds more to it:

> "*…Through the ages men have been drawn to unknown regions by Siren voices, echoes of which ring in our ears today when on modern maps we see spaces labelled "unexplored," rivers shown by broken lines, islands marked "existence doubtful." In this address I shall deal with terrae incognitae, both literal and as symbolizing all that is geographically*

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2   See Bilgin, P. (2012); For a critical study in the Turkish literature see *Türkiye Dünyanın Neresinde?* (Eds.) Bilgin P, Durgun S. & Yeşiltaş M. (2015).

3   In the 1990s "space and place" gained popularity; especially in postmodern studies which took it as a socio-political problematic. This perspective deeply influenced present-day urban theory and human geography, as seen in the work of authors such as David Harvey (1996) and Edward Soja (1989), and in contemporary discussions around the notion of spatial justice.

unknown; I shall discuss the appeal that they make to the imaginative faculties of geographers and others and the place of the imagination in geographical studies[…]

There is merit in conceiving it more comprehensively. I have already suggested that geographical knowledge of one kind or another is universal among men, and in no sense a monopoly of geographers. All persons know some geography, and I venture to think that many of the animals do, also.

According to the humanist school in geography, space-place is conceptualized as a "life-world". French sociologist Henri Lefebvre and the Neo-Marxist tradition argue that there are different modes of production of space (i.e. spatialization) from natural space (absolute space) to more complex spatialities whose significance is socially produced (i.e. social space). Upon this ground, in reference to the famous argument, "there is a politics of space because space is political" (Lefebvre 1974) we can argue that every perspective involves a political projection.

In support of the idea that geographical imagination is one of most important political tools, Fotiadis (2008/2009) argues different orientations provide different views of the world, and are often chosen specifically to make the viewer adopt the same viewpoint as the mapmaker. There is nothing natural about a particular orientation; it is the dominance of socially constructed beliefs that makes it seem so. To take a more contemporary example, we may analyse the map "NATO Member and Partner Countries", and how it adopts projection, orientation so that the viewer adopts the position of NATO countries facing the Euro-Atlantic partners in opposition. This inevitably encourages identification with the NATO space instead of the "other" bloc. This also gives an orientation as if the neighbour countries to NATO countries had to serve (or sooner /later are destined to serve) NATO purposes. Moreover, in this map you also see what sort of roles (Dialogue, Cooperation, etc.) and missions are given to each region by NATO (See Figure 1).

Figure 1: NATO MAP: Source NATO archives, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_81136.htm (accessed 13th October 2017).

A critical map-reader should ask why a particular orientation has been chosen and what political purpose it serves. The examination of such maps helps us to deconstruct the mentality behind the governance/management of security, migration, energy, etc., but here we will be content to show that "a map is a not merely a map" but it reflects the ideology of its maker. On the map above we have a specific classification of the regions such as "Istanbul Cooperation Initiative Countries" printed in beige representing "the countries of the broader Middle East region practical bilateral security cooperation with NATO so as to contribute to global and regional security" (Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, United Arab Emirates) and Euro-Atlantic categorized as a major political actor in light green colour. Especially the relationship between NATO and "Euro-Atlantic partners" is defined in a hierarchic manner:

"To help often newly independent states build a solid democratic environment, maintain political stability and modernize armed forces. Discussions on security issues of common interest take place within a multilateral forum called the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and practical cooperation is organized with individual partner countries through NATO's Partnership for Peace program. NATO also maintains special relationships with Russia, Ukraine and Georgia".

This hierarchic discourse of "help" and "cooperation" is clearly seen here as if there is an unquestioned hegemony between the non-NATO countries and NATO members. This discourse seems to suggest that these countries are supposed take the member states as a model and serve the purposes defined by NATO. Regarding the Mediterranean region, this hegemonic discourse was softened to some degree defining the relationship in the form of "participation and dialogue" rather than "being in need of help from NATO". In the map above the Mediterranean region that is represented in red accommodates the dialogue countries, namely Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia. According to NATO, these countries "participate in a security dialogue with NATO to improve mutual understanding and contribute towards regional security through stronger practical cooperation". As the map underlines, these participating countries are entitled "to consult collectively and individually with NATO". It is clear that in this hierarchic discourse, Mediterranean partners are defined more on an equal basis compared to the other regions. This raises new questions and discussions over the spectrum of self-other relationships. As the discourse above exemplifies, NATO's perception of Mediterranean dialogue countries gives us more insights to discuss the role of this region in the demarcation between East and West.

In particular, the "Southern Mediterranean" identity and its position vis-à-vis the EU can be seen as an interesting case for an unusual self-other relationship. As has been argued by several scholars, the formation of an "other" can take many forms. The "other" does not necessarily have to take the shape of a subordinate, backward, or even dangerous identity as within Edward Said's influential study on the West and the Orient (Said, 1979). The other can also be constituted as equal or even superior to a (national) self, it can be located in a different time, and it can, for instance, be constituted as one's own historical past. The relationship between self and other can accordingly also be marked by enmity or amity, by admiration or indifference. The self can identify with the other or even submit to the other (Neumann 1996, Campbell 1998). We will come back and further argue about this relationship in the chapter below (EU's View of the Mediterranean) where we discuss the conceptions of the Mediterranean in the EU discourse.

The Mediterranean as a "Pool of Identities"

In this part of the study the primary focus will be the Mediterranean as the home for the emergence of "Eastern-Western" identities and how these identities shift according to the changing political conditions. In doing this we will basically take both the Turkish and European perspectives as different geographical imaginations. Historically speaking, the Mediterranean identity was significantly transformed while the Ottomans started to dominate the region; and it was equally so when the Empire was geographically shrinking and the Turkish State was born on the "Asia Minor" or Anatolian territories. Moreover, along with the changing conditions in world politics, the Mediterranean region gained new meanings for both "Eastern" and "Western" sides of the region. This brings about contested or sometimes contrasting narratives regarding the Mediterranean identity. In some political narratives the very definition of the Mediterranean perpetuates the East-West dichotomy and in others "Mediterranean identity" functions as an

instrument to "escape westward" from any Islamic or "Eastern" attachments. For this reason this article assumes that the deconstruction of the various "uses of the Mediterranean" would help us investigate how different meanings, perceptions and political projections are at stake.

Historically speaking, the Mediterranean has always been a zone of encounter where different or antagonistic religions and cultures converge and diverge. Each cultural/political group developed an attachment to this region in its own way. There are remarkable studies that try to draw our attention to the "essentialist narratives" over how the "self-other" dichotomies are at perpetuated in both Europe and the Arab and Turkish Mediterranean (Gozzi, 2012, p. 13). In these narratives the different "uses" of the Mediterranean as a category of identification are changing according to the perception by different states, people and societies. For instance, in the eyes of an Arab society being Mediterranean can be synonymous with a Western identity, whereas for British society being Mediterranean can be perceived as closer to the Eastern type of identity.

It seems that the Mediterranean region is a key space where the concepts of West and East are constructed and reconstructed throughout the ages. On this point we should also recall that the very first uses of the concept of "West" referred to people, societies and states surrounding the Mediterranean, whereas the lands further to the East and South constituted the "East" (Hentch, 1992). The very idea of Europe is also developed upon the constitution of the Eastern ground with the Muslim conquests of Asia Minor, Malta, Spain and southern territories. While the category of the West shifted more further westwards with the emergence of the idea of "Europe", the people in the south of the Mediterranean Sea came to be included more in the category of the East. These developments also have a negative impact on the idea of a "Unified Mediterranean". Hence this unity was shaken by the changing political balance between dichotomous relations between East/West and North/South in the region. Besides Braudel's (1972, p. 615-42) historical remarks, there are also numerous studies that confirm that these dichotomies are persistent:

> "If the eastern Mediterranean was in the process of sliding slowly and unconsciously into dependence on the Westerners . . . parallel to this hold of the West over the East, there was another conquest on the western side, the conquest of the South by the North" (Fontenay 1993, p. 52).

In order to understand different attachments and conceptions of the Mediterranean we need to see how these dichotomies (East/West and North/South) became functional (or sometimes dysfunctional) in specific examples. For instance, there remained a belief in the cultural identification with the Mediterranean in the Arab world: especially in Egypt and Lebanon the Mediterranean dimension of their identity is much more preserved than others (Salem 1997). Moreover during the 1950s some Lebanese nationalist thinkers claimed that they favoured the Mediterranean identification over other identities. Hence for some countries "Mediterranean identity" became a useful instrument to "de-tach" from the Arab/Islamic world while claiming affinity with Europe and the West. However, this identification was played down during the foundation of Israel when countries of the Arab league started to struggle with Israel (Salem 1997,

p. 23-42). North African intellectuals have also favoured a similar Mediterranean identification as a way of highlighting the Maghreb's Arab Berber ethnic mix and underlining historical links with Europe in general and with France in particular. As Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco gained independence, there emerged non-European Mediterranean states enabling an intellectual discourse closer to this peculiar Mediterranean identity. So, Mediterranean identity became an alternative spatial representation, which is used by Maghreb intellectuals to demarcate their identity from the Mashreq other (Bilgin 2004, p. 273).

Hence one can argue that the Mediterranean identity card is put forward by the non-Western countries to identify with a more "favourable" or "powerful" image, namely the "Western" image. As we discussed in the NATO map above, this sort of identification would also be welcomed by the official NATO discourse since it classifies these countries as the "dialogue partners" in the Mediterranean. The uses of the Mediterranean identity as an "escape westwards" can be understood more clearly in the light of the discussion of Orientalism. As is well known, Said (1979) posited that the outsiders, (for Said the Western cultures) perceived the non-western lands and in particular the Orient as open and often virgin territory. It was there for to be captured and subjugated. Whether this was always the case or not, it does point to how such imagining became revenue for legitimizing actions. What is crucial here is that the very act of imagining becomes an apparatus and an expression of power. This power is the ability of colonizers to construct and objectify what they are seeking; they use it to erect their perceived reality. Apart from Said's dichotomized Orientalism, Makdisi in his article on "Ottoman Orientalism" argued that there are nuanced versions of Orientalism and some of them are formed outside Europe. Makdisi suggests "in an age of Western dominated modernity, every nation creates its own Orient" (Makdisi 2002, p. 768).

In this chapter we have tried to see how different geographical imaginations of the same geographical area produced different identities. Under this light we can claim that the various uses of Mediterranean identification form a continuum. It is apparent that the power relationships are the most effective in the construction of Orient/Occident. As far as Western dominated modernity and the Eastern identities are concerned, it is significant to note that these identities are mutually constitutive. However, the flexibility of these identifications is eventually bound by the political climate of the region. Hence depending on geo-strategic perceptions, Mediterranean attachments and identities became stretchy. This helps us to understand the above examples of how and why a once favoured Mediterranean identity was played down during the foundation of Israel. Hence the foundation of Israel led to a certain polarization between Arab and non-Arab identities in the region. So when there is a common threat, identities may unite to solidify the common "self" (i.e., the solidification of the idea of Europe against the Threatening Turk"), or possible identities may dissolve and highlight the nuances to differentiate themselves from "the similar others" as is in the case of Maghreb intellectuals differentiating from Mashreq.

Mediterranean in the Western Imagination: "Dramatic Geography and the Grand Turk"[4]

In the Western imagination the Mediterranean was portrayed as the original setting of classical and scriptural histories, but also represented as a space of historical conflict between Christianity and other religions. Most importantly, the expansion of the Ottoman to Eastern Mediterranean (which is called the Levant in Western discourse) had an impact on the imagination of the Mediterranean in the minds of English subjects (Vitkus 2003, p. 35). The ways in which the fear of the "Grand Turk" and the accompanying threat of "turning Turk" shaped European culture have been studied from literary and historical perspectives.

In his Mediterranean traged, *Othello*, the Island of Cyprus ruled by Venice faces an attack and Shakespeare portrays the Turkish threat as invisible but terrifying. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Europeans were both colonizers and colonized, and even the English felt the power of the Turkish threat to Christendom. In his analysis of *Othello*, Vitkus argues that according to Protestant ideology, the Devil, the Pope, and the Turk all desired to "convert" good Protestant souls to a state of damnation, and their desire to do so was frequently figured as a sexual/sensual temptation of virtue, accompanied by wrathful passion for power. Historicist studies of *Othello* show how Christendom was put at the centre of civilization, how it exploited the perceptions of a global struggle between the forces of good and evil, and producing a seeming binary opposition that in reality is complex and multifaceted. Vaughan's chapter "Global discourse: Venetians and Turks" makes apparent the importance of Turkey in the imaginative geography of Stuart England (Vaughan 1994, p. 13-34).

There are many examples regarding literary studies showing how the imagination of the "dangerous other" (any Islamic or Arab identity) is usually categorized as the "Turk". The fascination and fear of the exotic religions and the clear link with personal downfall were expressed in a number of early modern plays, perhaps nowhere clearer than in the dramatist Robert Daborne's 1612 play "A Christian Turned Turk" in which the audience follows an English sailor who became a pirate in the Mediterranean and later turned Turk after falling in love with a beautiful Turkish woman. In the play his situation illustrates both the fascination of the exotic as well as the fear of Islam in England at the time.

It would be appropriate to bear in mind here that the image of the "Turk" had a great role in the reconfiguration of Mediterranean space. As the Argentinean writer and philosopher Borges states "the negative image of Carthage is the work of the Romans and in the same spirit the horrible image of the Turk is the product of Western Europe" (Kumrular 2009, p. 27-46). This image was travelling throughout the Mediterranean, at every step polished and revived by new stories turning into a Turkish Obsession-*Ossessione Turca* (Ricci 2002).

Historically speaking, there are some periods when the image of the "threatening Turk" lessened. The turning point of the relationship between European powers and the Ottoman is marked by

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4   For more detailed study of the term "dramatic geography" see Laurence Publicover (2017).

the Treaty of Carlowitz (1699) representing the first example in which the Turks were invited to participate in the European Congress; despite the decline of the military threat it was perceived as a cultural threat. As Neumann argues "the empire was seen by many as an incarnation of the old religious war, the former infidel metamorphosed into "barbarian". That means, "civilization" seems to step into the shoes of "religion" in Europe's differentiation from the "Turk" (Neumann 1996, p. 51) This very term "civilization" with its embedded religious connotation paves the way for the "civilizational geopolitics" that will be discussed in detail below in the discussion of the "Mediterranean from EU's Perspective" (section D).

So far we have tried to give an historical and ideological picture of the Mediterranean both as a space for multiple identities and also a space for the demarcation of the construction for East-West, Self and Other. The coming chapters will focus on the Islamic heritage and "Turkish" side of the Mediterranean story.

Islamic Mediterranean Heritage

The vast literature on the Mediterranean region suggests that it is hard to confine its perception to one dimension. So there is not one fixed definition of the Mediterranean region, it has many dimensions. As Braudel (1976, 1, p. 473) claimed, "space was the enemy number one in the Mediterranean. In this enormous geography extending from Gibraltar to Syrian coasts Ottomans played a significant role in the transformation of the notions of "our place" and "theirs", "near" and "far" as well as "East" and "West".

The meeting of Islamic culture with the Mediterranean region dates back to the mid-7th Century. When the Islamic forces reached the Northwest of the Mediterranean Sea it changed the whole cultural and political climate of the region. One of the preliminary authors who wrote about the Mediterranean was Mes'udi (896-965) who mentions that Harunürreşid, the Khalifa of the Abbasid had an immense plan to build a canal (modern-day Suez Canal) that would connect the Red Sea to the Mediterranean but he was concerned about any possible military attack on Muslim Pilgrims by the Byzantine forces. So here we can also detect that the "othering discourse" is heavily nourished by military /security reasons. The Mamluk politician and historian Nüveyri (1332) narrated that the Mediterranean region had 170 islands that were prosperously developed and zoned by the Franks and later were destroyed by the military attacks of Islamic forces[5].

Islamic geographical terminology about the Mediterranean had kept both Latin terms *Mediterraneum Mare* and *Internum Mare*. In Late Latin, in referring to the sea, *Medi-terra* originally meant "in the middle of the earth" rather than "surrounded by land", because to the Mediterranean cultures without knowledge of much of the earth, the Mediterranean Sea was in the centre of the world. The word *mediterranean* is first recorded in English, in 1594, as the name of the sea. In Islamic geographical knowledge *Mediterraneum Mare* is defined as the "*el Bahrü'l*

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5   Encyclopedia of Islam, 1960, Brill publications, Vol: 2; p. 231.

Mutavassıt"(the sea between the mainlands) and the *Internum Mare* is defined as "*El Bahrü'd dahili*". However in popular usage these terms did not take much stock; usually it was called "*Bahrü'r Rum*", that implies "the European shores" historically referring to East Roman heritage. Regarding the mainland bordering the Mediterranean Sea, there were several names such as Bahrü'l-Endelüs (Andalucian Sea), Bahrü'l-Mağrib (Sea of the Magreb), Bahrü'l-İfrîkıyye (Sea of Tunisia), Bahrü'l-İskenderiyye (Sea of Alexandria), Bahrü'ş-Şam (Sea of Damascus), Bahrü'l-Kostantiniyye (Constantine's Sea) and ve Bahrü'l-Efrenc (Sea of the Franks).

It is important here to see how the Ottoman Empire approached the region in the military context since the Ottoman navy was famous for its military glory from around the late 11th century to the 18th century at least. The geography of the Ottomans extended from the further western parts of the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean and the Strait of Hormuz[6]. The success of the Ottomans is usually related to their contribution to the wider subject of geography and nautical science. This aspect, however, is little mentioned in the literature. Until recently, historians were mostly preoccupied with the dramatic story of the geographical discoveries and oceanic voyages undertaken from the late 15th century (Zaimeche 2002). However, several scholarly works have been published recently highlighting the contribution of Ottoman scholars to the development of cartography, geography and nautical science. Special attention was given to Ottoman maps, whether they be the charts of the Mediterranean or world maps, especially those designed by Piri Reis (Hess 1969:70).

The Kitab-i Bahriye (Book of Navigation) by Piri Reis (1465-1553) is worth mentioning here as it is one of the most famous pre-modern books of navigation. It contains detailed information on navigation as well as extremely accurate charts describing the important ports and cities of the Mediterranean Sea. Rich in detailed information on the major ports, bays, gulfs, capes, peninsulas, islands, straits and safe anchorages of the Mediterranean Sea, it is also full of navigation techniques and navigation-related information on astronomy. The book also includes information on the local people of each country and city, and the curious aspects of their culture. The book was originally written between 1511 and 1521, but it was revised with additional information and better-crafted charts between 1524 and 1525 in order to be presented as a gift to the Ottoman Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent. Piri Reis drew these charts during his travels around the Mediterranean Sea with his uncle Kemal Reis. The revised edition of 1525 has a total of 434 pages and contains 290 maps. The maps contain detailed information on important ports and cities of the Mediterranean, where we can see how the areas of water are circumscribed by imposing and colourful linked mountain chains (the Alps, the Apennines, the Balkans, the Pyrenees, without forgetting the eminent Hellas and Lebanon) as if they were utopian fantasy kingdoms.

Below there is a map showing how Piri Reis depicted Europe and the Mediterranean region (See Figure 2).

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6   See, for instance, M. Longworth Dames (1921); E. Denison Ross (October 1921); E. D. Ross(1922).

Figure 2: Map of Europe and the Mediterranean region by Piri Reis. The map shown is from the 16th century book Kitab-ı Bahriye. (Source:Library of İstanbul University, no 6605).

According to Piri Reis, the borders of the Mediterranean are described as starting from the North of the Bosphorous including the Marmara and Aegean Seas until Gibraltar Bay. This area was composed of four regions, namely the sea of Rum (European coast), the sea of Spain, the Black Sea and *Bahr-i Ebyaz* (White Sea, meaning *Akdeniz* in Turkish that refers to the Mediterranean Sea). In his definition, the *Bahri Ebyaz* region is composed of the Arabs, Franks, Rum and people of Maghreb. After all, the Mediterranean is a vast space that separates Europe from Africa and where cultures co-exist from contrasting periods of history (Roman Christianity – what is commonly called the West, the ancient culture of Greece, Constantinople, conquered by the Ottomans in 1453, as well as Islam, the Phoenicians, the Persians, the Assyrians, the Chaldeans and even the Sumerians).

Modern world maps politically and physically rest on an idea of boundary since territories are demarcated either by political relations or by physical limitations. Waters and mountains are the usual natural boundaries in the modern mindset. However, Mediterranean waters reflect an unusual character here, since "it is the only body of water that represents historical connectedness and unity" (Kolluoğlu & Toksöz 2010). We can see this unified perspective in the ancient maps such as in Piri Reis.

The perception of unity and multiplicity as a characteristic was preserved in the Islamic perception of the Mediterranean for many years. Though there are different definitions and political descriptions of the region in the Islamic world, they share the idea that the Mediterranean Sea as the womb of multiplicity. It can be stated that from the Islamic point of view, the Mediterranean is perceived as a space where "opposites join but do not merge"; some authors and interpreters take the verses of the Quran (El Kehf 18/6061, er-Rahman 55/19) as a reference to define the Mediterranean sea as the "Merace'l bahreyn", (Sea where two waters meet), meaning the place where the sweet and sour waters reach each other (Kadıoğlu 2016, p. 187). This imagination paves the way for various "readings" of the Mediterranean but within the limits of our concern here, we will be content to mention that in the Islamic imagery the Mediterranean is conceptualized as a home of opposites, where they co-exist but do not "mingle".

Ibn Khaldun had realized the importance of the Mediterranean not only as a space for unity and identity but also for power struggle. According to him, there was once a Golden Era of Muslim maritime power in the 8th and 9th centuries when the Muslims ruled the Mediterranean. Besides control as an expression of power against Christians, it is also an opportunity to unite the Muslim world. By the 14th century, Ibn Khaldun claims "Muslim powers have turned away from the sea, becoming vulnerable to cycles of the rise and fall in the land-based Bedouin Dynasties (Fromherz 2010, p. 20).

Mediterranean from the EU's Perspective

It is well known that Mediterranean space during the time of the Roman Empire was the centre of world politics, whereas now it has shifted to the periphery in EU politics and the EU's construction of the Mediterranean has also transformed over time. It is basically because of the changing conditions in the international and regional contexts. There is an emerging critical literature on the Eurocentric Mediterranean discourse[7] that is trying to decipher how the definition of the Mediterranean region varied through time, and how it is spatially categorized within the EU space.

When we look at the interest of the EU in the Mediterranean during the 1970s (GCC, AMU) the Euro-Arab relations did not grow further possibly due to the mistrust caused by some EU states' colonialist backgrounds and also other regional security dynamics (Jawad, 1992). As further research suggests, the definition of the Mediterranean by the European Community during the Cold War deviated from the EU's definition during the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), also known as the Barcelona Process, and a new conception emerged after the September 11 attacks – to be followed by the Istanbul, Madrid and London attacks – mainly based on security concerns. Recently, the Mediterranean has again been reconfigured along with a different security

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7   On the Euro-centric focus of European Studies and studies on the Mediterranean/Middle East, see Cebeci (2012), Bilgin (2016), Onar and Nicolaïdis (2013)

focus, particularly based on threat perceptions related to the refugee crisis and ISIS (Cebeci & Schumacher 2016):

The *MEDRESET* policy report (2016) shows that the EU constructs the Mediterranean space mainly through three discursive practices, notably

1) "The Mediterranean as a diverse geopolitical space"

2) "The Mediterranean as a dangerous space"

3) "The Mediterranean as a space crucial for EU interests".

In the contemporary world, when the EU security discourse refers to Mediterranean problems the aim is either to solve it so that this problem would not threaten security directly (that is through military or terrorist threats) in Europe, or indirectly (that is through increasing migration/restlessness among the Mediterranean diaspora in the Union (Bilgin 2004, p. 274). Bilgin further argues that the discourse on security of the EU in the 1990s shifted towards what she refers to as Agnew's term "civilizational geopolitics".

To recall what civilizational geopolitics means briefly, we need to clarify Agnew's conceptual framework regarding the 'ages of geopolitics'. Accordingly, an age is perceived as a period in which the modern geopolitical imagination has shown distinctive features and relations to practice. The first, dominant in the 18th and early 19th centuries, was a "civilizational geopolitics", in which Europe's unique civilization compared to the newly discovered rest of the world played a central role. The second, dominant from the late 19th century to 1945, was a "naturalized geopolitics", in which the 'natural' character of states as predators and competitors assumed a key position. The third, operational during the years of the Cold War, was the "ideological geopolitics" based on dividing up the world between competing ideas about how best to organize political and economic life i.e., 'socialism' versus 'capitalism' (Agnew 1994, p. 12).

When we use the above-mentioned framework to analyse the EU's perspectives and Mediterranean policies we may see more clearly how and why the EU adopts certain attitudes under specific political conditions. Especially during the Cold War, the EU made use of the security umbrella provided by NATO and adopted a peculiar approach to security building a larger agenda (such as economic, environmental, human rights) without labelling them as security issues. This was a way to deal with major problems (such as migration, human trafficking, drug trafficking) without being entangled in the East-West confrontation (Bilgin 2004, p. 271-75). However, another confrontation that EU-Mediterranean relations have to deal with is the security and democracy dilemma. It is often concluded that the EU has privileged security and regime stability in the short run, at the expense of the long-term goal of sation and propagation of human rights norms. As far as the Southern Mediterranean is concerned, the most important issue for the EU is cooperation on issues of illegal immigration, organized crime and terrorism, while also seeking to contain fears from the Southern Mediterranean states that the EU would impose its own political system and values on the Mediterranean states or even employ in outright interference. Moreover, as

Malmvig argues (2004, p. 6), the EU has also itself feared that too strong pressures for political reforms may lead to aggressive and hard transition processes, or result in Islamists taking over government power (Spencer 2002).

These studies analysing the security approach by the EU argue that there are two conflicting security discourses: a liberal reform discourse and a cooperative security discourse. The simultaneous presence and intermingling of these two discourses have meant that the EU has wavered uneasily between different priorities and logics in its Mediterranean policy. This gives EU policies a rather schizophrenic spirit, while at the same time arousing suspicions on the part of Arab member states about the real intentions and goals of the EU in the region (Malmvig 2004).

The Mediterranean as defined by Europeans shows not only temporal variation, but many European actors also conceive of it in different terms. For the Member States of the EU, which are located in the Mediterranean space, it is part of their identity –although some continue to see its southern shores in terms of the self-other dichotomy. On the other hand, for some non-Mediterranean EU Member States, even the EU's southern Member States represent Europe's periphery and the latter have sometimes been subjected to an "othering" discourse, mainly because of their cultural, social and economic characteristics. This recalls the ideological geopolitics that Agnew defined.

However, this ideological geopolitics by the EU towards the non-Mediterranean countries seem to switch into a version of civilizational geopolitics when it comes to the partners in Mediterranean region. As Malmvig (2004) argues within the cooperative security discourse, the Mediterranean partners are indeed articulated as different from Europe/the EU, and they are, in fact, explicitly named as an "other". Yet, this "other" is not constituted as backward or inferior, or as a threat to fight or transform. The relationship between the EU and the Mediterranean is rather articulated as a partnership based on equality and respect; free from notions of superiority/inferiority. It is, hence, not a radical other, but what could be called an "equal other", which is encouraged. As we see in the Barcelona Declaration, the partnership is based on "due regard for the characteristics, values and distinguishing features peculiar to each" (Barcelona Declaration, 1995). Each people "has its own values, customs, language and beliefs", but these differences are not sources of enmity or conflict, but of enrichment (9890/03 Press 151, p. 13).

> "The ultimate goal of the dialogue should not be to change the Other, but rather to live peacefully with the Other" "Conscious that the values of dialogue, tolerance and respect for the Other […] constitute an important factor in bringing closer together cultures and civilizations".

According to Malmvig (2004), these presumptions of the equality of the Other and the possibility of mutual enrichment are further justified by references to a shared Mediterranean past, in which "our" different cultures and religions were born: "The Mediterranean region is the birthplace of

several great civilizations of the history of the world in which originated the three monotheistic religions" (Holm, 2004). By referring to this common past, the Other, although expressed as different, is at the same time situated very close to the Self (Europe). That can be termed here as an "authentic version of the Self". Hence the shared Mediterranean past becomes a type of "mother-figure", which has given birth to equally grand and civilized children. Now as adults, the "siblings" have to remember their common roots. They are to be brought closer together and learn from one another, yet they respect each other's autonomy and difference (Malmvig 2004). This interpretation supports the argument that the EU's discourse towards Mediterranean partners holds civilizational geopolitics as an invocation to recall the common culture and civilization which is again represented by European ideals.

As far as Turkey is concerned, things are more ambivalent. In Europe's typology the relations can be characterized as a mixture of civilizational and naturalized geopolitics. Due to Turkish/Islamic culture and values it is exposed to an "othering" discourse by the EU, however it holds a very special place for its specific geographical location as being by far the main springboard country to the EU. For instance, as of February 2017 Turkey has been hosting 2,910,281 registered Syrian refugees; in addition to the registered ones, it also hosts more than a million unregistered refugees mostly coming from Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan. According to the EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey, it is hosting the largest refugee population in the world, ahead of both Lebanon and Pakistan (European Commission 2017c). In some border cities like Kilis, the refugee population even exceeds the local population.

It is widely argued by scholars that Turkey-EU relations turn Turkey into a hub for irregular migrants. The 'politicization', 'securitization' and 'economization' of international migration and asylum in Europe also makes asylum seekers find more secure options, like moving to some third countries and countries of transit such as Turkey. The possibility to be used as a buffer zone makes Turkish authorities concerned that this might turn Turkey into a country of first asylum, and for this reason Turkey insists on maintaining the "geographical limitation"[8] in its migration policy (Öner 2013, p. 217).

Recently, in an attempt to end "irregular migration" from Turkey to the EU, an agreement was signed between Turkey and the EU on 20th March 2016. According to the deal, Turkey would accept one refugee from the Greek Islands who used Turkey as the route to Europe; in exchange, a Syrian asylum seeker in Turkey would find a home in Europe. (Görgülü and Dark 2017, p. 9). It is apparent that the EU's border control is also an important element of concern, "We do not know at present what is going on in the Mediterranean Sea. We do not know, nor do the member states" Edgar Beugels, head of research and development at Frontex, told reporters in Brussels (18th

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8   Turkey retains a geographic limitation to its ratification of the 1951 U.N. Convention on the Status of Refugees ("Refugee Convention"), which means that only those fleeing as a consequence of "events occurring in Europe" can be given refugee status. Regardless of any geographical limitation under the Refugee Convention, Turkey must still abide by the principle of non-refoulement (that no one may be returned to a country in which he may face persecution), which is binding in all cases. For details of Turkey's reservation, see http://www.unhcr.ch/refworld/ refworld/legal/instrume/asylum/51engsp.htm.

March 2013)[9]. This means that spanning some 2.5 million square kilometres, the Mediterranean Sea remains largely outside the surveillance scope of the Member States and the Warsaw-based EU border agency Frontex.

From the EU side, the selection criteria for asylum seekers were quite vague. As for Turkey, visa-free travel for Turkish citizens was the big prize for taking back refugees and economic migrants from Europe. Besides being problematic from the human rights perspective, the deal had many shortcomings and it soon became clear that its full-scale implementation would never be possible. Therefore, the Turkey–EU migration deal did not ultimately succeed and only 6,907 Syrian refugees have been relocated from Turkey to the EU within its mandate (European Commission 2017a and 2017b). Despite this, improving cooperation with Turkey on the refugee crisis remains a priority for the EU.

Lesser (2016) argues that developments in the Eastern Mediterranean now have a central place in the perceptions of Northern and Western Europe, including Germany. To the extent that Berlin continues to develop a more active and forward leaning external posture, the effects of this will be felt, first and foremost, on Europe's southern periphery where crises abound. Germany's central role in dealing with Europe's refugee crisis, including negotiations with Turkey and the leadership of NATO's maritime operation in the Aegean, is the clearest example.

So far this paper has discussed the Mediterranean space as seen by the EU and from a "Western" angle. The coming chapter will look at the same region from a different angle and we will try to see how Islamic culture and the Ottomans saw the Mediterranean. Furthermore Turkey's view of the Mediterranean region will be discussed along its geo-political reading of the region.

Turkish Attachments/Detachments vis-à-vis the Mediterranean

The Mediterranean identity for Turkish politics is ambivalent. This ambivalence is historical. In order elaborate on this we need to look at the historical framework. The overall debate over identification during the dissolution of the Empire had its own multilayered problematics. However, we can recapitulate the historical roots of these problematics as the tension of three main currents of thought: Westernism, Islamism and Turkism. When the Turkish Republic was born under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Westernization came forward as a dominant ideal. For Atatürk and the leading elite, Europe and the values it represented were identical to modernization and they believed that it was possible for a newborn secular country to redefine its past, its roots and reform its traditions along Western lines. While the Ottoman Empire can be territorially considered a European state to some extent, it has never been perceived as part of the European circle. As Agnew (1994, p. 94) pointed out, from the late 18th century onwards "the otherness of Turks" had been a basic barrier to their participation in civilizational geopolitics. As

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9   https://euobserver.com/justice/119473 (accessed on 15.October.2017).

Neumann remarkably argues, though Ottomans were the famous "sick man of Europe" they were not perceived in a similar way in Asia (Neumann 1999, p. 55-9).

Therefore it was important for newborn Turkey to relocate its identity both ideologically and geopolitically. The interwar era was a crucial period for Turkey to gain international recognition as a modernizing country[10]. The republican elite and foreign policy builders had invested so much energy to take a place within the community of western civilization and they tried to show that the Islamic faith is not a barrier to taking this place; rather it has all the qualifications to be included in the circle of western civilization. This is most likely why the geographical role of Turkey is defined as a "bridge" that has been used and reinterpreted for many years. "Bridge" has become the metaphor describing contemporary Turkey, however the Turkish political elite used "door," "latch and key," "crossroads," and "gate" to describe not only Turkey's hybrid location and past, but also the role or function to which it aspired internationally (Yanık, 2009, p. 536-537). When the leading Turkish elite react against their European counterparts' unwillingness to include Turkey in the EU, they equally react against being portrayed as a Middle Eastern or Mediterranean country. Though Europeans did not include Turkey in terms of identity, they did not exclude it in terms of political-economic sense. Since 1963, when Turkey signed the treaty of association with the European Community, the relations have expanded its span and activity.

Given the context of the above-mentioned self-other relationship and the discussion over Orientalism, it is worth rethinking how Turkey locates itself with respect to the Mediterranean. We have already emphasized that Turkey's relationship to the Mediterranean seems to be highly determined by mainly two competing ideologies namely Westernization and Islamism.

As a general tendency, Turkish policy-makers were locating Turkey as part of the Western world rather than part of the Middle East or the Mediterranean. Especially in the young Republican Turkish political discourse (that is in favour of Westernization), there is a remarkable attitude that puts Turkey in the circle of Western civilization. This attitude puts a strong boundary between the Mediterranean (meaning the Eastern) and Turkish identity. (Bilgin, 2004, p. 278). This attitude was preserved towards the European Union and the discussion over Turkey's membership. Actually the whole discussion over the EU and Turkey has become a framework that perpetuates the powerful dichotomization of the Western type of self-other.

As Görgülü and Dark (2017) argue, being geographically close to the EU, Turkey has been under the influence of several Mediterranean policies of the Union including the Global Mediterranean Policy (1972), the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (1995), the Southeast Europe Stability Pact (1999), the EU Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East (2004) and the European Neighbourhood Policy (2004). Turkey has been involved in these initiatives with different levels of interest. However, its participation in the above-mentioned forums has never secured an elevated degree of junction between Turkey's foreign policy and the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the Union, especially when the political and security dimensions

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10   For a detailed study on Turkish Mediterranean Politics in the Interwar Era, see Güvenç S. & Barlas D. (2010).

of the initiatives were weakly developed. However, a practice of dialogue has been established between the two sides and this has created a productive ground for rapprochement.

One may also argue that Turkey's foreign policy decisions towards the Mediterranean have been under the shadow of the EU membership process, the Cyprus question, debate over energy resources, relations with Greece and the conflicts of the Middle East. Moreover, the lack of a broad definition of the Mediterranean region in Turkey's strategic thinking paves the way for its fragmented perception; that means the region is perceived through separate dynamics including the Middle East, Greece and Cyprus, the Balkans, and Europe. This portrait also confirms that in Turkey's geopolitical thinking, the Eastern Mediterranean hosts numerous security concerns as well as economic opportunities essential to Turkey's nationwide interest.

Görgülü and Dark (2017, p. 5) argue that the most chronic problems of Turkey's foreign policy, like the Cyprus question and the relations with Greece over the Aegean Sea, are in fact Mediterranean issues. However, Turkey has treated them as separate foreign policy problems rather than a part of its regional Mediterranean policy. In other words, Turkey's foreign policy has preferred to deal with the issues on the Mediterranean distinctly instead of constructing a single and unified Mediterranean policy. In the words of a Turkish diplomat "the Mediterranean has never been conceptualized as a totality in Turkish foreign policy" (Tayfur 2001). In other words, there is no single comprehensive definition or conceptual appreciation of the Mediterranean region in Turkish foreign policy. There is no single desk or department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that deals solely with the Mediterranean region and Mediterranean issues. Instead, the Mediterranean region is under the umbrella of different functional departments.

In general, the Turks perceive the Mediterranean region as being composed of the Middle East, Greece and Cyprus, the Balkans, and Europe. This means that "the Mediterranean" really means the "Eastern Mediterranean" in Turkish foreign and defence policy. This is because the Eastern Mediterranean presents a variety of problems that are perceived as important threats to Turkish territorial integrity and the country's vital interests. The problems with Greece and Syria, the Cyprus problem, the Arab-Israeli conflict and its chain impacts in the region constitute the main preoccupations of the Turkish foreign policy establishment in the Mediterranean overall.

As a result, it may be argued that Euro-Mediterranean co-operation is an ambitious and comprehensive EU regional project. As noted above, however, mainstream Turkish attitudes are not very enthusiastic about the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) programme. Turkish policymakers do not conceal their indifference towards the EMP. Indeed, "from the beginning, Turkey has been an affiliate to the programme but as an unwilling partner." It may seem strange, nonetheless, that a country leading various initiatives aimed at regional cooperation in its region such as Turkey should fail to express enthusiasm for the EMP (Tayfur 2001).

According to some expert views, the Eastern Mediterranean is the region which will determine the future of the international security order. During the Cold War, the region was a centre of sporadic crises against a setting of multiple unresolved disputes – Lebanon, Cyprus, Greek-Turkish

friction, and of course, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Today, the Eastern Mediterranean has moved from the periphery to the very centre of global concerns. The land and sea space spanning the Levant, the Aegean, Egypt, and onward to Libya, is set to be a zone of persistent chaos and conflict. Weak or collapsed states, direct and proxy wars and a confluence of great power stakes are all part of the equation – threatening the security of societies and individuals. NATO, the EU, and others, including Russia and China, are now compelled to address the challenges of strategy in the Eastern Mediterranean. In the midst of this pervasive tension, there are a few positive opportunities, including the potential for a Cyprus settlement, Turkish-Israeli reconciliation, and cooperation regarding the region's energy resources. Taking advantage of these opportunities will be critical for Turkey and the region (Lesser 2016).

Under the insecure conditions in the Eastern Mediterranean it seems that Turkey has to go beyond strengthening its core defence partnerships. With some three million refugees already in Turkey, Ankara has as much of a stake in successful EU-Turkey cooperation on this front as Brussels – perhaps more. There is now a reasonable chance for a settlement of the Cyprus dispute. Success on this issue would be transforming for Turkish-EU relations, EU-NATO cooperation, regional energy cooperation, and in many other considerations. It would be a very positive improvement in the troubled region. It might also be the medium for Ankara and Athens to move beyond their customary détente, to resolve long-standing air and sea space disputes in the Aegean – debates that continue to restrict maritime cooperation and resource development. Moreover, the normalization of Turkish-Israeli relations is long overdue. It is most unlikely that this relationship will return to anything like its former strategic character, but the costs of estrangement are greater in a vaguer and conflict-prone region, and there are important shared interests to pursue, from energy trade to tourism and defence (Lesser 2016).

Conclusion

This paper attempted to decipher the various perceptions and uses of the Mediterranean region under the light of the Eastern and Western political imaginations. It argues that the Mediterranean region with its long multicultural history and vast geography is a good example to show how the same space is perceived and politicized by contested narratives. These narratives are produced by Eastern or Western geographical imaginations that have historical and political implications. Moreover these attachments are based on different assumptions that configure the Mediterranean sometimes as a womb of sibling identities, sometimes as a battlefield of antagonistic actors. Thus different uses of Mediterranean identity depend on who, when and why questions. As we have discussed above from the perspective of the non-European Mediterranean countries, Mediterranean identity can be used as an escape westwards allows a reorientation of identity by detaching the possible links with Islam, Arab or any identity with Eastern connotations. In the Turkish case, the Mediterranean identity does not produce the same meaning. Rather than signifying the West, it is associated with an Eastern identity that traditional Turkish discourse is unwilling to embrace. According to this perspective, the very term civilization cannot be equated

only with Westernization, hence Islamic creed cannot be a hindrance to gainingacknowledgement by the civilized world. On this point both Said's and Makdisi's discussion of Orientalism-Occidentalism provides a useful framework to understand the various uses of Mediterranean identity as a signifier of western/eastern progressive-modern/backward-premodern meanings. Moreover Makdisi's powerful argument that "in an age of Western dominated modernity, every nation creates its own Orient" helps us here to make sense of the Turkish reactive attitude against the EU's exclusory practices. Turkey here does not even allow itself to be categorized as "Mediterranean" since it reconstructs an "Orient" along Mediterranean identity that may sound like a mimicry of Western discourse that estranges the East. This is why for Turkey any attachment with Mediterranean identity seems like a disappointment to be acknowledged by the West. However it needs further discussion since the ruling party (Justice and Development Party) discourse in the 2010s seems to be developing new directions towards non Western alternatives to attach with.

The dichotomies such as East-West, Orient-Occident, Self-Other are reproduced here in different forms and from different angles. These dichotomies produce their own geographical narratives that are mutually constitutive. The Mediterranean is the very space where contrasting identities meet, co-exist and constitute each other. For the European discourse. The Mediterranean can be pictured as a womb by referring to the common past with the "Other". Although it is not Europe, is at the same time situated very close to the Self (Europe). The Mediterranean may be called an authentic/primitive version of the Self. Hence the shared Mediterranean past becomes a type of "mother-figure", which has given birth to "equally grand" and "civilized" children. Western narratives on the Mediterranean are generally is based on the "uncivilized enemy" usually characterized as the "Turk". As we can see in Shakespeare's *Othello*, one of the classical texts of Western literature, the fear of the "Grand Turk" and the accompanying threat of "Turning Turk" are there to coagulate European identity and culture.

As a result, this paper argued that to understand how is it possible for the very same Mediterranean to refer to different/often contrasted worlds of meaning we need to think about geographical imagination and the mindset that regulates this imagination. Here, critical geopolitics allows us to make sense of seemingly contradictive uses of the Mediterranean and helps us to show in what ways they are justified on their own geo-logic. So both the EU's and Turkey's attitudes towards the Mediterranean must always be re-evaluated along the fundamental discussion over civilizational, ideological and naturalized geopolitics respectively since these attitudes are mutually constitutive and have their consequences on vital issues such as the securitization of migration and discussion over further cooperation on both energy and security issues.

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The Mediterranean: Not a Union, but an Integrated Space?

Birlikten Ziyade Entegre Bir Bölge: Akdeniz

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Abstract

This study examines several multilateral cooperation initiatives in the Mediterranean and by discussing their failures in generating a genuine cooperation, it hypothesizes about an integrated Mediterranean space, where prime challenges might lead to a loose functional framework of integration. In putting forward this hypothetical integrated space, the study begins with discussing prime challenges in the region: security, migration and environment, and it proceeds with early multilateral cooperation attempts. Among these, it focuses its attention on two ambitious ones: Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the Union for the Mediterranean, and underlines the disappointments in these attempts in realizing peace and prosperity in the region. The study concludes that an integrated space in the Mediterranean, which takes European integration experience as a model, might offer a better solution to the common problems in the region with a precondition that southern Mediterranean states are provided a clear perspective in a sincere and equal partnership.

Keywords: Mediterranean, cooperation, security, migration, environment, integration, space

Öz

Bu çalışma Akdeniz'deki çeşitli çok taraflı işbirliği çabalarını ele almakta ve bu işbirliği çabalarının samimi bir işbirliği tesis etme konusundaki başarısızlıklarını ortaya koymaktadır. Yazı Akdeniz'de öncelikli sorunlara odaklı gelişecek dinamiklerin gevşek bir işlevsel entegrasyon çerçevesine olanak tanıyabileceği hipotezini ileri sürer ve bölgedeki güvenlik, göç ve çevre gibi temel sorunları tartışır. Ardından, bu sorunların çözümüne yönelik erken işbirliği çabalarını ele alır. Bu işbirliği çabaları arasından, iki iddialı projeye, "Avro-Akdeniz Ortaklığı" ve "Akdeniz için Birlik"e odaklanır. Her iki projenin de bölgede barışı ve refahı sağlama konusunda beklentileri karşılayamadığının altını çizer. Sonuç olarak, Akdeniz'in, Avrupa entegrasyonunu model olarak alan entegre bir alan olarak kurgulanmasının, Akdeniz ülkelerine samimi ve eşit koşullarda, açık bir perspektif sunulması kaydıyla, ortak sorunlara daha iyi çözümler bulunmasına katkıda bulunacağı önermesini ileri sürer.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Akdeniz, İşbirliği, güvenlik, göç, çevre, entegrasyon, mekan

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Introduction

The Mediterranean has not referred to a political unity except during Roman and Ottoman periods. It is referred to as "a concept, a center, a limit, or an edge" (Brummett, 2007, p. 9). Yet, it is more than all of these conceptualizations, and it is definitely more than just a sea. It is a broad maritime space where interaction, communication and movement of people, goods and other assets have always taken place. The idea of the Mediterranean as a space with common qualities like culture, climate, architecture, etc. has existed in the minds of early observers such as poets, novel writers, historians, geographers or political scientists since ancient times. Different visions and frames of the Mediterranean as a space are found on the eastern, northern and southern coastlines, in the writings of Ibn Khaldun, Ibn Battuta, Evliya Çelebi, Muhammad as-Saar, Braudel, and many others (Brummett, 2007). Similarly, early navigators of the Mediterranean such as sailors, merchants, slave traders or pirates would also have tended to see the sea as a common space in its totality or sub-regions like the Aegean, eastern Mediterranean, Adriatic and the shores of West North Africa, etc. over which they undertook their business. The actors of the Mediterranean found a climate/environment suited to the development of civilizations. Olives, olive oil, grapes, wine, palm trees, ivory, slaves and wheat were some of the most traded commodities. Catholicism, Orthodoxy, and Islam were the dominant religions and denominations. The Roman Empire, Carthage, and the Ottoman Empire were the states/empires that determined the agenda over and around this space for hundreds of years. Referring to rising tourism industry during the last half of the 20th century, Henry Lefebrvre (1991, p. 353) claimed that Mediterranean transformed into a leisure oriented space. In sum, the Mediterranean has been a political space[1] over which many different actors played different games, made calculations and taken actions.

Due to its characteristics, this space hosts both unity and diversity. While there is a physical and cultural unity in the region, there are ethnic, linguistic, religious, and political diversities. That is why the Mediterranean is often referred as both a bridge and a barrier (Tsardanidis and Guerra, 2000). In the end, what the Mediterranean will be, either a bridge or a barrier, is subject to the outcome of the interaction of those different actors at political, social and economic levels. The nature of these interactions – be they are peaceful, conflictual or hostile – will determine the level of suffering for the people.

The EU has had a bumpy relationship with the Mediterranean countries. When the EU Member States approached the Mediterranean and focused on cooperation with the launch of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership first, and the idea of a Mediterranean Union later, they started from a different end. In line with their own integration experience, they had an institutional and a top down perspective. Though they tried to explore commonalities and common interests to achieve the potential for cooperation in the Mediterranean, there was no ideology or another drive like immediate short-term profit that would fuel this integration. In addition, the EU has been criticized for being highly EU-centric in these processes as well as for not paying real attention to

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1   According to Edward W.Soja (1971, p. 1), political organization of space is characterized with the ways in which space and human interaction are structured to fulfill political functions.

the Mediterranean. So what remains is a romanticized vision of a Mediterranean, best described in the words of Sarkozy (Charlton, 2008, p. 3):

"The European and the Mediterranean dreams are inseparable […] We will succeed together; we will fail together. […] We will build peace in the Mediterranean together, like yesterday we built peace in Europe [*and that the Mediterranean Union would not be*] north against south, not Europe against the rest . . . but united."

As briefly discussed in this study, earlier multilateral cooperation attempts as well as the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the Union for the Mediterranean have all disappointed the participants in realizing this united Mediterranean vision where peace and prosperity reign. Yet there are urgent issues that call for attention and a concerted response, primarily security, terrorism, irregular migration, and environmental degradation. There are other problems, too, such as human trafficking, smuggling, problems with exploitation of the undersea basin, unstable undemocratic regimes in the south, economic crises in Greece, Spain, France and Italy, inequalities, status of women in the south, xenophobia in the north and the declining importance of the Mediterranean as the world's economic centre of gravity shifts east. Though the Mediterranean space loses its strategic advantage, the problems need cooperative solutions. Despite these problems, the advantages of the Mediterranean space offer a deepening and widening volume of trade, cultural interactions, tourism, newly discovered undersea resources, the sea being a common basin for fishing, mixing of people, cultural similarities, having been located at the centre of Africa, Europe and Asia, logistic advantages, population, labour, and intra-Mediterranean trade (still low). These advantages should motivate the actors to strive for integration in this space, or for the establishment of an integrated Mediterranean space, which might start as a loose functional integration in one area, such as migration or environment, and might spill over to other areas as occurred in Europe. Or it might start as a very loose regime in such an area, and remain so, in which parties interact, solve the problems and continue to do trade, make cultural, political, economic exchanges in harmony.

In line with these thoughts, this study starts by examining the prime challenges in the Mediterranean – security, migration and environment – and proceeds by discussing several multilateral cooperation programmes and frameworks in the region. Among these programmes and frameworks, the attention is on two ambitious initiatives: the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, or the Barcelona Process, and the Union for the Mediterranean. As the study briefly discusses the failures of these initiatives, it questions whether two crises in the Mediterranean space, those of migration and environment, may trigger integration in this space. Following this discussion, the study concludes by putting forward some considerations on this hypothetical integrated Mediterranean space. The study is built on through examination of secondary literature on identified prime challenges, cooperation efforts and initiatives. Reports by several international organizations as well as those by the EU have been critically examined.

Prime Challenges in the Mediterranean

As a sea, space, and region with porous borders, the Mediterranean faces several challenges that urge all countries with Mediterranean coastlines to consider cooperation seriously. The Mediterranean is co-possessed by more than 20 countries in three different continents: Europe, Africa and Asia. As shown in Figure 1, the number of countries in the European continent with Mediterranean coastlines exceeds those in Africa and Asia. Spain, France, Monaco, Italy, Malta, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Albania, Greece, Cyprus, and Turkey are the European countries of Mediterranean. In addition, though it does not have a coastline on the Mediterranean, Portugal is also considered part of the region. To the south, Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia are the African countries with Mediterranean coastlines, while in Asia, Israel, Lebanon, and Syria share the Mediterranean.

Figure 1: Mediterranean Countries. Source:http://www.istockphoto.com/tr/vektör/mediterranean-sea-region-countries-map-gm594478992-101950585

With such diverse littoral states with different levels and understandings of economic, political and societal development, the Mediterranean has been a centre for challenges. Moreover, the challenges have not been static, they have been dynamic as they have changed with the changing international conjuncture and priorities of the parties. As briefly discussed in the following section, several cooperation and dialogue processes have taken place since the end of the Cold War and the priorities of these processes are informative for the dynamic challenges that the space and/or region faces. It is understood that before the end of the Cold War, and in its early aftermath, the foremost concern was security in cooperation efforts. In 2001, just before September 11, Brauch (2001, p. 7) enumerated six long-term challenges of the Mediterranean in the 21st century. These were:

- Different levels of population growth between northern, southern and eastern shores;

- The impact of climate change on the temperature, precipitation and rise of the Sea level;

- The scarcity of water for drinking and irrigation;

- The decline of self-sufficiency in food production and the increasing need for imports of cereals;

- Soil erosion and desertification;

- Urbanization and pollution in the major cities on the eastern shores (Istanbul, Cairo, etc.).

Though these issue areas have kept their importance, September 11 deeply affected international relations in the region. In the post-September 11 context, the 'fight against terrorism' emerged as one of the prime concerns and has remained so until today. Since the early 2000s, cooperation efforts aimed to create conditions in which terrorism cannot flourish in the Mediterranean. In addition to the fight against terrorism, mobility in the Mediterranean has been the other important item in dialogue and cooperation efforts. Securitization of migration and concerns over irregular migration in the region have led to various forms of dialogue and partnership frameworks as well as institution building and operations by northern coastline states. Moreover, environmental degradation in the Mediterranean has become the following item in dialogue, cooperation and partnership efforts. Several environmental agencies have recognized the Mediterranean as a fragile eco-system with strained resources, and they have carefully monitored human activities with important causes for the degradation of this eco-system since the early 1990s (European Environment Agency, 2006). In addition to these three main issue areas – security, migration and the environment – sustainable development, energy, shared basin management, transport and logistics, the arms race, armed conflicts, democratization, human security, social protests and movements in the Arab countries, civil war in Syria, the Syrian refugee crisis, jihadism and international terrorism have demanded the utmost attention of the Mediterranean states.

Security

During the Cold War, security in the Mediterranean was discussed within the context of the East – West confrontation and the Middle East conflict. The dissolution of the Soviet Union has removed the Soviet threat and left a dynamic security environment, which has been changing since then. In this environment, the number of security issues has increased, and their nature has changed. During the 2000s, non-military security challenges came to the fore. In those years, Ormancı (2000) explains these challenges as the difference in economic development, Islamic fundamentalism, terrorism, organized crime, and drug trafficking, increasing military expenditures and the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and demographic imbalance. The 2010s witnessed social protests and movements in the Arab countries with coastlines on the Mediterranean. However, the hopes for democratic transition in these countries were dashed in only few years as they were driven to political instability. Several of these southern Mediterranean

states have faced new destabilizing factors and have fallen prey to violence and terrorism. We should also highlight that the Mediterranean and its surrounding littoral states have suffered from high levels of military activity in the last decade. The war in Lebanon in 2006 was followed by foreign intervention in Libya in 2011 and the Syrian civil war is still ongoing.

Under these conditions, the Syrian civil war and its wider impact, ongoing instability in Libya, and its potential ramifications for the region, widespread violence, armed conflict, economic and social instability and increased activities of transnational terrorist networks in the Mediterranean are thought to be the most concerning security challenges today (Black, *et al.* 2017). Among these, terrorism deserves a few more words as it has become a real threat for the region.

Currently, the most significant terrorist threat in the Mediterranean emanates from the Islamic State in the Levant (ISIL). The group is also known as the Islamic State (IS), Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), or Daesh (Irshaid, 2 December 2015). With origins in al-Qaeda, it emerged as a *jihadist* militant group in Iraq in 2013. After making territorial gains in Iraq, the group took control of some territory in Syria and proclaimed the establishment of a caliphate. The group aims to extend its so-called caliphate further into Syrian territory and poses a direct threat to countries adjacent to Syria and Iraq: such as Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, Libya and Egypt (Black, *et al.*, 2017, p. 12-15). The group has conducted deadly attacks against military, political and civilian targets not only in these countries but also in France, Spain, Germany, Belgium, Britain, Sweden, Russia and the US. Though its impact is lethal in all aspects of human life in the Mediterranean, ISIL is unfortunately believed to have gone global by perpetrating more than a hundred attacks in 30 countries killing thousands of people.

As shown in Figure 2, ISIL has had the most negative impact on the south-eastern Mediterranean countries (in red). While Turkey, France, Greece and Algeria have been affected by medium impact (in light orange), Spain, Italy, Tunisia, Albania, and Cyprus are reported to have a low impact of ISIL terrorism (in green). The group has carried out deadly attacks in all Mediterranean countries except Italy. As shown by the blue circles, the deadliest attacks have taken place in Egypt, Libya, Turkey, France, Syria, Tunisia and Algeria.

Figure 2: Terrorism in the Mediterranean. Source: IEMed Mediterranean Yearbook 2016.

Migration

As Haas (2011, p. 60-61) observes, since the 1950s migration dynamics within, from and towards the Mediterranean have fundamentally changed. These changes were not without reasons, they were triggered by the changes in the broader political and economic context of the region. Specifically, they were marked by the economic rise of the countries on the northern coasts and their accession to the EU as well as economic growth in the Gulf countries and Libya after 1973. In the 1990s, these countries emerged as new destinations for migrants from southern Mediterranean countries, as well as from sub-Saharan Africa and Asia (Castles, *et al.*, 2013).

Moreover, economic growth and increasing demand for service sector employees in Spain, Portugal and later Turkey, pulled labour migrants from these countries (Baldwin-Edwards, 2005; İçduygu, 2005). As the demand for labour was not matched by sufficient legal channels of migration, these dynamics paved the way for irregular migration to these countries (Cornelius and Tsuda, 2004; İçduygu, 2005; Triandafyllidou and Vogel, 2010). In addition, North African migrants were joined by sub-Saharan Africans in their attempts to cross the Mediterranean by boats. As a response, northern coastline countries – many have already become EU members – have intensified their border controls in order to curb irregular migration. Rather than curbing irregular migration, efforts to strengthen border controls and create impermeable borders have diversified migration routes in the Mediterranean (Gonzales-Enriquez, 2010; Triandafyllidou and Vogel, 2010). Concerns about irregular migration have paved the way for many operations as well as several partnership and cooperation initiatives in the Mediterranean. As the initiatives are

discussed in the following paragraphs, the main concern was to regulate international migration flows destined for northern Mediterranean countries by curbing irregular migration flows from the southern and eastern coastlines (Geddes, 2005; Wolff, 2008). However, as highlighted by the International Organization for Migration (2008), despite 40 years of efforts irregular migration is far from waning. That is because, not only irregular migration but all flows of migration in the Mediterranean have been driven by factors of economic, political, demographic and environment as well as by the migration policies (Haas, 2011). This means that adopting exclusively securitized approaches to migration by neglecting the root causes and the drivers of the phenomenon in the region has had only negative consequences such as diversification of routes to dangerous ones, migrant deaths in the sea or in the hands of smugglers.

As observed very recently, among all these factors, state violence and wars have had a tremendous role in shaping migration processes in the region. The roles played by the Arab-Israeli conflict, the conflict around the Western Sahara, the civil wars in Algeria, Iraq and Syria cannot be denied in producing all types of migrants, but primarily refugees (Castles, *et al.,* 2013).[2] According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the number of refugees in the world has reached 21.3 million, making Turkey, Pakistan, Lebanon, the Islamic Republic of Iran and Ethiopia top countries of asylum. The ongoing civil war in Syria has caused the worst refugee crisis of our time, making Syrian refugees the largest refugee community in the world. It is estimated that by December 2016, 12.5 million Syrians had been displaced since the conflict began in 2011. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) there are 7.5 million internally displaced persons while over 4 million people have sought asylum in neighboring countries – Turkey, Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq. Among these nations, Turkey is reported to host the largest number of Syrian refugees – almost 3 million as of May 2017. Lebanon hosts the second largest Syrian refugee community (1 million) in the region.

Refugees have become more prominent as they started to cross into Europe in large numbers in 2015. The majority of them arrived by sea, mainly from the Turkish coasts to the Greek islands, but also from Egypt, Libya and Tunisia to Italy. According to the UNHCR (2017), the number of sea arrivals, which was 216,350 in 2014 reached 1,015,953 in 2015 and then fell to 363,425 in 2016. In addition, thousands of migrants are thought to have drowned as they went missing in the Mediterranean during their dangerous journeys. Syrian refugees made up the majority among the refugees, followed by Afghans and Iraqis. Although the so-called "refugee crisis of 2015" has been taken under control, the civil war in Syria still continues with no imminent hope of peace. Many people continue to leave Syria or the places they sought asylum in the first place. The Mediterranean continue to host many refugees until their next destination.

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2   1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol define a refugee as a person, who "owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it" (UNHCR, 2010, p. 14).

Environment

The Mediterranean is threatened by environmental degradation due to population and urban growth, tourism, intensive agriculture and pollution, disposal of industrial and domestic waste and desertification. It has been identified as one of the areas most responsive to climate change. The region faces water stress, extreme climate events (such as floods and droughts), biodiversity decline, rise in temperature and sea level, air and water pollution and soil degradation (European Environment Agency, 2015, p. 1-2). In addition, the rivers feeding into the Black Sea are highly polluted due to the levels of industrialization in the coastline countries.

Water shortage in the region is a major concern. According to Plan Bleu (2017), southern coastline countries along the North African coast receive only one-tenth of the total rainfall in the region while coastal and island communities face serious water shortages, especially during the tourism season. Water stress in the region is expected to worsen with population growth, development of tourism and industry in the southern coastlines (*ibid*, p. 2-3). Moreover, demographic growth in the southern coastline states is expected to have very adverse effects on the environment. In addition to increased stress on water, demographic growth will raise the number of urban dwellers, as well as the problems of waste management and air pollution.

According to experts, the Mediterranean environment is recognized as one of the most vulnerable in the world. That is why despite their cultural, political and economic differences, Mediterranean states have been open to dialogue and cooperation. As discussed in the following pages, besides security and migration, the environment has become one of the key items in cooperation efforts.

Quest for Strengthened Relations: The Road to Union for the Mediterranean

In order to strengthen relations among Mediterranean countries, several initiatives have been undertaken since the early 1990s. It is possible to trace the early phases of efforts for cooperation in the Mediterranean from the 1970s. Since then, though all of their efforts have not born fruit, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Western European Union (WEU), the United Nations (UN), and the European Community (EC), later the European Union (EU) have become the leading actors in shaping issue-specific cooperation efforts.

OSCE's interest in the Mediterranean dates back to the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, which recognized that:

"…security in Europe is to be considered in the broader context of world security and is closely linked with security in the Mediterranean as a whole, and that accordingly the process of improving security should not be confined to Europe but should extend to other parts of the world, and in particular to the Mediterranean area" (OSCE, 2015, p. 14).

Following the adoption of the Act, non-participating states were invited to take part in the meetings on Mediterranean issues. Participating states remained interested in the region and emphasized the need to involve the Mediterranean more with its 1990 Charter of Paris:

"We will continue efforts to strengthen security and cooperation in the Mediterranean as an important factor for stability in Europe (*ibid*, p. 16)."

Since then all following key documents of the OSCE have emphasized the Mediterranean and underlined the need to foster deeper relations with the non-participating states in order to generate security and cooperation in the region. Non-participant states in the Mediterranean have been invited to the meetings and they have been given the opportunity to submit opinions in different issue areas. It is also important to note that OSCE has promoted transparency and accountability and enhanced public confidence in electoral processes in non-participant Mediterranean states by sending observers for election monitoring and supervision (ODIHR, 2010).

NATO set its eyes on the Mediterranean twenty years later in 1994 when it launched its Mediterranean Dialogue (MD). The idea behind this process was the recognition that security in Europe is closely linked to security and stability in the Mediterranean. MD's aims are enumerated as "to contribute to regional security and stability", "to achieve better mutual understanding" and "to dispel any misconceptions about NATO among the participant countries". MD has also been considered an integral part of NATO's adaptation to the post-Cold War security environment (NATO, 2015, p. 4). Currently, besides its members, MD involves seven non-NATO countries of the Mediterranean: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia (NATO, 2015, p. 4). It promotes cooperation among participants in security-related issues via seminars, workshops, practical activities on the modernization of armed forces, civil emergency planning, crisis management, border security, environment, public diplomacy, counter terrorism, etc. (*ibid*, p. 5).

Similarly, the OECD and the UN have also been active in the region. The OECD has developed programmes devised to strengthen investment infrastructure in the southern coastline countries. The latest of these, the EU-OECD Programme, strives to promote investment in the Mediterranean by helping national and local actors in the region to modernize their investment policies, build institutional capacity and raise awareness of the region's attractiveness (OECD, 2016, p. 3). The UN, on the other hand, has initiated regional cooperative efforts in different issue areas. The environmental Mediterranean Action Plan by UN Environment Programme, Regional Refugee and Migrant Response by UNHCR and the Spring Forward for Women Programme – a partnership on women's empowerment in the Mediterranean by UN Women are only three of these efforts.[3]

Besides all these frameworks and initiatives, the EU has initiated two encompassing cooperation processes for the Mediterranean. The first was given impetus by the first Euro-Mediterranean

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3   Spring Forward for Women was launched jointly by UN Women and the European Commission as a regional programme to promote gender equality and women's empowerment in the South Mediterranean countries.

Conference in Barcelona in 1995. Having recognized the new political, economic and social issues on both sides of the Mediterranean and the common challenges they posed, partners called for a coordinated response. The call resulted in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, also known as the Barcelona Process. With its different aspects and novelties, the Barcelona Process was a unique and ambitious initiative, and it is still believed to represent a turning point in Euro-Mediterranean relations.

The process aimed to lay the foundations of a new regional relationship based on cooperation between the EU and 12 southern and eastern Mediterranean countries. In doing that, it focused on security and stability in the Mediterranean, on agreeing shared values and initiating a long-term process for promoting democracy, good governance and human rights and achieving satisfactory trading terms for the partners. The main objectives of the Process are codified as:

1. To put forth a common area of peace and stability through the reinforcement of political and security dialogue;

2. To construct a zone of shared prosperity through an economic and financial partnership and the gradual establishment of a free-trade area;

3. To trigger a process of rapprochement between peoples of the Mediterranean through a social, cultural and human partnership in order to encourage understanding between cultures and exchanges between civil societies.

Zaafrane and Majoub (2000, p. 10) presented these ambitious objectives of the process with the diagram below:

Outcomes	Means	Mechanism
Peace	Democracy	Dialogue
Stability	Economic Development	Exchanges
Shared prosperity	Social, human and cultural development	Cooperation

In their influential paper, the authors discussed whether these three objectives – peace, stability and shared prosperity – were separable, and noted that partial and interest-driven steps might lead the region to destabilization instead of promoting peace and stability. Another concern raised by the paper was 'the permanent concern' for 'equity' among the non-European partners. The authors called partners to act cautiously in order not to generate new fears about this permanent concern and noted that the Partnership must be governed by principles of cooperation and partnership (as declared in the Declaration) but not by a balance of power politics.

The impact of EU enlargement in culminating this quest for regional cooperation should not be overlooked. After their accession to the EC/EU in 1986, Spain and Portugal worked very hard to give the EU a Mediterranean angle in which their interests in the region would make a

resonance within the EU system (Tovias, 2008). Besides the ambitions of these new members at the time, the Barcelona Process should also be considered within the international conjuncture. The fall of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s brought new opportunities and challenges for all regions, including the Mediterranean. The Euro-Mediterranean Conference took place only two years after Samuel Huntington had shared his influencing *clash of civilizations* thesis, which argued that coming international conflicts would be shaped by culture and civilization. Amid discussions on the clash of civilizations preparing the ground for international conflicts, Javier Solana, Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs and High Representative for the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy, opened the conference saying that "they were brought together to straighten out the clash of civilizations and misunderstandings that there had been between them, and that it was auspicious that they had convened on the 900th anniversary of the First Crusade" (Barcelona Process, 2001).

The Barcelona Process, or the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership began life with such high hopes, intentions and plans. However, only ten years later, by 2005, it was considered a disappointment. Borrell (2010), a former President of the European Parliament, explains that the process was born in the environment of optimism after the Oslo Peace Accords for the Middle East and it was already 'a mission impossible'. He claims that the failure of the peace accords rekindled conflict between Israel and Palestine, and later the war in Iraq generated "a confrontation between the western and Muslim worlds [and that] rendered the workings of the Barcelona Process almost impossible" (*ibid*, p. 3). EU enlargement to central and eastern Europe should also be kept in mind while the failure of the process is questioned. By the late 1990s, Europe had to direct its attention to former communist states in central and eastern Europe, which explained their aspirations to 'return to Europe' by joining the EU. As Borrell (2010) also notes, this enlargement process consumed much of the political energy and financial resources of the EU. In the end, as the planned steps were not taken, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership or the Barcelona Process was not able to fulfil its promises and failed to realize its aims.

While the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership was largely considered a failure, the Mediterranean became a title/chapter in the new European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2003. The ENP's underlying thoughts were similar to the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. It was about "avoiding the emergence of new dividing lines between the enlarged EU and its neighbours and instead strengthening the prosperity, stability and security of all" and the policy was "based on the values of democracy, rule of law and respect of human rights" (European Commission, 2016, p. 1). The ENP has its own mechanisms to reach these stated objectives.

In a way, the Mediterranean seemed to be downplayed within this policy. There was no specific emphasis on the Mediterranean in the ENP structure, and the region was not more important than any other neighbouring region. However, several developments have urged the EU to be more involved in the region since then. The 2004 Enlargement of the Union brought two more Mediterranean countries into the Union, Cyprus and Malta. A year later, Croatia and Turkey were recognized as candidates. Migration flows from southern coastlines to the EU have

reached unprecedented levels. At the same time, environmental levels have been alarming and environmental degradation in the region has been pervasive, accelerating and putting people's health at risk. The failure of the Barcelona Process and these developments but also its interests in addressing domestic political concerns led Nicolas Sarkozy to call for a 'Mediterranean Union' in his campaign for the French presidential elections in 2007 (Balfour and Schmid, 2008).[4] Though it was later diluted, Sarkozy's ambitious call for the 'peoples of the Mediterranean' led to the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) (Gillespie, 2008). As discussed below, despite its novelties the UfM has proven less successful than its predecessor (Gillespie, 2013, 179).

Disappointments in the UfM: What is wrong in the Mediterranean?

Meeting in Brussels on 13-14 March 2008, the European Council approved the principle of a Union for the Mediterranean, but rather than replacing the Barcelona Process, the Council decided to integrate this new initiative into it. Following this decision, the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) was created by 43 Euro-Mediterranean Heads of State and Government on 13 July 2008 at the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean. The UfM constitutes a framework for political, economic and social relations between the EU and the southern and eastern Mediterranean countries. As it was launched as a continuation of the Barcelona Process, the UfM shares its goals and aims to work towards the creation of peace, security and stability as well as sharing prosperity with the southern and eastern Mediterranean countries (UfM Secretariat, 2017).

In addition to giving a fresh impetus to the multilateral cooperation framework provided by the Barcelona Process, the UfM has brought several novelties. The introduction of a permanent institutional structure – a two-year Southern and Northern Co-Presidency and a secretariat to empower the regional dialogue among the Members and the stakeholders – are considered its two important institutional novelties. Bi-annual summits of the heads of state and government is another one. Membership of the UfM has expanded: 44 countries were invited to Paris and 43 of them subscribed to the final declaration. Libya opted to be an exception. It was recognized that the 'partnership' element between northern and southern countries remained weak under the Barcelona Process. The EU has been referring to the notion of 'co-ownership' within the ENP framework and this notion has been injected to the UfM as well (Gillespie, 2008; Balfour, 2009). Unlike the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, the UfM's priorities have been clearly defined and the Secretariat will direct its attention to these issue areas and manage the projects related to them: "de-pollution of the Mediterranean Sea; maritime and land highways; solar energy; regional research programmes; joint civil protection programme for disasters; and business development for small and medium-sized enterprises" (UfM Parliamentary Assembly, 2017, p. 1).

As Gillespie (2013) notes, in a very short period of time, the UfM followed the earlier multilateral cooperation frameworks in disappointing its participants. In his words, it has proven to be less

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4   It is thought that in addition to provide cooperative solutions to common problems, the proposal was aimed to restore France's leading position in Europe and in the Mediterranean (Joffe, 2008; Doğan, 2008).

successful than the Barcelona Process (*ibid*, 179). Several reasons are discussed for the failure. The primary factor is considered to be the EU-centric approach towards the neighbouring regions. Another reason is the different levels of strength among EU member states. Mediterranean members of the EU are relatively weak and dependent on the North. They do not have a high degree of autonomy vis-à-vis other Europeans to develop and continue a full-fledged Mediterranean program. They need to accommodate the fears, concerns and calculations of the north too. Therefore, Mediterranean members of the EU cannot focus solely on the Mediterranean. Mediterranean members of the EU do not see the rest of the Mediterranean as equal. They just want the others to follow and be dependent on their terms which are not decided by themselves alone but together with the other EU members (Doğan, 2008).

Another reason for the failures is the imbalance and radical inequality among the countries on the Mediterranean. Inequalities make it difficult to come together and establish a union. As shown in Figure 3 below, the south is weak, poor, demographically young, and politically instable.

Mediterranean Countries	GDP per capita ($, 2016)	Population (in thousands)	Percentage of total population under 15 years	Percentage of Total Population in Urban Areas	Literacy rate (+15)
Portugal	19,813	10,699	15	62	95
Spain	26,529	46,772	15	78	98
France	36,855	63,458	18	86	99
Monaco	162,009	36	13	100	99
Italy	30,527	60,964	14	69	99
Malta	25,058	469	14	95	92
Slovenia	21,304	2,040	14	50	100
Croatia	12,091	4,387	15	58	99
Bosnia & Herzegovina	4,709	3,744	14	49	98
Montenegro	6,701	633	19	63	98
Albania	4,147	3,227	22	55	96
Greece	18,104	11,419	15	62	97
Turkey	10,788	74,509	26	72	91
Cyprus	23,324	1,129	17	71	98
Syria	…..	…..	35	56	86
Lebanon	7,914	4,292	24	87	90

Israel	37,293	7,695	27	92	98
Egypt	3,515	83,958	31	44	72
Libya	…..	…..	31	78	89
Tunisia	3,689	10,705	23	67	78
Algeria	3,843	36,486	27	74	73
Morocco	2,832	32,599	27	57	56

Figure 3: Economic and Social Indicators, Mediterranean Countries. Source: The World Bank, 2017; UN, 2012. *before the civil war

Yet despite these indicators, southern Mediterranean states are sovereign and they do not want to be totally dependent on the north. They need to be negotiated with and convinced. The European defenders of a Mediterranean Union are not powerful enough to convince the south to take part in this union. In addition, there are other players in the region like the US, Russia and China and their position on the establishment of a Union should also be analysed. Considering all these indicators, we note the complicated nature of the relations in the region with an emphasis on the lack of European absolute superiority in the Mediterranean.

Moreover, the countries in the region are governed by a variety of regimes ranging from democratic monarchies to authoritarian republics. It is difficult to close the gap between democracies and non-democracies. These regimes are quite incompatible with those on the northern coastline. Southern Mediterranean countries and those located in the north, most of which are EU members, have different priorities and mental settings. Therefore, developing a common lingua over which cooperation and exchanges would be possible is a difficult task.

Arab states on the southern coastline, literally and politically speak the same language. Italian, French and Spanish are not too distant languages and the regime types and political culture of those European Countries are quite similar. Israel, Turkey and Greece on the eastern Mediterranean are more distant in terms of languages. However, culturally they would be considered similar to each other with Israel being an exception as an extraordinary intervention in the course of history.

Political and societal developments on both sides should also be emphasized. Political Islam as an ideology and its projects on the southern coastline countries, with rising xenophobia and political, ideological and economic crises of the West on the northern coastline EU member countries are not easy to accommodate. Under these conditions, we may consider the subregional integration projects of the Maghreb, Mashreq, Levant, Adriatic, and the Aegean rather than an 'encompassing Union' for the region as a whole.

Migration and Environment Crises: Leverage for Cooperation?

Crises refer unexpected and sudden but unmanageable changes in large volume. They are basically indicators of insufficiency of existing institutional structures vis-a-vis new developments. Crises are not always so bad. They are also indicators of a need for change. A crisis situation is one when actors could not continue with the existing status quo.

When the environmental degradation and the migration crisis in the Mediterranean are considered, the steps expected to be taken are questioned. In other words: the question is whether the northern coastline countries – almost all are EU members – will turn a blind eye and expect the outcome of these crises to hit them or whether they will use these crises as leverage for a radical transformation.

What Europe is trying to do at the moment with migration is to stop it by means of security measures. What should have been done on the other hand is to work to better those conditions that lead to massive human mobility before they rise and become acute (Doğan, 2008).

People have different motivations for moving, such as security, a better economic and social life, better educational opportunities, or more freedom. Many people from the southern coastline countries as well as from sub-Saharan Africa are moving towards northern coastline countries but also to other southern countries with these motivations. If migrants are provided similar conditions to those of the destination countries at home, they would not prefer to migrate. So, the northern Mediterranean that wants to regulate migration at home, has to work stronger for the betterment of the origin countries, primarily those on the southern coastline of the Mediterranean.

Firstly, they have to work to strengthen democracy in these countries without having secondary thoughts. This means that they should not approach democracy as a tool to penetrate other countries and increase their own short term gains and maximize their own short term interests. Their long-term interests lie in the development of democracy in the South and that would give people relief. The curse of colonialism will follow ex colonizers up until they pay back the last penny they stole from their colonies.[5]

Secondly, security has to be prioritized and democracy promotion should not jeopardize the security of people in any condition. Democracy promotion should not encourage minorities for independence, either. While we try to minimize the bullying undemocratic activities of the states, we should not allow a process that creates more insecure and more oppressive states. Confidence building among different communities, promotion of rights of minorities, minimizing oppression by the states and any other group that resorts to violence should be the priorities of the EU while projecting its preferences and might to other regions.

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5   An adopted quote from Pirates of Caribbean – The Curse of the black pearl.

Regarding the environmental crises, the EU's efforts have hardly been a success. As noted above, the Mediterranean is becoming dirtier, fish stock and biological life are deteriorating. Europe's Mediterranean members' capabilities are limited. They are calling on other members for cooperation. As they do not have enforcement mechanisms and capabilities, the impact of this call is minimal. However, environmental levels are alarming and Mediterranean countries have to cooperate to develop institutional mechanisms to help the environment.

Conclusion: Not a Union, but an Integrated Space?

Despite the negativities that dominate the debate on what has been happening over the Mediterranean, this might, unexpectedly, create a window of opportunity for the creation of an integrated Mediterranean space as well. Europeans other than Mediterranean ones would be forced to think Mediterranean-wise. They should think about the problems of people over the non-European parts of the Mediterranean and be compelled to produce solutions to the problems of these people. This activity would lead to the formation of institutions and through these institutions all Europeans would communicate more and this process would lead to the formation of a more interrelated and then integrated Mediterranean space.

When the European political landscape and existing patterns are studied, it is understood that the European way of approaching problems is securitization in the first place. Paradoxically, this might lead to further conflicts and more sophisticated breaches of European security. The current policy choices of the European states, including the northern Mediterranean states, over migration crisis are explained by this approach. Migration is a highly securitized issue in Europe. EU member states are trying to manage migration with securitized regimes and policies. However, this option is unsustainable. In our hypothetical integrated Mediterranean space, the northern coastline, EU Mediterranean countries could opt to deal with migration at source countries through political and economic means. This approach would inevitably entail policies for political and economic restructuring at source countries. These policies would be devised according to the problems, needs and crises of the origin countries. If they were designed to please only the destination countries – EU members in our discussion – then they would be temporary and complicate the problem, further.

To reiterate once again, after the major crises there exists a window of opportunity. This opportunity can be utilized if there is a willing leadership. It could be created under the leadership of a major power, like the EU or some of the EU member states that are ready to take the lead. But if the power that plays leadership is not that powerful and convincing enough, its efforts will be useless as it will not convince others. When we consider the Mediterranean countries, we do not see such leadership potential in terms of capacity and capabilities in any of the southern coastline states. Though they have strategic interests in the region, neither the US nor Russia are Mediterranean countries. In the end, we once again turn to the north, to the EU. There is no other potential actor, therefore the EU has to assume this leading role.

Under such leadership of the EU, integration of the Mediterranean space might start as a very loose functional integration and might spill over to other areas as occurred in Europe. Or it might start as and remain a very loose regime in which parties interact only for trade, to make cultural, political and economic exchanges in harmony. In either case, there should be freedom of movement for goods, services, capital and human beings. Without free movement of factors of production, integration at social and economic level cannot be provided. And the rest of the Mediterranean cannot feel themselves as equals. If the southern and eastern Mediterranean are not respected and they cannot have a fair share of economic, cultural and political resources as equals then there will not be any improvement in the level of integration.

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The Future of Euro-Mediterranean Migration and Partnership. A Perspective from the Southern Mediterranean

Güney Akdeniz Perspektifinden Avro-Akdeniz Göç Olgusunun ve İşbirliği'nin Geleceği

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Abstract

In order to explore the future of Euro-Mediterranean migration and partnership, it is necessary to make an incursion into the past and the present. Two observations will serve as a point of departure: the importance of migration in Euro-Mediterranean relations; the failure of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) and the handling of the migration issue.

Migration is an important component of relations between Europe and the South of the Mediterranean. More than ten million immigrants from the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean live in Europe. They transfer about 15 to 20 billion Euros annually to their countries of origin, far more than foreign direct investment and public development aid[2]. And yet the EMP, itself in breakdown, neglects or even ignores this fact. The EMP has been out of action for a long time. Migrations around and across the Mediterranean are currently in crisis.

The purpose of this Communication is to consider their future, on the basis of the dual failure of the EMP and the treatment of the migration issue. Thus, we will deal with the question in three parts: the first will focus on the failure of the EMP, the second will deal with the limits of handling the migration issue and migration policies, and the third will focus on the prospects for Euro-Mediterranean migration and partnership.

Keywords: Migration, Southern Mediterranean, Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, Immigrants

Öz

Avro-Akdeniz göçünün ve ortaklığının geleceğini anlamak için geçmişe ve bugüne bakmak gerekir. Avro-Akdeniz ilişkilerinde göç olgusunun önemi, Avro-Akdeniz Ortaklığının başarısızlığı ve göç meselesinin ele alınış biçimleri bu yazıdaki önemli çıkış noktalarımız olacaktır.

Göç Avrupa ile Akdeniz'in güneyindeki ülkeler arasındaki ilişkinin önemli bir unsurudur. Avrupa'da, Güney ve Doğu Akdeniz'den gelip yaşayan kişilerin sayısı 10 milyondan fazladır. Bu insanlar her

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** According to our estimates. Morocco alone has about four million immigrants in Europe, Turkey as many and some two million from Algeria and Tunisia. Morocco receives € 6-7 billion per year of transfers from Moroccans living abroad, more than three-quarters of them from Europe. See also OECD, the annual report on Trends in International Migration.

yıl anavatanlarına 15-20 milyar Avro transfer etmektedir. Bu miktar Akdeniz'in güneyindeki ve doğusundaki ülkelere yapılan kalkınma yardımlarının miktarından çok daha fazladır. Bununla birlikte çökmekte olan Avro-Akdeniz Ortaklığı projesi bu olgunun önemini ihmal etmektedir. Avro-Akdeniz Ortaklığı sürecinde uzun zamandır herhangi bir gelişme gözlenmemektedir. Akdeniz'deki ve etrafındaki göç olgusu bir krizin içindedir.

Bu makalenin amacı Avro-Akdeniz Ortaklığının ve göç olgusunun ele alınış biçiminin başarısızlıklarını temel alarak gelecekleri üzerine düşünmektir. Bu çerçevede konuyu üç bölümde ele alacağız: Birinci kısım Avro Akdeniz Ortaklığının başarısızlığına odaklanacaktır. İkinci kısım ise göç olgusunun ve göç politikalarının ele alınışına dair sınırlılıklarla ilgilenecektir. Üçüncü kısım ise Avro-Akdeniz göçüne ve ortaklığına dair gelecekteki beklentilere odaklanacaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Göç, Güney Akdeniz, Avro-Akdeniz İşbirliği, Göçmenler

Introduction: The Failure of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership

In our view, the failure of the EMP stems mainly from a misconceived and narrow conception of partnership and a bilateral mode of operation[1].

Misconception

The EMP is mainly based on free trade agreements, which are destructive of economic activity in the Southern Mediterranean. They are destructive because they are built on the reciprocity of the advantages granted on both sides. But free trade between countries with unequal levels of development and subsidies granted to producers in European countries creates conditions of unequal competition that destroy production in the Southern Mediterranean, particularly in the agricultural sector, which contributes to rural exodus and international emigration.

The modus operandi consists of bilateral negotiations between the European Union (EU)[2] and each of the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries which result in bilateral agreements.

Three successive agreements have been signed: "Association Agreements" of the 1960s, "Cooperation Agreements" of the 1970s and 1980s and "Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements" of the years 1990-2000, following the Conference of Barcelona[3]. Although they cover more and more areas of cooperation, the Agreements have four components: political, economic, financial and socio-cultural. However, they still proceed from the same approach, with the same spirit, the main thing being the establishment of a Euro-Mediterranean free trade area,

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1 Another reason is certainly the lack of economic integration in the Southern Mediterranean which, moreover, was not encouraged by the EU's modus operandi that negotiated with each of the separate South-Mediterranean countries.

2 We will speak for convenience of the European Union, knowing well that it has borne other names before, Common Market, and European Economic Community.

3 Hamdouch B. (April 2002).

migration being either ignored or treated in a negative way. The procedure has always remained the same: bilateral negotiations between Europe and each of the South and East Mediterranean countries. Even after the Barcelona Conference (1994), which was multilateral!

Bilateral Agreements

There were agreements before and after the 1994 Barcelona Conference. Two types of agreements were concluded before the Barcelona Conference, the Association Agreements and the Cooperation Agreements. The "Association Agreements" of the late 1960s (1969 for the three countries of the Maghreb, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia) are fixed-term trade agreements, generally five years, which provide for reciprocal preferences between the EU and the Mediterranean country concerned. The "Cooperation Agreements", signed in 1976 between each of the three countries of the Maghreb and the EU, are of indefinite duration and are not only trade agreements. They also deal with technical cooperation and financial cooperation.

The Barcelona Conference has a great ambition, which, according to its Final Declaration, is to build a Euro-Mediterranean area of peace and prosperity, in a spirit of reciprocity, based on a broader partnership including three other aspects: political, financial and socio-cultural. Regular dialogue is planned for each of the three components. The economic component consists mainly of the establishment of a vertical free trade area, i.e. between the EU and each of the partners by 2010, free trade between the partners not being covered by these agreements. Genuine free trade in the Euro-Mediterranean area – that is to say vertical and horizontal – would have required multilateral negotiations bringing together all stakeholders around the Mediterranean – such as the Barcelona Conference – and a global free trade agreement, leaving peculiarities to be addressed in complementary agreements.

The Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements that followed the Barcelona Conference[4] were passed with all the South and East Mediterranean countries. They are based on the Barcelona Declaration and include the four components: political, economic, financial and socio-cultural. The resulting free trade agreements provide for a tariff dismantling of both partners (EU and Southern partner countries) in a spirit of reciprocity, without taking into account differences in their levels of development.

Migration as a "Parent pauvre"Poor Parent" of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the Limits of Migration Policies

These are in fact the limits of the treatment of the migration issue by the Euro-Mediterranean agreements and the migratory policies themselves. Migration is the issue the EMP left behind both before and after the Barcelona Conference.

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4   However, the agreements with Tunisia and Morocco were signed before the Barcelona Conference, but they proceed in the same spirit. Cf. Hamdouch B. (April 2002)

Migration, "Parent pauvre"Poor Parent" of the EMP

Migration is the "parent pauvre"poor parent of the Euro-Mediterranean agreements. It is absent from the Association Agreements of the 1960s and the Cooperation Agreements of the 1970s. The latter nonetheless refer to the non-discriminatory treatment of immigrant workers. Migration, on the other hand, was the subject of bilateral labour agreements between the main European immigration countries at the time (France, Germany, Holland, Belgium) and each of the Maghreb countries since the 1960s. It should be noted in this connection that the application of the non-discriminatory treatment of migrant workers is unsatisfactory, as the judgments of the European Court of Justice show[5].

The Barcelona Declaration deals with migration in the section on "Partnership in the social, cultural and human spheres" and not in the economic part, although it is first and foremost a labour force[6]. It reiterates the protection of the rights of regular immigrant workers, but nevertheless contains a contradiction. On the one hand, it "recognizes the importance of the issue of migration in Euro-Mediterranean relations", and on the other it wants to "reduce migratory pressures"[7]. And "in the area of illegal immigration, partners decide to establish closer cooperation. In this context, aware of their responsibility for readmission, the partners agree to implement bilateral agreements or arrangements to adopt the appropriate provisions and measures for the readmission of their nationals in an irregular situation"[8].

Thus, the Barcelona Declaration does not deal with the issue of migration, i.e. migration flows and policies, with the exception of clandestine migration. In addition, the Declaration and the Program of Work annexed thereto cover, in the same section and in directly related paragraphs, migration and terrorism, drug trafficking, international crime and corruption!

This way of evacuating the migration issue or of treating it only incidentally[9] and negatively also appears in the refusal of the European side to include it in the negotiations of the Association Agreements with the Mediterranean countries.

The Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements, which proceed from the Barcelona Conference, have the same approach as the Barcelona Declaration on migration. Migration is part of the social and cultural component. Regular dialogue is foreseen, with the priority to be given to "reducing migratory pressure" and "reintegration of returnees due to the illegality of their situation"[10]. Concretely, the results of the social dialogue have led, in the case of Morocco,

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5   Cf. Garson J-P. and Barros L. (1998).

6   Migration is not considered an integral part of international trade, unlike goods, services, capital and technology and is therefore not the subject of international agreements that organize it

7   Declaration of Barcelona.

8   Ibid.

9   Garson J-P. and Barros L. (1998).

10   Morocco-EU Association Agreement. Cf. Hamdouch B. (2002).

to the repatriation of Moroccans in an irregular situation in European countries and to tighter controls on illegal migration from Morocco.

Thus the various Euro-Mediterranean Agreements do not deal with migration or deal with it only incidentally and negatively, and only from the point of view and from the short-term interests of the European Union, by associating it with security issues. Migration policies remain national, subject to bilateral conventions.

The Limits of Migration Policies

The current migratory crisis is the result of a number of factors: the failure to manage a natural, long, ancient human phenomenon that is constantly being renewed in the face of political, social, economic and climatic hazards. It has been exacerbated recently in the Mediterranean region by wars and political and cultural crises. The migratory crisis is a revelation, a statement of failure of isolated migratory policies.

National measures, carried out in haste, such as the closing of borders and the erection of walls, have resolved nothing. There remain the humanitarian actions carried out by Italy (Operation Mare Nostrum in 2015 and the massive bailouts that continue to be carried out in the Mediterranean by the Italian Coast Guard and some other NGOs) and the massive reception of refugees by Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan and Greece.

European actions have been partial, carried out in haste, and for the most part not followed by effect or not adapted, and hence have not resolved the issue either. European policies for outsourcing and border control are examples such as the agreement between the EU and Turkey of March 2016 to keep Europe-bound refugees and migrants in Turkey or the prospect of agreements with other countries of the Southern Mediterranean (notably Libya) to retain refugees and migrants in camps outside Europe.

There are no regional, Mediterranean, concerted policies involving all partners, all stakeholders. The year 2015, with the arrival of more than one million migrants and refugees in Europe, and the ensuing migratory crisis, show the limits of the partial, national and short-term policies adopted.

Migration Perspectives in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership

With the continuation of current trends and policies, the EMP will at best stagnate and the migratory crisis will continue. Everyone will lose, Europe and the countries of the Southern Mediterranean. Hence the need for a new vision of the Europe-South Mediterranean partnership: a true win-win partnership in the current and future global configuration.

The Facts: the Failure of the EMP and the Handling of the Migration Issue

The EMP is down and trans-Mediterranean migration is in crisis. EU trade with the southern Mediterranean is stagnant if not receding. Priority has always been given to the enlargement of the EU. This was at the expense of relations with the South. After the great enlargement in the East of 2004 with the admission of ten countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the idea of a rebalancing appeared. The European countries of the Mediterranean have thought of the creation of a Mediterranean Union which would bring the countries of the southern shore closer to the EU. But the project has shrunk to the point of becoming the Union for the Mediterranean. This is mainly focused on sectoral actions. It is an even less ambitious emanation of the Barcelona Conference which has shown its limits.

As far as migration is concerned, it is now clear that bilateral partnerships (between two countries or between the EU and eacha South-Mediterranean or African country alone) are not a good approach to tackle the issue as a whole[11]. The sub-regional or regional attempts to date either:

-Dialogue 5 + 5 [12]concerns only the Western Mediterranean and do not address the issue of migration.

 – The Euro-African Conferences on Migration and Development, the first of which took place in Rabat in July 2006, have produced nothing concrete about managing migratory flows and their implications for development.

So What to Do? Some Ideas for Reflection

First of all, we need to change our approach and paradigm, considering mobility a natural and historical human right, at least as much as the international trade in goods, services or capital flows. Why have we excluded human movements from international agreements on trade liberalization and organization[13]? Migration should therefore be integrated into the EMP.

We should then come out of unequal partnerships, old hegemonic schemes to move towards concerted regional migration policies, within the framework of a true "balanced partnership", a global partnership for the interest and development of all the partners. This requires a new vision and approach.

A proposition in this direction could be the creation of a Euro-African Alliance for Migration and Development. Morocco has already proposed the creation of an African Alliance for Migration and Development. It could be a first step, which would allow the African countries concerned to form an "alliance", to speak with one voice with the EU.

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11   Cf. Hamdouch B. (2016).

12   Mauritania,Morocco, Algeria,Tunisia, Libya;Portugal,Spain,France,Italy and Malta.

13   This is what the GATT did and after it the WTO.

What Future for Trans-Mediterranean Migrations?

This will depend on the end of the political, economic and cultural crises in the region and the establishment of a regulatory and operational framework for managing migration. Having failed to implement national, regional, and in particular European and Euro-Mediterranean migration for development policies in due course, the countries of Europe and South and East Mediterranean are currently in the midst of a migration crisis.

The resurgence of migration flows was observed after the previous crises, the penultimate one being that of the early 1970s. The demographic imbalances being what they are on both sides of the Mediterranean, one can expect a revival of trans-Mediterranean migratory flows as growth picks up and Europe "digests" the numbers of newly arrived migrants and refugees. But flows will evolve in their intensity, their geographical distribution and their characteristics according to the needs of some and the availabilities of others: types of migrations, temporary, circular or long, levels of qualifications, specialties...

There remains the issue of the approach, the regulatory framework and migration policies. Will we learn from the recent past, from the current migratory crisis to adopt a new vision, in the long term, a global partnership that includes migration, a global partnership that is "balanced", sustainable and in the best interests of all partners, a win-win partnership?

Conclusion: Euro-Mediterranean Migration and Partnership Can Have a Future

The EMP is going badly. It is "mal parti" (badly gone) to quote the title of René Dumont's work on development policies in African countries in the post independence era[14]. Migration and the EMP are currently at an impasse. To do nothing is to let the crisis set in. Is the EMP, including migration, doomed to failure? Yes, if we continue along the same path. No, if we change course, approach, and paradigm. Then migration and the EMP, migration in the EMP can have a future in a Mediterranean Area or a Mediterranean Union to be built, which would be the counterpart of the other major global poles, North America, China, India ...in a global economy and a global world.

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14   Well-known work: "L'Afrique noire est mal partie".

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MAKALE YAZIM KURALLARI

Şekil Şartları

1. Makale başlığı ve yazar adının ardından en az 300 kelime olacak şekilde bir makale özeti bulunmalıdır. Bu özette, makalenin temel fikirlerinin tümünü kapsayacak biçimde amaç, yöntem, bulgular ve sonuçları anlatılmalıdır. Özet metninin hemen altında makaleye ilişkin anahtar kelimeler yer almalıdır.

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4. Makale uzunluğu asgari 7 500 kelime, tercihen 70 000 vuruş (boşluklar dâhil)- sayfa başına yaklaşık 3 450 karakter, 20 sayfa- civarında olmalıdır.

5. Makaleler Microsoft Word formatında Times New Roman karakterinde, 1 satır aralıklı olarak ve kenara dayalı şekilde yazılmalıdır. Metin için 12 punto, dipnotlar için 10 punto kullanılmalıdır.

6. Başlık 12 punto kullanılarak, bold karakterlerle ve sayfa ortalanarak yazılmalıdır.

7. Dipnotlar, ilgili sayfanın sonuna sıralı numaralar hâlinde eklenmelidir. Dipnotlar 10 punto kullanılarak, 1 satır aralıklı olarak ve kenara yaslanmış şekilde yazılmalıdır.

8. Referanslar Harvard Sistemi çerçevesinde parantez içerisinde metnin içinde ilgili bölümün olabilecek en yakın yerinde yazar soyadı ve makale/kitap yılı olarak aşağıdaki örneklere uygun olarak yazılır:

Konu………..çerçevesinde değerlendirilebilir (Keyder, 1989)……………........................... Öniş'in (2005) iddiasına göre…………………………………………………………………

alıntılar ise yazar soyadı, makale/kitap yılı ve sayfa numarası olarak yazılır – e.g. (Keyman, 2005, s. 111) ya da (della Porta, 2010, s. 195-205).

Bir yazarın birden fazla eseri kullanıldığında (Göle, 2002; 2010);

Bir yazarın aynı yılda yayınlanmış birden fazla eseri kullanıldığında (Tarrow, 1997a; 1997b);

Bir yazarın aynı yılda yayınlanmış birden fazla eseri sayfa numarası verilerek kullanıldığında: (Smith, 2002a, s.195; Smith, 2002b, s. 80);

Birden fazla yazarın çalışması referans olarak verildiğinde yıla göre sıralanır: (Tarrow, 1998; della Porta; 2002; Smith, 2010) (not: aynı yılda yayınlanmış, ikiden fazla çalışma kullanıldığında alfabetik sıralanır).

9. ullanılan kaynakların bilgileri, metnin sonunda yazarların soyadı sırasına göre alfabetik olarak düzenlenen kaynakça bölümünde sıralanmalıdır. Aynı yazarın birden fazla eseri kullanıldığında, yazarın (yazarların) çalışmaları kronolojik olarak eskiden yeniye doğru sıralanmalıdır. Kitap ve dergi isimleri italik harfler kullanılarak yazılmalıdır. Kaynakçada yer verilen çalışmaların birden fazla yazarı var ise, her birinin soyadı ve ad bilgisine yer verilmelidir. Kaynak gösterirken sırasıyla aşağıdaki referans modelleri kullanılmalıdır.

Dergi Makaleleri İçin:

Karpat, K. H. (1972) "The Transformation of the Ottoman State, 1789-1908", International Journal of Middle East Studies, 3 (July): 243-281.

Derleme Kitaplarda Bulunan Makaleler İçin:

Tilly, C. (1986) "Action collective et mobilisation individuelle", dans P. Birnbaum et J. Leca (sous la dir. de), Sur l'individualisme, Paris: Presses de la Fondation nationale des sciences politiques, 213-237.

Mardin Ş. (2002) "Adlarla Oyunlar", içinde D. Kandiyoti ve A. Saktanber (der.), Kültür Fragmanları. Türkiye'de Gündelik Hayat, İstanbul: Metis, 127-140.

Kentel F. (2011) "Nationalist Reconstructions in the light of Disappearing Borders", in M. Casier and J. Jongerden (eds.), Nationalisms and Politics in Turkey. Political Islam, Kemalism and the Kurdish Issue, New York: Routledge, 48-64.

Kitap İçin:

Pettit, P. (1997) Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Birden Fazla Yazarlı Çalışmalar İçin:

Kirişçi, K. (2012) "Turkey's New Draft Law on Asylum: What to Make of It?" in Pacaci Elitok H. S. and T. Straubhaar, Turkey, Migration and the EU: Potentials, Challenges and Opportunities, Hamburg: Hamburg University Press, 63-85.

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