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Civilian Powers and Contemporary Global Challenges

Bahadır PEHLİVANTÜRK* & Birgül DEMİRTAŞ**

Introduction

Since the dawn of the discipline of International Relations, concepts of power and security have always held a central role and have drawn different and sometimes conflicting interpretations. These varied interpretations gave rise to diverse theoretical approaches and schools of thought with their own ideas as to how actors can become powerful and how security can be provided. These academic debates are also accompanied by different understandings and implementations of nation-states and the roles of the military with regard to these issue areas of power and security. Over time, various transformations in the nature of the international system and the nature of conflicts also obliged the discipline to revisit its previous conceptualizations of power and security. As the world became more interdependent, as international economy and economic security became more important issues, and as the number of interstate conflicts decreased while at the same time non-traditional security problems emerged, definitions and previous ontological categorizations also had to be transformed.

This special issue focusing on the foreign and security policies of civilian powers aims to provide analyses of alternative ways of approaching global issues.

How can a state provide its own security? How can it become a powerful

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actor? Would the possession of military power be enough to have security and to protect a state from threats? How can we operationalize the power of states and of other international actors? These are fundamental questions in the field of International Relations. This special issue focusing on the foreign and security policies of civilian powers aims to provide analyses of alternative ways of approaching global issues.

During the Second World War both Germany and Japan experienced the peak of their militarized security policies through aggression toward other countries. However, the end of the war and the humiliating defeat of both countries led to a fundamental change in their approach toward foreign policy and global politics as well as their domestic norms. Both countries reconstructed their state identity and their fundamental approach toward international politics. The United States, as the main victor of the Second World War and as the hegemonic power, became the fundamental actor in pushing both states to reformulate their domestic and foreign policies in the post-Second World War era, reshaping them as robust liberal democracies with strong anti-militarist norms.

Hence, Germany and Japan experienced radical transformation and turned into special types of civilian actors in the international system. After suffering from the terrible losses and destruction of the Second World War, they became global civilian actors by basing their foreign policy on certain pacifist leanings, using peaceful instruments, mainly through multilateral platforms. In fact, it could be argued that it is their civilian characteristics, their multilateralism and internationalism, and their preference to spend a fundamental part of their budget for education, health, welfare and other areas of civilian needs instead of military exuberance, that has made them global economic powers. In other words, both Japan and Germany owe their economic power to their civilian power characteristics.

In addition to the emergence of these two civilian nation states, the post-Second World War also witnessed the emergence of a civilian regional organization, that is the European Coal and Steel Community. Thanks to its supranational characteristics it has become a *sui generis* organization and based its policies on normative values and principles, with the fundamental aim of making another war in its region impossible. This was also accompanied with a growing web of global governance, supported and expanded by various international organizations and regimes, allowing civilian means more room for influence in shaping the outcomes in global affairs.

Furthermore, other state actors also started putting a special emphasis on soft power instruments and civilian power characteristics. Turkey is just one of them. Ever since the foundation of the Republic of Turkey in 1923, norms and values have become important in Turkish foreign policy. Basing its foreign policy on the principle of "Peace at Home, Peace in the World," articulated by the founder of the Republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Turkey became a multilateral actor.

> Ever since the foundation of the Republic of Turkey in 1923, norms and values have become important in Turkish foreign policy.

This special issue will focus on the foreign policies of Germany, Japan, Turkey and the European Union. Different articles analyze civilian power aspects of their international relations and try to shed light on continuities and changes.

It was the French scholar François Duchêne who first coined the term "civilian power" in the 1970s while studying the European Community (EC) and its place in global politics. He argued that it was an important characteristic of the EC.[1] The fact that the EC did not have any substantial military power did not constitute any obstacle, on the contrary it could become the pathway for the EC to play a constructive role in international relations through economic, diplomatic and cultural means, and as an agenda setter and creator of norms.

The term was later developed further by Prof. Hanns W. Maull. The drive for Maull's work came with the reunification of Germany and the rise of Japan to economic superpower status, creating a need to predict how these two powers would behave in the uncertainties of the post-Cold War order. He argued that Germany and Japan constituted new types of powers that were more relevant for the transformed world system, and that even the US should aspire to be one. Basing his studies on the foreign policies of Berlin and Tokyo in the post-Second World War era, he analyzed how the two countries could create new state identities based on civilian features and apply them in their foreign policies.

In Maull's classical definition, the concept of "civilian power" consisted of three fundamental elements: First, civilian powers base their foreign policy on cooperation with other actors in order to realize their objectives; second, they use non-military means, like economy and culture in their foreign policy; and third, they are keen to

develop supranational institutions, i.e. they are ready to share their sovereignty with other actors.[2] Characterising Germany and Japan as "prototypes of a promising future"[3] he argued that their security alliance with the US provided them with the opportunity to develop their non-military potentials. In his later studies, Maull further emphasized the internationalist and supranationalist characters of civilian powers, mostly resting his analysis on the behavior of Germany.[4]

Within the frameworks for evaluating the foreign policy behavior of the European Union as a singular actor, some sister concepts have also been developed. Ian Manners' works on the European Union led to the emergence of the new concept of "normative power". Stating that the EU is an organization based on nine normative principles of sustainable peace, freedom, democracy, human rights, rule of law, equality, social solidarity, sustainable development and good governance, he argues that the important feature of the EU is that through these principles and values the EU is defining what the "normal" is in world politics. Giving the example of the norm of abolition of the death penalty, after the creation of this norm as a part of European identity, it started to spread to other parts of the world without using any kind of coercive power.[5]

> If one country is deemed as one type of power, it does not necessarily mean that it is also the other type.

Even though there are large differences between the concepts of civilian powers and normative powers, strong adherence to global liberal norms and a quest for a rules- and law-based world order mark both. However if one country is deemed as one type of power, it does not necessarily mean that it is also the other type.

In this issue, we preferred to focus on the concept of civilian power, rather than normative power, because the former encompasses a wider aspect of the actorhood role of nation-states. It also has more coverage for more states, while the concept of normative power could be used in a rather restricted manner.

The challenges of the post-Cold War era and especially the period after the 9/11 terrorist attacks led to some changes in the foreign policy understanding of the civilian powers. Faced with new kinds of global problems, like ethnic conflicts and new terrorist organizations, the pure civilian approach was being questioned not only internally, but also externally. In particular, the US administration has

had new expectations from not only Germany and Japan, but also from the European Union, to involve themselves further in solving the new kind of global problems.

Especially Japan has been under direct US pressure since the Gulf War, to shed its civilian power attitude and abolish constitutional restrictions toward becoming a 'normal' power.[6] Also lately, all European NATO countries are being castigated by the US administration for their perceived lack of military contributions. The Washington administration also expects them not to shy away from spending more on the military but also pushes them toward using military instruments when necessary as well. The studies in this special issue examine the continuities and changes in the civilian power conception of the EU as an international organization and of three countries, Germany, Turkey and Japan as case studies.

The issue starts with the article by Dr. Mustafa Kutlay on the EU's transformative power. Because of its *sui generis* features the EU has been considered as an international organization that has the potential to transform not only the member and candidate states, but also its neighboring regions as well. However, the study argues that the Euro crisis and migration issue have had a negative

impact on the transformative power of the European Union, leading to the weakening of the solidarity within the EU. In addition, the study also argues that the changing global structure and the rise of new powers are further weakening the position of the EU in the international system.

The second article, by Dr. Birgül Demirtaş and Mahmut Mazlum, deals with Germany's changing security policies by especially focusing on the issue of use of force. It analyses the evolution of Germany's civilian power characteristics based on three case studies of Kosovo, Afghanistan, and the uprisings in the Middle East, using a theoretical framework of realist constructivism. The article tries to answer the following research questions: To what extent has Germany been able to maintain its traditional peaceful foreign policy in the new "global disorder"? Which factors affect its decision to be involved or not in military interventions in various regional and global conflicts? What does the German case tell us about the evolution of civilian powers in the current global circumstances?

Dr. Emel Parlar Dal, Ali Murat Kurşun and Hakan Mehmetcik evaluate the role of trade in the creation of Turkey's civilian power role in Africa. It tries to look at the degree to which its African trade policies contribute to the

construction of a civilian foreign policy. Moreover, the article analyses the connection between "power and trade" and between "civilian power and trade". Since Turkey is not usually perceived as a traditional civilian power in the academic literature, this study tries to expand the use of the concept of civilian power to Turkey in its relations with Africa.

İbrahim Akbaş focuses on an original topic for the IR literature and a concept closely related with the concept of civilian powers, soft-power, by evaluating the place of cartoons in foreign policy as part of Japanese soft power conception. By taking anime and manga as important instruments of Japanese foreign relations, the study examines the "Cool Japan" concept, a brand adopted by the government of Japan and an expression of Japan's emergent status as a cultural superpower. Since anime and manga represent Japanese cultures, the Japanese state supports their development and implementation as a novel foreign policy approach.

In this issue, we also have an article analysing great power competition in the Middle East written by Dr. Saman Zulfqar. The article mainly focuses on a comparison of the US, Russian and Chinese policies toward the Middle East and argues that the involvement of external powers in the region harms the regional stability. The article shows that emphasis on military means alone does not bring peace and stability to the regional and global politics. Although the main theme of the article is different from the focus of the special issue, it puts forward an important case study that proves how foreign policies based on military instruments alone could result in further destabilisation of the Middle East.

Even though the recent turmoil in world politics and the concerns for the demise of the liberal world system are becoming voiced rather frequently nowadays, as the editors of the special issue we believe that civilian power behavior will continue to shape the world system in fundamental ways. At a time when the hegemonic power of the world seems to be behaving in a predatory way that undermines the system itself, the potential paths that civilian powers will choose, their foreign policy choices and transformations, and the way they will construct security thought will gain more importance. We hope that this publication will instill further interest in civilian powers, both conceptually and empirically, and encourage further academic studies.

Endnotes

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The Transformative Power of the EU in a Changing International Order

Mustafa KUTLAY[*]

Abstract

The EU is a distinct actor in global politics. Researchers have developed different concepts to explain its sui generis nature. All approaches, however, converge in the sense that the EU has acted as an important transformative power that altered political preferences in member and candidate countries and informed dominant policy paradigms that organise state-market relations in its sphere of influence. This study argues that the EU's transformative power is under stress as never before due to the internal and external political economy challenges. From an internal point of view, the way in which the euro crisis and migration waves were managed dramatically jeopardized the solidarity ethos in the EU. From an external point of view, the changing international order and the rise of emerging powers weaken the appeal of the EU governance model in global politics.

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Key Words

EU Transformative Power, Changing Global Order, Euro Crisis, Emerging Great Powers.

Introduction

The actorness of the EU is one of the intriguing debates in global politics. The EU, with its *sui generis* institutional architecture and multilateral and multilevel governance model, diverges from traditional players. On the one hand, the EU does not fit into the standard template of nation-states; on the other hand, it falls short of being a genuine supranational polity. The EU also does not have military capabilities that can be compared to the regular armies of the nation-states. The weak hard power capacity of the EU, however, does not make it a powerless actor in global politics. On the contrary, the European integration experience has motivated researchers to re-consider the power concept in international relations and dig deeper into alternative sources of influence other than military might.

> The European integration experience has motivated researchers to re-consider the power concept in international relations and dig deeper into alternative sources of influence other than military might.

The majority of integration scholars agree that the EU poses a distinct power but they are not so much in agreement about the exact nature, sources, and limits of its power capacity. The EU, for instance, is defined as a "civilian power",[1] "normative power",[2] and "market power".[3] Although these conceptualisations diverge in several aspects and sometimes contradict with each other, one common element in all these definitions is that the EU exerts power in international politics through non-military instruments and has the capacity to transform the target countries along the lines of its norms, values, and preferences. The transformative capacity of the EU without resorting to force reflects its distinctive nature in global politics.

This paper argues that the transformative power of the EU faces serious challenges at least since the emergence of the euro crisis. From a political economy perspective, this study maintains that the declining appeal of the EU not only stems from the internal problems of European integration but also from the changing dynamics of the global order. The second part of the paper offers a discussion about the ways in which poor governance of the EU's multiple challenges (the euro crisis, migration challenge, and Brexit) has undermined its transformative capacity. The third part discusses the changing global order with particular reference to its impact on the declining appeal of the EU. The final part concludes the paper. It should be stated at the outset that economic instruments are not the only sources of the EU's transformative capacity but this paper mainly concentrates on the economic dimension as it constitutes the epicentre of the European integration project.

Transformative Power of Europe in Times of Multiple Crises

At the dawn of the 21st century, there was a high level of optimism about the global role of the EU. The consolidation of the political union following the Maastricht Treaty, the adoption of a new European Security and Defence Policy, and the introduction of the euro as the single currency underpinned the visibility of the EU as a global actor.

The EU's expansion to the Central and East European countries in the 'big bang enlargement wave' further consolidated this perception. Though the EU was not completely free from some major problems at the time, the dominant view was that the EU was "a quiet superpower" in the making.[4]

Despite the recent developments regarding security and defence capabilities, the EU is still considered as a "small" power, dependent on the US in terms of military resources and mobilization capacity.[5] The EU, however, has distinct power capabilities that are widely discussed among pundits. Duchêne, long before the recent debates, argued that the EU is a "civilian power", bringing non-military approaches to the management of international conflicts.[6] Manners, along the same lines, defined the EU a "normative power" that has the capacity to shape the behaviour of others not only through coercion but also through diffusing its norms. Accordingly, the EU is conceptualized as a power that has the capacity to define the "normal" in international politics.[7] A particular identity based on a set of norms, such as rule of law, peace, democracy, human rights, and liberty, makes Europe a distinct normative actor in global politics. Also, some other scholars have labelled the EU a "market power."[8] According to Damro, the EU's identity is "a comparatively large regulated

market with institutional features and interest group contestation."[9] The European Single Market sustains the material basis to the EU "as a market power that externalizes its economic and social market related policies and regulatory measures."[10] This, in turn, makes the EU as the "shaper of globalization."[11]

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Given the EU's non-conventional power base, Leonard suggested that the EU has an unmatched "transformative capacity" that extends beyond Europe into the Mediterranean region, the Middle East and North Africa. According to this account, the EU reshapes the international order through attractiveness of its governance model, dynamic economy, social policies and crisis-management capacity.[12] The transformative capacity of the EU, however, this paper maintains, is under severe stress in the post-2008 period. Contrary to the expectations and bold statements about the role of the EU in the 21st century, its ability to act as a capable

actor has deteriorated dramatically. The following sections elaborate on this proposition with reference to the Eurozone and migration crises.

The Governance of the Eurozone Crisis

The euro crisis constitutes one of the turning points in the history of European integration. It should be considered as a critical juncture not only because it brought European economies to the brink of collapse but it also severely hit the solidarity culture among the member countries. The management of the euro crisis was ill advised and sparked a process that eradicated 'transformative power Europe'. Rather than exploiting the crisis as an opportunity to reform the incomplete institutional design of the Eurozone and to expand 'market power Europe', the crisis triggered blame games and led to further peripherialisation of some member countries due to austerity-obsessed economic policies. The Greek crisis and the way in which it has been governed is a clear illustration of this trend. Therefore, this part concentrates on the mismanagement of the Greek economic crisis with emphasis on its negative consequences in terms of the domestic and global appeal of the EU.

The Greek economic crisis caught the European policy-makers by surprise. As a relatively tiny economy comprising just 2.5% of the Eurozone, many analysts and policy makers could not predict the massive aftershocks of the Greek economic crisis. The structural problems of the Greek economy were in fact a reflection of the design problems and the inherent dilemmas of the Eurozone rather than merely being idiosyncratic management failures in a peripheral European economy. In late 2009, combined with Greece's very high government debt ratio and skyrocketing current account deficit, the government change and revision of budget deficit figures in the aftermath triggered an unprecedented economic panic.

> The management of the euro crisis was ill advised and sparked a process that eradicated 'transformative power Europe'.

The government's increasing credibility gap pushed the Greek economy into a deadlock, which resulted in Greece's cut-off from the markets in the first quarter of 2010. After a turbulent period of tough behind the curtain negotiations, Papandreou requested EU-IMF support in April 2010.

A joint European Commission-European Central Bank-International Monetary Fund (EC-ECB-IMF) mission, called the 'troika,' was sent to Athens to negotiate the terms and conditions of the bailout package.[13] The bailout package was attached to strict conditionality.[14] The unusually ambitious program had three major components: Fiscal reforms, financial reforms, and structural reforms that would buttress the sustainability of the state's fiscal pillar.[15] Despite an ambitious start, it did not take too long for policy-makers and market actors to realize that the first bailout package was too little too late to arrest the economic meltdown in Greece and in the rest of the Eurozone. Not surprisingly, the failure of the first program necessitated new bailouts.[16] However, new reform programs also suffered from substantial problems in terms of design and implementation.[17]

The Greek economic crisis has become a textbook case of crisis mismanagement for the EU with huge ramifications for other Eurozone economies. The political elites in debtor countries and creditors failed to develop a common language and overcome collective action problems. Therefore, the Euro crisis deepened the faultlines in the EU by exposing coordination problems between debtor (southern) and creditor (northern) countries. Rather than concentrating on the design failures of

the Eurozone as a whole and addressing fundamental problems, the EU leaders started a vicious cycle of blame games, which was evident in the way in which the Greek crisis managed.

From the early phases of the crisis, Greek Prime Minister at the time, George Papandreou's approach diverged from that of the troika and creditors, first and foremost Germany. In fact, unbridgeable gaps emerged between the parties regarding the sources of the turmoil and the measures to be taken to overcome it. With the deepening of the economic crisis, the blame games precipitously intensified.

At the root cause of the blame games lays the narrative mismatch between debtors and creditors. For instance, Papandreou narrated the Greek crisis as "a test case for Europe."[18] Papandreou argued that the crisis partially stemmed from unfettered globalization and uncontrolled financial speculation in the Eurozone. Accordingly, similar to the leaders of other debtor economies, Papandreou argued "Greece was only a symptom of much deeper structural problems in the Eurozone and vulnerabilities in the wider global economic system."[19]

As an outcome of his structural interpretation of the Greek and Eurozone crises, Papandreou suggested European-level counter-crisis measures. The Greek policy-makers and other

crisis-ridden countries in the Eurozone offered debt mutualisation and the common debt management to ensure fiscal centralization and sustainability of state debts across the European economies.[20] This perspective, however, diverged significantly from creditor countries'. Especially Germany, as the EU's hegemonic power that shaped the post-crisis reform measures, insisted on a strict conditionality program. Germany argued that harsh austerity measures were inescapable to overcome the credibility of commitment and moral hazard problems in the Eurozone. The austerity-obsessed reform packages, however, further exacerbated the collective action problems. For instance, Greek Prime Minister Papandreou had hard times as he disagreed with the spirit of the austerity program. He stated this explicitly as follows: "people who were not responsible for the crisis were paying the price for [extreme austerity]. There was a sense of injustice [in the bailout program]."[21]

The austerity programs designed for debtor countries, especially the one for Greece, were exceptional. For instance, Wolf argued that Greece was asked to do what Latin American countries did in the 1980s, "a lost decade- the beneficiaries being foreign creditors."[22] Several pundits also argued that the fundamental problem of the Eurozone was not fiscal profligacy of the member

countries. In fact, fiscal problems were rather a symptom reflecting the 'design crisis' of the Eurozone.[23] Therefore, as the argument went, a disproportionate imposition of austerity measures would not relieve the pressure over the crisis-ridden economies and would not strengthen the hands of pro-reform coalitions across the Eurozone.[24]

The failure of the first bailout program necessitated another rescue package amidst infamous "Grexit" debates in mid-2011, with imminent risks of triggering a domino effect in the Italian and Spanish economies. The new package was estimated at "109 billion euros with lower interest rates and extended maturities [which were] very closely [attached to] the strict implementation of the program."[25] The Papandreou government, squeezed between the troika's relentless demands and the domestic opposition, called for an unexpected referendum. Papandreou's surprizing decision triggered the faultlines in the financial markets and attracted severe criticism on the part of the Franco-German leadership. Under intense pressure from Angela Merkel and Nicholas Sarkozy, Papandreou revoked the referendum decision and resigned from his post on 6 October 2011.

The resignation of the Greek Prime Minister exacerbated the democratic legitimacy debates in the EU as

many commentators argued that the process leading to this decision reflected the undemocratic nature of the EU's crisis management strategies. The appointment of the new Greek Prime Minister, Lucas Papademos, the former governor of the Bank of Greece (BoG) and vice president of the ECB, further consolidated this perception. As Kouvelakis asserts, the "Papademos government was the natural incarnation of a ruling bloc that is entirely dominated by the interests of European finance."[26] Merkel also placed her full support behind Papademos. Given the strong support he received from European circles, Papademos succeeded to secure the second bailout package in February 2012, which was around 137 billion euros. However, Papademos lacked the popular democratic legitimacy in the eyes of the domestic constituency. The public outrage against Germany and austerity program significantly restricted his mandate. Concomitant to the appointment of technocratic figures as prime ministers in other crisis-ridden European countries, he was conceived as the representative of the troika and therefore suffered from extensive credibility deficits. In this adverse environment, the social havoc created by the economic crisis and harsh austerity measures imposed by the troika extremely narrowed the room for reform possibilities.

The resignation of the Greek Prime Minister exacerbated the democratic legitimacy debates in the EU as many commentators argued that the process leading to this decision reflected the undemocratic nature of the EU's crisis management strategies.

The intensification of blame games and the overly moralistic approach of the creditors toward debtor countries also increased the anti-European sentiment at the popular level. The majority of the population in Greece, for instance, started to draw analogies between the protectorates of foreign powers established during the country's debt-ridden history and Greece's present misery. In addition to the tormented historical memories of the Greek people in regard to their country's troubled fiscal relations with foreign creditors, the Greek people interpreted the post-crisis intervention of the troika as 'a new German occupation by other means.' In the post-2011 period, frequent street protests against the troika dominated the political agenda. Between May 2010 and March 2014, 20,201 legal demonstrations took place in Greece.[27] The Civil Servants' Confederation (ADEDY) and The General Confederation of

Greek Workers (GSEE) organized 34 general strikes in the same period. The strikingly high number of protests indicates that the established political parties, conventional approaches and the reform program had lost credibility and legitimacy.

The Greek case deserves in-depth discussion in terms of the EU's transformative capacity because it exemplifies how the mismanagement of the euro crisis alienated the societies in the periphery of European integration. The harsh austerity policies and the EU's failure to ensure economic recovery estranged southern European societies as well as the Central and East European countries. The rising inequality between the northern and southern members of the EU called the entire integration mentality into question. As one commentator highlighted, "today's northern European countries are running up record current- account surpluses, just as some southern European countries are experiencing Weimar-level unemployment."[28] Thus, the populist and anti-EU parties gained rapid ground as the EU failed to deliver its promises to ensure wealth and prosperity in new members.

The rising populist tendencies in the EU should be considered as an outcome of uneven economic distribution and identity-related factors. However,

it would be fair to suggest that the protracted crisis provided a fertile ground for the Eurosceptic parties to mobilize the masses against the fundamental principles of the EU project. For instance, in Greece, the xenophobic neo-Nazi party Golden Dawn's electoral base expanded dramatically from less than 1 % to 7 % of the total votes. The Coalition of the Radical Left, SYRIZA, also defeated all established parties and became the largest party in the Hellenic Parliament, receiving 36.3 % of the vote in the January 2015 elections. Different than the left-wing populism in Greece, the right-wing populist movement, the Alliance of Young Democrats (Fidesz) under Viktor Orban, pushed Hungary towards an illiberal direction. Orban several times lambasted the EU governance model in his speeches. For instance, he claimed, "we are expecting a solution from Brussels, which will never come… Everything is now happening in an uncontrolled fashion."[29] The populist Law and Justice government in Poland, echoing Orban, is also very critical of the direction of the European integration project. The far-right and far-left parties are on the rise in several other European countries including, but not limited to Germany, France, Austria, Spain and the Netherlands.[30] As the EU's problem-solving capacity decreased in the aftermath of the euro crisis, the legitimacy of the European

integration project deteriorated in the eyes of the citizens of EU member countries. This, in turn, opened up new political space for anti-establishment parties to expand their electoral base.

Europe's Migration Crisis

The second crisis is the migration challenge, which has deep ramifications on the normative credentials and problem-solving capacity of the EU. Starting from early 2015, the number of refugees trying to reach European borders increased dramatically due to the intensifying civil war in Syria and destabilization in the Middle East and North African region. The European leaders struggled to find an effective solution to the flow of migrants in the absence of a collective and norm-based response. The EU's overly pragmatic approach and hesitance to allocate refugees across member states posed a direct contradiction to Europe's alleged norms and principles.[31] In the absence of a coherent European-level response, member states acted unilaterally, which further exacerbated the problem. For instance, Hungary, Croatia and Slovenia closed their borders to refugees coming from Serbia. The Polish government declared that Poland would not participate in the reallocation scheme and Bulgaria built fences along its borders.[32]

> The EU's overly pragmatic approach and hesitance to allocate refugees across member states posed a direct contradiction to Europe's alleged norms and principles.

The EU's weak internal solidarity and hazy approach in tackling the refugee crisis brings two major consequences regarding its appeal. Domestically, it has created disappointment, especially among recent members. As Ivan Krastev points out, "many Eastern Europeans feel betrayed by their hope that joining the EU would mean the beginning of prosperity and an end to crisis."[33] The poor management of the euro and migration crises created disillusionment in Southern and Eastern European countries alike. Externally, narrowly constructed interest-based refugee policies and the hesitant approach of most member states to accept refugees undermined the EU's image as promoter of human rights.[34] The EU abandoning its principles for the sake of immediate *Realpolitik* interests in the migration problem jeopardized its normative credentials in the eyes of third countries. Furthermore, the ineffective policy response created ample opportunity for nationalist-populist leaders in the periphery to exploit the EU's crumbling

internal solidarity. Similar to the euro crisis, the inept policy response of the EU members and institutions opened up ample room for Eurosceptic parties to capitalize on the 'politics of fear.'

> The collective failure by European leaders to address the economic problems and develop a coherent European-level response to the migration crisis triggered new faultlines in the EU.

Stated differently, the collective failure by European leaders to address the economic problems and develop a coherent European-level response to the migration crisis triggered new faultlines in the EU, which in turn unleashed the anti-establishment sentiments across Europe. A clear manifestation of this trend is increasing scepticism about the benefits of EU membership. The publics especially in peripheral countries increasingly questioned the promise of market economy and liberal democracy in the EU. One can also suggest that the internal tug-of-wars among European member states in the wake of multiple crises are likely to have spill-over effects in terms of the EU's external anchor role and political appeal. The political fragmentation and weak crisis-management capacity may

also undermine the EU's promise as the beacon of democracy, human rights, and prosperity in the eyes of the third countries. The EU's leverage over its periphery may be damaged gradually, which in turn, may adversely inform its norm-setter role over the broader neighbourhood.

The Shift in Global Order

The problems associated with the EU model do not only stem from the poor governance of its multiple crises. It is also closely related to the on-going shifts in global order, a trend that has accelerated since the global economic crisis. The global crisis, which erupted in the US and spread across European economies, revealed the deep structural problems associated with the neoliberal economic model. Whereas advanced Western economies encountered insurmountable challenges in the post-crisis period, emerging powers experienced relatively high growth rates. Economic dynamism, favourable demographic conditions, and the increasing interdependence in regional trade provided opportunities for these countries to act as more active participants in the global political economy. Between 2010-2014, for instance, the BRICS succeeded to grow at 5 per cent, and China has become the locomotive with 8.6 % growth on an annual basis.[35] The robust trade

and investment performance of the emerging economies also consolidated their status in global politics. The following figure demonstrates that the share of developed countries in world GDP has gradually declined over the years. For instance the share of the USA in purchasing power parity terms declined from 20.8 to 18.2 between 2007-2017 (see figure below). Similarly Europe's share declined from 23.3 % to 19.1 %. In the same period, the share of the BRICS increased from 21.9 % to more than 30 %. The share of the BRICS is expected to increase to almost 38 % in purchasing power parity terms as of 2030. In a similar vein, for the most astounding emerging power, China, it is expected that "in market exchange rate terms, China [will] overtake the US in 2028 despite its projected growth slowdown."[36]

Share of world GDP (percent 2005, US$ PPP)

Year	USA	Europe	BRICS
2007	20.8	23.3	21.9
2017	18.2	19.1	30.4
2030	15	15.3	37.7

Europe here includes all EU and non-EU countries in Europe as defined by the UN Statistics Division (except former USSR states such as Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine, Armenia and Azerbaijan, which are included by the UN in the Eastern Europe subregion).

Source: https://developingeconomics.org/2017/09/27/the-brics-and-a-changing-world/ (last visited 20 January 2018).

There is a quasi-consensus in the international relations discipline that the global order is changing in shape and form.[37] The nature of this change, however, is a topic of intense controversy. Scholars, who put particular emphasis on the ontological underpinnings of the liberal international order, suggest that emerging great powers tend to rely on different norms, values, and institutions than the Western states. Given that the power balance is shifting in favour of the emerging world and the US is not as strong and willing as it used to be in providing public goods to stabilise the current international order, it is more likely that new regional orders are in the making across the world. This has major implications in terms of the alliance preferences of countries even located in Europe's neighbourhood. In the coming "multi-order world", Flockhart argues, "with alternative international orders emerging, cost-benefit calculations of states that do not really share the fundamental principals rooted in a Western identity looks set to change."[38] In this process, regionalisation should be taken as a trend-setting paradigm as the robust growth of emerging great powers and amplifying trade and investment opportunities increased their attractiveness in the countries located even at the periphery of Europe. The governance models and institutional structures of non-western great powers

diverge from the mainstream paradigm that the EU advocates as part of its transformative credentials. From an economic governance point of view, the emerging great powers seem to employ a strategic model of capitalism, which has two distinctive characteristics according to Bremmer.[39]

First, policymakers that promote strategic capitalism believe that state intervention is a permanent feature of economic policy-making. State intervention is formulated as a strategic choice to design long-term policy alternatives. Strategic capitalists think that, rather than being an end in itself to expand individuals' opportunities, markets are primarily "tools that serve national interests."[40] The securitization of state-market relations reflects a new form of neo-mercantilism, which has become increasingly dominant in the formulation of states' foreign trade and investment policies. Stated differently, economic policies are considered as instruments of geopolitical rivalries among the states. China, for example, designs controlled foreign direct investment (FDI) regulations that oblige foreign companies to transfer know-how as part of their investments. The selective industrial policies and neo-protectionist tendencies are especially visible in the case in high-value-added industries in the case of China and geo-economically strategic sectors such as energy in the case of Russia. Therefore,

the rise of great powers in the global South poses a great challenge to the free market economy model that the EU promotes in its relations with third countries. The increasing competitive edge and expanding market share of the emerging powers also restrains the EU's market power, as it decreases the EU's regulatory influence.

Second, strategic capitalist models have a distinct set of priorities in comparison to European governance models in their relations with third countries. Rather than attaching political conditionality measures to economic partnership agreements or development assistance, emerging great powers tend to promote flexible development schemes in their relations with partner countries. In a period when democratic efficacy and economic dynamism are on the retreat in Europe, the economic vigour and flexible corporation opportunities turn emerging powers into attractive models in terms of economic and political development. This admiration, then, influences alliance patterns of several countries. Not surprisingly, Russia and China emerge as attractive partners to cooperate with, even for countries located within the EU's sphere of influence. The weak crisis-management performance and ubiquitous collective action problems in the EU provide a fertile ground for emerging great powers to expand their sphere of interests. The subsequent crises of the EU such as

the euro turmoil, migration crisis, and finally the Brexit conundrum paved the way for the perception that the EU is not capable of dealing with the complex problems occupying its agenda. The EU's inefficient performance in the Syrian and Ukrainian crises further exacerbated this perception. One can suggest that the contradictory policies of the EU, arguably, jeopardised its political and economic leverage in the region and beyond, which in turn, opened up new spaces for other actors to exert their influence.

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The long-term economic performance of the strategic capitalist models in emerging great powers and the resilience of their appeal, however, is not far from debate. The emerging great powers, China in particular, are at a crossroads in terms of economic reforms and institutional transformation. The recent data suggest that emerging powers

have started to demonstrate sluggish growth performance as they approach the middle-income trap, which is considered as a crucial challenge for developing economies.[41] The middle-income trap refers to the slowdown tendency for developing economies after GDP per capita has reached a certain threshold. For most countries it becomes quite challenging to improve their per capita figures from middle to high-income threshold. The World Bank's research estimates that of the 101 middle-income countries in 1960 only 13 reached high-income level status by 2008.[42] The overwhelming majority stagnated in the middle. As the economy moves from labour-intensive and low-cost exports toward capital-intensive production, labour is re-allocated to high-value added sectors. This results in economic stagnation, as productivity growth from sectoral re-allocation and technology import disappears. The challenge for the emerging great powers, first and foremost for China, is to ensure economic diversification and transformation of institutions toward political pluralism that stimulate growth and underpin competitive edge. Only in this way can emerging great powers become a genuine rival to the European model of economic governance and act as the spearheads of new world orders. Nevertheless, the change in power balances appears to be a structural trend in international

politics rather than a temporary phenomenon.

> The EU is at the crossroads of remaining a relevant global actor, capable of informing alliance patterns and global trends.

The debate so far suggests that the EU is at the crossroads of remaining a relevant global actor, capable of informing alliance patterns and global trends. In a world becoming increasingly fractured and fragmented, the EU has to develop new capabilities to live up to its commitments. In terms of security relations, the European leaders need to adopt proactive strategies to make the EU an independent security actor. In the past 50 years of the European project, the integration has unfolded in a stable security environment mainly provided by the US as the main funder of the NATO alliance. The US leadership, however, appears to be more hesitant to sustain the security structures of the Western alliance. In terms of political and economic relations, the EU needs to reconsider its governance model as well. This paper therefore suggests that the transformative power capacity of the EU is under a severe test due to the internal and external challenges. In a changing global order, where

emerging powers are becoming more assertive to take part in regional and global governance and the relevance of the West as a security community is declining, the EU model becomes less attractive in the eyes of several countries including those located in the European periphery. Thus, the EU's commitment to its normative identity, based on human rights, democracy and freedoms, appears to be more important than ever not only for the future of the European integration process but also for the shape and form of the incoming global order(s).

Conclusion: Holding the Centre

This paper argued that the EU faces serious tests in terms of its actorness in global politics. The transformative power of the EU is in jeopardy due to internal and external challenges. Drawing on the euro crisis and migration challenge, this study suggested that poor crisis management has led to the weakening of the EU role model and undermined the solidarity ethos among member countries. As a result, the EU has found itself in the middle of turbulence unprecedented since its formation years. From an external point of view, the changing geopolitical landscape in global political economy has put extra pressure on the European model of governance.

The liberal democracy and free market economy, as the two constitutive pillars of EU's transformative power, are being challenged especially by the revisionist emerging great powers in global politics. The European liberal model, as it appears, does not seem to constitute the 'only game in town' anymore. Thus, this paper argues that the debate on the potentials and limits of the EU's transformative power should be placed within the changing global context.

> The liberal democracy and free market economy, as the two constitutive pillars of EU's transformative power, are being challenged especially by the revisionist emerging great powers in global politics.

That being said, it is arguably too early to make conclusive inferences regarding emerging world orders and the relative decline of the EU. There are at least two critical factors that are likely to shape the parameters of the debate in the coming years. The first one concerns the EU's revival capacity. Historically informed analysis suggests that the driving force of integration in Europe is crisis. The integration process followed a dialectical mechanism in the sense that each crisis forced the European

elites to search for innovative answers to the existing problems to protect the appeal of the EU in the eyes of member states and the external world. Therefore, crisis in European integration should not only be conceptualised as the culmination point and outburst of material contradictions but also as a moment of decisive intervention toward creative solutions. The outcome, however, depends on the extent to which European policy-makers demonstrate necessary leadership to reconcile the interests of member countries and the priorities of the EU supranational project. As Börzel suggested, the problem of the EU is not about creating more or less Europe but to overcome the "commitment-compliance gap" that hinders purposeful collective action.[43]

The second factor concerns the institutional capacity of the emerging great powers in terms of political stability and economic performance. As was highlighted above, the emerging great powers have their own political and economic systems. However, we still lack adequate research to what extent and through which mechanisms emerging great powers are capable of creating a new order in the coming multi-order world. Therefore, the appeal of this governance model and its demonstrative effect for the countries located in the periphery of the EU remain as an understudied area. The performance of the emerging great powers, similarly, is yet to be tested. The institutionalist political economy literature demonstrates that long-term development performance depends on the quality of economic and political institutions. Increasing institutional quality in the emerging great powers is still a work in progress. These countries need to improve their economic and accompanying political institutions to meet these challenges and offer a sustainable alternative model of governance.

In conclusion, one can suggest that the main defining characteristics of the contemporary international system are uncertainty and fluidity. The EU, in this context, is at a crossroads in terms of institutional restructuration and reformation. To sustain the EU's transformative capacity the European elites should not only consider internal developments but also adjust to the transformations taking place in the global world order.

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Civilian Powers and the Use of Force: The Evolution of Germany as a 'Realist Civilian Power'

Birgül DEMİRTAŞ[*] & Mahmut MAZLUM[**]

Abstract

Because of Germany's rising economic and political clout not only in European but also in global politics, it is worth analysing the dynamics of change and continuity in Germany's policy towards the use of force. This article aims to critically examine the evolution of Germany's civilian power characteristics based on three case studies of Kosovo, Afghanistan, and the uprisings in the Middle East, by using the theoretical framework of realist constructivism. The article tries to answer the following research questions: To what extent has Germany been able to maintain its traditional peaceful foreign policy in the new "global disorder"? Which factors affect its decision to be involved or not in military interventions in various regional and global conflicts? What does the German case tell us about the evolution of civilian powers in the current global circumstances?

Key Words

Realist Constructivism, Civilian Powers, Use of Force, Germany, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Libya.

Introduction

"The use of military means as a last resort cannot and should not be excluded, but no conflict that we face today can be solved by military means alone."[1]

Angela Merkel

"Germany's path to greater military assertiveness has not been linear, and it never will be. Germans do not believe that talking at roundtables solves every problem, but neither do they think that shooting does. The mixed track record of foreign military interventions over the past 20 years is only one reason for caution."[2]

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The literature on civilian powers has so far mainly analysed actors like Germany, Japan and the European Union, which formulated their foreign policies during the Cold War based on civilian national role conceptions.[3] The current challenges seem to encourage these actors to rethink their traditional foreign policy approaches, which exclude the use of power. For example, Japan has been reconsidering its foreign policy since the end of the Cold War.[4] The current government under the prime ministry of Shinzo Abe has been putting great emphasis on increasing Japan's role in the global system. The creation of the National Security Council in 2013 and approval of a new legislation in 2015 allowing Japanese soldiers to participate in collective self-defense operations by simplifying the procedures for the deployment of Japanese troops abroad were important steps in the evolution of Japanese security policy.

Meanwhile, the European Union has also been reconsidering its security and defence policies considering the period since the early 1990s. Ever since the formation of the three pillar system with the Treaty of Maastricht, the Union has been trying to consolidate its common foreign and security policies. The Treaty of Lisbon created a Common Security and Defense Policy with the aim of increasing cooperation among member states and allowing them to cooperate better. In its Global Strategy 2016 it was stated that "While NATO exists to defend its members-most of which are European- from external attack, Europeans must be better equipped, trained and organised to contribute decisively to such collective efforts, as well as to act autonomously if and when necessary."[5] On the one hand, the EU tries to create a better coordination among the defence policies of the member states via the European Defense Agency; on the other hand, it is engaged in an ever increasing number of civilian and military operations abroad.[6] In November 2017, the Permanent Structured Cooperation on security and defence (PESCO) was established in order to improve cooperation on defence and security issues.[7]

In addition to Japan and the European Union, Germany has also been reconsidering its security policy ever since its dream of unification was fulfilled on 3 October 1990. A comprehensive examination of German foreign policy is important in the current *Zeitgeist* because of several factors. First of all, Germany has been one of the least affected countries by the global economic crisis that started in 2008. While some EU countries, like Greece, Portugal and Spain, were experiencing deep economic crisis and

rise of unemployment rates, Berlin continued to grow at stable rates and in fact saw its unemployment figures decrease. Therefore, the economic weight of Germany within the EU and in the world has an increasing trend. Second, because of Brexit, Germany's political weight in the EU will also increase and Berlin administrations will probably play a more leading role in the organisation. Third, recent years have witnessed a flourishing of Germany's role in global affairs. The country has been involved in taking initiatives, starting negotiations and trying to find solutions to regional and global problems on almost every occasion, the best examples being the P5+1 negotiations in the Iranian nuclear crisis and the Russian-Ukrainian conflict.

In addition to Japan and the European Union, Germany has also been reconsidering its security policy ever since its dream of unification was fulfilled on 3 October 1990.

Therefore, because of Germany's rising economic and political clout not only in European, but also in global politics it is worth analysing the dynamics of change and continuity

in Germany's international relations. This article aims to critically examine the evolution of Germany's civilian power characteristics based on three case studies, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Libya, as well as the fight against DAESH.

The concept of "civilian power" was constructed during the Cold War era in order to describe those actors which refrained from using force in their external relations. Although the era of the Cold War was characterized by balance of power and military rivalry between two antagonistic blocs, there were some actors who preferred not to depend on military power in order to have an impact on their neighbourhood and the global system.

The concept of civilian power was first used for the policies of the European Community. It was then extended to the foreign policies of Germany and Japan. All these three actors relied on civilian means in their international relations. They did not become part of any military involvement or conflict. Based upon the military guarantee of mainly the USA, they could devote their financial capacity and intellectual potential to education, health, social security and other areas of civilian public policies. Both Germany and Japan also guaranteed the concept of civilian power in their constitutions as well by banning the use of force and

emphasising peaceful foreign policies. Their notorious histories as aggressive military powers pursuing expansionist policies in their external relations was reconstructed as the "other" and they were thus able to create new identities. In addition to taking lessons from their past, the soft and hard pressure of the Western countries, mainly that of the US, towards democratisation and pacifism, should be taken into consideration as well.

As the bipolar world order came to an end, it was hoped that the newly emerging international system would be more peaceful. The concept of peace dividend became popular and increased the hopes that, as the global system was becoming more civilian, civilian powers such as Germany could consolidate the peaceful nature of their international relations further. However, the regional conflicts starting with the Balkans and the Middle East and the international tension following the terrorist attacks of 9/11 created an unanticipated global turmoil that continues to pose challenges for the civilian powers.

As the bipolar world order came to an end, it was hoped that the newly emerging international system would be more peaceful.

Although German decision makers did try to stick to their role concept created in the late 1940s and the German public was not yet ready to question the peaceful state identity, the international circumstances forced Germany to re-evaluate its traditional foreign policy.

This study will focus on those challenges pushing Germany to reconsider its civilian power identity. As mentioned above, Kosovo, Afghanistan and the current turmoil in the Middle East will be considered as three case studies. In each case, German foreign policy will be analysed in order to understand the continuities and changes. To what extent has Germany been able to maintain its traditional peaceful foreign policy in the new "global disorder" and refrain from use of force is the basic research question of this article. Which factors affect its decision to be involved or not in military interventions in various regional and global conflicts? What does the German case tell us about the evolution of civilian powers in the current global circumstances?

The article will consist of five parts. In the first part, it will provide a conceptual framework to explain the approach of realist constructivism and concept of civilian power. Then, in the second part, it will provide a summary of German foreign policy during the Cold War. Afterwards, in the third part it will consider German foreign policy

towards the war in Kosovo; in the fourth part it will deal with Germany's approach towards the Afghanistan operation; and in the last part it will explain how Germany reacted to the Libya intervention and the struggle against DAESH.

The Conceptual Framework: Realist Constructivism and Civilian Power

Realist constructivism is based on the assumption that classical realism and mainstream constructivism do in fact have many common characteristics. In the International Relations literature realism is associated with power and constructivism is based on norms, values and identities. These two theories are considered to be the opposite of each other. In fact, classical realism does not omit the importance of morality and mainstream constructivism does not deny the importance of power in international relations. Hence, these two approaches can be compatible with each other. Barkin's groundbreaking article argues that a realist constructivist perspective can be a useful approach in studying global politics. In fact, different dimensions of power as well as normative factors affect the state of international relations together. Hence, realist constructivism argues that there can be an interaction between dynamics

of power and norms.[8] This study will benefit from the realist constructivist approach.

> Realist constructivism is based on the assumption that classical realism and mainstream constructivism do in fact have many common characteristics.

Realist constructivism can be an appropriate framework to study contemporary German foreign and security policy. On the one hand, German leaders try to maintain the basic features of classical norms, values and identities; on the other hand the current global power dynamics promote making limited changes in their global approach. Hence, both dynamics of power relations and impact of morality do exist in German foreign policy.

In addition, the concept of civilian power will be useful in studying the current German foreign policy. The notion of "civilian power" was first used with regard to the European Community in the 1970s during the period of *détente*. As being one of the main scenes of the horrors of the two world wars, Europe had to take lessons from its terrible history of the first half of the 20th century. As the main project for the reestablishment

of a durable and positive peace on the continent, the foundation of the European Community (EC) was a big step forward for the de-militarisation of the region.

Hence, it is quite understandable that the first usage of the concept of "civilian power" emerged in the context of the European Community through the academic works of François Duchêne. He argued that the basic strength of the EC was stemming from its civilian characteristics and refraining from military means. Emphasising that "Lacking military power is not the handicap it once was"[9] his main argument was that the EC should concentrate on non-military forms of power, like economic power, and that would be its main strength in global politics.[10]

Stating that "Western Europe could in a sense be the first of the world's civilian centres of power",[11] his idea was that EC could use this power to "domesticate"[12] international relations. According to his view, the EC must try to spread its civilian and democratic values to other actors as well and try to emphasise the understanding of common responsibility for the global problems. In other words, it was argued that the EC's civilian characteristics, i.e. its emphasis on non-military means, like economics, was a great asset for itself and it would have the potential

to civilise the international politics as well. In fact, this was an outstanding conceptual contribution to the literature on the EC during the time in which two blocs were competing with each other in every aspect, including militarily.

The concept was then further developed, clearly defined and transmitted to two countries, namely Germany and Japan, by Hanns W. Maull. In his landmark studies, he elaborated how and why these two countries could be defined as civilian powers. Focusing on the foreign policies of Germany and Japan after the Second World War, he analyzed how the two countries could create peaceful identities despite the fact that they were allied with the Western block.

In Maull's classical definition, the notion of "civilian power" consisted of three basic elements: First, civilian powers should focus on cooperation with other actors in order to realize their aims; second, they use non-military means in their foreign policy, like economics; and third, they are eager to develop supranational institutions meaning that they are ready to share their sovereignty with other actors.[13] Characterising Germany and Japan as "prototypes of a promising future"[14] he argued that their security alliance with the US provided them with the opportunity to develop their non-military potentials.

This study will take this definition of the concept as the basis to be able to analyse whether Germany can still be considered as a civilian actor or not. Historical analysis will be used in the article focusing on both discourse analysis and policy analysis. The next section will provide a brief sketch of German foreign policy after the end of the Second World War till the reunification of Germany in 1990. This historical background is important in order to grasp how the change in global politics in the 1990s and reunification affected German foreign policy and its approach towards the use of force.

German Foreign Policy between 1949 and 1989: "Never Again War"

Situated in the heart of Europe, surrounded by rival states, led by leaders with global ambitions, entering the global political arena by delay because of late unification, German history after 1890 was mainly based on militarism, whose roots dated back to Prussia. With the firm belief that Berlin had the potential to become one of the great powers, the German ruling elite invested substantially in the army, thereby contributing to the emergence of rival blocs and, in the end, to the outbreak of two world wars.

However, the humiliating defeat of the Second World War and the following occupation by the Allied forces led to the construction of a new national and state identity in both East and West Germany. Since East German foreign policy is out of the scope of this paper, this study will only focus on the case of West Germany, namely the Federal Republic of Germany.

> The humiliating defeat of the Second World War and the following occupation by the Allied forces led to the construction of a new national and state identity in both East and West Germany.

First of all, the way that the concept of peace is handled in the German Basic Law (Constitution) will be analysed. In the Basic Law, the notion of peace is mentioned in several places. First, in the Preamble it is stated that Germany has the determination to serve world peace. Then, in the first article, par. 2 on basic rights, it is stated that "inviolable and inalienable human rights" are required in order to have "peace and justice in the world."[15] In Article 8, par. 1 the right of peaceful assembly of the German people is recognized. Article 24, par. 1 states that Germany can transfer its sovereign powers to

international organisations. Par. 2 mentions that the country may enter into an organization of mutual collective security "(i)n order to preserve peace"[16] and this might lead to restrictions on its sovereignty. This article includes the element of supranationalism, one of the elements of civilian power according to Maull. In addition, Article 26, par. 1 focuses on global peace and states that any activity giving harm to world peace is unconstitutional and needs to be punished. The significance of international law is expressed in Article 25; international law will be part of federal law and it will have priority over other laws. In sum, in the legal governance system of the Federal Republic of Germany the notion of "peace" has been given a central place and the idea of supranationalism has been recognized from the very beginning.

The legal reforms were accompanied by other reforms as well. On the one hand, the centralized political structure of the state was replaced by federalism leading to distribution of power, on the other hand economic, educational and other reforms were also carried out in order to create a democratic country and instil a peaceful identity on society.

One might argue that at the time West Germany did not have any alternative other than creating a democratic legal and political system based on internal and external peace. It was under occupation and did not enjoy full sovereignty. The Allies would not have allowed it to resume a militarist foreign policy. However, it should be remembered that this legal framework and foreign policy based on civilian power managed to consolidate itself in the country and found support from all the political parties as well as the German public. Across the spectrum of German politics a consensus was established to create (or recreate) a peaceful foreign policy that might lead to a regaining of respect and trust in regional and global politics. Therefore, although Germany's transition from aggressive to peaceful international politics was painful and dictated by the great powers, its consolidation was rooted in endogenous factors. It was because of its embracement by the wider society that this identity could be sustained. Renouncing the use of force and pursuing a peaceful policy became fundamental pillars of West German foreign policy.

Although Germany's transition from aggressive to peaceful international politics was painful and dictated by the great powers, its consolidation was rooted in endogenous factors.

Westpolitik and *Ostpolitik* became two basic and complementary principles of Bonn's foreign policy, each one based on the notion of creating a peaceful foreign policy. The catastrophic events that Germany lived through were considered as a result of its deficient integration with the West.[17] Therefore, West Germany became a founding member of the Council of Europe and The European Coal and Steel Community. In 1955 it became a member to NATO as well.[18] *Westpolitik* represented a policy of integration with the Western institutions and its participation in the Western bloc during the bipolar environment of the Cold War.

After constructing a peaceful national and state identity and furthering its integration with the Western institutions, West Germany created *Ostpolitik* in order to improve its relations with the Eastern bloc countries as well. As the era of *détente* started leading the way to a warming up of relations between the two rival blocs, Germany's ruling elite under the leadership of Chancellor Willy Brandt started a rapprochement policy with the socialist countries, signing agreements with each of them in order to better political, economic and cultural ties.[19]

Ostpolitik was an important sign of how Germany tries to civilise its relations with the "others" as well.

After consolidating a civilian identity inside and establishing itself a secure place in the Western system, the Bonn administration turned its face to the East. Benefitting from the appropriate international environment it tried to build new bridges with the socialist countries hence contributing to the consolidation of the *détente* in global politics. Therefore, *Ostpolitik* can be considered as an example of an initiative of a civilian power to spread the civilian values in the neighbourhood and across the globe.

In brief, German foreign policy between 1949 and 1989 fulfilled all the conditions for being a civilian power: First, cooperation constituted the main norm in its international relations. Second, it refrained from any use of force and put an emphasis on other forms of power like economics. Third, it also concentrated on supranationalism as experienced in its becoming one of the main founding fathers of the European integration process.

Having provided a brief sketch of historical background of German foreign policy after the Second World War, the next part will analyse the period after the reunification in 1990. After focusing on the main foreign policy debate between supporters of normalisation and liberalisation, case studies will be dealt with, starting with the Kosovo War. Although the Cold

War period witnessed the consolidation of civilian power role, the period of the 1990s brought new challenges.

Germany's Global Politics After Reunification: Old Wine in a New Bottle?

Although the end of the Cold War was characterised by the breakup of some states, like Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union; Germany was the only country that emerged from the Cold War as reunified. As a result of the signing of the The Unification Treaty on 3 October 1990, West and East Germany succeeded to end their separation and continue as a single state. As a now larger, more populated and richer country (despite the financial cost of the initial years) and through realising its historical dream of unification in a peaceful way, "the German question" came to the forefront of intellectual debates. Being able to spread its political regime, economic system, legal structure, norms and values to the former East Germany, some experts argue that in fact what happened in 1990 was not the reunification of two Germanies, but the enlargement of West Germany to the East.[20]

Irrespective of whether it was reunification or enlargement of West Germany, there was an increasing debate both inside and outside on the possible foreign policy path of the new state. This debate can be defined as the Liberalisation-Normalisation debate.[21] Some observers argued that Germany should stick to its national role conception of the Cold War years and hence continue to focus on global partnerships and peace-oriented policies. This approach was named as *liberalisation*. According to the liberalisation supporters, Germany should continue its European path and not deviate from the civilian power orietation. On the other hand, some others argued that it needed to formulate a new identity and new policies that would help the country to normalise. This approach was labelled as *normalisation*. The advocates of normalisation argued that Berlin should try to act like a normal country without letting its history limit itself. This approach also claimed that, like normal countries, Germany should be able to resort to use of force as well if it became necessary.[22] Mearscheimer, for example argued that the reunified Germany would change its course, become a major power and try to acquire nuclear weapons,[23] which in the end did not happen.

> Germany was the only country that emerged from the Cold War as reunified.

However, immediately after the reunification Germany was confronted with new challenges in the realm of foreign policy. The Gulf conflict in 1990-1991 presented one of the first challenges in regional politics. During the US-led intervention into Iraq Germany mainly used checkbook diplomacy and did not take part in the military conflict. The wars of the Yugoslavia dissolution process were another big challenge. The Yugoslavian wars presented an important issue for Germany because of historical burden, geographical closeness and refugee flows.

It could be argued that the liberalisation approach became effective between 1990-1999 until the Kosovo operation. However, the period since 1999 deserves a closer look, which will be the topic of the next section.

The Kosovo War and Germany: Never Again War or Never Again Auschwitz?

As the newly reunited Germany was trying to carry out the reform process to reintegrate with the former East, a conflict erupted in its neighbourhood. Because of its historical burden in Yugoslavia due to its occupation in the Second World War, the existence of Yugoslav guest workers in the country and multilateral ties with Yugoslavia, this conflict created a challenge for Berlin. As the debates on its early recognition of the breakaway republics of Croatia and Slovenia were continuing, the war spread to Bosnia Herzegovina. After the United Nations decided to impose sanctions on the transfer of weapons and ammunition to the warring parties, the Berlin administration decided to send military personnel, aircraft and destroyers to the international peace missions.

As the newly reunited Germany was trying to carry out the reform process to reintegrate with the former East, a conflict erupted in its neighbourhood.

However, as soon as the German government wanted to participate in out-of-area missions, it led to a huge debate within domestic German politics. The German Constitutional Court decided in 1994 that if the following two conditions were fulfilled, Germany could send soldiers to the international missions: First, the operation should be carried out within the framework of collective defence or security; second, for each operation an affirmative simple majority vote of the *Bundestag* (German parliament) is required.[24] As NATO started its military operations against Serbian

targets the following year, Berlin did not take an active part and did not become part of the military campaign. It played a role only behind the scenes by taking part in the observation of the sanctions and in sending humanitarian assistance.

Although Germany did not take part in the NATO operation, still the military experience, political discussions and decision of the German Constitutional Court during the Bosnian War played an important role in the learning process of German foreign policy elites as one step forward in the use of "salami tactics."[25] As the war spread to Kosovo and all the diplomatic initiatives of Germany and other countries were exhausted, NATO carried out an intervention against Serbian targets without an authorisation from the United Nations Security Council in order to pressure the Milosevic regime for a ceasefire.

Despite all the domestic discussions, Germany took an active part in the bombing campaign, hence using force in its foreign policy for the first time since the end of the Second World War.[26] Why? How could Germany with its consolidated civilian power identity participate in a military operation that was not in line with international law (at least in a narrow sense) and in a region in which it faced many historical prejudices because of its past violent

policies? How would it be possible that such a policy was realized by a coalition government consisting of the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) and The Alliance 97/Greens, which were seen as the political actors most favouring peaceful policies, and throughout their history had stayed at arm's length from the use of force.[27]

First of all, German leaders insisted on the claim that all peaceful means had been used and exhausted to end the Kosovo conflict. Despite all the international diplomatic initiatives it was not possible to convince the Milosevic regime to stop the violence against civilians. Chancellor Gerhard Schröder stated that the NATO operation was not a war, but the realisation of a peaceful solution through military means. The German government tried to convince the public that it was not part of power politics, instead it was a humanitarian intervention, meaning that the military campaign was carried out to realise humanitarian objectives and reestablish peace in the region. In other words, it was claimed that sometimes the use of force might be necessary to reinstall peace. During the Cold War German foreign policy was based on two axioms: "never again war" and "never again Auschwitz". But in the case of the Kosovo conflict, applying the two principles simultaneously was not possible. Therefore, the ruling

political elite argued that in order to prevent new cases of Auschwitz, the use of force might become necessary. The relevant debate on the use of force for peaceful purposes led to cleavages both within the SPD and the Greens, however the cleavages were only of a temporary nature.

Another evaluation of the Kosovo intervention was related to the Basic Law as well. In Article 4 it is stated that if the government does not act in compliance with the Constitution, the German people have the right to resist. According to some views this line of thought could be extended to the Kosovo case, implying that even if there was no affirmative resolution of the UNSC, still the intervention could be seen justified because of the fact that what was happening in Kosovo between 1998-1999 was against the basic principles of international law.[28]

One should also emphasise the importance of increasing international expectations from Germany to contribute to dealing with the new global challenges. Checkbook diplomacy would not last forever. The allying countries were expecting Germany to play a greater role in global politics, one that would be in line with its increasing weight.

In the literature it was emphasised that despite its participation in the NATO intervention Germany still

kept intact its basic foreign and security principles and values that had been formulated since 1949.[29] It acted in a multilateral way, cooperating closely with its traditional allies without any hegemonic ambitions. Moreover, it did not favor any kind of expansion of the intervention, stating that there was no intention whatsoever of sending in ground forces.[30]

The Kosovo moment in German foreign and security policy characterised a turning point at which the civilian power identity was reframed according to the new internal and external circumstances.

Still, we would argue that the Kosovo moment in German foreign and security policy characterised a turning point at which the civilian power identity was reframed according to the new internal and external circumstances. The breaking of the taboo on the use of force would have repercussions on future international missions. Although there is high amount of sensitivity in the German public for each and every debate on the use of force, the Pandora's box was opened in March 1999. The fact that it was opened by the most peaceful political parties in

German politics would convince the German public about the necessity and justification of the operation.

Considering the three basic preconditions of civilian power identity, it can be stated that Germany did continue to cooperate with its main allies in the case of the Kosovo conflict. The fundamental nature of its supranationalism was maintained as well. But with regard to instruments of foreign policy, the use of the air force did not fit the definition of civilian power. Therefore, the Kosovo case has shown that under the new global circumstances, if there were humanitarian objectives at stake, and if there was broad support in German internal politics, Berlin could break its taboos with regard to the use of military means. Even if the Kosovo case constituted an exceptional moment in the German post-war history, it led to new debates on civilian actorhood. The Kosovo experience also showed that power and morality can interact with each other in German foreign policy as argued by realist constructivism. Its allies pushed Germany to take more responsibility, and the Berlin administration decided to use force in exceptional circumstances despite maintaining civilian power orientation in general.

After the terrorist attacks of 9/11, German foreign policy again had to face new challenges and take difficult decisions. The Kosovo case may have represented a turning point in German security policy, but the post-9/11 world pushed Germany to take difficult decisions. Germany's approach towards the ISAF operation in Afghanistan would be dealt with in the next section.

A Litmus Test of Civilian Actorhood in Afghanistan

As the 9/11 terrorist attacks shocked the whole world and started a new era in international politics, Germany was one of the countries to declare its full support to the US in its upcoming fight against global terrorism. As its main ally that had provided a comprehensive security umbrella for Germany during the Cold War was attacked by a global terrorist organisation, Germany wanted to give its wholehearted support not only rhetorically, but also through its concrete actions as well. Chancellor Schröder declared his government's "unlimited solidarity" (*uneingeschränkte Solidarität*) with the US in this struggle, however, being conscious of the sensitivities of the German public towards any kind of use of force, he also stated that Germany was ready to take military risks, but Germany was "not available for adventure."[31]

In the case of Iraq, as the US government was preparing for a

military intervention against Iraq, the German coalition government objected to it from the very beginning. Backed by the majority of the German public, the Schröder government opted to not support any military operation against the Baghdad regime since the link between the Iraqi government and Al Qaida could not be substantiated and there was no authorisation from the UNSC. Joining forces with France and some other countries in Europe, Germany experienced an important crisis with the George W. Bush government.[32]

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However in the case of Afghanistan, after the United Nations Security Council authorised the establishment of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in order to provide stability and put an end to the activities of terrorist organisations, the German government wanted to contribute as well by sending soldiers to the region. However, since the SPD-Alliance 90/Greens coalition government had already experienced the domestic difficulties of sending soldiers in the case of the Balkans, it decided to organize a confidence vote in the Bundestag on 16 November 2001 by asking two questions: Should Germany send soldiers to the Afghanistan mission and should the coalition government remain in power? The vote was passed by a slim majority.[33] It is important to look at how the government justified sending soldiers to Afghanistan and what kind of reactions it had from the opposition, mainly the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS).

First of all, it was argued by the coalition government that the Afghanistan mission would mainly be a peace mission. German forces would be deployed to contribute to the reconstruction and stabilisation of Afghanistan. The ISAF mission was considered to be a separate mission from the US military intervention. Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer during the debates at the *Bundestag* stated that it would be a *peace mission*. Second, as emphasised by Prime Minister Schröder, Germany should fulfill its increasing responsibilities in the world since it did regain its full sovereignty with the reunification. The notion of "increasing responsibilities" came to the forefront whenever a new international mission was being discussed on the German political scene. Third, the concept of the partners'

"increasing expectations" was also stated by Schröder. Fourth, despite all the risks and dangers associated with the mission, an understanding emerged that sometimes in order to reach peace and peaceful solutions states have to resort to the use of force. That was an understanding that had emerged with the discussions during the Kosovo War and became influential during the Afghanistan operation as well.

This approach is clearly in line with the assumptions of realist constructivism. The argument that force and morality can not be separated from each other is in accordance with realist constructivism. During the discussions in the Parliament, the coalition government MPs reminded their peers about Germany's successful missions in the Balkans, mainly in Macedonia. Only the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) opposed the mission. The PDS MPs argued that war was the wrong answer to the problem of terror. They claimed that the UN mandate was not clear enough. They reminded their colleagues of the bitter results of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Instead they favoured a mission under Chapter 6 of the UN Charter, focusing on humanitarian aid and peaceful means. Fifth, the persistent claim of German politicians was that participating in the ISAF mission was necessary for protecting Germany's own security as well as global security. Only

if the risks and threats in Afghanistan were dealt with on the ground, it was argued, could Berlin maintain its own security. The then Minister of Defense Peter Struck stated that "the security of the Federal Republic of Germany is today defended at Hindukush as well."[34]

In tracing the discussions on German foreign policy since the early 1990s, it should be noticed that the following concepts have been increasingly used: partner with equal rights in the international society, increasing duties and responsibilities, and increasing expectations. These terms can be considered as evidence of the country's moving closer to normalisation, at least rhetorically.

Germany sent its first contingent of soldiers to the ISAF mission in January 2002. In February 2003 German troops together with Dutch troops overtook ISAF leadership for six months. Over time Germany established Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) in Kundus and Faisabad, hence concentrating its mission in the North. In 2006 Germany became the leader of the regional commando in the north of Afghanistan. During these first years, German troops were mainly focusing on reconstruction activities and training of Afghan security forces.

However, as the security situation in Afghanistan worsened by 2007

because of the rising control of the Taliban, Germany's position became much more difficult to preserve. From 2007 onwards, German soldiers had to be involved in counter-insurgency measures that would be impossible to associate with the concept of civilian power. As a result of the deteriorating security situation, German special forces were forced to get involved in the fight against the Taliban, which had not been foreseen when German soldiers were sent there in 2002. Hence, a German military mission seen as a *stabilisation force* turned into a *combat force* within five years. Over the years the number of German soldiers increased from 1,200 to 5,350, making Germany the third biggest military force in the ISAF.

As the security situation in Afghanistan worsened by 2007 because of the rising control of the Taliban, Germany's position became much more difficult to preserve.

As a result of such growth and changes, the concerns and criticisms of the German public towards the Afghan operation increased tremendously, as the public was not ready to face such a challenge. At the very beginning when the German government was

sending the soldiers to the area, the main discourse of the ruling political elite was based on the idea of a peace mission that was foreseen to contribute to the stabilisation and reconstruction of the country as well as training of the Afghan security forces. However, at the end of the day, the Taliban's resurgence and its rising control over different parts of the country radically changed the circumstances in which the German mission had to operate.

In fact, the Afghanistan mission contributed to the evolution of German security doctrine. In the White Book of the Defence Ministry published in 2006 the concept of "networked security" ("Vernetzte Sicherheit") was developed, meaning that security should include different elements, not only military, but also societal, economic, environmental and cultural factors. Security does not concern just national, but also international level as well.[35]

As the fragile situation in Afghanistan got worse, the challenges for the German mission got bigger. It was stated that the German mission deployed in Kundus received intelligence claiming that two of NATO's fuel trucks had been hijacked by the Taliban and were going to be used in a suicide attack. As a result, a senior German officer ordered two American jets to carry out an airstrike on the area on 4 September

2009. The strikes led to the death of many people. The exact number is not known, but according to different sources the number of casualties was between 90-142, many of them civilians.[36] It was later understood that the intelligence did not reflect the truth. German leaders did not recognise the civilian casualties in the first days, but as the truth became explicit, German Chief of Staff Wolfgang Schneiderhan stated that "Now we have lost our innocence."[37]

The Kundus affair became a bitter military fault for Germany, leading to questioning its early hope that on the ground in Afghanistan it would be the missions of other countries that would deal with hard threats whereas Germany would mainly contribute to civilian and humanitarian activities.[38] That was not the case. In a fragile country such as Afghanistan, any mission could encounter any threat at any time. Hence, the German leaders' "defensive mindset" became much more questioned as a result of the Kundus affair.[39] A good example of this change can be observed in the definition of the German mission. As the then Minister of Foreign Affairs Joschka Fischer stated on 22 December 2001 in the German Parliament on the day of voting to send the German soldiers to the ISAF mission, it was a "peace mission" ("Friedensmission"),[40] however, Chancellor Angela Merkel, in her declaration after the Kundus strike, used the concept of "combat mission" ("Kampfeinsatz")[41] to describe the German mission. This was an important rhetorical change for the leadership of a country mainly characterised as a civilian power for half a century.

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Even after the Kundus debacle Germany continued its mission within ISAF, as Merkel in the declaration after the strike emphasised that German soldiers were acting together with partner countries and the mission itself was contributing to German security as well as global security against the threat of global terrorism, while at the same time conveying her sorrow over the incident.[42] About 2½ months after the incident, the Labor Minister Franz Josep Jung, who was Defence Minister at the time of the incident, and Chief of Staff Wolfgang Schneiderhan, both resigned.[43]

The mission in Afghanistan continued to have a considerable impact on German politics in the following years as well. In May 2010, German President Horst Köhler led to an outburst of criticism during his visit to Afghanistan when he made the following statement:

> "A country of our size, with its focus on exports and thus reliance on foreign trade, must be aware that… military deployments are necessary in an emergency to protect our interests… for example when it comes to trade routes, for example when it comes to preventing regional instabilities that could negatiely influence our trade, jobs and incomes".[44]

His speech was criticised by wider segments of the German public with the accusation that he was supporting a military mission for the purpose of Berlin's economic interests. Until that time German leaders had been justifying the decision to be part of the ISAF mission by putting furward security needs, protection of the country from threats of global terrorism, and Berlin's increasing international responsibilities. It was for the first time that a German leader was explaining German's role in ISAF via its economic interests. The idea of using an international mission to furher

Germany's economic activities was not in compliance with its traditional role conception. As a result of heavy criticisms, Köhler had to resign from his post. For the first time in German history a foreign mission of the German army led to the resignation of three high-level officials, the President, the Labor (and former Defence) Minister, and the Chief of Staff.

As a result of German soldiers' participation in counter insurgency operations, German leaders felt the need to change their rhetoric. In 2010 Defence Minister Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg talked about "war-like conditions" in Afghanistan.[45] It was the first time a German minister was mentioning the concept of *war* in the case of the ISAF operation and hence acknowledging the facts on the ground. Hence, the rhetoric of German leaders was changing from emphasising the peacefulness of international missions to referencing the "war-like" conditions on the ground.

Since the 1990s, German decision makers began having to reconsider the instruments of foreign policy with every global challenge. As the traditional peaceful means of the Cold War, such as diplomacy, economics and culture, were not enough to solve the new types of problems, and as its global allies had increased expectations from the reunified Germany, Germany

had to reformulate how it would act in the realm of global politics. After securing the legal background for sending soldiers to international missions during the Bosnian War, the conflict in Kosovo played a historical role for actual direct participation in an international intervention, and afterwards, the Afghanistan mission became Germany's first counter-insurgency operation.

However, it was a thorny path, since every time the Bundeswehr became involved, it led to hot debates in internal politics and faced domestic criticism. Even in cases when the majority of the German public believed that military intervention would be necessary to solve a conflict, their view on the participation of German soldiers in these missions was negative.

The ISAF mission resulted in a rethinking of how to reformulate Germany's interests, responsibilities and actorhood under the new international circumstances in which global terrorism was becoming an ever increasing threat.

As the ISAF mission had to face increasing challenges with the rise

of Taliban power, "the culture of restraint"[46] saw greater impact. The Kosovo operation was relatively short and succeeded in having a lasting impact of stabilisation and a return to peace without leading to any German casualties. The ISAF experience, on the other hand, presented a different and more difficult experience. Starting as a peace mission it turned into a combat mission leading to the deaths of more than 50 German soldiers, recreating a culture of remembrance and martyrdom. Therefore, the ISAF mission resulted in a rethinking of how to reformulate Germany's interests, responsibilities and actorhood under the new international circumstances in which global terrorism was becoming an ever increasing threat.

Meanwhile, German leaders tried to play a "double game" during the ISAF mission as they aimed to show their allies that Germany had started undertaking responsibilities towards global challenges, at the same time they did their best to make the German public believe that ISAF was in fact an humanitarian mission.[47]

German leaders emphasised that the country was gaining more weight, thereby more responsibilities, that the use of military means was possible in the case of exhaustion of all peaceful instruments, and it would like to act in alliance with partners. However,

the case of Afghanistan showed very bitterly that all this was easier said than done. As the then Defense Minister Thomas de Maizière stated, to establish a security structure and sustainable peace in post-conflict Afghanistan was a complicated process. He also drew attention to the following change in Germany's policy towards Afghanistan during 12 years of Germany's participation in the ISAF mission:

> "Afghanistan has triggered a learning process. While a western-style democracy used to be the objective at the beginning, the task at hand now- after many, sometimes painful years- is to empower the people in Afghanistan to preserve at least a minimum of peace in their country themselves."[48]

De Maizière's statement provides a critical account of the change in German perception of the Afghan mission from an ambitious one to a minimal one.

Hence, as opposed to the Kosovar case, it would be possible to draw the following lesson from the Afghanistan case: Even if Germany acts in line with international law, cooperates with its partners, uses force only as last resort after trying peaceful means, still that does not guarantee that the mission will be successful. Especially after the worsening of security in the country,

the ISAF mission turned into "mission impossible" and could not achieve the aim of creating a stable and secure Afghanistan. Therefore, the issue of use of force when confronted with security challenges continued to become ever more problematic. Therefore, even if the cooperative nature of German foreign policy behaviour continued and supranationalism persisted, the use of combat force that sometimes led to civilian casualties created a further debate on the civilian foreign policy identity. However, the lessons drawn from the Afghan mission led to a questioning of effectiveness and success of international military missions in fragile countries.

Even if Germany acts in line with international law, cooperates with its partners, uses force only as last resort after trying peaceful means, still that does not guarantee that the mission will be successful.

Another important point is the emerging gap between politicians' discourses and public perception. Although German leaders' official declarations and statements draw attention to the rise of Germany and the expected normalisation of its policies,

the same change can not be seen in the public attitude. The German public is still very concerned and suspicious towards the use of force. Therefore, it might be possible to mention the emerging normalisation of political discourse versus the preservation of liberalism and peace-dominance of the public attitude. It is to be seen how this gap between politicians and public will evolve in the foreseeable future.

The German public remained cautious towards military missions especially when they continued for a longer period of time and involved casualties. As the surveys proved, German public support for the ISAF mission decreased tremendously after the German army was involved in combat missions. In 2005 64% of Germans supported ISAF, in 2010 it decreased to 44%, and in 2011 to 37%, almost half of the initial support.[49] According to another survey that same year, only 22% of the German public supported the participation of German soldiers in ISAF.[50]

It is also worth noting that a majority of the German public thinks some international military missions are necessary and they should be carried out. But they think that Germany should not be part of them and should not send any soldiers. For example, according to one survey, in the case of Libya, 62% of the German public supported an intervention against the regime of Muammar al Qaddafi, with only 31% opposed. However, 65% of those surveyed rejected any possible German involvement in military mission, with only 29% approving it.[51]

Figure 1: Factors affecting the decision making process in Germany with regard to missions involving use of force

Meanwhile, as the Afghanistan operation was continuing, Germany undertook an important reform in 2011 with regard to its military by putting an end to the system of conscription and paving the way for a voluntary army. Following the example of other Western countries that had already abolished the draft years years earlier, German leaders were aiming to reduce the number of soldiers and make the army more efficient. German soldiers' increasing global involvement and need for professionals in these international missions paved the way for this comprehensive reform. Schulte, an expert on defense issues stated that "After the end of the Cold War, we don't need mass armies any more. And if you send your soldiers into harms way like in Afghanistan or at the Gulf of Aden, where people are on anti-piracy patrol, you do need professionals."[52] Hence, the Bundeswehr's increasing global entanglements led to a substantial reform.

> Germany undertook an important reform in 2011 with regard to its military by putting an end to the system of conscription and paving the way for a voluntary army.

After analysing German participation in the ISAF and its meaning for its civilian actor role, the next section will shed light on German policy towards the turmoil in the Middle East that started as the "Arab Spring" but turned into Arab Uprisings.

Arab Uprisings: Returning to Limbo

This section will examine how German foreign policy makers behaved towards the uprisings in the Middle East after 2010 and to understand whether there was a continuation or change of the policy implemented in Kosovo and Afghanistan where we have observed that there was a cooperation with the Western allies.

In fact, the Middle East has not been a priority area of German foreign policy, which instead mainly focused on Europe and its periphery after the Second World War. The Middle East, as a region in which great powers have made their historical weight felt, did not offer much maneuvring room for Berlin. Since Germany was not one of the colonizing countries of the region, it did not have the historical interests and ties that some of its partners like France and the United Kingdom have. From Berlin's perspective, the energy relationship with Middle Eastern countries and sensitive ties with Israel have become the main pillars of its attitude.

As the first social movements started in Tunisia and then in Egypt, the Berlin administration supported the democratisation of the regional countries and called the leaders of those countries to listen to the protestors and not resort to violence. However, as the situation became more complicated, Berlin had to begin rethinking its policies.

> As the first social movements started in Tunisia and then in Egypt, the Berlin administration supported the democratisation of the regional countries.

As the protest movements spread from Tunisia to Libya, they were met with the violence of the Muammar Qadhafi administration. When he tried to quell the protests against his dictatorial regime, the situation turned into a conflict and then a civil war. As the number of civilian casualties started to rise, the human tragedy and ensuing disorder was referred to the United Nations Security Council, in which Germany was a non-permanent member. As the voting took place on 17 March 2011, 10 members of the UNSC voted affirmatively to intervene in Libya to stop the violence in accordance with Chapter 7 of the UN Charter. Germany abstained from voting

together with four other members.[53] Hence, Berlin, on this occasion, did not act together with its historical allies, like the UK, the US and France. Interestingly enough it voted together with many BRIC countries. How can we explain the fact that Germany was separating itself from its Western allies and finding a common path with the emerging countries of the global North and South despite its bandwagoning in the previous cases of Kosovo and Afghanistan?

In fact, the case of Libya is a clear evidence that Germany's policies towards the use of force would not proceed in a linear way,[54] instead it will be full of ups and downs. In each and every case with regard to resort to military means German decision makers would consider the domestic and international circumstances, compliance with international law, the possibility of civilian casualties as well as casualties on the side of the Bundeswehr, in addition to availability of an exit strategy.

In the case of Libya, the turmoil started at a time when the German mission was already experiencing difficulties within ISAF, leading to an important decline in the support of the German public towards the operation in Afghanistan. Hence, as a result of increasing public concerns towards military missions, German leaders were extremely

sensitive about the idea of starting a new operation.

Five reasons can account for Germany's lack of support towards a military intervention in Libya. First of all, as stated above, the German public was becoming ever more apprehensive about sending German soldiers abroad because of the increasing difficulties and failures experienced in the Afghanistan mission. As a democratic country, politicians were affected by the changing public mood.

Second, the fact that every military operation involved the risk of civilian casualties led to concerns on the part of Berlin. Although an international operation under UN mandate would target military installments of the Qaddafi regime, it would possibly lead to civilian casualties that would make it more difficult to explain military involvement to the German public.

Third, the fact that it was not only Libya that was engulfed in turmoil, but Bahrain, Egypt and Syria which were also experiencing similar protest movements, led to further concern among German decision makers. What if the domino effect would occur and violent conflicts would continue to spread? Would it be possible to intervene in each and every conflict? Did these interventions carry any chance of durable success?

Fourth, the lack of a clear exit strategy and concerns with regard to the effectiveness of a military solution to the complicated problems in Libya constituted another reason for German abstention. Having in mind not only the debacle in Afghanistan but also failures resulting from the occupation of the US-led coalition in Iraq were also remembered in the German capital. Peter Wittig, the then German Ambassador to the United Nations stated the following:

> "Decisions on the use of military force are always extremely difficult to take. We have carefully considered the options of using military force, its implications as well as its limitations. We see great risks. The likelihood of large scale loss of life should not be underestimated. If the steps proposed turn out to be ineffective, we see the danger of being drawn into a protracted military conflict that would affect the wider region. We should not enter a military confrontation on the optimistic assumption that quick results with few casualties will be achieved. Germany, therefore, has decided not to support a military intervention."[55]

The then Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle also stated that it was

wrong to consider using military instruments everytime there is injustice in North Africa or in Arabia.[56]

Fifth, Libya did not have close economic and political ties with Germany, hence it was not one of the priorities of German global politics.

The other conflict that will be examined under this section is the Syrian Civil War and the fight against DAESH in the Middle East. The involvement of the external actors like the US and Russia converted the Syrian conflict into a multilateral one. Germany did not join the global coalition against DAESH at the beginning when the coalition was established in September 2014, because of its traditional value-based foreign policy and its negative stance against democracy through interventions. According to Germany's view, democracy should be found and initialized gradually by inside forces to become successful.[57]

However, Germany's position has changed as a result of refugee influxes from the region to the EU countries and terrorist attacks operated by DAESH militants in the main European cities. Germany became part of the coalition in December 2015. The terrorist attacks in Paris in November 2015 played an important role in Germany's decision to join. Germany joined the conflict indirectly at the first phase via giving arms and providing training to

Iraqi Kurdish peshmerges to help their fight against DAESH.[58] Although this policy was criticized because of the news claiming these weapons were sold on the black market, Germany maintained its policy. Germany sent renaissance aircraft and soldiers to İncirlik base in Turkey to give support to the fight against DAESH, but it was not involved in direct confrontation.[59] In addition, Germany initiated a transformation partnership program to help the regional countries via giving support to projects.

Hence, Germany's position during the Libya intervention and fight against DAESH represents a step back policy and has parallels with the classical civilian power role. Germany did shy away from military intervention in Libya and dared to break away from its traditional allies. In the fight against DAESH it is not involved in combat operations, but mainly contributes to the surveillance role. Therefore, it can be stated that on every occasion German leaders have considered to use the instrument of force very carefully, considering international law, domestic concerns, past experiences, and the possibility of an exit strategy. The normalisation of German attitudes did not represent a finished story. Although German leaders gave signals of *normalisation*, the majority of the German public still favours *liberalisation*.

Table 1: Military Expenditure and its share of Germany's GDP since 1990

Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database: https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex (last visited 20 December 2017).

Table 2: German Arms Exports and its ranking in the World since 1990

Source: SIPRI Arms Transfer Database https://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers last visited 20 December 2017).

Considering all three case studies it can be stated that Germany's classical civilian power role has evolved considerably since the 1990s mainly because of the shifts in the global system and emergence of new challenges, like ethnic conflicts and global terrorism. Both decisionmakers and the public still give priority to non-military means in the solution of the problems, but when all other means are exhausted and humanitarian causes are at stake, then a consensus can emerge in German politics to send German soldiers and military equipment abroad. In other words, the decision depends on the definition of German interests under the current circumstances. Therefore, it can be stated that Berlin is evolving into a realist civilian power using force when it seems appropriate or when it is forced by the external conditions. As shown in Table 1 above, in deciding whether or not to use instruments of force the following factors are being taken into consideration: Are all the civilian means exhausted in the solution of the conflict? Do military means have a chance to bring a solution in the foreseeable future? Are there humanitarian causes that are being harmed by the conflict? What do the German public and main political parties think about it? What are the expectations of the other countries, mainly those of allies? Considering all these issues, German policymakers try to come up with a decision.

> Germany's classical civilian power role has evolved considerably since the 1990s mainly because of the shifts in the global system and emergence of new challenges.

Table 2 depicts Germany's military expenditures, showing that although military expenditures have increased since early 2000, their place in terms of GDP almost remains the same. Meanwhile, with regard to arms exports Germany is ranked third. It can be argued that there is a discrepancy between civilian power identity and its arms exports. The interplay between force and morality, as realist constructivists claim, needs to be further studied in light of Germany's high ranking in global arms sales.

In Lieu of Conclusion

Ever since the end of the reunification process, Germany's attitude in the global politics has attracted much more attention in the literature and the expectations of its allies have been increasing. In an era of global ambiguity, the rise of alternative security issues, and the increasing importance of non-state actors, Berlin administrations have tried to find a way to reframe the classical role conception of civilian

power that had dominated German foreign policy since 1949.

> In an era of global ambiguity, the rise of alternative security issues, and the increasing importance of non-state actors, Berlin administrations have tried to find a way to reframe the classical role conception of civilian power.

The process of adoption to new circumstances still continues, however a balance sheet can be drawn by reconsidering the 28 years since unification. This article tried to understand whether Germany can still be considered to concentrate on civilian instruments, when it is confronted with new challenges.

In the case of Kosovo and Afghanistan Germany mainly allied with its partners and dared to use the instrument of force. The NATO air operation during the Kosovo War continued for 2½ months and did not lead to any German casualties (although it resulted in civilian casualties in Kosovo). Therefore, it did not lead to a major discussion in the German public afterwards. Since it was the first instance of German soldiers using force after the Second World War, it was an important turning point.

Table 3: Summary of Three Case Studies and German foreign policy

	Scope	Perception in Germany	Compliance with international law	Exit strategy from German perspective	German decision
Kosovo	NATO intervention	Humanitarian causes	No UNSC Resolution	Clear	Participation
Afghanistan	First UN, then NATO mission	Humanitarian causes and eradication of global terror threat	UNSC Resolution	Not clear	Participation
Libya	NATO intervention	Geopolitical interests of Western countries	UNSC Resolution	Clear	No participation

The case of the Afghanistan mission turned out to be a greater challenge because of the complexity of the problems on the ground. An international operation starting as a peace mission was transformed into a real combat mission and German soldiers had to be involved in counter-insurgency operations. As the mission lasted for 12 years, the support of the German public tremendously decreased, especially after 2007 during which time the Taliban started regaining control over certain territories. This mission also overshadowed the civilian actorhood of Berlin.

The Arab uprisings constituted an important landmark, showing that evolution of German security policy will not be straightforward, instead it will be full of ups and downs. Going back to its former role conception of civilian power, the Merkel administration did not approve the NATO operation in Libya and gave only surveillance support to the fight against DAESH.

The paper argues that although the case of Germany showed that a civilian power could try to reframe its role in global politics and adopt to changing circumstances in accordance with realist constructivism, the evolution does not have to follow a smooth path and could be full of ups and downs. Each experience, successful or bitter, provides feedback for the formulation of policy towards new challenges. Therefore, Germany's new national role conception can be called a *realist civilian power* since it decides on each case considering internal and external conditions and its own interests. Its attempts to preserve a civilian power role in general and its concern towards being part of military missions at the same time are in line with realist constructivism.

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Second, the paper also claims that in the German case there is a gap between the perspectives of politicians and the public. Although many of the mainstream political parties do favour use of force as a last resort, the German public is still wary of the effectiveness and morality of using force. In addition, a majority of Germans are against greater involvement of their country in international affairs. According to

surveys by the Körber Foundation, while 62% of Germans approved greater German involvement in global politics in 1994, the rate of support dropped to 34% in 2015. Although the figure rose to 41% in 2016, still the majority thinks otherwise despite all the appeals by German policymakers, from Gauck and Steinmeier to Merkel, von der Leyen and de Maiziere, to take more responsibilities worldwide.[58] In addition, only 13% of the public approves of the use of force in foreign policy.[59] It seems that the *partial normalisation* of German foreign policy does not have any major impact on the 'liberal' and 'civilian' German public.

This article, based on the case study of Germany, has showed that traditional civilian powers may have a tendency to reframe their national roles depending upon changes in the global system and on the emergence of new security problems that can not be solved by classical peaceful means. However, this process of evolution is not smooth and may create important problems inside the country because of the opposition of different political actors. Especially when the use of military force does not bring about expected outcomes in the short or medium term, this might have a tendency to make things more complicated. The article also argued

that the evolution of German foreign and security policy can be understood through a realist constructivist approach because of the interplay between morality and power.

As the global tensions continue in different parts of the world, it is worth observing German foreign behaviour in the future since Germany enjoys a higher standing in regional as well as global governance. Whether German foreign policy orientations will give any inspiration to other countries in its neighbourhood is an important research question. Would its possible attitude, civilian or military, towards different challenges be taken as a model or case of inspiration by other countries? That would be an interesting question to be analysed by looking at different case studies comparing German foreign policy with that of other countries.

Another point of interest for further studies would be how Germany reconciles its identity of civilian actorhood with its becoming the third biggest arms exporter in the world, with 23% of its arms exports going to the Middle East, a region where there are ongoing violent conflicts.[60] The relationship between civilian identity and trade interests is another topic to be analysed.

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Assessing the Role of Trade in the Formation of Turkey's Civilian Power in Africa

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Abstract

This paper attempts to assess the civilian character of Turkey's political economy in sub-Saharan Africa with a special focus on its trade policy towards African countries. It also seeks to explore the degree to which its trade policies towards the continent contribute to the construction of a civilian foreign policy. Additionally, this study delves into the linkages between "power and trade" and between "civilian power and trade". Assuming that Turkey is not usually conceived as a traditional civilian power in the IR literature and political debates, this paper aims to fill the lacuna in the existing literature focusing on the impact of trade on the making of civilian power. Applying Maull's three-faceted framework of civilian power characteristics (cooperation, use of economic means, development of supranational structures), this study concludes that in Turkey's emerging "civilian power" objectives, trade's role is larger in the use of economic means for securing national goals and cooperation in the pursuit of international objectives than in the development of supranational structures for international management level.

Key Words

Civilian Power, Trade Power, Turkey-Africa Relations, Turkey's Trade Policies, Civilian Power-Trade Nexus.

Introduction

This paper attempts to assess the civilian character of Turkey's political economy in sub-Saharan Africa (hereafter Africa) with a special focus on its trade policy towards African countries. It also seeks to explore the degree to which these trade policies contribute to the construction of a civilian foreign policy

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and actorness. As one of the composing elements of civilian power, trade has the capacity to strengthen interdependence and cooperation among countries and to engender changes in countries' structural power and international influence. The ways countries derive their international power at both the normative and civilian levels and their capability to build an effective interconnectedness among different policy and influence areas continue to require deep investigation in IR on both analytical and empirical grounds. In addition, this study delves into the linkages between "power and trade" and between "civilian power and trade".

Acknowledging that trade is an influential power maximizer and legitimizer, this paper is structured around the following research questions: In which way(s) has trade affected Turkey's civilian power capacity in Africa since the 2000s? How has Turkey's trade power impacted the way it has grounded its emerging civilian power in an era marked by regional uncertainties and global anxieties? What are the opportunities and challenges Turkey has faced in developing its civilian power in Africa through trade? Can the trade and civilian components of a foreign policy be successively and effectively merged?

As Turkey has not traditionally been conceived of as a civilian power in the

IR literature and political debates, this paper aims to fill the lacunae in the existing literature by analytically and empirically focusing on the impact of trade on the creation and display of a civilian foreign policy. There are relatively few studies which focus on the link between trade and its effects on Turkish foreign policy within different geographies even though a flourishing literature focusing on the EU's external policy and trade exists. The main novelty of this paper is to conceptually comprehend the correlation between "civilian" and "trade" in terms of inputs and outputs and second to empirically analyze the specific case of Turkey's African trade policy in the 2000s. Another important novelty of this paper is to use "trade" as a foreign policy tool on empirical grounds by employing different sets of data. Thus, this paper goes beyond the descriptive nature of the existing literature on Turkey's African engagement.

Against this background, the first part of this study will explain the Civilian Power-Trade Nexus on a methodological ground with insights from the civilian power literature in EU studies. Here the paper first provides an explanation of civilian power together with its common characteristics, as well as its associated patterns such as the ideal role of civilian foreign policy. Second, it delves into exploring the civilian-trade nexus through

interactions and interdependence, which serves in constructing states both "civilian" and "trade" powers. In the second part, the driving factors of Turkey's African engagement since the 2000s will be explained in terms of its foreign policy preferences and trade motives. In the third part, the way in which Turkey engaged in constructing civilian power through trade will be analyzed with reference to empirically grounded research data on trade volumes, mutual diplomatic visits and other complementary figures in the 2000s and on the basis of Maull's three civilian power characteristics: *cooperation in the pursuit of international objectives; economic means for securing national goals;* and *the development of supranational structures for international management.*

Civilian Power-Trade Nexus

From "Civilian" to "Civilian Power": A Contested Term in Nature

As a highly-contested term in the IR literature in general and EU studies in particular, "civilian" signifies a civilian approach to international politics expressed by states' commitment to democracy, rule of law, material prosperity, multilateralism,

supranational cooperation, development cooperation, respect for human rights, peaceful resolution of conflicts, trade, and democracy promotion. According to François Duchene, who first introduced the term "civilian power" in the 1970s with reference to the European Economic Community, Europe has the ability and capability to "domesticate relations between states" by promoting its own model of political economy and integration to the entire world.[1] Although Duchene's conceptualization lacks a clear explanation of the means and the nature of "civilian power",[2] it introduced a highly and continuously debated topic to IR and European-centric studies and opened up space at the empirical level for future case studies.[3] The concept was soon approached by other IR scholars who enriched its conceptual framework. Hanns Maull[4] reinterpreted the concept and applied it to Germany and Japan, two countries with anti-militarist cultural and political identities[5]. In that article, defining civilian powers as states eager to "take initiatives and exercise influence over events, and which use particular strategies and instruments to achieve their objectives",[6] Maull described the three main characteristics of civilian powers as:[7] i) the acknowledgement of the necessity of *cooperation* with others for pursuing international objectives; ii) the use of *nonmilitary,* particularly

economic means, to secure national goals; and iii) the willingness to *develop supranational structures* to address critical issues of the international environment.

Grounded on these three characteristics of civilian powers, Maull defines three objectives of civilian powers: (i) willingness to civilize international relations; (ii) willingness to transfer sovereignty to supranational institutions as a promoter of collective security; and (iii) willingness to establish a civilized international order based on equality, justice and tolerance.[8] Maull also attempts to present civilian power as a foreign policy. In that vein, he draws the boundaries of an ideal type of civilian foreign policy role,[9] a specific national role conception essentially designed on the basis of German and Japanese post-war foreign policies. As introduced by Hanns Maull and categorized by Tewes,[10] three main features characterize this abstract ideal type or prototype of a civilian foreign policy role: *domestic preconditions*; *normative commitments*; and *power instruments.* Under this three-layered classification, trade is also considered one of the power instruments to be used by an ideal type civilian power to strengthen its civilian foreign policy role and identity.

As stated by Ian Manners, Maull's three civilian power objectives mainly aim to "civilize" international relations by developing international law, international institutions and democracy.[11] For Manners, one of the most significant commonalities of the various civilian power definitions is that they prioritize the possession of economic power and/or the use of non-military, especially economic, instruments.[12] Aside from this common acknowledgement of the centrality of "economic power" as a prerequisite of being a civilian power, contradictions and academic debates exist with regards to whether or not the concept also encompasses the use of coercive instruments, including military ones.[13] Like Hedley Bull's criticism of Duchene's "civilian power Europe", Stelios Stavridis also rejects the emphasis of the non-military in the definition, arguing that as the output is more important than the choice of military or non-military means used to diffuse human rights and democracy to other countries.[14]

One of the most significant commonalities of the various civilian power definitions is that they prioritize the possession of economic power and/or the use of non-military, especially economic, instruments.

Trade as an Instrument of Civilian Power

Trade has the potential to both construct and legitimize states' power on the world scene. However, states should follow some principles and guidelines in order to create a "civilian" impact through trade. Of course, trade cannot alone increase states' capacity to build up an efficient and multifunctional civilian foreign policy role. In practice however, it has the ability to structurally shape states' foreign policies and can play the role of an accelerator of multilateralism and influence diffuser through commercial deals and diverse multilateral platforms in the long term.[15] Together with the three civilian power determinants, trade can easily be coordinated with the foreign policies of states aiming to pursue "civilian" goals.

On the other hand, it is difficult to argue that all trade powers can be defined as one of Maull's three civilian power types. Departing from this, as a constitutive element of civilian power, trade has a transformative capacity to strengthen political-economic interactions among states.[16] In this sense, if coordinated successfully with foreign policies of states and positively perceived by the international society as a new source of influence in a civilized international system, trade and trade

power can perform as mutually constructing patterns for states' evolving civilian foreign policy role. The trade-civilian nexus can only be truly exploited and merged if they feed each other practically and ideologically. This means that trade power derived from trade is generally expected to act as a force for good and to increase political cooperation among states. Beyond this, trade may also help states increase their credibility and legitimacy as a global "civilian actor", only if other components of civilian actorness such as domestic preconditions, normative commitments and other power instruments including democracy promotion, development cooperation and mediation are included in the construction of the role of civilian power as functioning factors.

In addition, it is difficult for some states lacking an inherent and historical "civilian" orientation in their policies, identities and culture to turn trade power into civilian power. States' efforts to promote trade must also go hand in hand with their civilian appeal and, as explained above, civilian and trade should be juxtaposed with both the historical past and the current situation of countries. Acknowledging that constructing a civil power role requires time and empirical evidence together with supporting discourses, an intertwined trade-civilian approach seems to be indispensable for states to

successfully realize their international political economy engagements in different geographies.

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As a rising power, Turkey tends to use its trade policies as a soft power instrument that boosts the ground on which Turkey's civilian power actorness emerges on the shoulder of NGOs, humanitarian relief and aid volunteers and workers, as well as private businesspeople. In this sense, Africa is one of the most important regions to Turkey's growing and expanding civilian-reach. Turkey's designation of its trade policies in Africa is therefore an apt area to study Turkish civilian power characteristics within a trade-civilian power nexus.

Driving Factors of Turkey's African Trade Policy

There are several factors that drive Turkish engagement with Africa.

Changes in the nature of international politics must first be considered. As the iron cloud of the Cold War was replaced by a multilateral and multi-actor international system, regional and rising powers gained more freedom to set up their own foreign policy priorities and agendas. With advancements in transportation and communication technologies, investment, the globalization of capital and trade, and the economic crisis and slowdowns in the West since the 2008 financial crisis, economic and political engagement with neglected countries and regions has become more relevant and prevalent in the foreign policy terrain of rising powers. In this international climate, Turkey has its own economic, political, cultural and altruistic reasons to engage with Africa. Turkey's geographic proximity to Africa, shared anti-colonial discourse and religious and cultural ties with the region are also driving factors.[17] Rhetorically, Turkey has played the roles of anti-colonial solidarity, natural partner and benevolent protector within Africa to enhance its standing and position.[18] Domestically, as Turkey grew economically and its social structures shifted with an emerging new type of middle class, the Turkish private business sector, to fulfill a need for new markets, extended its interests in Africa much earlier than the Turkish state did. One of the major indicators

of a robust and dynamic economy is the increasing middle class which is also an important catalyzer of changing foreign policy in the Turkish case over the last several years. Turkish governments have coorporated with the so-called "Anatolian tigers" to find new markets in return for their electoral and ideological supports.[19] In a similar way, due to religious, humanitarian, cultural and altruistic sentiments, Turkish civil society brought aid to Africa much earlier than did the state apparatus.

In this international climate, Turkey has its own economic, political, cultural and altruistic reasons to engage with Africa.

Turkey has increased its embassy presence from 12 to 39 over the last decade. In a similar direction, African ambassadorial presence in Turkey has increased from 10 in 2008 to 32 in 2015. The Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TİKA) operates in dozens of countries and has established offices in 15 countries in the Middle East and Africa. Turkish Airlines has become the largest network in Africa among foreign carriers, overtaking Air-France and Emirates by flying to more than 57 destinations across 30 countries on the continent.[20] Visa waiver agreements between Turkey

and Botswana, Morocco, South Africa, Libya, Mauritius, Swaziland, Seychelles and Tunisia have been implemented while a visa easing agreement allowed for visa processing at the border gate in Kenya, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania and Zambia. Turkey has provided a substantial number of scholarships to African students with the intention of increasing its cultural ties. Religion is also one of the motivating factors and tools of Turkish policy and discourse in Africa.[21] Turkish civil society has also initiated a number of activities, from providing humanitarian assistance to establishing educational and vocational trainings and orphanage centers. Turkish business people and NGOs have made significant investments in Africa. All of these activities in the form of trade, business relations, investment, humanitarian aid and educational/ vocational support in the continent are critical in shaping Turkey's new foreign policy agenda towards Africa. Through these civilian means and tools, Turkey has constructed a new moral enterprise towards Africa drawing upon historical, religious, cultural and identical connections giving way for a new type of Turkish moral, humanitarian and altruistic mission in global affairs.[22]

Both state and non-state actors in Turkey focus on humanitarian aid in Africa as a niche diplomacy area and use development and humanitarian

aid as an entry point into African affairs.[23] Africa receives one third of Turkey's official development aid, with Somalia as the biggest recipient.[24] However, Turkey generally uses its bilateral development cooperation and its own tools (98% of Turkish aid) to help other countries.[25] For instance, through TİKA led programs, Turkey provides development aid in 28 countries in Africa on education, health, infrastructure and agriculture. Since 2011, TİKA has spent more than US$ 315 million on hundreds of development programs.[26] Much of the work done by these state apparatuses follow and replicate non-state actors' operations in the continent. For example, TİKA and the General Directorate of State Hydraulic Works (DSİ) have programs on drilling water wells in Africa.[27] Yet, it is assumed that Turkish non-state entities have drilled thousands of water wells in Africa to provide clean water.[28] In this sense, state actors augment in various ways what the non-state actors do in Africa on a larger and more effective scale. Turkish NGOs work on health and education issues and Turkey also provides for the construction of schools and hospitals through joint projects with state entities such as TİKA and the Housing Development Administration of Turkey (TOKİ).[29] Moreover, Turkey's civilian non-governmental organizations, in addition to the government agencies, are very active in humanitarian relief programs in Africa. In the 1990s, starting with foundations sending meat for the Islamic Sacrifice Feast to Africa, Turkish civilian humanitarian relief foundations began to deal with problems in education, health, water sanitation and vocational training, etc. Africa is known as home to the world's highest and fastest-growing number of orphans due to AIDS and conflicts. To provide care and support to thousands of African orphans, Turkish civilian relief foundations have opened a number of orphanages in the region. All in all, Turkey's humanitarian and development aid offers a new model compared to other countries's effort on the continent[30] and the Turkish model depends more on the extensive and intensive work done by Turkish civil society and NGOs.

Table 1: Turkey's Africa Opening in Focus

Country	HLSCC	ACDRM	TECA	FTA	Visa	Embassy	E_Ankara	TEOCC	TCCA	FERB	THY	TS
Angola			x			2010	2012	x		2011	x	
Benin			x			2014	2013		x	2015	x	x
Botswana					x	2014						x
Burkina Faso									x		x	
Burundi							2014		x			x
Algeria						x	x	x	xx	1990	x	x
Djibouti			x			2013	2012		xx	2015	x	x
Chad			x			2013	2014		xx	2015	x	
Equatorial Guinea			x							2014	x	
Eritrea			x			2013			x		x	
Ethiopia			x			1926	2006	x	xx	2008	x	x
Morocco	2013	x		2006	x	x	x	x	x	1990		
Cote d'Ivoire						2009	2013	x	x	2014	x	
Gabon		x				2012	2015		x			
Gambia		x				2011	2011		x	2011		
Ghana			x	2015		2010	2012		x	2011	x	x
Guinea			x			2013	2016		xx	2016		
Guinea Bissau									x			
South Africa						1994	1993	x	x	1997	x	
Cameroon						x		x	xx	2014	x	x
Kenya						1968	2012	x	xx	2010	x	x
Congo		x	x			2014	2013	x	x	2015	x	
Dem. Rep. of Congo						1974	2011	x	x	2015	x	
Lesotho									x			x
Liberia									x			x
Libya		x			x	x	x		xx	2007	x	
Madagascar			x						x	1990	x	x
Malawi			x			2011			x	2016	x	
Mali		x	x			2010	2014		x	2015	x	
Mauritius			x	2013	x					2014		x
Egypt	2011		x	2007		x	x	x	xx	1992	x	
Mauritania		x				x	x		x	2011	x	
Mozambique						2010		x	x	2015	x	
Namibia						2012			x			x
Niger						2012	2012		xx	2015	x	

Nigeria			x			1960	x	x	x	2011	x	
Rwanda					2014	2013			x	2012	x	x
Senegal		x	x			1960	2006		xx	2015	x	x
Seychelles				x					x		x	x
Sierra Leone									x			x
Somalia		x				2011	x		xx	2015	x	x
Sudan			x			x	x	x	xx	2008	x	x
Tanzania						2009		x	xx	2011	x	
Togo									x		x	x
Tunisia	2012		x	2005	x	x	x	x	xx	1990	x	
Uganda			x			2010	2011		x	2011	x	x
Zambia			x			2011	2013		x		x	x
Zimbabwe			x			2011			x		x	X

HLSCC: High Level Strategic Cooperation Council, ACDRM: Agreement on Cooperation in Defense Related Matters, TECA: Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement, FTA: Free Trade Agreements, UFR: Undersecretariat of Foreign Trade, TEOCC: Turkish Embassy Office of the Commercial Counsellor, FEBR: Foreign Economic Relation Boards (DEİK), THY: Turkish Airlines, TS: Turkish Scholarship, TCCA: Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA), E_Ankara: Embassy opened by the given country in Ankara
X: Active, operational, exist, Xx: Active, operational, exist and there is TIKA office in the country

Source: The data is collected from various institutions and the table is made upon these data by the authors.

Turkey has also attached great importance for peace and stability in Africa and has provided personnel and contributed financially to seven UN Peace Missions in Africa (MONUSCO/DRC, MINUSMA/Mali, MINUSCA/CAR, UNAMID/Darfur, UNMISS/South Sudan, UNOCI/Cote d'Ivoire and UNMIL/Liberia).[31]

In addition to political, cultural and altruistic sentiments, trade is one of the main reasons driving Turkey's Africa opening. Indeed, trade has always been an important part of Turkish foreign policy towards Africa as the country needs new markets for its growing industry. As a state body, the Foreign Economic Relations Board (DEİK) is the most important body enhancing bilateral trade and economic relations with Africa. DEİK has established Business Councils with African counterparts in 31 countries. As of 2015, Turkey has signed 39 trade and economic cooperation agreements with African countries. While in 2003 there were no free trade agreements (FTAs), five agreements have come into force as of 2015 (Tunisia 2005, Morocco 2006, Egypt 2007, Mauritius 2013,

Ghana 2015). In addition, four FTA negotiations are ongoing (Democratic Republic of Congo, Kameron, Seychelles, Libya) and discussions for the opening of FTA negotiations are ongoing (Algeria and South Africa).[32] FTAs are important as, along with trade and economic relations, political relations become more intense and meetings are scheduled regularly. Increasing cultural, humanitarian and business activities across the continent are all interlinked in terms of their outcomes. The expansion of bilateral aid and NGOs' activities play a catalyzer role in Turkey's increasing exports to the region. The fact that Turkey's trade volume increased six-fold between 2003 and 2015 to $19.5 billion, which equals 8.7% of Turkey's total trade, also proves the existing interdependence between humanitarian activities and trade. A further look at the data suggests that during this period Turkey has also succeeded to increase its trade relations with almost every African country.

Trade has always been an important part of Turkish foreign policy towards Africa as the country needs new markets for its growing industry.

Given Turkey's account deficits, finding new markets for Turkish products

is one of the immediate solutions to overcoming Turkey's economic difficulties. In this sense, the growing trade relations between Turkey and Africa are driven by both economic necessities and other aforementioned sentiments. One of the most important aspects of Turkish businesspeople in Africa is that most of them are Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (SMEs) without any international experience. In this sense, the increase in the civilian influence in Turkish trade policies did not just originate from formal cooperation or established mechanisms between state and non-state actors but from civilian expertise, networks and mobilization capacities.[33]

The increase in the civilian influence in Turkish trade policies did not just originate from formal cooperation or established mechanisms between state and non-state actors but from civilian expertise, networks and mobilization capacities.

Africa has one of the highest potentials for Turkey as an export destination. The Turkish garment and textile industries and construction sector have

Table 2: Transformation of Turkey's Trade with the African Countries (Millions USD)

Country	Trade 2005	Trade 2010	Trade 2015	Change in 10years (%)
Angola	$35,93	$109,39	$196,04	446%
Benin	$7,30	$119,91	$82,83	1035%
Botswana	$0,26	$0,62	$1,51	482%
Burkina Faso	$4,17	$55,17	$68,22	1537%
Burundi	$2,03	$4,39	$2,55	26%
Algeria	$1.668,95	$2.572,97	$2.566,42	54%
Djibouti	$7,23	$31,17	$98,36	1261%
Chad	$1,14	$3,44	$39,07	3323%
Ecuadorian Guinea	$10,77	$32,80	$45,84	326%
Eritrea	$12,23	$6,84	$13,88	13%
Ethiopia	$139,67	$215,78	$419,31	200%
Morocco	$514,06	$1.020,76	$2.048,19	298%
Cote D'ivorie	$59,66	$145,14	$389,85	553%
Gabon	$27,45	$23,87	$69,38	153%
Gambia	$10,53	$20,71	$16,00	52%
Ghana	$104,81	$290,84	$388,51	271%
Guinea	$12,34	$30,34	$68,86	458%
Guinea Bissau	$0,18	$2,51	$6,98	3693%
South Africa	$1.575,72	$1.258,87	$1.407,70	-11%
Cameron	$52,39	$88,52	$118,63	126%
Kenya	$52,32	$99,74	$144,51	176%
Congo	$29,50	$56,66	$131,51	346%
Democratic Rep. Of Congo	$2,24	$17,04	$162,67	7161%
Lesotho	$0,54	$0,70	$0,28	-48%
Liberia	$58,75	$75,06	$81,75	39%
Libya	$578,70	$2.358,02	$1.615,56	179%
Madagascar	$9,46	$28,93	$59,58	530%
Malawi	$18,56	$23,62	$32,05	73%
Mali	$12,89	$11,32	$32,64	153%
Mauritius	$15,67	$29,07	$40,97	162%
Egypt	$954,55	$3.177,05	$4.340,78	355%
Mauritania	$11,05	$38,88	$110,03	896%
Mozambique	$18,73	$89,38	$116,22	521%
Namibia	$0,93	$3,70	$85,44	9064%
Niger	$4,01	$14,75	$31,35	681%
Nigeria	$129,98	$471,15	$503,97	288%
Ruanda	$0,36	$7,99	$30,44	8430%
Senegal	$35,41	$84,76	$133,72	278%
Seychelles	$5,90	$4,69	$16,65	182%
Sierra Leone	$5,42	$35,07	$45,77	745%
Somalia	$3,05	$6,17	$72,38	2277%
Sudan	$153,19	$232,96	$449,16	193%
Tanzania	$33,05	$103,65	$150,94	357%
Togo	$7,60	$37,51	$53,75	607%

the largest export potential.[34] Turkey mainly exports furniture, appliances, construction materials, iron and steel, machinery and garment and textile products to Africa while importing oil, gas, gold and other raw materials. Turkey aims to reach US$ 50 billion in trade with Africa as of 2023, yet Turkey's trade with African countries is asymmetric in nature. Even though Turkish exports are mostly goods and services that can help Africa to build up a scale of economy to be competitive in the long run, Turkey should focus more on direct investments, especially in infrastructure. Indeed, African leaders are worried about the unequal positioning in their bilateral relations which refrains them from engaging with Turkey in a more substantial way. However, at the second Turkey-Africa Summit in 2014 in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea, Turkey underlined equality in Turkish-African relations and a full-fledged Turkey-Africa partnership strategy.[35] In this sense, Turkish commitments in Somalia and trade relations with countries such as Ethiopia, where Turkey is the leading country with US$ 2.5 billion direct investment and where Turkish-origin companies are the single largest foreign employer in the country, showed Turkey's benevolent intentions. Turkish companies have made US$ 6 billion in direct investments in Africa, especially in the horn of Africa, which

is the largest recipient of Turkish FDI to date.[36] In addition, Turkish construction companies and their construction projects in Africa serve to enhance trade relations. Indeed, there is a steady increase in Turkish contracting firms' projects carried out in Africa. Turkish firms undertake mass housing, transport infrastructure and petro-chemical facility projects, all of which are important for African development and growth.

Overall, Turkey has managed to move beyond state-to-state dealings in implementing its foreign policy and increasingly relies on the cooperation of non-state actors in Africa.[37] In this sense, Turkish non-state actors, mainly aid workers and private business sector representatives, influence Turkish trade policies in Africa through agenda setting and lobbying.[38] Turkish state bodies help these self-oriented private endeavors through diplomatic and logistic support, trade deals and establishing flight routes via Turkish Airlines. Turkish politicians have also raised awareness on Africa and relations with Africa. Social, cultural and political contacts, scholarships, technical assistance, aid, trade and investment are all elements of Turkey's soft power base in Africa. Upon this soft power base, Turkey displays the behavior of civilian foreign policy.

Assessing the Role of Trade in Turkey's Attempt to Construct a Civilian Power in Africa

Having outlined the principal driving factors of Turkey's economic relations with African countries, Turkey's emerging presence in the continent needs to be further assessed to understand to what extent trade, one of the most fundamental tools of engagement in Africa, adds to the construction of Turkey's civilian power on the continent. As already explained in the introduction, the degree to which Turkey can construct its civilian power through its existing trade policies could be analytically tracked with the application of Maull's three-faceted civilian power prototype: "i) the acceptance of the necessity of cooperation with others in the pursuit of international objectives; ii) the concentration on non-military, primarily economic, means to secure national goals…; and iii) a willingness to develop a supranational structures to address critical issues of international management".[39]

Cooperation With Others in the Pursuit of International Objectives

While the means and aims of Turkish foreign policy have moved smoothly towards a civilian role starting from the late 1990s and early 2000s, this new orientation prompted Turkey to develop itself a functioning role in various branches of international cooperation in an attempt to pursue and attain its national interests.[40] Indeed, this new civilian attitude for obtaining visible outcomes found a solid ground in Turkey's political-economic engagement with African countries. To this end, particularly from 2005 onwards, Turkey has initiated a wide-ranging international political cooperation with African countries from a civilian approach, which has allowed Turkey to not only increase its economic presence on the continent but also overcome some of the deadlocks in its attempts to gain leverage in global affairs.[41] Turkey's election to the non-permanent member seat in the United Nations Security Council for 2009-2010 with the striking support of 51 votes from 53 African countries can be seen as one of the best illustrations of Turkey's appeal to this civilian understanding through cooperation with African countries to gain global leverage. This prompt and visible output of the international objective oriented civilian cooperation with African countries has also been encouraged by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who recently linked the country's desire to open embassies in each African country to the fact that the continent

as a whole holds 54 votes in the United Nations.[42] In fact, Turkey mobilized this cooperation-objective nexus in Africa in pursuit of creating a civilian impact just before the 2008 UNSC non-permanent seat elections. Two months before the election in August 2008, Turkey initiated and hosted the first Turkey-African Partnership Summit with the participation of 49 African countries and together revealed the İstanbul Declaration which set the ground for future cooperation.

Although this apparent success in 2008 represents the first characteristic of the civilian type of foreign policy engagement, trade also allows for cooperation and objective seeking. Herein, the diplomatic visits paid by Turkish leaders to African countries and the consequent increase in trade volume provide important clues as to how this civilian characteristic of engagement was mobilized. In this regard, unusual to Turkish foreign policy tradition, Turkish leaders began diplomatic visits to various sub-Saharan Africa countries in pursuit of laying a more solid ground for cooperation, resulting in a relative boom in trade volume. As Table 3 illustrates, high-level visits by then President Abdullah Gül and then Prime Minister and current President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to African countries attempted to lay the ground for cooperation based on a civilian approach. Countries like Gabon, Ghana, Somalia, Nigeria, Kenya and

Senegal attracted greater than usual attention as Turkish leaders visited these countries more than once in a short period. Almost all declarations made following these high-level visits proposed more integrated cooperation for the agenda of Turkish-African relations by highlighting issues such as visa-free travel, cooperation on higher education, military cooperation and, of course, the need for increased trade relations.[43] However, the most important characteristics of these visits are the fact that these are designed to smooth the ground for Turkish NGOs, private humanitarian aid workers, and businesspeople working already in this region. That is, there is a significant correlation between leaders' visits and locations where business and civil society groups work. Indeed, these places are those where Turkish private NGOs such as IHH, the Turkish Red Crescent, World Doctors, or state associations such as TİKA, TOKİ, Diyanet or Turkish businesspeople are substantially present.

The diplomatic visits paid by Turkish leaders to African countries and the consequent increase in trade volume provide important clues as to how this civilian characteristic of engagement was mobilized.

Table 3: Sub-Saharan African Countries Visited by Turkish Presidents and Prime Ministers between 2009-2016

2009	Kenya (President Abdullah Gül)	Tanzania (President Abdullah Gül)	-	-	-	-	-	-
2010	Congo Democratic Republic (President Abdullah Gül)	Cameroon (President Abdullah Gül)	Nigeria (President Abdullah Gül)	-	-	-	-	-
2011	Ghana (President Abdullah Gül)	Gabon (President Abdullah Gül)	Somali (Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan)	South Africa (Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan)	-	-	-	-
2012	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2013	Gabon (Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan)	Niger (Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan)	Senegal (Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan)	-	-	-	-	-
2014	Equatorial Guinea (President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2015	Ethiopia (President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan)	Somalia (President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan)	Djibouti (President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan)	-	-	-	-	-
2016	Nigeria (President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan)	Ivory Coast (President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan)	Ghana (President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan)	Guinea (President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan)	Uganda (President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan)	Senegal (President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan)	Somalia (President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan)	Kenya (President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan)

Source: Prepared by drawing largely on the data from various official websites:
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye-afrika-iliskileri.tr.mfa;
http://www.tccb.gov.tr/receptayyiperdogan/yurtdisiziyaretler/;
http://kdk.gov.tr/sayilarla/turkiye-afrika-ulkeleriyle-iliskilerini-guclendiriyor/11

Figure 1: Turkey's Exports to Sub-Saharan Africa Countries Visited by Turkish Leaders between 2009 and 2015

Indeed, these visits had a profound impact on Turkey's trade relations with African countries. An analysis based on the cause and effect relationship between these visits and the increase in trade volumes demonstrates the role of trade in the civilian characteristic of cooperation. For instance, assessing Table 3 and Figure 1 in an integrative way, it is much easier to make sense of the increase in Turkey's export volumes between 2009 and 2011 with Kenya and Tanzania following President Gül's 2009 visit. This civilian cooperative agenda produced a visible impact in Turkey's trade relations with these countries. It is possible to take this argument further by linking the increase in Turkey's export volumes with Gabon and Ghana between 2010 and 2013 to the visits paid by Turkish leaders in the same period. Again, it is possible to observe how then President Gül's visit to Nigeria in 2010 came into play in the sharp increase in Turkey's exports to Nigeria between 2010 and 2014 following the decrease in 2009 and 2010.

By the same token, the influence of official visits on increasing trade volumes can also be observed in African countries, where Turkey had decreasing trade volumes prior to Prime Ministerial visits. For instance, following a sharp decrease in Turkey's exports to South Africa between 2009 and 2010 (Figure 1), Prime Minister

Erdoğan paid a visit to South Africa in 2011. Likewise, the same trend can be observed with Erdoğan's visit to Ethiopia in 2015 following decreasing exports in 2013 and 2014. Indeed, after Erdoğan's visit, Turkey's exports to Ethiopia began to increase again. Thus, these figures illustrate that Turkey's civilian cooperative agenda has found an operational backdrop for its trade relations.

Drawing largely on the above-mentioned argumentation, it would not be wrong to argue that starting with Turkey's adoption of a more civilian approach in its foreign engagements, this civilian cooperative agenda has found an operational backdrop in its trade relations with African countries. Having realized that its political cooperation with African countries can result in a win-win situation and increase Turkey's global leverage, Turkish leaders began to accommodate the tool of trade in this causal civilian relationship in the cooperation-objective nexus to create mutual benefits while laying the ground for further civilian cooperation with African countries.

Economic Means to Secure National Goals

Turkey's civilian path in Africa in pursuing its national goals is inherently based upon economic motives and business-focused interactions rather than military means. This trajectory of the civilian character and priority given to economic means in Turkey's opening towards African countries began in the mid-2000s. Within this scope, trade has also become one of the key influential factors in Turkey's attempt to make use of economic means to pursue its national economic goals.[44] In this sense, Turkey launched "A Strategy on the Development of the Economic Relations with African Countries" prepared by the Undersecretariat for Foreign Trade in 2003[45] and began working on the targets outlined in this document. This document aimed mainly at a doubling of the trade volume with African countries and an increasing presence of Turkish companies on the continent.[46] Departing from this strategy, Turkey has begun to operationalize its economic tools in Africa on two grounds: legal and institutional.

Turkey's civilian path in Africa in pursuing its national goals is inherently based upon economic motives and business-focused interactions rather than military means.

To this end, Turkey has initiated the implementation of legal steps aimed at catalyzing the use of economic tools in African countries. The main aim of these legal implementations was to create solid economic means that would strengthen Turkey's ability to obtain its national goals. Although these legal steps have not been operationalized for the most part in Africa, they included the signing of the Agreements on Reciprocal Promotion, Protection of Investments with 22 African countries, the Agreements on the Avoidance of Double Taxation with 11 African countries, and Free Trade Agreements with four African countries.[47] Although these early legal initiatives to create and establish robust economic means for easily engaging in economic relations with the African countries have not been expanded to the majority of African countries, they sowed the seeds of economic engagement for trade relations between Turkey and countries in Africa.

In addition to these legal initiatives, Turkey has attempted to undertake institutional programs to ensure that its economic means are securely grounded to allow the pursuit of its national goals when engaging in economic relations in Africa. Apart from the opening of commercial consulates in 26 African countries,[48] Turkey's relations with the African Development Bank serve as a model for these institutional undertakings. The African Development Bank accepted Turkey as a member in 2008. Özkan argues that Turkey has begun to intensify its engagements with the Intergovernmental Authority on Development in East Africa and the Economic Community of West African States as well.[49]

It is important to note that these institutional accessions facilitated advantageous economic tools, allowing Turkish enterprises to make use of funds allocated for various projects. Another important development on the institutional level is related to the continent's regional economic communities. Within this scope, some Turkish missions in Africa have registered in important regional economic communities such as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development Partners Forum, the Economic Community of West African States, the East African Community, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, and the Economic Community of Central African States.[50]

Figure 2: Turkey's Exports to Sub-Saharan Africa and its Share in Total Exports (2006-2016)

Source: http://www.tuik.gov.tr/PreIstatistikTablo.do?istab_id=1547 (last visited 20 January 2018).

Moreover, the most recent initiative, the "Turkey-Africa Economy and Business Forum," held in İstanbul in November 2016, helped economic relations reach another important dimension at which the economic relations between Turkey and African countries are discussed collectively by governmental and non-governmental organizations and business actors in both regions. This is important in the sense that the civilian emphasis on economic tools has moved to the core of the Turkish-African agenda, allowing for the topics, issues and new projects in the civilian sphere to be openly discussed among all the partners involved.

This civilian approach to the establishment of secure economic tools for the pursuit of national goals in the continent has had a profound impact on Turkey's trade relations with African countries. Overall, as suggested in Figure 2, the share of exports to African countries in Turkey's total exports has increased from 1.7 % to 2.7 % between 2006 and 2016. Although these figures are not satisfactory within the scope of Turkey's strategic opening towards Africa, it gives important clues about the civilian impact of these economic tools. It is worth noting that this civilian approach has also produced results on a win-win basis.

Turkish companies and investors have begun to invest and acquire important companies in Africa (for instance Arçelik purchased one of the leading South African manufacturing firms, Defy[51]). In addition, Turkish companies engaging in trade in African countries have created thousands of jobs throughout the continent (for instance more than 10,000 in Ethiopia).[52]

Turkey invests heavily on creating economic tools that would ease and trigger trade and business relations with African countries. The legal and institutional steps taken by the Turkish government prove Turkey's desire to prioritize economic means as a solid ground for its relations with African countries. Although far from being firmly established, the results also prove that these early attempts to establish economic tools from a civilian perspective not only help Turkey's national interests but in return serve a favorable purpose for its trade partners.

Supranational Structures to Address Critical Issues of International Management

Turkey's appeal to the civilian type of foreign policy in its political-economic engagements with African countries has also been linked to another important characteristic of civilian powers and highlights the eagerness to create and work with bilateral networks and collective supranational structures for dealing with the challenges faced. In addition to its strategic partnership with the African Union as the largest supranational umbrella organization for African countries, Turkey makes financial donations to this union as well as to various supranational funds such as the World Food Program.[53] In line with the emerging cosmopolitan identity resulting in an increasing willingness to work with and contribute to such global structures, Turkey's civilian motivation to help African countries in solving their problems has also been reflected in various initiatives launched jointly by Turkey and its African partners.[54] As Table 4 indicates, starting from 2008 Turkey has worked to launch joint conferences and programs laying the ground for international cooperation with the continent that create mutual benefits and at the same time addressing the problems the continent faces.

While calling for more intensified trade relations between the two sides, the framework emphasized the role of international structures in the economic relations between Turkey and Africa.

Table 4: Intergovernmental and International Initiatives Between Turkey and African Countries Organized to Address Critical Issues

18-21 August 2008	I. Turkey-Africa Partnership Summit in İstanbul
2008	The İstanbul Declaration on Turkey Africa Partnership: Cooperation and Solidarity for a Common Future
2008	Cooperation Framework for Turkey-Africa Partnership
15 December 2010	High-Level Official Meetings in İstanbul
16 December 2010	Ministerial Level Reviewing Conference in İstanbul
21-23 May 2010	I. International Donor's Conference for the Reconstruction and Development of Darfur, with Egypt in Cairo
09-13 May 2011	IV. United Nations Conference on the Least Developed Countries, in İstanbul
31 May - 01 June 2012	II. International Donor's Conference for the Reconstruction and Development of Darfur, co-chaired with Egypt in Cairo
19 June 2013	II. Turkey-Africa Partnership High Level Officials Meeting in Addis Ababa
19-21 November 2014	II. Turkey-Africa Partnership Summit in Malabo
19-21 November 2014	Joint Implementation Plan of Africa-Turkey Partnership 2015-2019
2015	Mid-Term Review Conference of the İstanbul Programme of Action 2015
23-24 February 2016	High Level Partnership Forum for Somalia

Source: Turkey-Africa Relations, *Ministry of Foreign Affairs*, at http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey-africa-relations.en.mfa (last visited 10 February 2018).

These civilian efforts to establish international frameworks between Turkey and African countries for coping with challenges have touched upon the role of trade as a facilitator in this civilian-based relationship. For instance, the "İstanbul Declaration", accepted in the first Turkey-Africa Partnership Summit in 2008 in İstanbul emphasizing a robust commitment to international norms, makes a clear reference to the role of economic relations and addresses trade and investment as one of the most essential of nine areas in which Turkey and African countries need to work

together more comprehensively.[55] The "Cooperation Framework for Turkey Africa Partnership" accepted at the same Summit in 2008 expanded in more detail how these international structures can be operationalized to strengthen trade and investment relations between Turkey and African countries. In this sense, while calling for more intensified trade relations between the two sides, the framework emphasized the role of international structures in the economic relations between Turkey and Africa. It did so by making reference to the need for the establishment of a comprehensive legal groundwork enhancing the role of international financial institutions and the foundation of business councils in pursuit of transforming the existing trade relations into a more institutionalized structure.[56]

With the institutionalization of this intergovernmental process between 2008 and 2016 and the various conferences and roadmaps during this period, Turkey and the African countries began to ground their relations on an international basis. The growing role of trade in enhancing these relationships was in parallel emphasized much more in these framework documents. Building on the previous background, the "Joint Implementation Plan of Africa-Turkey Partnership 2015-2019"[57] declared after the Second Africa-Turkey Summit held on 19 to

21 November 2014 in Malobo called for a more expanded understanding of the trade and investment relations between Turkey and African countries and proposed more institutionalized implementations of an integrated approach to establish an inter-sectoral understanding including political and social domains. Drawing on this integrated approach, the 2015-2019 implementation plan included more concrete recommendations than its processor. Among the objectives of this plan the creation of a joint database, the integration to the global network of various international/transnational African commissions, the proliferation of trade meetings and the creation of various councils that would regulate Turkish-African business relations may be cited.

Already engaged in trade relations with African countries but not under a collective framework, Turkey's evolving relations based on this new civilian approach to institutionalize and collectivize trade relations with the continent is also important in the sense that both parties' international efforts to create operational frameworks to find solutions to the deadlocks in the evolving relations have all, in some way, touched upon the role of trade as an accelerating factor. These new attempts have the potential to transform the existing loose bilateral relations into a collaborative international framework

that in turn would boost Turkey's civilian power role on the continent.

Acknowledging trade as one of the elements constructing civilian powers, these findings prove that Turkey has the desire to operationalize trade in its trajectory towards emphasizing civilian power in its relations with African countries. Indeed, it is possible to track the role and impact of trade in Turkey's construction of the three characteristics of civilian power, *cooperation in the pursuit of international objectives*, *economic means for securing national goals* and the *development of international/transnational structures for international management* in Africa.

Far from being complete, Turkey has shaped its relations with African countries on a civilian ground and wisely looked to engage the role of trade in this civilian foreign policy implementation starting from the mid-2000s. Although Turkey has begun to create the legal and institutional infrastructure for trade's bigger role in this three-faceted civilian trajectory, Turkey needs to create more comprehensive frameworks for its relations with African countries to properly operationalize this infrastructure and create more profound results. One of the most important steps to be taken by Turkish policy makers is to more clearly link the role of trade as a power maximizer to its

civilian foreign policy implementations in Africa. For instance, while Turkey cooperates eagerly with African leaders, the role of trade between Turkey and African countries has not been fully institutionalized and still depends on the individual efforts of the leaders. In addition, although Turkey works to create international/transnational structures to address the critical issues, so far trade has been unable to settle into its well-deserved place in these structures. Again, even though Turkey works to create economic means that can be utilized in its relations with its African partners, the number of free trade agreements remains below the target. It seems clear to Turkish policy makers that there is a solid ground for merging trade and the civilian components of foreign policy implementations in Turkey's relations with African countries. Yet, the link between these two remains far from completely connected.

> Turkey has shaped its relations with African countries on a civilian ground and wisely looked to engage the role of trade in this civilian foreign policy implementation starting from the mid-2000s.

Conclusion

As a central and constitutive element of civilian power, trade has both the capacity and potential to gradually construct civilian power if used strategically and effectively as a surrogate for, as well as a complement to, states' foreign and security policies. This study verifies this argument, albeit partially, in the sense that Turkey's increasing trade volume with African countries since 2000s has simultaneously contributed to the making of Turkey's civilian power on the continent in the three levels of *cooperation for pursuing international objectives*, *use of economic means to secure national goals* and *development of international structures/organizations*. An in-depth analysis of the role of trade in each of the above-mentioned Maullian "civilian power" characteristics indicates that in the pursuit of Turkey's emerging "civilian power" objectives, trade plays a larger role in the *use of economic means for securing national goals and* the *cooperation in the pursuit of international objectives* levels than in the *development of international structures for international management*.

Trade powers can enact a civilian foreign policy role if all of the three characteristics of civilian power are proportionally embedded in states' political economic orientations.

It can also be argued that trade powers can enact a civilian foreign policy role if all of the three characteristics of civilian power are proportionally embedded in states' political economic orientations. This study confirms this argument by the relatively low performance of Turkey at the levels of international cooperation and development of international structures. Despite Turkey's increasing capacity and willingness to develop international cooperation with African states over the last decade through African summits, mutual diplomatic and business visits, and opening of embassies, Turkey's efforts in this field seem not to have created a high impact in terms of results. This has been proven by the lower number of votes by African states for Turkey's 2015-2016 candidacy for the UNSC's non-permanent membership than in 2009-2010. Taken together with the general volatile character of the votes of African states in international organizations, this result is a good indicator of the limits and fragility of Turkey's cooperation with Africa. Another segment under which Turkey shows lower performance, the development of international/transnational structures, is also far from having a high impact, mainly due to Turkey's lack of a comprehensive international organization strategy for the African continent. Turkey's efforts at this level need to be restructured

both strategically and institutionally. The weak institutionalization and the dispersed character of Turkey's political economy towards Africa makes it hard for Turkey to achieve effective results in the short term. The present study clearly illustrates that there is still room for Turkey to take further steps in reinforcing cooperation and multilateralism with the African states. Regarding the use of economic means as the civilian power layer, despite being its strongest area, Turkey lags behind the other emerging powers actively engaged in Africa such as China, India and Brazil in terms of trade volume, number of free trade and tax exemption agreements, and direct investment volume. Here it also appears clear that Turkey's trade power in Africa is increasing fast. However, a significant trade potential remains between Turkey and Africa that has not been totally explored. In addition, as detailed in section 3, despite its increasing effectiveness as a civilian power instrument in recent years, trade still does not remain a primary vehicle for the construction of Turkey's civilian power in Africa. The merging of a trade power role with a civilian power role depends heavily on Turkey's ability to effectively operationalize its trade power instruments with the aim of creating "a civilian power impact" in foreign policy.

Last but not least, the more Turkey constructs favorable relations with African countries, the more Turkey increases its global leverage, as experienced before in the UNSC elections. In the last decade, Turkey seems to have made significant efforts to lay a solid ground by strengthening diplomatic connections and creating transnational networks for a sustainable Turkish-African partnership. However, the lack of a comprehensive and institutionalized approach to Africa constitutes the main limitation for Turkey's ability to turn into a civilian power in the region. Here it must also be acknowledged that a gradually evolving civilian power actorness in the Africa region would certainly help Turkey expand this role outside Africa, to both its neighboring regions and the global arena. Regional and global civilian power actorness are of course mutually constructed and strongly interdependent. Turkey's increasing political economic engagement with African countries now gives the impression of being a more trade-focused diplomacy rather than being an international/transnational-focused one and this makes this policy incomplete and weak as a way to render Turkey an effective regional civilian actor.

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A "Cool" Approach to Japanese Foreign Policy: Linking Anime to International Relations

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Abstract

International Relations literature is quite unfamiliar with the global phenomenon of anime and manga. This study examines Japanese soft power via approaching anime and manga as its crucial components. The article consists of three main parts. Firstly, Joseph Nye's conceptual framework of soft power is presented; then, the cultural politics of Japanese foreign policy after World War II is described. In the third part, the Cool Japan Project is mentioned as a main column of Japanese soft power. Anime and manga have a central place in this project, with their ability to produce content that is related to Japanese culture. This study aims to analyze the substantial contribution of anime and manga to Japanese soft power.

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Key Words

Cool Japan, Anime, Manga, Soft Power, Joseph Nye.

Introduction

The disintegration of the Soviet Union triggered the most comprehensive transformation process of recent history. The widespread global transformation that followed the Cold War weakened the explanatory power of established International Relations theories, and led scientists to new research avenues. In this environment, Joseph Nye focused on the concept of "power". By questioning the traditional definition of power, he brought a new breath to the concept. In this article, Nye's soft power concept occupies a central importance as the article aims to create a linkage between anime, manga[1] and Japanese foreign policy. The Cool Japan Project has an irreplaceable role in the Japanese culture industry, which produces the main components of Japanese soft power. Anime and manga

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represent two of the main columns of the culture industry. Thus, it has an essential relation with the country's foreign policy.

> The widespread global transformation that followed the Cold War weakened the explanatory power of established International Relations theories.

After the Second World War, the ban on the use of military force led Japan to seek different foreign policy choices. In this process, Japan, along with the Yoshida Doctrine, directed its attention to commercial and economic policies. The globalization wave in the 1990s provided new opportunities to Japan for its economy-based foreign policy approach. These opportunities have emerged thanks to the international popularity of anime and manga. The aim of the Cool Japan Project is to make Japanese pop-culture more effective as a soft power tool in foreign policy. Although the video game industry also has a significant place in Cool Japan, anime and manga are much more important in terms of producing content, creating culture, forming new societies and affecting international sociology.

Anime has been studied in many different academic areas, for example, the psychological aspects of anime-related fan events,[2] characteristics of anime in Japanese art history,[3] transcultural aspects of anime and hybrid identities,[4] tourism,[5] information technologies[6] etc. This study considers anime as a soft power element according to the International Relations literature and assesses it as a central element of Japanese soft power. Subsequently, through the context of the Cool Japan Project, it is deemed also to be indirectly linked to Japanese foreign policy. Thus, this study aims to contribute to research on anime's role as a soft power element within the International Relations literature.

This study consists of three main parts. The first part examines Joseph Nye's soft power concept from a historical perspective. In the second part, the history of Japanese soft power is analyzed and the transformation of Japan and its foreign policy after the Second World War are examined. Subsequently, Japan's transformation and institutional activism are described along with the globalization wave of the 1990s. In the third part, first, Cool Japan is described and second, anime and manga's substantial place in Cool Japan is explored.

Soft Power: A Conceptual Framework

Conceptualization of soft power can be taken as a critique of realism. Realist theory claims to provide a useful base for decision makers, however, it neglects ideas and social forces that shape identities. Interactions of international institutions, diverse groups and individuals also generate significant outputs in international politics.[7] It is therefore necessary to extend the concept of power outside of the frame of realist theory and deal with it on a new ground.

> Conceptualization of soft power can be taken as a critique of realism.

In 2004, Joseph Nye compiled his major works in the study "Power in a Global Information Age".[8] The categorization of the articles made by Nye himself is remarkable. It refers to an implicit intellectual procession of Nye's concept of "soft power". The study, which started by revealing the limits of realist theory, draws a conceptual line through globalization, interdependence and governance, through the concept of soft power.

The realist sense of power conception is based on gauging the position of other actors within a rather exclusive "hard" dimension. As in the carrot-stick analogue, hard power including military and economic capacity has threatening and rewarding mechanisms. However, similar results can be obtained without using such methods, and soft power forms the "other side" of power.[9] State A can ensure that its dominant political and social values are internalized by state B; without outmaneuvering it by using martial or economic instruments. State A can establish itself as a model to be taken by the means of its transparency, prosperity, culture, domestic practices, legitimate foreign policy, and social values. Thus, State B (and other states) might prefer to internalize and implement the practices of State A, and prefer its international priorities.[10]

Joseph Nye first introduced the concept of soft power in his book "*Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power,*" which was published in 1990. In this study he argues that it is necessary to retain the indirect and abstract dimension of power in order to identify the agenda and draw the frame of a debate. This dimension that originates from the abstract social processes of power can be considered as soft power.[11] In the same year, "Soft Power"[12] and "The Changing Nature of Power in World Politics"[13] were published in the journals *Foreign Policy* and *Political Science Quarterly*

respectively, further embedding the soft power concept into the literature.

Nye likens the concept of power to weather conditions in terms of international politics: Everyone is talking about power; however, nobody can bring a comprehensive approach to the concept. The dictionary meaning of power is to act and control others, however it is difficult to define and measure the power in international politics. In the world of the 1990s; categories such as natural resources, population and geography which were understood as material sources of power, started to lose their importance. On the other hand, such factors as technology, education and economic growth were rapidly gaining importance, signaling that power should be taken into account by considering new sources. This transformation makes the concept of power an abstract category in certain meanings.[14] To avoid confusion, new sources of power should be described in more detail.

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Nye, in his works published in 1990, revealed the sources of soft power but did not go into a clear categorization. In his book "Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics," published in 2004, this deficiency was removed and he suggested that there are three soft power sources. These are culture, political values and foreign policy. Culture attracts the attention of others; political values can find space for themselves both at home and abroad; and foreign policy is a source of legitimacy and authority. According to Nye, the institutions in which soft power is produced appear as corporations, universities, foundations, churches or other non-governmental organizations.[15] Soft power is the ability to determine other actors' own preferences. In this sense, the decision-making process is more important than the decision itself. The main mechanism of soft power functions on the decision-making process of the other actors.

Soft power has become a central concept in the International Relations literature since the early 2000s. Among the most important reasons for this situation are developments in communication and transportation technologies. According to Nye, the acceleration in mass communication processes is revolutionary and it has now become much more costly to maintain a closed and repressed

domestic political structure.[16] The effect of this is that world politics has become more sophisticated in this context, and direct influence through leading elites is more difficult. This means that; even for the US, the world's sole superpower, it is hard to sustain traditional hegemonic policies. According to Nye, the importance of soft power emerges at this point. All states, including a superpower like the US, have to consolidate their soft power to achieve foreign policy goals.[17]

Soft power should not be perceived simply as influence in a narrow perspective, as influence can be produced by hard power tools as well. The persuasive ability of soft power should not be sought in the external processes of actor relations. Instead, the process of internalizing certain actors' thoughts and behavioral patterns should be focused on.[18] At this point, soft power's relation with norms becomes significant. Constituent norms of soft power must have the qualities that attract other actors' attention. However, even when the desired result is obtained and the intended effect is created, it is difficult to measure it.[19]

> The persuasive ability of soft power should not be sought in the external processes of actor relations.

When compared with the "commanding" hard power, soft power emerges in cooperative and harmonious relations. At this point, Nye shows an example of the parents' relationship with their children. Children can be kept under control as long as their beliefs and priorities are shaped by their parents. Repressive and force-based parental methods may work on the child to some extent, but they will lose their effect in the long-term effect, and these methods may go even against the parents.[20] Compared to hard power, soft power is not a more effective or moral power type. As hard power tools are used for negative purposes, soft power can also be used in a similar manner. Globalization, information-based economies and increasing interdependence have increased the emphasis on the soft dimension of power.[21] Such developments will also have an impact on the future of power.[22] This transformation in the power phenomenon is valid for all actors. Therefore, it would be fallacious to think of hard and soft power as independent of each other.

Japanese Soft Power: Past and Present

Until the end of the Second World War, Japan carried out imperial policies in the region based on hard power and bringing great destruction to all areas

of life. After the war, Japan entered into a radical transformation process, seeking ways to develop friendly relations with regional countries on the basis of economic prosperity. This section examines both legal and political aspects of the transformation that Japan has realized. In this context, the institutional activism in the establishment of Japanese soft power and the Cool Japan Project, which has a central importance in soft power policies, are analyzed. Finally, the role of anime in this institutional and political structure, which is considered the essential contribution to the literature, is studied.

Why is Soft Power so Important for Japan?

The transformation of global politics and the increasing importance of soft power have been recognized by the Japanese government. However Japan has realized this transformation through a number of historical obligations of its own. First, it is legally prohibited for Japan to have military power. Japan, defeated in World War II, was occupied by the Allies until 1952. In November 1946, the new Constitution proposed by the Allies was adopted. According to Article 9 of the Constitution, which is still in force, Japan was forced to disperse all land, naval and air forces and was banned from using the potential of war.[23]

"Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.

In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized."[24]

While entering the new world order after the Cold War, Japan did not possess hard power in the beginning. Therefore, there was no choice for Japan but to focus on soft power. Although Japan's abandonment of hard power is an obligation; with the peaceful policies that have been put into practice, Japanese society has focused on economic and cultural development policies on their own initiative. Culture, which is one of the three basic sources of soft power, is the main focus of the Japanese government in this context. Starting from its own near abroad, Japan has begun to take interest in the whole world with systematic policies, and has made itself a center of attraction. The good results achieved in the economy, the establishment and strengthening of cultural institutions

with the support of the government, have been the dominant elements of Japanese soft power. The Yoshida Doctrine, which was declared in 1946, has emphasized the economic priority; with the Fukuda Doctrine, in 1977, it was once again emphasized that Japan would not pursue pro-power policies. Under these circumstances; subsequent Japanese governments, which have followed policies to increase their economic power for many years, have not missed opportunities to increase foreign trade and have been able to transform the country's cultural products into consumer goods.

> With the peaceful policies that have been put into practice, Japanese society has focused on economic and cultural development policies on their own initiative.

The second factor that made Japan focus on soft power is the fact that Japan's most important export market is its own periphery.[25] As a result of this, in Southeast Asia, Japan has increased its influence not in the military but in the cultural sense. Seeking ways to strengthen its historical ties with the near abroad, Japan has used both traditional and popular culture as a

means of interaction. In this respect, Japan's image has been strengthened in nearby countries, and consumption of Japanese products has increased. The Japanese government has also made moves to strengthen its international trade ties and to open up to the Western market. In this context, Japan became a member of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in the 1950s, and became a member of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in the 1960s. In addition, the US pressured Western European states, in order to open up to Japanese products; thus, Japan has benefited from the US's leading position in international trade.[26]

Post-War Era and the Yoshida Doctrine

Despite Japan's being remembered for its hard-power policies in the pre-war era, the use of culture as a diplomatic instrument in Japan actually goes back to the 1920s. Japan, with its goal of becoming a colonial power, sought to use a number of cultural commonalities shared with other nations of the region against Western competitors.[27] Japan pursued imperial and expansionist policies in the process leading up to World War II and took steps to increase its sphere of influence in the region. With the outbreak of the war,

Japanese expansion gained a military character and the Japanese armed forces started occupations. After the war, Japan intended to break the anti-Japanese sentiment that was formed in the region after the war and started to establish policies to strengthen its international image.[28]

Seeking ways to strengthen its historical ties with the near abroad, Japan has used both traditional and popular culture as a means of interaction.

The colossal demolition of World War II and the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in particular, caused a traumatic effect on the Japanese people. As a consequence, Japan decided to avoid using violence as a political instrument in foreign policy processes. The military protection provided by the US to Japan after the war was also effective in this decision. Subsequently, the policy promulgated by the Yoshida Doctrine, which is named after Japan's Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida, was formalized.[29] According to this, Japan is an island country with a crowded population and it depends on overseas trade to achieve high standards of living. Therefore, Japan should give its political weight to commercial and economic development.[30] Along with

the Yoshida Doctrine, Japan left behind its aggressive foreign policy in the post-war period, and cooperated with the regional countries by establishing economy-focused relations. This provided a suitable environment for the soft power policies that would begin to be established in the 1970s.

The Pre-Globalization Era and the Basis of Japanese Soft Power

By the 1970s, Japan had recovered in economic terms and succeeded to shroud the wounds of war to a large extent. At this period, the Fukuda Doctrine was the determining factor of Japanese foreign policy. In 1977, Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo once again emphasized that Japan would not be a military force, and that Japan's intention was to develop positive relations with Southeast Asian states on a basis of mutual trust and understanding. In addition, Japan would promote cooperation with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) governments and take initiatives for the establishment of peace and prosperity in the region.[31]

In conjunction with these policies, in 1972, *The Japan Foundation*, one of Japan's most important cultural institutions, was established. The Foundation's objective is to develop

friendly relations with the world on the basis of mutual trust and understanding. In this context, relations are established through categories of culture, language and dialogue.[32] In 1973, the *Japan Foundation Awards* were announced and a "friendship program" was initiated. In 1984 Japanese language proficiency tests were put into practice. Accordingly, the *Urawa Japanese Language* Institute was established within the foundation in 1989.[33] While The Japanese Foundation operates in the cultural dimension of relations, the *Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA)* was established in 1974 with the aim of operating on the economic footing of the relations. The JICA consists of private sector representatives and public officials. A range of technical and economic co-operation, including financial assistance, is aimed at contributing to the socio-economic development of developing countries.[34]

> With the boost of globalization, Japanese culture was about to have a tremendous international influence with the arrival of the 1990s.

In the 1970s, Japan's second largest export market was the Southeast Asian states. At the same time, the stability of Southeast Asia in terms of raw material flow was important for Japan. Following the Vietnam War, the United States' damaged image and its announcement on a reduction of its military presence in the region, obliged Japan to take more responsibility for the stability of the region.[35] Japan had to be more visible on the one hand; and on the other, it had to avoid reproducing the negative images of the war. In this context, both institutional activism and official foreign policy positively reflected Japan's image in the region. Thus, with the boost of globalization, Japanese culture was about to have a tremendous international influence with the arrival of the 1990s.

The Post-Cold War Era and the Globalization Wave

Two essential changes that took place in the 1990s paved the way for soft power politics that Japan had already begun to implement to a certain extent in Southeast Asia since the 1970s. First; with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, old communist regimes began to integrate into global capitalism. Second; advancements in communication technologies were enabling media content to circulate more quickly and easily around the globe. As a result, Japanese cultural products were not limited to this region alone anymore, and began spreading rapidly all over

the world, meeting masses of fans.

Until the 1990s, cultural interaction was enhanced with exchange programs, language education, Kabuki[36] and Japanese tea ceremonies. Good relations were established through a number of values shared with the societies of the region but perceived to be more associated with Japan, such as determination, hard work, commitment to family, and the challenges of non-Western modernization. In the 1990s, Japanese media acquired an important place in the region, and Japanese television programs' and pop idols' popularity increased significantly in Southeast Asia. Following these developments, the importance of government support for the media industry was recognized, and in 1991 the *Japan Media Communication Center* (JAMCO) was established.[37] JAMCO produces a variety of TV programs, including free documentaries, programs and dramas for kids, and educational programs for TV channels of developing countries. With content in English, Spanish, French and Arabic, JAMCO produced 11,145 programs in 90 countries in total.[38] Programs are made on a wide range of topics such as nature, the environment, foodstuff, science and technology, traditional culture, history and modern living.[39]

The Japan Foundation also accelerated its activities in the 1990s and expanded its institutional structure. In 1990, the *Japan Foundation ASEAN Culture Center* was formed. In 1991, the *Abe Fellowship Program* was launched and the *Center for Global Partnership* was opened. In 1997, the *Japanese Language Institute Kansai* was established. In 2003, the Japan Foundation was reorganized as an independent organization. In 2010, the *Standard for Japanese–Language Education* was announced. The *China* and *Asia Centers* were established within the Foundation in 2006 and 2014, respectively. The Foundation conducts international partnership programs in the areas of language education, art, culture and science.[40] It has 24 branches in 23 different countries.[41] In these countries, cultural exchange is carried out in three fields, namely art, language education and intellectual exchange. The Foundation has conducted activities on fashion, cinema, music, drama and design in the countries where it operates. The Foundation is cooperating with the *Sakura Network*, a global network of Japanese-language educational institutions. As part of this; in 264 cities, 652,519 people took a Japanese-language proficiency test in 2015. In the same year, the Japan Centers and the Japan Foundation's overseas offices conducted 198 Japanese-language education programs and received 100,406 attendees. In 2015, the number of course takers

increased by 19,542.[42] Although the foundation did not have an essential development in the institutional sense until the 1990s, it accelerated its institutionalization activities towards the 2000s and achieved independent status in 2003.

> The government has found significant institutional activism and has opened the way for more products to be produced and distributed with promotive policies.

In the 2000s, Japanese produced media products began to spread all over the world and found a market in Western countries in particular. In this process, the concept of "Cool Japan" came to be added to Japanese foreign policy discourse. Japan's growing international popularity also led to an increase in the number of "cool" productions each year. Subsequently, a pop-culture diplomacy emerged and the export of media products was connected to more institutional mechanisms. At the same time, US President George W. Bush's harsh policies and growing global tension increased sympathy for Japan and its soft power. This created economic opportunities for Japanese companies and paved the way for Japanese products in world markets. In

this context, the Koizumi government took important steps between 2001 and 2006. Institutions such as the *Head Office for Intellectual Property Strategy* (2002), the *Committee for Tourism Nation* (2003), the *Committee for Info-communication Software* (2003), the *Research Committee for Content Business* (2005), the *J-Brand Initiative* (2003), and the *Council for the Promotion of International Exchange* (2006) were established to make policies more systematic. More developments were implemented at the ministerial level. The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) established the *Cool Japan Promotion Office* in 2010. Soon after, the *Council for the Promotion of Cool Japan* was appointed by the Cabinet Secretariat. In 2006, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) adopted an official policy of pop-culture diplomacy. In the same year, MOFA assumed sponsorship of the World Cosplay Summit.[43] In 2008, an anime character, *Doraemon,* was appointed as "Anime Ambassador". Although METI works only on market promotion, MOFA implements more inclusionary policies on Japanese culture.[44]

The success of Japanese pop-culture has created a new policy area for the Japanese government. The government has found significant institutional activism and has opened the way for more products to be produced and distributed with promotive policies.

In April 2005, the government issued a declaration entitled "Japan's 21st Century Vision".[45] According to this, Japan should produce policies for the purpose of becoming a "culturally creative nation" as of 2020.[46] To this end, Japan should take advantage of its own culture, creative power and technology, increase free exchange between cultures, and strengthen its new global position. This situation, as described above, has led to a new link between the state and cultural industries. As the economic and diplomatic values of cultural products have increased, policy makers have instrumentalized them.[47] Manga and anime products that are unique to Japan, have a particular place in the production of such creative products.

What is the Cool Japan Project?

The concept of "Cool Japan" has a central importance in terms of Japanese soft power. Originally, the term was first used in 1967 by a British band *Bonzo Dog Doo Dah* as: "Cool Britannia, Britannia you are cool/Take a trip!/Britons ever, ever, ever shall be hip."[48] In the 1990s "Cool Britain" was embraced by the British government in order to recreate Britain as an epitome of culture, style and innovation.[49] However, the concept of "Cool Britain" has not been as comprehensive as "Cool Japan" and has long been forgotten. In

2002, US journalist Douglas McGray's article "Japan's Gross National Cool", written for *Foreign Policy* magazine, paved the way for the popularization of the concept.[50] The concept began to be discussed in the early years of the 2000s, and in the second decade of the 2000s, it became part of official policies. After McGray's article, the notion of soft power that, in the eyes of many, only the United States possesses, began to be associated with Japan. According to McGray, Japan is able to create patterns of consumption through its domestic creative industry. Thanks to the "Gross National Cool", Japan would have its own soft power. After McGray's article, in 2003 *Time* magazine prepared a special edition titled "Asia," with a "Cool Japan" cover. According to *Time*, Japan was turning its pop-culture into a major industrial resource.[51]

Cool Japan spontaneously emerged in the market and the Japanese government has carefully transformed, sterilized, and begun to use it for its own policy interests.

Cool Japan has become a part of the Japanese cultural industry in the 2000s and has also begun to be discussed

in academic circles. According to Valaskivi, Cool Japan is creating a new social imagination. The rhetoric for Cool Japan is similar to the processes of imagining and representing the idea of "nation".[52] Daliot-Bul also deals with Cool Japan from a similar point of view. According to Daliot-Bul, Cool Japan spontaneously emerged in the market and the Japanese government has carefully transformed, sterilized, and begun to use it for its own policy interests.[53] Storz claims that in the 1990s Japan's competitive power was weak in new areas such as business software or biotechnology. However, with transformations and institutional shifts in innovation systems, the competitiveness of video games produced by Japan's "cool" industry has significantly increased.[54] Abel analyzes the concept of "cool" in depth and discusses whether the troubles experienced due to the great tsunami disaster in 2011 can be overcome with Cool Japan.[55] Concerning the central position of anime in Cool Japan, Condry treats anime as a collection of texts and focuses on the creation processes. He describes the cultural influences created by the anime with the stages of the creation process.[56]

In 2004, a work entitled "Intellectual Property Strategic Program", published by *Intellectual Property Strategy Headquarters*, pointed to a dramatic increase in the content business.

Categories such as movies, music, animation and game software; which form the subcategories of the content business, are shown to have achieved significant global success. However, parties do not carry out their activities in a common framework. Although the size of the Japanese content business amounts to US$ 8.7 billion, its share in GDP is below world standards.[57] This report emphasizes the size and importance of the content business sector and indicates that it can play an important role for the establishment of Japanese soft power: "However, since the content business is operated on a large scale and involves various industrial fields, it is not only expected to drive the Japanese economy but also to play a significant role in improving the image of Japan abroad ("soft power"). Therefore, it is an important industry for designing the national strategy."[58]

Anime and manga's place within the content industry is detailed in the report entitled "Content Industry Current Status and Direction of Future Development" published by the *Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry* (METI) in April 2016. The size of Japanese content in the foreign market amounts to US$ 13.8 billion and constitutes 2.5% of the foreign content market. The subcategories are as follows in terms of sales rates in foreign markets according to their sectors:

Manga, game, character merchandise, animation, movie-music-broadcast.[59]

In May 2011, the concept of Cool Japan became part of official policies with the proposal prepared by the *Cool Japan Advisory Council*.[60] In 2012, *METI* launched a roadmap by publishing a report on the promotion of the "Cool Japan Strategy and the Creative Tokyo Project". According to this report, the Cool Japan strategy, which is based on anime, fashion, food culture, design and tourism, is described as follows: "Through the Cool Japan Strategy, ensure employment by promoting overseas development by small and medium businesses and young designers, attracting tourists to Japan, and revitalizing local communities."[61]

In March 2013, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe announced his support for the Cool Japan strategy and stated that he planed to establish a public-private entity in this context.[62] As a result of this, in November 2013, the Cool Japan Fund (a public-private fund) was established to support Japanese products in the global market.[63] It was announced that Japan would provide US$ 1 billion in support for its "soft" exports including Japanese ancestral cuisine, fashion and cinema.[64] The Cool Japan Initiative's report in 2014 once again emphasized the importance of the public-private partnership, which was assigned to the responsibility of

METI. According to this report, Japan is the country that produces the most creative products in the world with a share of 36% in the global market. Japanese products compete in the fields of cinema, music, drama and animation with products from Europe, USA and Korea in major Asian cities such as Taipei, Hong Kong, Bangkok, and Shanghai. Although Japanese products do not perform well in the categories of cinema and music; they have similar popularity rates with their competitors in drama. The situation in the anime and manga sectors is much different: Japan has undisputed superiority in the region.[65] According to the Cool Japan Movement Promotion Council's report in 2014, Cool Japan's objectives are listed in three steps: The first is "Promoting Domestic Growth", the second is "Connecting Japan and Other Countries", and the third is "Becoming Japan That Helps the World".[66] Once again, the importance of public-private partnership in achieving these aims emerges.

The most important move Japan has made is to redesign public-private cooperation according to the conditions of the day, especially according to the soft power that makes up the conceptual framework of this work. From Nye's perspective, the line between the private and public sectors in the global economy is increasingly blurred. Old-style national companies

are leaving their place to hybrid organizations.[67] The final report of the Intellectual Property Strategic Program published in 2016 by the Intellectual Property Strategy Promotion Headquarters focuses on a similar subject. A public-private partnership that is hardly mentioned in the same organization's first report in 2004, is an important part of the 2016 report. The report emphasizes the importance of public-private partnership to promote new content expansion. In addition to the production of Japanese content, the produced content must be linked to different industries and new markets must be created: "It is from this standpoint, and in line with the "Intellectual Property Strategic Program 2015," that the "Cool Japan Public-Private Partnership Platform" was established in December 2015 in order to serve as a mechanism for specific promotion of essential, integrated development between content-producing and non-content-producing industries. It was under the auspices of this Platform that the "Cool Japan Business Seminar" was held in collaboration with the comprehensive, commercial "Anime Japan" animation event in March 2016 to facilitate cross-sector matching for content-related industries and others."[68]

Anime industry is about 12% of the video game industry, which is another part of the Cool Japan project.[69]

Although anime and manga industries have less share than the video game industry in the Japanese economy; the main content of Japanese popular culture emantes from anime and manga. Economic size, therefore, is not a decisive indicator of sectors in Cool Japan. On the contrary, anime and manga are seen as the flagship of the Cool Japan project. As a result, special attention is given to anime and manga in order to achieve Cool Japan's strategic goals.[70]

The Substantial Place of Anime and Manga in Cool Japan

Among Japanese cultural elements, anime and manga need further attention since they enjoy the most widespread global diffusion. The history of manga, which has a special place in Japanese culture, dates back to ancient times. Since the 12th century manga has been produced in scrolls and formed the basis of modern manga. The contents of the drawings were common animals such as frogs, monkeys and foxes. Although religious content has also entered as subjects of manga over time; in the 17th and 18th centuries, secular issues started to be processed and manga became commercialized. In the 19th century, manga took its place in daily life

and created its own market. During the turbulent years of the 1920s and 1930s, manga was used as a means of resistance against the repressive policies of authoritarian rule and therefore increased its popularity. In addition to manga describing the war period (both humanistic and political), it began to be drawn in new categories (sports, school, romance, etc.) after the war.[71] Diversity in the mentioned categories made it possible for adults to be manga readers too. This has helped to popularize anime, most of which have been adapted to the screen from the manga since the 1980s.

The Japanese pop-culture industry does not only produce its own products, but also reproduces global products in its own style.

Albeit the first anime prototypes appeared at the beginning of the 20th century when silent films were filmed, anime in its modern sense is based on the years following World War II. In this period, when anime was trying to find a place for itself on the screen, the animation industry was under the dominance of Disney. In 1956, the famous *Toei Animation* was established and aimed to be the "Disney of the East".[72] Famous directors such as Takahata Isao and Miyazaki Hayao, who grew up in Toei, gave birth to another famous animation studio "Studio Ghibli".[73] The biggest difference between Disney animations and Japanese anime is the content. In these years; animations, like cartoons, were made for children. However, Japanese anime carries all aspects of life on the screen. Many categories such as sports, science-fiction, mythology, horror, and even adult content are the subjects.[74] This aspect of anime has increased the diversity of target audience and has strengthened its hand against Western style animation. According to the Association of Japanese Animations, 60 member anime production companies are now providing products in 112 countries, reaching to some 87.2 % of the world's population.

The Japanese pop-culture industry does not only produce its own products, but also reproduces global products in its own style. Popular Hollywood products such as Matrix, Kill Bill, and even Shakespeare's works have been adapted to the anime style. The growing popularity of anime has created fans around the world and world-wide fan groups have started to be established. Fans are also involved in the reproduction process of Japanese pop-culture in this context.[75] Fans'

participation to the production process increases the "intercultural" nature of the anime. Fan-made subtitles, toys, costumes, etc. create a unique way of contribution to anime. Therefore, the "language" of anime is becoming more and more global with each passing season.[76]

Anime production has created a sector that does not require large costs and thus has a high level of sustainability. Anime can be produced with a combination of a few actors. Yet in the production phase it is also open to contributions made by people of different backgrounds. This has led to a significant turnover of the anime content, which was initially influenced by Japanese culture. Increasingly, Manga artists, sponsors, investors and fans have become part of the production process.[77] At the same time, the increasing attractiveness of anime has created a phenomenon under the name of "otaku tourism".[78] Anime fans organize visits to the cities where their favorite anime is produced. These visits appear as a kind of "pilgrimage", and help to create new social groups and communication channels. According to Okamoto, the audience is increasing their admiration by visiting places of interest.[79]

The word *otaku* means geek and/or nerd. The concept of otaku was first used in 1983 by a manga named Cute

Pie Comics (Manga Burikko). Today it expresses "extreme" fans who do not want to get out of the world created by anime and manga. *Otaku*s are defined as introverted people, with weak social ties and very few friends.[80] In Japan, the otaku culture has spread so much that the sociological consequences of this situation are evident in Akihabara (a district famous for selling electronics products in Tokyo). In 2007, Akihabara's popularity surpassed that of Tokyo Disneyland. Akihabara is home to the otaku. Flooded with anime products, it welcomes foreign tourists to a considerable extent: "A convergence of discursive forces economic and political, cultural and social, domestic and foreign conditioned a "cool" otaku image in Akihabara, which reframed and restricted the possibilities for people gathering there."[81] Anime series are so influential that fans are even taking it further and seeing anime characters as their friends.[82] Some fans who are seeking spiritual pursuits even base this on anime, seeing the series they admire as a kind of spiritual guide.[83] As a result of this, anime's (and in conjunction with it, manga's) ability to affect the masses can be considered to be quite high. The phenomenon that emerged in Japan has spread rapidly throughout the world and has created a new sociology by creating its own societies.

Problems of Japanese Soft Power in the 21st Century

During the early 2000s Japan started to shrug off the post-bubble slump, but the positive atmosphere dissipated after the 2008 global financial crisis. There have been two important reasons for this. The first is simply the difficulty of catching up with the old sales figures in difficult market conditions. The second comes from the challenges of increased competition from international firms. What is meant by the latter is that Japan's pop-culture products are becoming more and more de-centralized with the ever-developing information technologies. The involvement of different actors into the production and consumption processes has also started to transform the content of Japanese pop-culture products, slowly breaking the Japanese monopoly. Although the spread of the Otaku culture in Hong Kong, South Korea and China was encouraged by Japan in the 1990s, this has also led to the change of Japanese pop-culture. According to Mori, it is impossible for Japanese cultural products to remain "as is" in Asia's huge geography.

The breakthroughs that Japan has made were implemented by China and South Korea as well.

Moreover, the breakthroughs that Japan has made were implemented by China and South Korea as well. The Chinese government established animation-focused television channels in 2004, requiring the broadcasts of these channels to be mostly made in China. Although China's cultural policies have not achieved the expected success, South Korea has made a breakthrough. Korean dramas in particular have found a very large audience.[84] Nevertheless, China's superiority and cultural capacity in the region is considered more by Japan. Japan, with its cultural products, entered the Chinese market aiming to be permanent, and tried to create a pan-Asian market. In this context, co-productions with China and South Korea have increased. However, China's economic success and physical size have always been a source of concern for Japan.[85] The traces of this concern are also seen in the changing character of Japanese foreign policy.

In the 2010s, Japan has begun to change its traditional foreign policy which was implemented after World War II. In this context, Japan's low profile foreign policy mentality, which was in force for more than half a century, has begun to be abandoned. The debate surrounding Article 9 of the Constitution has found a particular place on the public agenda and Japan has started to review its international role. As a result, Japan

has increased its participation in international peacekeeping activities. Through peacekeeping, Japan aims to maximize its security and prestige and to build a more active foreign policy, possibly allowing more room for the use of the armed forces. By expanding the scope of its national security concept, Japan does not only consider security in its own borders, but also aims to take the initiative for peace all over the world.[86] Considering the conceptual nature of soft power, evaluating the effectiveness of Japanese soft power on its national security is very difficult. Consequently, after 2010, Japan began to combine its peaceful profile that was built after World War II with its military capacity, to actively participate in international peace-keeping missions.

Conclusion

Japan was defeated in the Second World War and continues to have legal obstacles to increases in its hard power. Therefore soft power mechanisms offer an important opportunity for Japanese foreign policy. In this regard, Japan first developed its cultural relations at the regional level and established relations on the basis of shared traditional cultural values, extending into popular culture. Thanks to the relationships established through mutual friendship and cooperation, pop-culture products

managed to spread internationally. The impact of pop-culture products to the masses in the 1990s did not escape the attention of the Japanese government and necessary institutional activism began to be realized. In the 2000s, the Japanese culture industry institutionalized effectively and attracted masses on a global scale. As a content producer, anime and manga played a great role in this success.

> By expanding the scope of its national security concept, Japan does not only consider security in its own borders, but also aims to take the initiative for peace all over the world.

A number of new studies can be realized in connection with this study. Japanese pop-culture has been a source of Japanese soft power, with many years of creative work and political moves coming together. However, nowadays many pop-culture products produced by Japan find new sources from outside of Japan. This situation inevitably reduces Japanese culture's international influence. Furthermore, global giants such as Hollywood and Netflix compete more and more effectively with the Japanese anime industry.[87] The 2008 global financial crisis and the emergence of new global security

threats have dissolved the favorable climate created by the economic and political globalization of the 2000s. The emergence of the concept of soft power depends precisely on the dynamics of a favorable global environment. Today, there is an increasing pressure on states to put military policies into practice. In this environment, anime-as a component of soft power- might play an interesting role in combining soft and hard power.

Japanese pop-culture has been a source of Japanese soft power, with many years of creative work and political moves coming together.

Endnotes

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Competing Interests of Major Powers in the Middle East: The Case Study of Syria and Its Implications for Regional Stability

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Abstract

The Middle East region has always remained the centre of attraction for major powers due to its geostrategic importance and huge energy resources. The Middle East, due to hosting many ethnic and religious nationalities, has been a conflict-prone region, facing various conflicts and crises that not only make regional states confront each other but also invite extra-regional powers to play their role.

The paper aims at highlighting the current situation in the Middle East by taking Syria as a case study. After 2011, the civil war in Syria and the subsequent instability provided Russia and the United States with an opportunity to support opposing factions engaged in war. The theme of involvement by extra-regional powers in regional conflicts having negative implications for regional peace and stability will be discussed in this paper.

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Key Words

Syria, Strategic Competition, Conflict, Crisis, Shatterbelt, Stability.

Introduction

The Middle East, a conflict-prone region, is in a state of flux due to the shifting geopolitical landscape of the region. The current phase of instability and turmoil can be traced back to two important developments – the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the disastrous consequences of the so called Arab Spring (later on called as the Arab Uprisings).

The Middle East and in particular the Persian Gulf have immense strategic importance due to their huge energy resources. It is estimated that the region holds 52.5% of the total crude oil reserves of the world as well as 44.6% of total natural gas reserves.[1]

Another unique geographical characteristic of the region is that the Middle Eastern landmass is rimmed

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by five seas – the Caspian Sea, Black Sea, the Eastern Mediterranean, the Red Sea /Gulf of Aden and the Arabian /Persian Gulf – all of which are important for regional as well as for extra-regional powers that have historically sought to achieve control over them.[2]

Moreover, maritime transportation through three chokepoints – the Suez Canal (connecting the Mediterranean and Red Seas), Bab-al-Mandab (connecting the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden), and the Straits of Hormuz (connecting the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea) makes Middle East a tremendously significant area in sustaining the global economy.[3]

The strategic location of the Middle East – at the junction of three continents and with huge energy resources -- has long attracted outside powers to the region. Interestingly, the presence of outside powers has not stabilized the region, rather it has further exposed the fissures – different sectarian outlooks, and weak state structures in the region. To gain competitive advantage, these outside powers build upon and further reinforce internal divisions in the region. These facts have hindered the geopolitical integration of the region as most of the states rely on external military support.[4]

Despite unique geographical characteristics and shared resources, the region has been marred with intense sectarian conflict as well. In particular, the US withdrawal of combat troops from Iraq without signing the Framework Agreement shifted the regional balance of power in Iran's favor. Moreover, the Arab uprisings of 2011 not only created chaos and turmoil but weakened the monarchies in the region. Coupled with these two important developments was the signing of the Iran Nuclear Deal known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which created insecurity and fear among Iran's rival Arab states. Given the structured insecurity of Gulf-Arab states vis-à-vis Iran and Syria, for which these states had sought US security protection, it is noteworthy that the US withdrawal of troops from Iraq and signing of the JCPOA contributed to harnessing sectarian tensions in the region.

The strategic location of the Middle East – at the junction of three continents and with huge energy resources -- has long attracted outside powers to the region.

This paper highlights the role of regional as well as extra-regional powers in the Syrian conflict while identifying the implications of their involvement for regional peace and stability. Though the US is still militarily a dominant actor, China's expanding influence and Russia's renewed interest both pose challenges to US interests in the region. Syria, due to its prolonged civil war (2011-onwards) has become a centre for major power competition between the US and Russia. This renewed geo-political contest by outside powers to achieve their interests at the cost of regional peace and stability by accelerating regional states' fears makes the Middle East an extremely volatile region. The concept of Shatterbelt, a geo-political theory, has been used as the conceptual framework to highlight the geostrategic importance of the Middle East, its power politics, its embedded sectarian conflict and most importantly the on-going Syrian conflict, which has been aggravating issues with the involvement of regional and extra-regional powers. The Shatterbelt concept has rarely been used by writers in the Middle East context. In this regard, the paper is an attempt to apply the concept of Shatterbelt to the Middle East region. It seems a relevant concept regarding existing realities.

The Middle East – A Shatterbelt Region: The Conceptual Framework

The importance of geopolitical theories in international politics cannot be denied. International Relations scholars are well aware of geopolitical heartland-rimland theories, which both emphasized the permanence and centrality of a global struggle for power between Eurasian-based land power and rimland-based sea power in the context of global maritime dominance.[5] In a related conceptualization, Saul Cohen used the term shatterbelts as roughly equivalent to the concept of rimland.[6]

The term "shatterbelt" refers to a geographical region that is beset by local conflicts within or between states in the region and by the involvement of competing extra-regional major powers.

Some geographical regions are inherently more conflict-prone than other regions and are referred to as "shatterbelts."[7] The concept of shatterbelts was coined in geopolitical writings of the 20th century. The term

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"shatterbelt" refers to a geographical region that is beset by local conflicts within or between states in the region and by the involvement of competing extra-regional major powers.[8] To a great extent, shatterbelt regions are held responsible for major power conflicts – World War I and World War II are often said to have started in shatterbelt regions.

Traditional geo-politicians and conflict theorists have treated geography either as a facilitating condition – in the context of geographical proximity – or as a source of conflict – with regard to territorial conflicts, while the distinct feature that can be attributed to the concept of shatterbelt is its uniqueness of combining these two characteristics.[9]

Though the term shatterbelt was coined much later, strategists such as Mahan (1900) studied a belt of weak Middle Eastern and Asian states that due to the anticipated presence of vast resources, attracted the great powers – Great Britain and Russia – which got involved in strategic competition for territorial and economic expansion in the area.

The instability during the inter-war period and the outbreak of World War II renewed the interest of geo-political theorists to identify what makes one region more volatile and conflict-prone than other regions. In the subsequent inquiry, the terms shatter zones and shatterbelts were devised. The study of conflicts in the shatterbelt regions show that states, due to their internal fragmentations – ethnic, religious or linguistic cleavages – fall into civil wars with higher possibility of escalation of conflict due to the involvement of external powers.[10]

Initial writings on shatterbelt regions focused on Central and Eastern Europe but Cohen incorporated the concept of shatterbelts into his regional model of the world. He classified three regions – the Middle East, Sub Saharan Africa, and South East Asia as shatterbelts, which he defined as "large strategically located regions, occupied by a number of conflicting states that are caught between the conflicting interests of the great powers."[11] The physical, environmental, historical, cultural, and political differences between states and uneven population distribution in shatterbelt regions are likely to produce fragmentation in these states, thus reducing the chances of political or economic coordination among them. Cohen identified that shatterbelt regions have some strategic importance – mineral wealth or control over shipping lanes – thus attracting great power competition to enhance their influence in these regions.

The Middle East as a shatterbelt region is characterized by deep divisions within and between sovereign states

and societies, which are further inflamed by great power competition.[12] Home to many ethnic and religious communities- Sunni and Shia Muslims, Christians, and Jews; Arabs, Turks, and Persians; Azeris, Kurds, and Druze; Alawites and Maronits; Nilotic Blacks and Sudanese Arabs- the Middle East has remained mired in conflicts and crises.[13] The religious, ethnic and racial strife gets intensified by scarce arable land and water resources as well as conflicting claims over oil and gas resources.[14]

> The Middle East as a shatterbelt region is characterized by deep divisions within and between sovereign states and societies.

The deep internal divisions in the Middle East shatterbelt are enhanced by major powers' policies to achieve their objectives. To get more leverage vis-a-vis rival states, the major powers are in direct competition due to the strategic location and huge resources of the region, which not only increase geopolitical competition among regional states but contribute to exacerbating sectarian tensions as well.

In recent times, the sectarian cleavage in Middle East politics emerged after

the Iranian revolution in 1979, when the US, along with the Sunni Arab monarchies, viewed Iran as a rising threat to its interests in the region. In this context, the most notable feature regarding US policy is the 1980 Carter Doctrine, which will be discussed in the following section. The Iranian revolution and subsequent Iran-Iraq war provided a rationale for the extra-regional powers to get more actively involved in the affairs of the Middle Eastern states by exploiting the fears of regional states. The extra-regional states' involvement, though highly destabilizing, has become a permanent feature in the region.

This paper discusses the interests and roles of the major powers; namely the US, Russia and China, in historical context. The US and Russia had long been involved in the affairs of the Middle East but China, though heavily dependent on energy resources of the Middle East, was not an active player in Middle East politics. For the first time in history in January 2016, China issued a White Paper on its relations with the Arab States.[15] Maintaining a balance between China's relations with Israel and the Arab States as well as between the Sunni Arab States and Iran has been a guiding principle of China's Middle East policy. China has cordial relations with Israel but at the same time it supports a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital

and supports a WMD-Free Zone in the Middle East.[16]

Interests of Great Powers in the Middle East – Past and Present

The Middle East has remained an arena of strategic competition during the 19th and 20th centuries between Western European imperialist powers and Czarist Russia. Even before the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire in 1919, Britain, the most important colonial power, had strategic goals in the region and opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 provided it with an opportunity to be the dominant commercial power in the world.[17] The joint control of Anglo-Egyptian forces over Sudan gave Britain access to the western shores of the Red Sea to complement the base on the other side at Aden, which commanded the strait of Bab-al-Mandeb, the exit to the Indian Ocean.[18] Moreover, British protectorates were established over Bahrain (1867), the Trucial States (1892) and Kuwait (1899), which became bases to pursue the power struggle.[19]

Other European powers also got engaged within the Middle Eastern region. France strengthened its foothold in the Levant (Lebanon and Syria) and also took hold of Djibouti, on the African shore of the Gulf of Aden, while developing the port into a commercial and strategic rival to British Aden.[20] Similarly, Italy seized Eritrea and got access to landlocked Ethiopia, which became the central focus for Italy's imperialist ambitions in Northeastern Africa.[21] Meanwhile, Czarist Russia sought expansion towards territories around the Caspian Sea, bringing it into conflict with the Ottoman Empire and Persia.

> The Middle East has remained an arena of strategic competition during the 19th and 20th centuries between Western European imperialist powers and Czarist Russia.

In the mid-20th century, the Western European powers' influence in the Middle East started to decline as France gave up its influence over Lebanon in 1945 and over Syria in 1946. Britain granted independence to trans-Jordan in 1946, and after a year, it withdrew its mandate from Palestine as well.[22] The war ravaged European states – Britain and France left the space for the United States which became the dominant Western power in the region.

As part of its containment strategy[23] United States made defense

arrangements with Middle East states and in response, Soviet Union also formalized a policy of alliances beyond its borders. The Suez Crisis of 1956 provided Moscow with an opportunity to emerge as the patron of Egypt, providing it with military and economic assistance, while establishing military and air bases in the country and subsequently enhancing its influence in the Middle East.[24] Soviet alliances with Middle Eastern states enabled it to deploy naval forces in the eastern Mediterranean, the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean. At different times, Soviet navy had access to bases in Libya, Egypt, Syria, in Ethiopia's Eritrea province and Somalia.[25]

In this backdrop of external involvement in the Middle East, the interests of United States, Russia and China are discussed below.

US Interests in the Middle East

The sole objective of the US has been to maintain its predominance in the region and to achieve this end, US is ready to employ all elements of national power including the use of military force. This objective was clearly enunciated in the Eisenhower Doctrine of 1957 and in the Carter Doctrine of 1980. The Eisenhower Doctrine pronounced US commitment to the security

and stability of the Middle East by employing peaceful means – economic and military aid as well as through the use of force,[26] while the Carter Doctrine stated that 'any attempt by an outside power to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be considered as an attack against vital interests of the US and will be deterred by any means necessary including military means.'[27] Similarly, US governments from time to time have expressed their interests in the Middle East as core interests.

Ensuring the protection and free flow of oil has been the most constant, and the most important, US interest in the Middle East.

Ensuring the protection and free flow of oil has been the most constant, and the most important, US interest in the Middle East. Olaf Caroe, a British official, recognized the importance of Middle East energy resources especially in the Persian Gulf and Arabian Peninsula, and identified a role for the US to maintain preeminence in the region.[28] Since the 1970s, America's strategic interest in the region has been not only securing easy access for itself but also ensuring an open and secure market for its allies in East Asia and

Europe. Middle Eastern countries, especially the states of the Persian Gulf, are key oil producers and exporters. Europe, China, and Japan all depend on imported oil to meet their energy needs. In recent times, given US-Iran hostile relations, Iran has been considered as a potential threat to the free flow of oil.[29]

To prevent the spread of nuclear weapons has been another key interest of the US in the Middle East. This policy intends to prevent any hostile state from gaining enough power to threaten US interests regarding oil security or the security of Israel. Initially in 1981, Israel's preventive attack on Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor[30] eliminated the possibility of Iraq's developing of nuclear weapons. Similarly, Israel attacked Syria's al-Kibar nuclear facility in 2007.[31] But it is ironical that any effort on the part of regional states to strengthen institutional mechanisms regarding non-proliferation could not gain desired attention from the major powers. In this regard, it is worth noting that the proposals to make the Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Free Zone could not produce any dividends. The original proposal as put forward by the Egyptian Representative during the NPT Review Conference in 1995 has been revived from time to time, even in the last NPT Review Conference (May 2015).[32]   Apart from Israel,

which has always remained indifferent to the proposal, the US has also been reluctant to support such a proposal.[33]

> To prevent the spread of nuclear weapons has been another key interest of the US in the Middle East.

The United States maintains extensive security cooperation with Israel. Washington helps Israel preserve its "Qualitative Military Edge", with legislation ensuring Israel's superiority over "any conventional military threat from any individual state or possible coalition of states or from non-state actors.[34] US and Israeli defense companies often work together on projects, including missile defense programmes such as the Arrow and Arrow II anti-missile systems. The "Iron Dome" anti-missile system, which helps protect Israel form Hamas and Hizbullah rockets, was a joint US-Israel effort.[35]   Since the 9/11 attacks, the United States has prioritized counter-terrorism in its policy towards the Middle East. Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen rank high regarding bilateral counter-terrorism cooperation.[36] As far as counter-terrorism is concerned, through cooperative efforts, the United States gains access to vital intelligence, local

services use their agents and capabilities to target and disrupt terrorists at home, and in some cases, such as Yemen, the United States secures physical access in order to launch drone strikes.[37]

To meet its interests, the United States maintains a range of security relationships in the Middle East. These include defense cooperation agreements, basing and access rights, and the prepositioning of military assets. The current US force structure in the Gulf consists of bases in Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait and the UAE.[38]

The US has been the largest arms supplier to the regional states. US military commitments and its security guarantees have been the cornerstone of the Middle East security architecture. The US security umbrella has allowed Gulf monarchies to stand up against their powerful regional rivals – Iraq and Iran.

> The US has been the largest arms supplier to the regional states.

The US invasion of Iraq and later on withdrawal of US troops from Iraq without signing any Status of Forces Agreement has shifted the regional order in Iran's favor. Moreover, President Obama's focus on East Asia and its engagement with Iran on nuclear

issue was considered detrimental to the Gulf States' interests and created fears and doubts in the Gulf capitals about America's commitment to Gulf security.[39]

The Gulf States' disillusionment with the US, along with their economic pragmatism in light of the global power transition to the East, motivated them to diversify their political and security relations.

In this regard, since 2005 onwards, relations with China, Russia and Western countries were also enhanced.[40]

Russian Interests in the Middle East

In the post-Cold War era, Russian engagement with the Middle East states can primarily be seen through the prism of countering secessionist movements in the North Caucasus as Moscow had been accusing Gulf entities of funding the separatists and extremists in Russia.[41]

In the past, Moscow had blamed Gulf-based charity organizations for introducing radicalism in the region and financing extremist groups in the North Caucasus.[42]

Russia, while fighting the Chechen wars, faced severe criticism from Muslim countries, especially the

Middle Eastern countries which termed the Chechen fight against Russia as a struggle for achieving right to self-determination.[43] The War on Terror provided Russia with an opportunity to cooperate with the West and classify its military operation in Chechnya as part of the terrorist strategy.[44]

Russia's opposition to the Iraq war and its anti-Western rhetoric helped it to improve its relations with the Muslim states. In this regard, granting Russia an observer status in the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC) in 2003 was a breakthrough, which led to the improvement of relations between Russia and Muslim countries and subsequently changed the stance of Muslim countries towards Russia's actions and policies towards its Muslim population in the North Caucasus.[45]

> Russia's opposition to the Iraq war and its anti-Western rhetoric helped it to improve its relations with the Muslim states.

It is reported that Russian Muslims have been participating in the war in Syria as part of the rebel forces and constitute the second largest group of foreign fighters in Syria after Libyans.[46] Similarly, militants from the North Caucasus have joined high military ranks in DAESH[47] in Iraq and Syria.[48] This has been a cause of concern for Russia as these fighters will come back with more battlefield experience and might try to mobilize a global Jihadist movement against the Russian government after the end of the Syrian conflict.[49]

Secondly, Russia is interested in engaging Middle Eastern states economically but, despite its continuous efforts, it plays a marginal role in the economies of the Gulf States. As per 2013 statistics, out of the Gulf Cooperation Council's $1.47 trillion total trade with the world, Russia-GCC trade was valued at $3.74 billion.[50] Economic relations remain focused on three areas: arms sales, energy, and investment. The region is the second largest arms export market for Russia after the Asia Pacific.[51]

Despite having political differences on issues of Iran, Syria and Palestine, Russia has established strong economic relations with Israel, with bilateral trade reaching $3 billion in 2009.[52] While making arms deals with Middle Eastern states, Russia has given due consideration to preserve strategic equation vis-à-vis Israel and the Muslim states of the Middle East. Apart from Israel, Russia has also established strong economic relations with Turkey. Their trade volume has

been constantly increasing and has reached to over $34 billion in 2012.[53]

As regards Russia's relations with the Gulf countries, energy has remained the most significant component of economic relations. Energy generates over 40% of Russia's federal fund and over 75% of foreign hard currency earnings.[54] Russia has been continuously engaging Iran, Qatar, Algeria and Libya, the key gas producers of the region, to cooperate and coordinate their policies regarding gas.[55] The Russian objective is to contain Europe's efforts to diversify its sources of energy (as Europe imports 80% of Russia's gas) away from Russia. To achieve this end, Russia has adopted a three-pronged strategy.[56] First, to ensure that Russian controlled pipeline routes – Nord Stream and South Stream – are constructed and alternative pipelines circumventing Russia cannot be developed. Second, to engage gas producing Central Asian states such as Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to ensure that they sell their gas through Russian controlled pipelines. Third, to persuade the other gas producing countries (Middle Eastern) to collaborate and coordinate with Russia in deciding market share in the European gas market.[57]

The loss of Iraq as the major importer of Russian weapons was a setback to its interests in the region but after the US refusal to sell arms to Egypt in 2013 following the military takeover, Russia stepped in and signed arms deals with the Egyptian government.[58]

Apart from Russia's economic relations with the Middle Eastern states, the Arab uprisings in 2011 provided Russia with an opportunity to expand its strategic influence in the region. Initially, Russia remained neutral regarding developments taking place in Tunisia and Egypt as part of the Arab Spring because these two countries were not of much relevance to Russia.[59] Developments in Libya and the subsequent Western military intervention for regime change alarmed Russia, which abstained from Resolution 1973, authorizing NATO's airstrikes against the Qaddafi regime and sanctioning military support for opposition forces to topple the Qaddafi government.[60]

Apart from Russia's economic relations with the Middle Eastern states, the Arab uprisings in 2011 provided Russia with an opportunity to expand its strategic influence in the region.

While opposing Western interventions, the Russian stance on the Syrian

conflict seems highly uncompromising. The Syrian conflict has become a litmus test for confronting the concept of humanitarian intervention, as in 2008 the Russian intervention in Georgia was to set 'redlines against NATO enlargement.'[61] Why Russian policy towards Syria is different from its policy towards other Middle East states will be discussed below.

China's Interests in the Middle East

China's primary interest in the Middle East has been continued access to energy resources. China has surpassed the US as the largest importer of Gulf energy resources. Since 1995, the Middle East has been China's number one source of imported petroleum.[62] In this regard, Saudi Arabia and Iran are of immense importance. According to 2012 statistics, Saudi Arabia was the number one source of petroleum while Iran was the fourth most important supplier of imported Chinese oil.[63] As regards China's energy relations with Iran, despite expressing public opposition to sanctions, China has complied with the UN and the US sanctions against Iran and later on played important role in negotiating P5+1 Iran Nuclear Deal.

Moreover, rising tensions in East Asia have compelled Chinese policy makers to look westwards. It was suggested that in 'China's far west, Washington does not have a network of alliances to block Beijing from breaking out, thus China has greater opportunities to enhance its geopolitical and economic influence in Central Asia, the Middle East and beyond.'[64] After much deliberation in 2013, the Chinese leadership declared the launching of two initiatives – the Silk Road Economic Belt and the Maritime Silk Road, adopting the name of the ancient trade route between China and the West through Central Asia and the Middle East.[65] To pursue these initiatives, China has been constructing and financing ports in Egypt, Israel, Jordan and Turkey in the Mediterranean region as well as in Eritrea and Djibouti on the Red Sea.[66] In this regard, China has been heavily investing in Egypt, pledging $45 billion in construction of the Suez Canal Economic Zone and an additional amount of $15 billion in Egyptian electricity, transportation and infrastructure development projects.[67]

China's primary interest in the Middle East has been continued access to energy resources.

Another of China's interests in the Middle East has been preserving

internal security at home and around its periphery. China considers the Middle East as a strategic extension of China's periphery, as the issues unfolding in the Middle East will have a direct influence on China's internal security and stability.[68] These concerns make China a very cautious player in Middle East affairs.[69]

China considers the Middle East as a strategic extension of China's periphery.

Historically, China avoided military presence in the region, and its first naval visit to the Mediterranean occurred in 2009. In 2010, the Chinese navy visited Jeddah and in 2011 and 2014, it conducted rescue operations to evacuate its nationals from Libya. Similarly, in April 2015, it evacuated foreign nationals from Yemen while in the same year, it conducted joint naval exercises in the Mediterranean Sea for the first time. In 2016, China started constructing a naval base in Djibouti, an East African country that is at the southern entrance to the Red Sea on the route to the Suez Canal and that also hosts the largest US military base in Africa.[70] In July 2017, after completion of the facility, China sent ships carrying troops to China's first overseas military base.[71]

Historically, China avoided military presence in the region.

Current Political Dynamics in the Middle East and Major Power Competition in Syria

After analyzing the interests of US, Russia and China it is imperative to highlight the current regional dynamics that attracted the active involvement of extra-regional powers. Emile Simpson identifies three trends that unveil Russian and the US confrontationist policies in the Middle East.[72] The US and its Western allies, in responding to the Arab Spring, intervened for regime change in Libya and later on attempted it in Syria by backing the rebel forces. But a weakening of moderate rebel forces and strengthening of extremists and hardliners in each case paved the way for Russia to support the regimes on the pretext of preventing 'Islamist chaos'. The best examples of this are Gen. Haftar in Libya, President Assad in Syria, and the Sisi Government in Egypt.[73]

Secondly, after signing the Nuclear deal with Iran, the Obama Administration and later on Trump Administration have taken a hard line stance against Tehran while Russia strengthened its

relations with Tehran and acted as a broker between Saudi Arabia and Iran to set up the November 2016 OPEC agreement.[74]

Apart from the US-Russia stand-off on many issues in the Middle East, China has remained persistent in its stance of non-intervention in internal affairs of states and opposed Western efforts to regime change in Libya and later on in Syria, while emphasizing peaceful resolution of the conflict rather than overthrowing the Assad regime.[75]

> China has remained persistent in its stance of non-intervention in internal affairs of states.

The prolonged Syrian civil war attracted the regional as well as extra regional powers to get involved in the conflict to enhance their own interests. A significant reason for the involvement of these states has been Syria's geo-strategic importance in the Middle East. Apart from its own natural resources, Syria serves as the centre of thousands of kilometers of oil and gas pipelines that run through the Middle Eastern states.

Another reason that signifies its geo-strategic importance is the fact that Syria is one of only two Arab states that share borders with non-Arab neighbors, as it shares borders with Turkey and Israel. The status of being a frontline state adjoining Israel gives Syria an exceptional stature in the Arab world and makes it pivotal in international efforts to resolve the Palestine-Israel conflict.[76] Syria considers Israel as a continuous external threat and its loss of the Golan Heights, its natural defense against Israel, only augmented its insecurity and fear.[77]

Apart from external threats, the current Syrian conflict can be traced back to the so called Arab Spring of 2011. The large-scale protests against President Bashar al-Assad and his government prompted a violent response from the Assad government. The subsequent deterioration of the situation paved the way for external involvement in the Syrian conflict.

Since the outbreak of the current crisis, the external powers have sought to shape the outcomes of the conflict.[78] It is more pertinent to classify external actors into three groups: the first group comprises those who support the Assad regime – Iran, and Russia; the second group consists of those that oppose the Assad regime – Turkey, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, the US and its NATO allies; and a third group that cannot take sides in a decisive way; Jordan, Lebanon and Israel.[79]

> Since the outbreak of the current crisis, the external powers have sought to shape the outcomes of the conflict.

All the actors supporting or opposing Assad regime have different interests and different strategies. Saudi Arabia and the US both have a convergence of interest in reducing Iran's influence in Syria (which they consider enables Iran to exert influence in the Levant) with regard to preserving the regional balance of power. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states also share these concerns.[80]

The states that support the Assad regime have their own reasons. Syria is the only Arab ally of Iran that reduces its regional isolation, and provides it leverage vis-à-vis Hizbullah and Lebanon, and helps it challenge the regional order supported by the US.[81] Likewise,

As regards extra-regional powers, Syria has been a strategic ally of Russia since the Cold War, and to protect Syria, Russia has exercised its veto power at three crucial times – in 2011, 2012 and 2014- to block the imposition of sanctions or use of force against the Syrian regime.[82] The absence of sanctions has allowed Russia to provide

President Assad with military support when the regime was close to collapse. Russian warships patrolled in waters close to Syria and its military advisors provided support to the Syrian army.[83]

One significant reason for Russia's technical as well as military support for Syria is Russia's access to its strategic base at Tartus. The base is a refueling station and provides logistics facilities to Russian navy ships while providing the Russian navy with the ability to maintain a regular presence in the eastern Mediterranean.[84] Moreover, Tartus port gives Russia greater ability to navigate in the strategically important Gulf of Aden as well.[85]

> Syria has been a strategic ally of Russia since the Cold War.

Apart from strategic interests, it is noteworthy to highlight Russia's economic interests vis-à-vis Syria, which is a transit state with regard to energy pipelines.

Initially, Russia also favored non-interference and non-intervention in Syria but later on it got actively involved in the conflict by supporting the Assad regime not just diplomatically and politically but by extending military support as well. Russia has been

launching airstrikes in Syria since September 2015, nominally against DAESH targets but critics negate Russia's claim and assert that Russia has also been targeting rebel forces fighting against the Assad regime.[86]

It is estimated that Russian airstrikes have strengthened the Assad regime for the first time in the long civil war that is approaching its seventh year, enabling Syrian forces to retake strategic territory near Latakia.[87]

As for as the US role in the Syrian conflict is concerned, after its inability to get authorization from the United Nations Security Council to resort to military action, it elicited the support of Arab states in bringing forth the Syrian National Coalition in an attempt to unify diverse opposition forces and to get them international recognition.[88] In response to the Syrian military's suspected poison gas (chemical) attack on Khan Shiekhoun, a rebel controlled town that resulted in heavy civilian casualties- 86 people including 27 children- the US launched 59 Tomahawk cruise missiles targeting the Shayrat airfield in Homs province from where the chemical attack was launched.[89] It has been termed as the first direct US military attack on Assad forces that was strongly condemned by the Russia, terming it detrimental to US-Russia bilateral relations.[90]

The Syrian Conflict's Implications for Regional Stability

The Syrian conflict in its seventh year seemed to be winding down as the Assad regime had survived and DAESH had been defeated while regional states were looking ahead to the outcomes of the conflict.[91] In this regard, on November 22, 2017, a meeting of leaders from Iran, Turkey, and Russia was convened at Sochi, Russia to discuss the future of Syria. Similarly, UN-sponsored talks between representatives of the Syrian opposition and Syrian government were held on November 28 to chalk out the future course.[92]

In Syria, Russia, Turkey and Iran have emerged as the dominant external players.

To curb opposition, the Government of President Assad launched a fierce bombing campaign against anti-government rebels in Eastern Ghouta in the suburb of Damascus, killing hundreds of people including children and women.[93] Despite the Security Council's resolution for a truce for 30 days, a cease-fire has not taken effect.[94]

In Syria, Russia, Turkey and Iran have emerged as the dominant external players. The apparent disinterest of the United States has given Russia leverage to engage in post-conflict settlement talks. As regards the future of Syria, to maintain the unity of Syria as well as to accommodate the interests of all the stakeholders will remain a daunting challenge for the foreseeable future. So far, the longevity, gravity and complexity of the Syrian conflict have created serious regional implications that are elaborated below.

• **Harnessing the Sectarian Challenge in the Region**

The sectarian issue has long been embedded in the regional politics of the Middle East, but Saudi-Iranian rivalry for regional hegemony has harnessed the sectarian politics.[95] As mentioned earlier, Iran has been the main beneficiary of shifting geopolitical dynamics in the Middle East – the post-Saddam Shia regime in Iraq as well as the Arab uprisings of 2011 have immensely contributed to raise the regional influence of Iran. Moreover, the Iranian-P5+1 deal further helped Iran to shift the balance in its favor.[96] Iran's increased leverage as well as the Sunni monarchies' activism have been harnessing the sectarian divide in the region and can lead to further instability.

The future sectarian challenge may emerge from the emerging political structure of Syria. Syria not only became a battleground for regional states to support their sectarian factions, but Syrian refugees' presence in neighboring states created fear about demographic change in those states. This is especially true in Lebanon (on which Lebanon's political structure is based), but support to pro- Syrian government factions and anti-Syrian government factions can lead to eruption of sectarian and communitarian tensions as was the case in 1975 and which fuelled the civil war there (1975-1990).[97] These fears and concerns can trigger sectarian strife in respective states. Syrian conflict is becoming a defining factor in containing or escalating sectarian tensions in the region. This sectarian divide is not limited to Syria alone, Yemen is also passing through intense civil war. Bahrain and Lebanon also have sectarian cleavages that can be exploited by external players.

• **Rising Militancy**

The Assad regime's renewed initiative to launch attack against rebels in the Sunni dominated region of Ghouta has the potential to not only generate sectarian violence across the region but it can enhance militancy in youth. External involvement in internal affairs of states has already given rise to militancy. Foreign interference on the

pretext of humanitarian intervention in Libya and later on in Syria has been the determining factor in fueling militant tendencies in the region. In this regard, the Syrian example is the most illustrious one that has become a battle field for regional and extra-regional states to pursue their interests. The neighboring states fear that the influx of Syrian refugees will bring about militancy in their respective states as well.

> Foreign interference on the pretext of humanitarian intervention in Libya and later on in Syria has been the determining factor in fueling militant tendencies in the region.

• **Weak and Fractured State Structures**

As a result of the Arab uprisings (2011) weak state structures provided non-state actors and private militias with an opportunity to rise up to fill the security vacuum in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen.[98]

The prolonged conflicts in Iraq and Syria not just challenge the unity of these two states but threaten to redraw the map of the Middle East.[99] The prolonged civil wars have given rise to

non-state actors. In this context, the most challenging threat has been the rise of the DAESH,

Though after an intense battle, DAESH has been defeated in its stronghold, Mosul, Iraq, but Iraqi forces have to rely on US support to meet the future challenge, as $1.2 billion in budget funds have been requested for 2018 to continue supporting the Iraqi forces.[100] The United Nations has also estimated $1 billion will be needed for reconstructing Iraqi cities.[101] The threat of resurgence of DAESH or any other non-state actor cannot be ruled out unless state structures and the legitimacy of governments in the Middle East are restored.

• **Regional Counter-Terrorism Initiatives**

Most states in the Middle East have been directly involved in the armed conflicts since 2011. During 2013-17, Saudi Arabia was the world's second largest arms importer with arms imports increasing by 225% compared to 2008-12. Arms imports by Egypt – the third largest importer in 2013-17 grew by 215% between 2008-12 and 2013-17.[102] In this backdrop, in December 2015, Saudi Arabia announced the formation of a 41-member Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition (IMCTC) to form a unified pan-Islamic front against terrorism.[103]

> Most states in the Middle East have been directly involved in the armed conflicts since 2011.

In this regard, an Arab-Islamic-American Summit was held in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia on May 21-22, 2017, in which 55 Sunni majority Muslim states signed the communiqué to fight terrorism.[104] During the summit, President Trump criticized Iran and termed it as a state sponsor of terrorism in the region.[105]

The Islamic Military Alliance to Fight Terrorism (IMAFT) declared to operate in line with the UN and OIC provisions on terrorism. The exclusion of Iran and Iraq from the IMAFT reinforced the perception that it was an alliance of Sunni states. The policy of exclusion has contributed to signing of an anti-terrorism accord between Iran and Iraq. The two states signed a memorandum of understanding to extend cooperation and exchange experience in fighting terrorism and extremism, border security, education, logistical, technical and military support.[106]

Such alliances and pacts to fight terrorism and extremism face definitional problems as the world does not have a mutually accepted definition of terrorism. It is said that one country's terrorist is another's freedom fighter. Similarly, the maiden visit of President Trump to the Middle East, especially Saudi Arabia, not just heightened the fears of states that were excluded from the IMCTC but also concerned Russia, who has intelligence and military relations with these states.

In is pertinent to mention that Russia has been strengthening relations with the states for combating terrorism – Russian paratroopers conducted a joint counter-terrorism exercise with the Egyptian military – the post-Soviet, Russia's first military exercise with Egypt. Similarly, Russia deployed a naval flotilla off the Mediterranean coast of Libya and it supports Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, military leader of the Eastern faction in Libya.[107]

The counter-terrorism cooperation between the US and its allies and between Russia and its allies has the potential to escalate the existing tensions and mistrust in the region.

Conclusion

The Middle East, a volatile region, has been facing immense challenges. The regional states' mutual distrust and suspicions about each other perpetuate instability in the region. While the strategic location and the energy richness of the region has been a contributing factor to attract outside powers to expand their influence in

the region, regional rivalries have been harnessed by the outside powers by directly supporting the states or their proxies. In this regard, the Syrian case is the best example to illustrate the involvement of regional as well as extra-regional states and the drastic consequences of such involvement for regional peace and stability. The inherent instability which is caused by ethnic, tribal and sectarian conflicts, and strategic competition between regional as well as extra-regional powers –

Russia and the US – make the Middle East a shatterbelt region. Much of the current instability is fueled by the Syrian conflict, but whether resolution of the Syrian conflict will address other sources of instability is yet to be seen.

The regional states' mutual distrust and suspicions about each other perpetuate instability in the region.

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