ORTADOĞU ETÜTLERİ

MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES

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İÇİNDEKİLER ∕ *CONTENTS*

ÖNSÖZ

Ortadoğu Bölgesi tarihinin en kapsamlı dönüşüm süreçlerinden birini yaşamaktadır. Dönüşümün süreklilik arz ettiği ve Ortadoğu'ya has bir olgu olmadığı düşünülebilir. Ancak 2003 Irak işgali başlangıç noktası olarak alınırsa ülkelerin toplumsal, ekonomik ve siyasi parametrelerinde ciddi değişimlerin olduğunu ifade etmek mümkün hale gelmektedir. Soğuk savaş şartları altında kurulan iktidar yapıları, toplumsal baskı, ideolojik dönüşüm ve ülkelerin dış politikaları sarsılmış ve henüz yeni bir düzenin parametreleri oluşmamıştır. Bu dönüşüm, on yıllar boyunca siyasi, ekonomik, sosyal alanlarda birikmiş olan sorunların bir sonucu olmakla birlikte, bu sorunların güncel şartlar altında kendini yeniden var kıldığı bir süreç olarak devam etmektedir. Bu açıdan bakıldığında sürecin oldukça sancılı bir şekilde yaşanması ve beklenmedik sonuçlar ortaya çıkarması da sürpriz değildir.

Son on beş yılda bölgede meydana gelen değişimler, Ortadoğu'ya dair çeşitli ezberleri yerinden ederken, bazı faraziyelerin ise gerçeklere tekabül ettiğine dair önemli işaretler sunmuştur. Sarsılan en önemli ezberlerden biri, bölgenin durağan ve homojen bir yapıya sahip bir bütün olduğuna yönelik kabullenmedir. Halbuki son on beş yıldır görüldü ki, bölgede ciddi bir dinamizm söz konusuydu. Bu dinamizm hem ideolojik boyutta hem de yeni nesillerin beklentilerini ve tepkilerini ortaya koyma biçiminde kendini göstermiştir. Sarsılan ikinci önemli varsayım ise iktidar yapılarının, bütün unsurları ile bir bütün olduğu ve sarsılmayacağına dair inançtı. Halbuki 2010 yılından sonra başlayan isyanlar aynı zamanda rejimlerin içindeki çeşitli (ordu, istihbarat, devlet başkanı gibi) aktörlerin kendi aralarında bir rekabet halinde oldukları ve aynı zamanda rejimlerin kırılganlıklarını gözler önüne sermiştir.

Değişim sürecinde uluslararası aktörlerin sahip olduğu etkinlik düzeyi ise bölgesel değişimin nasıl yol alacağı ve hangi noktalara evrileceği sorusunu cevaplamak için yalnızca iç aktörlerin pozisyonlarına odaklanmanın yeterli olmadığını ortaya koydu. Bir başka deyişle Ortadoğu ülkelerinin küresel aktörlerle ilişkileri devlet düzeyinde yürütülen dış politika ile sınırlı olmadığı görülmüştür. Bölge üzerindeki güç mücadelesi rejimlerin sarsılması ile daha görünür bir seviyeye gelmiş ve bu mücadele yine değişim serencamını önemli ölçüde etkilemiştir. Başta ABD olmak üzere, hegemonik güçlerle girift ilişkileri olan iktidarlar, bu ilişkiler sayesinde ayakta kalabilmiş ve fakat bunun karşılığında bölgenin ve bir bakıma bir bütün olarak İslam dünyasının kendi bölgedeki kaynakların ve zenginliklerin (kapitalist ve kal-

kınmış) merkeze taşıyan bir aracıya dönüşmüşlerdir. Bu ilişki biçimi aynı zamanda bölge içi ittifakların oluşmasında da pay sahibi olmuştur.

Son yıllarda ortaya çıkan değişim süreci akademisyenler ve araştırmacılar için yeni ampirik bulgular da sunmuştur. Bu durum son yıllarda Ortadoğu üzerine yapılan akademik çalışmaların hem niteliğinde hem de niceliğinde önemli değişimlere yol açmıştır. Bu çalışmaların önemli bir kısmı yalnızca son yıllardaki değişimi anlamlandırmaya ya da açıklamaya yoğunlaşırken, bir kısmı da tarihsel meseleleri yeniden ele almaya yönelmiştir.

Ortadoğu Etütleri dergisinin bu sayısı da bölgesel değişimde yaşanan karmaşanın açıklanması ve tarihsel meselelerin yeni perspektiflerle ele alınmasına yönelik olarak çeşitli konulara odaklanmıştır.

Sevilay Aksoy, makalesinde Ortadoğu için yeni bir dönemin başlangıcı sayılabilecek 2003 Irak işgaline odaklanmaktadır. 1 Mart Tezkeresinin TBMM tarafından reddedilmesi ile başlayan süreç Türk-Amerikan ilişkileri, Türk dış politikasının yapım süreci, toplumsal aktörlerin dış politikaya etkisi bakımından da etkili olmuştur. Aksoy'a göre tezkerenin TBMM tarafından reddedilmesi, savaşı önlemeye yetmemiş ancak Pentagon'un askeri planlarını bozmuş ve hem Türkiye-ABD ilişkileri hem de Türkiye-Irak ilişkileri üstünde önemli bir etkisi olmuştur. Parlamento'nun kararı sadece önemli sonuçlarından ötürü değil aynı zamanda öncesindeki karar-alma sürecinin Türk dış politika yapıcılarının ulusal çıkarların tanımlanmasında olmasa bile uygulanmasında karşılaştıkları norm-çıkar ikilemini ortaya koyması dolayısıyla da çok önemlidir. Bu ikileme ilişkin dinamikler Uluslararası İlişkiler'in iki ana davranış kalıbı olarak "sonuç mantığı" ve "uygunluk mantığı" açısından önem taşımaktadır. Makale bu iki kavramı merkeze alarak 1 Mart tezkeresini toplumsal aktörler ile karar vericiler açısından tartışmaktadır.

Ahmet Asker ise I. Dünya Savaşı öncesinde Filistin üzerindeki güç mücadelesini ele almaktadır. Asker, dönemin başat güçleri olan İngiltere ile Almanya'nın Filistin üzerindeki mücadelesini dil ve eğitim üzerinden nasıl yürüttüğünü ele almaktadır. Hem arşiv belgeleri hem de ikincil kaynaklar üzerinden Tarihe *Sprachkampf (dil kavgası)* olarak geçen bu tartışma, farklı ülkelerden Filistin'e gelen batılı Yahudiler ile Siyonistler ve yerel Yahudiler arasındaki beklenti ve görüş farklılıklarının nasıl görünür olduğuna dikkat çekmektedir. Makale, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun bölgedeki hâkimiyeti devam etmekteyken, Technion'un eğitim dili üzerinden yürütü-

len dil kavgası, aynı zamanda, Yahudi ulusunun inşasına giden yolda, İbraniceye yüklenen misyonu, Filistin'deki Siyonist hareketliliği ve İsrail devletinin kurulmasıyla sonuçlanan Siyonist hedeflere nasıl adım adım yaklaşıldığını gözler önüne sermiştir.

Betül Doğan Akkaş ise, Körfez krizine farklı bir açıdan yaklaşmaktadır. Akkaş'a göre 2008 küresel gıda krizinden bu yana Körfez ülkelerinin gündeminde yer alan gıda güvenliği, 2017 Krizinin Katar'a uyguladığı ambargo ile yeni bir aşamaya geçmiştir. Çalışma, Katar'ın gıda güvenliği inşasını, 1996'da belirlenen Roma Deklarasyonu ilkeleri çerçevesinde ele almıştır. Katar'ın coğrafi ve ekolojik şartlarından kaynaklı olarak kronik bir gıda güvenliği sorunu her dönemde söz konusu olmakla birlikte 2017 krizi ile birlikte bir ulusal güvenlik meselesi olduğu ortaya çıkmıştır.

Turgay Yerlikaya ise Mübarek rejimine karşı 2011 yılının başında patlak veren ayaklanmaları yeni bir perspektifle ele almaktadır. Makale Yeni Toplumsal Hareketler literatürünü temel hareket zemini olarak kabul ederken, sosyal medya kullanımının teoriye kattığı yeni tartışmaları da değerlendirmiştir. Bu çerçevede çalışma Tahrir gösterilerini açıklamak için Yeni Toplumsal Hareketler teorisini kullanırken protestoların bu çerçevede taşıdığı dinamikler itibariyle tipolojik olarak bir yeni bir model olarak ortaya çıktığını iddia etmektedir.

Şerif Dilek ise Eylül 25 Eylül 2017'de KBY'nin oylama sunduğu bağımsızlık referandumunun tarihsel kökenlerine inmekte ve bu süreci çeşitli boyutlarıyla analiz etmektedir. Dilek'e göre enerji kaynakları üzerinden çok uluslu şirketlerle yapılan anlaşmalar, yabancı devletlerle kurulan diplomatik ilişkiler ve DAEŞ'e karşı mücadele de hem uluslararası kamuoyu hem de devletler düzeyinde tanınan meşruiyet kurumsal yapılarını güçlendirmenin yanı sıra kendilerine olan aşırı bir güven yanılsamalarına yol açmıştır. Çalışma, IKBY'nin enerji kaynaklarını ve DAEŞ'e karşı verdikleri mücadeleyi bağımsızlık arayışında politik bir enstrüman olarak kullandıklarını iddia etmektedir. Bu çerçevede Irak Kürtlerinin gelecek arayışında kritik bir nokta olarak görülen 25 Eylül 2017 bağımsızlık referandumu ve bunun başarısızlıkla sonuçlanması Kürtlerin mevcut konumlarını tekrar tartışmaya açarak yeni bir süreci başlatmıştır.

Bilal Salameyh ise Suriye iç savaşı ile yoğun bir şekilde tartışılan Esed rejiminin yapısını teorik bir çerçevede analiz etmektedir. Salameyh Hafız ve Beşar Esed yönetimindeki Suriye rejimini (1970-2011) *neopatrimonyal* bir rejim olarak kavram-

laştırmıştır. Makale, Esed rejiminin neopatrimonyal egemenliğinin *rejimin kişiselleştirilmesi, patronaj ağları ve klientalizm* olmak üzere üç sütün üzerine kurulu olduğunu iddia etmekte ve rejimin tarihsel dönüşüm sürecini bu anahtar kelimeler üzerinden analiz etmektedir.

Cemal Nassar ise 25 Ocak devrimi sonrası Mısır'da selefilik akımı içerisindeki dini ve siyasi tartışmaları ele almaktadır. Özellikle Mısır'da Selefi ideolojideki politikacı ile vaiz arasındaki tartışmalı ilişkiyi merkeze alarak Mısır'daki Selefilerin 25 Ocak 2011 Devrimi'nden sonra yaşadıkları dönüşümün izlerini sürmektedir. Çalışma Selefi Dava Hareketi ile Nur Partisinin siyasi sürece yönelik farklı bir tavır geliştirmelerine neden olan gerekçeleri ve bunun Dava faaliyetlerinin geleceğini nasıl etkileyeceğini belirlemeye dönük bir çaba sarfetmiştir.

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THE TURKISH STANCE TOWARD THE US REQUESTS FOR THE 2003 IRAQ WAR: A CASE OF NORMS VERSUS INTERESTS?

Abstract

The rejection of the US pleas for the 2003 Iraq War by the Turkish Parliament stands as one of the most controversial, divisive and much-debated foreign policy decisions in the Republican history of Turkey. The pleas of the Bush administration, if fully accepted and executed by Ankara, were of the kind that would make Turkey part of the US-led war coalition. Although the Turkish airspace was opened to the US and British war aircraft and missiles later on, and limited logistical support was provided during the war, the Parliament's decision was a rejection of the US demands, which, though not sufficing to prevent the war itself, disrupted the military plans of the Pentagon, and had significant impact on the relations between Turkey and Iraq as well as between Turkey and the US. The parliament's decision is of paramount importance not only because of its crucial consequences but also because the decision-making process preceding it reveals the intense dilemma that was faced by the Turkish foreign-policy makers vis-à-vis norms versus interests in the implementation, if not formulation, of national interests. The dynamics concerning this dilemma are well represented by the two main logics of action in International Relations (IR): the logic of consequences and the logic of appropriateness. This article examines the Ankara's decision-making process in the run-up to the 2003 Iraq War from the perspectives of those two logics with a particular view to the reasons and circumstances associated with the predominance of either of the logics and the shifts between them.

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Key words: Logics of action; logic of appropriateness; logic of consequences; 1 March decision; 2003 Iraq War; Turkish foreign policy; Turkey-US relations; Turkey-Iraq relations

ABD'NİN 2003 IRAK SAVAŞI İÇİN İSTEKLERİ KARŞISINDA TÜRKİYE'NİN TUTUMU: NORMLAR-ÇIKARLAR KARŞITLIĞI VAKASI MI?

Öz

2003 Irak Savaşı için ABD'nin taleplerinin Türk Parlamentosu tarafından reddedilmesi Türkiye Cumhuriyet tarihinin en çok tartışmaya yol açmış, ihtilaf çıkarmış ve çok müzakere edilmiş dış politika kararlarından birisidir. Bush yönetiminin talepleri, şayet Ankara tarafından tamamen kabul edilmiş ve uygulanmış olsaydı, Türkiye'yi ABD liderliğindeki savaş koalisyonunun tarafı yapacak nitelikteydi. Türk hava sahası ABD ve Britanya savaş uçaklarına ve füzelerine sonradan açılıp savaş esnasında sınırlı lojistik yardım yapılmış olsa da, Parlamento'nun kararı ABD'nin isteklerinin reddi anlamına geliyordu. Bu karar, savaşı önlemeye yetmese de Pentagon'un askeri planlarını bozdu ve hem Türkiye-ABD ilişkileri hem de Türkiye-Irak ilişkileri üstünde önemli etkisi oldu. Parlamento'nun kararı sadece önemli sonuçlarından ötürü değil aynı zamanda öncesindeki karar-alma sürecinin Türk dış politika yapıcılarının ulusal çıkarların tanımlanmasında olmasa bile uygulanmasında karşılaştıkları norm-çıkar ikilemini ortaya koymasından ötürü de çok önemlidir. Bu ikileme ilişkin dinamikler Uluslararası İlişkiler'in iki ana davranış mantığı tarafından ortaya konmaktadır: sonuç mantığı ve uygunluk mantığı. Bu makale Ankara'nın 2003 Irak Savaşı'na giden dönemde karar-alma mekanizmasını bu iki mantığın bakış açısından, özellikle herhangi birinin ne sebeplerle ve hangi şartlar altında baskın hale geldiği ve yerini diğerine bıraktığı sorularını dikkate alarak incelemektedir.

Anahtar kelimeler: Eylem mantıkları; uygunluk mantığı; sonuç mantığı; 1 Mart kararı; 2003 Irak Savaşı; Türk Dış Politikası; Türkiye-ABD ilişkileri; Türkiye-Irak ilişkileri

الموقف التركي تجاه مطالب الولايات المتحدة في حرب العراق 2003: حالة من المبادئ مقابل المصالح

ملخص

إن رفض مناشدات الولايات المتحدة لحرب العراق لعام 2003 من قبل البرلمان التركي يمثل واحدة من أكثر قرارات السياسة الخارجية إثارة للجدل والتفرقة والجدل في التاريخ الجمهوري لتركيا. كانت مناشدات إدارة بوش، لو قبلتها أنقرة ونفذتها بالكامل ، من النوع الذي سيجعل تركيا جزءاً من تحالف الحرب الذي تقوده الولايات المتحدة. على الرغم من أن المجال الجوي التركي قد تم فتحه أمام الطائرات الحربية الأمريكية والبريطانية والصواريخ في وقت لاحق، وتم توفير الدعم اللوجستي المحدود خلال الحرب ، إلا أن قرار البرلمان كان رفضًا للمطالب الأمريكية ، والتي على الرغم من أنها غير كافية لمنع الحرب نفسها ، لكنها تمكنت من تعطيل الخطط العسكرية للبنتاغون ، وكان له تأثير كبير على العلاقات بين تركيا والعراق وكذلك بين تركيا والولايات المتحدة. إن قرار البرلمان له أهمية قصوى ليس فقط بسبب عواقبه الحاسمة، ولكن أيضاً لأن عملية صنع القرار التي سبقته تكشف عن المعضلة الشديدة التي واجهها صانعو السياسة الخارجية الأتراك فيما يتعلق بتقييم المبادىء مقابل المصالح في التنفيذ، وفي تعريف المصالح الوطنية تحديداً. إن ديناميكيات هذه المعضلة ممثلة بشكل جيد من خلال منطقتي العمل الرئيسيتين في العلاقات الدولية (IR): منطق العواقب ومنطق الملائمة. تبحث هذه المقالة في عملية صنع القرار في أنقرة في الفترة التي سبقت حرب العراق عام 2003 من وجهة نظر هذين المنطقتين مع وجهة نظر معينة للأسباب والظروف المرتبطة بهيمنة أي من المنطق والتحولات بينهما.

كلمات مفتاحية: منطق العمل، منطق النتيجة، قرار مؤرخ في 1 مارس 2003، حرب العراق، السياسة الخارجية التركية، العلاقات التركية الأمريكية، العلاقات التركية العراقية

Introduction

In 2002 the US conveyed to Turkey its requests concerning the war it was planning to undertake against Iraq. The requests of the Bush administration, if fully accepted and fulfilled by Ankara, were of the kind that would make Turkey part of the US-led war coalition against the regime in Baghdad. The requests, which were submitted to Ankara as a long detailed list in late 2002, roughly involved the deployment of tens of thousands of US troops on Turkish soil (around 80,000), the opening of several Turkish airports and harbours to US aircraft and navy, the opening of the Turkish airspace to the US warplanes and missiles during the war and other logistics-related requests.[1] Simply put, Turkey's long-standing superpower NATO ally was demanding to open a northern front against Iraq from Turkey by using Turkish land, air and sea territory. For the first time in the Republican history, Turkey was being asked to deploy foreign troops on its territory at an unprecedented scale and for war-making purpose against a neighbouring country. Equally troublesome was the tendency of the Bush administration to intervene in Iraq even in the absence of an authorisation from the Security Council of the United Nations. Ankara eventually found itself in a hard and bitter situation to which it responded by pursuing an active peace diplomacy followed by the conduct of bilateral negotiations with the Americans. At the end of a protracted process that lasted for more than 2 months to the dismay of Washington, the government, accepting most of the US requests, though at a reduced scale, in return of the US acknowledgement and pledge to fulfil Turkey's war-related political, military and economic needs, submitted for approval to the Turkish parliament a bill asking to let the deployment of foreign troops on Turkish territory and to send Turkish troops abroad. However, the Turkish parliament surprised many, particularly the Bush administration, by not approving the government's bill on 1 March 2003. Although the Turkish airspace was opened to the US and British war aircraft and missiles later on, and limited logistical support was provided during the war, the Parliament's decision was a rejection of the US demands, which, though not sufficing to prevent the war itself, disrupted the military plans of the Pentagon and was regarded as having inflicted damage, which some feared would last, on the so-called strategic partnership between the two old NATO allies – any negative rhetoric and/or action towards Turkey from the US for a considerable period of time was blamed by many on the

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[1] For the full list, see Fikret Bilâ, Ankara'da Irak Savaşları: Sivil Darbe Girişimi ve Gizli Belgelerde 1 Mart Tezkeresi (İstanbul: Güncel Yayıncılık, 2007), p. 302.

1 March decision while the Turkish government strove to mend its ties with Washington. The Parliament's rejection of the bill also complicated, among others, the issue of sending Turkish troops to northern Iraq. Although such deployment would be for security-seeking rather than expansionist purposes, the Turkish army quickly lost the support (and thus approval) of Washington for such a move for some time. The Iraq war itself seriously aggravated the issue of security vacuum in northern Iraq in particular and in Iraq in general, complicating Ankara's fight against ethnic separatist terrorism that gained new and complex dimensions over the years. On the other hand, Turkey's overall abstention from the war helped render Ankara an active participant in the economic, and, to a much lesser extent, political reconstruction of post-2003 Iraq, conferring upon it an influence (though not long-lasting in retrospect) which had seemed almost unattainable in the fearsome and stressful atmosphere of March 2003. The abstention also seemed to have facilitated, among others, the development of a new political language and cooperative relations with northern Iraq, which was then hoped that would have an impact on Turkey's relations with its own Kurdish population.

This controversial, divisive and much-debated foreign policy episode of Turkey was subjected to several analyses with a view to explaining and rendering it meaningful from different perspectives: e.g. the conditions and the extent of the influence of Turkish parliament on the historical 1 March decision;[2] the impact of identity politics and historical narratives on the shaping of Turkey's interests on Iraq;[3] the implications of the 1 March decision for Turkish democracy and foreign relations;[4] and the detailed journalistic[5] and bureaucratic[6] accounts of the decision-making process of the Turkey's 2003 policy on Iraq. Implicit in most of those analyses is the emphasis on the dilemma that the Turkish decision-makers found themselves vis-à-vis norms versus interests in the formulation and implementation

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[2] Baris Kesgin and Juliet Kaarbo, "When and How Parliaments Influence Foreign Policy: The Case of Turkey's Iraq Decision", International Studies Perspectives, Vol. 11, No. 1, 2010, pp. 19-36; Zeynep Taydaş and Özgür Özdamar, "A Divided Government, an Ideological Parliament, and an Insecure Leader: Turkey's Indecision about Joining the Iraq War", Social Science Quarterly, Vol. 94, No. 1, 2013, pp. 217-241.

[3] Meliha Benli Altunışık, "Turkey's Iraq Policy: The War and Beyond", Journal of Contemporary European Studies, Vol. 14, No. 2, 2006, pp. 183-196; Şaban Kardaş, "Turkey and the Iraqi Crisis: JDP between Identity and Interest", in M. Hakan Yavuz (ed.), The Emergence of a New Turkey: Democracy and the AK Parti (Salt Lake City: The University of Utah Press, 2006), pp. 306-330.

[4] Christopher Brewin, "Turkey: Democratic Legitimacy", in Alex Danchev and John MacMillan (eds.), The Iraq War and Democratic Politics (London: Routledge, 2005), pp. 93-109.

[5] Bilâ, Ankara'da Irak Savaşları, and Murat Yetkin, Tezkere: Irak Krizinin Gerçek Öyküsü (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 2004).

[6] Deniz Bölükbaşı, 1 Mart Vakası: Irak Tezkeresi ve Sonrası (İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2008).

of their position. From the perspective of International Relations (IR) theory, this dilemma translates into the two predominant and competing logics of action that are often referred to in the discipline to delineate the boundaries of and account for state behaviour, i.e. the logic of (expected) consequences and the logic of appropriateness. The former logic, embodying a utility-maximising approach and associated mainly with the so-called rational theories of IR such as neo-realism, dictates agents to pursue their self-interest by making use of all the available means at their disposal and at the expense of others if that is necessary. The logic of appropriateness, on the other hand, which is often juxtaposed against the instrumental logic and associated with the so-called reflexive theories such as constructivism and normative theory, demands the agent to act in line with the intersubjectively constituted (social, legal or ethical) norms and conventions, and to abstain from the whims of its selfish desires.

The Turkish government's behaviour during the roughly four months period leading up to 1 March 2003 presents an intriguing case study as far as these two logics are concerned. Many inside and outside Turkey, regardless of whether they were critical of or happy with the way the Turkish government handled the US requests, depicted the government's behaviour as hesitant and indeterminate. The government was observed as vacillating between apparently contradicting positions: seeking to prevent the war that it largely regarded illegal and illegitimate while simultaneously leaving the door open to the requests of its NATO ally, and eventually accepting them, though at a reduced scale.[7] The pursuit of an active peace diplomacy in support of the disarmament of Iraq through the UN diplomacy route representing the former position can be read as Turkey's will to protect and uphold the two fundamental and related norms of the international community, namely sovereignty and the norm regulating the use of force. As will be explained below, the Turkish government clung to this policy as long as it could, certainly longer than the Bush administration and the hawkish media wished for. And this policy reflects an ethic of responsibility on the part of decision-makers with a view to protecting the long-term interests of community – a responsibility which the Turkish government felt to owe to several communities (Turkish, Iraqi and other

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[7] Beyond the Turkish perception, there is a broad consensus that the US invasion of Iraq was against both the formal norms of international law and the intersubjective normative understandings of the international community concerning the legitimate use of force. See, e.g., Vaughn P. Shannon and Jonathan W. Keller, "Leadership style and international norm violation: The case of the Iraq war", Foreign Policy Analysis, Vol. 3, No. 1, 2007, pp. 86-88.

regional) emanating from a mix of order- and justice-related concerns. On the other hand, the government increasingly got involved in intense negotiations with the Americans with a view to agreeing upon the terms of collaboration in case the war broke out. As the possibility of preventing the war declined, the protection of the presumed Turkish national interests (primarily the protection of the territorial boundaries of Turkish sovereignty) in the context of a war against Iraq got ascendance, and their defence necessitated bypassing and even violating the international norm regulating the use of force. Thus, during the whole period in question one sees the deployment of a complex combination of international and domestic logics of appropriateness on the one hand and a consequential/instrumental logic on the other by the policy makers. The situation the Turkish foreign policy makers found themselves in before the war can be described as one of a weaker party being forced to cooperate with a superior power resolutely bent on pursuing its national security objectives to the detriment of international law and hence the long-term interests of the international community.[8] The US administration of the time is aptly described by Richard Price as "a regime whose most powerful members would seem to exemplify – hardly uniquely, though prominently – the instrumental monological actor par excellence, impervious to learning and redefining their interests and identities in the light of dialogue and engagement (not to mention evidence), instead constantly deploying every conceivable means at their disposal to reinforce the pursuit of their already decided-upon goals".[9] The Turkish case study is intriguing in as much as it shows, to borrow from Price, the limits *and* possibility of pursuing the logic of appropriateness within the context of a highly unequal power relationship that was also marked by the antinomy of a long-standing alliance with increasingly diverging interests.

The next section of the article further clarifies these two logics of IR. Then a succinct explanation of the political, economic and security aspects of the Turkish environment is given in order to help contextualize the main analysis that follows it. Two periods roughly corresponding to the Turkish foreign-policy making on the

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[8] For a concise explanation of those objectives that were a combination of instrumental interests and ideology, and the extent to which they were advanced by the 2003 Iraq War, see F. Gregory Gause III, "The Iraq War and American National Security Interests in the Middle East", in John S. Duffield and Peter J. Dombrowski (eds.), Balance Sheet: The Iraq War and U.S. National Security (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009), pp. 68-86. For the intra-(neo)conservative debate on the issue, see Gary Rosen (ed.), The Right War? The Conservative Debate on Iraq (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

[9] Richard Price, "Moral limit and possibility in world politics", in Richard M. Price (ed.), Moral Limit and Possibility in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 24.

pre-war Iraqi crisis are analyzed in terms of the logics concerned with a view to revealing the reasons and circumstances associated with the predominance of either of the logics and the shifts between them.

The logics of (expected) consequences and appropriateness: interests versus norms

In the IR literature two logics of action, having been originally elaborated by the leading students of the Carnegie School,[10] are generally deployed to render meaningful the behaviour of states: the logics of expected consequences (LoC) and of appropriateness (LoA). These logics "span the entire space of meaningful action" of (imperfectly) rational actors in that "[a]ction without either logic is random and appears senseless..., while action shaped by the logics takes on direction and meaning."[11] While one of the logics predominantly affects the course of action at one time, it may later be replaced by the other, and they often co-exist and characterize the same action.[12] The questions concerning the relationship between them, particularly the shifts between them and within each are amongst the most intriguing in social sciences. The logic of consequences, also known as the logic of instrumentality, involves "deliberate consideration of alternatives, assessment of their outcomes and preference-driven choices. Its key feature is the presence of calculated choice between alternatives", and hence its association with analysis-based action.[13] Actors are assumed to act by taking into account the probable consequences of their action with a view to maximising their interests (defined a priori) and minimising harms. Acting as such confers upon them 'rational' status, though inevitably a bounded one as the information-processing required for that analysis and the resulting analysis are bound to be limited and thus imperfect.[14] Although, as rightly pointed out by Snidal, rationality as a meta-theory does not specify the content of interests, goals and values, and is neutral on the identity of actors,[15] its entry into IR through materialist theories such as neo-realism and neo-liberalism

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[10] Most notably the works of Herbert Simon and James G. March on bounded rationality and decision-making. For a list of those works, please see Martin Schulz, "Logic of Consequences and Logic of Appropriateness", in Mie Augier and David J. Teece (eds.), The Palgrave Encyclopedia of Strategic Management (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), p. 7.

[11] Ibid., p. 2.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Duncan Snidal, "Rational Choice and International Relations" in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simmons (eds.), Handbook of International Relations (London: Sage, 2007), pp. 74-75.

rendered the two almost identical.[16] In terms of those theories, the dominant rational actor is the state, and its interests are of material nature defined mainly in terms of power (usually the triad of military, economic and political power). While pursuing its interests defined as such, the state acts upon the widely accepted motto of 'the ends justify the means'. It is obvious that the selfish pursuit of material interests bears the potential of bringing into conflict of similarly motivated actors in the absence of a higher coordinating, mediating and sanctioning authority. Actually, according to the realist argument, it is the absence of a hierarchical order in the international arena that obliges states to act selfishly. The feelings of fear and suspicion as to the intentions of others compel states to be vigilant and to prepare not to face the worst (annihilation or conquest) by exploiting the opportunities for power reinforcement.

This is, of course, a broad and quite a simplistic picture of the logic of consequences or instrumentality in IR. The realist tradition generally characterized by the LoC is far from a monolithic body, embodying the thoughts of a rich array of philosophers, scholars and statesmen who do not necessarily agree, for instance, on the goals of agent (seeking power as a means or as an end) or on the causes of self-help behaviour (the inherently bad nature of human being or the anarchical nature of international structure). Similarly, they disagree, though not fundamentally, on the role of law and morality in international politics. While the structural variants of realism do not even engage with this subject while explaining state behaviour,[17] the prominent figures of classical realism diverge on the scope, feasibility, effectiveness or desirability of norms and morals in the conduct of foreign policy.[18] However, what underlies more or less all at minimum is the assumption of a self-caring agent (an empire, a kingdom or a state) – an agent who must (or at any rate does) care for its own needs first and foremost by the means it deems fit.

Juxtaposed to this world of selfish pursuit of material interests is "a community of rule followers and role players with distinctive sociocultural ties, cultural connections, intersubjective understandings, and senses of belonging".[19] In the latter

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[16] James Fearon and Alexander Wendt, "Rationalism v. Constructivism: A Skeptical View", in Carlsnaes, Risse and Simmons (eds.), Handbook of International Relations, pp. 58-59.

[17] See, e.g., Kenneth N. Waltz, "Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory", Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 44, No. 1, 1990, pp. 21-37.

[18] See, e.g., Duncan Bell (ed.), Political Thought and International Relations: Variations on a Realist Theme (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), particularly pp. 1-104.

[19] James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, "The Institutional Dynamics and International Political Orders", International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 4, 1998, p. 952.

world, where the predominant logic of behaviour is the LoA, "actions are seen as rule-based".[20] "Actors recognize a situation and connect it to appropriate action consistent with relevant rules." Rules, being "relatively fixed responses to defined situations", has a broad spectrum ranging from roles, habits and experiences to bureaucratic rules, norms, laws and institutions. Accordingly, "automatically following a familiar routine,… conforming to a norm, generously fulfilling an obligation" or "blindly following an order" by actors are all regarded as instances of rule-guided behaviour.[21] As those instances imply, there is far less information-processing in the LoA when compared to the LoC; no or little information processing is used to analyze the consequences, for instance, of membership obligations of an alliance/ partnership or an institution, e.g. no extensive studies are made on the costs and benefits of that alliance or institution. However, when the obligations under consideration are questioned, adjusted, replaced, abandoned, or cautiously fulfilled, then one moves more to a mode that is closer to LoC.[22]

The question of to what extent the different positions represented by these two logics account for practices of foreign policy has been explored with regard to different cases. A number of scholars tend to argue (and agree) that the relationship between the two logics does not need to be conceived of in absolutely exclusivist terms. March and Olsen, for instance, perceiving any political action as "probably involv[ing] elements of each", claim that "[p]olitical actors are constituted both by their interests… and by the rules embedded in their identities and political institutions."[23] Finding out which logic dominates in what kind of situation is the task of researcher. Similarly, in their attempt to bridge the positions of rationalists and constructivists, Wendt and Fearon argue that this is an issue that can be settled by empirical analysis only. For instance, on the issue of motivation for norm-compliance, realists generally argue that states, when they comply with the norms of international law, do so mainly for selfish reasons (i.e. self-interest or coercion), while the constructivist response is that the compliance is out of a belief in their legitimacy.[24] The realist position points to an instrumental reasoning, while the

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[20] Ibid., p. 951. Although its association with rule-based action seem to make LoA sound more virtuous than LoC, March and Olsen later concluded that LoA "may reflect learning of some sort from history, but it does not guarantee technical efficiency or moral acceptability."

[21] Schulz, "Logic of Consequences and Logic of Appropriateness", p. 2.

[22] Martin Schulz, personal communication, April-August 2016.

[23] March and Olsen, "The Institutional Dynamics and International Political Orders", p. 952.

[24] Fearon and Wendt, "Rationalism v. Constructivism", pp. 61-62.

constructivist argument defends (the possibility of) a deeper internalisation of the norms on the part of states who "identify with or make them part of their conception of the self, and as such make the group's interest in upholding norms their own individual interest as well".[25] Wendt and Fearon argue that the compliance is sometimes because of a belief in the legitimacy of norms, and sometimes it is out of self-interest, with the two being affected by a host of factors. Weak third-party enforcement, for instance, they say, may demotivate even the otherwise enthusiastic rule-followers.[26] And sometimes it is the particular nature of an international norm, e.g. its vague terms and broad parameters, that facilitate its violation by the already willing (and powerful) actors.[27] Hinnebusch, on the other hand, looking at the matter from a different perspective and analyzing the operation of those logics within the complex environment of the Arab Middle East, argues that there actually needs to be "a relative congruence" between the normative and the material for "a stable social order" to exist. Seeing also that actors are motivated by both logics, he defends that any espoused norm and identity need to be supplemented by a corresponding material structure to be viable in the first place. Otherwise, he claims, "[norms] lack the material anchor to endure [while power structures] lack the legitimacy to survive without the continual application of coercive power".[28]

The pre-war Turkish context, national interests, and key foreign policy actors

The war plans of the US against Iraq caught Turkey at a particularly vulnerable period in its history. Turkey was trying to recuperate from a number of acute political, economic and security problems and had seriously embarked on the process of EU membership, regarded as a panacea for many of those ills, when the US knocked on its door for help to wage war against its southeastern neighbour. The collaboration with the US, apart from other considerations, bore the significant potential of wreaking havoc on this recuperation process.

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[25] Ibid., p. 61.

[26] Ibid., p. 62. On the issue of motivation see also, Jon Elster, "Social norms and economic theory", Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 3, No. 4, 1989, pp. 99-117.

[27] Vaughn P. Shannon, "Norms are what states make of them: the political psychology of norm violation", International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 44, No. 2, 2000, pp. 293-316.

[28] Raymond Hinnebusch, "Explaining international politics in the Middle East: The struggle of regional identity and systemic structure", in Gerd Nonneman (ed.), Analyzing Middle East Foreign Policies and the Relationship with Europe (London: Routledge, 2005), p.244.

When Turkey first learnt about the military intentions of the US against Iraq in 2002, an ideologically heterogeneous coalition government was in power (the difficult combination of the centre-left, centre-right and far-right (nationalist)), that was struggling hard to recover from the economic recession, and to make and implement the necessary liberal reforms for the EU membership, and, while doing all these, not to disintegrate. The recession that had hit in 2001 was unprecedented, marked with significant devaluation of the Turkish lira, a minus growth rate and increasing unemployment. The economy had been saved from an Indonesian-style collapse by a multi-billion US dollars bailout from the IMF and the bold structural financial reforms that followed. On the political front, the most pressing issue was to proceed with the requirements for being an official candidate of the EU, which had been granted after many years of strained relations with Brussels. Ankara had pledged to make a long list of political, legal, administrative and economic reforms with a view to fulfilling the membership (Copenhagen) criteria of the EU.[29] Among those were also some sensitive issues such as giving greater cultural (mainly linguistic) rights to Turkish citizens of ethnically non-Turkish origin, the abolishment of capital punishment, and broadening the scope of freedom of expression. Difficult compromises had to be reached within the coalition or, where they failed, support from the other parties in the parliament had to be obtained in order to proceed on all these fronts. The abatement of ethnic separatist terrorism since the capture of the head of the PKK, no doubt, significantly facilitated those reforms by bringing about a more conducive political atmosphere. However, notwithstanding that the government had managed to accomplish significant political and economic progress by the autumn of 2002, it was forced to call for early general elections. That decision has been the subject of wild speculations since then, including the one that related it to Washington's desire to see a stable, easy-to-cooperate government in Ankara during the Iraqi crisis. Although the government and the prime minister, Bülent Ecevit, had been largely cooperative towards the US during the Afghanistan phase of the war on terror,[30] the well-known opposition of the left-wing Ecevit to a war against Iraq was claimed to be, alongside his ill health, one of the major reasons in the accelerated destabilisation of the government.[31]

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[29] The details of those pledged reforms embodied in the first Turkish National Programme for the Adoption of the Aquis, which was issued in March 2001 in response to adoption of the first Turkey-EU Accession Partnership by the EU Council of Ministers, can be found at https://www.ab.gov.tr/195_en.html (August 14, 2018).

[30] Nursin Atesoglu Guney, "The New Security Environment and Turkey's ISAF Experience", in Nursin Atesoglu Guney (ed.), Contentious Issues of Security and the Future of Turkey (Hampshire: Ashgate, 2007), pp. 177-189.

[31] Fikret Bilâ, Ankara'da Irak Savaşları, pp. 101-103.

As a matter of fact, the parameters of Turkey's foreign policy towards Iraq, being also embraced by the military and the majority of political parties, had been set as a state policy. The latter, being inherently hostile to the further destabilisation of Iraq, was unlikely to let a sympathetic approach to the US war plans regardless of which government was in power in Ankara. Those parameters as they appeared in the documents of Foreign Ministry were Turkey's commitment to the national unity and territorial integrity of Iraq; treating as a *casus belli* the establishment of a Kurdish state in northern Iraq; the fair distribution of Iraq's national income from its natural resources among its citizens regardless of their ethnic and sectarian origins; and the commitment to political representation of and the protection of cultural rights of Iraq's Turkmen citizens. Most of those principles, in turn, had been formulated in response to three issues, which had become chronic after the 1991 Gulf War: Turkey's own Kurdish question, the issue of the PKK terrorism and the *de facto* division of Iraq into three pieces. Or, put differently, Turkey's Iraq policy had been taken hostage by those intractable problems. Turkey perceived the division of Iraq as threatening for the other two issues,[32] particularly the Kurdish question, since it long believed that the establishment of a Kurdish state in northern Iraq incorporating the oil-rich regions of Mosul and Kirkuk would be enticing for the Kurdish populations of the whole region, including the Kurds of Turkey, Iran and Syria, with dire implications for the territorial integrity of the host countries. The emphasis upon Iraq's territorial integrity as the centrepiece of Turkey's Iraq policy was criticized as a contradiction given the *de facto* division of Iraq and the role played by Turkey in this respect through its cross-border anti-terrorism military operations and the permission given to the Operation Provide Comfort

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[32] Ironically, the de facto division of Iraq, which seemed to threaten Turkey's national survival, had first come into being with the initiative of the Turkish president, Turgut Özal, after the 1991 Gulf War in response to the refugee crisis that had been triggered by the suppression of the Kurdish (and Shiite) uprisings by the Saddam regime in March 1991. Although a division of that sort, which came to be enforced by the military forces of the US, Britain and France, had not been explicitly authorized by the UN resolution 688 (one of the pioneers of which was Özal), the fact that the division literally protected the Kurds and Shiites from the maltreatment of the Saddam regime and created a permissive environment for Turkey's cross-border operations into northern Iraq to fight the PKK in the 1990s, forced an otherwise reluctant Ankara to accept the situation. The Turkish parliament renewed several times (from the end of 1991 till 2003) the mandate of Operation Provide Comfort (and the renamed Operation Northern Watch), made up of the warplanes of the coalition forces that were deployed in Turkey to enforce the imposed no-fly zones in Iraq. On the unilateral imposition of the no-fly zones in Iraq see, for instance, James Cockayne and David Malone, "Creeping Unilateralism: How Operation Provide Comfort and the No-Fly Zones in 1991 and 1992 Paved the Way for the Iraq Crisis of 2003", Security Dialogue, Vol. 37, No. 1, 2006, pp. 123-141, and Baskın Oran, "Kalkık Horoz": Çekiç Güç ve Kürt Devleti (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1998). Oran also explains in detail the difficulties and dilemmas that were faced by the Turkish policy-makers concerning the deployment of Operation Provide Comfort in Turkey.

to enforce the no-fly zones in Iraq instituted after the 1991 Gulf War.[33] However, this emphasis had to be read instead as Ankara's commitment to avoid the transformation of that situation into a *de jure* one. Both the Ecevit government[34] and the JDP (Justice and Development Party, *Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*) government[35] that replaced it in late 2002 reiterated that Turkey, while being warm to the ideas of autonomous zones or an administrative federation in Iraq, was absolutely opposed to the disintegration of Iraq and the establishment of independent states, including a Kurdish state, in its stead. The latter state of affairs, it was believed, would have catastrophic effects on the domestic orders of Iraq and Iraq's neighbours, and destroy the whole regional order. As for the PKK problem, Baghdad's loss of authority over northern Iraq since the Gulf War had also created a safe haven for the PKK, whose increased attacks in the 1990s met a stern response from the Turkish armed forces. The human and material cost of that military campaign against the separatist terrorism had been prohibitively expensive for Turkey, having retarded political, social and economic development in many ways. Insisting upon the different natures of the PKK issue and the Kurdish question, and trying to tackle the matter predominantly through military means during the last two decades, Turkey's wish was to see a strong central government in Baghdad that would not let authority vacuums of the kind that existed in northern Iraq. Ankara did not officially express a particular preference for the identity of government in Baghdad, but it was no secret that Saddam Hussein's removal from power would not upset anyone in Turkey. The totalitarian and brutal nature of Saddam's regime had led to numerous conflicts at the domestic, regional and international levels, and also prompted or at least given the excuse for the US and its allies to increasingly engage in the Gulf region from 1990 onwards, whose agendas or designs for the region did not always coincide with those of the regional powers. As Ecevit explicitly stated, Ankara did not perceive Saddam Hussein as a direct or immediate threat to Turkey but it did not specifically care about him either; the concern was rather with the consequences of his aftermath.[36]

Before proceeding with the analysis of the Iraq policy of the JDP government, some explanatory remarks also need to be made on the key actors and mechanisms

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[33] Åsa Lundgren, The Unwelcome Neighbour: Turkey's Kurdish Policy (London: I.B. Tauris, 2007), pp. 73-97. See also the previous note.

[34] Fikret Bilâ, "Amerika'ya Irak mesajı", Milliyet, 14 Jan. 2002.

[35] Yasemin Çongar, "Saddam sonrasını konuşanlar", Milliyet, 27 Jan. 2003.

[36] Fikret Bilâ, Ankara'da Irak Savaşları, pp. 51-52.

of foreign policy making in Turkey as was constitutionally valid during that period.[37] The foreign policy executive in Turkey was then made up of the government, the Foreign Ministry bureaucracy and the military, backed up by the National Intelligence Institution (MIT). The president, though being the head of the state and presiding over the National Security Council, was devoid of any political accountability and thus could not generally take any authoritative decisions on foreign policy issues. However, this did not necessarily prevent him from exerting considerable influence on foreign policy if he wished. Particularly, if the president happened to be closely related to (e.g. former politician) or in sympathy with the government or had a charismatic personality, he was able to influence foreign policy decisions to varying degrees through his stance and rhetoric as was the case, for instance, with Turgut Özal's presidency during the 1991 Gulf War.[38] During the 2003 Iraqi crisis, Turkey's president, Ahmet Necdet Sezer, happened to be a person with strong legal background, i.e. the former chairman of the Constitutional Court. His identity as such at least hinted that the legality of the war would underlie his views, posing a normative constraint on the government.

Leaving aside this *ad hoc* presidential influence, the parameters of foreign policy in Turkey were broadly determined by the government working in close cooperation with the Foreign Ministry bureaucracy. However, depending on the nature of the issue, the government could be constrained by a plethora of actors, including the military, the parliament, the affected constituencies or interest groups, and the media. Following the establishment of the National Security Council (NSC) after the 1960 military coup d'état and its reinforcement after another coup (1980), domestic and foreign policy issues deemed to be falling under the category of 'national security' were discussed under this body bringing together the top rank staff of the military, prime minister and some cabinet ministers under the chairmanship of president. Till the amendment of the related articles of the 1982 Constitution regulating the composition and the scope of authority of this semi-military body in line with the requirements of the EU membership in 2001, the government was under obligation to 'give priority consideration' to the decisions given by the NSC on matters relating to national security, which easily covered a broad spectrum of foreign policy issues. After the constitutional amendment in question, the NSC

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[37] For a succinct explanation in English supplemented with examples from the period of 1960-1999, see Philip Robins, *Suits and Uniforms: Turkish Foreign Policy since the Cold War* (London: Hurst and Company, 2003), pp. 68-92.

[38] William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000* (London: Frank Cass, 2002), pp. 220-224.

decisions lost, at least in theory, their authoritativeness and assumed 'advisory' character.[39] However, the Iraqi crisis involving stark security issues inevitably rendered the military one of the influential actors on the matter.

The parliament's contribution to foreign policy making, on the other hand, was generally confined to being a forum facilitating the expression of different political views and holding the government accountable on foreign policy matters. However, it could be authoritative in certain occasions such as the ratification of international treaties and agreements, and the declaration of war. Concerning the latter, the government constitutionally needed the approval of the parliament to send troops abroad and/or accept foreign troops to the country.[40] Since the Iraqi crisis called into duty both the parliament's public forum function and its permission concerning the US pleas, the parliament was bound to play a decisive role in the execution of Iraq policy, potentially constituting an effective political and normative constraint on the government.

As for the role of interest groups and political constituencies in foreign policy, this was generally issue-bound and dependent on the political will (and democratic credentials) of the government in Turkey. The looming Iraqi crisis had signalled that the scope of Turkish stakeholders likely to be affected by a war would be wide, including not just the big industrialists but also a number of businesses ranging from transportation to tourism, which, in turn, meant that economic considerations too were to play a significant role in the government's policy.

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[39] Article 118 of the Constitution read as: "…The National Security Council shall submit to the Council of Ministers its views on taking decisions and ensuring necessary co-ordination with regard to the formulation, establishment, and implementation of the national security policy of the State. The Council of Ministers shall give priority consideration to the decisions of the National Security Council concerning the measures that it deems necessary for the preservation of the existence and independence of the State, the integrity and indivisibility of the country, and the peace and security of society.…"

The same Article (as amended on October 17, 2001) reads as: "…The National Security Council shall submit to the Council of the Ministers its views on the advisory decisions that are taken and ensuring the necessary co-ordination with regard to the formulation, establishment, and implementation of the national security policy of the state. The Council of Ministers shall evaluate decisions of the National Security Council concerning the measures that it deems necessary for the preservation of the existence and independence of the state, the integrity and indivisibility of the country and the peace and security of society…"

[40] Article 92 of the Constitution reads as: "The Power to authorise the declaration of a state of war in cases deemed legitimate by international law and except where required by international treaties to which Turkey is a party or by the rules of international courtesy to send Turkish Armed Forces to foreign countries and to allow foreign armed forces to be stationed in Turkey, is vested in the Turkish Grand National Assembly.

If the country is subjected, while the Turkish Grand National Assembly is adjourned or in recess, to sudden armed aggression and it thus becomes imperative to decide immediately on the deployment of the armed forces, the President of the Republic can decide on the mobilization of the Turkish Armed Forces."

And, lastly but not the least, beyond material interests, the Iraqi crisis bore the potential of pitting the government against the public in general and its firmly devout constituencies in particular on ethical grounds. The largely anti-war sentiments combined with the Muslim sensitivities of the public, along with the neo-Islamist/conservative character of the government, signalled that the government's calculus and policy-making would not be able to escape the influence of ethical norms. That normative aspect in particular would be the litmus test of the possibility of the pursuit of an ethical foreign policy on the Iraqi issue.

Such were the domestic and foreign policy contexts with their attendant logics of appropriateness and consequences when the JDP, a new political party with roots in political Islam, took over the government in November 2002 with a majority in the parliament. Washington, though initially being anxious about the Islamist character of the party, was generally pleased to see a one-party government, which offered the prospects of stability for the improvement of the Turkish economy and of taking more easily and boldly the necessary foreign policy decisions on the EU, Cyprus and Iraq than the previous coalition government. The liberal pledges of the leading cadres of the JDP on political and economy matters, and their rhetoric of commitment to Turkey's Western vocation and secularism led Washington at least to give the benefit of doubt to this new party which also described itself as conservative-democratic rather than Islamist. On the Iraq issue, the US did not see a particular reason for concern since such was its belief that the decision on its pleas would be largely shaped by the Turkish military in any case and the JDP government would be obliged to respect it even if it happened to think differently.[41] This stance, apart from revealing the hypocrisy of the US concerning its desire to see democratic government in Turkey (and elsewhere in the Middle East), was harbinger of the authoritative and commanding monologue that Ankara would increasingly experience during the period leading up to the Iraq War.

The encounter of the JDP government with the US on the Iraq issue till the start of the war in late March 2003 can be divided roughly into two periods in terms of the logics of behaviour. The first period that lasted from November 2002 till February 2003 is the time when the behaviour of the Turkish government can be depicted as acting with a sense of responsibility towards several communities, not just the Turkish, and thus, not readily or automatically submitting to the de-

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[41] Yasemin Çongar, "AKP iktidarına ABD'den bakışlar", Milliyet, 4 Nov. 2002.

mands of its long-standing ally. In that period the government sought to strike a balance between two competing logics to the best of its ability given the structural constraints at various levels of analysis. The second period lasting from February 2003 till the start of the war, though embodying elements of both logics, increasingly involved an emphasis upon Turkish national interests, and thus is predominantly characterized by the logic of consequences.

Stage I

Soon after the new government was voted in, the most urgent item on its agenda quickly became the Iraqi crisis. This was mainly for two reasons: the significant role ascribed to Turkey as a staging post in the US war plans against Iraq and the serious implications of the aftermath of that war for Turkey and beyond. Just before the general elections Washington had submitted a long list of its pleas to Ankara, which included, among others, the deployment of 80, 000 American military personnel and 250 military aircraft in Turkey; the access to 14 airports and 5 harbours scattered around the country, along with access to all the roads, railways and waterways connecting them; and permission to use Turkish territory during the war against Iraq.[42] Washington, both through this list and its bilateral contacts with the Turkish civilian and military officials, made it clear that it was determined to wage war against Iraq regardless of the ongoing UN procedures and the fierce anti-war positions of other great power members of the Security Council, and that Turkey's role would be critical in this regard. The US insisted upon Turkey's support since it is only through opening a northern front from Turkey that, it argued, the war would more easily reach its objectives and end more quickly with lesser US military (and Iraqi) casualties.[43] And to start military planning for the war Washington hoped to get a response from Ankara in the shortest time possible. Acting under an intense time pressure the US expected Ankara to keep pace with Washington's timetable and organize its policy-making on the issue accordingly.

Ankara was not being asked what it thought of the pros and cons of a war against its southeastern neighbour or whether it agreed with the proclaimed objectives of that war or about its input into post-war planning. The US was acting with already decided goals and means, and Ankara was only being asked whether

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[42] See fn. 1.

[43] Michael R. Gordon, "U.S. is pressing for Turks' help in move on Iraq", New York Times, 28 Nov. 2002.

it wanted to contribute to its project. In other words, the US was expecting Turkey to approach its demands not with a calculating mind but in line with a logic of appropriateness, i.e. to fulfil them without much questioning and hesitation. Having said that, the situation was not as if Turkey could give a decision of its own free will and simply say yes or no without having to worry about the aftermath of that response. The prime minister, Abdullah Gül, and the JDP's then politically banned leader, R. Tayyip Erdoğan, told on several occasions that Turkey did not have the luxury of Germany, France or Belgium to adopt an exclusively independent position on the issue. As already explained, the Turkish economy had only recently started to come out of a deep recession with the help of a number of major bailout packages from the IMF,[44] which had been clearly given with the good will of Washington. There was still a dire need for the latter if the economy was to continue to produce and grow. Around the time the American and Turkish officials were having talks on the Iraq issue, Turkish ministers and bureaucrats were coming together with the IMF officials to discuss the conditions of release of a credit slice worth of US$1.6 billion. Although the two issues were technically different, the growing perception in Turkey, particularly in the Istanbul Stock Market, was to see the two somehow related,[45] posing a (at least psychological) barrier for the government to adopt a relatively autonomous stance on the Iraq issue. Added to that was the concern of the government and an array of economic sectors about the likely cost of a war on the fragile economy. The tendency of particularly the big industrialists, represented by the powerful Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen Association (TÜSİAD), was to seek compensation from the US for Turkey's war-related economic losses in return for Turkey's accepting (some of) the US pleas.[46] Although many believed that the US had to compensate Turkey in any case as the primary responsible actor for the estimated losses, there was scant belief that any compensation, regardless of its amount, would be given in return for no help. Thus, contrary to the expectations of Washington, there was much hesitation, calculation and mistrust on the part of its NATO ally. Ankara, instead of approaching its strategic ally with the logic of appropriateness and proving to be a reliable partner, increasingly calculated the costs of its action and inaction vis-à-vis the US pleas.

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[44] For details of the IMF assistance, see Yılmaz Akyüz and Korkut Boratav, "The making of the Turkish financial crisis", World Development, Vol. 31, No. 9, 2003.

[45] See, for instance, Songül Hatısaru, "Irak hem risk hem fırsat", Milliyet, 12 Jan. 2003; Songül Hatısaru, "Bütçe de IMF ile anlaşma da netleşmedi", Milliyet, 17 Feb. 2003.

[46] "Totaliter bir rejimin yanında yer almayın", Milliyet, 14 Jan. 2003.

An equal and perhaps more important constraint on Turkey's stance was Ankara's Iraq policy. The latter, as explained, was deeply hostile to any intervention that had the potential to dismember Iraq by inducing (further) destabilization and decentralization. And the core Turkish foreign policy executive, the government, the Foreign Ministry and the military, all agreed that there were just too many uncertainties associated with the US war plans concerning the future of Iraq, necessitating Turkey's cooperation with the US. Only through a cooperation which would inevitably amount to saying yes to some, if not all, of the US pleas, it was argued, Ankara would be let to deploy its army in northern Iraq against *faits accomplis* such as the announcement of a Kurdish state and/or the incorporation of the oil-rich districts of Mosul and Kirkuk into that new state, and later to have a say in the reconstruction of post-war Iraq. There was also a growing concern that the Iraq question was only a part of a greater hegemonic design relating to the whole Middle East that possibly involved changes in maps as well as regimes. Ankara's particular concern was to lose its communication with and thus its influence on Washington when its Middle Eastern neighbourhood would be subjected to quite a radical transformation with possible dire implications on Turkish national interests.

Another factor that complicated the government's decision-making was related to its own legitimacy problem emanating from Turkey's infamous Islamist-secularist divide. Only five years ago the coalition government led by the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi), the party out of whose ranks the JDP was born, had been forced out of power by a post-modern style military intervention, inflicting damage on the trust relations primarily between state and political institutions as well as between state and society. Having drawn its part of the lessons from this bitter past, the JDP's election platform[47] as well as its predominant rhetoric and policies after the election all focused on restoring that lost confidence. And the main vehicle the post-Islamist party deployed to prove its democratic and secular credentials to its internal and external critics turned out to be foreign relations. The JDP quickly embraced Turkey's historical European vocation deemed to be the reflection of the Republic's commitment to modernization. The party's leading cadres, including its politically banned leader, Erdoğan, paid their first official visits to the European capitals (and Washington) with a view to both getting a date for the start of mem-

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[47] The JDP's 2002 election platform can be found at
https://acikerisim.tbmm.gov.tr/xmlui/bitstream/handle/11543/954/200304063.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y (28 August 2018).

bership negotiations with the EU and proving their loyalty to Turkey's long-standing western ties. In the run-up to the 2002 Copenhagen European Council Summit where the decision on the start of membership negotiations would be taken, the Bush administration, along with Britain, put an unprecedented pressure on the European capitals, even to the extent of causing dismay in some, in favour of Turkey's membership.[48] Although Washington's support as such was not unrelated to its expectations from Turkey on Iraq,[49] at a time when the JDP was seeking to buy domestic legitimacy through external recognition, friendly relations with the West, including the US, considerably mattered – another instrumental calculation on the part of government.

At this point, the government faced the further dilemma of whether it would be possible to have good relations simultaneously with Washington and the EU within the post-Cold War environment where the former unity of the West seemed to be shattered by the divergence of interests and approaches on a number of geopolitical issues, including Iraq. Particularly during the early 2003 when increasingly tense and conflictual relations seemed to reign between the 'old Europe' and the US over the disarmament of Iraq, Turkey's active support for either side might have been easily interpreted in zero-sum terms: rapprochement with the anti-war stance of France and Germany as having come at the expense of strategic partnership with the US or saying yes to the US pleas implying Turkey's drifting away from its European vocation. The latter prospect, in particular, bothered the JDP government, since its party programme, prioritizing further democratization and civilianization seemed to be more realizable with Turkey's further integration with Europe rather than by getting bogged down with the US in Iraq, which threatened to reverse those processes with its inescapable emphasis on security and the associated potential of reinforcing the military's influence in politics.[50]

Having its hands tied considerably by Turkey's long-standing economic and political vulnerabilities as well as its own legitimacy problem, the new JDP government found itself in a very uneasy position vis-à-vis the unrelenting superpower's otherwise unacceptable unilateral demands. A number of leading Turkish journalists wrote at the time that the question was not whether the government would

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[48] Philip Webster and Rory Watson, "Bush angers Europe as Ankara is rebuffed", The Times, 14 Dec. 2002.

[49] Michael R. Gordon, "U.S. presses Turkey's case on Europe and Cyprus", New York Times, 3 Dec. 2002.

[50] See, e.g., Ahmet Sever, Abdullah Gül ile 12 Yıl: Yaşadım, Gördüm, Yazdım (İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2015), pp. 41-43, for personal views and sentiments of Gül on the issue.

cooperate with the US but rather concerned the scope of that cooperation. Striking a balance between the US pleas and Turkish national interests, a balance that would manage to keep Turkey out of the war while simultaneously protecting national interests in northern Iraq during and after the war, and maintaining strategic relations with the US, was put forth as the optimal option before the government, which then had to work out how to put it into practice.[51] However, the government, instead of immediately giving a response to Washington, organized its policy-making in tandem with the ongoing UN procedures on Iraq and stated its priority as preventing the war. Both the prime minister, Gül, and the JDP's banned leader, Erdoğan, told their US counterparts and Turkish public on several occasions that they were in favour of the resolution of the Iraqi crisis through peaceful means and opposed to a war that lacked international legitimacy and legality. Regarding the 1441 UN Resolution on Iraq as providing not a sufficient ground for military sanctions, they made it clear that the US had to wait for the interim report of the arms inspectors that would be submitted in late January 2003, and, if that indicated Baghdad's non-compliance, then a second UN resolution explicitly sanctioning a military attack had to be sought for.[52] Emboldened also by the growing anti-war positions of some of Turkey's EU associates and of the world public opinion in general, Gül embarked on an active peace diplomacy involving five key regional actors, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Jordan and Syria, which all seemed to share his perspective. Gül and his main foreign policy advisor, Ahmet Davutoğlu, emphasized that neither Turkey nor those five states (and many other regional states), notwithstanding their common perception of the Baghdad regime as a threat, supported a war that would radically destabilize not only Iraq but the region as a whole. Davutoğlu argued that treating Iraq issue as part of the global war on terror could have dramatic consequences leading to a regional chaos from which no one would benefit, particularly the regional states, and he defended the government's peace diplomacy as a serious initiative committed to avoiding that chaos.[53] Gül was particularly concerned about the prospect of 'Lebanonisation' of post-war Iraq: the country's engulfment by long-lasting bloody ethnic and sectarian conflicts, and their spread

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[51] See, e.g., Sami Kohen, "Mesele sadece Irak değil…", Milliyet, 26 Dec. 2002; Mehmet Ali Birand, "Irak olayı düzeni değiştirecek", Posta, 9 Jan. 2003; Taha Akyol, "Strateji", Milliyet, 16 Jan. 2003.

[52] See, e.g., "Erdoğan: Ölümün pazarlığı olmaz", Milliyet, 28 Dec. 2002; and Taha Akyol, "Başbakan Gül'ün penceresinden", Milliyet, 28 Dec. 2002; and Abdullah Karakuş, "'Operasyon bir yıl sonraya ertelenmeli", Milliyet, 16 Jan. 2003.

[53] See the interview made with Ahmet Davutoğlu by Derya Sazak, "Yabancı asker kabulü radikal bir değişimdir", Milliyet, 13 Jan. 2003.

to the neighbouring states.[54] Hence was his strong belief that all the diplomatic and political options had to be exhausted for the disarmament (and then the democratization) of Iraq before one could seriously embark on the option of war. The regional diplomacy led by Ankara directly targeted Baghdad rather than Washington, seeking to persuade Saddam Hussein and his cabinet to fully cooperate with the UN arms inspectors in line with the UN Resolution 1441 and be fully transparent concerning Iraq's assumed stock of weapons of mass destruction so as not to leave an excuse for the US to attack. This was also the message Ankara increasingly gave to Baghdad in several bilateral open and secret missions sent to or received by this country.[55]

The neo-Islamist/conservative character of the government and the JDP, the strong anti-war stance of the public, the legal constraint imposed by the constitution and its fierce advocacy by the president all encouraged the already willing premier Gül to test the limits of an ethical foreign policy for some time at least. Gül's hand was also strengthened by the fact that the government's peace diplomacy was not an isolated policy being pursued despite the military or the Foreign Ministry. To the contrary, it was backed by the declaration of the National Security Council that met in late December 2002, supporting the continuation of the efforts for the peaceful resolution of the conflict on the basis of international consensus and related UN resolutions.[56] Although during that meeting it was also emphasized that if those efforts came to nothing and the war broke out, Turkey might be obliged to take independent steps to protect its national interests, the first priority of the state and political establishment was the prevention of the war; the logic of appropriateness had the upper hand then. One of the leading advocates of this position was the president, Ahmet Necdet Sezer, former chairman of the Constitutional Court, who adopted a strict legalistic stance that laid more emphasis on the legality aspect of the Iraqi crisis than others, often referring to Article 92 of the Turkish Constitution on the matter.[57] Although his stance was not authoritative in legal terms, his statements on the issue were readily embraced and referred to

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[54] Fikret Bilâ, "6 Müslüman ülkenin sözcüsü olacağız…", Milliyet, 15 Jan. 2003.

[55] See, e.g., Önder Yılmaz, "Tüzmen'den Bağdat'a 'Genç Osman' çıkarması", Milliyet, 11 Jan. 2003; Fikret Bilâ, "Müslüman liderleri İstanbul'a bekliyor", Milliyet, 17 Jan. 2003; Taha Akyol, "Gül'ün umudu ve üç hedefi", Milliyet, 21 Jan. 2003; and Fikret Bilâ, "Taha Yasin'in gizli ziyareti", Milliyet, 7 Feb. 2003.

[56] "MGK, Irak'ı masaya yatırdı: Esnek harekat kararı", Milliyet, 28 Aralık 2002.

[57] See, e.g., "Sezer: Yeni BM kararı şart", Evrensel, 18 Feb. 2003, https://www.evrensel.net/haber/138982/sezer-yeni-bm-karari-sart (25 Dec. 2009).

by all those who did not want to get involved in the looming war on ethical and/or instrumental grounds. Resul Tosun, an influential JDP MP, for instance, told the Turkish parliament in early January that Turkey's participation in or support for a war that lacked international legitimacy was totally unacceptable. He asked "how can we do that when thousands of people will die, thousands of children will become orphans, thousands of women will become widows and the war will leave behind also thousands of captives, and thousands of handicapped?" He then went on enumerating national grounds to support his anti-war stance.[58]

However, it was remarkable that the humanitarian and the associated legitimacy aspects of the looming war were given broad coverage in the parliamentary and press statements of the JDP MPs and ministers, even to the extent of creating concern particularly in the US that Gül and Erdoğan were "doing nothing to prepare the public for the necessity of deposing Saddam."[59] Washington was particularly worried that even if the government would finally resign and send a bill to the Turkish parliament in the coming weeks in support of the US pleas, then it would find it difficult to get the bill accepted given the fierce anti-war positions of the JDP and the main opposition party, the RPP (Republican People's Party, *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*). However, it seemed that the government found it difficult to persuade the MPs and public opinion on a matter on which it was not itself persuaded. Therefore, Ankara, despite being under unprecedented pressure from Washington, pursued largely a foot-dragging policy, preferring to wait for the final verdict of the UN on the Iraqi disarmament and exploiting this protracted process for not conveying its final response to the US and instead conducting open-ended bilateral military and economic negotiations with the Americans with a view to protecting Turkish national interests in case the war erupted.

However, neither the regional diplomacy nor the UN process produced the kind of results expected by Turkey. Although Baghdad seemed to accelerate its cooperation and be more transparent in its relations with the inspectors from both the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Washington (and London) tended to accentuate the negative aspects of the commission reports submitted to the UN

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[58] TBMM Tutanak Dergisi (Minutes of the TGNA Debates), 15 Jan. 2003.

[59] William Safire, "The Northern Front", New York Times, 16 Jan. 2003. See also Morton Abramowitz, "Turkey and Iraq, Act II", Wall Street Journal, 16 Jan. 2003.

on 27 January 2003,[60] treating them as a *casus belli*.[61] Increasingly defiant and bellicose rhetoric of Washington combined with the simultaneous increase in the deployment of US warships in the Gulf and the Mediterranean signalled to Ankara that the time had arrived to pay more serious attention to the possibility of war and to focus on the protection of national interests within the context of war. The statement of the National Security Council that met on 31 January 2003, unlike that of the December meeting, while still advising to keep an eye on the peace diplomacy and the UN route, explicitly called on the government to start making preparations with a view to getting the permission of the parliament to implement the military measures deemed necessary to protect national interests.[62] That statement was soon followed by the public statements of Gül and Erdoğan to the effect that Turkey from then on would be in close cooperation with the US over the Iraq issue. Erdoğan, in a calculated move to start preparing the public for the war, said "[t]he decisions we make for war are not because we want war, but so we can contribute to peace as soon as possible, at a point when it is not possible to prevent war. *Our moral priority is peace, but our political priority is our dear Turkey.*" And pointing to the concerns emanating from Turkey's Iraq policy and historical responsibility, he told his party, "[i]f one is left out of the equation at the start of the operation, it may not be possible to be in a position to control developments at the end of the operation."[63] "Either you will remain outside the process and accept the consequences that follow or you will play an active role in the rewriting of history", he warned. He also resorted to the metaphor of 'fire' to differentiate the position of Turkey from other anti-war European powers and to justify its involvement in the war. "If, despite all our best efforts, fire breaks out in our neighbour", he said, "we cannot simply say 'it is none of our business'".[64]

Stage II

With a view to setting up the parameters of Turkey's collaboration with the US in a possible war, the government (and the military) initiated formal talks with the

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[60] Ewan MacAskill, et al., "Is Saddam hiding something? Blix gives his verdict on Iraqi weapons", The Guardian, 28 Jan. 2003.

[61] Julian Borger, et al., "Another step towards war", The Guardian, 28 Jan. 2003.

[62] https://www.mgk.gov.tr/index.php/2003-yili-ocak-ayi-toplantisi (9 August 2018).

[63] Dexter Filkins, "Top politician indicates Turkey may join U.S. effort against Iraq", New York Times, 5 Feb. 2003. Italics are mine.

[64] "Savaş yaklaşıyor, dışında kalamayız", Yeni Şafak, 5 Feb. 2003; "ABD'ye açık mesaj", Yeni Şafak, 19 Feb. 2003. See also the interview Erdoğan gave to the columnists of Yeni Şafak, "Belge olmadan asla", Yeni Şafak, 20 Feb. 2003.

US diplomats in Ankara at the beginning of February 2003. The negotiations that lasted for a month were multifaceted, covering Turkey's war-related political, military and economic needs as well as the US pleas. The Turks had reluctantly sat around the table after their attempts to realize their optimal choice of preventing the war had almost come to nothing. They had been convinced neither of the existence of the weapons of mass destruction in Iraq nor about the rightness of the choice to use force to tackle the perceived threat. However, given the immanency of the threat of war, they got preoccupied with reducing the harmful effects of the looming war on different aspects of Turkish national interests and, thus, extracting as much guarantee and compensation as possible from the American side. Since both sides were adamant about the rightness and necessity of their Iraq policies and were persistent in their pleas to each other, the talks between the two old NATO allies assumed more of a strategic behaviour involving bargaining based on a stick-and-carrot policy rather than of a dialogue based on persuasion and/or learning.[65] The Turks, though facing a superpower, acted with a belief that the war would be immensely difficult and troublesome for the US if they used their stick and did not allow the deployment of US ground troops in Turkey. The Americans, on the other hand, being well aware of Ankara's sensitivities vis-à-vis Iraq as well as political and economic vulnerabilities, did not hide their intention, above all, of keeping Turkey politically and militarily out of Iraq if Turkey were to prove unaccommodating with regard to their demands. The first carrot that was extended by Ankara to Washington was the permission given to the US military personnel to upgrade and modernize the facilities at a number of Turkish airbases and harbours with a view to preparing them for a war against Iraq.[66] Although Gül reminded the public and Washington that such permission did not necessarily condition or hijack the government's subsequent steps,[67] it was indeed difficult for the Americans not to perceive this as a sign of encouragement or as a bargaining tool to induce concessions from them. Although the required upgrading did not start immediately and was delayed till the Turkish Parliament gave its permission on the deployment of foreign troops,[68] the increasing arrival of the US warships carrying military and

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[65] For a succinct but useful explanation of the characteristics of different types of communication, including strategic action, mutual communication, and discourse ethics, see Neta C. Crawford, "Homo Politicus and Argument (Nearly) All the Way Down: Persuasion in Politics", Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 7, No. 1, 2009.

[66] Suna Erdem, "Ankara vote clears way for U.S. to use military bases", The Times, 7 Feb. 2003.

[67] Gerald MacLean, Abdullah Gül and the Making of the New Turkey, (London: Oneworld Publications, 2014), p. 234.

[68] Barkın Şık, "Fenerbahçeliler tezkere bekliyor", Milliyet, 18 Feb. 2003.

construction equipment to the Turkish ports on the Mediterranean coast reflected the US perception.

Notwithstanding the economic aspects of the talks being highlighted by the US press (even sometimes in a manner deemed insulting or denigrating by the Turks), the most critical issues over which the Turkish delegation (chaired by a senior Foreign Ministry bureaucrat, Deniz Bölükbaşı) fought diplomatic battles with the US diplomats concerned the political future of Iraq and the parameters of Turkey's military presence during the war. On the surface the ultimate objective of a democratic Iraq maintaining its territorial integrity and national unity was shared by both sides, and the US officials gave repeated assurances to the anxious Turkish side that they would not let Iraq disintegrate after the war. However, the silence or unsatisfactory explanations of the Americans concerning the post-war political construction of Iraq and how they were planning to accomplish this enormously difficult task fed the already existing suspicions and fears in Ankara. Theoretically speaking, a united and democratic Iraq could have been created through different state types, and it was Ankara's firm belief that certain types of arrangements such as an ethnic-based federation were more likely to lead to the dismemberment of the already fragile country in the long-term, if not sooner. What not only extended the diplomatic talks in Ankara but also hardened the already negative image of the Bush administration before the Turkish public and its representatives, was the indeterminacy of the Americans over this issue along with their increasing political and military reliance on the Kurds in northern Iraq as potential partners in the war; the continuing ambiguity over the future status of the oil rich Mosul and Kirkuk regions; their foot-dragging over the Turkish demand concerning the status of Turkmens in the future Iraq government; and their reluctance and uneasiness as to the Turkish military presence in northern Iraq during wartime.[69] The press leakage of the diplomatic wrangling on minor issues such as the insistence of the Americans to get the identity cards of the US soldiers be paid by Ankara as well as major issues such as the reluctance of Washington to disarm the Kurdish peshmerga after the war certainly did not help this negative atmosphere.[70]

On the economic front, on the other hand, Ankara was seeking what it considered to be 'war compensation' from its superpower ally. The aftermath of the 1991

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[69] Bölükbaşı, 1 Mart Vakası, pp. 36-50.
[70] "Sinir geren pazarlık", Milliyet, 20 Feb. 2003; Sami Kohen, "Kuzey Irak'ta yeni tehlike", Milliyet, 25 Feb. 2003.

Gulf War, the Turkish officials claimed, had cost Turkey dearly in many respects, from the losses amounting to US$100 billion from the closure of the Ceyhan-Kirkuk oil pipeline to the multifaceted costs accruing from the fight against the PKK, which had consolidated its position in the authority vacuum of northern Iraq. Determined not to repeat similar experiences and to protect the already fragile economy, the Turkish government held parallel talks with Washington, seeking economic aid in addition to the IMF credits. Although those talks had started earlier in January 2003, with the failure to agree on several issues, such as the amount, duration and conditions of the aid, they dragged into February.[71] By the end of February both sides seemed to agree on an aid package of US$25-30 billion[72] as well as on a number of critical political and military issues.[73] Apparently, the divergent interests of Ankara and Washington vis-à-vis Iraq had been finally reconciled more or less to the satisfaction of both. Washington agreed, though reluctantly, to turn the shared points into written documents to be signed pending the final permission of the parliament.

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[71] "ABD'yle kesintisiz pazarlık", Milliyet, 8 Feb. 2003.

[72] In terms of the agreement, the US would give Turkey a grant of US$6 billion, the 2 billion of which would be used to clear off some of the military debts of Turkey, and Ankara would have the option of turning the remaining US$4 billion into a long-term credit of around US$24 billion with a low interest rate, "ABD kredisinin kontrolü 2004'e kadar IMF'de olsun", Milliyet, 27 Feb. 2003.

[73] Among the agreed points, the most significant ones were the consensus to establish a democratic Iraq based on an administrative type of federation with a government representing all major ethnic groups; Turkmens, alongside Arabs and Kurds, were to be considered as 'constituting' elements of the Iraq nation; all districts of Iraq, including the oil-rich regions of Mosul and Kirkuk, would not be allowed to be 'owned' by a particular faction or group; the income from the oil reserves, considered as the asset of the Iraqi nation only, was to be distributed fairly to the whole population; a Turkish military force of around 31,000 soldiers (with another 31,000 soldiers providing logistical support) would enter northern Iraq under the Turkish command following the entry of a US force of around 24,000 soldiers (with another around 38,000 soldiers providing logistical services from within Turkey), with the former being deployed along an axis with a nearly 20 kilometres depth from the Turkish border; the US and Turkish military forces would act in a coordinated manner in northern Iraq with a view to avoiding undesirable developments such as the occupation of Mosul and Kirkuk by any of the opposition groups in the region; the Turkish military forces would be able to resort to force to render ineffective the PKK forces but would not fight any of the Iraqi forces; the Kurdish peshmerga, while being armed with light weapons during the war, would be disarmed by the Americans after the war with a view to setting up a united Iraqi army. For further details of the final documents, known as 'Memorandum of Understanding' (Mutabakat Zaptı), see Bölükbaşı, 1 Mart Tezkeresi, p. 44-74, and Bilâ, Ankara'da Irak Savaşları, pp. 313-328. However, the exact content of that Memorandum, especially the section covering the operational freedom to be granted to the Turkish military in northern Iraq has remained a matter of controversy up till now. While some, such as the ex-US ambassador and the RPP MP, Şükrü Elekdağ, argued that the text did not let the Turkish military to deal with the PKK except in cases of self-defense, the Turkish head of the negotiating team, ex-ambassador Deniz Bölükbaşı, argued otherwise claiming that the Turkish military had been granted the authority it had demanded from the Americans. See, for instance, the respective interviews made with each many years later: Uğur Dündar, "1 Mart Tezkeresi TSK'nın PKK'ya operasyon yapmasını yasaklamıştı!..", Sözcü, 4 March 2016, http://www.sozcu.com.tr/2016/yazarlar/ugur-dundar/1-mart-tezkeresi-tsknin-pkkya-operasyon-yapmasini-yasaklamisti-1120174/ (27 May 2016) and İpek Özbey, "Hâlâ 1 Mart tezkeresinin bedelini ödüyoruz", Hürriyet, 10 Oct. 2017.

With the completion of the negotiations with an agreement and the government's subsequent preparation of the long-awaited bill, it was as if the government trusted that a large number of uncertainties associated with the approaching war had been cleared and the necessary means to safeguard the national interests had been adopted. However, conflicting signals coming from within and outside the government, combined with those from northern Iraq, heralded that the passage of the bill in the parliament would not be a smooth process. Although with the start of the talks in February the government had given up insistently asking the US to legalize the war through an explicitly-worded UN resolution authorizing the use of force, a few cabinet ministers, the RPP, the president and the chairman of the parliament started to voice more frequently and loudly their concerns that the bill, unless brought to the Parliament in tandem with such a UN resolution, would be devoid of constitutionality. Although many were aware that legality and legitimacy were not the same things and that legality obtained through a UN resolution did not always ensure legitimacy, they increasingly brought up the issue of constitutional constraint to obstruct the government's (and the US's) plans.

Although the president's stance might be described as purely legalistic given his legal background, the chairman of the parliament, Bülent Arınç, an outspoken and influential JDP MP seemed to believe that the constitutional constraint was the only barrier that could have helped stop an otherwise illegitimate war or at least Turkey's participation in it.[74] He and several MPs defended that it was all wrong to seek protecting Turkey's national interests by contributing to or participating in an illegitimate war against a neighbour with which Turkey shared historical, religious and social affinities, and which would continue to remain Turkey's neighbour after the warring parties left. Their deeply emotional and strong-worded rhetoric no doubt both shaped and reflected the feeling and opinion already rampant among the public and within the parliament.

The stance of the main opposition party, the RPP, on the other hand, was a bit more complicated than that of either the president or Arınç in that they insisted upon a new UN resolution to accept US troops to Turkey but not to send Turkish troops to Iraq. Regarding Turkey's planned military presence in Iraq as an act of self-defence against the perceived threats delineated in Ankara's Iraq policy, they interpreted the constitutional constraint largely from a political perspective. Ac-

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[74] "Meşruiyet olmadan tezkere göndermeyin", Yeni Şafak, 25 Feb. 2003.

cordingly, they defended the division and separate voting of the government's bill in the parliament, warning that they would reject the bill if it was submitted undivided.[75] During the parliamentary debates, the final stance adopted by the government concerning the constitutionality of the bill was such that, given the controversial nature of the procedural legitimacy of the UN Security Council resolutions, it was wrong to treat the Security Council as the final legitimizing authority at all times. Since the government, like the RPP, perceived the planned Turkish deployment in northern Iraq as not an act of aggression as defined under the UN Charter but one of self-defense, but, unlike the RPP, considered the exercise of such deployment as too difficult, if not impossible, in the absence of cooperation with Washington, it opined that the Turkish parliament, not the Security Council, held the final legitimising stamp on the issue.[76]

A number of developments started to unfold in northern Iraq as the negotiations in Ankara were drawing to a close, prompting question marks even in the minds of pragmatic actors, and rendering the government hesitant again. Among them were the mass protests organized in several towns against the Turkish military deployment in northern Iraq, reinforced by the decision of the Kurdish parliament to the same effect;[77] the reported repressive measures of the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), one of the two powerful Kurdish groups that control the region, against the members of the Iraqi Turkmen Front, the main Turkmen political party;[78] the rumours that the US was planning to heavily arm the Kurdish peshmerga contrary to its pledges in Ankara;[79] and the exclusion of Turkmens from the leadership of the committee that was being envisioned by the Iraqi opposition groups to play a role in the transition to democracy.[80] All these increasingly raised questions as to what extent the US could be trusted to comply with the terms of the agreement that was about to be reached in Ankara, since it was perceived as already acting against them, probably out of an agenda that conflicted with Turkey's. The feeling of mistrust increasingly overshadowed the relationship of the two allies.

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[75] Bilal Çetin and Sami Gökçe, "Meclis'ten iki ayrı yetki istenecek", Yeni Şafak, 2 Feb. 2003.

[76] See, for instance, Burhan Kuzu's (JDP), chairman of the Constitution Commission of the parliament, speech to the parliament on the day of the discussion and voting of the bill before the session was closed to the public, TBMM Tutanak Dergisi (Minutes of the TGNA Debates), 1 March 2003.

[77] Stephen Kinzer, "Forget Hussein. Iraq's Kurds are free already", New York Times, 2 March 2003; Anthony Loyd and Suna Erdem, "Kurds urge U.S. to deter Turks", The Times, 26 Feb. 2003.

[78] Fikret Bilâ, "Ankara Barzani'den rahatsız", Milliyet, 21 Feb. 2003.

[79] Fikret Bilâ, "Uçaksavarlar kime?", Milliyet, 26 Feb. 2003.

[80] Fikret Bilâ, "Ankara'nın iki kuşkusu", Milliyet, 1 March 2003.

It was in this tense atmosphere created by a combination of normative and instrumental concerns that the bill was opened to signature within the government and then brought before the Parliament for approval. The government was already divided during the stage of signature and the opposing ministers agreed to sign the bill only not to block the decision-making process, publicly announcing that they would vote against it in the parliament.[81] Gül and Erdoğan, however, despite the signs that there was also normative and/or instrumental opposition to the bill from within their own party, which was likely to further rise in the face of increasing pressure from the public and their own devout constituencies,[82] seemed publicly confident that the majority of the JDP MPs, excepting some 50 at most, would support the government on an issue which concerned crucial national interests. After an almost five hours-closed briefing that informed the JDP MPs about the details of the agreement reached with the US, Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), Gül told the press that "our friends now understood the difference between being responsible and irresponsible."[83] Such confidence, along with their conviction that it was wrong to dictate the conscience of their MPs,[84] led them not to take a binding group decision before the voting. Since the RPP had declared beforehand that they had taken a group decision to vote against,[85] the direction of the votes of the JDP MPs, who held 363 seats in the parliament, became even more critical in obtaining the necessary simple majority. However, the decision of the government to delay the voting for one more day to wait for the statement of the NSC holding its regular monthly meeting signalled that, despite public appearances, the government was unsure of the decision of its party group and thus needed the final support of the military to persuade the undecided and the opposed. The government, however, could not obtain the expected support as the NSC, in its extraordinarily short statement, did not make any endorsing reference to the bill.[86]

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[81] "Bakanlar imzaladı söz artık Meclis'in", Milliyet, 25 Feb. 2003; "Yalçınbayır direndi, Gül imza istedi", Milliyet, 25 Feb. 2003.

[82] According to the press reports, among the religious groups that had overwhelmingly voted for the JDP in 2002 general elections, the Nakşibendi group as a whole and at least half of the Süleymancılar were vehemently opposed to the bill while the Nurcu group adopted more or less a pragmatic line, Serhat Oğuz, "Tarikat AKP'den sağduyu istedi", Milliyet, 28 Feb. 2003. On the other hand, the Felicity Party, the predecessor of the Welfare Party out of which the top cadres of the JDP came, was also opposed to the bill, asking the JDP MPs to reject the bill in line with their reason and conscience, not the directives of their party leaders, "Tezkereye 'hayır' çağrısı", Yeni Şafak, 27 Feb. 2003.

[83] "İkna için 3 uyarı", Hürriyet, 26 Feb. 2003, http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/ikna-icin-3-uyari-130336 (10 Dec. 2009).

[84] "'Grup kararı almayacağız'", Milliyet, 24 Feb. 2003.

[85] "CHP, tezkereye 'ret' oyu verecek. Baykal: 81 yıl sonra yabancı ordu geliyor", 27 Feb. 2003, http://www.tgrthaber.com.tr/dunya/-105328.html (10 Dec. 2009).

[86] Barkın Şık and Önder Yılmaz, "Sezer: Karar artık Meclis'in", Milliyet, 1 March 2003.

Although the military wing of the NSC had apparently acted so mainly out of the democratic leanings of the Chief of Staff, Hilmi Özkök (i.e. not to influence the free will of the parliament and to confer the entire political responsibility to the government),[87] it was most likely that many MPs, accustomed to the public statements of the NSC, perceived that as the uneasiness of the military with the terms of MoU and/or the US behaviour.

The government's bill, long-awaited by Washington, asking for the permission of the parliament for the deployment of US troops in Turkey and the sending of Turkish troops to northern Iraq was turned down by the parliament at one of its historical sessions on 1 March 2003. Although the number of 'yes' votes (264) exceeded that of 'no' votes (250) with limited abstention (19), the bill was regarded rejected for having failed to get the support of the simple majority of the voting MPs (267), thoroughly disappointing Washington and the Turkish supporters of the bill. Following the rejection, the government, though initially asking everyone, including Washington, to respect the result as the democratic decision of the parliament,[88] could not itself hold to that principle in the face of the continuing expectations of the Turkish military and the Pentagon to resubmit the bill to the parliament. Given the continuing defiance of the UN by Washington and its plan to open a northern front in Iraq through non-Turkish routes,[89] the genuine Turkish hope that the parliament's decision might deter the war quickly faded away. The Chief of Staff, Hilmi Özkök, in one of his rare public statements, expressed their concern that the unilateral measures Turkey could be obliged to take for self-defence in case of the eruption of war might leave them facing the coalition forces. Turkey, with a view to avoiding the latter situation and obtaining war compensation, he advised bluntly, had to "choose the lesser evil" and help the US.[90]

The government responded positively to Özkök's concerns, looking into the matter from an exclusively national/instrumentalist perspective. Although the new government, formed in mid-March under Erdoğan's premiership following the lifting off of his political ban, could not seem to keep pace with the pressing war timetable of the Pentagon,[91] Ankara gave every sign to Washington that it intended

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[87] "'Savaşanlara yardımcı olmalıyız'", Milliyet, 6 March 2003. Those views were corroborated by Hilmi Özkök himself years later, Fikret Bilâ, "Tezkerenin geçmemesi bir anayasal kazadır", Milliyet, 1 Oct. 2007.

[88] Dexter Filkins, "Turkish deputies refuse to accept American troops", New York Times, 2 March 2003.

[89] Ibid.

[90] "'Savaşanlara yardımcı olmalıyız'", Milliyet, 6 March 2003.

[91] Veli Toprak, "Bush sıkıştı", Yeni Şafak, 14 March 2003.

to help in one way or another, seeking to maintain the MoU reached previously. Even the otherwise norm-bent president gave its support to that now mostly one-sided bargaining process, seeing that the unilateralist super power closed off all the doors of legitimating its efforts to disarm Iraq before the international community. However, at a time when the foreign policy executive in Ankara was seriously considering resubmitting the bill to the parliament, Washington's announcement that the MoU was no longer on the table led the government to prepare a new bill involving only the opening of the airspace to the warplanes of the coalition powers and the deployment of the Turkish military forces in northern Iraq.[92] The government clarified in its bill that as the UN route for the peaceful resolution of the conflict had been exhausted, it was seeking the permission of the parliament on the former out of Turkey's long-standing alliance relationship with the US and on the latter mainly for deterrence, not offensive, purposes with a view to implementing the parameters of Turkey's Iraq policy.[93] The bill was accepted by the parliament in another closed session by 332 votes against 202 with 1 abstention on 20 March 2003. Considering that the US and British warplanes used the Turkish airspace intensely to bomb several Iraqi targets in the following weeks and months[94] and to open a relatively lightly-armed northern front in Iraq in collaboration with the Kurdish peshmerga, the 20 March bill, along with the subsequent logistical support provided by Turkey,[95] met most of the US's need for Turkey to wage war. The government, which had sought hard a few months ago to prevent the war on both normative and instrumental grounds, ended up making Turkey, though indirectly, part of the US-led coalition for instrumental ends. The deployment of the Turkish army in northern Iraq, regarded generally as the most effective means by the state and political establishment to accomplish some of those ends, could not be realized, despite the permission of the parliament, in the face of the American (and Kurdish) opposition.

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[92] Elçin Ergün and Önder Yılmaz, "Tezkere daraldı", Milliyet, 19 March 2003; Yasemin Çongar, "'Tam tezkere olmazsa, para da gelmez'", Milliyet, 19 March 2003.

[93] TBMM Tutanak Dergisi (Minutes of the TGNA Debates), 20 March 2003.

[94] The Turkish Defence Minister, Vecdi Gönül told the parliament in December 2007 that the US airforce had used the Turkish airspace around 4300 times to fly into Iraq from the start of the war, TBMM Tutanak Dergisi (Minutes of the TGNA Debates), 11 Dec. 2007.

[95] Steven R. Weisman, "Powell patches things up, as Turkey consents to help", New York Times, 3 April 2003.

Concluding Remarks

In the run-up to the 2003 Iraq War, the behaviour of the Turkish government was informed by norms as well as interests. However, the government failed to adopt consistently either a principled stance or a pragmatic one vis-à-vis the pleas of its long-standing super power ally. Just as there were strong reasons and supportive conditions to be principled and to stay out of the looming war against its neighbour (i.e. parallel domestic and international norms regulating the use of force, and their advocacy by some state and political elites as well as the majority of the public), there were also many uncertainties associated with that war, the consequences of which seemed to closely concern, among others, Turkey's political future and security. The fear of the elites was that those consequences, if left unattended by distancing oneself from the US, might have exacerbated Turkey's long-standing critical insecurities concerning its national identity and territorial integrity as well as the fragile economy. Those combined with the regional and international insecurities such as the overall dependence and weakness of many Middle Eastern governments, the absence of any effective regional conflict-resolution mechanisms in the region, and the ineffectiveness of the outdated UN mechanisms to tackle the challenges of a unipolar world, made it too difficult for the government to consistently pursue a normative course of action, one that is solely based on international law.

The government, out of a sense of multi-level responsibility and of an (Islamic) identity-based and humanitarian impulse to be other- as well as self-regarding, clung to the normative path as long as it believed that such a course of action could have deterred the war and served the long-term interests of the domestic, Iraqi, regional and international communities. Such belief, in turn, was based on the genuine (but, in retrospect, naïve) reasoning that the Turkish support was essential to the US's war-making and that without such support the US would have found it too costly and too difficult to wage a war against Iraq. It seems that the Turkish policy-makers largely misread the US intentions (and determinacy!) on the Iraq issue. However, once such misreading was corrected by the subsequent US rhetoric and war-planning, the government, unaided by the material and institutional realities, increasingly found itself obliged to adopt an instrumental logic and act with a view to fulfilling the material and ideational interests of its domestic audience only. In this sense, the Turkish case supports the argument by Hinnebusch that any espoused norm or identity needs the support of a corresponding material structure for it to be viable. When the international legal norms of sovereignty and

the legitimate use of force were being challenged by the hegemonic power itself in the absence of a firm and coherent counter-hegemonic bloc at the international and/or regional levels, the Turkish policy-makers, for the reasons already explained, simply found it too difficult to comply with those norms. Within the context of a hegemonic challenge, the compliance as such increasingly seemed to the government as well as other elites in Ankara as turning a blind eye to the war-related national interests. Perhaps what relieved the government's conscience to a certain extent was that the looming war was not of Turkey's making, and that the government at least forced the limits of peacefully resolving the conflict at the regional level before starting negotiating with the Americans. Also, some of the items at the negotiation table were not all self-regarding. The Turkish insistence on the territorial integrity of Iraq and the national character of its oil-rich regions embodied other-regarding elements as well. However, from the perspective of logic of appropriateness, the Turkish behaviour turned problematic once the government proved unable to stand behind the historical decision of the Turkish parliament rejecting Turkey's support and participation in the war, and eventually found itself violating the international (and domestic) norms by aiding the illegal and illegitimate US war effort in certain ways. However, those norms were violated not because they were deemed vague and hence open to multiple interpretations, but because Ankara simply perceived them as lacking the necessary material and institutional support required for their viability. At a time when the otherwise more powerful opponents of the war (the European bloc led by France and Germany) too opened their airspace to the war aircraft of 'the coalition of the willing', Turkey did not feel secure and strong enough to hold onto the principles of international law alone. The logic of consequences prevailed in the absence of material and institutional structures upholding those legal principles.

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Doç. Dr. Ahmet Asker

FİLİSTİN'DE GÜÇ MÜCADELESİ BAĞLAMINDA DİL KAVGASI (1913)[*]

Öz

Filistin'de I. Dünya savaşının başlamasından kısa süre önce *Hilfsverein der deutschen Juden* öncülüğünde 1912'de Yafa'da Yahudi öğrencilerin teknik bilimlerde eğitim göreceği *Technion* adında bir okulun temeli atıldı. 1913'te okulun eğitime başlamasına yakın bir sırada eğitim dili ile ilgili dernek yöneticileri ile Siyonist gruplar arasında, görüş ayrılığı baş gösterdi. *Hilfsverein* yöneticileri teknik derslerde eğitim dilinin Almanca olmasını savunurken, çoğunluğu doğu Avrupa ve Rusya kökenli Siyonistler, eğitim dilinin bütünüyle İbranicede olmasını savunuyorlardı. Yafa'da *Technion*'un eğitim dili üzerinden başlayan bu tartışma, Siyonistlerce anti-asimilasyoncu bir niteliğe büründürülerek yaygınlaştırıldı. Böylece kısa sürede Kudüs ve Hayfa gibi Filistin'in diğer kentlerine de sıçrayarak 1913-1914 arasında uluslararası kamuoyunda ses getiren bir protesto kampanyasına dönüştü.

Tarihe *Sprachkampf* (dil kavgası) olarak geçen bu tartışma, farklı ülkelerden Filistin'e gelen batılı Yahudiler ile Siyonistler ve yerel Yahudiler arasındaki beklenti ve görüş farklılıklarını su yüzüne çıkardı. *Hilfsverein* yönetimiyle Siyonist gruplar arasında yaşanan dil savaşının arka planında, Avrupalı devletlerin Osmanlı'ya nüfuz etme yöntemlerini ve bir okulun eğitim dili üzerinden bölgedeki rekabetlerini de okumak mümkündür.

I. Dünya Savaşı öncesinde, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun bölgedeki hâkimiyeti devam etmekteyken, *Technion*'un eğitim dili üzerinden yürütülen *dil kavgası,* aynı zamanda, Yahudi ulusunun inşasına giden yolda, İbraniceye yüklenen misyonu, Filistin'deki Siyonist hareketliliği ve İsrail devletinin kurulmasıyla sonuçlanan Siyonist hedeflere nasıl adım adım yaklaşıldığını gözler önüne sermiştir.

Anahtar kelimeler: Filistin, Siyonism, Ortadoğu, Dil Kavgaları, Yahudiler

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[*] Bu makale, Türk Tarih Kurumu, Ege Üniversitesi, 9 Eylül Üniversitesi ve İzmir Kâtip Çelebi Üniversitesi işbirliği ile 12-15 Kasım 2015 tarihlerinde İzmir'de düzenlenen ULUSLARARASI I. DÜNYA SAVAŞI SEMPOZYUMU' nda bildiri olarak sunulmuştur.

"THE LANGUAGE QUARREL İN PALESTİNE İN THE CONTEXT OF POWER STRUGGLE"

Abstract

In Yafa, In Palestine, slightly before the start of the First World War, in 1912 the foundation of a school called "Technion" has been started in the leadership of Hilfsverein der deutschen Juden. In this school the Jewish students would receive the education in technical sciences. A difference of opinion started in 1913, a little before the start of the education of the school between the institution administrators of the school and the Zionist groups about the language of the education. While the administrators of Hilfsverein defended that the language of the education in the technical courses must have been in German, the Zionists of mostly eastern European and Russian origin were defending that the language of the education must have been totally Hebrew. This discussion which started from the language of the education in Technion in Yafa have become widespread under an anti-assimilationist perspective. Accordingly, it spread to the different cities of Palestine such as Jerusalem and Haifa in a short period of time. It then became in 1913-14 as a protest campaign which brought echoes in the international area.

This discussion which the historians called Sprachkampf (The language war) made the difference of opinions between the western Jews who came to Palestine and the Zionist and the local Jews apparent. On the backstage of the language war which took place between the Zionist groups and the Hilfsverein administration, it is possible to see the methods of the European states for penetrating to the Ottoman Empire and their competition of the area on the basis of the language of education. When the rule of the Ottoman Empire was still continuing in the area before the First World War, the language war which continued on the language of the education in Technion also highlighted the mission of the Hebrew language in the construction of the Jewish nation, the Zionists movements in Palestine, and how the Zionists targets were achieved step by step finally resulting in the formation of Israel.

Keywords: Palestine, Sionism, Middle East, Language Wars, Jews, Hilfsverein.

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نزاع اللغة في فلسطين في سيـاق الصراع على السلطة

ملخص

في عام 1912، وقبل بدء الحرب العالمية الأولى بقليل، بدأ في يافا بفلسطين تأسيس مدرسة تدعى "تكنيون" في قيادة "هيلفسيرفاين دير دوشين جودن". في هذه المدرسة، كان سيحصل الطلاب اليهود على التعليم في العلوم التقنية. بدأ الاختلاف في الرأي عام 1913، قبل بدء تعليم المدرسة بقليل، بين مؤسسي المدرسة والجماعات الصهيونية حول لغة التعليم. في الوقت الذي دافع فيه مديرو "هيلفسيرفاين" عن أن لغة التعليم في الدورات التقنية يجب أن تكون باللغة الألمانية، كان الصهاينة من أصل شرق أوربي وروسي في الغالب يطالبون بأن تكون لغة التعليم هي اللغة العبرية بالكامل. هذه المناقشة التي بدأت حول لغة التعليم في "تكنيون" في يافا، أصبحت فيما بعد منتشرة على نطاق واسع في ظل منظور مضاد للانسجام. تبعا لذلك، انتشرت هذه الظاهرة إلى مدن فلسطين المختلفة مثل القدس وحيفا في فترة قصيرة من الزمن. ثم أصبح في 1913–1914 كحملة احتجاجية أحدثت أصداءً دوليةً.

هذه المناقشة التي أطلق عليها المؤرخون Sprachkampf (الحرب اللغوية) أحدثت اختلافًا في الآراء بين اليهود الغربيين الذين جاءوا إلى فلسطين وبين اليهود الصهاينة واليهود المحليين. على خلفية الحرب اللغوية التي وقعت بين الجماعات الصهيونية وإدارة "هيلفسيرفاين"، من الممكن رؤية أساليب الدول الأوروبية للتغلغل في الإمبراطورية العثمانية ومنافستها على المنطقة من خلال لغة التعليم. . عندما كانت سيادة الدولة العثمانية لا تزال مستمرة في المنطقة قبل الحرب العالمية الأولى، فإن الحرب اللغوية التي استمرت على لغة التعليم في "تكنيون" سلطت الضوء على مهمة اللغة العبرية في بناء الأمة اليهودية، الحركات الصهيونية في فلسطين ، وكيف تحققت الأهداف الصهيونية خطوة خطوة ، وأخيراً نتج عنها تشكيل إسرائيل.

كلمات مفتاحية: فلسطين، صهيونية، الشرق الأوسط، خلاف اللغة، اليهود

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Giriş

Osmanlı'nın yıkılışı ile sonuçlanacak I. Dünya savaşının hemen öncesinde Filistin'de, Yahudilere yönelik kurulması planlanan bir teknik okulun eğitim dili etrafında yaşanan mücadele, farklı diyarlardan Filistin'e göç eden Yahudiler arasındaki politik ve kültürel çeşitliliği yansıtması bakımından önemlidir. Söz konusu okul, teknik bilimlerde geri kaldığı düşünülen Yahudi gençlere, eğitim imkânı yaratmak amacıyla *Hilfsverein der deutschen Juden* (Alman Yahudileri Yardımlaşma Derneği) tarafından düşünülmüş ve Hayfa'da inşasına başlanmıştır. Teknik okul, henüz tamamlanmadan, bölgedeki Yahudi halkında büyük heyecan yaratmıştır. Zira bilim ve tekniğin merkezi durumundaki Avrupa'dan uzakta, Ortadoğu'nun kalbinde kurulacak teknik okulun, eğitimde geri kalmış Yahudilere gelişme imkânı kazandırması amaçlanmaktadır. Böylece modern mühendislik bilgisine sahip Yahudi öğrenciler, Filistin'in kalkınmasında önemli rol oynayacaklardır.

Alman Yahudilerin bu okulu kurma girişimleri, Almanya'nın dış ülkelerdeki kültür politikası ile örtüşmektedir. Zira kolonyal yarışa geç katılmış olan Almanya, İngiliz ve Fransızlarla kıyaslandığında kültür politikaları açısından da oldukça geridedir. 20. Yüzyılın başlarından itibaren Osmanlı coğrafyasında Alman nüfuzunu geliştirebilmek için kültür faaliyetlerini hızlandırmış, Alman dilini ve mefkûresini yayacak kurumlar açma yoluna gitmiştir. Dolayısıyla böylesi bir dönemde Alman Yahudileri Yardımlaşma Derneği'nin Filistin'de bir okul açma girişimi, Alman dışişlerinin desteklediği ve yakından takip ettiği bir proje haline gelmiştir.

Ancak bu okulun kuruluşu sırasında ortaya çıkan engelin kaynağı ne Amerika, Fransa veya İngiltere gibi diğer batılı ülkelerin rekabetçi tutumları, ne de Filistin'e Yahudi göçünü kısıtlayarak Siyonist hedeflerin önüne geçmeye çalışan Osmanlı hükümetidir. En büyük engel, okulun eğitim dilinin bütünüyle İbranice olmasını savunan, çoğunluğu Rusya kökenli radikal Siyonistlerden gelmiştir. Alman konsosluk raporlarında radikal olarak tarif edilen Siyonist Yahudiler, Hilfsverein derneğinin yönetim kurulunun, Teknik okulun ağırlıklı Almanca olan çok dilli bir eğitim programına sahip olmasına yönelik kararına şiddetle karşı çıkmışlar, protesto gösterileri örgütleyerek Filistin'deki diğer Yahudileri etkilemek üzere kamuoyu oluşturmaya çalışmışlardır. Alman Yahudileri Yardımlaşma Derneği'nin yönetim kurulu kararının Teknik okulun eğitiminin Alman karakterine yönelik almış olduğu kararları protesto ederken şiddete varan eylemler düzenlemişlerdir. I. Dünya

Savaşı'nın başlamasıyla sonuçsuz kalan bu tartışma, tarihe Dil Mücadelesi (*Language War-Sprachkampf*) olarak geçmiştir. Bu mücadele, amaçları Filistin'de bir yurt, hatta gelecekte bir Yahudi devleti kurmak olan Siyonistler ile farklı tarihsel süreçlerden gelen Yahudiler arasındaki farklı görüş ve yaklaşımları yansıtan ilginç bir örnek olmuştur.

Bu makalede, Filistin'i bir Yahudi toprağına dönüştürmek üzere harcanan çabaların kültürel ayağı olan İbranice'nin ön plana çıkarılması için verilen mücadelenin bir boyutu gözler önüne serilmiştir. Ulus devlet olmanın en önemli şartlarından biri olan ulusal dile sahip olma gereğinin bilincinde olan ve belgelerde radikal olarak tanımlanan Siyonist Yahudiler bu uğurda kendi dindaşlarıyla ve *Hilfsverein* gibi emperyalist çıkarlara hizmet eden Yahudi kurumlarıyla mücadele etmekten geri durmamışlardır. Savaş yıllarında, taraflar arasındaki güç mücadelesi bağlamında yaşanan bu kavga, bir yandan, diğer emperyalist güçlerin yaptığına benzer şekilde Almanya'nın Filistin'e nüfuz etmek için kullandığı argümanları göstermekte, diğer yandan Rusya kökenli Siyonist Yahudilerin radikal tutumlarını gözler önüne sermektedir.

Osmanlı Ortadoğusunda Güç Mücadelesi ve Yabancı Okullar

Emperyalizmin Osmanlı coğrafyasına girişi, keşfedilen ülkelerdeki gibi doğrudan işgal yoluyla değil, Osmanlı sultanlarından ticari ve kültürel alanlarda alınan imtiyazlarla, aşamalı bir süreçte gerçekleşmiştir. Ancak bu imtiyaz kapısı bir kez açıldığında kendi aralarında rekabet içerisinde olan diğer batılı emperyalist devletler Osmanlı coğrafyasında nüfuz sahibi olabilmek için yoğun bir çaba içine girdiler. Batılı devletlerin desteklediği hayır kurumlarınca açılan, gayr-i Müslimlerin eğitimine yönelik okullar, bu nüfuz etme girişiminin bir ayağını oluşturdular. Bu amaçla bir yandan cemaat okullarını himayelerine almaya çalıştılar, diğer yandan Osmanlı coğrafyasında kendi okullarını açmak suretiyle eğitim ağlarını genişlettiler. Osmanlı Devleti yabancı ülkelere tanıdığı kapitülasyonlarla bu sürecin gelişmesine farkında olmadan katkı yapmıştır. Bunun farkına varıldığında Yabancı okulların denetlenmesi çalışmaları başlatılmış ve 1869'da Maarif Umumiye Nizamnamesi yürürlüğe konulmuştur. Ancak bu denetim çabaları kapitülasyonların tanığı himaye hakkından dolayı beklenen sonucu verememiştir. II. Meşrutiyet döneminde de yabancı okulları denetleme çabası devam etmiş ancak yine kapitülasyonların tanıdığı himaye hakkı, bu denetimi zora sokmuştur. I. Dünya Savaşı öncesinde

Osmanlı'da yabancılara ve Osmanlı tebaası gayr-i Müslimlere ait toplam 2811 okul bulunmaktadır. Bu okullar, Osmanlı'daki okulların dörtte birine denk gelmektedir.[1] Bu oranlar Osmanlı Devleti'nde yabancıların sahip olduğu nüfuzun eğitimdeki boyutunu ortaya koyması açısından önemlidir.

Filistin de bu etkiden bağımsız değildir. Ortadoğu'daki emperyalist rekabet çerçevesinde Marunîler gibi Ortadoğu'nun yerli Hıristiyanları kadar Yahudiler de bir faktör olarak ön plana çıkmıştır. İngiltere, Fransa, Amerika ve Almanya gibi emperyalist devletler himaye yoluyla Yahudileri kullanma yoluna gitmişlerdir. Siyonistler de kendi hedeflerine ulaşmak için emperyalist rekabeti kullanmaya çalışmışlardır. Hindistan yolu üzerindeki Mısır'ı işgal eden İngiltere ile Suriye üzerinde iddiası olan Fransa'nın Ortadoğu'daki rekabeti Filistin'de iyice açığa çıktığında Yahudilerin rolü daha da önem kazanmıştır. Hem İngiltere hem Fransa Filistin'de nüfuz sahibi olabilmek için Yahudiler ile ilişkilerini güçlendirme yoluna gitmişlerdir. Siyonist projeye sempati duyan İngiltere, açıkça olmasa bile, Yahudilerin Filistin'e göçünü teşvik ederek, orada gittikçe büyüyen Yahudi nüfusu ile Filistin'de güçlü bir dayanak noktasına sahip olmayı hedeflemiştir.[2] Böylece İngiltere, hem Süveyş kanalının savunmasız doğu yakasını güvenceye almış olacak, hem de haksız yere toprak ele geçirdiği iddiasından kaçınabilecektir.[3] Fransa ise, Osmanlı yönetiminin tepkisinden çekindiği için, bu kurumların açıkça desteklendiği izlenimi vermekten kaçınsa da, eğitim sisteminde Fransız dilini fdefqnve kültürünü ön planda tutan *Alliance*[4] okullarını 20. Yüzyılın başlarından itibaren rakiplerinin Filistin'de gittikçe artan nüfuzları karşısında açıkça desteklemeye başlayacaktır.[5]

Emperyalist yarışa gecikmeli katılan Almanya, Ortadoğu'ya nüfuz etme sürecinde İngiltere ve Fransa ile benzer yöntemler kullanmıştır. Alman Kayseri II. Wilhelm iktidara gelir gelmez dünya siyaseti (Weltpolitik) takip edeceğini ilan etmiş ve öncelikle Osmanlı sultanı II. Abdülhamit ile ilişkilerini geliştirmiştir. Bu kapsamda

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[1] Mehmet Emin Elmacı, *II. Meşrutiyet'ten Lozan'a kapitülasyonlar*, (İzmir: Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi, Atatürk İlkeleri ve İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü, 2001), s.161.

[2] Ali Arslan, *İkinci Yahudi Göçü. Avrupa'dan Türkiye'ye*, (İstanbul: Paraf, 2010), s. 58-60.

[3] James Barr, Kırmızı Çizgi, Paylaşılamayan toprakların yakın tarihi, (Çev. Ekin Can Göksoy), (İstanbul: Pegasus Yayınları, 2016), s. 12.

[4] 1860'da liberal Yahudiler tarafından kurulmuş olan Fransız Yahudi Örgütüdür. Fransız devriminin kavramlarından beslenmiştir. Baskı gören Yahudileri savunmayı ve temel haklarına kavuşmalarını sağlama yönünde çaba harcamayı kendine görev edinmiştir. Birlik kendini 1862'den itibaren özellikle Kuzey Afrika ve Ortadoğu'daki Yahudilerin eğitim ve öğretimine adamıştır.

[5] Aron Rodrigue, *Türkiye Yahudilerinin batılılaşması. Alliance okulları 1860-1925*, (Çev. İbrahim Yıldız), (Ankara: Ayraç Yayınevi, 1997), s. 196, 233-6.

1898 yılında Osmanlı'ya; İstanbul, Hayfa, Yafa, Kudüs, Şam ve Beyrut'u kapsayan bir gezi düzenlemiştir. Bu gezinin amacı Osmanlı devleti ile müttefikliğe doğru giden yolda Almanya'nın Osmanlı coğrafyasındaki ticari ve kültürel nüfuzunu arttırmaktır.[6] Alman Dışişleri bunun için Filistin'deki konsoloslukları aracılığıyla bölgede geniş bir istihbarat ağı kurmuştur. Almanya'nın Filistin'deki askeri, ticari ve kültürel etkinliğinin hızla artması, Almanya ile Osmanlı arasındaki bu yakınlaşmanın doğal bir sonucudur.

Bu bağlamda Alman Yahudilerinin girişimiyle 1901'de Berlin'de kurulan *Hilfsverein der deutschen Juden*, Almanya'nın bölgedeki kültürel yayılmacılığına hizmet edecek, *Alliance* okullarının Fransız dili ve kültürünün yaygınlaşmasına yaptığı katkı gibi, Alman dili ve kültürünün yaygınlaşmasına katkı yapacaktır. Osmanlı yönetimi altındaki Filistin'de, Almanya ile Fransa arasındaki rekabet, *Hilfsverein* ve *Alliance* arasındaki rekabete de yansıyacaktır. Her ikisi de Yahudilere hizmet etmek amacı taşıyan bu kurumların arasındaki rekabet, *Hilfsverein*'ın Hayfa'da kurmayı planladığı *Technikum* okulunun eğitim dili ile ilgili 1913'te patlak veren krize kadar devam edecektir.[7] Ancak Yahudi ulusal bilincini geliştirmek için çaba sarf eden Siyonistler, bu bağlamda Yahudi dili ve kültürünün gelişimini yavaşlatacak her türlü müdahaleye karşı bir siyaset geliştirme yoluna gidecekler, arka planda emperyalist hedeflere hizmet eden Yahudi kuruluşlarına Siyonist bir karakter kazandırma mücadelesi vereceklerdir.

Emperyal Güç Mücadelesi Bağlamında Hilfsverein Der Deutschen Juden

Hilfsverein der deutschen Juden (Alman Yahudileri Yardımlaşma Derneği), savaş, pogrom ve göçler nedeniyle büyük sıkıntılar yaşayan Doğu Avrupa ve Ortadoğulu Yahudilerin siyasi ve sosyal durumlarını iyileştirmek amacıyla Dr. James Simon (1932'ye kadar dernek başkanı), Eugen Landau, Max Warburg ve Dr. Paul Nathan öncülüğünde 1901 Mayısında Berlin'de kurulmuş bir dernektir. I. Dünya Savaşı'nın başlamasından kısa süre önce derneğin Almanya'da on binin üzerinde üyesi, Amerika, Rusya ve Filistin'de önemli sayıda sempatizanı bulunmaktadır. Dernek on binlerce Rus Yahudi'sinin Batı'ya ve Filistin'e göç etmesine sebep olan 1903 ve 1905 Kişinev pogromlarında aktif rol oynamış, alınacak tedbirleri görüşmek

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[6] Necmettin Alkan, "Dış siyasetin bir aracı olarak hükümdar gezileri: Kaiser II. Wilhelm'in 1898 şark seyahati", *Osmanlı Araştırmaları XXXI*, (İstanbul: 2008), s.10.

[7] Rodrigue, *Türkiye Yahudilerinin batılılaşması,* 236.

üzere 1903'te Viyana'da, 1905'te de Londra'da, konferanslar düzenlemiştir. Dernek öncelikle Almanya'daki ve diğer ülkelerdeki Almanca konuşan Yahudilerin bilimsel, kültürel ve ekonomik gelişimlerine katkı sağlamayı hedeflemektedir. Bu amaçla Doğu Avrupa, Rusya ve Osmanlı'da okullar açmış, böylece Alman Yahudileri arasındaki bağları güçlendirmeye de çalışmıştır. Bu derneğin açtığı okullarda –İbraniceye yer verilmesine rağmen– Alman dili ve kültürü ön planda tutulmaya çalışılmıştır. Alman Dışişleri bu derneği, 1860'da Fransa'da kuruluşundan beri çeşitli ülkelerde okullar açarak eğitim yoluyla Fransız kültürünün yayılmasına hizmet eden Paris merkezli *Alliance Israélite Universelle*'e bir alternatif olarak görmüş, Alman Yahudileri için merkezi bir rol oynamasının yanı sıra Alman dilini ve kültürünü yayan bu derneği desteklemiştir. *Hilfsverein*, Filistin'de ana okuldan öğretmen lisesine kadar uzanan ve eğitim dili İbranice olan ancak Almancanın ön planda yer aldığı kapsamlı bir eğitim sistemi kurmuştur. 1913'te derneğin Hayfa'da kurmayı planladığı bir teknik okulda fen bilimleri alanındaki derslerin Almanca dilinde anlatılacağının açıklanması, Siyonist çevrelerin sert tepkisi ile karşılaşınca, *Technion*, Siyonistler ile *Hilfsverein* yöneticileri arasında bir *mesele* haline dönüşecektir.[8]

Technion (Technikum): Hayfa'da Bir Teknik Üniversitenin Kuruluş Süreci

XX. Yüzyılın başlarında Hayfa'da fen bilimleri alanında modern eğitim verecek bir okulun açılması düşüncesi doğmuştur. Böylesi bir okulun kurulması fikrini yaymak ve destek toplamak üzere Viyana'da felsefe okuyan Martin Buber; Berlinli yazar ve editör Berthold Feiwel ve Chaim Weizmann bir topluluk kurdular. Bu topluluğun üyeleri, yaşadıkları yerlerde üniversitelere girmek isteyen Yahudi gençlerin karşılaştıkları zorlukları anlatan bir bildiri hazırladılar. Bildiride, Yahudi gençlerin teknik eğitim almakta yaşadıkları problemlerin altı çizilmektedir. Onlara göre bu sorunun temelinde ekonomik ve sosyal engeller bulunmaktaydı.[9]

Yahudiler -özellikle doğu Avrupa ve Rusya kökenliler– genelde erken yaşta ticari işlerle ilgilenmeyi tercih ettiklerinden teknik bilimlerde geri kalmaktaydılar. Hayfa'da kurulacak teknik okul sayesinde Yahudi gençlerine bilimsel dallarda mesleki eğitim verilmesinin yolu açılmış olacaktır. Bu okuldan mezun olacak

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[8] Ze'ev Wilhem Falk, "Hilfsverein der deutschen Juden", *Encyclopaedia Judaica*, Fred Skolnik - Michael Berenbaum (Ed.), Cilt. 9, (Detroit: Keter Publishing House, 2007), s. 106–7.

[9] Martin Buber, Berthold Feiwel, Chaim Weizmann, *Bet Sefer Gavoa Yehudi*, (Geneva-Lausanne: 1902).

öğrenciler böylece ileride Yahudi sanayisinin gelişmesine de ciddi katkı sunabile-ceklerdir. 1903'te toplanan I. Meclis Yahudi yönetimini oluşturmaya yönelik atılan önemli bir siyasi adımdır. Meclis başkanı, Dr. Menahem Ussishkin mecliste Filistin'de Yahudilere yönelik bir yükseköğretim enstitüsünün kurulmasının önemini dile getirmiştir. Meclis, Filistin'de bir politeknik enstitüsünün kurulması önerisini desteklemiştir. Böylece *Technion*'un kuruluşuna doğru önemli bir adım atılmıştır. *Technion*'un fikir babası olarak anılan Alman Yahudileri Yardımlaşma Derneği'nin yöneticilerinden Dr. Paul Nathan, farklı Yahudi gruplarını *Technion* şemsiyesi altında bir araya getirmekte ve kaynak bulmakta merkezi bir rol oynamıştır. Okulun kuruluş çalışmaları Dr. Paul Nathan'ın 1907'de Filistin'i ziyaret etmesiyle hız kazanmıştır. Okul için, Moskova'dan Wissotzky 100.000 ruble, New York'tan Jacob Schiff 100.000 dolar bağışta bulundular. Böylece *Hilfsverein*'ın ön-cülüğünde, Alexander Baerwald'ın mimarlığını yaptığı okul binasının inşaatına başlanmış ve okulun temeli 1912'de Hayfa'da, Karmel dağının eteklerinde atılmıştır.[10] Eğitime başlamasına yakın bir dönemde *Technion*'un yönetim kurulu, eğitim po-litikasını belirleyen kararları açıklamıştır. Bu açıklama sonrasında okulun eğitim diliyle ilgili Siyonistler ile *Hilfsverein* yöneticileri arasında, tarihe dil kavgası olarak giren bir süreç başlamıştır.

Dil Kavgası ve Taraflar

Eğitim dili ile ilgili çatışmanın temelinde, değişik coğrafyalardan Filistin'e gelen Batılı ve Doğulu Yahudilerin geleceğe dair farklı beklenti ve duygular içerisinde oluşları yatmaktadır. Fransa ve Almanya'dan gelenler başta olmak üzere Batı Avrupalı Yahudiler, 19. Yüzyılın sonlarına gelindiğinde, her ne kadar anti-semitik dalgadan olumsuz yönde etkilenseler de, en azından hukuki düzeyde kendilerini yüzyıllardan beri baskı altında tutan kısıtlamalardan kurtulabilmişler, meslek seçme, emlak alıp satma, seyahat etme gibi temel yurttaşlık haklarına kavuşmuşlardır. Batı Avrupa'nın eğitim kurumlarında birkaç dil bilen çağdaş Yahudiler olarak görece daha özgür düşünebilmektedirler. Ancak Polonya, Baltık ülkeleri, Ukrayna ve Rus çarlığında bulunan Yahudiler, Batıdaki dindaşlarına göre çok daha zor du-rumdaydılar. 20. Yüzyılın başlarında, temel yurttaşlık haklarından dahi mahrum bir şekilde, pogromların kolay hedefi halindeydiler.[11] Bu durum Doğu Avrupa'dan

[10] Yaakov Dori, "Technion, Israel Institute of Technology", *Encyclopaedia Judaica*, Fred Skolnik ve Michael Berenbaum (Ed.), Cilt: 19, (Detroit: Keter Publishing House), s. 571–2.

[11] David Fromkin, *Barışa son veren barış. Modern Ortadoğu nasıl yaratıldı? 1914-1922*, (Çev. Mehmet Harmancı), (İstanbul: Sabah Kitapları), s. 268.

Filistin'e veya Amerika'ya kaçmak zorunda olan Yahudilerin daha muhafazakâr ve radikal oluşlarını açıklar. Dil savaşında da görüleceği üzere, Siyonizm'e yaklaşımlarında radikal milliyetçi tavırlarının etkisi görülecektir.

Dil savaşına taraf olan üç örgüt; *İbranice Dili Komitesi* (Hebrew Language Committee -Va'ad ha-Lashon ha-Ivrit), *Öğretmenler Birliği* (Hebrew Teachers Association-Ichud ha-Morim) ve *Hilfsverein* örgütleridir. Ancak arka planda Alman Dışişleri de tartışmaya taraf olmuş ve açıkça olmasa bile *Hilfsverein*'ı himaye eden bir politika takip etmiştir.

Eliezer Ben-Yehuda öncülüğünde 1890'da kurulan *İbranice Dili Komitesi*'nin amacı, yazılı ve sözlü İbranicede akademik araştırmalar yapmak, bu sayede İbraniceyi zenginleştirmek ve çeşitli ülkelerden Filistin'e göçen Yahudi grupların konuşabileceği, eğitimde ders dili olarak kullanılabilecek ortak bir İbraniceyi hayata geçirmektir. Böylece Yahudiler arasında dilde birlik sağlanacak ve ulusal aidiyet duygusu güçlendirilecektir. *Öğretmenler Birliği* (Hebrew Teachers Association - Ichud ha-Morim), eğitim seviyesini ve okulların standartlarını yükseltmek, okullarda Yahudilik bilincini ve İbraniceyi geliştirmek ve de öğretmenlerin koşullarını iyileştirmek amacıyla 1903 yılında kurulmuştur. Birlik öğretmenleri, Fransızca ve Almancaya ağırlık veren *Alliance* ve *Hilfsverein*'ın okullarında, İbraniceye yer verilmesi için baskı yapmıştır. *Technion* yönetim kurulunun, teknik bilimlerdeki derslerde Almancanın kullanılacağını açıklamasından sonra dersleri boykot etme kararı almıştır.[12]

Almanya ise konuya dolaylı olarak müdahil olmuştur. Alman Kayseri II. Wilhelm'in dünyaya açılma stratejisi (Weltpolitik) ve bu çerçevede şekillenen *Drang nach Osten* politikası Alman Dışişleri'nin ilgisini Osmanlı topraklarına yönlendirmiştir. *Hilfsverein* okulları Filistin'de Alman nüfuzunu arttırmanın bir yolu olarak görülmektedir. Okullara destek veren Almanya'nın bölgede görevli konsolosları *Technion*'un eğitim dili ile ilgili Siyonistlerin kopardığı yaygarayı yakından takip ettiler. 1908 devriminin özgürlük ve eşitlik atmosferinden kaynaklı olarak cemaat içi olaylara müdahale etmeme tavrı gösteren Osmanlı hükümeti ile Rusya'yı da tartışmanın içine çekmek üzere, basında manipülatif haberler yayınlanmasını sağladılar. Kudüs, Yafa ve Hayfa'daki Alman konsolosluk görevlileri,

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[12] Dennis Kurzon, "The Language War: Hebrew and Other Languages in Pre-First World War Palestine", *The Studies on the Hebrew Language*, (Cambridge Scholars Publishing, Newcastle upon Tyne, 2014), s. 107-8.

Almanya karşıtlığı haline dönüşme tehlikesi gösteren dil kavgası ile ilgili ayrıntılı raporlar hazırladılar.

Hilfsverein yöneticileri, Almanya'nın teknik bilimlerde ileri seviyede olması ve burada yetişecek çocukların iş bulma imkânı açısından önemli bir Avrupa dilini daha öğrenmeleri adına, derslerin Almanca verilmesi taraftarıydılar. *Technion*'da ders verecek hocaların çoğunlukla Alman kökenli ve anadillerinin Almanca olması da diğer bir faktördür. Ancak, özellikle doğu Avrupa ve Rusya'dan göç eden, muhafazakâr Yahudiler ve Siyonist liderler eğitim dili olarak İbranicenin kullanılmasını arzuluyorlar, bunun ulusal birliği güçlendirecek önemli bir faktör olduğunu görmekteydiler. Almancayı savunanları ise, ulusal bilinci zayıf, İbranice karşıtı ve asimilasyoncu olmakla suçlamaktaydılar. Böylece Siyonist çevreler, *Öğretmenler Birliği* öncülüğünde, 1913-1914 arasında asimilasyon karşıtı bir protesto kampanyası başlattılar. Bu çerçevede Filistin'in farklı yerlerinde gösteriler ve grevler organize ettiler.

Protestolar

Technion'un eğitim dili ile ilgili protestoları başlatan gelişme, okulun yönetim kurulu toplantısında alınan kararların bir gazetede yayınlanması olmuştur. *Jüdischen Institut für technische Erziehung in Palästina*[13] (Filistin'de Yahudi Teknik Eğitim Enstitüsü) idare meclisi Dr. James Simon başkanlığında 26 Ekim 1913'te Berlin'de toplanır. Toplantıda okulun eğitim stratejisiyle ilgili önemli kararlar alınır. Almancanın sadece Hayfa'daki Teknik okulda değil, Alman Yahudileri Yardımlaşma Derneği'nin *Technion*'a öğrenci yetiştiren ilk ve orta kademedeki bütün okullarında geniş bir yer tutmasına karar verilir. 31 Ekim 1913'te Siyonistlerin Almanya'daki merkezi yayın organı *Die Welt*'te yayınlanan kararlara göre okulda resmi bir eğitim dili öngörülmüyor, fakat enstitünün Yahudi karakteri gözetilerek İbranicenin özel bir yer tutacağı belirtilmektedir. Ayrıca Şark halklarının ve Osmanlı vatandaşlarının birlikteliğini sağladığından dolayı Arapça ve Türkçe'nin de yoğun bir şekilde kullanılmasının önemi vurgulanmaktadır. Doğa bilimleri ve teknik bilimlerle ilgili derslerin ise "*modern zamanların bilimsel gelişmesinde önemli bir rol oynayan, büyük bir medeniyet ve kültür dili*" olarak tarif edilen Almancada yapılması uygun bulunmuştur. İngilizce ve Fransızcanın ise öğrencilere, gelecekte

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[13] Belgelerde farklı adlandırmalar yer alsa da kastedilen hep aynı okuldur: Technion (İngilizce) veya Technikum (Almanca).

İngiliz ve Fransız egemenlik alanlarında iş bulmada kolaylık sağlaması açısından üst sınıflarda kapsamlı bir şekilde öğretilmesi istenmektedir. Enstitü'nün eğitim politikası aşağıdaki maddelere göre belirlenmiştir:

Enstitünün bütün dalları için zorunlu tutulacak resmi bir ders dili olmayacaktır.

İbranice, Teknik okulun Yahudi karakterine uygun olarak, en ayrıcalıklı bir konuma haiz olacaktır.

Arapça ve Türkçe, öğrencilerin Şarktaki ve Osmanlı devletindeki yerli halklarla sıkı bir vatandaşlık ve iş ilişkileri geliştirebilmelerini sağlayacak yoğunlukta kullanılacaktır.

Doğa bilimleri ile teknik dersler, öğrencilere modern zamanların bilimsel gelişmesine aracılık eden büyük kültür dillerinden birini aktarmak amacıyla Almanca öğretilecektir.

Öğrencilere ileriki kariyerlerinde ve de İngilizce ile Fransızca gibi Avrupa dillerinin hâkim olduğu coğrafyalarda kolaylık sağlayacağından, İngilizce ve Fransızca üst sınıflarda kapsamlı bir şekilde ele alınacaktır.[14]

Die Welt'te beş başlık altında yayınlanan yönetim kurulu kararları, eğitim dilinin tamamıyla İbranice olması yönünde çaba harcayan Siyonistlerin beklentisini karşılamaktan çok uzaktır. Eğitim dilinin her aşamada İbranice ağırlıklı olmasını savunan Siyonistler, bu kararlar karşısında, Kudüs, Hayfa ve Yafa'da protesto gösterileri düzenlediler. İlk olarak teknik okulun yönetim kurulunda bulunan üç Siyonist aktivist; Schmarja Levin[15], Louis Ginzberg (Ahad Ha'am)[16] ve Dr. Jehiel Tschlenow[17] bu görevlerinden istifa ettiler.[18] Ancak okulun kuruluşunda öncü rol

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[14] Das Politische Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Löytved Hardegg "Unter Bezugnahme auf den Bericht von 8. August 1913, Jn Nr. 2026.", nr.392, Haifa, den 10 November 1913.

[15] Siyonist aktivist lider. Rusya'da doğdu. Üniversiteyi Berlin'de okudu. Bu sırada Rus Yahudileri Bilim Derneği üyeliği yaptı. 1911'de *Engeres Aktions-Comite* (EAC) üyeliğine seçildi. 1913'te Amerika'ya gitti ve savaş bitene kadar orada kaldı. Amerika'da iken yoğun Siyonist faaliyetler içerisinde bulundu. (1867-1935). Jehuda Reinharz, *Dokumente zur Geschichte des deutschen Zionismus 1882-1933*, (Tübingen: Mohr, 1981), s. 160.

[16] İbranice dil bilgini. Berlin, Straßburg ve Heidelberg'te üniversite eğitimini aldı. Heidelberg'de Felsefe doktoru oldu. 1899'da Amerika'ya gitti ve 1902'de Yahudi teolojisi üzerine Profesör oldu. Talmud hakkında birçok eser kaleme aldı. (1873-1953). Frederick T Haneman, "Ginzberg, Louis", *The Jewish encyclopedia*, (New York, London: Funk and Wagnalls, 1901-1906), s. 671.

[17] Rusya'da doğdu. Moskova Üniversitesi Tıp Fakültesi'nden mezun oldu ve Moskova'da doktorluk yaptı. Aynı zamanda *EAC* (Engeres Aktions Komitee) ikinci başkanıydı. 1911'de Dünya Siyonist Örgütü yönetim kurulu başkan yardımcısı oldu ve Siyonist organizasyonlarda aktif rol oynadı. (1863–1918). <http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/judaica/ejud_0002_0020_0_20075.html> Erişim Tarihi: 20.7.2015.

[18] Das Politische Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Löytved Hardegg, "Unter Bezugnahme auf den Bericht vo 8. August 1913, Jn Nr. 2026.", nr.392, Haifa, den 10 November 1913.

üstlenen *Hilfsverein* yöneticileri ile çocuklarının Avrupa'nın bilim dili olarak kabul edilen Almancada eğitim görmesini isteyen aileler, Almancada ısrarcı olmuşlardır. Sonuçta Siyonistlerin *Technion* ile ilgili başlattığı protesto kampanyası, *Hilfsverein*'ın Filistin'deki bütün okullarına yönelmiştir.

Hayfa'daki Protestolar

Die Welt'te yayınlanan yazıdan 2 hafta sonra, 15 Kasım 1913'te, yaklaşık 300 kişilik Siyonist bir grup, idare meclisinin kararını protesto etmek için teknik okulun yakınlarında toplandılar. Siyonist eylemcilerin öncelikli amacı, teknik okulun en azından orta sınıfında derslerin İbranice yapılmasını sağlamaktır. Aksi halde dersleri boykot edeceklerini ve kendi hususi okullarını açacaklarını belirttiler. Yönetim kurulundan istifa eden üç Siyonist'in Yahudi, kamuoyunu etkilemek ve böylece yönetim üzerinde bir baskı unsuru oluşturmak amacıyla bu protesto gösterilerini organize ettikleri tahmin edilmektedir. Protesto gösterilerine katılanların yarıya yakını kadın ve çocuklardan oluşmaktaydı. Protestodaki konuşmacılar arasında Almanya kökenli Dr. Moses Auerbach, Rusya kökenli Kaufmann Pewsner ve Hilfsverein okullarında öğretmenlik yapan Osmanlı Yahudisi Bensabath bulunmaktadır.[19] Hayfa'daki Siyonist eylemciler protestoların Yahudiler açısından önemli diğer iki kent olan Yafa ve Kudüs'e de sıçraması için yoğun bir çaba sarf ettiler ve bunda başarılı oldular.

Yafa ve Kudüs'ten Yükselen Siyonist Tepkiler

Teknik okulla ilgili alınan karara en sert tepki, yüzyılın başlarında Filistin'de yeni Yahudi yaşamının ve Siyonizm'in merkezi olarak yükselmekte olan Yafa'dan gelmiştir. Bu kentin diğer bir özelliği İbranice dilinin özenle korunduğu ve geliştirildiği bir liseye ev sahipliği yapmasıdır. Hayfa'daki teknik okulun eğitim diliyle ilgili yükselen Siyonist tepkinin Yafa'daki çıkış noktası işte bu lisedir. *Öğretmenler Birliği'ne* üye Siyonist lise öğretmenlerinin başlattığı ve öğrencilerin desteklediği protestoların amacı Hayfa'daki teknik okulun Yahudi karakterinin, özellikle de İbranicenin korunmasının ve de güçlendirilmesinin önündeki engellerin kaldırılmasını sağlamaktır. Bu amaçla okulun yönetim kurulunun Berlin'deki toplantısından çıkan kararları kınayarak *Hilfsverein*'ın bütün okullarına savaş açtılar.

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[19] Löytved Hardegg, "Unter Bezugnahme auf den Bericht vo 8. August 1913, Jn Nr. 2026.", nr. 392, Haifa, den 10 November 1913.

Hedefleri, Hayfa'daki teknik okul ile beraber, Almanca ağırlıklı eğitim veren derneğin bütün okullarında eğitimin İbranice yapılmasını sağlamaktır. Siyonistlerin büyük bir kısmı İbranicenin korunması ve geliştirilmesi meselesini adeta bir *Yahudi Rönesansı* olarak görmekteydiler. Fakat konsolosluk raporlarına göre İbranicenin teknik okulda eğitim dili olarak kullanılması önerisi o dönem için gerçekçi olmayan, hayalî bir istektir. Ancak bu tür eylemlerle Siyonistler, yüzyılın başlarında İbraniceyi Filistin'de önemli bir faktör haline getirmeyi başarmışlardır.[20]

Hilfsverein'ın 140 çocuklu bir erkek okulu protestolardan olumsuz etkilenmiştir. Veliler Siyonistlerin şiddet içerikli tehditlerinden korktukları için çocuklarını bir süre okula göndermediler. Siyonist gençler grev zamanında para alamayan öğretmenlerinin maddi sıkıntılarını karşılamak ve İbranice ders veren rakip bir okulun kurulmasına katkı sunmak üzere kendi aralarında bir fon oluşturdular. Tel Aviv'deki eğitim çevreleri de öğrencileri protesto gösterilerine ve boykota katılmaları için kışkırtmaktaydılar.[21]

Bu bağlamda protestocu gruplar, Yahudi ailelerini, çocuklarını *Hilfsverein*'ın okullarına göndermemeye ve okullarda görevli öğretmenleri istifaya davet ettiler. Bu protestolardan etkilenen bazı aileler, çocuklarının İbranice dili dışında eğitim almasına müsaade etmeme kararı aldılar. Yafa'da bulunan *Ezra* okulundaki öğrencilerin anne ve babaları böyle bir kararı deklere eden bir bildirinin altına imza attılar:

Biz aşağıda imzaları bulunanlar, çocuklarımızı Ezra okulundan alıp koşullarımız yerine getirilmedikçe onları geri getirmeyeceğimize söz veriyoruz.

Berlin'deki Ezra'ya imzalarımızı içeren bir telgraf gönderilecek ve Ezra Derneğinden okuldaki öğretim dilinin yalnızca İbranice olmasını isteyeceğiz ve telgrafla yanıt bekleyeceğiz. Salı gününe kadar yanıt bekleyeceğiz.

Kararların yerine getirilmesini izlemek için beş anne-babadan oluşan bir alt kurul seçilmiştir. Eğer Ezra isteklerimizi kabul etmezse, bu alt kurul, Öğretmenler Merkezi ile birlikte hareket ederek gecikmeksizin bir okul açılmasını sağlayacaktır.[22]

[20]Das Politische Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Heinrich Brode, nr.392, Jaffa, den 24 November 1913.
[21]Das Politische Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Heinrich Brode, nr.392, Jaffa, den 24 November 1913.
[22] Kurzon, "The Language War: Hebrew and Other Languages in Pre-First World War Palestine", s. 114.

Protestolara katılan bir grup öğrenci, tepki olarak *Technion* yönetim kurulundan istifa eden Ginzberg'e bir mektup yazarak İbranice eğitimdeki kararlılıklarını bildirdiler: *Ülkemizde konuşma ve öğretim için yalnızca İbranice'nin kullanılabileceğini ve kullanılması gerektiğini bütün dünyaya kanıtladık, ülkemizde kurulmakta olan tek yükseköğretim kurumuna büyük umut bağladık. Eğitimimizi sürdürme ve tam İbranice bir eğitim alma umuduyla sevinçliyiz. Technion'un dili İbranice olabilir ve olmalı!*[23]

Kudüs'teki tepkiler Yafa'daki kadar yoğun değildir. Siyonist aksiyon komitesi, Filistin'deki bütün Yahudi okullarında genel bir greve gidilmesi için çağrıda bulunmuştur.[24] Ancak eylemcilerin grev çağrısına Kudüs'ten sadece öğretmen okulu katılmıştır. Zira Kudüs'ün yerli Yahudi aileleri ile Yahudi cemaatinin siyasi ve dini liderleri *Hilfsverein*'ın eğitim sistemini desteklemişlerdir. Bölgenin tüccarları önemli bilim ve ticaret dili olan Almancanın yoğun olarak kullanılmasından yanaydılar.[25]

Dr. Paul Nathan'ın Bölgeyi Ziyareti

Hilfsverein'ın ikinci başkanı Dr. Paul Nathan derneğin genel sekreteri Dr. Cahn ile sorunu yerinde görmek üzere 1913 Aralık ayında Berlin'den Filistin'e gelir. Protestoların devam ettiği sırada bölgede incelemelerde bulunan Dr. Paul Nathan ve Dr. Cahn derslerin İbranice yapılması için başlatılan protestolara katılan öğretmenlere taviz verilmemesi konusunda anlaşırlar. Bunun üzerine *Technion* yönetim kurulu son durum karşısında alınacak tavrı görüşmek üzere yeniden toplanır. Toplantıda doğa bilimleri ile teknik bilim alanlarındaki derslerin Almanca yapılması kararının politik açıdan akılcı olup olmadığı, bu konuda geri adım atılıp atılmayacağı ve Alman Yahudilerinin baskılara boyun eğip eğmeyeceği görüşülür. Sonuçta yardımlaşma derneğinin eğitim ilkelerinden ve prensiplerinden ödün vermemesi ve *Technion* ile ilgili önceden alınan kararların arkasında durulması kararlaştırılır. Buna göre okulun desteklenmesine devam edilecek, fakat kimse okula devam etmeye zorlanmayacaktır. Tepkilerden dolayı şimdilik okulun çok fazla talep görmeyeceği, ancak zamanla, tepkilerin azalmasından sonra okula yönelik ilginin artacağı öngörülmektedir.[26] Ayrıca protesto eylemlerine katılan, *Hilfsverein*

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[23] Kurzon, "The Language War: Hebrew and Other Languages in Pre-First World War Palestine", s. 112.

[24] Das Politische Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Schmidt, , nr.392, Jerusalem, den 24 November 1913.

[25] Das Politische Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Schmidt, nr.392, Jerusalem, den 24 November 1913.

[26] Das Politische Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Heinrich Brode, nr.392, Jaffa, den 24 November 1913.

okullarında görevli öğretmenlerin görevlerinin 10 Aralık Çarşamba gününden itibaren askıya alınmasına karar verilir. Bunun üzerine Siyonist eylemciler Kudüs'te bulunan bir öğretmen okulundaki ders sırasında, sınıfların pencerelerinden içeriye koku bombaları dahi atmışlardır.[27]

Protestoların Sonlanması İçin Alınan Önlemler

Hilfsverein yetkilileri ve Alman Dışişleri, Siyonistlerin, derneğin okullarını hedef alan protestolarını sonlandırmak için diplomatik girişimlere başladılar. Yafa konsolosu Dr. Heinrich Brode, bir Rus meslektaşının sorun çıkaran Rusya kökenli itaatsiz Yahudilerin Filistin'den Sibirya'ya sürgüne gönderilebileceği konusunda Siyonist liderlerin uyarılacaklarını vadetmesinden hareketle, *Technion*'un eğitim diline gösterilen tepkileri yatıştırmak için Rus diplomatlardan yardım alınabileceğini düşünmektedir. Ayrıca Berlin'e, Siyonist protestolara tepki göstermesi için Rus hükümetinin kışkırtılmasını tavsiye etmiştir. Brode, Almanya'nın İstanbul Büyükelçisi Freiherrn von Wangenheim ile Kudüs ve Hayfa'daki Alman konsolosluklarına gönderdiği ayrıntılı raporunun sonunda, yukarıda bahsedilen önlemler sayesinde Filistin'de Siyonistlerin öfkesinin dindirilebileceğini belirtmiştir. Brode ileride olayların Almanya'nın politik veya ekonomik çıkarlarına zarar verecek bir boyut kazanması halinde, Siyonist faaliyetleri bastırmak için Osmanlı hükümetinin de kışkırtılabileceğinden bahsetmektedir. Buna göre *Bab-ı Ali*'nin dikkati Filistin bölgesindeki Siyonist faaliyetlere çekilebilir, bu sayede *Bab-ı Ali*, bölgedeki Siyonist tahriklerin önüne geçmek için daha çok çaba sarf edebilir: "*Türk hükümetinin dikkati Filistin'de adım adım ilerleyen hususi devlet oluşumuna yöneltilmelidir. Gerçi bunun öncüleri ultra-Siyonistler kendilerini memnuniyetle Osmanlının sadık yurttaşları olarak göstermekteler. Fakat gerçekte kendilerini bölgenin bağımsız efendileri olarak hissetmeye başladılar.*"[28]

Dr. Brode'nin *"Bab-ı Ali'nin dikkatinin bölgedeki Siyonist hareketliliğe çekilmesi"*'ni gündeme getirme teklifi hemen yankı bulmuştur. Bu amaçla İstanbul'da, Almanya'nın Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'ndaki nüfuzunu arttırmaya yönelik yayın yapan *Osmanische Lloyd* gazetesinin 20 Aralık 1913 tarihli nüshasında Siyonist tepkilerden rahatsız olan Yahudi ailelerin, karşı protestosuyla ilgili bir habere yer verilmiştiri:

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[27] Das Politische Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Schmidt, nr.392, Jerusalem, den 16 Dezember 1913.

[28] Das Politische Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Heinrich Brode, nr.392, Jaffa, den 24 November 1913.

Yahudi nüfusumuzun çoğunluğunun radikal Siyonistlerin terörizmine yönelik öfkesi durulmuyor. Yoksul Kudüs'ümüzde bir günde yüz kişi, sempatinin bir göstergesi olarak Hilfsverein'a üye oldu. Ailelerin oluşturduğu yüksek katılımlı topluluk çocuklarının kışkırtılmasını şiddetle protesto ettiler. Yardımlaşma derneğinin okulları sadece biraz daha az öğrenci sayısıyla faaliyetine devam ediyor. Sadece öğretmen okulu önemli bir kayıp verdi, çünkü protestolara karışanlar okuldan mümkün olduğunca uzak tutuluyor.[29]

Eğitim dili tartışmaları, I. Dünya Savaşı'nın başlamasıyla sona erdi. *Technion* binası savaş sırasında Osmanlı ordusu tarafından, savaş sonrasında ise 1924'de kadar İngiliz ordusu tarafından askeri hastane olarak kullanılacaktır. 1924'te eğitime başlayacak olan *Technion*'da eğitim dili ile ilgili tartışma savaşta yenilen Almanya'nın bölgedeki etkisini yitirmesiyle beraber son bulacak ve dersler İbranice dilinde yapılacaktır.[30]

Siyonist Protestolar İle İlgili Değerlendirmeler

Almanya'nın Hayfa konsolosu Löytved Hardegg, Yahudilerin Osmanlı yönetimindeki Filistin'e daha sağlam ayaklarla basmadıkları sürece Siyonist politikaların kısa vadeli ve başarısız olmaya mahkûm olacağını düşünmektedir. Zamanla kendiliğinden gelişecek olan İbranice dilinde eğitim yapılabilmesinin ise ciddi bir maddi yeterliliğe bağlı olduğunun altını çizmektedir. Hardegg'e göre, abartılı taleplerde bulunan Siyonist eylemciler, zaten bölgedeki Yahudi varlığına şüpheyle yaklaşan Arapların huzursuzluğunu daha da arttırmaktaydılar. Hardegg dil kavgasının Yahudi birliğini zayıflattığını düşünmektedir.[31]

Almanya'nın Yafa konsolosu Dr. Heinrich Brode, protestocu gençlerin büyük kısmının, eski vatanlarında baskı görmüşken, yeni vatanlarında baskıcılara dönüşen Rus kökenli Yahudiler olduğunu belirtmektedir. Dr. Brode, protestoların, özellikle Almancayı hedef almadığını, genel olarak İbranice dışındaki dillerin eğitim dili olarak kullanılmamasına yönelik olduğunu, dolayısıyla Almanya'nın çıkarları açısından kaygılanacak bir durumun söz konusu olmadığını belirtmiştir. Brode'ye göre bu protestoların olumlu sayılabilecek bir sonucu olmuştur. Bu tartışma sayesinde, Almanya'daki Yahudiler, daha iyi bir eğitime ve kültüre sahip batılı Ya-

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[29] "Der Kampf um die hebräische Unterrichtssprache", *Osmanische Lloyd*, in *AAPA,* nr.392, 20 Dezember 1913.

[30] Dori, "Technion, Israel Institute of Technology", s. 572.

[31] Das Politische Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, nr.392, Haifa, den 17 November 1913.

hudilerin; Rusya, Romanya veya Galiçya kökenli *asalak* doğu Yahudilerinin baskıcı eylemlerine, gelecekte katlanıp katlanmayacaklarını tartışmaya başlamışlardır. Brode; *ultra-Siyonistler* olarak nitelendirdiği bu protestocuların eski devletlerinde görmüş oldukları baskı ve şiddetten dolayı her türlü yabancı dayatmasına güçlü bir nefret ve öfkeyle karşılık vermelerini doğal karşılamaktadır. Brode'ye göre bu tepki, özellikle Alman Yahudilerine yönelmiş bir tepki değildir. Protestocular Yahudi karakterinin geliştirilmesini yavaşlatacak her girişime aynı tepkiyi göstere-ceklerdir. Ancak yine de Brode Alman Yahudilerinin bu durum karşısında korkuya kapılmalarını ya da çekinmelerini doğru bulmamaktadır.[32] Almanya'nın Kudüs konsolosu Schmidt ise Fransızcanın ağırlıkta kullanıldığı *Alliance* okullarına yönelik benzer bir tepkinin oluşmamasının manidar olduğuna dikkat çekmektedir.[33]

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[32] Das Politische Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Heinrich Brode, nr.392, Jaffa, den 24 November 1913.
[33] Das Politische Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Schmidt, nr.392, Jerusalem, den 24 November 1913.

Sonuç

Hilfsverein'ın girişimi ile açılması planlanan *Technion*'un eğitim dili tartışmaları, Filistin'deki girift ilişkilerin boyutlarını göz önüne sermiştir. Meselenin bir boyutu, Osmanlı egemenliğindeki bir coğrafyada batılı devletlerin nüfuzlarını arttırmak için giriştikleri güç elde etme mücadelesi ve kültür emperyalizmidir. Emperyalist yarışa gecikmeli başlayan Almanya, *Hilfsverein*'ı kültürel nüfuzunun arttırmanın öncü bir kolu olarak görmüştür. Kaleme alınan raporlar, Almanya'nın konsoloslukları aracılığıyla bölgede geniş bir istihbarat ağına da sahip olduğunu göstermektedir. Bu durum, Osmanlı-Alman yakınlaşmasının doğal bir sonucudur. Raporlarda geçen isimler ve bağlı oldukları devletler, Siyonistlerin uluslararası örgütlenme yeteneği hakkında da bir fikir vermektedir. 20. Yüzyılın başlarında Filistin'de bir okulun eğitim dili ile ilgili başlayan tartışmaya, Rusya'dan, Almanya'dan, Amerika'dan Siyonistlerin müdahil olduğu görülmüştür. Batılı devletler, Yahudileri, Siyonistler ise batılı devletleri kullanma yoluna gitmişlerdir. Ortadoğu'nun asıl hâkimi olan Osmanlı Devleti'nin son dönemlerinde, Balkanlarda olduğu gibi Filistin'de de iktidarının zafiyete uğradığı dikkati çeken bir husustur.

Tartışmanın gözler önüne serdiği diğer bir boyut, Filistin'de Siyonistlerin, Yahudi devletine giden yolda kat ettikleri mesafedir. Bu sürecin en önemli ayaklarından biri bölgede giderek artan Yahudi nüfusu olmakla beraber, diğer bir ayağı da bu nüfusun niteliği ile ilgilidir. Bu tartışmalar, Siyonistler başta olmak üzere Yahudilerin ulusal bir bilince sahip olduğunu da göstermiştir. Zira ulusal bilincin en önemli öğelerinden biri dilde birliktir. Yahudi grupları arasındaki farklı politik eğilimleri gün yüzüne çıkaran dil kavgası, orta ve uzun vadede dil birliğine önem veren Siyonistlerin zaferiyle sonuçlanmıştır. Savaş sonrasında, Albert Einstein'ın da ziyaret ettiği *Technion*, eğitimine bundan böyle İbranice dilinde devam edecektir. Ancak Yerel Yahudi grupların ve batı Avrupa kökenli Yahudilerin, Siyonistlerin politikalarından rahatsız oldukları ve onları radikal buldukları altı çizilmesi gerekli diğer bir husustur.

Sonuç itibariyle bugün İsrail'in en önemli üniversitelerinden biri olan ve Nobel ödüllü bilim insanlarını da barındıran *Technion*'un kuruluş sürecinde yaşanan *Dil Kavgası*, henüz Osmanlı idaresi altındayken Filistin'de yoğun faaliyet gösteren Siyonistlerin zaferiyle sonuçlanmıştır. Siyonistlerin bu dil zaferi, İsrail devletinin kurulmasından önce, Yahudi ulusal bilincinin gelişimi açısından önemli bir kilometre taşı olmuştur.

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ORTADOĞU ETÜTLERİ

Betül Doğan Akkaş

Re- Approaching Food Security of Qatar: Challenges and Possibilities[1]

Abstract

Food security has been on the agenda of the Gulf Countries, especially after 2008 global food crisis, and has a new face with the current blockage imposed on Qatar since June 2017. This study aims to discuss the challenges of food security in Qatar and the possible solutions in the context of/given the current Gulf Crisis. Challenges and possibilities for the Qatari state in any condition of food insecurity are discussed in detail under the umbrella of food security literature and dimensions declared in Rome Declaration on World Food Security of 1996. Qatar is quite vulnerable in terms of food security and this chronic problem requires multifaceted strategies and partners to eliminate it and ease the current situation rooted in the embargo conditions. The research elaborates underlying impact of the Gulf crisis on this relatively small oil monarchy's food insecurity and emphasizes the need of further development, despite all achievements done so far by the Qatari policy makers.

Key Words: Food Security, Gulf, Qatar, Gulf Crisis, Blockade

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"KATAR'IN GIDA GÜVENLİĞİNİ YENİDEN ELE ALMAK: ZORLUKLAR VE OLASILIKLAR"

Öz

2008 küresel gıda krizinden bu yana Körfez ülkelerinin gündeminde yer alan gıda güvenliği, 2017 Krizinin Katar'a uyguladığı ambargo ile yeni bir aşamaya geçmiştir. Bu çalışma, Körfez krizi sonrası gıda güvenliğinin zorluklarını ve bu zorluklar karşısında uygulanan muhtemel çözümleri tartışmayı hedeflemektedir. Çalışma, Katar'ın gıda güvenliği inşasını, 1996'da belirlenen Roma Deklarasyonu ilkeleri çerçevesinde ele almıştır. Katar'ın coğrafi ve ekolojik şartlarından kaynaklı olarak kronik bir gıda güvenliği sorunu her dönemde söz konusu olmuştur. Bu özel duruma karşı Katar'ın uyguladığı özenli politikalara ve stratejilere rağmen, Körfez Krizi gıda güvenliği açıklarını tetiklemiş ve derinleştirmiştir. Bu araştırma, hali hazırda uygulanan politikaları, zorlukları ve Körfez krizi ile gelen yeni sorunları muhtemel çözümler çerçevesinde detaylı olarak incelemiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Gıda Güvenliği, Körfez, Katar, Körfez Krizi, Ambargo

إعادة مقاربة الأمن الغذائي في قطر: التحديات والاحتمالات

ملخص

كان الأمن الغذائي على جدول اعمال دول الخليج، وخاصة بعد ازمة الغذاء العالمية عام 2008، ثم أطل علينا الأمن الغذائي بوجه مختلف مع الحصار الحالي المفروض على قطر منذ حزيران/ يونيو 2017 بسبب الأزمة الخليجية. تهدف هذه الدراسة إلى مناقشة تحديات الأمن الغذائي في قطر واحتمال الحلول في سياق / نظراً للأزمة الخليجية الحالية. نناقش بالتفصيل التحديات والإمكانيات المتاحة للدولة القطرية في أي حالة من حالات انعدام الأمن الغذائي تحت مظلة المواد والأبعاد الخاصة بالأمن الغذائي التي تضمنها إعلان روما بشأن الأمن الغذائي العالمي لعام 1996. إن قطر ضعيفة جداً من ناحية الأمن الغذائي وهذه المشكلة المزمنة تتطلب استراتيجيات وشراكات متعددة الأوجه للقضاء عليها، وتخفيف الوضع الحالي الناتج من ظروف الحظر. تشرح الدراسة التأثير الأساس لأزمة الخليج على انعدام الأمن الغذائي لهذا البلد النفطي الصغير نسبياً، وتشدد الدراسة على الحاجة لمزيد من التطوير، على الرغم من جميع الإنجازات التي حققها صانعي السياسة القطريين حتى الآن.

كلمات مفتاحية: أمن الغذاء، الخليج، قطر، أزمة الخليج، الحصار

Introduction

Food security has been on the agenda of the Gulf Countries, especially after 2008 global food crisis[2], and has a new face with the current blockage imposed on Qatar since June 2017. According to Rome Declaration on World Food Security (1996)[3], when availability, quality, price and safety of food; and the fundamental right of everyone to be free from hunger are under risk, it becomes a security matter.[4] Arab states import 60% of their foods, and it is even higher in the GCC States with imports more than 80%.[5] The two GCC countries Saudi Arabia and Qatar have the most institutionalized policy making to deal with this problem in the Arab world.[6] However, this study focuses only on Qatar being one of the most food import-dependent countries in the world with more than %80 imports of food and that is currently facing an embargo since June 2017 which includes food products. Qatar is not self-sufficient for any of basic food products (wheat, rice, meat, vegetables, fruit) except fish, which has, for centuries been the main source of nutrition for the society.[7] This study aims to discuss the challenges of food security in Qatar and the possible solutions in the context of/given the current Gulf Crisis. The main question of the research is what are the possibilities for Qatari state to deal with the challenges in this food insecurity condition? To reach an answer, the research consists of two major parts; challenges and possibilities. The paper starts with a brief introduction of approaches to the food security, and moves to discuss in details the challenges Qatar is facing in this regard. The discussion of possibilities that will follow is divided into four parts. The last part discusses the current situation especially with regards to Gulf crisis and the embargo applied on the food security dilemma in Qatar.

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[2] Eckart Woertz, "The Gulf Food Import Dependence and Trade Restrictions of Agro Exporters in 2008," Protectionism? The 4th GTA Report (2010).

[3] "Rome Declaration on World Food Security," http://www.fao.org/wfs/index_en.htm.

[4] Mari Luomi, The Gulf Monarchies and Climate Change: Abu Dhabi and Qatar in an Era of Natural Unsustainability (Hurst Company, 2012).

[5] Zahra Babar and Suzi Mirgani, eds., Food Security in the Middle East (United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2014).

[6] Ibid.; Eckart Woertz, "Arab Food, Water, and the Big Landgrab That Wasn't," Brown J. World Aff. 18 (2011).

[7] Luomi, The Gulf Monarchies and Climate Change: Abu Dhabi and Qatar in an Era of Natural Unsustainability; Mohamed A Darwish, Hassan K Abdulrahim, and Yasir Mohieldeen, "Qatar and Gcc Water Security," Desalination and Water Treatment 55, no. 9 (2015). Tahra ElObeid and Abdelmonem Hassan, "Nutrition Transition and Obesity in Qatar " in Food Security in the Middle East, ed. Zahra Babar and Suzi Mirgani (Oxford University Press, 2014).

Approaches to the Food Security

While approaching food security, the literature provides variety of conceptual frameworks to analyze keys of this issue, which feed into the research. At the end of 1980s, the security studies in the international relations discipline has started widening with addition of non-military matters. Initially, political, economic, environmental and societal security were new types/areas of security. However, there were also human security discussions which are not state-centered, rather bring human to the center of the security. Hence, regarding comprehensive approaches to security, food security is related to international relations in two ways.

First of all, food security can be understood/theorized under the human security discussions.[8] This refers to a narrative regarding environmental degradation as a security threat to human beings.[9] Qatari case validates this approach through combining environmental policies like water and climate change with food security which are all based on the lack of resources.[10] Although this is a common approach to the issue, there is a second approach illustrated by the Copenhagen School, which is more appropriate in analyzing Qatari case.[11] Buzan et'al (1998) states that for the environmental types of security, there are scientific and political agendas which overlap sometimes and shape each other.[12] For instance, Qatari policy making process and political agenda involve scientific methods that have clarified the situation of food security for many years. Qatari policy makers have taken this scientific issue and made it political through declaring it under the political agenda by National Food Security Program of 2009; they have taken a step further with securitizing it under Qatar National Vision 2030. This is not abnormal when food security conditions of the country are taken into account. According to Buzan et'al (1998) "security is the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or above politics".[13]

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[8] For further information: Human Security in Theory and Practice (2009) UN Human Security Unit http://www.un.org/humansecurity/sites/www.un.org.humansecurity/files/human_security_in_theory_and_practice_english.pdf

[9] E. Foster, "Green Security," in Critical Approaches to Security: An Introduction to Theories and Methods, ed. Laura J Shepherd (Routledge, 2013).

[10] Zahra Babar and Mehran Kamrava, "Food Security and Food Sovereignty in the Middle East," in Food Security in the Middle East, ed. Zahra Babar and Suzi Mirgani (United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2014).

[11] Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap De Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998).

[12] Ibid.

[13] Ibid., 23.

This is exactly what Qatari policy makers have done so far for food because it is not like global warming discussions in the U.S; it is real and in everyday life of people. They can see the food insecurity in the supermarket; hence, the securitization or direction of investments for food has a public support.

In addition to these approaches based on the security studies, initial step for defining food security in practical manner was done by the World Food Summit in 1996 and "aimed at renewing global commitment to the fight against hunger. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) called the Summit in response to widespread under nutrition and growing concern about the capacity of agriculture to meet future food needs"[14]. Hence, the hunger and future food needs were two basic issues in the Summit. Food security was defined in the declaration of the Summit and "exists when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life".[15] This definition, which is a milestone, will be used in following sections to analyze level of achievements and challenges regarding food security of Qatar.

Although food security has been discussed in the literature in the last decades, the concept has increasingly taken a place in the literature since 2007-2008 global food crisis, and redefined in the studies with national food security and sovereignty terms. National food security refers to self-sufficiency of the country to provide enough food to its population as opposed to national food sovereignty, which measures availability of food without considering domestically produced or imported food.[16] Food sovereignty, therefore, provides a more comprehensive and realistic approach, especially for countries like Qatar where food insecurity is not seasonal or periodic but rather chronic. Thus, cases of chronic food insecurities require other strategies than self-sufficiency to eliminate this long-term lack of access to food security for household and individuals.[17] International remittance, state subsidies and other possible explanatory variables are influential on approaching the household food security.[18] Qatar is not a country dependent on international remittance;

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[14] "Rome Declaration on World Food Security".

[15] Ibid.

[16] Per Pinstrup-Andersen, "Food Security: Definition and Measurement," Food Security 1, no. 1 (2009): 5.

[17] Ibid., 6.

[18] Madhav Regmi and Krishna P. Paudel, "Food Security in a Remittance Based Economy," ibid.9, no. 4 (2017).

however, its distributive social contract as an oil-rich country leads to the state's subsidies for food prices and this cannot be ignored while measuring household food security.[19]

Assessment of Qatari Food Security: Challenges and Possibilities

After discussion of theoretical approaches to the food security, it is vital to emphasize Qatari food security dilemma these approaches. Regarding analysis of challenges, Qatari food security is examined through four dimensions in Rome Declaration on Food Security; availability, access, utilization and stability (Table 1). The first element in the Declaration is "availability of sufficient quantities of food of appropriate quality"[20]. Qatar is not able to provide sufficient quantity and quality of food, domestically. Qatari dilemma for food security is relatively new and has started in the time of Sheikh Hamad. For Qatar, there has not been suffering from domestic energy supply shortages; however, water and food, as other/also requirement for survival, have been limited. When global food crisis happened in 2008, Qatari moves for food security has started simultaneously. Sheikha Mozah and Sheikh Hamad were driving forces behind environmental sustainability and renewable energy ideas. That is why Qatar Foundation has been established with variety of research institutes in these areas. When Sheikh Tamim was heir apparent yet, he was responsible for Qatar National Food Security Program (QNFSP).[21] There is not updated information by the QNFSP; however, it has been influential on food security not only for availability but also for the rest of dimensions.

Availability of food in Qatari food security context is not necessarily similar to the way how poor or undeveloped countries are dealing with it, it is rather a geographical dilemma. Food security is rooted in the lack of natural resources, which is a matter the country is dealing with being a desert state of the Gulf coast. Thus, although it is mostly an issue that comes with poverty, the case for Arab Gulf coun-

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[19] Julian A. Lampietti et al., "A Strategic Framework for Improving Food Security in Arab Countries," ibid.3, no. S1 (2011): 11.

[20] http://www.fao.org/forestry/13128-0e6f36f27e0091055bec28ebe830f46b3.pdf

[21] Luomi, The Gulf Monarchies and Climate Change: Abu Dhabi and Qatar in an Era of Natural Unsustainability; ElObeid and Hassan, "Nutrition Transition and Obesity in Qatar ".

tries is completely diverse and based on their geographical condition, scarcity of water and arable land.[22]

Although structural factors such as population and income growth are discussed in the studies regarding food insecurities of the Arab countries, what challenges the availability of food in Qatar goes beyond this, especially with addition of the embargo imposed on Qatar.[23] Food insecurity in Qatar is closely related to the market volatility, which refers to the lack of adequate food in the market, whether it is imported or locally produced. Demand for food has increased rapidly in Qatar with the change of socio-economic structure of the society affected by population growth and urbanization with oil discovery. However, the domestic supply was not enough to handle this increase. While food consumption per capita is rising, the gap between consumed and produced products is also expanded.[24] Hence, availability challenge for Qatar starts with intersection of supply and demand. [25]

Access (physical and economic) to food for a nutritious diet is the second dynamic in the Declaration.[26] The price of agricultural products in Qatar is expensive but basic nutrition items (milk, bread... etc.) are subsidized by the State.[27] For instance, Qatar is in the category of low price risk and high quantity risk in cereal import dependency similar to Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Emirates and Oman, due to its wealth and its subsidy policies. [28] This is quite important for residence of Qatar because food items are mostly expensive proving "availability does not assure access" and not only availability but also "distribution of the available food is critical".[29] Hence, international agro-investments can bring cheaper products and even lead to economic benefit for Qatar as Hassad Australia's chief executive John McKillop emphasized in Financial Review potential gain of the company in coming years.[30]

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[22] Zahra Babar and Mehran Kamrava, "Food Security and Food Sovereignty in the Middle East," ibid. (United Kingdom); Lampietti et al., "A Strategic Framework for Improving Food Security in Arab Countries," 9.

[23] "A Strategic Framework for Improving Food Security in Arab Countries."

[24] Darwish, Abdulrahim, and Mohieldeen, "Qatar and Gcc Water Security."

[25] Lampietti et al., "A Strategic Framework for Improving Food Security in Arab Countries," 9-13.

[26] http://www.fao.org/forestry/13128-0e6f36f27e0091055bec28ebe830f46b3.pdf

[27] Luomi, The Gulf Monarchies and Climate Change: Abu Dhabi and Qatar in an Era of Natural Unsustainability.

[28] Lampietti et al., "A Strategic Framework for Improving Food Security in Arab Countries," 13.

[29] Per Pinstrup-Andersen, "Food Security: Definition and Measurement," ibid.1, no. 1 (2009): 5.

[30] Matthew Cranston, "Qatar's Hassad Defends Australian Agriculture Investment Results," Financial Review, http://www.afr.com/.

The third dimension is utilization of food through adequate diet for a healthy and productive life.[31] This is not directly related to import of good quality products from Australia or any other state, but it is more of a domestic habit that can be shaped by a long term social campaign. QNFSP is not only for bringing food to the state, but also to produce research on nutrition and diet analysis of Qatar.[32] This is prominent because diseases backed by overweight and over food consumption are common in Qatar. According to research by Al Obeid and Hassan (2014) the level of diabetes and obesity is quite high, especially obesity that is a public illness in the country.[33] Hence, it is visible that food security issue in Qatar is not only about bringing food to the state but also maintaining nutrition and diet at the national level.

The last dimension refers to a core challenge for food security in Qatar and combines previous ones as well; stability of food resources.[34] When there is not availability or access of food, sustainability is also not possible. Qatar lacks control over food sources which are highly dependent on imports, even if the country's wealth provides assurance.[35] These four food security dimensions (availability, access, utilization and stability) are inter-connected and refer to the country's import and self-sufficiency challenges.

Table 1: Food Security in Qatar with Four Dimensions of Rome Declaration on Food Security

Food Security Dimensions	Qatari Situation
Availability of sufficient quantities of food of appropriate quality	*Not self sufficient *Quality is not sustainable
Access (Physical and Economic) to food for a nutritious diet	* Expensive but state-subsidy supports
Utilization of food through adequate diet for a healthy and productive life	* Obesity and Diabetic are public health problems
Stability of food resources	* Not stable in any food crisis * No Food storage

Source: Own Elaboration

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[31] http://www.fao.org/forestry/13128-0e6f36f27e0091055bec28ebe830f46b3.pdf

[32] Luomi, The Gulf Monarchies and Climate Change: Abu Dhabi and Qatar in an Era of Natural Unsustainability.

[33] ElObeid and Hassan, "Nutrition Transition and Obesity in Qatar ".

[34] http://www.fao.org/forestry/13128-0e6f36f27e0091055bec28ebe830f46b3.pdf

[35] Babar and Kamrava, "Food Security and Food Sovereignty in the Middle East."

Food Security Strategies: Possibilities

Qatar has four main strategies to handle these challenges defined through Rome Declaration, shown in the Table 2; self-sufficiency, import, land acquisition and foreign agro-investment. First of all, local production of food is one of the mainstream resources for a country. When Self-Sufficiency Ratio (S.S.R.) of Qatar is taken into consideration (Table 2), it is clear that Qatar needs a strategy to enhance its capacity for food security in more than ten types of items including cereals, wheat, flour, rice, meat, barley, potatoes, vegetables, sugar etc. According to Table 1, Qatar is self-sufficient only in fish, which has decreased after 2008 rapidly.

Table 2: Food Self-Sufficiency Ratio (S.S.R) of Qatar

	S.S.R. % by Years		
Items	2004-2008	2010	2011
Cereals (Total)	1.20	0.52	0.37
Wheat and Flour	0.02	0.02	0.02
Maize	8.28	7.32	7.62
Rice	0.00	0.00	0.00
Barley	3.80	0.76	0.42
Potatoes	0.68	0.13	0.05
Pulses (Total)	0.00	0.00	0.00
Vegetables (Total	24.15	17.79	22.89
Fruits (Total)	21.72	14.08	13.67
Sugar (Refined)	0.00	0.00	0.00
Fats and oils (Total)	0.00	0.00	0.00
Meat (Total)	20.06	10.03	10.77
Red Meat	32.26	8.33	8.68
Poultry Meat	13.18	10.63	11.60
Fish	92.88	39.07	37.30
Eggs	35.50	16.31	16.59
Milk and Dairy Prod.	8.38	21.62	22.85

Source: Own Elaboration of the Arab Agricultural Statistics YearBook of 2008-2010-2011, Retrieved from http://www.aoad.org/priod_en.htm

This is why Qatari state has started a local production process in meat, chicken, milk and dairy products, and vegetables. This self-sufficiency is one of the four national strategies of Qatar to deal with food insecurity. When National Food Security program was launched, it was declared that Qatari state aims to reach self-sufficiency in food security by 2020s.[36] Also Qatar National vision states that Qatar is planning to be independent from food import by 2030.[37] QNFSP has supported local farms to overcome self-sufficiency issue at the first level and the number of local farms jumped to 1600 by 2010s from 453 in 1975.[38]

However, Qatar does not have enough ecological capacity to produce food without over-consuming energy as other Gulf States have quite less arable land and ground water.[39] There is already limited amount of clean water (underground water) while the agriculture spends up to %74 of fresh water with contributing GDP only %1.[40] Consumption of underground water leads to soil salinization which brings saltwater intrusion into the remaining fossil water resources. Darwish *et'al* (2015) argue that it is better to not engage in agriculture with local farms, which even does not produce enough food, to prevent more consumption of fresh water.[41] On the other side, it is valid to say that product quality is really high in local farms and not expensive compared to the imported ones in supermarkets. However, as it is presented in Table 3, elaboration of the literature, there is a gap between leverages and challenges of local production.

The second national strategy for food security is import of good quality and halal foods, which are suitable for dietary needs and food preferences of Qatar. Import is a common strategy of countries that have issues with food self-sufficiency because "in order to get food they do not necessarily need to grow it".[42] When

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[36] KIm Wyatt, "Where Does Our Food Come From? An Insight into Qatar's Food Industry," http://www.dohafamily.com/Winter-2015/Where-does-our-food-come-from-An-insight-into-Qatars-food-industry/; Luomi, The Gulf Monarchies and Climate Change: Abu Dhabi and Qatar in an Era of Natural Unsustainability; ElObeid and Hassan, "Nutrition Transition and Obesity in Qatar ".

[37] "Qatar National Vision 2030," ed. General Secretariat For Development Planning (Doha2008).

[38] Luomi, The Gulf Monarchies and Climate Change: Abu Dhabi and Qatar in an Era of Natural Unsustainability, 177.

[39] Eckart Woertz and Martin Keulertz, "Food Trade Relations of the Middle East and North Africa with Tropical Countries," Food Security 7, no. 6 (2015): 1101.

[40] Luomi, The Gulf Monarchies and Climate Change: Abu Dhabi and Qatar in an Era of Natural Unsustainability.

[41] Darwish, Abdulrahim, and Mohieldeen, "Qatar and Gcc Water Security."

[42] Woertz, "The Gulf Food Import Dependence and Trade Restrictions of Agro Exporters in 2008," 43.

Qatari food import is examined via data extracted from the Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC), there is absolutely a diversification of import countries all around the world from Asia to America[43]. Diversification of imports is positive especially if there is not a geographic limitation over imports, due to wars or a border issue.[44] However, as it is raised by literature, food import can easily be affected by political problems/conflicts and global crisis. For instance, global food crisis in 2008 has clearly affected Arab countries; hence, national food security program of Qatar had been launched right after the crisis.[45]

The third strategy of Qatar is land acquisition.[46] This policy along with foreign-agro-investments have attracted a lot of critics- as types of international agricultural investments-from host countries and researchers, due to its influence in long term ecological and economic implications for the host countries.[47] 40.000 hectares from Kenya ,100.000 hectares from Sudan, Latin America land purchase, rice farm purchase from Asia and sheep rearing and grain cultivation in Turkey are some examples of Qatari foreign-agro investments. The first challenge is that land grabbing leads to a social-political tension in host countries. This is not something new. Land acquisition is always a controversial issue, when it comes to selling lands to a foreigner. Brazil and Thailand have banned foreign land acquisition.[48] It is also stated in the literature that running a land is completely demanding process and requires hard-work, which makes it a difficult investment option.[49] It is also risky because host countries are not safe most of the times and in any violent situation, farm lands can easily be destroyed. Loumi (2012) emphasizes that Qatari foreign

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[43] "What Does Australia Export to Qatar? (2014).تم in The Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC) (MIT University, 2014).

[44] Haweya Ismail, "Food and Water Security in Qatar: Part 1 – Food Production," in Strategic Analysis Paper (Future Directions International, 2015); Alpen Capital, "Gcc Food Industry " (2015). acquisition (fter the crisis (ndicated that there is not guring outs. ficant alteration on depressionackign

[45] Luomi, The Gulf Monarchies and Climate Change: Abu Dhabi and Qatar in an Era of Natural Unsustainability.

[46] Rami Zurayk, Jad Chaaban, and Alia Sabra, "Ensuring That Potential Gulf Farmland Investments in Developing Countries Are Pro-Poor and Sustainable," Food Security 3, no. S1 (2011).

[47] Ayşen Tanyeri-Abur and Nasredin Hag Elamin, "International Investments in Agriculture in Arab Countries: An Overview and Implications for Policy," ibid.: 116.

[48] Luomi, The Gulf Monarchies and Climate Change: Abu Dhabi and Qatar in an Era of Natural Unsustainability; Woertz and Keulertz, "Food Trade Relations of the Middle East and North Africa with Tropical Countries," 1102; Rami Zurayk, Jad Chaaban, and Alia Sabra, "Ensuring That Potential Gulf Farmland Investments in Developing Countries Are Pro-Poor and Sustainable," ibid.3, no. S1 (2011).

[49] Sarah Ruth Sippel, "Food Security or Commercial Business? Gulf State Investments in Australian Agriculture," The Journal of Peasant Studies 42, no. 5 (2015).

land acquisition in Sudan, Ethiopia, and Kenya is problematic for the lack of safety.[50] If the land is not safe for this long-term demanding investment, it is not logical to construct farms.[51]

Table 3: Food Security Strategies of Qatar

Methods	Challenges	Leverages
Self-sufficiency	* Consuming groundwater (already limited) * Soil salinization * Land degradation * Only %5 percent of Qatari territory is arable * Not enough for the entire population	* good product quality * not expensive
Import	* Not Sustainable * Expensive or not affordable for every item * It can easily be affected by global crisis and diplomatic relations	*diversification of options
Land Acquisition	* Social tension in hosts countries * Difficult to run a farm * Risky investment * Host countries have already food security issues of their own (Ethiopia, Sudan)	*long-term solution
Foreign Agro-investment	* potential of domestic unrest in host country	*less risky *economically beneficial

Source: Table is a revised version of the Table 12 in Dogan, Betul. "Securitization: Conceptualizing Qatari Foreign Policy." Qatar University, 2017, 102.

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[50] Luomi, The Gulf Monarchies and Climate Change: Abu Dhabi and Qatar in an Era of Natural Unsustainability.
[51] Ibid.

Qatari agro-investments abroad in terms of land grabbing raise question marks because of the reasons mentioned above. However, beyond international agricultural investments of Qatar, intra-Arab agricultural investments are one of the central discussions in the literature on food security.[52] When global food crisis affected food insecurity in the Arab region catastrophically, critical approaches to these agro-investments and land acquisition were intensified. [53] Therefore, the last/fourth food security strategy of Qatar, which is foreign agro-investment, is a polished version of land grabbing with addition of more trade centered policies.

Foreign agro-investments refer to a business deal between Hassad Food and a local farm which is in the company's investment portfolio. This is a mutual interest in which Qatari SWFs company Hassad Food invests on the farm and receive agricultural products in return.[54] Hence, the State basically focuses on "sizeable investments in agricultural and livestock sectors in international food companies".[55] This strategy is applied in Australia by Hassad Australia Company , and this is one of the success stories for Qatari food security that requires special attention especially with providing accessibility of food in the blockade time.

When relationship between Qatar and Australia is examined through help of Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade website, trade-based ties attracted the attention. Although the exchange of ambassadors was quite late, in 2012, the amount of trade between states is high; Australian good trade with Qatar was $1.2 billion while services trade was $518 million in 2015.[56] Meat, motor vehicles and live animals are three main export materials of Australia to Qatar. Hassad Australia is the main element in the agricultural trade between states and under the umbrella of Hassad Food SWFs company. Hassad Australia was

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[52] Tanyeri-Abur and Hag Elamin, "International Investments in Agriculture in Arab Countries: An Overview and Implications for Policy."

[53] Per Pinstrup-Andersen, "Food Security: Definition and Measurement," ibid.1, no. 1 (2009): Philip McMichael, "Land Grabbing as Security Mercantilism in International Relations," Globalizations 10, no. 1 (2013): Tanyeri-Abur and Hag Elamin, "International Investments in Agriculture in Arab Countries: An Overview and Implications for Policy."; Timothy B. Sulser et al., "The Future Role of Agriculture in the Arab Region's Food Security," ibid.; Julian A. Lampietti et al., "A Strategic Framework for Improving Food Security in Arab Countries," ibid.; ibid.; Eckart Woertz and Martin Keulertz, "Food Trade Relations of the Middle East and North Africa with Tropical Countries," ibid.7, no. 6 (2015).

[54] Sippel, "Food Security or Commercial Business? Gulf State Investments in Australian Agriculture."; Woertz, "Arab Food, Water, and the Big Landgrab That Wasn't."

[55] Babar and Kamrava, "Food Security and Food Sovereignty in the Middle East," 4.

[56] Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, "Country Brief," http://dfat.gov.au/geo/qatar/Pages/qatar-country-brief.aspx.

founded in 2009 as Hassad Food's first international investment that mainly aims at exporting grain and livestock. "Currently, Hassad Australia owns and operates 300,000 hectares of land that produces 190,000 tons of grains and 290,000 heads of sheep on yearly basis".[57] The company owns 14 properties around Australia.

Although commercial cooperation between parties is vital for both of them, there are not many studies on cooperation to achieve food security except those research/data found on official websites, databases and a couple of academic research. The major contribution of Australia towards Qatar's agro-investments is linked to its investment-promotion policy with open market to international participants. Another leverage in cooperation with Australia for food security is coming from developed agricultural sector. Australia provides a stable political environment with qualified labor force and infrastructure in agriculture which will not possess risk for Hassad Australia's investments.[58]

Australia is already a food exporter country because it possesses a large and fertile agricultural land. The country is "highly self-sufficient in terms of food production: 93% of domestically consumed food is produced in Australia; furthermore, around 60% of agricultural production – mainly wheat, sugar, beef, wine and processed dairy products – is exported and estimated to feed another 40 million people abroad"[59] In addition to that, Australia has been exporting meat to the Middle East for 45 years and has a good reputation of quality products.[60] Although the main export materials of Australia in 2014 were machines, transportation, metals, technological and chemical products, the role of agricultural products in country's trade is also vital.[61]

Hassad Australia is a successful example of/for Qatar's food security strategies with taking policy making from the context of security to 'commercial business'.[62] As it is stated "by 2009 Hassad food started investing in stakes agriculture rather than purchasing land; the company did not 'want to be in a situation where the

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[57] Hassad Food, "Hassad Australia. ," http://www.hassad.com/English/Pages/Hassad-Australia.aspx.

[58] Sippel, "Food Security or Commercial Business? Gulf State Investments in Australian Agriculture."

[59] Lawrence, Richards, and Lyons 2013, p.3 quoted in ibid.

[60] Matthew Cranston, "Qatar's Farmland Investment Hassad Australia yet to Make Profit," https://www.farmland-grab.org/post/view/25863.

[61] "What Does Australia Export to Qatar? (2014)تم

[62] Sippel, "Food Security or Commercial Business? Gulf State Investments in Australian Agriculture."

rich are taking away food and land of poor'" [63]. Hassad Food's chairman Nasser al-Hajri similarly states that "buying agricultural land isn't a goal for the company" but "to produce and improve the production from different parts of the world".[64] According to information in Hassad Australia website, the vision of the company is "to be a leader in Australian Food production"[65] Which emphasizes that Hassad Australia moves away from focusing only on Qatari food security to shaping itself for commercial business to eliminate challenges and to gain economic benefit out of investments.

As it is illustrated in the previous part of this study, Qatari food security is not conducted anymore through land grabbing, which leads to criticism from the host countries and brings less economic return. Therefore/Hence, foreign agro-investments are differentiated from land acquisition in the study. What is clear/apparent in Hassad Australia case is that the company conducts more business oriented agro-investments and hires Australian farmers in their farms to produce agricultural products rather than buying land. However, this also is not an easy deal as it is raised by Matthew Cranston in Australian Financial Times, Hassad Australia did not start gaining out of its investments yet.[66] Cranston states that "the company has made a loss with combined worth of more than $27 million".[67] Hassad Australia's chief executive John McKillop commented on Cranston's critics arguing that agricultural investments take time to re-gain and that the overall success of Hassad so far was a major achievement from/for them already beside the future economic gains.[68]

The Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC) has four main item groups referring to agricultural trade between Australia and Qatar; animal and vegetable bi-products, vegetable products, animal products and foodstuffs.[69] It is clear that sheep and goat meat with 76.5M export value in 2014 is the biggest share in the

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[63] Luomi, The Gulf Monarchies and Climate Change: Abu Dhabi and Qatar in an Era of Natural Unsustainability, 180.

[64] "Qatar's Hassad Eyes $625m Spend on Food Supplies ", Arabian Business Bloomberg http://www.arabianbusiness.com/qatar-s-hassad-eyes-625m-spend-on-food-supplies-459435.html.

[65] Hassad Australia, "About Us," https://hassad.com.au/vision-and-mission/.

[66] Cranston, "Qatar's Farmland Investment Hassad Australia yet to Make Profit«.

[67] Ibid.

[68] "Qatar's Hassad Defends Australian Agriculture Investment Results," https://www.farmlandgrab.org/post/view/25886.

[69] "What Does Australia Export to Qatar? (2014).تم"

agriculture-related import of Qatar from Australia. Sheep and goat meat, sheep and goat, bovine meat and cheese are four items under the animal products. When the rapid increase in sheep and goat (from 9.93M to 56 M), sheep and goat meat (from 9.68M to 76.5M) and bovine meat (from 1.53M to 15.2M) is taken into consideration, it is valid to say that the biggest share is in animal products. In the other three categories, there is still a remarkable trade share; however, it is not like animal product category but decreases and fluctuates time to time. Widam Food is an example of an increase in animal products trade between Qatar and Australia because it is "a shareholding company...exclusively handling the government subsidization of Australian meat to Qatari market, and it also support the market by importing other type of meat on non-exclusive basis.[70]

If Hassad Australia is able to conduct investments in the long term as a main driver of Qatar's agro-investments, there will always be a certain amount of agricultural products guaranteed in the market. This would be one of the best options to stabilize certain types of food imports and to not risk sustainability, availability and access.

Gulf Crisis: Re-emphasize of food security

Food crisis and embargo pose high risks for countries whose agricultural sustainability is mostly based on import. The gap between supply and demand is a crucial detail especially at the times of food crisis or embargo, which triggers the lack of food storage in the country. Hence, the food embargo applied on Qatar since June 2017 has underlined three major problems for Qatari food security; necessity of food and water storage, diversification of supply and sustainability in the market.

When the media campaign regarding Saudi-led embargo on Qatar started, the cabinet underlined on June 5 that "marine and air spaces will remain open for import and movement" to emphasize that there is no need to panic.[71] Similarly, Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated on the same day that "these measures taken against the State of Qatar will not affect the normal course of life of the citizens and residents of the State and that the Qatari government will take all necessary measures

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[70] Widam Food, "About Us," Widam Food, http://www.widam.com.qa/about-us-c1sof.

[71] Pramod Prabhakaran, "No Need to Stock up; Necessary Steps Taken to Ensure Normal Life: Qatar Cabinet," The Peninsula Qatar, https://thepeninsulaqatar.com/article/05/06/2017/No-need-to-stock-up-necessary-steps-taken-to-ensure-normal-life-Qatar-cabinet.

to ensure this and to thwart attempts to influence and harm the Qatari society and economy".[72] Although officials stated from the very first minute of the blockade that necessary precautions are taken, a panic buying was visible with multiple long queues in supermarkets just five hours after the diplomatic crisis has erupted.[73]

Official releases for the influence of the embargo on Qatar's food security challenge are limited to calming and self-confident statements. There is not any information on how much the state increased subsidies for domestic production or imported foods and which product types were more difficult to provide. These are important in order to assess the role of embargo on food insecurity and to analyze state's policy making in the process, when huge number of local products released to the market and the subsidies on them are considered. For instance, price for Baladna milk was more than 15 Qatari riyals before the embargo and decreased to 6 Qatari riyals in a couple of months. This huge drop of the prices is visible in many other local products including cucumber, tomato and eggplants; however, according to Consumer Price Index (CPI) announced by Ministry of Development Planning and Statistics, food and beverage prices increased 4.2% from June to July 2017.[74] When CPI for August 2017 was checked, there was a drop of 0.6% from July to August in food and beverage prices.[75] Although there is not any official release or information to deepen in the policy making and state subsidies for the food prices, it is possible to say that food prices, which affect access and availability dimensions of food security, were highly controlled by the government and are stabilized with more state subsidies. Otherwise, this decrease in local food prices cannot be explained. In addition to price issue, the speedy production and promotion of local products framing them as national proud in the supermarkets can be interpreted as a way of constructing food security in a national narrative. "Yes to Qatari Products and Friendly Countries" and "Together We Support National Products" are

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[72] "Qatar Regrets the Decision by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain to Sever Relations," news release, 2017, https://mofa.gov.qa/en/all-mofa-news/details/2017/06/04/qatar-regrets-the-decision-by-saudi-arabia-the-united-arab-emirates-and-bahrain-to-sever-relations.

[73] the Sundaily, "Panic Buying in Qatar," the Sundaily, http://www.thesundaily.my/news/2017/06/06/panic-buying-qatar.

[74] Ministry of Development Planning and Statistics, "Consumer Price Index (Cpi) July, 2017 (Base Year 2013=100)," news release, 2017, https://www.mdps.gov.qa/en/statistics1/pages/lateststats/16082017.aspx.

[75] "Consumer Price Index (Cpi) August 2017 (Base Year 2013=100)," news release, 2017, https://www.mdps.gov.qa/en/statistics1/pages/lateststats/17092017.aspx.

two most common labels in supermarkets and the Souq to see how food insecurity jumped with the embargo to be framed in a national discourse.

Nevertheless, changes in the country's food security profile with the influence of embargo are also visible in the findings of Global Food Security Index. According to the index, Qatar has moved nine steps back in 2017 as the 29th country, globally, with 6.0 deterioration in overall score for the sum of three dimensions; affordability, availability, quality and safety. Country's score on affordability, which is defined as "food consumption as a share of household expenditure, proportion of population under global poverty line, gross domestic product per capita, agricultural import tariffs, presence of food system net programmes and access to financing for farmers" is the top with ranking 93.3 points in 2017 as it was in 2016.[76] Interestingly and although there is a highly influential siege on food security, Qatar's affordability score is higher than the rest of GCC countries; UAE (84.4.), Kuwait (83.1), Bahrain (77.9), Saudi Arabia (75.9), and Oman (72.8) and moved only 0.3 scores back compare to 2016 (93.6). Availability is the main challenge for Qatar, as previously discussed in the paper. Scores for availability in 2017 is the lowest in the GCC with ranking 54.8, later than Ghana, Peru, Paraguay. Qatar's score for availability in 2017 was deteriorated (11.7) compare to 2016. For the third dimension, quality and safety, Qatar is ranked the highest among the GCC countries in 2016 and 2017; however, the score was deteriorated by 4.7 in 2017 (74.1). [77]

Qatari residents have been forced to leave under this siege, with the closure of Qatar's only land border shares with Saudi Arabia. Challenges and changes are mentioned in the above; however, Qatar quickly adopted strategies to ease these conditions for its residence. The State has rapidly tended to deal with alternative trading partners via air and marine transportation with higher costs of supply. Iran was one of the early supporters of Qatar and possibilities for Qatar's food security. According to Fars News Agency chairman of the union of exporters of agricultural products, Reza Nourani on June 5, Iran can export food products to Qatar from ports of Bandar Abbas, Bandar Lengeh and Bushehr and the shipment can reach in 12 hours.[78] Iran started sending fruits and vegetables everyday (100 tonnes)

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[76] The Global Food Security Index, "User Guide for the Global Food Security Index:," (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2017), 6.

[77] "Country Rankings," (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2016-2017).

[78] J. Saul and M. El-Dahan, "Qatar Food Imports Hit after Arab Nations Cut Ties: Trade Sources," Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-gulf-qatar-food/qatar-food-imports-hit-after-arab-nations-cut-ties-trade-sources-idUSKBN18W24N.

with cargo planes. Qatari entrepreneurs also initiated deals and projects to secure food and water in the country. Bloomberg quoted one of these initiatives by Moutaz Al Khayyat, chairman of Power International Holding, bringing 4000 cows that cost US $8 million and building up milk production.[79] It must be stated that due to this extra-territorial food security initiatives and Hassad Food's import programme which evolved into a commercial business, Qatar did not face any problem to provide meat products during the embargo.

Turkey has been another trade partner which boosted economic relations since the beginning of the crisis. Vulnerability of Qatar for daily food products such as milk, yogurt, chicken, fresh fruits and vegetables have been underlined and led Turkey to cooperate for transfer of tons of foodstuff to Qatar. Although sustainability of food shipments was even questioned by Turkey's Economy Minister Nihat Zeybekci, Turkey has been a partner for Qatar in providing food security with food and water transportation through airlift, trucks and ships.[80] In addition to food import from alternative partners and the increase of local production, Qatar National Research Fund (QNFR) raised its support for projects aiming at sustainable food supply with innovative solutions.[81] The embargo has forced Qatar to experience its vulnerabilities and challenges in regard to food security. The challenge of sustainability of food and water products has been witnessed by all residence since June 5, although variety of policies were undertaken to minimize negative influences of the siege.

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[79] M. Sergie and D. Abu-Nasr, "Flying Cows to Qatar Is One Man's Way to Beat the Saudis," Bloomberg, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-06-12/flying-cows-to-qatar-is-one-man-s-way-to-beat-the-saudis.

[80] D. Butler and T. Karadeniz, "Turkey Sends Qatar Food and Soldiers, Discusses Gulf Tensions with Saudi," Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-gulf-qatar-turkey-saudi/turkey-sends-qatar-food-and-soldiers-discusses-gulf-tensions-with-saudi-idUSKBN19D0CX.

[81] Marhaba, "Qnrf: Projects Designed to Tackle Qatar's Food Security Challenges," Marhaba, https://www.marhaba.qa/qnrf-projects-designed-tackle-qatars-food-security-challenges/.

Conclusion

Food insecurities witnessed in Qatar have been illustrated through assessment of the country's challenges under four dimensions of Rome Declaration; availability, access, utilization and stability. Qatar faces challenges in these four categories; however, introduced four main strategies composed of self-sufficiency, import, land acquisition and foreign agro-investment since Qatar National Food Security Program was launched in 2009. Among these possibilities, Qatari policy makers structured self-sufficiency with support of local initiatives and foreign-agro investments to guarantee sustainability of food and water product. In this case, the role of Hassad Food cannot be ignored. As a result of this extra-territorial food security initiative which evolved commercial business, Qatar did not face any issue in providing meat products even during the current embargo. The siege led Qatar to experience food and water products embargo since June 2017, underlined market volatility, necessity of the food and water storage, diversification of suppliers and sustainability of food security. The case of embargo has added a seasonal or periodical food insecurity to the country's already vulnerable situation. Nevertheless, Qatari policy makers have rapidly increased their trade relations with countries that are not part of the siege, mostly Iran and Turkey, while speeding up the production and promotion of local products. Despite all achievements done so far by the Qatari policy makers, this relatively small oil monarchy is quite vulnerable in terms of food security. This chronic problem requires multifaceted strategies and partners to eliminate it and ease the current situation rooted in the embargo conditions.

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ORTADOĞU ETÜTLERİ

MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES

Dr. Turgay Yerlikaya

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND SOCIAL MEDIA: THE EXAMPLE OF THE TAHRIR PROTESTS[*]

Abstract

This article examines the Tahrir protests in the context of New Social Movements (NSMs) and resource mobilization and argues that the Tahrir protests can be assessed within the framework of these movements. The literature review presented evaluates how NSMs became conceptualized after different theoretical debates took place and how NSMs depart from conventional models. The main argument of this article is that due to its dynamics, the Tahrir protests present a new social movement model. It is further illustrated how social media plays an important role in the organization and diversification of information sources of social movements. It is claimed that while social media is not the absolute determinant in social movements, it brings abour structural reforms such as the elimination of the hierarchical relationship model, the tendency of acting without a leader, and granting social movements autonomy.

Key Words: Tahrir Protests, New Social Movements, Resource Mobilization, Social Media

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[*] This article has been developed from the author's doctorate thesis.

"TOPLUMSAL HAREKETLER VE SOSYAL MEDYA ARASINDAKİ İLİŞKİ: TAHRİR EYLEMLERİ ÖRNEĞİ"

Öz

25 Ocak 2011 tarihinde başlayan ve kısa sürede önemli sonuçlara yol açan kitlesel hareketler, otoriter rejimlerin ürettiği kronik sorunların öfke patlaması olarak değerlendirilebilir. 6 Ekim 1981'de Enver Sedat'ın öldürülmesinin ardından devlet başkanı olan Hüsnü Mübarek'in uzun yıllar süren baskıcı tek adam rejimi ülke halkının otoriteryen bir rejim altında yaşamasını beraberinde getirmiştir. Bu makale Tahrir protestolarını Yeni Toplumsal Hareketler (YTH) ve Kaynak mobilizasyonu bağlamında incelemekte ve söz konusu hareketin bu kategorilerde değerlendirilebileceğini iddia etmektedir. Bu çerçevede toplumsal hareketler literatürü ele alınmakta ve zaman içerisinde sosyal teoride yaşanan tartışmalarla birlikte YHT'nin kavramsal olarak ortaya çıkışı ve geleneksel modellerden ayrıştığı değerlendirilmektedir. Çalışmanın ana argümanı ise Tahrir protestolarının taşıdığı dinamikler itibariyle tipolojik olarak bir yeni toplumsal hareket modeli sunduğudur.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Tahrir Protestoları, Yeni Toplumsal Hareketler, Kaynak Mobilizasyonu, Sosyal Medya

العلاقة بين الحركات الاجتماعية ووسائل التواصل الاجتماعية: احتجاجات ميدان التحرير إنموذجاً

ملخص

تتناول هذه المقالة احتجاجات ميدان التحرير في سياق تعبئة الحركات الاجتماعية الجديدة(NSMs) والموارد، وترى هذه المقالة بأنه يمكن تقييم احتجاجات التحرير في إطار هذه الحركات. في هذا السياق تتم مناقشة أدبيات الحركات الاجتماعية وتعتبر أنه إلى جانب المناقشات الجارية في النظرية الاجتماعية مع مرور الوقت وظهور المفهوم من الحركات الاجتماعية الجديدة وتمايزها عن النماذج التقليدية. الحجة الرئيسية للدراسة هي أن الديناميات التي تتضمنها احتجاجات التحرير تقدم إنموذجا جديداً من الناحية التصنيفية للحركات الاجتماعية. ويتضح كذلك خلال المقالة كيف تؤدي وسائل التواصل الاجتماعية دوراً مهماً في تنظيم وتنويع مصادر المعلومات للحركات الاجتماعية، وبالرغم من أن وسائل التواصل الاجتماعية ليست هي المحدد المطلق للحركات الاجتماعية، إلا أنها تجلب إصلاحات هيكلية بسيطة، مثل القضاء على إنموذج العلاقة الهرمية، وتشجع الميل للعمل دون قائد، وتمنح الحركات الاجتماعية الاستقلال الذاتي.

كلمات مفتاحية: احتجاجات التحرير، الحركات الاجتماعية الجديدة، تعبئة الموارد، الإعلام الاجتماعي

The Tahrir Protests: A General Overview

In light of Egypt's historical experience, the presence of military and bureaucratic apparatuses alongside the existence of paramilitary elements have played a function in preventing the emergence of social opposition.[1] The repressive policies of state bureaucracy and elements directly connected to the regime showed themselves in the protests of January 25, 2011, and a bloody intimidation attempt was exhibited in order prevent the demonstrators who gathered in Tahrir Square.[2] After becoming the head of state after the assassination of Anwar Sadat in 1981, the collective opposition against the strict-one man regime by Hosni Mubarak finally opened the way for mass expression of cumulative problems, and steps were taken in the sense of democratization.[3]

Despite the chronic one-man regime, which produced authoritarian and repressive policies, Egypt has an important historical experience and repertoire for social movements. A significant tradition of opposition was formed against the Mubarak regime and this opposition managed to keep its criticisms alive at all times. This opposition prepared the processes for mass protests such as the 1968 revolt against the government, which was perceived as the reason for the loss of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, the student protests that occurred against Anwar Sadat in 1972, and the wave of social movements that emerged with the "Bread Riots" in 1977. These events prepared for the workers' uprisings during the 1990s and 2000s.[4] The tradition of rebellion, which became institutionalized and organized in 2008, prepared the institutional dimensions of the revolution that occurred in January 2011. When looked at from this framework therefore, it can be seen that although Egypt

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[1] Fulya Atacan, ""Ekmek, Özgürlük, Sosyal Adalet": Mısır'da Muhaliflerin Talepleri Açık Değil mi", **Sokağın Belleği: 1 Mayıs 1997'den Gezi Direnişi'ne Toplumsal Hareketler ve Kent Mekanı**. Derya Fırat (drl). Dipnot Yayınları, 2014, p. 52.

[2] The first name of Tahrir Square, located in the center of Cairo, the capital of Egypt, is Ismailiye Square. During the withdrawal of British soldiers from Egypt and Sudan protests emerged, and as a result the squre was called "Midan al-Tahrir" (Freedom Square). After the decision made by Gamal Abdel Naaser, the square was officially named Tahrir Square. Tahrir Square later became the scene for political protests of university students in 1972, protests against Mubarak's support for the U.S. invasion of Iraq, and the scene for protests and meetings that were arranged, which called for reform in the country in 2005-2006. See. Derek Gregory, "Tahrir: "Politics, Publics and Performances of Space"", **Middle East Critique**, Vol.22, No.3, (November 2013), p.238.

[3] The phrase "tipping point" is used in the literature of social movements and refers to the final event that pushes fort he emergence of mass social movements. The tipping point of the social mobilization in the region was the self-immolation of the peddler Mohammed Bouazizi in December 2010 at the beginning of the Arab uprisings. Meanwhile, the tipping point in Tahrir was when the images of people who were tortured by the police of Khaled Said were shared on Facebook. This symbolic event created a tipping point for the mobilization of social masses in the region, which were already existent, to express themselves more bravely.

[4] İsmail Numan Telci, **Mısır: Devrim ve Karşı Devrim**, İstanbul: SETA Yayınları, (2017), p.56.

has been stage to authoritarian rule, the country's history also presents rich content in terms of social movements and social opposition.

The fact that traditional politics had not been effective against Hosni Mubarak, who was in power for nearly thirty years, laid the ground for the emergence of alternative movements. The various different groups formed in Egypt, which stood in opposition to Mubarak took social opposition to different dimensions. Examples of these groups include the *Kefaya* movement,[5] which was formed in 2004, the April 6 Youth Movement, which was formed after police brutality during the textiles strike in 2008,[6] and other movements that include the *Revolutionary Socialists*.[7] The political, economic, and social problems that emerged before the Arab revolts during the Mubarak regime are closely related to the mobilization of groups that were uncomfortable with the regime and their ability to expand their spheres of influence. The Kefaya movement, which came to being in 2004 in order to prevent the re-election of Mubarak in the 2005 elections, and its associate woman-

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[5] The Kefaya movement, which initially emerged as a group mainly consisting of lawyers in 2004, came together in an attempt to prevent the re-election of Hosni Mubarak in the 2005 elections as there is no statement in the constitution of Egypt that demands a restriction on electoral terms. Thus, the movement re-emerged with the "kefaya" slogan, meaning "enough." The movement expressed the demands of the oppressed people in Egypt in the fields of equality, freedom, and economy, and were the signatories of many protests. With its intesive utilization of new media tools, the Kefaya movement is an important example in terms of mobilization of social movements and the differences encountered on organizational terms. For more information on the Kefaya movement see. Manar Shorbagy, "The Egyptian Movement for Change-Kefaya: Redefining Politics in Egypt", **Public Culture**, Volume.19, No.1, (2007), p.175-196. Nadia Oweidat ve Diğerleri, "The Kefaya Movement: A Case Study of a Grassroots Reform Initavive", **Rand Corporation: National Defense Research Instıtue, (**2008).

[6] The members of the 6 April Movement, which was established in 2008 with the attempt to support workers' rights, dresses in black in order to distinguish themselves, and is a movement that heavily used new social media tools such as Facebook, Twitter, and Flickr. Ahmed Maher and Muhammed Adel are within those that established the group. The founding members of this group were arrested after the military coup led by Sisi. For more information on the 6 April Movement see. Emad El- Din Shahin, "The Egyptian Revolution: The Power of Mass Mobilization and the Spirit of Tahrir Square", **The Journal of the Middle East and Africa**, Vol.3 No.1, (May 2012), p.46-69. For the observation of the 6 April Youth Movement in terms of the literature on social movemets see. Hafez Bassem, "New Social Movements and the Egyptian Spring: A Comparative Analysis between the April 6 movement and the Revolutionary Socialists", **Perspectives on Global Development and Technology**, Vol.12, No.1-2 (2013).

[7] Idle and Nunns, p.24., The Revolutionary Socialists, where were formed in 1991 in solidarity of the workers that went on strike during the trade union elections, have until this day defended the rights of the working class and have come to the fore due to their opposition to the government's neoliberal policies. Socialists, who continued their existence with the efforts of students and some intellectuals, displayed their opposition against the Mubarak regime actively during the revolution process. Nadia Idle and Alex Nunns (Ed.), **Tahrir Meydanından Tweet'ler**, Esra Ergün (translation.), Paloma Yayınları, 2014, p. 23.

See, İsmail Numan Telci, "Mısır'da Devrim ve Karşı-Devrim Sürecinde İç ve Dış Aktörlerin Rolü: 2011-2015, (**Unpublished PhD thesis,** Sakarya Üniversitesi SBE, 2015), p.62-65.

wing Harakat al-Tag'eer are both examples of how mass mobilization occurred against the hegemonic understanding of politics created by the Mubarak regime.[8] These political practices can also be interpreted as opportunities allowing for the institutionalization of social unrest, which can be regarded as the early signs of the democratization wave in Egypt and the Middle East.

Due to the fact that *Kefaya* had a heterogenous appearance, with the inclusion of liberal, Islamist, Nasserist, and Marxist identities, it had no difficulty in establishing its legitimacy both on the national and global level. The fact that the *Kefaya* movement depicted the regime's pressures through bloggers prior to the Arab uprisings illustrates its experience in individual and mass opposition. In order to break the political and social pressure imposed by the Mubarak regime, the *Kefaya* movement increasingly used the international press and independent media organizations. The documentaries and other documents prepared by *Kefaya* have been serviced by media outlets such as *Al Jazeera, BBC, Washington Times, CNN, New York Times* and other nongovernmental organizations such as *Human Rights Watch* and *Amnesty International.* The utilization of media and civil society expanded the scope of the opposition against the Mubarak regime. The fact that the group was able to utilize these kinds of materials and make the unrest in Egypt known worldwide played an important role in Mubarak minimizing his pressure on the opposition. As a matter of fact, Condoleezza Rice, who was the then acting U.S. Secretary of State, cancelled her visit to Egypt in 2005 on the grounds that the demonstrations were violently suppressed by the state.[9]

The acceleration of mass demonstrations with the support of different social sectors resulted in the Mubarak regime increasing its censorship on information and communication technologies. The Mubarak regime prevented communication and interaction through mass media in order to prevent the demonstrations from moving to a different dimension. Despite the prohibition of mass media and social media, demonstrators eventually reached Tahrir Square and protests were suppressed violently by the regime forces. While the political atmosphere in Tunisia changed as a result of the army siding with the ordinary people, violence was intact in Egypt. The use of violence against the growing opposition as a reflex of protecting the Mubarak regime left hundreds of people dead, and therefore, the army,

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[8] Rabap El- Mahdi, "The Democracy Movement: Cycles Protests", Rabab El- Mahdi, Philip Marfleet (Ed.), **Egypt: The Moment of Change**, London: Zed Books, 2009, p.87.

[9] Oweidat vd.**,** p.24.

which depicted somewhat unclear policies relatively close to Mubarak, had to change its position.[10]

The endeavor of the mass opposition to influence politics in Egypt had achieved relative success through the protests that took place in the squares. Thus, with the beginning with what became the anger riots on 25 January, 2011, the Hosni Mubarak regime, which ruled for 30 years, came to an end. This event has become accepted as one of the most important events that occurred in the recent history of Egypt.[11] Following the fall of the Mubarak regime, a transition period took place where the army seized power, the constitution was suspended, and parliament was dissolved. The demands of change that occurred during the transition period were not taken into consideration by the army and violence continued to be adopted against the public gathered in the squares. Despite all the pressures felt during the transition period, the requests for democratization continued, and as a result during the second round of presidential elections that took place on 16-17 June 2012, Mohammad Morsi – who came from a Muslim Brotherhood background – was elected with 51.8% of the vote.[12] After a short while, those that expressed their dissatisfaction of the Morsi regime took to the streets again and not only did a chaotic environment emerge in Egypt, but the revolution process also evolved to the contrary. While it was expected for Egypt to take steps in the way of democratization, the military took advantage of the chaotic environment that occurred and on 3 July, 2013, a military coup occurred.

The success of the first phase of the social movements that began in Tunisia and made its impact in other Middle Eastern countries in a short time can be explained in this respect with multiple reasons. While mass media and social media had an impact on these movements to find space for themselves, the relationship between domestic political and social groups, the utilization of resources, and the political atmosphere of countries are also extremely important in this regard. Likewise, the preventative, or facilitating, role that the army played in influencing the power of social movements is also a very important factor that allowed for these

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[10] For a comparative analysis of the role of the army and other factors in the region see. Zoltan Barany, "Comparing the Arab Revolts: The role of the Military", **Journal of Democracy**, Vol.22, No.4, (October 2011) p.28-40. For a study that shows how social movements evolved to a different phase due to the fact that the Egyptian army did not Show a clear reaction and sided with the people within itself during the early phases, considering the necessity of a division within the coalition forming the regime so that a regime change can occur see. Edip Asaf Bekaroğlu, Veysel Kurt, "Mısır'da Otoriter Rejimin Sürekliliği ve Ordu: 'Arap Baharı' ve Sonrası Sürecin Analizi" , **Türkiye Ortadoğu Çalışmaları Dergisi**, Volume: 2, No: 2, 2015, p.1-36.

groups to reach such results. From this perspective therefore, it is not enough to analyze the developments of social movements in the Arab world solely through the perspective of new media and term them as social media revolutions. As a matter of fact, the effect that social media had in Tunisia and Egypt was not replicated in the case of Syria, as with the involvement of regional actors, the process evolved into different points.[13] For this reason, when analyzing an issue, rather than taking a deterministic approach, it is more useful to take a multi-cause approach in order to understand the issue at stake.

Social Movements, Social Media, and the Tahrir Protests

The emergence of new media tools and especially with the line of publication pursued by Al Jazeera in the Middle East, diversified information sources and this accelerated the process of the revolts. With the establishment of this channel, the Arab media and discourse became relatively pluralized. As a result of Al Jazeera's practice of reporting in the process, social movements became known in countries outside the region and the oppression inflicted by the regimes on the people became more apparent. This change in the Arab media played an important role in restructuring the Middle East.[14]

Following the success of the Tahrir protests, research emerged which questioned the relationship between social media and protests, and the extent to which these relationships occurred. It was thus claimed that social media is an effective tool in weakening authoritarian regimes and an influential tool in mobilizing the opposition. A study that was conducted after the Tahrir protests illustrates that participants used social media to a great extent.[15] Social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, Skype, and YouTube made it possible for the opposition to make their voices heard and to become an organized power. The process of revolt, which

[11] İsmail Numann Telci, "Mısır'da Geleceğini Arayan Karşı Devrim", **SETA Analiz**, No.149, (January 2016), p.7.

[12] Fulya Atacan, "Duvar: Devrim mi, Geri Dönüş mü?", **Moment Dergi**, Vol.1 No.1, (2014), p.61.

[13] For a study that is concerned with how the authoritarian one-man regimes tried to block the flow of information on the internet see. Philip N. Howard ve Sheetal D. Agarwal, "When Do States Disconnect Their Digital Networks? Regime Responses to the Political Uses of Social Media'', **The Communication Review**, Vol.14, (September 2011), p.216-232.

[14] For a comprehensive analysis of the changes and innovations that Al Jazeera brought in the media structure in the Middle East and the Arab world, and how it played a role in the re-structuring of the region see. Mohammed El Ofi, "Influence without Power: Al Jazeera and the Arab Public Sphere", Mohamed Zayani (Ed.), **The Al Jazeera Phenomenon: Critical Perspectives on New Arab Media** içinde (66 - 80), Pluto Press, 2005.

[15] Zeynep Tüfekçi, Christopher Wilson, "Social Media and the Decision to Participate in Political Protest: Observations From Tahrir Square" , **Journal of Communication**, Volume62, Issue2, April 2012, p. 363-379.

is known with its TV, mobile phones, and internet-based social media platforms, allowed for the opposition to not only expand the scope of their struggle against the regime but also strengthened the legitimacy of their demonstrations in the international arena.[16] The monopolistic attitudes of countries against the flow of information and the censorship they implemented by controlling the domestic media monopoly triggered individuals to turn to alternative and new media instruments.[17] After Facebook launched its Arabic version in 2009, the number of its users in the region increased dramatically. While in 2008 the number of users were 1 million, this figure reached 2.2 million in 2009, 4.2 million in 2010, and 9.8 million in 2011.

Opposition groups that emerged during the Tahrir protests benefited significantly from traditional and new media tools in order to make their political and social struggles more effective. The April 6 Youth Movement, which includes names such as Ahmed Maher, Asmaa Mahfouz, Mohammed Adel, Waleed Rashed is among the most important examples of this.[18] A Facebook account, which was set up to make the movement heard of reached 70.000 followers in a short amount of time and this figure later reached up to millions. This group was influential in the occupation of Tahrir Sqaure during the January 25 revolution and used social media in order to reach to the masses, which played an important role in the mobilization of demonstrators. Another example of the important role played by social media during the uprisings is the Facebook account of *We are Khaled Said,* which was established after the police killed Khaled Said in an internet cafe in June 2010.[19] In addition to this, the Facebook accounts that were created by Egyptians

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[16] Nurullah Ardıç, "Understanding the 'Arab Spring': Justice, Dignity, Religion and International Politics", **Afro Eurasian Studies**, Vol.1, Issue.1, (Spring 2012), p.14.

[17] Al Jazeera's contribution to the distribution of knowledge and to the process of democratization in the region has been the subject of many studies. Prior to the internet and satellite conventions, regime forces heavily censored in the countries throughout the regime and this prevented the people from being informed about the otuside world. Especially after Al Jazeera began to broadcast and after the increase of the use of the internet in the region, a new public sphere for the Arab world (voices of the new Arap public) was created. Together with these developments, the Arab people gained a more autonomous ground for both regional and global issues, and have been able to discuss their own political and social future. For the arguments on the Arab public sphere after Al Jazeera and internet Technologies see. Marc Lynch, **Voices of the New Arab Public: Iraq, Al-Jazeera, And Mıddle East Politics Today,** Columbia University Press, New York, 2006.

[18] Castells, p.61.

[19] The Facebook account, *We Are Khaled Said,* is well-known to have had an effect on the process of the Tahrir protests and the expansion of the scope of the protests. The subject of the roots of the rebellion tradition in Egypt expressed in detail above is also the case for various websites during similar dates. The "We are All Laila" Facebook account that was established in 2006 by bloggers in order to criticize the injustices and oppression against women is an early example of the culture of criticism online. See. Linde Herrera, **Revolution in the age of Social Media**, Verso, 2014, p.14.

living abroad, such as "Voice of Egypt Abroad" and "Egyptians Abroad in Support of Egypt" played an important role in expanding the scope of the social movements to a global level. The fact that these pages reached significant numbers of followers in a short period of time made it possible to make this phenomenon known as an individual case in the eyes of the masses, which increased the sensitivity towards the subject.

People were informed of the mass protests and the oppressive policies of the Egyptian regime through these accounts.[20] The success of the social media accounts named above in depicting the oppression of the regime both in Egypt and on a global level was a factor that facilitated the ability of drawing international supporters. The fact that the events go beyond national borders reflects how social media tools can influence social movements and the dimensions of the relationship between social media and social movements.

Within this process, which can also be considered as a communication revolution, the structural change created by the information and communication technologies undoubtedly shaked the regime-controlled monopoly. During the beginning of the process, groups that were directing mass demonstrations through social media accounts were able to exchange information about the time, place, and the attitude to be displayed by protestors, without being affected by censorship unlike conventional channels. The role that was played by social media accounts, where traditional media is under regime control in the Middle East, is therefore important in this respect. Contrary to the cautious attitudes of Western media organizations such as *CNN* and *BBC,* by displaying support towards the public and by utilizing their social media in this regard, networks such as *Al Jazeera*, *Al-Arabiya*, and *TRT al-Turkiyya* allowed for the process of revolution to widen its audience.

Apart from the very social media accounts that were effective in the adoption of social media by the masses, those people that were behind these social media accounts also played important roles within this process. The activism Asmaa Mahfouz, one of the founders of the 6 April Youth Movement and a student at Cairo

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[20] For more information on the We are All Khaled Said Facebook group, which was established by Wael Ghonim after Khaled Said was tortured and killed by regime police forces see. Jose Antonio Vargas, "Spring Awakening: How an Egyptian Revolution Began on Facebook", *The New York Times,* 17 February 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/books/review/how-an-egyptian-revolution-began-on-facebook.html (10 March 2018).

University, can be cited as an important example in this regard. The videos that Mahfouz shared on social media even before the overthrow of Mubarak contributed to the acceleration of the process and allowed it to be known in the public space. The video that Mahfouz shared on her Facebook page on January 18 reached thousands of people in a short amount of time and was instrumental in the intensification of the protests. In the video, Mahfouz reaches out to the silent opposition and prompts them to mobilize:

Four Egyptians have set themselves on fire... People, have some shame! I posted that I, a girl, am going down to Tahrir square and I will stand alone and I'll hold up a banner... I'm making this video to give you one simple message... We want to go down to Tahrir Square on January 25th... If you stay at home, then you deserve all that's being done to you and you will be guilty, before your nation and your people. Go down to the street, send SMS's, post it on the internet, make people aware.[21]

As can be understood from the statements made by Asmaa Mahfouz, due to the pressure felt by the oppressive one-man regime, channels in which social unrest could be made heard of were abolished. In fact, in her call for mobilizing the masses, Mahfouz's suggestions for using channels of communication aim at making the existing pressure known to the public in some way. The fact that Mahfouz's video reached hundreds of thousands of people in a short period of time, which eventually led to these people filling Tahrir Square, illustrates the importance of social media and communication channels. The fact that the majority of the people who took part in the protests were young was another factor that enabled the effective use of social media, which eventually led to the protests being adopted by a wider audience. Tahrir Square, which became the site of social mobilization, and the synchronization of protest calls from social media networks emerged as an important feature of the revolution. Some of these movements, which later emerged as leaderless movements,[22] were carried to the streets through some symbolic names. This enabled the re-discussion of the role of mass media in the policy-making processes. The impact that was made through the interactions of the demonstrators on social media platforms was summarized by Manuel Castells as follows:

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[21] Manuel Castells, "**İsyan ve Umut Ağları: İnternet Çağında Toplumsal Hareketler**", Ebru Kılıç (translation.), Koç Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2013, p. 62.

[22] Yeni toplumsal hareketlere ilişkin yapılan değerlendirmelerde hareketlerin merkezi bir programa ve lider figürüne sahip olmadığı vurgulanır. Claus Offe, "New Social Movements: Challenging the Boundaries of Institutional Politics", **Social Research**, Vol.52, No.4, Social Movements, (Winter 1985).

Social media networks played an important role in the revolution in Egypt. The demonstrators recorded the events with their phones, and shared the events live with the nation and the world through YouTube and Facebook. They decided on what to do on Facebook, coordinated themselves through Twitter and used bloggers to express their views.[23]

As stated by Castells, who openly highlights the relationship between social mobilization and technology, new media tools were used extensively during the Arab revolts. Within this context, the dimensions of the relationship between technology and social movements have been re-discussed and different opinions have been put forward. As a matter of fact, it is well known that there exist different opinions on the social and political effects of technological tools and communication technologies, and new analyzes are being made based on these views. There are three different schools of thought in the debate on the effects that the use of communication technology has on the social and political realms: transformants, continuists, and structuralists. According to the transformists, there will be an increase in political activities through the use of communication technologies and social change with information technologies is inevitable. The argument that information technology is going to make a difference in terms of revolution is among the claims of the transformists. However, continuists, who claim that the revolutionary change of information technologies is exaggerated argue that change will not come from these technologies but from social and political initiatives. Contrary to the argument that means of communication will be the determinant factor, according to continuists, a contextual analysis that brings social and political relations to the foreground seems more reasonable. Structuralists however present a thesis that communication technologies are effective on economic structures and that if desired, these technologies will affect many areas in social and political life. While structuralists do not believe that this change will occur alone, they argue that it is possible to act on a social medium in which the individual is kept at the forefront, and that this will bring change.[24]

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[23] Castells, p.64.

[24] Ian Miles, Howard Rush, Kevin Turner, John Bessant, **Information Horizons: The Long-Term Social Implications of New Information Technologies,** Edward Elgar Pub, 1988. Aktaran: Itır Akdoğan, **Digital-Political Fantasies in Istanbul: An analysis of the perceived role of ICT in changing institutional politics, activism, and identity,** Communication Research Centre CRC, Department of Social Research, University of Helsinki, 2012, p. 37. Turkish version, Itır Akdoğan, **Dijital Politik Fantaziler**, İstanbul, İletişim Yayınları, 2014.

As is seen above, there are important debates regarding the extent that communication technologies have an impact on social movements. Are technological tools determinants of social movements? How important is technology in the social action of an individual? It is known that social movements do not determine direct actions but are effective in shaping and spreading actions. Philip Howard's *The Digital Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Information Technology and Political Islam* also touches upon these debates and argues that there is a positive correlation between technology and socio-political environments, and that the use of technology by society can lead to positive consequences in political terms. According to Howard, the use of technologies opens up channels that will strengthen democracy, expand civil society, and contribute to the democratization of the state. Technology-based communication environments, which form the basis of the uprisings against dictatorial and authoritarian regimes, also contribute to the re-opening of blocked sociological structures. When viewed from this perspective, it can be stated that social movements that effectively utilize digital tools have a higher chance of reaching their objectives. As a matter of fact, parallel to the increase in the number of users of social media networks such as Facebook and Twitter during the Arab revolts, the number of people that embraced these protests also increased. It was with this that the protestors received results in some countries in a short space of time. Studies that compare the number of social media users before the uprisings and the number of users after this process provide important data, which highlights the importance between the number of social media users and the development of social movements.[25]

People that could not express their problems in the public sphere due to political, social, and economic pressure were able to find a space by using the opportunities offered by the internet. What is noteworthy here is the contribution that internet-based new communication technologies had on opening new spheres for different experiences. The fact that the mobility of large masses in the social media realm later transformed to the squares became a new feature in the nature of mass demonstrations. From this point of view, social media has become the place of rebellion against political functioning, which is observed as the source of unrest.

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[25] For detailed information and data about the use of traditional and social media by the Egyptian people in the protests of 2011 see. Chrıstopher Wilson, Alexandra Dunn, "Digital Media in the Egyptian Revolution: Descriptive Analysis from the Tahrir Data Sets", **International Journal of Communication**, 5 (2011), p. 1248–1272. , Jonh B. Alterman, "The revolution will not be tweeted" . **The Washington Quarterly** 34(4): (2011) , .103–116.

More, as social platforms and public places joined, new hybrid public spaces were created.[26] People that formed their own kind of civil society and who voiced their concerns through these channels influenced the political process in many ways and cooperated with both local and international networks. After being imprisoned by the regime for 12 days, the founder of the We are All Khaled Said Facebook account, Ghoneim's *#Jan25 is Revolution 2.0* tweet is a representation of the effect that new media channels had on the Tahrir protests.[27]

After overcoming the imposed embargos through satellite telephones and the broadcasts of Al Jazeera, the protesters were able to carry out their communication through different channel sources. Just like in the case of the *Iranian Green Movement*,[28] social media was an important tool for mass mobilization in Tunisia and Egypt and was perceived as an apparatus of freedom. The fact that the oppression inflicted by the regime was overcome through a new technology attracted the attention of different groups of people and in this sense it was made possible for society to embrace the unrest. Individuals that belonged to different political and ideological groups used these new communication channels in order to mobilize and expanded the scale of opposition against Mubarak.

The Tahrir Protests from the Sociology of Social Movements

When considered in the framework presented above, the events that began in Tunisia and spread to Egypt's Tahrir Square, and which later became known as the Arab uprisings, are an important example in the sociology of social movements. Standing in a different position from traditional social movement typologies, with its own characteristics, the Tahrir Protests can be evaluated in terms of "New Social

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[26] For the transition from spaces to flows and fort he definition of "Hybrid Public Space," which represents a combination of virtual and real public spaces see. Manuel Castells, "**İsyan ve Umut Ağları: İnternet Çağında Toplumsal Hareketler**", Ebru Kılıç (translation.), Koç Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2013, p.61.

[27] Derek Gregory, "Tahrir: "Politics, Publics and Performances of Space"", **Middle East Critique**, Vol.22, No.3, (November 2013), p.237. For arguments that depict how Facebook was an effective instrument in the Arab revolutions but how on the other hand it caused problems in coordination and loosened bonds see. S. Joseph, "Social Media, Political Change and Human Rights", **Boston College International and Comparative Law Review**, Vol.35, No.1 (Winter, 2012), p.145 - 188.

[28] For the article written by Chantal Mouffe, an important post-Marxist scholar, which takes into account an "agnostic" model within the radical democracy theoretical framework and which is applied on the green movement in Iran and the role that social media played in this movement see. Babak Rahimi, "The Agonistic Social Media: Cyberspace in the Formation of Dissent and Consolidation of State Power in Postelection Iran", **The Communication Review**, Vol.14, (September 2011), p.158-178.

Movements" and "Resource Mobilization." The class system that emerged after the industrialization period was the starting point for traditional social movements. The main characteristics of traditional social movements were class differences, discontent that emerged due to these differences, and rebellions based on national independence. When observing the reasons for the emergence of new social movements, it can be seen that the main difference between NSMs and traditional social movements is the idea of democracy and pluralism, the recognition of differences in society, and keeping the understanding of civil society at the forefront. New social movements emerged as a result of the reactions that were expressed against violations of democratic rights and freedoms, which were considered to exist in the social sphere. The new social movements, which have placed themselves at the center of civil society, concentrate on issues such as equality, differences, identity building, and the defense of identity politics.

New social movements also differ from traditional social movements in terms of their actor identity. While traditional social movements consisted mainly of the working class, new social movements consist of educated individuals who are active in civil society, mainly middle class, and who are able to make use of technology. While individuals such as Mohammad Bouazizi and Khalid Said came from relatively working class backgrounds, their ability to utilize technology channels and mobilize the masses illustrated that they were among the educated in comparison to others that participated in the protests.

When one observes the requests and complaints of those that took part in the Tahrir protests, the social traumas caused by the economic crisis are clearly seen. However, despite this, the economy factor is not a determinant on its own. The one-man regime that lasted for years and the political attitude that suppresses pluralism in the public sphere stand out as the main causes of these movements. The death of Khalid Said, who was the symbol of the outburst of anger of the crowd that gathered in Tahrir Square, is also a symbolic event that erupted with the combination of different reasons. An individual who was exposed to police violence and the pressures inflicted by the regime was killed by the police, and this event shaped the symbolic character of the movement by bringing forward the "honor" theme of the protestors. While this concept is relatively important for traditional social movements, it can be interpreted as the starting point of new social movements.

When examining the Tahrir protests through the literature on social movements, these protests can be approached through a framework of "Resource Mobilization." The studies that believe Resource Mobilization will help understand the Tahrir protests accept the following parameters as the variables of the protests and assesses them through these variables: the use of communication resources for mobilization, the existence of a global audience, and the instrumental resource created by social media platforms in terms of collective action and social change. Arguments such as the conjecture in Egypt at the time of the protests being effective in the use of resources, and the different political and social groups trying to achieve their goals by acting in alliance with each other, are used as arguments that support this perspective.[29] The fact that individuals who were excluded from the political and social realms got together with others disregarding their differences in ideological beliefs and utilized resources in this way, gave the opportunity to assess the Tahrir protests in this framework.

Time, money, organizational talent, and social and political opportunities are considered as important factors that determine the success of social movements according to Resource Mobilization. When viewed from this perspective, as stated earlier, although the protestors were in ideologically different positions from each other in the era before the revolution in Egypt, the fact that they all positioned themselves in opposition to Mubarak gave them the opportunity to work and act together. The Nasserist group that came together to defend the second Palestinian Intifada, which began in 2000, and the fact that the Muslim Brotherhood and Socialists came together to form the "People's Front" is an illustration of the social consensus during the process of revolution. Similarly, the fact that the socialists, Nasserists, liberals, and Muslim Brotherhood merged together under the Kefaya movement allowed for opposition groups to consolidate against Mubarak. The unification of people and groups with different opinions against Mubarak and the fact that they distanced themselves from a monolithic structure reinforced the legitimacy of the opposition. Although the anti-Mubarak coalition displayed a heterogenous character in connection with each other during the revolutionary process, with the military coup by Sisi on 3 July, 2013, these groups became disorganized and took different positions during the counter-revolution.[30] In this respect, when

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[29] Nahed Eltantawy ve Julie B. Wiest, "Social Media in the Egyptian Revolution: Reconsidering Resource Mobilization Theory", **International Journal of Communication**, Vol.5 (2011) , p.1207 - 1224.

[30] Telci, p.66.

compared to the examples of Gezi Park and other social movements, the participant profile of the Tahrir protests exhibited a heterogenous character and the reasons that gave rise to the protests were different from each other.

Theories of social movements also provide an important analytical framework in order for us to understand the different aspects of the Tahrir protests. At this point, the three components that Alain Touraine refers to in order to put forward the typology of social movements provides a useful model for highlighting the characteristics of the protests in Egypt. According to Touraine, the following aspects of a social movement will contribute to the categorization of the movement and make it more understandable:

The movement's identity

The movement's opposition

The movement's objective (social aim)

By expanding Tourain's social movements typology, Castells argues that the identity of the social movement is the core of what constructs it and who it acts on behalf of. The opposition coincides with the main enemy in the form clearly defined by the movement, and the social objective of the movement is the social order that it aims for in its final stage.[31] Tourain's analytic model provides a useful framework that demonstrates which category a social movement should be assessed in and what kind of typology it has. Observing social movements within this framework will facilitate the interpretation of the protests in concern of this article and enables to provide an integrative approach.

In light of this analytic framework, it is possible to define the identity of social movements in Egypt as a heterogenous community that includes people from different social classes and social organizations. As expressed above, Liberal, Socialist, Nasserist, and Islamist groups are the ones that realized the January 25 revolution in Tahrir. From this point of view, the identity appearance of the Tahrir protests from a socio-political and socio-cultural perspective are close to the social movement typology that is a heterogenous variety. While these groups were all in common against Mubarak, which allowed them to form the opposition, there social goals started to differ and therefore there was a change in the identity of the social

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[31] Manuel Castells, **Enformasyon Çağı: Ekonomi, Toplum ve Kültür: Kimliğin Gücü**, Ebru Kılıç (translation.), İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2006, p.100-101. Alain Touraine, **Sociologie de l'action**, Paris: Edition du Seuil, 1965.

movement. The main problem that constituted the identity of the Tahrir protests, regardless of the socio-political differences of the protesters, was the one-man regime that had been pursued for a long time. The one-man regimes perpetrated by Zine El Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia, Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, Gaddafi in Libya, and Ali Abdullah Saleh in Yemen play an important role in the anger outburst experienced by the people in the region. Movements that have a psychologically motivating characteristic in the sustainability of the social movement itself also ensures that the forces of different structures and ideologies are consolidated for a short period of time. Groups in opposition that actually allow social movements to construct their identity and which shape their objectives are irrevocable aspects of these movements. In fact, the names that were mentioned above, who continued to oppress their peoples during their one-man regimes, are the main actors in the positioning of social movements.

The social goal of the movements can be described as a social medium in which social relations take place according to democratic standards, a political environment brought by free and fair elections, a politically negotiated communicative ground of action, where economic deprivations are eliminated as much as possible, and where people can pursue an honorable social life. As a matter of fact, the themes of bread, justice, and honor are social realities that are prominent in the social movements in Tahrir. The fact that the social aims of a group of people who had been subject to the regime's pressures included democratization, economic development, and recognition, can be interpreted as a very natural need.

Conclusion

The protests that were a result of the social, political, and economic problems of the countries in the region climbed to its peak before the Arab revolutions, and this made it possible for the discontent to be known within the masses. The main objective of the crowds that gathered in places such as Cairo and Alexandria was the immediate end to the discontent felt by the social inequalities and repressive practices of those in power. Protestors that took to the streets on the themes of bread, freedom, and social justice (ıyş, hurriye, adale içtimaiyye), demanded for improvements in these policy areas. Following the demonstrations of anger accumulated against the Mubarak regime, large-scale demonstrations took place on January 24, and with the involvement of various social groups, the Mubarak regime came to an end. The fact that "Al sha'ab yureed iskat al-nizam" (the people want to topple the regime) was the most popular slogan used in the protests that reached from Tunisia to Egypt pointed to the reason of such social anger.[32]

By becoming an important issue on the agenda with the Arab uprisings, when observing the profile that emerged during the Tahrir protests, it can be stated that social movements are confronted with an important example. The Tahrir protests can be distinguished from traditional social movements due to their de-centralization, the reverse of hierarchical relations, and due to the fact that they introduced a relatively autonomous relationship model. More, the Tahrir protests contain certain parallels with New Social Movements and Resource Mobilization. While there are figures and groups that stand out in the Tahrir Protests, the absence of a leader mechanism and the appearance of a heterogeneous identity stand out as its distinctive features. This allows us to evaluate the protests within the new approach models in the literature. In addition to the fact that different political and social groups were not united under a single authority and did not organize horizontally, the mass utilization of new communication technologies during the Tahrir protests is also another feature that distinguishes this movement from traditional social movements.

The fact that the authoritarian regimes controlled traditional media channels and limited access to internet-based communication mediums led protestors to

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[32] Jeannie L. Sowers ve Bruce K. Rutherford, "Revolution and Counterrevolution in Egypt", Mark L. Hass ve David W. Lesch (Ed.), **The Arap Spring: The Hope and Reality of the Uprising** içinde (40-72), Westview Press, 2017, p. 41.

utilizing these methods. These new mediums facilitated participation in the social movement. Social media environments acted as a tool that increased the participation in social movements during the protests and individuals were able to create public awareness about the protests by using social media. Social media played an important role in the Tahrir protests as it became a platform where protesters shared live pictures, where negotiations were made in regards to the admission of the protests, and a platform that enhanced the ability for crucial events to be heard of. While social media tools were not the absolute determinants of the social movements, they had positive effects on the questioning of the authoritarian regimes and the dissemination of the scale of the opposition. Thus, in conclusion, as is seen in the Tahrir example, many structural differences occurred as a result of the effect social media had on social movements. These include not being subject to a leader, and the existence of a relatively autonomoys mode of operation instead of traditional hierarchical relations.

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ORTADOĞU ETÜTLERİ

MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES

Dr. Şerif Dilek

EXPECTATIONS AND REALITIES IN THE KURDISH QUEST FOR INDEPENDENCE IN IRAQ: 25 SEPTEMBER INDEPENDENCE REFERENDUM*

Abstract

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Following the invasion of Iraq, governance authority and economic opportunities allowed for the Kurds to increase their capacity in terms of politics, military, economics, and culture. Agreements made with multinational energy companies, the diplomatic relationships formed with other states, and the fight against DAESH strengthened the Kurds' institutional structure among other states and increased their self-confidence. In contrast to regional and international powers, the Kurds were able to perceive the security gap in the Middle East, which emerged after the changing environment caused after the Arab Spring. The central administration of Iraq perceives the Kurdish quest for a status, which has independence as its ultimate goal, as a threat to its national integrity. Therefore, the Baghdad administration increasingly implemented security-oriented and authoritarian policies with the aim of more centralization. An independence referendum was accepted as the only missing critical factor that would lead the Kurdish quest to its ultimate goal, and therefore, this referendum was held with high hopes. However, the consequences and the aftermath of the referendum were mis-calculated. This article argues that the Kurds utilized their energy sources and their fight against DAESH as political instruments in their quest for independence. Within this framework, this article underlines how the unsuccessful outcome of the 25 September, 2017, independence referendum resulted in a new period of debate concerning the position of Kurds.

Key words: Iraq, Iraqi Kurds, Independence Referendum, Energy

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* This article has been developed from the author's doctorate thesis.

IRAK KÜRTLERİNİN STATÜ ARAYIŞINDA BEKLENTİLER VE GERÇEKLER: 25 EYLÜL BAĞIMSIZLIK REFERANDUMU

Öz

Irak işgali sonrası yönetimsel meşruiyet ve ekonomik imkanlar Kürtlerin siyasi, askeri, iktisadi ve kültürel açıdan etki ve güç kapasitelerini artırmıştı. Enerji kaynakları üzerinden çok uluslu şirketlerle yapılan anlaşmalar, yabancı devletlerle kurulan diplomatik ilişkiler ve DAEŞ'e karşı mücadele de hem uluslararası kamuoyu hem de devletler düzeyinde tanınan meşruiyet kurumsal yapılarını güçlendirmenin yanı sıra kendilerine olan aşırı bir güven yanılsamalarına yol açtı. Özellikle Arap Baharı ile birlikte değişen bölgesel şartlar Kürtleri bölgesel ve küresel aktörlerin tutumlarının aksine Ortadoğu'da süregelen kaos ve istikrarsızlık boşluğunu fırsat olarak görmelerini sağlamıştı. Bu süreçte Kürtlerin statü arayışlarındaki nihai hedeflerinin bağımsızlık eksenli olması, Irak rejimini söz konusu durumu ulusal bütünlüğüne karşı bir tehdit olarak kabul etmesinin yanında daha fazla merkezileşmek amacıyla daha güvenlikçi ve otoriter politikalara sevk etti. Kürtler için statü arayışında kritik bir eşik olarak kabul edilen bağımsızlık referandumu büyük beklentilerle gerçekleştirilmiş ancak referandum sonrası gelişmeler öngörülememiştir. Bu makale Kürtlerin enerji kaynaklarını ve IŞİD'e karşı verdikleri mücadeleyi bağımsızlık arayışında politik bir enstrüman olarak kullandıklarını iddia etmektedir. Bu çerçevede Irak Kürtlerinin gelecek arayışında kritik bir nokta olarak görülen 25 Eylül 2017 bağımsızlık referandumu ve bunun başarısızlıkla sonuçlanması Kürtlerin mevcut konumlarını tekrar tartışmaya açarak yeni bir süreci başlatmıştır.

Anahtar kelimeler: Irak, Iraklı Kürtler, Bağımsızlık Referandumu, Enerji

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التوقعات والوقائع في السعي الكردي للإستقلال عن العراق: استفتاء الاستقلال 25 سبتمبر

ملخص

بعد الغزو الأمريكي للعراق، أدت زيادة الشرعية الإدارية والفرص الاقتصادية بعد غزو العراق من قوة وتأثير الأكراد في المجالات السياسية والعسكرية والاقتصادية والثقافية. الاتفاقيات مع الشركات متعددة الجنسيات حول مصادر الطاقة والعلاقات الدبلوماسية المبرمة مع الدول الأجنبية ومحاربة داعش عززت البنى المؤسساتية للاعتراف بالشرعية على مستوى الرأي العام العالمي وعلى مستوى الدول بل أدت أيضا إلى أوهام كبرى من الثقة بالنفس لديهم. إن الظروف الإقليمية المتغيرة وخاصة مع حلول الربيع العربي دفعت الأكراد إلى اعتبار ثغرة الفوضى وعدم الاستقرار في الشرق الأوسط كفرصة مقابل مواقف الجهات الفاعلة الإقليمية والعالمية. في الحقيقة أن الهدف النهائي للأكراد من هذه العملية هو البحث عن وضع يتمحور حول الاستقلال واعتبر النظام العراقي هذه الحالة تهديداً لوحدته الوطنية وأدى ذلك وبدوره إلى التوجه نحو المزيد من السياسات الأمنية والاستبدادية من أجل المزيد من المركزية. هذه التطورات بالنسبة إلى الأكراد قد وضعتهم في موقف حرج، حيث أن الاستفتاء على الاستقلال كان ينطوي على توقعات كبرى الا انه لم يكن ممكنا التنبؤ   بالتطورات التي حدثت بعد الاستفتاء. يناقش هذا المقال بأن الأكراد استخدموا مصادر الطاقة ونضالهم ضد داعش كأداة سياسية في سعيهم للاستقلال. وفي هذا السياق يعتبر الاستفتاء على الاستقلال في 25 أيلول 2017 والذي كان يعتبر نقطة حرجة بالنسبة لمستقبل الأكراد العراقيين، ومع انتهاءه بالفشل بدأت عملية جديدة بإعادة مناقشة الأوضاع الحالية للأكراد.

كلمات مفتاحية: العراق، أكراد العراق، استفتاء الاستقلال، الطاقة

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Power Elements in the Search for Sovereignty: Geopolitics, Economy, Energy

With the British invasion of Ottoman lands, the quest for a status became more apparent and efficient within Iraqi Kurds and until this present day, this search for a status has passed through many important stages.[1] In this process, the rebellions led by the Kurds to achieve their political demands first became politicized and then institutionalized.[2] While the politicization process was made possible due to the support provided by the Soviet Union, as power in the international system shifted towards the U.S., the Kurds became an important actor for the global superpower.[3] Kurds played an important role during the U.S. intervention in Iraq during the First Gulf War and during the U.S. administration's policies applied on Iran, and eventually obtained a *de facto* autonomous structure.[4] The 2003 invasion, which is also termed as the Second Gulf War, saw a global power such as the U.S. launch a new period and provide the Kurds with a new status. In the meantime, following the defeats that the Kurdish movement experienced against the Iraqi government in the 1970s, the internal fragmentation

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[1] For more information on the relationship between the Ottoman Empire and the Iraqi Kurds; Sinan Maru*foğlu, Osmanlı Döneminde Kuzey Irak (1831-1914),* (İstanbul: Eren Yayıncılık, 1998); Hakan Özoğlu, *Osmanlı Devleti ve Kürt Milliyetçiliği*, (İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2005). For the period after the British invasion; Mim Kemal Öke, *Musul Komplosu 1918-1926*, (İstanbul: İrfan Yayıncılık, 2012); Şakire Hıdoye Mıhoyan, *İki Dünya Savaşı Arasında Irak'ta Kürt Sorunu,* (İstanbul: Peri Yayınları, 1998); Stefanie K. Wichhart, "A 'New Deal' for the Kurds: Britain's Kurdish Policy in Iraq, 1941-45", *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, Vol.39, No.5, (2011), p. 815-831.

[2] For works conducted on Iraqi Kurds; Wadie Jwaideh, *Kürt Milliyetçiliğin Tarihi, Kökenleri ve Gelişimi,* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2012); David Mcdowall, *Modern Kürt Tarihi* (İstanbul: Doruk Yayıncılık, İstanbul, 2004); Martin van Bruinessen, *Ağa, Şeyh, Devlet*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2015); Kerim Yıldız, *The Kurds in Iraq: The Past, Present and Future,* (London: Pluto Press, 2007); Yaniv Voller, *The Kurdish Liberation Movement in Iraq: From Insurgency to Statehood*, (London: Routledge, 2014).

[3] For the importance of Kurds for global and regional actors see; Ofra Bengio, "The Challenge of to the Territorial Integrity of Iraq", *Survival*, Vol.37, No.2, (summer 1995); Robert Olson, "The Kurdish Question and Geopolitic and Geostrategic Changes in the Middle East after the Gulf War*", Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol.XVII, No.4, (summer, 1994); Ali Rıza Attar, *Kürtler: Bölgesel ve Bölge Dışı Güçler,* (İstanbul: Ağaç Kitabevi, 2004); David A. Korn, "The Last Years of Mustafa Barzani", *Middle East Quarterly*, Vol.1, No.2, (June, 1994); Hakan Özoğlu, "Molla Mustafa Barzani in the USA 1975-79", Presented at 2nd World Kurdish Congress in Erbil, Iraq, (11-15 October 2012); John K. Cooley, *Payback: America's Long War in the Middle East,* (London: Brassey's Inc, 1991); John K.Cooley, *Alliance Against Babylon: The US, Israel and Iraq*, (London: Pluto Press, 2005); Erol Kurubaş, "Irak Kürt Hareketi: İç Çekişme-Dış Destek-Ayaklanma", Ümit Özdağ, Sedat Laçiner ve Serhat Erkmen (Ed.) in *Irak Krizi*, (Ankara: Asam Yayınları, 2003), p. 21-43.

[4] For the de facto Kurdish region in Iraq see; Michael Gunter, "A De Facto Kurdish State in Northern Iraq", *Third World Quarterly,* Vol.14, No.2, (1993); Robert Olson, "The Creation of a Kurdish State in the 1990s?", *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol.XV, No.4, (summer, 1992); Robert Olson, "The Kurdish Question and Geopolitic and Geostrategic Changes in the Middle East after the Gulf War", *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol.XVII, No.4, (summer, 1994); Baskın Oran, *Kalkık Horoz: Çekiç Güç ve Kürt Devleti*, (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1996); Bengio, *The Challenge of to the Territorial Integrity of Iraq.*

and political division of the Kurds became clear. This political division between the Kurds led to a struggle of power, which has resulted in the emergence of a dual structure that has continued until today.[5] This dual structure within the Kurdish movement has made Kurds more vulnerable to external actors.

During the transformation of the Kurds, whose historical background is quite detailed, the First Gulf War was an important threshold. However, the *de jure* institutionalization process of the Kurds began after the U.S. invasion of Iraq. The invasion toppled Saddam Hussein and the authority gap in the country caused serious security concerns. Thus, with the Iraq invasion, the Ba'ath Party and the government structure collapsed, which eventually led to Iraq becoming a *failed state*.[6] This also increased the role of non-state actors and their influence on the political environment in the Middle East. The authority gap in Iraq not only opened the way for Kurds, Shia and Arab tribes, but also for groups such as Al-Qaeda. This situation led to non-state actors being able to limit the power of states and in fact allowed these groups to challenge the state. This made it difficult for states to ensure their security and fulfill their functionality.[7] In the new period, Kurds played an active role in the re-structuring of the country in order to legitimize their *de facto* status.[8]

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[5] After leaving the KDP in 1976, a group close to Jalal Talabani formed the PUK, which led to a dual structure within the Kurdish movement. For the struggle of power between Kurds, see; Michael Gunter, "The KDP-PUK Conflict in Northern Iraq", *The Middle East Journal*, Vol.50, No.2 (Spring, 1996); Ofra Bengio, "Autonomy in Kurdistan in Historical Perspective", Brendan O'Leary, John McGarry and Khaled Salih (Eds.) in *The Future of Kurdistan in Iraq*, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005), p. 173-185; Stephen Pelletiere, *Kurds: an Unstable Element in the Gulf, Boulder,* (Westview Press, 1984); Hussein Tahiri, *The Structure of Kurdish Society and the Struggle for a Kurdish State*, (Costa Mesa: Mazda Publishers, 2007).

[6] With the end of the Cold War, states that were formed during the decolonization process faced serious problems in effectively fulfilling the functions of a state. Those that failed to fulfill these functions were defined as failed states. While Helman and Ratner define the concept of a failed state as countries that are incapable of sustaining themselves as a member of the international community, Brookst defines this concept as states that have lost control of their violence mechanisms and states that fail to create peace and stability within their own sovereignty and sphere of influence. Gerald B. Helman and Steven R. Ratner, "Saving Failed States" *Foreign Policy 89*, (Winter 1992-93); Rosa Ehrenreich Brookst, "Failed States, or the State as Failure?", *The University of Chicago Law Review*, Vol.72, No.4, (Fall 2005).

[7] Mustafa Aydın, Nihat Ali Özcan ve Neslihan Kaptanoğlu, "Riskler ve Fırsatlar Kavşağında Irak'ın Geleceği ve Türkiye", *TEPAV Ortadoğu Çalışmaları*, July 2007, p. 58-60.

[8] For this see; Gareth Stansfield, *Iraqi Kurdistan: Political Development and Emergent Democracy, (*London: Routledge Curzon, 2003); Denise Natali, *The Kurdish Quasi-State*, (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2010); Brendan O'Leary, John McGarry and Khaled Salih (Eds.), *The Future of Kurdistan in Iraq*, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005), p. 3-45; Mahir A. Aziz, *Irak Kürtleri, Irak Kürdistanı'nda Milliyetçilik ve Ulusal Kimlik*, (İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2013).

Their cooperation with the U.S. during the Iraq invasion enabled the Kurds to secure their relatively stable and autonomous position in the north of the country.[9] Due to the diplomacy they pursued and under the guarantor of the U.S., Kurds found a place on the Interim Governing Council formed in 2003 and became an important actor in the re-construction and future of Iraq. By obtaining important positions in the transitional period governments and the general elections, and due to their influence on the negotiations in regard to shaping Iraq's future, Kurds strengthened their already existing status.[10]

Within their institutionalization efforts, the largest gain for Kurds was to transform what is called the "safe zone," which covers three provinces, from a *de facto* to a *de jure* structure. As of 19 March, 2003, it was stated that the Kurdish region was composed of Erbil, Sulaymaniyah, Kirkuk, Diyala, and Ninova, and that the administration of these provinces would continue during the transition period.[11] With the new Constitution adopted in 2005, the region gained an official identity. Thus, the recognition of the KRG as a federal region with *de jure* status led to gains such as the acceptance of Kurdish as the official language and the ability to form their own security force (the Peshmerga). In addition, it was also noted that apart from issues under the jurisdiction of the central government, the KRG would have the right to change laws that were produced by the federal parliament.[12]

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[9] Anna Nurzyńska, "The Safety Aspect in the Kurdish Autonomous Region", *Journal World Scientific News*, Vol.57, (2016) p. 680-5.

[10] Peter Galbraith, *Irak'ın Sonu: Ulus Devletlerin Çöküşü mü?*, (İstanbul: Doğan Kitapçılık, 2006), p. 149-51.

[11] Article 53, band A of the Transitional Administrative Law that was signed in 2004 states: "As of 19 March, 2003, the Kurdistan Regional Government is the official government that holds the lands in Duhok, Erbil, Kirkik, Sulaymaniyah, Diyala, and Mosul." The transition period was to continue until an official government was to come to power in 31 December, 2005. On 15 October, 2005, with the participation rate of 66%, the draft of a new Constitution was accepted by a popular vote. Following the acceptance of the Constitution, with the general elections that took place on 15 December, 2005, Jalal Talabani took office as President. Talabani ordered Nouri al-Maliki to form a government and the new Iraq government was formed on 20 May, 2006. For detailed information of the transitional period, see; Ferhat Pirinççi, "2003 Savaşı Sonrası Süreçte Irak'ta Siyasal Yapılanma", *Fırat Üniversitesi Orta Doğu Araştırmaları Merkezi Müdürlüğü İkinci Orta Doğu Semineri: Dünden Bugüne Irak (Uluslararası Katılımlı)*, 27-29 May 2004, Elazığ, Fırat Üniversitesi Basımevi, Vol.II, p. 12-3.

[12] Article 117 of the Constitution adopted on 15 October, 2005 states: "This Constitution, upon coming into force, shall recognize the region of Kurdistan, along with its existing authorities, as a federal region." Article 140 states: "In order to determine the will of the people, a referendum on Kirkuk and other disputed areas should take place by 31 December, 2007." Article 141 of the Constitution states: "Legislation enacted in the region of Kurdistan since 1992 shall remain in force, and decisions issued by the government of the region of Kurdistan, including court decisions and contracts, shall be considered valid unless they are amended or annulled pursuant to the laws of the region of Kurdistan by the competent entity in the region, provided that they do not contradict with the Constitution." (H.Bayhan, "Irak Kürtlerinin Yönetimsel Arayışı ve Federalizm Seçeneği: Tarihsel ve Teorik Bir Analiz", (Unpublished PhD thesis, Marmara University, SBE, 2013).

Kurds obtained significant gains in many issues including the distribution of power between the federal structure and regional government, the distribution of natural resources, and the right to contract with oil companies. However, the solution to the issue of disputed territories such as Kirkuk were postponed to a later date.[13] From the perspective of the Kurds, the legitimate acceptance of their status as part of a federal Iraq was a success. The goals that were aimed to be achieved through armed struggle were legally recognized under the guarantee of a global actor.[14] These gains, which have been interpreted as the historical transformation of Kurds, further led to the increase of their capabilities and opportunities in search for a future.

With the new constitution adopted after the Iraq invasion, a referendum was envisaged to be held by the end of 2007 in regards to the disputed territories. It has been argued that this referendum could not be held due to the policies pursued by Nouri al-Maliki during 2006-2010 and 2010-2014. This further accelerated and deepened the political and economic issues between Baghdad and Erbil. The political culture of Maliki during his second term as Prime Minister not only led to the rise of ethnic and sectarian tension in the country, but also laid the foundation for radical groups such as Daesh.[15] With the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq in 2011, Maliki's drive towards authoritarianism and his attempt to passivize the political opposition also deepened the tension between the central government's relations with the Kurds. When assessing relations during this period, it can be observed that Maliki's policies towards more centralization during a time when Kurds were trying to preserve their autonomous status brought the two sides opposite each other more often.[16] Nevertheless, the Kurds

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[13] A consensus was reached between the Kurds and the central Iraqi government on issues apart from Kirkuk (due to the uncertainty within the Constitution, both parties were able to interpret the issue of contracting with oil companies according to their own interests). According to the Provisional Constitution, the federal structure would be based on geographical and historical realities, and power would be shared between the federal government, government, governorships, municipalities and local governments). For more information, see; Sherko Kirmanj, "Kurdistan Region: A Country Profile", *Journal of International Studies,* 9, (2013), p. 152.

[14] A.S. Erkmen, "Amerikan Hegemonyasının Yeniden İnşasında Bölgesel Faktörlerin Rolü: ABD'nin Kuzey Irak Politikası Örneği", (Unpublished PhD thesis, Ankara University, 2008), p. 181.

[15] Ali Khedery, "Why We Stuck With Maliki-and Lost Iraq", *Washington Post*, 3 August 2014; Christopher R. Hill, "Iraq After Maliki", *Project Syndicate*, 25 August 2014.

[16] Works conducted on the relations between Baghdad and Erbil compare Nouri al-Maliki's aggressive policies (such as sending tanks to disputed areas such as Hanekin and the possibility of armed conflict) and his despotic attitude to that of Saddam Hussein. See; Núria Tomàs and Ana Villellas, "The Kurdistan Autonomous Region: Risks and Challenges for Peace", *Quaderns de Construccio de Pau*, (July 2009), p.7.

did not refrain from taking part in the balance of power within the Iraqi Central Government in order to ensure that the conditions were set for their pursuit in the future. Kurds utilized the opportunities they acquired by taking part in the balance of power in Baghdad during the establishment of the KRG. It seemed difficult for Kurds to achieve their ultimate objective or political aim without completing their historical experience of a search for status and political power with external support.[17] Within this framework, in order to develop their legitimate status towards independence, alongside being prevalent within the balance of power in Baghdad, the KRG adopted economic policies that would receive support from the international community and regional actors.

The Search for an Autonomous Economic Structure and the Importance of the Energy Factor

After being legally recognized as a federal state after the U.S. invasion of Iraq, the strategic and political policies pursued by the KRG reflected - both domestically and internationally - the fact that it would act independent from the Baghdad administration. The KRG took steps ranging in areas from politics, military, and defense (having the Peshmerga power, carrying out negotiations with other countries on a state level, being able to conduct agreements etc.). In addition to this, the KRG took important initiatives in the energy sector, including the research, operation, and export of natural resources, and on cooperation and agreements in this field. In particular, the economic policies pursued by the KRG, in which energy laid at the foundation, was the issue that left Baghdad and the KRG in conflict with each other.

In addition to becoming more politically involved, the Kurds, who were important actors in the post-2003 period, also received a larger share of the budget.[18] After 2005, due to establishing a dynamic economic environment and its regular budget revenues, the KRG was able to further develop. As the Kurds were prepared to enter the global market as an important player in the field of energy supply, the region was perceived as a rising potential market among international companies and actors. In addition to the sectarian policies pursued by

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[17] Serhat Erkmen, "Irak'ta İşgal Sonrası Siyasal Yaşam ve 2010 Parlamento Seçimleri", *Ortadoğu Etütleri*, Vol.2, No.3, (July 2010), p. 139-40.

[18] Prior to 2003, Kurds were recipients of 13 percent of the oil revenue received through the OFFP. However, after 2003 it was agreed that the KRG would receive 17 percent of the total budget of Iraq.

Maliki, harsh statements against Kurds in this period also led the KRG to control its economic resources more independently. On the road to institutionalizing its independent political stance in the field of energy, in 2006 the KRG established its own Ministry of Natural Resources.[19] With this, the newly established ministry was similar to the Oil Ministry formed in Baghdad. Following, in August 2007, the Iraqi Kurdistan Parliament approved its oil and gas law in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Constitution without waiting for the Iraqi central government to approve the "Hydrocarbon Law." The approved law gave the KRG's newly established ministry the authority to conduct oil agreements and to administrate its own oil sector.[20] The rapid growth of the KRG in the energy sector was of strategic importance. As was later seen, the KRG made important agreements with both states and multinational corporations on energy resources.

The major oil and gas reserves in the region provided the KRG with an important position in regional and global markets.[21] These high reserves made the KRG an important supplier of oil and natural gas, and meant an alternative energy source for both Turkish and European markets. The only way that the KRG was going to be able to enter the global energy market was through Turkey, and this relationship to be formed within the energy sector was not independent from their quest for political sovereignty. The two different political approaches maintained by Turkey against Erbil and Baghdad throughout 2008-2014 also draws attention.[22] A point worthy of emphasis here is that Turkey's high energy demand and the trade relationship it formed with the KRG further increased the

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[19] According to Article(s) 111, 112, 115, and 121 of the Iraq Constitution, with the aim to develop natural resources within the regional government, the newly established Ministry of Natural Resources was held responsible for the internal auditing of the KRG's Oil and Gas Law. For more information, see; "Ministry of Natural Resources", KRG, http://mnr.krg.org (22 April 2017). Ashti Hawrami, who was brought to lead this ministry had experience with many private sector companies and has director experience within many petrol companies. For a more detailed biography, see; "Ashti Hawrami (Abdullah Abdulrahman Abdullah)-Minister of Natural Resources", KRG, http://cabinet.gov.krd/p/page.aspx?l=12&s=030000&r=315&p=573&h=1, (23 April 2017).

[20] For the KRG's Oil and Gas Law, see; "Oil and Gas Law of the Kurdistan Region-Iraq", *KRG-Minister of Natural Resources*, http://mnr.krg.org/images/pdfs/Kurdistan_Oil_and_Gas_Law_English_2007.pdf, (25 Nisan 2017).

[21] It has been suggested that the oil and natural gas reserves in the KRG contain a higher potential than what has been predicted. Although oil reserves are estimated to be around 24 billion barrels, KRG officials have announced that with the inclusion of disputed territories such as Kirkuk, this figure reaches 45 billion barrels. More, they have also indicated that with new discoveries in natural gas reserves, the KRG have a total reserve of 5.67 trillion cubic meters, which is 3 percent of total reserves in the world. For more information see; KRG, *Ministry of Natural Resources*; Sylvia Pfeifer, "Exxon Signs Kurd Exploration Contracts", *Financial Times*, 10 November 2011; Ali Balcı, "Enerji'sine Kavuşan Komşuluk Türkiye-Kürdistan Bölgesel Yönetimi İlişkileri", *SETA Analiz*, (June 2014).

[22] Ali Balcı ve İsmail Akdoğan, "Bağdat ve Erbil arasında Irak'ta Denge Siyaseti", Kemal İnat, Ali Aslan and Burhanettin Duran (Eds.) in. *Kuruluştan Günümüze AK Parti: Dış Politika*, (SETA Yayınları, İstanbul: 2017), p. 263-280.

KRG's economic independence.[23] Following this process, Turkish companies became increasingly apparent within trade, energy, and investment markets within the KRG.[24]

By signing agreements with energy companies on different terms with Baghdad, the attractive conditions offered by the KRG attracted international energy companies and ensured that investments were channeled to this region. Despite the fact that the KRG had the opportunity to attract more investments, the two types of different contracts further deepened the legal and political disputes between Baghdad and Erbil.[25] The agreement signed with ExxonMobil in 2011, which allowed for the oil exploration in 6 different fields, further increased tension between Baghdad and Erbil.[26] By signing an agreement with ExxonMobil, which is one of the largest energy companies in the world, Erbil placed itself on the agenda as an important factor in the global energy market. This was more than economic development and was perceived as a political triumph.[27] Erbil did not limit itself to this and further pursued agreements with small and large companies such as Chevron, Total, DNO, and Gazprom Net in areas ranging from

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[23] Despite the instability and chaos in the region, Erbil aimed to lay the pipeline in 2017 and to export oil to Turkey in 2018. On the other hand, by expressing that 5 trillion cubic meters of natural gas will fulfill Turkey's 50-year natural gas demand, and due to the fact that Turkey has from time-to-time come across problems in foreign policy with Russia and Iran, the ability to diversify its energy supplier attracted attention to the KRG's reserves. Erdal T.Karagöl, "Enerjide Yeni Aktör: Irak Bölgesel Kürt Yönetimi", *SETA Perspektif*, 28 November 2013; "Rusya'ya Doğalgazına Karşı Kuzey Irak Doğalgazı!", *Enerji Haber*, 27 November 2015; Gönül Tol, "Untangling the Turkey-KRG Energy Partnership: Looking Beyond Economic Drivers", *Global Turkey in Europe*, (March 2014).

[24] Christina Bache, "Mutual Economic Interdependence or Economic Imbalance: Turkish Private Sector Presence in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq", *Middle East Critique*, Vol.27, No.1, (2018), p. 61-75.

[25] The KRG adopted "production sharing contracts" with energy companies and this consisted of providing companies the right to the ownership of oil depending on their shares. In contrast, Baghdad adopted what are called "technical service contracts," which have a higher risk. For more information on this issue, see; Z. Baykal, "Türkiye'nin Irak Kürdistan Bölgesel Yönetimi olan Enerji İlişkileri (2002-2014)", (Unpublished master's thesis, Marmara University, 2014).

[26] An agreement covering six different sites was signed between the KRG and ExxonMobil on 18 October. These sites were; Basika, El Kuş, East Arbat, Pirmam, Betvata and Kara Indir. For more information on the agreement between ExxonMobil and KRG, see; Sylvia Pfeifer, "Exxon Signs Kurd Exploration Contracts", *Financial Times*, 10 November 2011.

[27] Dmitry Zhdannikov, Isabel Coles and Ned Parker, "Special Report: How Exxon Helped Make Iraqi Kurdistan", *Reuters*, 3 November 2014.

the search of natural resources to their exportation. These companies signed agreements with the KRG at the risk of putting other investments in Iraq at risk.[28]

The fact that some of the agreements made by the KRG included disputed territories, which remain as a political sensitivity for the central Iraqi administration, deteriorated relations between the two.[29] Baghdad also announced that it was going to apply sanctions and boycott companies that sign agreements with Erbil.[30] In response to this, Erbil defended itself by stating that the Constitution of Iraq gives it the right to conduct such agreements and therefore did not recognize the decision made by Baghdad.[31] In this process, despite for opposition from the U.S. and the central government of Iraq, Turkey and the KRG formed a pipeline. This was of strategic value and importance. Due to Erbil storing oil that it exports with

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[28] Among these companies, DNO, Genel Enerji, Gulf Keystone Petroleum, Sterling Energy, Hess Corporation, Marathon Oil Company, Repsol YPF and OMV, ExxonMobil, Total, Chevron, Gazprom Neft draw attention. Thus, the number of companies operating within the KRG reflects the magnitude of interest in the region. In addition to these, it can be observed that the energy, oil and gas, construction, contracting and infrastructure companies of countries such as Turkey, U.S., Canada, U.K., Norway, UAE, China, India, South Korea, Spain, France, Hungary, Moldova, Austria, Cyprus, and Australia. "Iraq's Oil-Rich Kurds Move Steadily Toward Independence", *United Press International (UPI)*, 26 September 2013**;** "Iraq and the Kurds: The High-Stakes Hydrocarbons Gambit", *International Crisis Group,* 19 April 2012; Kate Leuba, "Exxon's Role in Iraq-Kurdistan Relations", *The American University of Cairo***,** 11 July 2014; Serhat Erkmen, "Türkiye-Kuzey Irak-ExxonMobil: Ne Getirir Ne Götürür?", *ORSAM,* 16 May 2013.

[29] In the agreement made with ExxonMobil, half of the fields (Kara İncir, Başika ve El Kuş) were within the borders of Kirkuk and Mosul, which are disputed territories. In addition to conducting contracts for energy resources within its own borders, by conducting contracts covering disputed territories the KRG indicated that these areas were *de facto* converted to their favor.

[30] "Baghdad Sanctions Kurdish Oil Exports", *United Press International (UPI),* 11 May 2009; Andrew E. Kramer, "Iraq Criticizes Exxon Mobil on Kurdistan Oil Pursuits", *The New York Times*, 12 November 2011; "Iraq Considering Sanctions Against Exxon- Shahristani", *Reuters,* 22 November 2011.

[31] Baghdad and Erbil developed discourse on the basis of Articles 111, 112, and 121 of the Constitution and used this to legitimize their actions. As a result of this, the KRG and the central administration interpreted matters relating to the ownership of energy resources, contracting, authority boundaries, exports, revenues and control, which are listed in the Constitution. The related Articles in the 15 November 2005 Iraq Constitution are as follows: Article 111: *"The oil and natural gas found in Iraq is the property of all Iraqi people living in various regions and provinces."* Article 121, paragraph 1: *"The regional powers shall have the right to exercise executive, legislative, sand judicial powers in accordance with this Constitution, except for those authorities stipulated in the exclusive authorities of the federal government."* Article 112, paragraph 1: *"The federal government, with the producing governorates and regional governments, shall undertake the management of oil and gas extracted from present fields provided that it distributes its revenues in a fair manner in proportion to the population distribution in all parts of the country, specifying an allotment for a specified period for the damaged regions which were unjustly deprived of them by the former regime, and the regions that were damaged afterwards in a way that ensures balanced development in different areas of the country, and this shall be regulated by a law."* Article 112, paragraph 2: *"The federal government, with the producing regional and governate governments, shall together formulate the necessary strategic policies to develop the oil and gas wealth in a way that achieves the highest benefit to the IRaqi people using the most advanced techniques of the market principles and encouraging investment."* See; "Irak Anayasası", *ORSAM*, 21 published in the 401 issue of the Official Gazette of the Republic of Iraq

tankers in Ceyhan, in 2014, the Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki cut the KRG's 17% budget share and did not pay the salaries of civil servants.[32]

In addition to this, once the KRG began to pump oil from the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik Pipeline to Ceyhan in May 2014, relations between the two sides took a different course. Following this, despite the fact that both sides came to an agreement on oil exports and on the budget of the KRG, disputes continued due to the fact that both sides accused each other of failing to fulfill mutual commitments.[33] There were serious statements made in regards to Baghdad leaving the KRG in a difficult position in terms of the budget issue; the KRG's Deputy Minister of Finance, Rabar Sidig argued that the KRG was not treated fairly and that the Iraqi central government did not pay 70 billion Iraqi dinars to the KRG between 2005-2016.[34] It was also argued that this was a political choice of the central Iraqi government in order to prevent any possibility of the KRG gaining power and to prevent the KRG from pursuing independence policies.

In addition to the independent foreign policy pursued by the KRG, its projects in the field of energy also made it an important regional and international ally. The KRG made important agreements in the development, exploration, production, and exportation of oil and natural gas reserves, which were made on a level clearly observed by other states. This policy adopted by the KRG was a mere use of energy in its state-building process and as a tool to end its search for economic autonomy and sovereignty.[35] The fact that energy was an important tool for both the regional and global equilibrium was undoubtedly the biggest factor that accelerated this process.

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[32] "Erbil'e 10 Milyar Dolar!", *Rudaw*, 28 August 2016.

[33] In an agreement made with the Iraqi central government in late 2014, Baghdad agreed to re-pay Erbil's budget share in exchange for 550,000 barrels of oil per day, including to and from Kirkuk, to Iraq's Oil Agency. However, after a couple of months, the KRG stated that the agreement had not been fulfilled, and therefore from mid-2015 onwards, began direct oil exports. The parties later came together again and tried to reach an agreement. "Erbil'e 10 Milyar Dolar!", *Rudaw,* 28 August 2016.

[34] Hevidar Ahmed, "KRG: Kurdistan's Economic Conditions Will Improve in 2017", *Rudaw,* 13 January 2017.

[35] (M.Ş.Dilek, "Irak Kürtlerinin Siyasi ve Ekonomik Beklentileri: Güç ve Siyasal Yapı", (Unpublished PhD thesis, Marmara University, 2017).

The Search for an Exit from the Crisis and the Road to the Referendum

In 2014, the KRG faced the issue of providing socio-economic governance to the 1.8 million people who escaped from the chaos and war that emerged with the Daesh threat. The fact that oil prices decreased during this period led the KRG to a financial crisis. Being defined as an economic *tsunami,* this situation not only stopped the projection of public investments and many other big projects, but also increased the rates of unemployment. Thus, the economic growth and prosperity of the regional government was seriously shaken.[36] In addition to the problems that the KRG was already facing, the fact that its budget share was not paid, left the KRG in a helpless position in which it could not pay the salaries of its civil servants. Due to the deduction of its budget share and its security problems, the KRG's GDP growth decreased by 49.5 percent between 2013-2014. While government revenues constituted 87 percent of GDP in 2013, this figure dropped to 38 percent in 2014. In addition, while the unemployment rate was 6.5 percent in 2013, this increased to around 13.5 percent in 2015.[37]

In order to overcome its economic crisis, the KRG tried to control economic resources in the disputed territories. Due to the fact that the referendum had not taken place, the question of who controlled these territories remained unclear. This non-clarity in regards to the governance of the disputed territories brought the central Iraqi government and the KRG opposite each other many times, even on military terms.[38] The disputed territories, which include Kirkuk, were of a highly sensitive issue due to both their high economic resources and also due to the fact that they account up to 10-12 percent of Iraq's geography, which makes them of strategic importance. The disputed territories have a population of 5.3

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[36] "Economic 'Tsunami' Undermines War Against Islamic State in Iraq-Kurdish Deputy PM", *Reuters,* 16 January 2016; Athanasios Manis, "Averting an Economic Meltdown in the KRI: Aligning Political Objectives with Economic Necessities", *Middle East Research Institute (MERI),* 17 July 2016.

[37] This information has been retrieved from research conducted by the KRG's Ministry of Labor, which was also backed by the U.S. RAND Corporation research company. See; "Tens of Thousands Unemployed in Kurdistan Due to Economic Slump", *Rudaw,* 5 October 2016.

[38] As is known, after the U.S. invasion, the central government and the KRG did not reach a consensus in Iraq. The provinces of Kirkuk, Mosul, Diyala and Salahaddin and some of the towns connected to them were defined as disputed territories in the Constitution and a referendum was envisaged until the end of 2007 in accordance with Article 140 of the Federal Constitution. Robin M. Mills, "Northern Iraq's Oil Chessboard: Energy, Politics and Power", *Insight Turkey,* Vol.5, No.1, (Winter 2013), p. 2-5; Bilgay Duman, "Irak'ta Ordu-Peşmerge Kapışması", *ORSAM,* 22 November 2012.

million, which is greater than the population of the Netherlands, and are spread across 40.000km^2 of land, which is four times the size of Lebanon. Therefore, if the disputed territories were to be included within the scope of the KRG, this would mean that the KRG would double its size.[39]

One of the biggest handicaps of the KRG was that despite its political and military autonomy, it remained economically dependent on the central government of Iraq. Due to the fact that 95% of its economic structure was dependent on oil exports, the KRG's trade rested solely on exports, which made it reflective of a classic rent-seeking state.[40] In addition to its classic rent-seeking economic structure, the KRG was also at further disadvantage in comparison to other rent-seeking states. This is because the KRG could not control its natural resources and remained dependent on the budget revenues that it receives from Baghdad. The government in Baghdad also used the budget issue as a means of punishment and utilized this method from time to time.

When assessing the issue of disputed territories, it can be observed that these territories have the potential to directly influence and affect the political and administrative structure of Iraq. The following reasons can be listed as the reasons why a solution could not be reached in regards to the disputed territories:[41] a) Baghdad approached the matter of disputed territories with caution due to their economic and geographic importance, b) the concerns that the KRG would be economically and politically independent from the central administration if they were to gain control of the disputed territories, and c) fear that the situation that covers most of the Kurdish population will bring Kurds closer to the idea of nationalization as an ethnic and geographic region. Within the disputed territories,

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[39] Following the Daesh attacks, the disputed territories were under the *de facto* control of the KRG and this increased the amount of land under the KRG's control by 30 thousand km^2. This meant that the KRG was ruling 71 thousand km^2 of the 78 thousand km^2 area that it claimed against the Iraqi central government. Salih Bilici ve Muhammet Kurşun, "Irak Kürt Bölgesel Yönetimi Topraklarını Genişletti", *AA,* 18 Mart 2016; "The People of the Kurdistan Region", *Kurdistan Regional Government*, http://www.gov.krd/p/p.aspx?l=12&p=214 (10 June 2017), Following the 25 September independence referendum, with the military interventions of the Baghdad regime, the KRG lost Kirkuk and other territories that it had gained from Daesh and retreated to its 2005 borders. Renad Mansour, "The Kurdish Referendum Backfired Badly. Here's Why", *Washington Post*, 25 November 2017

[40] For rent-seeking states, see; Hossein Mahdavy, "The Patterns and Problems of Economic Development in Rentier States: The Case Of Iran", M. A. Cook (Ed.) in *Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 37-61; Hazem Beblawi, "The Rentier State in the Arab World", Giacomo Luciani (Ed.) in *The Arab State*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), p. 85-98; Hazem Beblawi ve Giacomo Luciani, *The Rentier State, (*London: Croom Helm, 1987); Michael L. Ross, "Does Oil Hinder Democracy?", *World Politics,* Vol.53, No.3, (2001).

[41] Bayhan, *Irak Kürtlerinin Yönetimsel Arayışı ve Federalizm Seçeneği: Tarihsel ve Teorik Bir Analiz*, p. 304.

Kirkuk has a significant political, economic, and demographic strategic importance. While on the one hand Kirkuk is strategically important due to its oil and natural resources reserves, it is also important because it has the potential to cause destabilization due to the different ethnic and tribal communities that live there. Another issue was the great advantage of the KRG armed forces under the federal administration after Daesh attacks. After these attacks, the KRG's military capacity and armed forces began to fill the security gap in the disputed territories and came to the forefront on an international scale. This was to the extent that a military protocol was signed between the U.S. and the KRG in regards to the Peshmerga's role in eliminating Daesh from Mosul.[42] Due to western states providing military equipment and aid supplies to the Peshmerga, the KRG reduced itself to an illusion that it was a self-contained power. The funds, equipment and support the KRG's military power received from international actors was perceived as an important strategic asset in terms of international legitimacy. More, it was believed that this would lead the way to international support if there was ever going to be an independent Kurdish state.

A Strategic Dead-End: 25 September Independence Referendum and a Return to the Past

As stated above, the financial crisis experienced by the KRG, the issue of socioeconomic governance as well as ongoing political tensions, and the external support they received from international actors pushed them to a position in quest for a search for a status. The international political and diplomatic legitimacy the Kurds received in their fight against Daesh and the military support they received became an important factor. By utilizing their capacities and by taking advantage of the opportunity gap, Kurds took control of the disputed territories. The control of the rich energy resources in these regions brought a new equation and the KRG moved beyond the use of the independence discourse as a mere political instrument. This equation further strengthened the position of separation.[43] With this therefore, by taking into account the domestic balances of the KRG, the dynamics of Iraq and the greater Middle East, the President of the Iraqi Kurdistan

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[42] "Protokolekî Leşkerî di Navbera Hewlêrê û Washingtonê de tê Îmze Kirin", *Basnews,* 12 July 2016; "US to Provide Direct Military and Financial Support to Peshmerga", *Rudaw,* 12 July 2016.

[43] Ofra Bengio, "The Islamic State: A Catalyst for Kurdish Nation Building", *Tel Aviv Notes*, Vol.8, No.18, (2014); Gareth Stansfield, "Kurdistan Rising: To Acknowledge or Ignore the Unraveling of Iraq", *Middle East Memo***,** No.33, (July 2014).

Region, Masoud Barzani, went to take advantage of an opportunity that he believed would never rise again.

The Barzani-led KRG evaluated this environment more than just political discourse and the ambition to hold a referendum. Rather, they believed that it was an opportunity for strategic maneuver. Although the referendum didn't account for complete independence, it was the necessary visa required to pursue this path.[44] By emphasizing that Kurds were at a time in which they would never be so close to their ambition for an independent status, Masoud Barzani not only officially announced that the referendum would be held on 25 September, 2017, but also announced that the disputed territories will also be included in this referendum.[45] During a time in which Kurds were at a critical stage in their wonders for a future, it was of great importance for their leaders to make rational decisions. However, the leaders failed in doing this as they were in the illusion that the regional and international conditions were in their favor. Thus, by assuming that if the disputed territories were included in the referendum, that they could use this against Baghdad on the negotiating table and become the stronger side, the KRG administration intended to negotiate fiercely.

The chaotic environment in the Middle East, the security gap in Iraq, the military and political support that the KRG had received in its fight against Daesh, and the investment and trade relations that the KRG formed due to its energy resources were all factors that led the KRG to believe that an independence referendum would receive acceptance by international actors. However, by holding this referendum without the agreement or permission from the international community and without achieving sustainability within the KRG, the independence referendum step brought with it many risks. Regional and international actors that defended the territorial integrity of Iraq either supported Baghdad's military

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[44] In a panel he attended on 21 June, 2017, Senior Assistant to KRG President Masoud Barzani, Hemin Hawrami, stated that independence is not a a dream but a strategy. "IKBY'de Bağımsızlık Arayışı", *SETA Panel*, 21 June 2017; Serhat Erkmen, "IKBY'nin Referandum Kararı ve Irak'ın Geleceği", *AA,* 23 Haziran 2017; Abdullah Kıran, "Bağımsızlık Referandumu", *Serbestiyet,* 14 June 2016.

[45] Apart from the Kurdistan Islamic Group, the following parties attended the meeting that was held in the Piran district of Erbil under the chairmanship of President Masoud Barzani: "Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), Kurdistan Islamic Union (Yekgırtu), Kurdistan Islamic Movement Party (Bızutnewe), Kurdistan Socialist Democratic Party (KDSP) Kurdistan Toilers' Party (Zehmetkeşan), Kurdistan Communist Party, Kurdistan Toilers and Workers Party, Kurdistan Development and Reform Party, Erbil Turkmen List, Iraqi Turkmen Front, Turkmen Development Party, Armenian List in Kurdistan Parliament, Assyrian Democratic Movement, Assyrian Chaldean Popular Council. For more information see; "25ê Îlonê Roja Referanduma Serxwebûnê Ye", *Rudaw,* 7 June 2017.

interventions or turned a blind eye to them. This situation failed the expectations of the Kurds. The 25 September independence referendum, which was held under the direct opposition of regional actors and the uncertain attitudes of global actors, resulted in the loss of the achievements that the KRG had accumulated until then.[46] This referendum was also a dead-end for Masoud Barzani, as it ended his political life in the KRG.

While acceptance of the referendum process was at the forefront in society, the political response was not very strong. There were deep political disagreements between the KDP and PUK and the KDP and the Goran Movement. The decision to go to an independence referendum was given at a time when economic and political disputes had not been resolved. This involves the economic crisis due to the cuts in the budget, the drop of oil prices, the inability to pay civil servant wages, the decrease of public expenditure, and the suspension of important projects. On the political side, there were issues such as the fact that parliament had shut down, the speaker of the parliament couldn't enter Erbil, the fact that Masoud Barzani was continuing to rule despite his term ending in 2015, and finally, the postponement of the parliamentary and presidential elections that were decided to take place in November 2017.[47]

External actors (especially Tehran and Baghdad) used this opportunity to become closer with parties within the KRG, which were experiencing internal political struggles due to historical contradictions. In this period, the KRG's relationship with Iran and Baghdad, the regional support that Baghdad received and the decision of the U.S. administration to remain silent on the issue were all critical factors that decided upon the fate of the Kurds. Due to the fact that there was no strong political unity within the KRG, the interference of external factors further deepened the political disintegration among the Kurds. As a consequence of the PUK's strategic relationship with Iran and the agreements it reached with Baghdad, the KRG lost the governance of Kirkuk and other disputed areas. In addition to this, Baghdad stopped flights to the KRG, demanded the transfer of border crossings and imposed sanctions. The biggest fiasco and defeat for the Kurds in this process was their over-confidence in external support and their military capacity. Most particularly, questions were raised about the Peshmerga

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[46] Dilek, *Irak Kürtlerinin Siyasi ve Ekonomik Beklentileri: Güç ve Siyasal Yapı*, s.271.

[47] Ibid, s.286.

after the Daesh attacks. While the Kurds fortified their power in the political and economic spheres, the Peshmerga failed to reform and to become a professional army serving under the roof of a regional administration and not under the roof of a political party. A military force acting under the control of the political parties in a period when Kurds were focused on independence meant a great risk.[48] Indeed, the fact that the Peshmerga were affiliated with a political party rather than a national belonging led to an escalation of party interests and policies instead of national interests. This not only pushed the KRG into a weaker political position but also left them weak in face of an intervention. For this reason, the 25 September independence referendum has been recorded as a tragedy in the eyes of Iraqi Kurds.

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[48] Ibid, s.269.

Conclusion

Following the U.S. invasion of Iraq, by playing a role in the re-construction of the state and by pursuing a foreign policy independent of the central government, the Iraqi Kurds differentiated themselves and provided serious incentives to international energy companies in terms of investment. The agreements signed by international energy companies on the exploration and production of natural resources of the KRG were at a scope only experienced on a state level. The basis of these initiatives pursued by the KRG was to be able to use their rich energy resources to accumulate further economic autonomy and political power. In this process, by producing opportunities that derived from the security gap in the Middle East, the Iraqi Kurds used the Daesh threat in order to gain legitimacy on an international level. However, the political and economic steps taken by the KRG were perceived as a risk and threat by Baghdad. As emphasized in this article, the independence-oriented policies of the Kurds and the centralization-oriented policies of the Baghdad regime brought the parties in direct confrontation both politically and military. In particular, the fact that the KRG not only used oil as an energy source for economic development, but also as a bargaining element in the political arena, further escalated tensions between Baghdad and Erbil. Hence, with this strategy the KRG aimed to promote its state/nation-building process through the use of energy resources and to promote a possible independence through diplomatic legitimacy and international recognition.

Although the referendum in search for a future had multifaceted, multidimensional, and uncontrolled factors, the KRG failed to read the effects of the post-referendum process and were not prepared for the risks that were likely to occur. The fact that the KRG decided to hold an independence referendum during a time in which profound internal political divisions existed and at a time when they were extremely dependent on oil revenues has been a major strategic mistake. The biggest expectation of the Kurds was the military and political support they believed they would receive from international actors. However, at a time when the scope of Daesh's influence was decreasing in the Middle East, the U.S. prioritized the territorial integrity of Iraq. Many other Western states also decided to remain silent on the issue. Due to their sensitivity of the territorial integrity of Iraq and the effect that the independence referendum would have on the unitary structure of the country, powerful regional actors such as Turkey and Iran

supported Baghdad. The fact that international and regional actors either gave tacit consent or remained silent on the issue made it easier for Baghdad to intervene.

In conclusion, the fact that the independence referendum was held without achieving political unity among the Kurds, without comforting the worries of regional actors, and most importantly, without receiving the consent of the U.S., led to the failure of the 25 September independence referendum. As a consequence of this, the Kurds lost all achievements they had maintained up until then. The direct and indirect opposition of the majority of regional and international actors after the referendum created new uncertainties for Kurds. As a result, the approach of regional and international actors eliminated the possibility of Kurds to realize their demands of the future in the short-term. From the perspective of both regional and international actors, their decision to stand against the referendum was due to the instability and uncertainty that would arise in the Middle East as a result of the division of Iraq. More, they also wanted to block the possible emergence and strengthening of non-state armed actors in this environment. A final point that must be underlined is that it has become clear that in order for a possible Kurdish state to survive, it needs to receive the support of a strong international actor and receive protection from a regional actor. Within this context therefore, for the time being, the international system does not want the Kurdish quest for a future to evolve into expectations of independence, as this comes with further political and economic expectations. International actors that opposed the KRG's 25 September independence referendum not on principal but simply because of time and context point exactly to this.

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ORTADOĞU ETÜTLERİ MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES

Syria Under al-Assad Rule: A Case of Neopatrimonial Regime

Abstract

This paper aims to conceptualize the Syrian regime under the rule of Hafez and Bashar al-Assad (1970-2011) as a neopatrimonial regime. The paper claims that the neopatrimonial domination of the Assad regime bases on three pillars; the personalization of the regime, the patronage networks and the clientelism. Under the subtitle of personalization the Syrian regime, the paper tries to lay down the historical process and mechanisms used to personalized the regime under Hafez and Bashar al-Assad, through using the personal clique and the imposed personal cult. Following, the paper figures out the dual patronage networks that the Assad regime has utilized to consolidate his personal domination through penetrate the bureaucratic realm and the society; the Alawite patronage and the Baath Party patronage. In the same context, the paper evaluates the clientelism as another mechanism functions in the patrimonial penetration processes, mainly in the economic domain, and the changes that took place in this regard under Bashar al-Assad's rule.

Keywords: Assad Regime, Neopatrimonialism, Political Cult, Patronage Relations, Clientalism

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"NEOPATRİMONYAL BİR REJİM ÖRNEĞİ: ESED YÖNETİMİNDEKİ SURİYE"

Öz

Bu makale, Hafez ve Başar Esed yönetimindeki Suriye rejimini (1970-2011) neo-patrimonyal bir rejim olarak kavramlaştırmayı amaçlamaktadır. Makale, Esad reji-minin neopatrimonyal egemenliğinin üç sütün üzerine kurulu olduğunu iddia ediyor; rejimin kişiselleştirilmesi, patronaj ağları ve klientalizm. Esed yönetiminin kişiselleştirilmesi alt başlığı altında makale, Hafez ve Başar Esed'in yönetimi süre-cince, kişisel klik ve empoze edilen kişisel kült üzerinden rejimin kişiselleştirilme-sinin tarihi sürecini ve kullanılan mekanizmaları incelemeye çalışmaktadır. Bundan sonra makale, Esed rejiminin bürokratik ve toplumsal alanlarına nüfuz ederek ta-hakkümünü sağlamlaştırmak için başvurduğu ikili patronaj ağları ortaya koymakta; Alevi ve Baas Partisi'nin patronaj ağları. Aynı bağlamda makale, başta ekonomik alanda olmak üzere, patrimonyal tahakkümü ve nüfuz etme süreci için kullanılan klientalism mekanizelerini ve bu mekanizmalarının Başar Esed'in yönetiminde ge-çirdiği değişikleri değerlendirmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Esed rejimi, Neopatrimonyalizm, Siyasi Kült, Patronaj İlişkileri, Klientalism

سوريا تحت حكم الأسد: مثال عن الأنظمة الباترومونية الجديدة

ملخص

تهدف هذه المقالة إلى تأطير النظام السوري مفاهيمياً تحت حكم حافظ وبشار الأسد (1970–2011) كنظام باترموني جديد. حيث تدعي المقالة أن نظام الأسد يستند على ثلاثة دعائم رئيسية: شخصنة النظام، شبكات الحماية والمحسوبية والزبائنية السياسية. تحت عنوان شخصنة للنظام السوري، تحاول المقالة تحليل السياق التاريخي والآليات المستخدمة لشخصنة النظام في عهد حافظ وبشار الأسد، وذلك بالاعتماد على دور الزمرة الشخصية وفرض عبادة الشخصية السياسية للأسد. بعد ذلك، تستعرض الورقة شبكات الحماية والمحسوبية المزدوجة التي استخدمها نظام الأسد لتوطيد هيمنته الشخصية من خلال اختراق المجال البيروقراطي والمجتمع: شبكات الحماية والمحسوبية العلوية من جهة والحزبية لحزب البعث من جهة أخرى. في السياق نفسه، تقوم الورقة بتقييم الزبائنية السياسية كآلية آلية أخرى في عمليات الاختراق الباتروموني، خاصة في المجال الاقتصادي، والتغييرات التي جرت في هذا الشأن في ظل حكم بشار الأسد.

كلمات مفتاحية: نظام الأسد، الباترومونية الجديدة، شبكات الحماية والمحسوبية، الزبائنية السياسية.

The Syrian regime under Hafez and his son Bashar al-Assad (1970-2011), which consolidated itself through a long historical process, enjoys several features which make it best to be described as a neopatrimonial regime. The founder of this neopatrimoanial regime is without doubt Hafez al-Assad[1], who grabbed the power after a series of intra junta purges ending with the 1970 coup. The regime whose milestones and domination mechanism was laid down by al-Assad the father, was smoothly handed to his son Bashar, who succeeded to power following his father's death. Bashar has continued to rule through the neopatrimonial mechanisms.

The neopatrimonial typology is a modern adaptation of Weberian patrimonial ruling type, which belongs to the realm of authoritarian regimes. It represents a mixture of two types of domination that co-exist: namely, patrimonial and legal-rational bureaucratic domination. The neopatrimonialism takes place when the patrimonial relation penetrates the bureaucratic domain, through the mechanisms of patronage and clientelism in aim to control it in the interest of the patrimon. Thus, clientelism and patronage relations are sine qua non for realizing the neo-patrimonialism.

Weber had mentioned patrimonialism as one of three pure types of domination, emphasizing the role of personal rule in this type of domination[2]. Later Eisenstadt[3] modifies the concept to include both Weberian traditional patrimonialism and 'neo' rational-bureaucratic domination. Peter Pawelka[4] argues that there would be two bases of legitimization of neopatrimonial regimes. In additional to the traditional loyalty (like heritage), Pawelka argued for the martial reward (allocation of jobs and grants ...etc.) are bases for legitimization of neopatrimonial regimes. This argument has paved the way for other scholars like Medard[5], Bratton & Van de Walle[6], Gero

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[1] In this paper, *al-Assad* will be used, as it is pronounced in the Arabic origin, to refer to the name of the family, hence, Hafez al-Assad, Bashar al-Assad, al-Assad Family, will be written as such. However, in consistent with the general usage in the academia and media, *The Assad regime* will be used to refer to the regime of Hafez and Bashar al-Assad.

[2] Guenther Roth and Ckus Wittich (ed.), *Max Weber, Economy and Society; An outline of Interpretive Sociology.* (Berkeley, Calfornia, USA: University of California Press,1978).

[3] Samuel N. Eisenstadt, *Traditional Patrimonialism and Modern Neopatrominialism.* (London: Sage Publication,1973)

[4] Peter Pawelka, *Herrschaft und Entwicklung im Nahen Osten: Ägypten.* (Heidelberg: C.F.Müller: 1985)

[5] Jean Francois Medard, "Patrimonialism, Neo-patrimonialism and the Study of the Post-colonial State in Subsaharian Africa", *International Development Studies* No. 17 (1996): 76-97.

[6] Michael Bratton & Nicholas Van de Walle. *Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective.* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

Erdmann & Ulf Engel[7], and Bach[8], to address the role of clientelism and patronage relations in constructing neopatrimonial regimes. Thus, in addition to the personal patrimonial power, clientelism and patronage started to be seen as a *sine qua non* for the neopatrimonial regimes through which patrimonial power is able to penetrate the state and the society and thereby maintain its personal control.

In the core of Assad's neopatrimonial domination exists the role of the patrimonialism, which implies the personalization of the regime and the state's apparatus altogether. This patrimonialism was constructed and consolidated through the personal control of the security apparatus by appealing to the inner circle of security elites and officials, who formed a loyal clique around al-Assad. And with the constructing of Assad's personal cult, through cultish rituals, which have been regarded as a proof of loyalty to the patron.

The second milestone of Assad's neopatrimonial regime was the role of patronage relations and networks. The patronage relations although associated closely with clientelism, differs in its operating methods and structure. The patronage relation is a vertical one, in which the patron sits on the top of the chain. It applies to high-politics targeting a social group. These patronage relations and networks have been realized in the neopatrimonial Assad regime through Alawite patronage and Baath Party Patronage.

On the other hand, clientelism, which represents the third milestone of the neopatrimonial Assad regime, implies a dyadic relationship between the individual, who in this situation is the client, and the patron who is the ruler. Thus, the relation is horizontal when comparing to the vertical structure of the patronage relations. It is also an open and transitive relation applying to everyone from the society, so being a client is a potentiality for every citizen, who in his turn could be a patron for other citizens. In contrast, patronage relations seem to be narrower and enjoyed by one social or political group. The clientelism in the Syrian case has existed side by side with patronage relations. However, it was manifested more in the economic domain, which was organized through clientelism, at least in Hafez al-Assad's time.

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[7] Gero Erdmann & Ulf Engel. "Neopatrimonialism Revisited: Beyond a Catch-All Concept". *GIGA Working Paper,* No. 16 (2006),

[8] Daniel C. Bach. "Patrimonialism and Neopatrimonialism: Comparative Trajectories and Readings", *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics,* 49, No. 3 (2011): 275–294.

The Shortages of other Conceptualizations

Plenty of conceptualizations and theoretical frameworks have been applied to analyze the Assad regime. Agreeing on the role of Assad's personalism and the authoritarian aspect of the regime, scholars have offered various approaches either prioritizing or undermining the role of one of the regime's components. Some have focused on the role of the Baath Party and the populist aspect of the regime, others have shed light on the role of the Alawite community and sectarian politics in the consolidation of Assad's regime.

One of the scholars known to study the Syrian regime is Nikolas Van Dam. Van Dam, who prioritized the role of the Alawite community, argues in his famous book The Struggle for Power in Syria that the Assad regime is under 'Alawite dominated Baath Rule'[9]. A nearly identical viewpoint is endorsed by Eyal Zisser, who claims that Assad's regime has a clear sectarian nature and depends on the support of the Alawite community,[10] the nature which Zisser argues to be the reason behinds the regimes success and survival. Yet, Zisser himself said later that one of the main factors of Assad's success in ruling Syria is the composition of the ruling coalition, under which he even argues that the Assad regime [Hafez al-Assad] 'successfully reflected a coalition of social and political forces that represented most of Syrian society'[11]. Even Van Dam seems to revise this claim regarding the Alawite domination in his later book,[12] by arguing that there was an overlapping between the sectarian and social background which might affect the perception that the Assad regime was prioritizing and recruiting intensively from the Alawite's community.

Raymond Hinnebusch, a well-known scholar in Syrian Studies, argues that the key concept which gives the most adequate insight into the rise, durability and nature of the Baa'th's role is authoritarian-populism.[13] However, the labelling of the Syrian regime as 'authoritarian-populist' seems to undermine other factors like the over-representation of the Alawite community in the security apparatuses under the Syrian regime. It seems that the rule of the minority, in consolidating the Assad

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[9] Nikolas Van Dam, *The Struggle for Power in Syria.* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2011).

[10] Eyal Zisser, *Asad's Legacy: Syria in Transition* .(London: C. Hurst & Co, 2001)

[11] Eyal Zisser, *Companding Syria: Bashar Al-Asad and the First Years in Power* (London: I. B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2007), s. 9.

[12] Nikolas Van Dam, *Destroying a Nation, The Civil War in Syria* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2017).

[13] Raymond A. Hinnebusch, *Authoritarian Power and State Formation in Ba'thist Syria* (Boulder: Westview Press., 1990), s. 1-2.

regime (Alawite community in Syria) was neglected by Hinnebusch. His argument does not address the point that the dominant class with which the post-1963 regime in Syria aimed to establish an authority autonomous from is the previously dominant Sunni class, which constitutes the majority of the Syrian population, is the Alawite denomination. In other words, this means that the Baath regime, either willingly or not, launched a silent confrontation against the Sunni dominant political elite, who existed mainly in the major Syrian urban cities. As Ziyadeh argues, '[after 1966], this was chapter in which the countryside predominated over the city, the minority over a fragile mix between the majority and the minorities'[14]. This shifting in the ruling elite in Syria resulted in social dynamics that came with a sectarian flavor, which started to arise in the Syrian society in the form of more fragmentation and social clashing. Moreover, the populist-authoritarian typology supposes that the aim of the regime is to establish a strong autonomous state, yet it does not address the personal motivation behind the consolidation of the state and its apparatus. Furthermore, these populist policies retreated after Bashar seized power in 2000, whereby Bashar has launched a campaign to liberalize the economy and to adopt a more open market economy.[15]

Hinnebusch, referring to Heydemann's conceptualization of 'authoritarianism upgrading'[16] (AU), has elaborated the change in the authoritarian regime by arguing that 'the underlying deep change was a movement from an originally populist form of authoritarianism to "post-populist" (neo-liberal versions)', Hinnebusch defines 'post-populism' as a 'strategic shift in the political economy of regimes towards including new crony capitalists and excluding regimes' former populist constituencies'.[17] Hinnebusch applies the idea of AU in Syria during Bashar's era through what he calls post-populism authoritarianism (PPA).[18]

Although these arguments of AU and PPA address the changes in the Assad regime and other similar cases, they focus on the politico-economic and external factors behind these changes, while seem to undermine the self-driven dimension

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[14] Radwan Ziadeh, *Power and Policy in Syria.* (New York: I.B. Tauris 2011), s. 12.

[15] Muhammed Jamal Barout, *al-Aked al-Akhir fi Tarih Suriye, Jadalyet al-Jumoud w'al-Islah* (Beirut: Arab Center for Reseacrh & Policy Studies, 2012), s. 58-59.

[16] Steven Heydemann. "Upgrading Authoritarianism in the Arab World" *Analysis Paper, the Saban Forum for Middle East Policy, The Brooking Institution*, No. 39 (2007).

[17] Raymond Hinnebusch, "Authoritarian Resilience and the Arab Uprising: Syria in Comparative Perspective" *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 7, No. 1, (July, 2015): s. 19.

[18] Ibid, 26.

of the neo-patrimonial domination. Following its patrimonialization of the political and the social domains, neo-patrimonial domination continues to expand by deepening its patrimonial power vertically and spreading its control horizontally via its clients. Thereby, it should not be expected that neo-patrimonial domination should stop its expansion and refrain from penetrating the economic society. Patrimonializing the economic society would also be demanded by the patron's clients as well, who would search for new sources of revenue through liberalization of the economy and the economic public sector.

On the other hand, some academics went further to argue that the Syrian regime, mainly under Hafiz al-Assad, has represented an example of a sultanistic regime[19], however, examining the characteristics of the Syrian regime reveals that despite its sultanistic features, like personalism, it has failed to represent a fully sultanistic regime.

The complexity of the Syrian regime was admitted by Hinnebusch, who argued, that 'In the Syrian case, the outcome is, in fact, typically ambiguous' adding that 'despite attaining a certain ideological legitimacy, the failure to establish a cohesive center led to resort to patrimonial techniques resulting in Presidential Monarchy which shares power with military and bureaucratic elites and party institution'.[20]Thus, it seems that the patrimonial characteristic that Syrian regime enjoys has forced Hinnebusch himself to later label the regime as 'partly bureaucratic, partly patrimonial: a virtual "Presidential Monarchy."'[21] Volker Perthes in his book 'The Political Economy of Syria under Assad', also argues that the 'personal role of Assad has been secured by the deliberate employment of patrimonial instruments such as, personal loyalty and patronage'. He also emphasizes the role of clientelistic networks[22].

The mixed regime which Hinnebusch and Perthes argues to be the case in Syria, is almost the same that Erdmann and Engel argued to exist in the neopatrimonial regime, in which patrimonial domination coexists with bureaucratic domination[23].

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[19] Alan Siaroff, *Comparing Political Regimes, a Thematic Introduction to Comperative Politics,* (Canada: Broadview Press, 2005), s. 215.

[20] Raymond A. Hinnebusch, *Authoritarian Power and State Formation in Ba'thist Syria,* (Boulder: Westview Press., 1990), s.12.

[21] Raymon A. Hinnebusch, *Syria Revolution from Above,* (Oxford: Routledge, 2001), s. 5.

[22] Ibid, s. 180.

[23] Erdmann & Engel, "Neopatrimonialism Revisited: Beyond a Catch-All Concept"

Hence, we can argue that the patrimonialistic characteristic of the Syrian regime has existed from the early beginning. Yet it was not a pure case of patrimonialism, rather a case of neopatrimonialism.

The Neopatrimonialism of the Assad Regime

The neopatrimonialism of the Syrian regime stands on three pillars which characterize the regime under Hafez and Bashar al-Assad; the personalism of the regime through the role of Assad's clique and Assad's cult, the role of patronage relations through Alawite and Baath Party patronage, and the role of clientelist relations.

The Personalization of the Syrian Regime: Suriyet'ul Assad

Personalism of the regime and the state apparatuses lays in the center of patrimonial and neopatrimonial regimes, around which other controlling mechanisms that the patron uses to penetrate the state bureaucracy through patronage and clientelism relations are centralized. Through personalism, domination develops 'an administration and a military force which are purely personal instrument of the master' as Weber argues.[24]

This constructive process of personalized patrimonial power has been in going since Hafez seized power, and continued in his son Bashar's era. It is a complex process in which many social and political factors play a role, yet we can identify two main mechanisms that had been used in the consolidation and embodiment of power in the persona of Assad, the patron; Assad's clique and Assad's cult.

Hafez Assad was able to control the security apparatuses and thus the state altogether and linked it to his own persona through his clique of loyalists. The tight control of the state was assured by close censorship, absolute supervision and the atmosphere of fear secured by the iron fist of the clique controlling the security apparatus. This tightly personalized control of the state went in parallel with the constructing of Assad's cult. Using political symbolism under the sphere of fear, the political cult aimed to construct an emotional connection between the patron and his followers. These mechanisms continue also under his son Bashar's rule. The personalized patrimonial power in Syria, which has been constructed through personalized tight control of the state apparatus spreading fear and building a po-

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[24] Guenther Roth and Ckus Wittich (ed.), *Max Weber, Economy and Society; An outline of Interpretive Sociology.* (Berkeley, Calfornia, USA: University of California Press,1978).

litical cult, resulted in making Syria to be called as, *Suriyet'ul Assad* - Assad's Syria.[25]

Assad's Clique

In the core of Hafez Assad's effort to consolidate his patrimonial personalized power, lays the role of the clique. This clique is a closed group of officials whose loyalty and blind obedience to the patron, Assad, was unquestionable. The clique members, who submitted directly to Assad himself, were responsible of maintaining tight control of the state apparatus and in particular the security apparatuses and the army. Thereby they maintained Assad's personal control.

In general, it could be argued that this clique, which constitutes the inner circle of ruling elite, and which the loyalty to the patron is the sine quo non charactersitc of its members, had comprised mainly of three categories; al-Assad's family members and relatives, who share kinship with al-Assad; loyal security and army elites, many of whom were co-sects or old friends of al-Assad; loyal bureaucrats and statesmen, who were members of the Baath Party. These three categories could be considered as constitutive of hierarchical layers as well.

The first category of clique membership is the family members, whose linkage to the patron is based on kinship relations. One of the early signs of the increasing role of kinship relations in the Syrian regime is exemplified by the remarkable role played by Hafez's al-Assad younger brother Rifaat Assad in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Rifaat was the commander of the Defense Companies (Saraya al-Difaa'), the praetorian guard which played a substantial role during suppressing of the Islamic Insurgency 1979-1982. Another examples were that of Adnan al-Assad, who controlled the 'Struggle Companies' and Gen. Adnan Makhlouf, a cousin of Bashar's mother (Anisah Makhlouf), who commanded the strong, well-equipped Republican Guard.[26]

This kinship relation-based prioritizing intersects with the policy of inheritance, in which patrimonial power is transmitted from the father to the son. In the 1990s, with Hafez al-Assad's illness becoming more severe, the way had been paved for

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[25] *Suriyet'ul Assad* Assad's Syria, is an idiom widely used by al-Assad's loyalists and adopted by the loyal media. The idiom attaches Syria to al-Assad family manifesting the patrimonial and even arguably the sultanistic nature Syria under the Assad regime.

[26] Gary C. Gambill. Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, *"The Assad Family and the Succession in Syria"*. https://www.meforum.org/meib/articles/0007_s2.htm. (accessed May, 1 2018)

his elderly son Basel. Yet Basel passed away in a car accident in 1994, which paved the way to his younger brother Bashar. Not only Basel and Bashar, but also Hafez's third son, Maher, has been playing an important role in the army, particularly in commanding the Syrian Army's elite 5th Brigade.

This role of the first category the clique members continued under Bashar's era. Moreover, arguably the role of the family and kinship relations in forming this clique has increased under Bashar. Many relatives of Bashar outside of his immediate family occupy important positions in the regime. In addition to his brother Maher, who is said to play an important role in the army and particularly as the commander of the Republican Guard and the army's elite Fourth Armored Division, Bashar's brother in law, Assef Shawkat, his sister Bushra's husband, had occupied important positions like the Head of Military Intelligence, Deputy Chief of Staff, and Deputy Minister of Defense until his mysterious death. Another outstanding example was Atef Najib, Bashar's cousin, who was the head of the Political Security Directorate in Daraa, the cradle of the Syrian uprising, and the person who is said to be responsible of the inflammation of the uprising, by his reckless handling of the crisis in its early stages. Furthermore, the role of relatives in Bashar's rule has not been limited to the bureaucratic and security domain, it also extended to the economic domain, as exemplified by the significant role of his cousin Rami Makhlouf.

The second category of the clique membership is the loyal security and army elites. Even though Alawite members were overrepresented in this group, many Sunnis has found their seats in the clique as well. Among this category, we can name Muhammed al-Khuli, the Chief of Air Force Intelligence 1970-1987 and the Chief of Air Force 1994-1999, and Ali Duba, the Chief of the Military Intelligence 1974-2000, who were both Alawites. Non-Alawite members also existed like; Mustapha Talas, Assad's only Defense Minister; Naji Jamil, a Sunni from Dayr al-Zur who commanded the Syrian Air Force from November 1970 until March 1978; and Hikmet al-Shihabi, Assad's Chief of Staff. However, it is important to state here that "officer such as Talas, Jamil [Naji Jamil] and Shakkur [Major General Yusuf Shukkur, a Greek Orthodox Christian, succeeded Mustapha Talas as chief of staff in 1972] were able to exercise considerable power so long as they followed the president's policies"[27].

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[27] Nikolas Van Dam, *The Struggle for Power in Syria, s.* 69

The third category of the clique was comprised of the bureaucrats, or the face of the regime. Here, Sunni officials were represented more. Names like, Abd al-Halim Khaddam, former vice-president, and Faruk ash-Shar, former foreign minister and vice president, Abdullah al-Ahmar, Hafez al-Assad's Assistant Secretary General of the National Command of the Baath Party are among the members of this category. We can add to this category all the Syrian Prime Ministers under Hafez and Bashar who were all Sunnis. However, the power of this category and their weight in the clique is relatively low, simply because their power depends only on the consent of the patron and lack any power base, in contrast to the members of the second category, who are in turn inferior to the members of the first category who are prioritized due to their kinship relations with the patron and their direct access to power.

The clique has shown continuity, as the power structure of the regime (especially during the thirty years of Hafez's role) did not change to a large extent. This continuity means that this clique has also stayed loyal to the patron. In Hafez's time, apart from the instance of Rifat's coup attempt, the clique seems to have maintained its structure. It also continued to function during Bashar's first years, as Zisser argues 'the elite of Assad's era [Hafez al-Assad's era] essentially remained in place during the first years of Bashar's rule[28] and the clique was claimed to have an important role in guaranteeing the smooth transition of power.

The Assad regime was able to guarantee the blind obedience and total submission of the state apparatuses to the patrimonial power through the clique which tightly controlled the security apparatuses. For example, the army and military officers were tamed, firstly by the purges that took place in the regime's early years, and later through close monitoring of the officers through the Military and Air Force Intelligence Directorates which were controlled by clique members who linked directly to the patron. Thus, the army, as well as security apparatus, were fully personalized ending with what Weber had called 'patrimonial troops'. Thereby, they show no hesitation in cracking down on any uprising facing the patrimonial regime, either in the case of the Muslim Brotherhood or in the 2011 uprising.

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[28] Eyal Zisser, *Companding Syria: Bashar Al-Asad and the First Years in Power*, s. 63.

Assad's Cult of Personality

The second main mechanism in securing the personalization of the Syrian regime in the persona of Assad, is the constructing of Assad's political cult. While the role of the clique is limited to guarantee the personalized tight control and supervision of the state apparatus in an iron fist that spread the atmosphere of fear, the political cult was instrumentalized to construct the persona of Assad as the patron of the state in the public domain and ideational realm.

In this process of constructing the image of Assad as the patron of the state, various social and political tools have been used. The controlled media and public domain have been bombed with official and semi-official rhetoric, political symbols, public messages in a state-sponsored ongoing campaign aiming to incarnate the patron, Assad, in the public image.

The politics of symbolism is one of the three dimensions of the ruler's strategies of legitimation in neopatrimonial regimes according to Bank and Richter. In their paper, they define the politics of symbolism as looking at the "immaterial aspects of culture, identity and discourse", adding that "in this way adding new aspects to the classic 'Weberian' categories of charisma and tradition that were already – at least partially – included in the earlier, traditional understanding of neopatrimonialism"[29]. One of the best and rare academicians who address the role of cult and political symbolism in the consolidation of Assad's authority in Syria was Lisa Wedeen, who argues in her book *Ambiguities of Domination: Politics, Rhetoric and Symbols in Contemporary Syria* that "Assad's cult is a strategy of domination based in compliance rather than legitimacy"[30].

The construction of the Assad cult was a long and accumulative process that started from the early years of Hafez Assad's position. Patrick Seale, Assad's biographer, claims that the inventor of Assad's cult was Ahmad Iskandar Ahmad, Assad's Minister of Information 1974-1983.[31] However, Wedeen cited that Yahya Sadowski arguing that the "exaggerated homage of Hafez Assad began within the confines of the popular organizations as part of the party's overall glorification of

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[29] Andre Bank & Thomas Richter, "Neopatrimonialism in the Middle East and North Africa, Overview, Critique and Alternative Conceptualization", *Neopatrimonialism in Various World Regions"*, s. 8.

[30] Lisa Wedeen, *Ambiguities of Domination,* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1999), s. 6.

[31] Patrick Seale, *Asad of Syria, the Struggle for the Middle East.* (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1995), s. 339.

Baathist achievement, and became part of a strategy to rally mass appeal beginning in 1982"[32]. By the 1990s, Assad's cult was clearly manifest in the fact that tens of works have been published in Damascus on the Syrian president, all of them eulogies.[33]

The first statue of Assad in Damascus was erected at the Assad library in 1984. In the following years, the statues of Hafez al-Assad was to be erected in the entrance of almost every Syrian city and in the middle of public parks, while his portrait was to be hanged in every classroom and public office, and on every street corner. Hafez Assad was to become omnipresent. By the mid-1980s, Hafez al-Assad started to be referred to using extreme patrimonial phrases like; *al-Ab al-Kae'd* The Commanding Father[34], and *Sayyed al-Watan* The Lord of the Homeland. Among the other titles that were given to Hafez al-Assad; *al-Rafiq al-Kae'd* The Comrade Commander, *al-Kae'd al-Ramz* The Commanding Symbol, *Batel al-Harb wal-Salam* The Hero of the War and the Peace. This omnipresence interestingly has continued even after his death in 2000, following his death the state media started to call Hafez al-Assad, *al-Ka'ed al-Khalid* The Immortal Leader.

The role mentioned by Sadowski of the popular organizations and the Baath Party in constructing the cult was vital[35]. These organizations were used as channels to impose the patrimonial image on the public, mainly the students, and were instrumentalized to fulfill the rituals of Assad's political cult in the public domain. The fulfillment of Assad's political cult in the public domain was to be realized under the iron fist of the clique-controlled security apparatuses. This iron fist has forced the people either believing in Assad's cult or not to practice it. This situation was described by Wedeen by saying that people were acting 'as if'. For instance, state employees were taken by public buses to the polls to give the *bay'ah*[36] to *al-Ab al-Ka'ed*, and whoever hesitates or opposes would be put under investigation by the security apparatuses. A noteworthy point is that since the mid-1980s, the political motto that dominated the reelection campaigns of Hafez Assad was *'Ila al-Abad Ila al-Abad Ya Hafez al-Assad'* - Forever, Forever, Oh Hafez al-Assad.

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[32] Lisa Wedeen, *Ambiguities of Domination*, s. 33.

[33] Nikolas Van Dam, *The Struggle for Power in Syria*, s. 144.

[34] Yasin Haj Saleh, *Al-Thawra Al-Mustahila*. (Bairut: Al Mu'assase Al-Arabiya Lildirasat Wal-Nasher, 2017), s. 75.

[35] This role which will be discussed in details in the Baath Patronage part.

[36] *Bay'ah* originally an Islamic terminology, means to give the oath of allegiance to a leader. Yet it was used in Syria since mid 1980s to describe the reelection of Assad to presidency.

An important notion to highlight in the process of constructing Assad's cult is that this cult was not limited to his own persona, yet it extended to include other family members. Wedeen has also shed light on this notion. She states that "Assad shares the iconographic landscape with other heroes. Assad's family members, most specifically his mother, his deceased son Basel, his son Bashar ... also appear periodically in the state's symbolic displays"[37]. The construction of the political cult of Hafez al-Assad's family has paved the way for Bashar, to establish his own cult when he proceeded to power. By 1996, laminated pictures, buttons, and other paraphernalia regularly showed Assad flanked by his own sons. Sometimes the three are dressed in military fatigues, signifying that the young doctor, like his dead brother and aging father, has the requisite military fatigues[38]. Thus, the constructing process of Bashar's cult had started even before he took power.

Following Bashar's rise to power, the traditional of the political cult continued to take place in the public life. The image of Assad distributed during the 2007 Arab League Summit in Riyadh was captioned the '*Gaze of the Lions'*. It was displayed in the windows of Syrian cars as a sign of loyalty, and also as a way of gaining privileges such as being exempted from traffic fines. In the same year, during the next referendum, the *"We Love You"* campaign was carried out. It suggested blind loyalty and more closely resembled the propaganda of Hafez Al-Assad's rule. The propaganda was paid for by the close circle of businessmen who became faithful economic sponsors of the Assad family.[39]

The political cult in Syria under both Hafez and Bashar, has been a socially constructed process under the supervision of the state. Thus, it became a kind of official ritual. Students in Hafez's time, through their morning line and after saluting the national flag intonated the daily motto '*bil-Ruh bil-Dam Nafdeek ya Hafez'* 'We sacrifice our souls, our bloods for you Hafez'. In Bashar's time, Hafez was replaced with Bashar, and the motto changed accordingly: '*bil-Ruh bil-Dam Nafdeek ya Bashar'*. This political cult of Assad, will manifest itself after the 2011 uprising by the cultish behavior of Assad's supporters, such as the loyal motto '*al-Assad walla Mnhrek al-Balad'* 'Either Assad or We Will Burn the Country'.

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[37] Lisa Wedeen, *Ambiguities of Dominations,* s. 28.

[38] Ibid, 61.

[39] Malu Halasa, Zaher Omareen & Nawara Mahfoud, (ed.), *Syria Speaks, Art and Culture From the Frontline.* (London: Saqi Books, 2014).

Patronage Politics in Syria

The second pillar of neopatrimonial power in Syria is the role of patronage relations and networks, through which patrimonial power penetrates the state and society and thereby consolidates its domination. The patronage relations establish a hierarchical relationship by definition[40], and organized in vertical measures, which differentiates it from the horizontal clientelist relationships. Hence, we can argue that patronage relations are a step forward from clientelism, in which the networks will be organized hierarchically, while the patron sits on the top of the chain. Another related difference is that the patronage relation is a kind of high-politics dealing with social groups, as opposed to clientelism, which could be limited to two persons. So, to have a patronage relation we need to have a consolidated social group from one side, and a patron on the other, in contrast to the clientelism which constitutes a relationship between two individuals. Yet, patronage relations constitute a kind of asymmetric relationship in favor of the patron.

In the case of the Assad regime, these patronage relations have manifested in Alawite Patronage and Baath Party Patronage, each of which have been organized in a downwards fashion, while the patron take the prime position. Yet arguably, the aim of the Assad regime was never to establish an organic nation, but to control and mobilize the society in a way to serve its neopatrimonial domination.

Alawite Patronage

The Assad regime has depended on patronage relations and networks to consolidate its power. One of the two patronage relationships it has relied on is the Alawite Patronage. Historically, the Alawite community has played a major role in Syrian politics, and particularly after the March 1963 coup which brought the Baath Party to power. The role of the Alawites in politics and mainly under the Assad regime is still a matter of contested analysis and debate. Also, dealing with the Alawite community as a homogenous group holds the risk of generalization.

It would be inaccurate to argue that Hafez al-Assad was the man who brought the Alawites into politics, which was dominated by the army within which the minorities had been overrepresented since the independence of Syrian republic[41].

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[40] Volker Perthes, *The Political Economy of Syria under Asad,* (New Yor: I. B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 1995), s. 181.

[41] Veysel Kurt, "The Role of the Military in Syrian Politics and the 2011 Uprising", *Insight Turkey,* Vol. 18 / No. 2 / 2016, pp. 109-128

Even before the Baath took power, army recruitment from the poorer strata resulted in 65 percent of the noncommissioned officers being Alawite[42]. Hanna Batatu mentions that 'as early as 1955, Colonel Abd'ul Hamid as-Sarraj, chief of the Military Intelligence Bureau, discovered to his surprise that no fewer than 55 % or so of the noncommissioned officers belonged to the Alawi sect[43].

Not surprisingly, Hafez al-Assad had depended on his co-sects in forming his clique of loyalists, which operated as the inner circle of the regime. The patron-client relations between Hafez al-Assad and his inner circle loyalists, did not stop on this level, but this patronage relations and networks extended downwards to become the norm in which the regime recruits loyal officials accordingly. Thus, those inner circle loyalists, had generally depended also on their own co-sects. Hafez al-Assad's brother Rifat command of the Defense Companies is an obvious example, as the praetorian guards said to be dominated by Alawite members. Muhammed Al-Khuli, member of Assad's clique has extended the patronage relations downwards, as Sadowski mentions 'after taking power, Alawites were promoted to command of all military intelligence services, under the careful supervision of Muhammed al-Khuli, an Alawite general'[44].

The Alawites did not become a 'dominant minority' nor did the Assad regime become fully sectarian. It is important to state here, that the Assad regime was eager not to be associated with the Alawites' role, assuming that it was as such. Thus, on the one hand, the sectarian question was a taboo in Syria, and a matter which would lead to interrogation by the security apparatuses when mentioned. On the other hand, the Syrian presidents, both Hafez and Bashar have been keen to participate in the main prayers in the Grand Umayyad mosque in Damascus and show no disagreement nor try to distinguish themselves from the main official Sunni religiosity.

However, at the end of the day, the Alawites became a privileged group as the preferred clients for the patron and his close clients. Thus, the patronage relations transformed into a kind of patronage network, which operated mainly within the Alawite sect. In contrast to the patronage network under the Baath Party, which

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[42] Yahya M Sadowski, "Patronage and the Ba'th: Corruption and Control in Contemporary Syria.", 444

[43] Hanna Batatu, *Syria's Peasantry, the Descendants of Its Lesser Rural Notables, and Their Politics,* (Princeton, New Jersey: Prinecton University Press, 1999), s. 157.

[44] Yahya M Sadowski, "Patronage and the Ba'th: Corruption and Control in Contemporary Syria.", s. 444

will be discussed later in more detail, the patronage networks resulting from Alawite patronage were limited only to the members of Alawite communities.

It can be truly argued that Hafez Assad used the Alawite power base and arranged it around his personality to consolidate his authority. However, on the other hand, the Alawite community also has its own internal dynamics and motivations which should not be neglected. As Goldsmith argues, using Ibn Khaldun's asabiyya concept[45], the Alawite community has its own assabiyya. The intersection between Hafez al-Assad's personal motivation with the dynamics of the Alawite community resulted in this fateful alliance.

These Alawite patronage networks have provided their clients with privileges in several domains. The patronage relations did not operate only within the state apparatus, but came to exist in other social domains. The Alawites also started to be overrepresented not only in the army but also in the bureaucracy. Hence 'an Alawi middle class emerged with the growth of the civil service, and over the past decade, the freezing of public sector recruitment has affected the Alawi community less than any other because Alawis are protected by a system of political patronage'[46].

The patronage relations under the Assad regime has boosted the Alawite assabiye, and helped the community to come together. Thereby, the Assad regime has become an essential dimension for the Syrian Alawite identity and feeling of belonging. The deeper the patronage networks spread within the Alawite community, the more they feel attached to the Assad regime. In contrast, the Assad regime succeeded in consolidating its patrimonial power, using the Alawite patronage network to penetrate the state apparatuses, mainly the army and security branches. Thereby, both Hafez and Bashar al-Assad were able to keep tight control over the army and the state altogether by utilizing and mobilizing the Alawite community through the patronage relations and networks which are arranged hierarchically while the patron sits on the top of the chain.

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[45] Hinnebusch & Ajami had also referred, before Goldsmith, to the role of asabiyya in the Alawite politics, see: Raymond Hinnebusch, "Syria Under the Bath: The political Economy of Populist Auhtoritarianism." *The State and the political Economy of Reform in Syria*, (Fife, Scotland: the Univerity of St Andrews Center for Syrian Studies, 2009), s. 5-24. & Fouad Ajami, *The Syrian Rebellion,* (Stanford, California: Hoover Institiute Press Publication), s.13.

[46] Fabrice Balanche, The Alawi Community and the Syria Crisis . *Middle East Institiute.* http://www.mei.edu/content/map/alawi-community-and-syria-crisis (Accessed March 25, 2018.)

The Alawite community has become deeply linked to Assad's regime and has invested in its survival, thanks to the patrimonial relations and networks. This patronage relations have contributed to the Alawite asabiyya along with the insecurity and consolidation of the community around the patrimonial family, Assad. This role has continued during Bashar's time, who even appointed two Chiefs of Staff, Ali Aslan and Ali Habib, as well as a Defense Minister, Ali Ayyub, who said to be from the Alawite community.

Baath Party Patronage

In additional to the Alawite patronage, the Assad regime has utilized Baath Party patronage to foster its patrimonial domination over the state and society in Syria. The Baath Party patronage networks were vital in expanding the social base of the regime and reaching out to various social layers. Hence, the Baath Party in Syria under the Assad family had lost its ideological idealization and had started to have an instrumental role in the hands of the patrimonial power. The Baath Party and its organizations were very instrumental in mobilizing the people, generating legitimacy, and glorifying the patron by practicing and celebrating the political cult of Assad. The patronage relations and networks which were established through the Baath Party helped the patrimonial power to penetrate the bureaucracy and mobilize various social segments, thus increasing the amount and diversifying power-holders, all within the interest of the patron, al-Assad. As Devlin argues "Assad can rightly be assessed as the man who converted Baathism in Syria from party rule into a dictatorship"[47].

During Hafez Assad's reign, the Baath Party enjoyed the official advantaged position in Syrian politics. The following privileges were guaranteed by the Syrian constitution: the Baath Party was to be the leading party of the state and society; the Baath Party was to lead the National Progressive Party, which includes other parties; the Baath Party is the only party that could conduct political activities in the military. This advantaged position has transformed it into a critical driver and was utilized for Baath Party patronage. However, the Baath Party plays little role in decision-making procceses and was used more as a rubber stamp for the decisions made by Assad and his inner circle[48].Yet, it remains an essential role for orga-

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[47] John F Devlin. "The Baath Party: Rise and Metamorphosis." *The American Historicak Review*. Vol. 96, No.5 (1991): 1396-1407, s. 1406.

[48] CIA, *Syria Without Assad: Succession Politics,* (Middle East Division, Office of Regional Political Analysis, Central Intelligince Agency, 1978) Approved For Release 2006/05/25, s.13

nizing people, mobilizing the masses, and legitimizing the regime. From this point, pan-Arab ideology plays a role.

On the other hand, the party's body and affiliated organizations expanded more and more. The expanded and oversized body of the Baath Party, reveals the stretching of the patronage relations and patronage networks. The Baath Party started to be organized in every social segment and every corner of the country, yet this expansion in activities and membership, does not represent success in recruiting new believers in the party' ideology. Instead, it indicated the increasing domain of opportunism and the number of opportunists. However, the role of the state-sponsored political cult and security apparatus in pushing the people towards the party should not be neglected.

The Baath Party patronage relations goes downwards and operates to the benefit of the patron as well as the client. The patronage relations through the Baath Party was vital for Assad to maintain his political and social control, mobilize the people around his cult, generate public support and assert his legitimacy. On the other hand, being a member of the Baath Party was an advantage for a client who seeks access to power, social, bureaucratic or political upgrading. These patronage relations include all party ranks, from the peasants' federation in the countryside to the central committee of the party. Men like Abdullah al-Ahmar, the son of a poor construction worker who became the highest official of the Baath Party below Assad, developed a vibrant network of clients in the business community[49].

These patronage relations and networks were established on the ground through the political and social organizations of the Baath Party. For example, in order to realize the aim of patronizing Syrian politics through the party, Assad established the National Progressive Front, a Baath Party-controlled coalition of parties. However, they were not allowed to seek new members in the armed forces or schools,[50] where Baath Party was able to do so.

In the public and social domain, the role of the popular organizations (*al-Munazamat al-Sha'biyya*) was vital. These organizations organized and targeted every social segment; school pupils, university students, women, workers, peasants and so on. At the end of the day, the Baath Party established and an organization in

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[49] Yahya M Sadowski, "Patronage and the Ba'th: Corruption and Control in Contemporary Syria.", s. 449.

[50] Charles Patterson, *Hafiz Al-Asad of Syria,* (iUniverse.com, Inc., 1991), s. 59.

every social field; the General Union of Peasants, the General Federation of Syrian Women, the General Federation of Trade Unions, the General Federation of Artisans Associations, the Union of Arab Writers, Munazzamet Talai' al-Baath the Pioneers of Baath Association, which targeted pupils from 6-12 years, Ittihad Shabibet al-Thawrah the Revolutionary Youth Union, which targeted students from 13-18 years, the National Union of Syrian Students[51]. Hence, '[Assad] strengthened the party-controlled organizations. These organizations helped mobilize support for Assad's regime among peasants, workers, students, women, young people, and other special groups within the Syrian society'[52].

It is noteworthy, that these organizations could organize and operate within the state apparatuses. The organization process was a state-sponsored one, and their members were given influence over admission, academic appointment, scholarship, etc. Even in the countryside, peasants' federations held influence over the allocation of loans and credits. As Perthes mentions 'organized parallel to the administrative structure of the state and the public sector, the different party levels exercise what is referred to as 'popular control' over the respective level structure of bureaucracy'[53].

These patronage networks have extended the ruling base and increased the stakeholders in the system. New social segments from the rural in particular joined the system and started to benefit from the systematic opportunism. On the other hand, patrimonial power has expanded its controlling circle and at the end of the day was able to penetrate not only the bureaucratic domain but also the social life.

This role of the Baath Party and its patronage relations declined under Bashar's rule. Bashar's era witnessed the decreasing role of Arabism as an ideology in regional politics, mainly following the overthrown of Iraqi Baath in 2003, and with the deepened Syria's alliance with Iran under the so-called *Mehwar al-Mukawama* The Axis of Resistance. Internally he opened the door for a privatization process that benefit his close clients. However, the role of the Baath Party remained important during Bashar's time. The party membership witnessed a considerable expansion.

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[51] For more detailed information about theses organization see; Jad al-Kareem al-Jeba'i, 2013. "al-Bunya al-Tasalu-tiyya lil-Nizam al-Suri, al-Nash'a wal-Tatawwur wal-Maal", *Halfiyat al-Thawra, Dirasat Suriyye*, (Bairut: Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, 2013), s.189-242.

[52] Charles Patterson, *Hafiz Al-Asad of Syria,* (iUniverse.com, Inc., 1991), s. 58.

[53] Volker Perthes, *The Political Economy of Syria under Asad,* s. 158.

When Hafez died the party's membership was around 1,4 million, and by 2005 it reached 1.8 million[54]. It is important to state here that this large membership does not reflect the real number of ideologues and believers, rather it is a result of the rooted opportunism and coercive policies which implies a compulsory membership for the students for example.

Like Alawite Patronage, the Baath Party patronage and its networks have been utilized by the patrimonial power of the neopatrimonial Assad regime to penetrate the Syrian state and society and thereby consolidate the personal power of the patrimon. The patronage networks were vital in reaching out various social segments, increasing the shareholders, and mobilizing the public around the patrimonial power.

The Clientelism of the Assad Regime

In addition to the personalization and the patronage relations, the neopatrimonial power of Assad regime consolidates its authority through the clientelism and its networks. The clientelism networks allowed the patrimonial power to reach out to new social segments and individuals beyond the patronage networks' targeted groups. The patrimonial power which penetrated the political and social life through the patronage relations, expanded more to penetrate the economic domain through the clientelism. However, the clientelism differs from the patronage relations in its related matter. While the patronage relations and networks tend to have a hierarchical order and thus take a vertical shape, the clientelism relation could be a horizontal relation that implies an interaction between a patron and a client. So, it does not target one social group in a patronage manner which implies the patron to be on the top of the chain. Rather it extends to include all the individuals in the society through horizontal patron-client relations, regardless of their social affiliation or belonging. In other words, while the patronage relations concern group politics and thus targeted social or political groups, the clientelism is opened to all individuals who live under the patrimonial power.

While the patronage relations are manifested through the Alawite patronage and Baath Party patronage. Here, the patronage-clientelism relations is limited to the members of either social or political group, Alawite or Baath Party. On the other

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[54] Eyal Zisser, *Companding Syria: Bashar Al-Asad and the First Years in Power,* (London: I. B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2007), s. 71.

hand, the clientelism is a cross-sectarian and a cross-political strata phenomenon. In the clientelism, the client-patron relation is a mutually beneficial relationship, which generally implies a martial reward, not ideoelogical one. Thus, the clientelism, relatively due its nature, function and flourish in the economic domain. Hence, it is understandable that this clientelism has existed more among the Sunni merchants of the urban cities in Syria, while the patronage relations of Alawite and Baath Party have found its base among the lower social class in the rural areas and the agricultural economy-based small cities such as Daraa.

Thus, the clientelism in Syria goes beyond, and it is not limited only to the political domain, it expanded also to the economic domain. Although public sector through the state planned economy has enjoyed an upper hand in the Syrian economy, that does not mean that the private sector does not enjoy relative independence, in particular, the merchants of the two bigger cities, Damascus and Aleppo. For example, the private sector occupies an almost exclusive place in the sphere of retailing, tourism, trucking, real estate: in 1973 it officially controlled 25% of wholesale and 32% of foreign trade[55]. At the onset of the Syrian uprising, 70% of the Syrian economy was controlled by the private sector[56].

The merchants and businessmen community, in general, were linked to the patrimonial power through clientelism relations. Through the clientelism the business community has guaranteed a license for their activities and sometimes benefited from the state-sponsored or owned projects, in contrast, they maintained their loyalty to the patrimonial power and sided with it in case of crises.

Hafez Assad's Era and Business Community

In contrast to his neo-Baathist predecessors, who were one of the most radical in the Arab world, in term of generating a social change, Hafez Assad after taking power in November 1970, started an era of reconciliation with the middle class, especially the merchants[57]. Assad tried to accommodate Sunni interests by relaxing the economic restrictions on Sunni merchants and businessmen[58]. Hafez restrained

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[55] Ibid.

[56] Aurora Sottimano, The Syrian Business Elite: Patronage Networks and War Economy, *Syria Untold*. http://www.syriauntold.com/en/2016/09/the-syrian-business-elite-patronage-networks-and-war-economy/ Accessed March 26, 2018.

[57] Yahya M Sadowski, "Patronage and the Ba'th: Corruption and Control in Contemporary Syria", s. 447.

[58] Martha Neff Kessler, *Syria: Fragile Mosaic of Power,* (Honolulu, Hawaii: University Press of the Pacific, 2002), s. 35.

the revolutionary policies in economic domain. Talk of collectivization stopped, trade controls were relaxed, and the government underwrote a program of loans for small businesses.[59] In front of a delegation of wealthy Damascene merchants on 6 December 1970, president Hafiz al-Assad announced his intention to do all he could to enhance the role of the private sector in Syria's commerce and industry[60].

The modus operandi between the Assad regime and the business community shaped through the clientelism. The clientelism relations started to be formulated mainly between the patrimonial power represented by the political and security ruling elite, who controlled the political life and thus the state's resources, on the one hand, and the merchants and businessmen community on the other. Hereby, A partnership was forged between the Alawite officers in the army and the security services, and the Sunni merchants class. The children of the senior commanders had done particularly well by that relationship, they were called, *Awlad al-Sultah* (children of authority), literally sons of the authority.[61]

On the other hand, this newly emerged capitalized bureaucratic class, or the bureaucratic bourgeoisie started to be the driving force behind the crony capitalism. A new class of enriched individuals has started to emerge to form a 'crony capitalists,' who shares a big stake of the semi-formal and informal economic activities. For instance, smuggling and particularly from Lebanon, started to be one of the main informal economic sector that controlled by the security officers, supplied 70% of all non-military foreign trade in early 1980s[62]. Another interesting example was the affair of nuclear waste, which former vice-president Abdulhalim Khaddam and his family will be accused of. Ironically Khaddam himself, following his defected from the regime, will describe the economic modus operandi under Assad's regime as 'corporatization of corruption.'[63]

The networks that the regime forged with elite business actors paid dividends in times of crisis. Badr ad-Din ash-Shallah, then president of the Damascus Cham-

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[59] Yahya M Sadowski, "Patronage and the Ba'th: Corruption and Control in Contemporary Syria.", s. 447.

[60] Fred H Lawson, *Why Syria Goes to War, Thirty Years of Confrontation.* (New York: Cronell University Press, 1996), s. 77.

[61] Fouad Ajami, *The Syrian Rebellion.* (Stanford, California: Hoover Institiute Press Publication, 2012), s. 73.

[62] Yahya M Sadowski, "Patronage and the Ba'th: Corruption and Control in Contemporary Syria.", s. 454.

[63] Leon Goldsmith, "Syria's Alawites and the Politics of Sectarian Insecurity: A Khaldunian Perspective", *Ortadogu Etuteli ORSAM*, Vol. 3 No.1, (2012), s. 44

ber of Commerce, assured the loyalty of big business to Hafez Assad in 1982, when the regime violently crushed an uprising in Hama[64].

Assad also opened the door by 1990s for the business community to be represented in the controlled political sphere through paving the way for some Damascus Chamber of Commerce's representatives to take seats in the parliament. Hereby the regime has expanded the ruling base, although the role of the parliament in Syrian politics is, without doubt, limited and controlled. By the end of the day, capitalists were never able to transform their growing economic power into political influence, unless they act and move within the patrimonial power's consent.

The clientelism was the modus operandi through which the relations between the Assad regime and the business community had been shaped. The clientelism relations and networks allowed the patrimonial power to oversee the economic domain and its activities and sometimes to shape it in the light of its interest, and on the other hand, allowed the business community to reach out state's resources and gain the license to operate in the economic domain, which continued to enjoy relative independence and was not transformed to entirely state ruled as in the case of the totalitarian regimes.

Under Bashar's Rule; from Clientelism to Patronage

The relatively independence economic domain, in which the Sunni urban merchants were operating in the Hafez's period has been restricted under Bashar's role. Bashar's role has witnessed the emergence and the consolidation of a new class of businessmen, many of them being from the Alawite community, who enjoyed close relations with the patrimonial power. Those newly emerged class has attempted to patrimonialism the economic domain as well. Thus, it could be argued that the class of *Awlad al-Sultah* which started to emerge under Hafez's role, has continued to consolidate and expand under Bashar, paving the way for the upgrading of *Awlad al-Sultah*.

The liberalization processes which was launched in Syria under Bashar Assad in the 2000s go in parallel with the consolidation of the patrimonialism of the head of the regime in the economic realm. Hence, the liberalization was going in favor of a bunch of 'entrepreneurs' who enjoy close ties with the patron. Bashar Assad's

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[64] Aurora Sottimano, *The Syrian Business Elite: Patronage Networks and War Economy* 2016, (Accessed March 26, 2018)

cousin Rami Makhlouf exemplifies this new mode of corruption whereby individuals close to the regime use family connections for 'predatory self-enrichment' in the private sector.[65] The result was that. Public assets were de facto transferred into the hands of crony capitalists, privileged networks, and corporations linked with the Asads by family and clan ties, while small business and the agricultural sector – the backbones of the Syrian economy – were neglected[66].

For instance, Rami Makhlouf monopolized the sector of the mobile phone in Syria which started to operate in 2000 by two operators, Makhlouf had a share of 75% of the first operator (Syriatel) and was one of the two owners of the second operator (94). Moreover, the Syrian authority started to harass Makhlouf's partners through the security services. Thus, he ended up controlling the two operators[67]. When Riyad Saif, a Sunni businessman and a member of the parliament at that time criticized what he called 'irregularities in the phone licenses' he was soon arrested and imprisoned[68]. Saif, who fled the country and joined the opposition following the uprising, will be elected as the head of The General Assembly of the Syrian National Coalition of the Opposition and Revolutionary Forces in May 2017. Another example was Makhlouf's attempt to take over the dealership of Daimler-Benz from 'Omar Sankqar & Sons Company' which belongs to the Sanqar family a well-known Damascene old Sunni bourgeoisie.[69] Interestingly to note here, that Ali and Wasim Sanqar (members of Sanqer family) funded one of the earliest opposition conferences in May 2011[70].

The Assad regime which formulated and consolidated its patrimonial power within the state apparatus and in the political and social domain through the penetration of the patronage relations (which comprise the clientelism), has tried to oversee and control the economic domain through the clientelism relations. However, the modus operandi of the patrimonial power in the economic domain has

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[65] Soren Schmidt,"The Development Role of the State in the Middle East: Lessons form Syria", *The State and the Political Economy of Reform in Syria*, (Fife, Scotland: the Univerity of St Andrews Center for Syrian Studies, 2009), s. 33.

[66] Aurora Sottimano. The Syrian Business Elite: Patronage Networks and War Economy.

[67] Soren Schmidt. "The Development Role of the State in the Middle East: Lessons form Syria.", s. 30

[68] Anthony Shadid, Syrian Businessman Becomes Magnet for Anger and Dissent. *New York Times*, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/01/world/asia/01makhlouf.html (Accessed in May, 5th 2018).

[69] Soren Schmidt, "The Development Role of the State in the Middle East: Lessons form Syria.", s. 31-32.

[70] Aurora Sottimano, The Syrian Business Elite: Patronage Networks and War Economy.

been upgraded throughout the rule of Hafez and Bashar al-Assad from simple patron-client relations in the early years, to a more systematic clientelism networks by the end of Hafez's time, this upgrading reached an attempt of establishing a patronage over the economic domain under Bashar's rule, eliminating more and more any space for non-patrimonial social activity.

This trend to patrimonalize the econmoic domain could be explained in two explanation; the first one, this would come as a reasonable second step after patronizing the political and social domain, since the patrimonial power is not expected to stop expanding and penetrating all aspects of the society to consolidate its power more and more. At the end of the day the systematic clientelism, which a step forward could transform to a patronage relation by time. The second explanation could be found in the inner circle of around Bashar al-Assad which started to include businessmen like Rami Makhlouf, the category that was not found in the clique of Hafez al-Assad. These economic and business-oriented elites would seek more penetration and patronizing of the economic domain for their benefit. While the traditional security and political elite had focused more on penetration and patronizing the political and social domains, the new formed economic benefiter elites start to target the economic domain as well.

Conclusion

There is no doubt that the Assad regime represents a case of authoritarian regime, however, this authoritarianism needs to be but under one typology that describes the regime and distinguishes it from other authoritarian regimes. The Assad regime fails to represent a case of totalitarian (and thereby post-totalitarian) or sultanistic regime. On the other hand, it seems that the arguments of populist-authoritarianism (PA), authoritarianism upgrading (AU), post-populist authoritarianism (PPA), and its associated conceptualizations, have their shortages. They tend to analyze and discuss authoritarianism in the framework, and sometimes as a result, of political and economic drivers. Thereby they neglect the personal motivation, which should be a departure point to analyze authoritarianism and the evolution of authoritarian regimes. In contrast, the neopatrimonial conceptualization puts personal domination in the center and accepts it as the driving force behind political and economic transformation, taking into consideration the role of patronage, as well as clientelist relations.

Neopatrimonialism seems to present an integral and explanatory framework for the Assad regime and similar regimes. The neopatrimonialism operates to condolidate the personal dominasion of the patron and penetrate the bureaucratic institution as well as the polititcal and social domains through mechanisms like patronage and clientalist relations.

In the core of Assad regime personalization strategy, functions the role of the loyal clique, whose members are responsible for maintaining tight control of the state's apparatuses, and in particular the security apparatuses and the army. Personalizing the security branches and the army has transformed them to what Weber had named 'the patrimonial troops'. In parallel to maintaining personal control over the state, Assad's cult of personality has been constructed in the public domain and the ideational realm, transforming Syria to Suriyet'ul Assad - Assad's Syria.

Meanwhile, the Assad regime has utilized dual patronage relations in order to penetrate the bureaucratic realm and society; Alawite patronage and Baath Party patronage. The patronage networks among Alawites and the Baath Party, which were arranged in a hierarchical manner with the patron on top, have enabled the patron to penetrate the state and the society. On the other hand the clientelism is another mechanism which functions in the patrimonial penetration processes, through which the patrimonial power was able to reach out the economic domain. However, following Bashar's rising to power, there was a trend of patrimonialization of the economic domain by the patrimonial power and associated loyal businessmen. Thus the patrimonial power under Bashar has taken a step forward to widen its penetration by patrimonializing the economic domain as well.

Illustration of the controlling and penetration mechanisms of the neopatrimonial domination of the Assad regime

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ORTADOĞU ETÜTLERİ MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES

جدلية العلاقة بين الدعوي والسياسي في الفكر السلفي المصري بعد ثورة يناير

ملخص

يدرس هذا البحث (جدلية العلاقة بين الدعوي والسياسي في الفكر السلفي المصري بعد ثورة يناير)، طبيعة التحول الذي حدث للسلفيين في مصر بعد ثورة الخامس والعشرين من يناير/كانون الثاني 2011، مع التركيز على الدعوة السلفية وحزب النور، الذي اندمج في الحياة السياسية بعد أن كان له موقف مغاير من العمل السياسي وممارساته، ومحاولة التعرف على المبررات التي دفعتهم لتبني هذا الاتجاه، ومدى تأثير ذلك على مستقبلهم الدعوي، ومعرفة الأسباب الجوهرية التي دفعته لمفارقة جماعة الإخوان المسلمين، وتأييد الانقلاب على المسار الديمقراطي.

وقد حدث تطور سلبي واضح في علاقة الدعوة السلفية الممثلة، بحزب النور مع جماعة الإخوان المسلمين، من خلال حزب الحرية والعدالة، لأن تطور هذه العلاقة أدى إلى الوقيعة بالإخوان والرئيس في مشاكل سياسية، ظهرت بوادرها حينما تهيأت الأجواء للانقلاب على الرئيس المنتخب.

وتم معالجة موضوع الدراسة في خمسة مباحث: تأصيل الممارسة السياسة في الفكر السلفي المصري، والعلاقة بين التيار السلفي والإخوان المسلمين بعد ثورة يناير، وموقف حزب النور السلفي من الانقلاب على المسار الديمقراطي، وموقف الهيئات والتيارات والأحزاب السلفية من الانقلاب العسكري، وخُتمت الدراسة بالحديث عن مستقبل التيارات السلفية في مصر بعد الانقلاب العسكري.

كلمات مفتاحية: مصر، الإيديولوجيات السلفية، الإخوان المسلمون، ثورة يناير

دكتور جمال نصار

أستاذ الفلسفة والمذاهب الفكرية المشارك في جامعة إستنبول صباح الدين زعيم

RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL DEBATES IN THE SALAFI MOVEMENT IN EGYPT AFTER THE JANUARY REVOLUTION

Abstract

This research examines the controversial relationship between the preacher and the politician in the Egyptian Salafist ideology after the January revolution, and the nature of the transformation the Salafists in Egypt have experienced after the revolution of 25 January/January 2011. The research focus on the Salafist Da'wa and the Nour Party, which has merged into political course after having had a different attitude to political practices. An effort has been made trying to identify the justifications that prompted them to embrace this trend, and how this would affect the future of their Da'wa activities. Furthermore, the research pursue figuring out of the root causes for which they have broken away from the Muslim Brotherhood movement, and supported the coup d'état on the democratic track.

There has been a clear negative development in the Salafist advocacy relationship, represented by the Nour Party, with the Muslim Brotherhood, represented by the Freedom and Justice Party. This development has caused the Muslim Brotherhood movement and the president profound political problems, the beginnings of which arose when the atmosphere was suitable for the coup d'état against the elected president.

The topic of the research was addressed in five units: Rooting political practice in Egyptian Salafist ideology, the relationship between the Salafist and the Muslim Brotherhood after the January revolution, the stance of the Salafi Nour Party from the coup on the democratic path, the position of the Salafist bodies, currents and parties from the military coup. The study concluded by talking about the future of Salafist currents in Egypt after the military coup.

Key Words: Egypt, Salafi Ideologies, the Muslim Brotherhood, the January Revolution

OCAK DEVRİMİ SONRASI MISIR'DA SELEFİLİK AKIMI İÇERİSİNDEKİ DİNİ VE SİYASİ TARTIŞMALAR

Öz

Bu araştırma, Ocak Devrimi sonrasında Mısır'da Selefi ideolojideki politikacı ile vaiz arasındaki tartışmalı ilişkiyi ve Mısır'daki Selefilerin 25 Ocak 2011 Devrimi'nden sonra yaşadıkları dönüşümün niteliğini incelemektedir. Araştırma, Selefi Dava Hareketi ile siyasi uygulamalara yönelik farklı bir tavır geliştirdikten sonra siyasete karışmış olan Nur Partisine odaklanmaktadır. Onların bu eğilimi benimsemelerine neden olan gerekçeleri ve bunun Dava faaliyetlerinin geleceğini nasıl etkileyeceğini belirleme maksadıyla çaba gösterilmiştir. Araştırma ayrıca, Müslüman Kardeşler hareketinden kopmalarına ve demokratik yolda darbeyi desteklemelerine neden olan ana sebepleri ortaya çıkarmaya devam etmektedir.

Nur Partisi ile Müslüman Kardeşler ve de Özgürlük ve Adalet Partisi tarafından temsil edilen Selefi savunuculuk ilişkisinde açık olumsuz bir gelişme meydana gelmiştir. Bu gelişme, Müslüman Kardeşler hareketi ve cumhurbaşkanının önüne ciddi siyasi sorunlar çıkarmış; bunların başlangıcı da seçilen cumhurbaşkanına karşı darbe için ortam uygun olduğu zaman ortaya çıkmıştır.

Araştırmanın konusu beş alt başlıkta ele alınmıştır: Mısır'da Selefi ideolojide siyasal pratiğin kökeni, Ocak devriminden sonra Selefiler ile Müslüman Kardeşler arasındaki ilişki, Selefi Nur Partisi'nin darbeden demokratik yola tavrı, Selefi örgütlerin konumu ve askeri darbe ile kendini gösteren akımlar ve partiler. Araştırma, askeri darbeden sonra Mısır'daki Selefi akımların geleceğine değinilerek sona erdirilmiştir.

Anahtar kelimeler: Mısır, Selefi İdeolojiler, Müslüman Kardeşler, Ocak Devrimi

مقدمة:

لقد أفرزت ثورة الخامس والعشرين من يناير 2011 في مصر ظهورًا ملحوظًا على الساحة السياسية للقوى الإسلامية في السلطة، وذلك بعد نتائج الانتخابات التي أعقبت التغيير السياسي الذي جاء بعد الإطاحة بمبارك، بعد حكمه لثلاثين عامًا، وكان لذلك كبير الأثر في تنشيط هذه التيارات بمختلف أنواعها، وظهورها بشكل ملحوظ في الساحة السياسية، مما يعني تنشيطًا لأيديولوجية التيارات والحركات الإسلامية بشكل أكثر وضوحًا، وتأثيرًا في الرأي العام، ولاحظنا ذلك ببروز التيار السلفي المتمثل في حزب النور، وتبوئه المرتبة الثانية بعد حزب الحرية والعدالة التابع لجماعة الإخوان المسلمين الذي تولى أعلى سلطة في البلاد.

وكان ملحوظًا، أيضًا، مشاركة بعض التيارات السلفية في العمل السياسي، بعد أن كانت محصورة في العمل الدعوي فقط، ومن ثمّ ظهرت الدعوة السلفية في الإسكندرية ممثلة بحزب النور الذي شارك في الانتخابات وحصد مواقع عديدة، والجبهة السلفية التي كانت أقرب للرئيس مرسي من حزب النور، الذي أيّد الانقلاب العسكري على التجربة الديمقراطية، وكانت هناك اضافة لشخصيات سلفية مستقلة، كانت لها مواقف متباينة.

ومن الأهمية التأكيد على أن السياسي مهما ابتعد عن المجال الدعوي يجب أن يعتقد أن السياسة من الدين، ويجب على الداعية أيضًا أن يوجه الناس في الأمور ذات الشأن العام، والذي أعنيه بالتخصص أن يكون هناك مَن تفرغ لآليات السياسة مثل: الانتخابات، وقيادة الحزب، والدخول في النشاط أو التنافس السياسي.

الأمر الآخر الذي يجب أن أنبه إليه هو أن مرجعية المسلمين واحدة سواء كان دعويًا أو سياسيًا، فالمرجعية هي الشريعة وهي القرآن والسنة، لكن كل فريق قد يجد مبتغاه أكثر في قرائن أو أدلة يحتاجها في عمله وتخصصه.

فالعمل السياسي يتجه بالأساس إلى فروض الكفاية، والعمل الدعوي يركز على فرض العين وفرض العين يلزم الجميع، لكن الدعوي يشرحها ويركز عليها ويربي الناس عليها، والسياسي يضع الحلول لإقامة فروض الكفايات، لكن في النهاية لابد للجميع من مرجعية واحدة هي مرجعية الإسلام. فالدعوة دين والسياسة دين، لكن الداعية لا يعرف إشكاليات السياسة، ولا السياسي يعرف إشكاليات الدعوة، وكل له عالمه الذي يعيش فيه.

والضرورة تقتضي بالطبع التمييز بين وظائف الحركة الإسلامية الأساسية وهي: (الدعوة – والتربية – والبر–إلخ) وبين الأعمال التخصصية مثل: (المسائل الاقتصادية – والعمل السياسي – والمناكفات الحزبية– إلخ).

قضية أخرى ينبغي التأكيد عليها هي أن التمييز ينصبّ على ما هو دعوي بالأساس، وبين ما هو حزبي تنافسي، بمعنى أن الداعية والعالم الشرعي لا يحجر عليهما الخوض في الشأن السياسي أو إبداء رأيهما، لأن هذا هو حق لكل أحد، لكن العمل الحزبي هو شأن تدبيري يدخل في التفاصيل والآليات بشكل مباشر، كما هو أيضًا عمل تنافسي، لكن قبل ذلك ينبغي العمل على ترسيخ الفصل بين الرموز الدعوية والرموز الحزبية.

وهذا لا يعني بطبيعة الحال التعارض مع شمولية الإسلام التي تشمل كل مناحي الحياة، لأن

الممارسة السياسة مهلكة كبيرة للرموز والشخصيات العامة، وهي لا تفرّق بين صغير وكبير، وإن من مصلحة الأمة دائمًا صون رموزها، ومرجعياتها عن الاقتراب من تلك المهلكة.

وليس فيما أدعو إليه أي توجه إلى فصل الدين عن الدولة، أو تجريد العمل السياسي من الضوابط الشرعية والأخلاقية؛ فعلى من يمارس السياسة أن يمارسها بغية تحقيق مصالح العباد والبلاد، وفي إطار الأحكام والآداب الإسلامية، كما أن على الدعاة والمثقفين أن يمتلكوا من الوعي السياسي، ما يجعلهم يساعدون في ترشيد الممارسة السياسية.[1]

وعلى ذلك سيتم التركيز في هذا البحث على المفارقة التي جعلت التيارات السلفية تتفاوت فيما بينها في ممارسة العمل السياسي قبل وبعد ثورة يناير.

وإشكالية البحث تبحث في محاولة معرفة طبيعة التحول الذي حدث للسلفيين في مصر بعد ثورة يناير، مع التركيز على الدعوة السلفية وحزب النور، الذي اندمج في الحياة السياسية بعد أن كان له موقف مغاير من العمل السياسي وممارساته.

والمنهج المتبع في الدراسة هو المنهج الوصفي، حيث يقوم الباحث بتتبع الحالة السلفية في مصر، ورصد أهم التحولات التي حدثت، ومقاربة بعضها ببعض، مع اللجوء إلى المنهج التحليلي، لتحليل الخطاب السلفي من خلال البيانات التي صدرت عن تلك التجمعات السلفية، وخصوصًا حزب النور المنبثق من الدعوة السلفية لدوره الواضح بعد ثورة يناير.

ويهدف البحث إلى تتبع ورصد التطور الذي حدث للحالة السلفية في مصر، مع التركيز على حزب النور السلفي نموذج الدراسة، ومعرفة الأسباب الجوهرية التي دفعته لمفارقة جماعة الإخوان المسلمين، وتأييد الانقلاب على المسار الديمقراطي.

وهذا البحث يشتمل على المباحث التالية:

المبحث الأول: تأصيل الممارسة السياسة في الفكر السلفي المصري

المبحث الثاني: العلاقة بين التيار السلفي والإخوان المسلمين بعد ثورة يناير

المبحث الثالث: موقف حزب النور السلفي من الانقلاب على المسار الديمقراطي

المبحث الرابع: موقف الهيئات والتيارات والأحزاب السلفية من الانقلاب العسكري

المبحث الخامس: مستقبل التيارات السلفية في مصر بعد الانقلاب العسكري

الكلمات المفتاحية: جدلية، السياسة، الدين، الثورات العربية، ثورة يناير، الثورات، حزب النور السلفي، حزب الحرية والعدالة، الجبهة السلفية، علماء السلفية، التيار السلفي، الأحزاب السلفية، العمل السياسي

المبحث الأول
تأصيل الممارسة السياسة في الفكر السلفي المصري

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[1] نصار، جمال، النهضة وضرورة التمييز بين الدعوي والسياسي، صحيفة الشرق القطرية، الرابط: http://cutt.us/FjjIc

في الحقيقة لم تكن السياسة بعيدة عن تفكير العلماء المحسوبين على التيار السلفي في مصر منذ بداية القرن العشرين، حيث تميزت الحياة العامة في حينها بتداخل السياسة في الدين، واهتمام العلماء بالقضايا السياسية التي كانت حاضرة في ذلك الوقت، وخصوصًا أن الاستعمار كان موجودًا ومهيمنًا على الحياة العامة، ومن ثمَّ ظهر العديد من المشايخ الذين ينتمون للتيار السلفي الإصلاحي مثل الشيخ محمد عبده (1323هـ – 1905م)، وتلميذه الشيخ محمد رشيد رضا (1354م – 1935هـ)، وعدد كبير من مشايخ الأزهر منهم: الشيخ محمد أبو زهرة (1394هـ – 1974م) والشيخ محمود شلتوت (1382هـ – 1963م).

ولم تكن جماعة الإخوان المسلمين (1346هـ – 1928م) بعيدة عن هذا التيار وخصوصًا أنها نشأت بعد سقوط الخلافة الإسلامية عام (1342هـ – 1924م)، وأكدت في التعريف بها أنها دعوة سلفية[2].

ويمكن القول إن التيار السلفي في مصر لم يكن على وتيرة واحدة بل تغيرت طرق ووسائل البعض للتعامل مع المرحلة الجديدة ولم يكن متجانسًا بدرجة كبيرة، بل كون هذا التيار "مجموعة متنوّعة من الجماعات المتنافسة في بعض الأحيان، وتتوزّع تلك الجماعات بين منظمات خيرية، وأخرى دعوية بدأت ممارسة السياسة بعد الثورة بهدف إقامة الشريعة الإسلامية"[3].

وما أود أن أركز عليه في هذه الدراسة؛ هي الخريطة العامة لأهم تكوينات هذا التيار، وموقفها من الممارسة السياسية.

أولًا: الجمعية الشرعية لتعاون العاملين بالكتاب والسنة المحمدية:

تعتبر من أكبر الجمعيات التي تقوم بالعمل الخيري في مصر والعالم الإسلامي، أنشأها الشيخ محمود خطاب السبكي في غُرة محرم عام (1331 هـ – 1912م)، وقد نالت جائزة الملك فيصل الإسلامية العالمية لخدمة الإسلام في العام (1430هـ – 2009م).

والجمعية الشرعية جمعية دعوية إصلاحية اختطت لنفسها خط الوسط والاعتدال، وعملت الجمعية جاهدة على ترسيخ مفهوم الدعوة إلى الله ليست بالقول فحسب، ولكن بالعمل أيضًا، وظهر موقفها من العمل السياسي الذي عبّر عنه مؤسسها الشيخ السبكي بقوله: "عدم التعرض للشؤون السياسية التي يختص بها ولي الأمر"[4]، وبالتالي هي لا تمارس السياسة، ولا تتكلم فيها، ولا تتخذ أي مواقف سياسية، وهذا نهجها منذ التأسيس إلى الآن[5].

ثانيًا: جمعية أنصار السنة المحمدية:

هي جمعية إسلامية سلفية قامت في مصر عام (1345هـ – 1926م) ثم انتشرت في غيرها للدعوة إلى الإسلام على أساس من التوحيد الخالص والسنة الصحيحة لتطهير الاعتقاد ونبذ البدع والخرافات كشرط لعودة الخلافة ونهضة الأمة الإسلامية، أسسها الشيخ محمد حامد الفقي (1378هـ – 1959م)، وهو من علماء الأزهر الشريف، وكان من رواد الجمعية الشرعية لكنه اختلف

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2   هذا ما ذكره الشيخ حسن البنا المؤسِّس، أثناء حديثه عن أن جماعة الإخوان المسلمين فكرة إصلاحية شاملة، في مجموعة الرسائل، انظر: http://cutt.us/K069T

3   براون، ناثان، الإسلام والسياسة في مصر الثورة، (مركز كارنيغي للشرق الأوسط، دراسة بتاريخ 23 أبريل/ نيسان 2013)، الرابط: http://carnegie-meg.org/3013/04/23/ar-pub-51622

4   فايد، عمار أحمد، السلفيون في مصر من شرعية الفتوى إلى شرعية الانتخاب، ضمن كتاب: الظاهرة السلفية التعددية التنظيمية والسياسات، تحرير بشير نافع وآخران، (الدار العربية للعلوم ناشرون، بيروت، الطبعة الأولى 2014)، ص52.

5   وقد عبر عن ذلك حديثًا الأمين العام للجمعية مصطفى إسماعيل، انظر: موقع اليوم السابع، الرابط: http://cutt.us/Liszf

معها في بعض مسائل الاعتقاد، وقد تأثر بتراث ابن تيمية وتلميذه ابن القيم، وأخذ الشيخ الفقي موقفًا سلبيًا من ثورة 1919م، واعتبر أن الحل ليس في المظاهرات والخروج إلى الشوارع، وإنما بالرجوع إلى سنة الرسول صلى الله عليه وسلم ونبذ البدع.

«وتركز في خطابها على محاربة بدع المساجد والأضرحة والصوفية، وتعتبر أن البعد عن الإسلام الصافي هو أحد أسباب تخلف الأمة الإسلامية كما أن مسألة وجوب الحكم بالشريعة على مستوى نظام الحكم في الدولة حاضرة ومنصوص عليها في أدبيات الجماعة وميثاقها، ولكنهم عندما يطالبون بها عبر الخطابة والكتابة والدروس المسجدية، فإن ذلك لا يصحبه أي عمل سياسي أخر ومعظم علماء ″جماعة أنصار السنة المحمدية″ هم من علماء الأزهر الشريف حتى اليوم، ولها فروع كثيرة في كل محافظات مصر لكنها أقل حيوية من الجمعية الشرعية رغم أن فكرها الفقهي أكثر حيوية من فكر الجمعية الشرعية″[6].

ولكنها تبتعد عن الشأن العام، وتتجنب توجيه النقد المباشر للنظام الحاكم، ونأت بنفسها عن أي حديث في السياسة أو المشاركة في آلياتها، مع الحفاظ على التأكيد على طاعة ولاة الأمور من وقت لآخر[7].

ثالثًا: الدعوة السلفية:

نشأت الدعوة السلفية في الإسكندرية في سبعينيات القرن الماضي (بين عامي 1972– 1977م) على أيدي مجموعة من الطلبة المتدينين، كان أبرزهم (محمد إسماعيل المقدم، وأحمد فريد، وسعيد عبد العظيم، ومحمد عبد الفتاح)، ثم ياسر برهامي وأحمد حطيبة فيما بعد، والتقوا جميعًا في كلية الطب بجامعة الإسكندرية، إذ كانوا منضوين في تيار (الجماعة الإسلامية) الذي كان معروفًا في الجامعات المصرية في السبعينيات أو ما عُرف بـ«الفترة الذهبية للعمل الطلابي″ في مصر[8].

ورفضت الدعوة السلفية الديمقراطية واعتبرتها كفرًا، واعتبرت من يقبلها يضحِّي بعقيدة التوحيد، لأنها قد تأتي برئيس ملحد أو كافر، وتعرض تطبيق الشريعة على الخيار الشعبي. ولكنها لم ترفض المشاركة السياسية والانتخابات من حيث المبدأ، وتعلل ابتعادها عن المشاركة السياسية إلى ما يسميه مُنظِّرها الأول الشيخ ياسر برهامي: أن ″موازين القوى التي لا تعرف معروفًا، ولا تنكر منكرًا إلا ما كان من مصالح هذه القوى، ولا ترعى حتى المبادئ المخترعة، والمقدسات المزعومة مِن الحرية والمساواة والديمقراطية، واحترام إرادة الشعوب وحقوق الإنسان″[9].

لذا اختارت الدعوة السلفية الابتعاد عن المشاركة حتى تتغير موازين القوى التي لا تتغير إلا بالإيمان والتربية. ولكنها بعد ثورة يناير شاركت في العمل السياسي.

رابعًا: الحركة السلفية من أجل الإصلاح (حفص):

حركة سياسية خرجت من رحم الدعوة السلفية العامّة في مصر، وتعتمد المنهج السلفي في الأمر بالمعروف والنهي عن المنكر في كل المجالات (السياسية والاقتصادية والاجتماعية وغيرها)،

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6   منيب، عبد المنعم، خريطة الحركات الإسلامية في مصر، (الشبكة العربية لمعلومات حقوق الإنسان، القاهرة)، ص27-28.

7   زاهر، معتز، التيار السلفي المصري من 25 يناير إلى الوقت الحاضر، (رؤية للبحوث والدراسات)، الرابط: http://ruyaa.cc/Page/2436# ftn16

8   عبد العال، علي، الدعوة السلفية بالإسكندرية: النشأة التاريخية وأهم الملامح، انظر الرابط:
     http://www.alhiwar.net/ShowNews.php?Tnd=17520

9   برهامي، ياسر، المشاركة السياسية وموازين القوى، (موقع أنا سلفي، تاريخ النشر 20 مارس 2007)، الرابط:
     http://www.salafvoice.com/article.aspx?a=664

وتستند في خطابها إلى القرآن والسنة والتجربة الحضارية الإسلامية التي قادها سلف الأمة الصالح، وهي تجربة لم تتكرر، وتنتظر من ينهض بالمسلمين على أسسها ليبعث تلك الحضارة ويتسلم المسلمون قيادة العالم من جديد[10].

وقد وُجِّهت نشاطات الحركة السلفية من أجل الإصلاح برفض من شيوخ الدعوة السلفية كونها ستؤدي لتسييس الدعوة السلفية التي ترى التركيز على التربية العقدية الصحيحة، بينما دعا الصمدي إلى "إيجاد صوت يعبِّر عن المنهج السلفي في الإصلاح والتغيير، وترشيد الممارسة السياسية بكل فئاتها ومستوياتها لتتوافق مع الشريعة، وتذكير الأمة بالثوابت التي يجب استحضارها في كل مشروع إصلاحي، وتكوين مرجعية قيادية للتيار السلفي[11].

وظهرت (حفص) بشكل فاعل في مظاهرات أكتوبر/تشرين الأول 2010 بمسجد الفتح بالقاهرة في قضية ما عُرِف بالمسلمات الجدد اللاتي أُشِيع أن الكنيسة تحتجزهن[12].

خامسًا: الجبهة السلفية:

الجبهة السلفية رابطة تضم عدة رموز إسلامية وسلفية مستقلة؛ كما تضم عدة تكتلات دعوية من نفس الاتجاه، وينتمون إلى محافظات مختلفة في جمهورية مصر العربية، ولا يجمع أعضاء الجبهة غير الإيمان بأهدافها، فلا توجد إمارة أو بيعة، ولا تعتبر الجبهة نفسها حزبًا سياسيًا، ولا تشترط على منتسبيها –غالبيتهم من الشباب– تبني كل خياراتها السياسية، تتمتع الجبهة باستقلالية واضحة عن النفوذ التقليدي للمشايخ ، وظهر ذلك واضحًا في خياراتها السياسية و(الثورية)، وإن كان خطابها الرسمي يقدِّر المشايخ، خاصة ما يُعرَف بالسلفية الحركية، وينتمي معظم شبابها لحزب النور وحزب الفضيلة، وظهر نشاط الجبهة بشكل واضح بعد ثورة يناير، وشارك أعضاؤها بفاعلية في الثورة وخصوصًا في جمعة الغضب.

واعتبرت الجبهة في بدايتها الدكتور محمد عبد المقصود مرجعية لها، ثم الشيخ فوزي السعيد، والشيخ رفاعي سرور الذي أثَّر كثيرًا في شباب الجبهة السلفية، وأصبح مرجعًا لها قبل أن يتوفاه الله. ثم فضَّل أعضاء الجبهة العمل بشكل مستقل حرصًا على حرية حركتهم، ومنعًا من تحمل أحد الرموز مسؤولية مواقفهم.

ولا يشغل الجبهة السلفية إلا مسألة تطبيق الشريعة، واستكمال مسيرة الثورة، وتقديم خطاب سلفي تجديدي، وتقويم مسيرة الإسلاميين من خلال "خلخلة بعض الرؤى غير المنضبطة التي تكرست في المرحلة السابقة"[13]، ومن أبرز رموز الجبهة السلفية الدكتور خالد سعيد، والشيخ أشرف عبد المنعم، والدكتور سعيد فياض، والدكتور محمد جلال القصاص.

وأثناء ثورة يناير تم التنسيق بين مجموعات الشباب، لمحاولة رسم صورة أكثر تنظيمًا، حتى أصبح للجبهة تواجد في اثنتي عشرة محافظة، تمثل مدينة المنصورة مركز ثقلها، تليها محافظات كفر الشيخ، الغربية، والجيزة[14].

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[10] موقع الحركة السلفية من أجل الإصلاح (حفص) على شبكة الإنترنت، الرابط: http://goo.gl/Gcaae

[11] حوار رضا الصمدي مع علي عبد العال في موقع إسلام أون لاين، وانظر: هاني نسيرة، "السلفية في مصر: تحولات ما بعد الثورة"، كراسات استراتيجية، (العدد 220، مركز الدراسات السياسية والاستراتيجية، الأهرام، القاهرة 2011)

[12] طالع بيان الحركة السلفية من أجل الإصلاح على الرابط: http://goo.gl/VTX9q

[13] الصفحة الرسمية للجبهة السلفية بمصر على موقع التواصل الاجتماعي فيس بوك، انظر الرابط: http://goo.gl/xLEQt

[14] فايد، مرجع سابق، ص 67-68

والخلاصة أن الثورة المصرية أحدثت نقلة نوعية في الخطاب السلفي، ونقلته إلى "فضاءين مختلفين في السياسة والفكر، لم يعتد عليهما، وكان يتعامل في المجال الفكري بقدرٍ من القطيعة والتعالي، ويتعاطى مع كثير من مسائل السياسة من بوابة الفتوى"[15].

هذا التغير ظهر في كثرة عدد الأحزاب ذات المرجعية الإسلامية (16) حزبًا بين مرخص وتحت الترخيص، تسعة منها ذات مرجعية سلفية)، لكنها تتباين في تقديرها للمواقف السياسية، والخلاف مع أحدها لا يعني بالضرورة خلافًا مع عموم التيار الذي تنتمي إليه. دليل ذلك أن حزب النور نفسه انشق وخرج منه حزب الوطن، فهل يمكن نزع صفة السلفية عن الأخير مثلا، أم هو تباين المواقف بين الرموز والمرجعيات، فضلا عن الخلافات الشخصية؟[16].

حيث شهدت الحالة السلفية تغيرات يمكن وصفها بأنها جذرية، فلم يكن اهتمامها قبل الثورة بالعمل السياسي، بل كان منصبًا على مجال الدعوة ، وطلب العلم، والتفقه في الدين.

ومن أبرز النصوص على الخصام بين السلفيين والممارسة الديمقراطية قبل الثورة، ما كتبه ياسر برهامي، نائب رئيس الدعوة السلفية في الإسكندرية، في مقاله عن "السلفية ومناهج التغيير" بقوله: "ترى الدعوة [يقصد الدعوة السلفية] عدم المشاركة في هذه المجالس المسماة بالتشريعية سواء بالترشيح، أو الانتخاب، أو المساعدة لأي من الاتجاهات المشاركة فيها، وذلك لغلبة الظن بحصول مفاسد أكبر بناء على الممارسات السابقة، وإن كنا نقر أن الخلاف بين أهل العلم في هذه المسألة خلاف معتبر"[17]

المبحث الثاني

العلاقة بين التيار السلفي والإخوان المسلمين بعد ثورة يناير

لم تنحصر العلاقة بين جماعة الإخوان المسلمين والتيار السلفي في مصر بعد ثورة يناير فقط، ولكن الواقع يشهد بقدم هذه العلاقة وتشعبها، سواء موقف السلفيين في مصر أو خارجها، وكان مجمل الخلافات بينهما تنحصر حول اهتمام الإخوان بالسياسة، وانصرافهم عن أصول الدين الصافي، حسب زعم الكثير من السلفيين الذين هاجموا الجماعة في أكثر من موقف.

و«لم يكن الدعاة السلفيون في بدايات نشأتهم الأولى، بعيدين عن حركة الإخوان المسلمين فكريًا ولا تنظيميًا، إذ نشأ بعضهم في بيوت إخوانية، كالشيخ ياسر برهامي، الذي اعتقل والده وعمه من بين من اعتقلوا من الإخوان خلال الحقبة الناصرية، بينما عمل البعض الآخر بين صفوف الحركة في أول حياته. لكنهم جميعا اتفقوا على رفض الانضمام إلى الجماعة، وقد تزعّم هذا الرفض محمد إسماعيل المُقدم الذي أصر على الاستمرار في دعوته التي كان قد بدأها قبل ذلك"[18].

والواقع أن علاقة الإخوان المسلمين بالسلفيين قبل الثورة اتسمت بحالة من السكون السلبي، والذي عملت مجموعة من المحددات على إيجاده، تتمحور حول الخلافات بينهما في مستوى النظر والفكر، ومستوى الممارسة، وفي بيئة ما بعد الثورة، حدث متغير رئيس، شكّل محددًا أساسيًا،

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[15] القديمي، نواف بن عبد الرحمن، الإسلاميون وربيع الثورات المنتجة للأفكار، (المركز العربي للأبحاث ودراسة السياسات، الدوحة، 2012)، ص23

[16] الزعاترة، ياسر، سلفية وإخوانية أم أحزاب سياسية، الجزيرة نت، الرابط: http://cutt.us/En5Yq

[17] مجلة صوت الدعوة، ص8، على الانترنت، وراجع الحداد، هيثم مجدي، مشروعية المشاركة السياسية في الأدبيات السلفية، موقع أنا السلفي، الرابط: http://www.anasalafy.com/play.php?catsmktba=61697

[18] عبد العال، مرجع سابق

لطبيعة العلاقة بين الإخوان المسلمين والقوى السلفية، تمثل هذا المتغير في انخراط الأخيرة في العملية السياسية، مما جعل الإخوان والسلفيين فاعلين سياسيين، أكثر من كونهما حركات دعوية، واتسمت العلاقة بينهما بعد الثورة، بدرجة من التوافق، الذي أوجبته المتغيرات السياسية طوال الفترة الانتقالية[19].

ويمكن تقسيم موقف السلفيين من الإخوان بوجه عام، إلى عدة أقسام:

(تيار عدائي – تيار متردد – تيار مؤيد):

التيار الأول: عدائي ومنحاز للسلطة على كل حال وعدائي بشكل هجائي وتكفيري للإخوان يمثله الشيخ أسامة القوصي[20]، والشيخ محمد سعيد رسلان[21] في مصر، ومثله المدخلية، والجامية[22] في المحيط الإقليمي.

التيار الثاني: متردد أو مربك لقواعده أو غير واضح في العلاقة، وهو التيار الأكبر مثل الشيخ محمد حسان والشيخ الحويني، ومعهم رموز الدعوية السلفية، وقد تغير الموقف بعد الانقلاب وانقسموا إلى فريقين فريق أيد الانقلاب وبالغ في متابعته حتى تماهى مع القوصي ورسلان، وآخر ظل غامضًا مترددًا، واقترب فريق آخر من الجهر بالحق على استحياء ونقد الإخوان على استحياء أيضًا.

التيار الثالث: مؤيد ومتعاطف مع الثورة والإخوان، وهو جمهور الشباب السلفي والكثير من قادتهم، وكان تيارًا خافتًا في البداية وبلغ ذروته الثورية والتماهي مع الإخوان بعد الانقلاب العسكري، ويمثله الجبهة السلفية، وحركة حازمون، والشيخ فوزي السعيد، والشيخ محمد عبد المقصود، وآخرون[23].

وكان من ثمار الثورة المصرية في 25 يناير/كانون الثاني 2011، أنها أنتجت بيئة سياسية تتسم بالتعددية؛ حيث تكونت أحزاب وحركات ليبرالية، وأخرى يسارية، وتشكّل عدد كبير من الأحزاب الإسلامية، لعل أهمها حزب "الحرية والعدالة" المنبثق عن جماعة "الإخوان المسلمين"، وعدد من الأحزاب السلفية، الوافدة حديثًا للمجال السياسي، والذي يُعدّ حزب "النور" أبرزها، الذي حصل على الشرعية القانونية في يونيو/حزيران 2011.

وبالتركيز على موقف الدعوة السلفية، من ثورة يناير، نجد أنها رفضت المشاركة في الثورة ورأت أنها مؤامرة، ولكن تغير الأمر بعد تنحي مبارك، حيث نظّمت الجماعة مؤتمرات عديدة في ربوع

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[19] نصار، جمال، السلطة واستدعاء الدين في الصراع السياسي المصري، الرابط: http://gamalnassar.com/main/art.php?id=6&art=802

[20] هو طبيب بشري، إمام وخطيب مسجد الهدي المحمدي بعين شمس، ورئيس جمعية سبيل المقربين الخيرية الأهلية، ولد في 8 أغسطس 1954، ودرس في اليمن على يد الشيخ مقبل بن هادي الوادعي. قال إن كل التنظيمات الجهادية التي ظهرت في أعقاب ثورة 30 يونيو، خرجت جميعها من مدرسة تنظيم الإخوان، وأصدر عدد من الفتاوى المثيرة للجدل. انظر: بوابة الحركات الإسلامية http://www.islamist-movements.com/13327

[21] من أبرز قيادات التيار المداخلي في مصر، مكنى بأبي عبد الله، ولد في 23 نوفمبر 1955، يبلغ من العمر 59 سنة في قرية سبك الأحد مركز أشمون، محافظة المنوفية، حاصل على بكالوريوس الطب والجراحة من جامعة الأزهر، وحاصل على ليسانس الآداب قسم اللغة العربية. انظر: بوابة الحركات الإسلامية http://www.islamist-movements.com/13327

[22] الجاميّة، نسبة إلى مؤسّس الطائفة، محمد أمان الجامي الهرري الحبشي، والمداخلة، نسبة إلى ربيع بن هادي المدخلي شريك الجامي في تأسيس الطائفة، وتارةً يسمّون بالخلوف، وقد أطلقَ هذا الاسمَ عليهم العلّامة عبد العزيز عبد العزيز قارئ. انظر: عبد السلام راغب، الجامية والمداخلة نشأتهم – أسماوْهم –شيوخهم، موقع الإسلاميون، الرابط: http://cutt.us/NSXEP

[23] عثمان، طارق، الإخوان المسلمون والسلفيون في مصر، قراءة تحليلية في طبيعة ومسار العلاقة، (مركز نماء للبحوث والدراسات)، ص18–20، الرابط: http://nama-center.com/ImagesGallary/photoGallary/pdf/nama_pdf_001.pd

مصر، احتفت فيها بسقوط مبارك، وأثنت على شباب الثورة وحذرت من المساس بالمادة الثانية من الدستور، والتي تنص على أن الإسلام دين الدولة، واللغة العربية لغتها الرسمية، ومبادئ الشريعة الإسلامية المصدر الرئيسي للتشريع.

وقد افتعلت بهذا معركة حول المادة الثانية التي كانت محل إجماع وطني – باستثناء أقوال شاذة ليس لها وزن مجتمعي – ولكن الجماعة رأت في افتعالها لهذه المعركة حشدًا لشبابها حولها بعد أن اختلت صورتها في نظر قطاع من جمهورها نتيجة موقفها السلبي من الثورة، فأوجدت هذه المعركة وبالغت في اختلاق ما يحاك بمصر من مؤامرات، وكل ما ذكروه تقريبًا يتعلق بإلغاء المادة وبالتالي نشر الإلحاد والشذوذ والعري بصورة كبيرة.

ويعتبر حزب النور الذراع السياسي الوحيد للدعوة السلفية، حيث أوضحت الدعوة السلفية– في بيان لها– أن الرؤية السياسية لكل من الدعوة السلفية وحزب النور واحدة، وهي تتضمن التمسك بالشريعة الإسلامية بفهم سلف الأمة مع العمل بكل الممكن، وبيان حكم الشرع فيما تعجز عنه، وهذا منهج مميز يمثِّل الميثاق الذي به تأسس الحزب، مع الاجتهاد في اختيار الشخصيات القادرة على التعبير عن هذه الرؤية عن قناعة تامة بها، والالتزام بالمواقف المنهجية والسياسية التي يتخذها الحزب من خلال العمل المؤسسي[24].

وقد حدث تطور سلبي واضح في علاقة الدعوة السلفية الممثلة، بحزب النور مع جماعة الإخوان المسلمين، من خلال حزب الحرية والعدالة، لأن تطور هذه العلاقة أدى إلى الوقيعة بالإخوان والرئيس في مشاكل سياسية، ظهرت بوادرها حينما تهيأت الأجواء للانقلاب على الرئيس المنتخب.

ونلاحظ أن الثورة المضادة عملت على تقسيم الكتلة الثورية إلى فريقين شباب الثورة والإسلاميين ونجحت عن طريق أذرعها في طرفي المعادلة من غلاة الليبراليين ومتشددي السلفية، وكان أول انقسام هو موضوع الاستفتاء على الدستور، وما صاحبه من تهويل واستخدام ألفاظ صاحبته كان أبطالها مجموعات ليبرالية وسلفية حتى وقعت الوقيعة، وأثار ياسر برهامي قضية (التحرش بالشريعة)، وهاجم الأزهر، وشعر الإخوان بالحرج، فدعوا إلى التحالف الديمقراطي لإتاحة الفرصة لشباب الثورة أن يحصلوا على دعم لوجستي مناسب بما تمتلكه جماعة الإخوان المسلمين من حضور شعبي واجتماعي، إلا أن تدخل المجلس العسكري، وتشدد حزب النور الذي ضم معه كل المجموعات السلفية المختلفة من الجماعة الإسلامية، والفضيلة، وحتى بعض الأفراد (عرف بعد ذلك بأنه بإيعاز من المجلس العسكري) مع الأحزاب الليبرالية وغيرها واستقطابه لشباب الثورة أفشل التحالف وازداد الانقسام وتوترت العلاقة مع حزب النور[25].

وحقيقة الأمر أن علاقة حزب النور والدعوة السلفية بالإخوان والرئيس، قد تغيرا في النصف الثاني من السنة التي حكم فيها الرئيس مرسي، من نهاية عام (2012) إلى نهاية بداية الانقلاب العسكري في 3 يوليو/ تموز (2013)، وظهر ذلك جليًا في المبادرة التي طرحها الحزب في (26 يناير/كانون الثاني 2013) لوقف العنف، كما ورد في البيان الذي ألقاه يونس مخيون رئيس الحزب ونادر بكار مساعد رئيس الحزب[26]، وكانت هذه المبادرة دافعًا لجبهة الإنقاذ المصرية التي

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[24] الدعوة السلفية تؤكد أن حزب النور هو الذراع السياسية الوحيد لها، الشروق المصرية، 31 من ديسمبر/كانون أول 2012، الرابط: http://cutt.us/dRPAn

[25] عبد الله، رضوان منيسي، جدلية العلاقة بين الإخوان والسلفية في مصر: المفاهيم والميادين، (مدارك لدراسات الإسلام السياسي السني والشيعي)، الرابط: http://cutt.us/5egly

[26] مبادرة حزب النور للخروج من الأزمة، البوابة نيوز، الرابط: http://www.albawabhnews.com/9910

ناصبت الرئيس مرسي العداء في دعم موقفها، بل تم الاتفاق بين الجانبين على ثمانية بنود من أبرزها تشكيل حكومة وطنية، بديلة عن حكومة هشام قنديل[27].

وزادت الخلافات بين الإخوان وحزب النور، التي تولدت مع الدعوة لمظاهرات (30 يونيو/حزيران 2013) والإعداد لها من قِبل "جبهة الإنقاذ"، ومشاركة حزب النور في اجتماعاتها في حزب الوفد، وانتهت بمشاركة الحزب في مشهد 3 يوليو/تموز 2013، بحضور أمين عام حزب النور المهندس جلال مُرة، ودعم الحزب فيما بعد للسيسي في الانتخابات الرئاسية، والدفاع عن شرعيته، وإصدار الفتوى لتأييده.

المبحث الثالث

موقف حزب النور السلفي من الانقلاب على المسار الديمقراطي

أرادت السلطة الحاكمة في مصر بعد الانقلاب على الرئيس المنتخب، دعم موقفها بأحد الأحزاب الإسلامية المهمة، الذي كان له النصيب الأكبر بعد حزب الحرية والعدالة في انتخابات 2012، وهذا لا يخرج عن طبيعة الدعوة السلفية الحاضنة لحزب النور، واختيارها لعدم الصدام مع السلطة، بل ودعمها له في خارطة الطريق. وهذا أدى إلى شق الصف السلفي برمته، ووجود معظم القوى السلفية في مواجهة مع سلطة الانقلاب[28].

وبررت الدعوة السلفية دعمها للسيسي في بيان صدر في الثالث من مايو/آيار 2014 بقولها: المشير عبد الفتاح السيسي أنسب من منافسه لهذه المرحلة، ويرون أنه أقدر على قيادة مؤسسات الدولة[29].

ومن ثمَّ لم تخرج ممارسات حزب النور والدعوة السلفية، عن الإطار الذي يمارسه السيسي، والقوى الداعمة له، برغم الانتهاكات التي حدثت في فض اعتصامي رابعة والنهضة، وكذلك الحرس الجمهوري، وغيرها من المواجهات الأخرى بين المعارضين للانقلاب، والسلطة الحاكمة.

وهذا ما أكد عليه ياسر برهامي، نائب رئيس الدعوة السلفية، بقوله: إن الفريق أول عبد الفتاح السيسى، وزير الدفاع، لم يصدر أمرًا بقتل المعتصمين أثناء فض اعتصام عناصر الإخوان فى ميداني رابعة العدوية ونهضة مصر بحسب علمه، وأن الأمر الذي أصدره هو التعامل مع من يرفع السلاح[30].

وعلى ذلك ضمنت السلطة الحاكمة في مصر دعم المؤسسة الدينية بشقيها (الأزهر والكنيسة)، وتحالفها مع أكبر حزب سلفي ممثلًا في حزب النور. ولكن هل تستمر العلاقة بين حزب النور والسيسي إلى الأبد أم أن قواعد الدعوة السلفية ربما تضغط لفك هذا الارتباط؟[31]

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[27] بنود اتفاق جبهة الإنقاذ وحزب النور للخروج من الأزمة الحالية، بوابة الأهرام، الرابط: http://gate.ahram.org.eg/News/302717.aspx

[28] يمكن الرجوع إلى الدراسة التي أعدها علوي عبد القادر السقاف، بعنوان: موقف حزب النور من الانقلاب العسكري رؤية شرعية واقعية، (موقع الدرر السنية،27 من شعبان 1434هـ)، الرابط: http://www.dorar.net/art/1610

[29] بيان شيوخ وأبناء الدعوة السلفية بشأن الانتخابات الرئاسية، موقع أنا السلفي، 4 من مايو/آيار 2014، انظر الرابط: http://www.anasalafy.com/play.php?catsmktba= 48505

[30] موقع اليوم السابع، 20 من يناير/كانون ثان 2014، الرابط: http://cutt.us/cuiQd

[31] نصار، السلطة واستدعاء الدين في الصراع السياسي المصري، مرجع سابق

وفي بيان داخلي لحزب النور، يوضح فيه الموقف من الرئيس مرسي بعد الانقلاب العسكري، ذكروا فيه لماذا لم يشاركوا الإخوان في المظاهرات التي خرجت يومي (21 يونيو/حزيران 2013) و (28 يونيو/ حزيران 2013) لدعم الدكتور مرسي قبل الانقلاب عليه، بعنوان هل خذل حزب النور الدكتور مرسي؟ "ليس لأحد أن يلزمنا باجتهاده، وقد كان اجتهادنا – وما زال – أننا لم نكن نرغب في تعميق انقسام الشارع إلى إسلاميين وغير إسلاميين، وأننا كنا في حاجة إلى تفريغ شحنة الغضب لدى العامة "لاسيما وأن لها ما يبررها" كما أننا طالبنا منظمي هذه الفاعليات بإيقاف خطاب التكفير والعنف، واعتذروا بالحرج من مطالبة الرموز التي تنتهج هذا الخطاب بإيقافه! وهذا قضى على أي احتمال لإعادة دراسة الموقف من مليونية (21ـ6ـ2013م)"[32].

وأشاروا أنهم اتفقوا مع مكتب الإرشاد التابع لجماعة الإخوان المسلمين بعدم النزول بعد ذلك، "تم الاتفاق مع مكتب الإرشاد على عدم النزول يوم (28–6–2013م) بناءً على أن رؤيتهم أن الجيش من المستحيل أن يتخلى عن د."مرسي"، ونحن كنا نرى أنه من المستحيل أن يتخلى عن القصر وإن كان من الممكن أن ينحاز إلى المتظاهرين إذا زاد عددهم عن حد معين "وهو ما حدث"؛ ولم يكن لمعتصمي "رابعة" أي دور حتى تم إعلان (3 يوليو/ تموز)"[33].

إن الدعوة السلفية الداعمة لحزب النور كانت بينها وبين الفريق أول عبدالفتاح السيسي تفاهمات، حينما كان رئيسًا للمخابرات الحربية، قبل إعلان نتيجة الانتخابات الرئاسية التي فاز فيها محمد مرسي بالرئاسة، وظهر ذلك من فيديو مسرّب لياسر برهامي القيادي في الدعوة السلفية[34].

كل هذا يؤكد أن حزب النور لم يكن بعيدًا عن الترتيب للانقلاب العسكري على الدكتور مرسي، ولم يفاجأ بذلك "بل هو مع من صنع الأحداث وقتها وليس أدل على ذلك من تصريح شعبان عبدالعليم عضو الهيئة العليا للحزب والذي صرح بأن "من يقول إن حزب النور لم يشارك في الإعداد للثورة – يقصد 30 يونيه – فهو لا يعرف شيئًا عن الثورات لأن حزب النور كان أحد المحركين في المشهد السياسي في الستة شهور الأخيرة، يقصد قبل 30 يونيه، فقدم مبادرة وقدم تحذير من الأخونة، وحرّك الرأي العام فهذا دوره، أما من يتكلم عن خروج الناس في الشارع فهذا لا يفهم شيء في الثورات"[35].

وأتصور أن كل الاستشهادات الشرعية التي أوردها قادة الدعوة السلفية لتبرير مشاركتهم في مشهد الانقلاب العسكري على المسار الديمقراطي لم يحالفه الصواب، وأرادوا من خلاله خداع الرأي العام السلفي وعموم المصريين، وهذا ما أكده "علوي بن عبد القادر السقاف"، أحد السلفيين في رده على هذا الموقف، ودحض شبههم في تبرير الانقلاب العسكري ودعمه[36].

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[32] موقع أنا السلفي، الرابط: http://www.anasalafy.com/play.php?catsmktba=42027

[33] السابق نفسه

[34] الزواوي، عمر، الجزيرة نت، الرابط: http://cutt.us/HtauG

[35] عباس، محمود، حزب النور وكواليس المشاركة في انقلاب الثالث من يوليو، نون بوست، الرابط: http://cutt.us/toZXA

[36] السقاف، علوي بن عبد القادر، موقف حزب النُور من الانقلاب العسكري (رؤية شرعيّة واقعيّة)، موقع طريق الإسلام، الرابط: http://cutt.us/K1uR7

المبحث الرابع
موقف الهيئات والتيارات والأحزاب السلفية من الانقلاب العسكري

اتضح في المبحث السابق موقف حزب النور والدعوة السلفية من الانقلاب العسكري، وتعرفنا على دورهم مع بعض التيارات الليبرالية، وخصوصًا جبهة الإنقاذ، في التمهيد للانقلاب على المسار الديمقراطي، ولكن هذا الموقف لم يكن هو موقف مجمل التيارات السلفية الأخرى، وبعض الشخصيات البارزة المحسوبة على هذا التيار، بل وجدنا أن بعض ممن انتسب لحزب النور والدعوة السلفية، وقفوا مع شرعية الرئيس مرسي، واختلفوا مع حزب النور في الانقلاب عليه، وكانت لهم مواقف داعمة للمسار الديمقراطي، ومن أهم هذه التيارات والهيئات والأحزاب السلفية:

■ الهيئة الشرعيّة للحقوق والإصلاح.

■ مجلس شورى العلماء.

■ الجبهة السلفيّة.

■ التحالف الوطني لدعم الشرعية ورفض الانقلاب.

أولًا: الهيئة الشرعيّة للحقوق والإصلاح:

تعتبر الهيئة الشرعية للحقوق والإصلاح من نتاج ثورة 25 يناير، حيث ظهرت كأحد المساعي لتوحيد الخطاب الإسلامي، ولاعب سياسي في ساحة الحركات الإسلامية، وإن اقتصر دورها على إبراز مواقفها السياسية والشرعية إعلاميًا.

ومن أبرز علمائها السلفيِّين: علي السالوس (الرئيس)، والدكتور طلعت عفيفي، والشيخ نشأت أحمد، والدكتور عمر عبد العزيز القريشي، والدكتور محمَّد عبد المقصود عفيفي، والسيِّد العربي، ومحمَّد يُسري إبراهيم (الأمين العام).

وقد اكتسبت الهيئة وزنها وقوتها من مجموع أعضائها الذين ينتمون لأغلب الحركات الإسلامية الموجودة على الساحة، بالرغم من أن كلًا من أعضائها هو عضو في الهيئة بصفته الشخصية، فالهيئة لا تضم لعضويتها حركات ومنظمات، وتضم أشخاصًا، لكنْ ثقل هذه الشخصيات في منظماتهم الأصلية يثقل الوزن السياسي للهيئة الشرعية بشكل أو بآخر، والهيئة تصف نفسها بأنها هيئة علمية إسلامية وسطية مستقلة، تتكون من مجموعة من العلماء والحكماء والخبراء[37].

وحددت الهيئة موقفها من الانقلاب على الدكتور مرسي في بيان صدر عنها ورد فيه: ″أن شريعة الله تعالى تقضي بأن الحاكم هو من انعقدت له بيعة المسلمين باختيارهم الحُرّ، وحيث انعقدت هذه البيعة بالفعل للرئيس الحالي د. محمد مرسي فإن أي منازعة للرئاسة دون الرجوع إلى الشعب الذي انتخبه تعتبر منازعة باطلةً شرعًا″.

وجاء في البيان: ″أن الوقوف وراء هذا المبدأ الأصيل من السياسة الشرعية، هو واجبٌ شرعي وطاعة لله ورسوله صلى الله عليه وسلم، ولذلك تهيب الهيئة الشرعية بجموع المسلمين أن

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[37] الهيئة الشرعية للحقوق والإصلاح اللاعب الأساسي بساحة الإسلاميين.. الإخوان والسلفيون والجماعة الإسلامية ينتظرون دعمها، اليوم السابع، الرابط: http://cutt.us/Xu7GQ

يحتشدوا في كافة ميادين مصر للدفاع عن حقوقهم الشرعية والمشروعة مؤكّدًا على حُرمةِ الخوضِ في الدماء والأموال بغير حقٍّ؛ والله تعالى يقول: (وَمَن يَقْتُلْ مُؤْمِنًا مُتَعَمِّدًا فَجَزَآؤُهُ جَهَنَّمُ خَـٰلِدًا فِيهَا وَغَضِبَ ٱللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَلَعَنَهُ وَأَعَدَّ لَهُ عَذَابًا عَظِيمًا) (النساء:93)[38].

وبهذا دعمت الهيئة الشرعية للحقوق والإصلاح موقف الرئيس المنتخب محمد مرسي، وحذرت من الانقلاب عليه، ودعت جموع الشعب المصري لتأييده والوقوف معه.

ثانيًا: مجلس شورى العلماء:

هذا المجلس يتكون من مجموعة من العلماء المحسوبين على التيار السلفي، من أبرزهم الشيخ عبد الله شاكر (الرئيس) والشيخ محمد حسان (نائب الرئيس) وآخرون، وصدر البيان الأول لمجلس شورى العلماء في (10 من مارس/آذار 2011)، يدعو إلى الموافقة على التعديلات الدستورية، ويرحب بالمشاركة في الانتخابات التشريعية، مع عدم ترشح العلماء والدعاة، وانتخاب الرئيس الأكثر تبنيًا للشريعة، محذرًا من المساس بالمادة الثانية للدستور[39].

وتبنى المجلس في بيانه الصادر بتاريخ (8 من يوليو/تموز 2013)، بعد الانقلاب العسكري، دعوة للصلح بين المختلفين، لحقن الدماء، جاء فيه: "ضرورة عودة الرئيس المنتخب من الشعب، الدكتور محمد مرسي إلى مكانه رئيسًا للبلاد وإيقاف حملة الاعتقالات والإفراج عن جميع المعتقلين في هذه الأزمة الأخيرة".

وأكدوا في البيان الذي وقّع عليه مجموعة من علماء مصر، على رأسهم الدكتور عبد الله شاكر، والشيخ محمد حسان، والشيخ أبو إسحاق الحويني، والشيخ محمد حسين يعقوب، والشيخ مصطفى العدوي، والشيخ سعيد عبد العظيم، جاء فيه: "إن المجلس بعد متابعته الأحداث الجارية على الساحة المصرية وما أدَّت إليه المواقف والقرارات الأخيرة من مواجهات دامية لا يرضي الله أولًا ولا الناصحين الأمناء في هذه الأمة".

وطرح المجلس رؤية للخروج من هذه الأزمة تتمثل في: "قيام الرئيس مرسي بعد إعادته بتشكيل حكومة كفاءات يتم الاتفاق عليها، والسعي في عقد مصالحة وطنية بين جميع الأطراف، والإسراع بإجراء انتخابات برلمانية"[40].

وبعد ذلك نتيجة للمتابعات الأمنية وسيطرة سلطة 3 يوليو على المشهد "توقف (مجلس شورى العلماء) عن الانعقاد وإصدار البيانات، وتنوعت أحوال أعضائه، فسافر الحويني واستقر في دولة قطر ممارسًا الدعوة وإلقاء الدروس الدينية هناك، فيما استمر مصطفى العدوي في إلقاء دروسه العلمية والدعوية في بعض المساجد بمصر، إضافة إلى لقاءات للفتوى في قناة الندى الإسلامية، وتوقف يعقوب عن اللقاءات الجماهيرية والفضائية مكتفيًا بمسجده الصغير حيث يلتقي فيه بخاصة طلبته، أما حسان فاستمرت قناته الفضائية قناة الرحمة بصورة عادية، ولكنه قلل من الظهور عما قبل"[41].

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[38] موقف العلماء المسلمين من الانقلاب على الشرعية في مصر، موقع طريق الإسلام، الرابط: http://cutt.us/clURg

[39] الموقع الرسمي للشيخ جمال المراكبي، الرابط: http://www.almarakby.com/web/play-538.html

[40] بيان المجلس 33، الصفحة الرسمية لمجلس شورى العلماء، الرابط: https://www.facebook.com/shora.alolamaa/

[41] زاهر، معتز، التيار السلفي المصري من 25 يناير إلى الوقت الحاضر، (رؤيا للبحوث والدراسات)، الرابط: http://ruyaa.cc/Page/2436

ثالثًا: الجبهة السلفيَّة:

تـهتم الجبهـة، وفقًـا لأهدافـها المعلنـة، بالسـاحة السـلفية نفسـها، حيث تعتبرها ميدان عملها الأساسي، ولا يشغلها فيمـا يبـدو غير مسـألة تطبيق الشـريعة، واستكمال مسـيرة الثورة، وتقديم خطـاب سـلفي تجديـدي، وتقويم مسـيرة الإسـلاميين من خلال ″خلخلة بعض الرؤى غير المنضبطة التي تكرست في المرحلة السابقة″[42].

ومن أهدافها أيضًا الدفاع عن الحقوق المشروعة للإسلاميين خاصة والمسلمين عامة، وتقديم خطـاب إسـلامي سـلفي للمجتمع مختلـف عن ذلك الخطـاب الإعلامـي السـائد في فترات الانكسار للاستبداد، بحيث يحافظ على الثوابت الشرعية من جهة، ويهتم بالواقع المصري، فيعيش آلام وآمـال النـاس ولا ينفصل عنهم أو يسـتعلي عليهم من جهـة أخرى، وتقديم نموذج عملي مشرف للمسـلمين، حيث تكون الحركة الإسـلامية هي الرائد الأمين للأمة، وهي طليعتها المضحية لتحقيق آمال الأمة، وحرزها، كي لا تعود إلى فترات الطغيان الجبري المستبد مرة أخرى[43].

ومن ثمَّ كان موقف الجبهة من الانقلاب العسكري واضحًا بالرفض ودعوة الشباب للخروج ضده في الميادين العامة لدعم شرعية الدكتور مرسي، وأشارت في بيانها رقم (90) بعد ستون يومًا من الانقـلاب: أن مصر عاشت أسـوأ أيامها في ظل الانقـلاب على الشـرعية، ورد فيه: ″تعرض الشعب المصـري خلال هذه الأيام لأكبر عملية تزييف للواقـع في تاريخه إن لم يكن في تاريخ البشرية، اسـتهدفت في الأسـاس ضرب هويتـه وتغيير ثقافتـه ومعتقداتـه.. وارتكبت سـلطات الانقـلاب بحق المصريين أبشع الجرائم ضد الإنسانية من قتل وحرق واعتقال وتنكيل للرموز السياسية والوطنية والإسـلامية، وقلب للحقائق وتلفيق للاتهامـات، واغتصاب لإرادة الشـعب، وتشـويه لصـورة كل من يعارض هذا الانقلاب العسكري الدموي الغاشم.. وتكبّد الاقتصاد المصري خسائر فادحة منذ اللحظات الأولى من عمر هذا الانقلاب تجاوزت الـ 200 مليار جنيه″[44]..

رابعًا: التحالف الوطني لدعم الشرعية ورفض الانقلاب:

اتخـذت مجموعـة من الأحـزاب الإسلامية والتيـارات السياسـية، موقفًـا ضد الانقـلاب على الشـرعية، والرئيس المنتخب محمد مرسي، عدا حزب النور الذي وقف مع السيسي وأيَّده في إعلان 3 يوليو/ تموز بحجة حقن الدماء، وانضوت هذه الأحزاب تحت مُسمى (التحالف الوطني لدعم الشرعية) الذي تكوَّن بعـد الانقلاب العسكري[45]، وشـارك في التحالـف أحزاب البنـاء والتنميـة، التابع للجماعة الإسلامية، والحرية والعدالة المنبثق عن جماعة الإخوان المسلمين، والعمل الجديد، والفضيلة، والإصـلاح، والتوحيـد العربـي، والحـزب الإسلامـي، والوطـن (الـذي انسـحب فيمـا بعـد)، والوسـط (انسحب فيما بعد).

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[42] الصفحة الرسمية للجبهة السلفية على الفيس بوك، انظر الرابط: https://www.facebook.com/gabhasalafia/

[43] موقع الجبهة السلفية الرسمي، الرابط:
http://gabhasalafia.com/%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%81-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D8
%AC%D8%A8%D9%87%D8%A9#.W37z0tgzZsN

[44] الصفحة الرسمية للجبهة السلفية بمصر على الفيس بوك، الرابط:
https://www.facebook.com/gabhasalafia/posts/584741234915579?_tn_=K-R

[45] تحالف سياسي مصري معارض لانقلاب الفريق عبد الفتاح السيسي على محمد مرسي أول رئيس مصري منتخب في 3 يوليو/تموز 2013، ويضم قوى سياسية وحركات إسلامية ونقابات عمالية ومهنية، وقوى شبابية ثورية، وشخصيات عامة، ودشن عمله بشكل علني يوم 27 يونيو/حزيران 2013.

كما تشكل من حزبي الأصالة، والشعب، وائتلاف اتحاد القبائل العربية بمصر، ومجلس أمناء الثورة، واتحاد النقابات المهنية الذي يضم 24 نقابة مهنية، منها نقابة الدعاة، والنقابة العامة لفلاحي مصر، واتحاد طلاب جامعة الأزهر، ومركز السواعد العمالية، والرابطة العامة للباعة الجائلين، وضباط متقاعدون ومحاربون قدماء[46].

وما يهمنا في هذا السياق هو الحديث عن الأحزاب السلفية التي شكلت هذا التحالف منها: **حزب الوطن السلفي**[47]، وحزب **الفضيلة السلفي**[48]، وحزب **الأصالة السلفي**[49]، وحزب **الإصلاح**[50]؛ وهذه الأحزاب التزمت بالخط العام للتحالف الوطني لدعم الشرعية، واستمرت داعمة له، بخلاف حزب الوطن الذي انسحب مبكرًا.

ومن ثمَّ مثَّلت البيانات الصادرة عن تحالف دعم الشرعية الذي أدان الانقلاب، وخطورته على مصر، وجهة نظر تلك الأحزاب، وكان البيان الأول للتحالف في هذا الصدد معبرًا عن استنكاره للانقلاب ودمويته وسلوكه الذي تعامل به مع المعارضين وصدر هذا البيان في (3 من يوليو/ تموز 2013) أكدوا فيه على أن ″هذا انقلاب واضح علي الدستور والشرعية بالإضافة إلي أنه سيعيد تشتيت جهود الجيش مرة أخري في إدارة المشهد السياسي، وهو ما عانينا منه عام ونصف مضطرين، ولا نريد أن نكرر هذه التجربة المريرة خاصة وأننا علي أبواب انتخابات برلمانية تستطيع المعارضة أن تحقق فيها الأغلبية وتشكل الحكومة″، ومن ثمَّ رفضوا رفضًا قاطعًا أي قرار يصدر خارج إطار الشرعية الدستورية واعتبروه ″منعدمًا لأنه يصدر عن غير ذي صفة″.

وفي نهاية البيان دعوا جموع المصريين للاحتشاد بالميادين ″للوقوف في وجه محاولات الانقلاب على الدستور، وللدفاع عن حرية المصريين التي يريد البعض سلبها والعودة بنا مرة أخري إلي عهود الظلام والفساد″[51].

المبحث الخامس

مستقبل التيارات السلفية في مصر بعد الانقلاب العسكري

بات التيار السلفي أكثر تشتتًا وضعفًا بعد الانقلاب العسكرى على المسار الديمقراطي في مصر، وتغيّر المشهد السياسي بشكل كبير عقب 30 يونيو/حزيران 2013، ، وتحوّل ″حزب النور″ ومعه ″الدعوة السلفية″، من قوة انتخابية لا يستهان بها، ترهب كافة منافسيها، إلى منافس ضعيف

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[46] التحالف الوطني لدعم الشرعية، الجزيرة نت، الرابط: http://cutt.us/ulW6n

[47] تشكّل حزب ″الوطن″ على وقع انشقاق رئيس حزب ″النور″ السابق عماد عبد الغفور، والذي كان يشغل منصب مساعد رئيس الجمهورية، عن الحزب بصحبة مجموعة كبيرة من أبرز قيادات ″الدعوة السلفية″، مثل يسري حماد، ومحمد نور، وراضي شرارة، وأحمد بديع.

[48] تأسس في 17 أكتوبر/ تشرين الأول 2011، ويعتمد على مجموعة من الشباب السلفي، في مقدمتهم محمود فتحي، رئيس الحزب الحالي، ومحمد عبده إمام، أستاذ القانون بجامعة الأزهر، وخالد سعيد، المتحدث باسم ″الجبهة السلفية″، والناشط حسام أبو البخاري (مسجون حاليًا)، وقد صرّح المهندس محمود فتحي من خلال مكالمة مع الباحث بتاريخ (24 من أغسطس 2018) أن حزب الفضيلة بدأ إسلاميًا وغلب عليه مصطلح سلقي في البدايات.. ثم حدث خلاف أدى لانفصال أعضاء ذهبوا وأسسوا حزب الأصالة.. وبقي حزب الفضيلة إسلاميًا ولا يصنّف نفسه أو يرضى أن يصنف كحزب سلفي.

[49] تأسس حزب ″الأصالة″ في يوليو/تموز 2011 على يد الشيخ محمد عبد المقصود، أحد أبرز رموز مدرسة ″السلفية الحركية″ المتمركزة بالقاهرة. وترأس الحزب في البداية شقيقه اللواء عادل عبد المقصود، مساعد وزير الداخلية الأسبق، قبل أن يتم إجراء تعديلات على الحزب بعد حلّ برلمان 2012، بقرار من المحكمة الدستورية العليا. ويتولى المهندس إيهاب شيحة رئاسة الحزب حتى اليوم.

[50] تأسس في سبتمبر 2011 ويتبنّى المنهج السلفي من منظور بعض مشايخ السعودية، ورأسه البرلماني السابق الدكتور عطية عدلان. وهو الحزب السلفي الوحيد الذي شارك ″الإخوان المسلمين″ في تحالفهم الانتخابي لبرلمان 2012.

[51] بيان (4) للتحالف الوطني لدعم الشرعية، الصفحة الرسمية للتحالف، الرابط: https://www.facebook.com/AllianceSupportingLegitimacy/

تلقّى هزيمة قاسية في معاقله الانتخابية في الانتخابات البرلمانية الأخيرة (نوفمبر/ تشرين الثاني 2015).

وقد خسرت قائمته الانتخابية في مواجهة قائمة "في حب مصر" المدعومة من أجهزة الدولة في قطاع غرب الدلتا، في حين لم يتمكن سوى ثمانية من مرشحيه فقط من الفوز بمقاعد فردية.

كما ضحّى نظام السيسي بحزب النور، في مواقف عدة، منها: "عدم السماح لقياداته بالخطابة، مثل ما طال مشايخ "الدعوة السلفية" التي انبثق عنها الحزب، وعلى رأس قياداتها ياسر برهامي. وتعرّض الحزب لحملة مبرمجة للنيل منه، والهجوم عليه بشكل كبير في وسائل الإعلام المختلفة"[52].

وسار على خطى "النور"، حزب "الإصلاح والنهضة"، الذي تبرّأ من توجهه الإسلامي، ليؤكد أنه حزب مدني، وشارك في الانتخابات، إلا أنه لم يفز بأي مقعد.

وعلى صعيد باقي التكتلات والأحزاب السلفية، فقد تحوّل معظمها لمجرد رموز شخصية معبّرة عن كل حزب، بعد اضطرار معظمهم للخروج من مصر مطاردين، عقب فض اعتصامي رابعة العدوية والنهضة، وموقفهم الرافض للانقلاب. وفي مقدمة هؤلاء: رئيس حزب "الفضيلة" محمود فتحي، ورئيس حزب "الأصالة" إيهاب شيحة، وأحد الرموز السلفية بالقاهرة محمد عبدالمقصود.

وفيما يتعلق برموز "السلفية العلمية"، فقد التزم كل من الشيخ محمد حسان، وأبو أسحاق الحويني، ومحمد حسين يعقوب، الصمت تمامًا، رافضين الدخول في صدام مع النظام السياسي بدعوى فقهية، وهي تجنب الفتنة.

ونجد أن نظام 3 يوليو في تعامله مع الأحزاب الإسلامية بشكل عام، والسلفية بشكل خاص يقوم على مستويين:

المستوى الأول: هو مستوى الاستخدام والتطويع، كما يفعل مع حزب النور السلفي، ولا يستطيع الحزب الخروج عن سياسة النظام، وبمثل هذه الضغوطات يريد نظام السيسي ألا يخرج الحزب عن تأييده في كل المواقف، كما يتم تهديد الحزب من حين لآخر بالبلاغات التي تطالب بحله.

المستوى الثاني: يشمل الأحزاب الإسلامية الأخرى المعارضة للنظام مثل حزب الأصالة، والوطن، والفضيلة، والإصلاح، ويتم التعامل معهم من خلال البلاغات التي تطالب بحل الأحزاب الإسلامية، وتلفيق التهم لبعض قياداتهم، وتغييبهم داخل السجون، وخروج العديد من قياداتهم خارج مصر.

والسيناريو الأرجح الذي يرسم مستقبل التيارات السلفية مع وجود نظام 3 يوليو في حده الأدنى؛ هو إرجاع عقارب الساعة إلى ما قبل ثورة يناير/كانون الثاني 2011، حيث لم يكن يُسمح للإسلاميين بإنشاء أحزاب، أو ممارسة العمل السياسي بغطاء شرعي.

وتتحدد العلاقة بين النظام والسلفيين بحسب موافقتهم الكاملة على كل ممارسات السيسي، بل وتبريرها، وإعطائها الصبغة الشرعية بحجة أنه السلطان المتغلب، ووجوب الانصياع له، حقنًا للدماء، ودرءً للفتنة.

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[52] أحمد، محمد، مصر: مستقبل التيار السلفي .. مجهول، العربي الجديد، الرابط: http://cutt.us/jIcAN

وأصبح كل من يخرج عن سياسة النظام أو يعترض على ممارساته، إما التهديد بالحل إن كان حزبًا، والسجن أحيانًا، وإما المنع من العمل الدعوي، والسجن أيضًا إن لم تتم الاستجابة.

ومن ثمَّ فإن على التيارات السلفية أن تحدد موقفها من العمل السياسي، إذا أرادت ممارستها بشكل نظيف، وخصوصًا بعد أفول دورها الذي بزغ بعد ثورة يناير/ كانون الثاني 2011، والعودة إلى توعية جموع الشعب المصري بالعلم الشرعي الأصيل، بنفس الطريقة التي كانت عليها قبل ثورة يناير/كانون الثاني، لأن سوى ذلك سيقابل بالعنف من قبل السلطة الحالية، وستكون عواقبه وخيمة، وقد ظهرت بوادره بانصراف بعض الشباب السلفي إلى التيارات الجهادية العنيفة، أو الانزواء بعيدًا عن كل الحركات والتيارات الإسلامية.

وختامًا؛ تكمن خطورة تداعيات هذا الصراع الدائر بين الإسلاميين بشكل عام، ونظام السيسي في القلق من تجدد الفوضى السياسية، والموقف الضعيف للإسلاميين قد يؤدي إلى زيادة تجنيد أولئك الشباب الذين من السهل إغرائهم من قبل الجماعات المتطرفة، وقد نجحت هذه الجماعات بالفعل في جذب العديد من الإسلاميين الحاليين في مصر، والاستفادة من وضعهم السياسي المزري.

ومن ثمَّ إذا فشلت جميع الأطراف المتنازعة في الوصول إلى حلول متفق عليها لوقف إراقة الدماء، والحفاظ على المصالح الأكبر لمصر، فإن ذلك يُنذر بمستقبل مظلم.[53]

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[53] سليمان، محمد، مستقبل الإسلاميين في مصر، معهد واشنطن، الرابط:
https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/ar/fikraforum/view/the-future-of-islamists-in-egypt

الخلاصة:

لقد أحدثت ثورة 25 يناير/كانون الثاني 2011 في مصر نقلة نوعية في الخطاب السلفي، ونقلته إلى "فضاءين مختلفين في السياسة والفكر، لم يعتد عليهما، وكان يتعامل في الفكر بقدرٍ من القطيعة والتعالي، ويتعاطى مع كثير من مسائل السياسة من بوابة الفتوى".

وقد أنتجت هذه الثورة بيئة سياسية تتسم بالتعددية؛ حيث تكونت أحزاب وحركات ليبرالية، وأخرى يسارية، وتشكّل عدد كبير من الأحزاب الإسلامية، لعل أهمها حزب "الحرية والعدالة" المنبثق عن جماعة "الإخوان المسلمين"، وعدد من الأحزاب السلفية، الوافدة حديثًا للمجال السياسي، والذي يُعدّ حزب "النور" أبرزها، الذي حصل على الشرعية القانونية في يونيو/حزيران 2011.

ويدرس هذا البحث طبيعة التحول الذي حدث للسلفيين في مصر بعد ثورة يناير، مع التركيز على الدعوة السلفية وحزب النور، الذي اندمج في الحياة السياسية بعد أن كان له موقف مغاير من العمل السياسي وممارساته، وما هي المبررات التي دفعتهم لتبني هذا الاتجاه، ومدى تأثير ذلك على مستقبلهم الدعوي؟ ومعرفة الأسباب الجوهرية التي دفعته لمفارقة جماعة الإخوان المسلمين، وتأييد الانقلاب على المسار الديمقراطي.

وبالتركيز على موقف الدعوة السلفية، من ثورة يناير، نجد أنها رفضت المشاركة في الثورة ورأت أنها مؤامرة، ولكن تغير الأمر بعد تنحي مبارك، حيث نظّمت الجماعة مؤتمرات عديدة في ربوع مصر، احتفت فيها بسقوط مبارك، وأثنت على شباب الثورة وحذرت من المساس بالمادة الثانية من الدستور، والتي تنص على أن الإسلام دين الدولة، واللغة العربية لغتها الرسمية، ومبادئ الشريعة الإسلامية المصدر الرئيسي للتشريع.

ويعتبر حزب النور الذراع السياسي الوحيد للدعوة السلفية، حيث أوضحت الدعوة السلفية– في بيان لها– أن الرؤية السياسية لكل من الدعوة السلفية وحزب النور واحدة، وهي تتضمن التمسك بالشريعة الإسلامية بفهم سلف الأمة مع العمل بكل الممكن، وبيان حكم الشرع فيما تعجز عنه، وهذا منهج مميز يمثّل الميثاق الذي به تأسس الحزب، مع الاجتهاد في اختيار الشخصيات القادرة على التعبير عن هذه الرؤية عن قناعة تامة بها، والالتزام بالمواقف المنهجية والسياسية التي يتخذها الحزب من خلال العمل المؤسسي.

وقد حدث تطور سلبي واضح في علاقة الدعوة السلفية الممثلة، بحزب النور مع جماعة الإخوان المسلمين، من خلال حزب الحرية والعدالة، لأن تطور هذه العلاقة أدى إلى الوقيعة بالإخوان والرئيس في مشاكل سياسية، ظهرت بوادرها حينما تهيأت الأجواء للانقلاب على الرئيس المنتخب.

وحقيقة الأمر أن علاقة حزب النور والدعوة السلفية بالإخوان والرئيس، قد تغيرا في النصف الثاني من السنة التي حكم فيها الرئيس مرسي، من نهاية عام (2012) إلى نهاية بداية الانقلاب العسكري في 3 يوليو/ تموز (2013)، وظهر ذلك جليًا في المبادرة التي طرحها الحزب في (26 يناير/كانون الثاني 2013) لوقف العنف.

وزادت الخلافات بين الإخوان وحزب النور، التي تولدت مع الدعوة لمظاهرات (30 يونيو/حزيران 2013) والإعداد لها من قِبل "جبهة الإنقاذ"، ومشاركة حزب النور في اجتماعاتها في حزب الوفد، وانتهت بمشاركة الحزب في مشهد 3 يوليو/تموز 2013، بحضور

أمين عام حزب النور المهندس جلال مُرة، ودعم الحزب فيما بعد للسيسي في الانتخابات الرئاسية، والدفاع عن شرعيته، وإصدار الفتوى لتأييده.

وبررت الدعوة السلفية دعمها للسيسي في بيان صدر في الثالث من مايو/آيار 2014 بقولها: المشير عبد الفتاح السيسي أنسب من منافسه لهذه المرحلة، ويرون أنه أقدر على قيادة مؤسسات الدولة.

ومن ثمَّ لم تخرج ممارسات حزب النور والدعوة السلفية، عن الإطار الذي يمارسه السيسي، والقوى الداعمة له، برغم الانتهاكات التي حدثت في فض اعتصامي رابعة والنهضة، وكذلك الحرس الجمهوري، وغيرها من المواجهات الأخرى بين المعارضين للانقلاب، والسلطة الحاكمة.

وبات التيار السلفي أكثر تشتتًا وضعفًا، عقب 30 يونيو/حزيران 2013 وتحوّل حزب "النور" ومعه "الدعوة السلفية"، من قوة انتخابية لا يستهان بها، ترهب كافة منافسيها، إلى منافس ضعيف تلقّى هزيمة قاسية في معاقله الانتخابية في الانتخابات البرلمانية الأخيرة (نوفمبر/ تشرين الثاني 2015).

وقد خسرت قائمته الانتخابية في مواجهة قائمة "في حب مصر" المدعومة من أجهزة الدولة في قطاع غرب الدلتا، في حين لم يتمكن سوى ثمانية من مرشحيه فقط من الفوز بمقاعد فردية.

كما ضحّى نظام السيسي بحزب النور، في مواقف عدة، منها: "عدم السماح لقياداته بالخطابة، مثل ما طال مشايخ "الدعوة السلفية" التي انبثق عنها الحزب، وعلى رأس قياداتها ياسر برهامي. وتعرّض الحزب لحملة مبرمجة للنيل منه، والهجوم عليه بشكل كبير في وسائل الإعلام المختلفة".

وسار على خطى "النور"، حزب "الإصلاح والنهضة"، الذي تبرّأ من توجهه الإسلامي، ليؤكد أنه حزب مدني، وشارك في الانتخابات، إلا أنه لم يفز بأي مقعد.

وعلى صعيد باقي التكتلات والأحزاب السلفية، فقد تحوّل معظمها لمجرد رموز شخصية معبّرة عن كل حزب، بعد اضطرار معظمهم للخروج من مصر مطارَدين، عقب فض اعتصامي رابعة العدوية والنهضة، وموقفهم الرافض للانقلاب. وفي مقدمة هؤلاء: رئيس حزب "الفضيلة" محمود فتحي، ورئيس حزب "الأصالة" إيهاب شيحة، وأحد الرموز السلفية بالقاهرة محمد عبدالمقصود.

وفيما يتعلق برموز "السلفية العلمية"، فقد التزم كل من الشيخ محمد حسان، وأبو أسحاق الحويني، ومحمد حسين يعقوب، الصمت تمامًا، رافضين الدخول في صدام مع النظام السياسي بدعاوى فقهية، وهي تجنب الفتنة.

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ORTADOĞU ETÜTLERİ — MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES

Merve Dilek Dağdelen

ORTADOĞU'DA ORDU VE SİYASET

Politics in the Middle East and its relation with the military have long been questioning in the literature of international relations, especially in the last half of the century. Countries in the region have been overcoming various types of difficulties after they obtain their sovereignty. While the Middle Eastern countries' governmental structures have been shaped in various ways, the military usually got a great influence in those structures. The book titled *Ortadoğu'da Ordu ve Siyaset* focuses on that structural position of the military.

The editor points out that the authors prefer to use the concept of "military and politics" instead of using "civil-military relations", due to the former indicates a significant point of the effectiveness of the military in domestic politics and foreign policies. While the concept of "civil-military relations" reflects a formal and institutional relationship between the two and allows examinations more likely on procedural relations between them, the concept of "military and politics" provides a better understanding on the role of the military, which is takes place at the heart of the politics. In this respect, the book examines the importance and effectiveness of the military in the political processes by studying several Middle Eastern states, such as Iran, Israel, Egypt, Algeria, Iraq, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan.

Each chapter tries to reveal how the military has become institutionalized and what kind of interrelated structure have been built up with politics in the Middle East. The book also considers the reaction of the militaries during the Arab

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Spring as a significant indicator for the role of the military in domestic politics. In this respect, strong ties and transitions between political and military elites are regarded as the key element for each chapter.

In the first chapter, Hakkı Uygur examines competitive military forces in Iran. He analyses the relations between the military and politics by considering the economic and military strength of the Revolutionary Guards and its effects on both Iran's domestic and foreign policies. Muhammed Mustafa Kulu, in the second chapter, investigates the Israeli army. He demonstrates the social and economic sources of the military in the country, and its considerable impact on political and governmental issues. The third chapter, which written by Mohammed Moussa, explicates the military's autonomous position against politics and its effect on politics in Egypt. Moussa designates the changes and continuities of the role of the military by dividing the historical processes into three periods. The first period begins with the Strike of Free Officers in 1952; the second period started with the demolition of Mubarak in 2011, and the third period adverts the 2013 military coup and the following developments in Egypt's domestic politics. Moussa reveals the social and political domains of the military in all three periods. The following chapter, by Ömer Aslan, stresses the great role of the military, which cannot be ignored, in gaining sovereignty of Algeria. Aslan highlights the dominance of the military over the politics by citing from Eva Bellin and states that "every state has an army but in Algeria the army has a state."[1] Talha Abdulrazaq, in the fifth chapter, explains the unexpected change in the role of the Iraqi army after the U.S. invasion in 2003. Abdulrazaq argues that the rise of the Iraqi nation-state and the rise of Iraqi army rooted in the same source and it is almost impossible to examine the politics in Iraq without mentioning the military. The chapter ahead, which written by the editor Veysel Kurt, describes the French effect on the Syrian army and politics after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Kurt claims that the military and a series of military coups between 1946 and 1970 shaped the power politics in Syria. He affirms that the 1970 military coup did not only lead to a change in the key actors, it also led to the reconstruction of both the regime and the military. He conveys his ideas about the current situation of Syria and concerns on the reconstruction of political and military mechanisms after the expected peace in the country as well. The next chapter by Abdullah Erboğa portrays rather a different context for Saudi Arabia. Erboğa asserts that the political elites hold complete control over all areas of power in Saudi Arabia. The Suud family, as Erboğa conveys, does not allow any other competitor who may rival

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[1] Eva Bellin, "The Robustness of Authoriterianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism Comparative Perspective", Comparative Politics, Vol. 36, No: 2, (January 2004), p. 143. Originally cited from Mohammad Harbi, cited in Le Soir de Bruxelles, Jan. 11, 2002.

their authority. Therefore there is not any proper mechanism or institution for the military, but the Suud family subsidies the country's security forces with the high level of oil income. When it is compared with the other states which mentioned above, Erboğa describes a reverse relation between the military and politics in Saudi Arabia. While the military intervenes in politics in other countries as in Iran or Egypt, the political elites lead and intervene in the military of Saudi Arabia. In the last chapter, Ömer Aslan analyses Pakistan that has similarities with Turkey, especially concerning the role of the military on the gaining the nation's sovereignty. Aslan studies the relation between military and politics and the rise and fall of the Pakistani army. He sorts several reasons for the withdrawal of the military from politics in the last part of the chapter.

It is mentioned throughout the book that the modernization process in the Middle Eastern countries was carried out by the army. In addition to this, a large portion of the revenues which obtained from the natural sources is allocated to defense expenditures. These two have leads to the efficiency of the military over politics. On the other hand, Veysel Kurt underlines the false promises of the literature for the political changes and improvements in the Middle Eastern countries after the *Arab Spring*. However, as Kurt says, the process showed that any change in the region would not happen without suffering. Besides, although the fact that the military's domination of politics is common in almost all the Middle Eastern states, their response to the *Arab Spring* has been different from each other. Kurt asserts that the dominance of the militaries over politics will continue in the Middle East. For this reason, it can be said that the book addresses a prominent subject in the literature. The editor also concludes, the fate of countries which will reform and/or reconstruct their militaries, like Iraq, Syria, Libya, and Yemen, will be shaped, in a great extent, by the efforts of national and international actors over the national militaries. In this respect, militaries in the Middle Eastern countries are and will be central actors and/or primary elements for the reconstruction of the relations between military and politics, and the future of the region.

The book *Ortadoğu'da Ordu ve Siyaset* falls short to cover a number of relationships, which is conducting independently from the political institutions, between the militaries and the international actors. However, it is so noteworthy that the book examines many countries in the context of a very popular topic that the relations between military and politics. In this respect, this book is such a valuable source, especially for Turkish literature.

STATES IN DISGUISE: CAUSES OF STATE SUPPORT FOR REBEL GROUPS

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Devlet dışı silahlı gruplar günümüzdeki en önemli güvenlik meselelerinden birisi olmuştur. Bu çalışma, çokça tartışılan bu mesele ile ilgili son zamanlarda çıkmış en kapsamlı ve ilgi çekici araştırmalardan birisidir. Kitap, Ortadoğu'daki silahlı örgütler ve başta devlet destekli terörizm olmak üzere, devletler ve silahlı örgütler arasındaki ilişkiyi hem nitel hem de nicel verilere dayanarak sistemli bir şekilde analiz etmektedir. Hem devletlerin hem de devletlerden destek alan silahlı grupların motivasyonlarını ve işbirliği mekanizmalarını açıklamaktadır.

Kitabın ampirik bölümünde vaka analizleri yapılmış ve çok değişkenli istatistik analizi yapılmıştır. İstatiksel analiz ise yazarın uzun çalışmalar sonucu oluşturduğu State- Nonstate Armed Groups (NAGs) Cooperation (Devlet- Devlet dışı Silahlı Gruplar İşbirliği) veri setine dayanmaktadır. Yazar devletler ve devlet dışı silahlı gruplar arasındaki gizli ilişkinin yapısını ve özeliklerini, bilinçli bir şekilde silahlı örgütlere destek veren devletleri içeren 352 vaka; ayrıca devletlerden destek alan silahlı grupları içeren 342 vaka üzerinden incelemektedir. Vakaların tarih aralığı ise Soğuk Savaş döneminin başından itibaren başlayarak 2010 yılına kadar uzanmaktadır. Yazar bulgularını, etkili faktörler olarak gördüğü değişkenlere odaklanıp test ettiği hipotezlerine dayandırmaktadır.

İlk bölümde yazar kitabı kısaca tanıttıktan sonra çalışmanın metodolojisini, kavramsallaştırmalarını, vaka seçimlerini ve kitabın literatüre katkısını ele almıştır. İkinci bölümde ise devletlerin destek verdikleri silahlı grupları seçme ve ittifak kurma süreçlerini teorik bir yaklaşımla

açıklanmıştır. Devletleri ve devlet dışı aktörleri ittifaka itebilecek nedenleri sentezlemiş ve test edilebilir hipotezlere dönüştürmüştür. Buna göre üç temel motivasyon belirlenmiştir: stratejik, ideolojik yakınlık ve domestik kaygılar.

Kitabının üçüncü bölümünde ise yazar veri toplama ve kodlama sürecini adım adım ve oldukça açık bir şekilde aktarmıştır. Bu bölümde analiz birimini ve değişkenleri, seçilen örnek olaylar üzerinden detaylandırmıştır. Dördüncü ve beşinci bölümlerde iki ayrı örnek olayla destek mekanizmasının nasıl işlediğini ve bunun ortaya çıkan istatistiksel sonuçla ilişkisini ortaya çıkarmaktadır. Kitabın temel argümanları Filistinli ve Çadlı silahlı grupların destek alma mekanizmaları incelenerek başarılı bir şekilde ortaya konmaktadır. Yazar bu bölümlerde devlet- devlet dışı silahlı grupların ilişkisini şemalar ve haritalandırma yöntemi ile çok daha anlaşılır bir hale getirmektedir. Sonuç bölümünde ise yazar ortaya koyduğu teorik yaklaşımı tekrar değerlendirerek, çalışmanın genel çıkarımlarını sıralamıştır. Sonrasında da politika önerilerinde bulunmuş ve gelecek araştırmalar için açık bırakılan yerleri değerlendirmiştir.

Verilerin analizi neticesinde yazar temel bulgularını şu şekilde özetlemektedir: Devletlerin, aynı anda hem iç hem de dış tehditlerle karşılaşmaları durumunda, silahlı gruplara destek verme olasılıkları artar. Devletler düşmanlarına karşı devlet dışı silahlı gruplarla kurduğu ittifakı, diğer devletlerle kurduğu konvansiyonel ittifak ilişiklerinin yerine kullanabilir. Devletlerin destek verebileceği birden fazla silahlı grup bulunuyorsa, devlet ve silahlı grup arasındaki ideolojik, dini ve etnik yakınlık, devletin destek vereceği grup tercihini belirler. Öte yandan silahlı gruplar da devlet tercihinde bulunabilir zira bu iki yönlü bir ilişkidir. Yazarın kullandığı "işbirliği" (cooperation) kelimesi de tam olarak bu ilişkinin iki yönlülüğüne işaret etmekte ve silahlı grupların da işbirliği yapacakları devletleri seçmelerinde bazı durumları göz önünde bulundurduklarını ifade etmektedir. Öyle ki silahlı gruplar da ilişki kurmak üzere etnik, dini ve ideolojik yakınlığa sahip devletleri tercih ederler. Ayrıca silahlı gruplar en az devletler kadar rasyonel bir şekilde hareket edip kendilerine destek verebilecek ülkeler içinde güçlü ve demokratik olanları tercih ederler. Sonuç olarak, hem devletler hem de silahlı örgütlerin seçim süreçleri birbirlerinden bağımsız iki ayrı sistematik süreci ifade etmektedir.

Daha detaylı bir inceleme yapıldığında yazarın başka dikkat bulgularından da söz edilebilir. Yazar demokratik barış teorisi ile kendi bulgularını başarılı bir şekilde ilişkilendirmiş, demokratik devletlerin başka demokratik ülkeleri hedef almak üzere silahlı gruplara yüksek seviyede destek verme ihtimalinin düşük olduğu sonucuna ulaşmıştır. Ancak yazarın bu argümanı, "demokrasi" kavramının tartışmaya açık yapısı nedeniyle eleştiriye de açık hale gelmektedir.

Çalışmanın dikkat çekici bölümlerinden birisi de kitabın sonunda bulunan "ek" (appendix) kısmıdır. Bu bölüm çalışmanın genel hatlarından ziyade daha ayrıntılı bilginin elde edilebileceği, veri tabanından kesitler sunmaktadır. Çalışmanın okuyucuya sunduğu avantajlardan bir diğeri ise bu veri tabanına ve kodlama çizelgesine internet sitesi üzerinden çevrimiçi erişimin de mümkün olmasıdır. Bu sayede yazarın çalışması başka yazarlar tarafından sayısal olarak tekrarlanabilir ve kontrol edilebilir olmaktadır.

Yazarın devlet dışı silahlı örgütler kavramsallaştırması, söz konusu kavrama ilişkin farklı yaklaşımları bertaraf edecek niteliktedir. Yazarın kavramsallaştırması, hem "terör örgütü" hem de etnik ya da diğer ayrılıkçı silahlı grupları tek bir çatı altında toplayıp, bunları daha sistematik bir şekilde çalışmayı mümkün kılmıştır. Böylelikle siyasi olarak tartışma doğurabilecek tanımlamalar ve kavramsallaştırmalardan uzak durmuştur. Devlet dışı silahlı aktörler ve devletler arasındaki ilişkiyi uluslararası ilişkiler disiplini içinde sistematik bir şekilde aktaran oldukça az sayıda akademik çalışma bulunmaktadır. Bu açıdan değerlendirildiği takdirde, kitabın literatürdeki önemi daha iyi anlaşılabilir.

Ortadoğu özelinde devlet ve devlet dışı silahlı aktörlerin ilişkilerinin bölgesel güvenlik anlayışı üzerindeki etkisi yadsınamaz. Bu durum göz önünde bulundurulduğunda, çalışmada kullanılan veriler ve verilerden elde edilen analizler özellikle Ortadoğu alanında çalışmalar yürütenler için önemli bir kaynak niteliğindedir. Zira son dönemde genel olarak Ortadoğu'da meydana gelen siyasi ve askeri gelişmeler, Ortadoğu'da yaşanan iç savaşlar, uluslararası aktörleri ve devlet dışı silahlı grupları bölgeye çekmiştir. Bölge, bu tarz devlet davranışlarının pek çok örneğine rastlayabileceğimiz bir alan haline dönüşmüştür. Yıkıcı iç savaş süreçlerinden geçen Suriye ve Yemen gibi ülkeler düşünüldüğünde, meselenin anlaşılması, doğru bir şekilde değerlendirilmesi ve gerekli önlemlerin alınmasına duyulan ihtiyaç giderek atmıştır. Dolayısıyla, bu çalışmanın bize sunduğu gibi, devlet ve devlet dışı silahlı aktörlerin ilişkilerine dair yapılmış kapsamlı ve sistemli çalışmaların önemi artmaktadır.

İngilizce olarak yayınlanan çalışmada, yazar oldukça akıcı bir üslup, görseller ve grafiklerle meseleyi anlaşılır hale getirerek okuyucuya yardımcı olmaktadır. Bu kitap Uluslararası İlişkiler, güvenlik çalışmaları, çatışma çözümleri ve karşılaştırmalı siyaset ile ilgilenen akademisyen ve öğrenciler için okunması tavsiye edilen bir çalışmadır. Bu kitap devlet- devlet dışı silahlı aktörlerin ilişkilerini aynı zamanda teorik bir çerçeveye oturtmaya çalışarak, devletler arası ilişkileri odak noktasına alan Uluslararası İlişkiler disiplininin ana akım teorilerine bu noktada da önemli bir katkı sağlamaktadır.

Doç. Dr. Ahmet Asker

FİLİSTİN'DE GÜÇ MÜCADELESİ BAĞLAMINDA DİL KAVGASI (1913)*

GENİŞLETİLMİŞ ÖZET

Emperyalizmin Osmanlı coğrafyasına girişi, keşfedilen ülkelerdeki gibi doğrudan işgal yoluyla değil, Osmanlı sultanlarından ticari ve kültürel alanlarda alınan imtiyazlarla, aşamalı bir süreçte gerçekleşmiştir. Ancak bu imtiyaz kapısı bir kez açıldığında kendi aralarında rekabet içerisinde olan diğer batılı emperyalist devletler Osmanlı coğrafyasında nüfuz sahibi olabilmek için yoğun bir çaba içine girdiler. Batılı devletlerin desteklediği hayır kurumlarınca açılan, gayr-i Müslimlerin eğitimine yönelik okullar, nüfuz etme girişiminin bir ayağını oluşturdular. Bu amaçla bir yandan cemaat okullarını himayelerine almaya çalıştılar, diğer yandan Osmanlı coğrafyasında kendi okullarını açmak suretiyle eğitim ağlarını genişlettiler. Osmanlı Devleti yabancı ülkelere tanıdığı kapitülasyonlarla bu sürecin gelişmesine farkında olmadan katkı yapmıştır. Bunun farkına varıldığında Yabancı okulların denetlenmesi çalışmaları başlatılmış ve 1869'da Maarif Umumiye Nizamnamesi yürürlüğe konulmuştur. Ancak bu denetim çabaları kapitülasyonların tanığı himaye hakkından dolayı beklenen sonucu verememiştir. II. Meşrutiyet döneminde de yabancı okulları denetleme çabası devam etmiş ancak yine kapitülasyonların tanıdığı himaye hakkı, bu denetimi zora sokmuştur. I. Dünya Savaşı öncesinde Osmanlı'da yabancılara ve Osmanlı tebaası gayr-i Müslimlere ait toplam 2811 okul bulunmaktadır. Bu okullar, Osmanlı'daki okulların dörtte birine denk gelmektedir. Bu oranlar Osmanlı Devleti'nde yabancıların sahip olduğu nüfuzun eğitimdeki boyutunu ortaya koyması açısından önemlidir.

Filistin de bu etkiden bağımsız değildir. Ortadoğu'daki emperyalist rekabet çerçevesinde Marunîler gibi Ortadoğu'nun yerli Hıristiyanları kadar Yahudiler de bir faktör olarak ön plana çıkmıştır. İngiltere, Fransa, Amerika ve Almanya gibi emperyalist devletler himaye yoluyla Yahudileri kullanma yoluna gitmişlerdir. Siyonistler de kendi hedeflerine ulaşmak için emperyalist rekabeti kullanmaya çalışmışlardır. Hindistan yolu üzerindeki Mısır'ı işgal eden İngiltere ile Suriye üzerinde iddiası olan Fransa'nın Ortadoğu'daki rekabeti Filistin'de iyice açığa çıktığında Yahudilerin rolü daha da önem kazanmıştır. Hem İngiltere hem Fransa Filistin'de nüfuz sahibi olabilmek için Yahudiler ile ilişkilerini güçlendirme yoluna gitmişlerdir. Siyonist projeye sempati duyan İngiltere, açıkça olmasa bile, Yahudilerin Filistin'e göçünü teşvik ederek, orada gittikçe büyüyen Yahudi nüfusu ile Filistin'de güçlü bir dayanak noktasına sahip olmayı hedeflemiştir. Böylece İngiltere, hem Süveyş

kanalının savunmasız doğu yakasını güvenceye almış olacak, hem de haksız yere toprak ele geçirdiği iddiasından kaçınabilecektir. Fransa ise, Osmanlı yönetiminin tepkisinden çekindiği için, bu kurumların açıkça desteklendiği izlenimi vermekten kaçınsa da, eğitim sisteminde Fransız dilini ve kültürünü ön planda tutan Alliance okullarını 20. Yüzyılın başlarından itibaren rakiplerinin Filistin'de gittikçe artan nüfuzları karşısında açıkça desteklemeye başlayacaktır.

Emperyalist yarışa gecikmeli katılan Almanya, Ortadoğu'ya nüfuz etme sürecinde İngiltere ve Fransa ile benzer yöntemler kullanmıştır. Alman Kayseri II. Wilhelm iktidara gelir gelmez dünya siyaseti (Weltpolitik) takip edeceğini ilan etmiş ve öncelikle Osmanlı sultanı II. Abdülhamit ile ilişkilerini geliştirmiştir. Bu kapsamda 1898 yılında Osmanlı'ya; İstanbul, Hayfa, Yafa, Kudüs, Şam ve Beyrut'u kapsayan bir gezi düzenlemiştir. Bu gezinin amacı Osmanlı devleti ile müttefikliğe doğru giden yolda Almanya'nın Osmanlı coğrafyasındaki ticari ve kültürel nüfuzunu arttırmaktır. Alman Dışişleri bunun için Filistin'deki konsoloslukları aracılığıyla bölgede geniş bir istihbarat ağı kurmuştur. Almanya'nın Filistin'deki askeri, ticari ve kültürel etkinliğinin hızla artması, Almanya ile Osmanlı arasındaki bu yakınlaşmanın doğal bir sonucudur.

Bu bağlamda Alman Yahudilerinin girişimiyle 1901'de Berlin'de kurulan Hilfsverein der deutschen Juden, Almanya'nın bölgedeki kültürel yayılmacılığına hizmet edecek, Alliance okullarının Fransız dili ve kültürünün yaygınlaşmasına yaptığı katkı gibi, Alman dili ve kültürünün yaygınlaşmasına katkı yapacaktır. Osmanlı yönetimi altındaki Filistin'de, Almanya ile Fransa arasındaki rekabet, Hilfsverein ve Alliance arasındaki rekabete de yansıyacaktır. Her ikisi de Yahudilere hizmet etmek amacı taşıyan bu kurumların arasındaki rekabet, Hilfsverein'ın Hayfa'da kurmayı planladığı Technikum okulunun eğitim dili ile ilgili 1913'te patlak veren krize kadar devam edecektir. Ancak Yahudi ulusal bilincini geliştirmek için çaba sarf eden Siyonistler, bu bağlamda Yahudi dili ve kültürünün gelişimini yavaşlatacak her türlü müdahaleye karşı korumacı bir siyaset geliştirme yoluna gidecekler, arka planda emperyalist hedeflere hizmet eden Yahudi kuruluşlarına Siyonist bir karakter kazandırma mücadelesi vereceklerdir.

İşte tam da bu sıralarda, I. Dünya savaşının başlamasından kısa süre önce *Hilfsverein der deutschen Juden* öncülüğünde 1912'de Yafa'da Yahudi öğrencilerin teknik bilimlerde eğitim göreceği *Technion* adında bir okulun temeli atılmıştır. Ancak 1913'te okulun eğitime başlamasına yakın bir sırada eğitim dili ile ilgili, dernek yöneticileri ile Siyonist gruplar arasında, görüş ayrılığı baş göstermiştir. *Hilfsverein* yöneticileri teknik derslerde eğitim dilinin Almanca olmasını savunurken, çoğunluğu doğu Avrupa ve Rusya kökenli Siyonistler, eğitim dilinin bütünüyle İbranicede olmasını savunmaktaydılar. Yafa'da *Technion*'un eğitim dili üzerinden başlayan bu

tartışma, Siyonistlerce anti-asimilasyoncu bir niteliğe büründürülerek yaygınlaştırılmıştır. Böylece kısa sürede Kudüs ve Hayfa gibi Filistin'in diğer kentlerine de sıçrayarak 1913-1914 arasında uluslararası kamuoyunda ses getiren bir protesto kampanyasına dönüşmüştür.

Tarihe *Sprachkampf* (dil kavgası) olarak geçen bu tartışma, farklı ülkelerden Filistin'e gelen batılı Yahudiler ile Siyonistler ve yerel Yahudiler arasındaki beklenti ve görüş farklılıklarını su yüzüne çıkarmıştır. *Hilfsverein* yönetimiyle Siyonist gruplar arasında yaşanan dil savaşının arka planında, Osmanlı'ya nüfuz etme yöntemlerini ve bir okulun eğitim dili üzerinden bölgedeki rekabetlerini de okumak mümkündür.

Alman Dışişleri Politik Arşivi belgelerine dayanan bu makalede, I. Dünya Savaşı öncesinde, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun bölgedeki hâkimiyeti devam etmekteyken, *Technion*'un eğitim dili üzerinden yürütülen *dil kavgası* ile Yahudi ulusunun inşasına giden yolda İbraniceye yüklenen misyon, Filistin'deki Siyonist hareketlilik ve emperyalist devletlerin Ortadoğu'daki güç mücadelesinin bir boyutu gözler önüne serilmiştir. Makale aynı zamanda, İsrail Devleti'nin kurulmasından önceki siyasi atmosfer hakkında da bir fikir vermektedir.

ORTADOĞU ETÜTLERİ
MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES

OCAK DEVRİMİ SONRASI MISIR'DA SELEFİLİK AKIMI İÇERİSİNDEKİ DİNİ VE SİYASİ TARTIŞMALAR

GENİŞLETİLMİŞ ÖZET

Önceleri fikri gelişmelere kapalı olan ve siyasete sadece fetva boyutundan bakan Selefizm, 25 Ocak 2011 tarihinde Mısır'da başlayan devrim ile siyasi ve fikri anlamda önemli değişiklikler kaydetmiştir. Devrim çoğulcu bir siyasi ortam oluşturarak solcu, liberal ve çok sayıda İslamcı partinin kurulmasına fırsat tanımıştır. Kurulan İslamcı partilerin başında Müslüman Kardeşler topluluğu tarafından kurulan "Hürriyet ve Adalet Partisi" ve selefi grupların kurmuş olduğu başta Haziran 2011 yılında meşruiyet kazanan "Nur" selefi partisi gibi birçok selefi partisi İslami partilerin birer örneğidir.

Bu araştırma, Ocak Devrimi sonrası selefilerin yaşadığı değişimi ele almaktadır. Özellikle, öncelerde siyasete girmeyi reddeden selefileri temsil eden Nur partisinin hangi nedenlerle siyasete girmeye karar verdiğini ve bu durumun gelecekteki İslami Davet durumlarına nasıl bir etki edeceğini, ve neden Müslüman Kardeşler topluluğu ile ters düşüp demokrasiyi bitiren darbeye destek olduklarını araştırmaktadır. Selefi davanın savunucuları Mısır'da meydana gelen devrimi reddetmiş, ve devrimi bir komplo olarak değerlendirmiştir. Fakat Hüsnü Mübarek görevinden ayrıldığını ilan edince selefi cemaati Mısır'ın her tarafında konferanslar düzenlemiş, Mübarek devrinin bitişini kutlamış, devrimi düzenleyen gençleri kutlamış, devletini dininin İslam olduğunu, Arapça'nın resmi dili olduğunu ve yasamanın temeli olarak İslam dini olduğunu ifade eden anayasa maddelerine dokunulmamasını istemiştir.

Nur Partisi mısır selefi cemaatinin tek temsilcisidir. Bu gerçeği selefi davanın temsilcileri açıkça belirtmiş ve Nur Partisinin kendileriyle aynı anlayışa sahip olduğunu belirtmişlerdir. Bu anlayış, İslam şeriatı ile ümmetin eski (selef) anlayışı aynı olduğunu, partinin başaramadığı bir konu hakkında şeriatın hükmünü belirtmenin partinin kuruluş özelliği olduğunu ve tam bir inançla bu anlayışı dile getirebilecek kişilerin partiyi temsil etmesi ve kurumsal olarak partinin benimsediği siyasi ve anlayış tutumlarına sadık kalmak olarak belirlenmiştir. Nur Partisi ile temsil edilen selefi dava ile Hürriyet ve Adalet Partisi ile temsil edilen Müslüman Kardeşler topluluğu arasında ilişkiler giderek kötüye gitti, bu gerileme iki parti arasındaki ilişkiyle kendini göstermeye başlamıştır. Durumun ciddiyeti seçilmiş cumhurbaşkanına darbe koşulları netleşince ortaya çıkmıştır.

İşin gerçeği ise Nur Partisi ve selefi cemaatin Müslüman Kardeşler topluluğu ve cumhurbaşkanı ile ilişkisi seçilmiş cumhurbaşkanıyla 2012 yılı sonundan 3 Temmuz 2013 tarihinde başlayan askeri darbe başlangıcına kadar olan sürede iyice kötüleşti ve 26 Ocak 2013 tarihinde resmi olarak şiddeti durdurma isteğinde bulunan Nur Partisi beyanında ortaya çıktı. 30 Haziran 2013 tarihinde Cephetül İnkaz tarafından gösteri düzenlemeye davet açıklamaları yapılmasıyla beraber Müslüman Kardeşler ile Nur Partisi arasında anlaşmazlıklar artmıştır. Çünkü, Nur Partisi'nin 3 Temmuz 2013 tarihinde yapılan toplantıya partinin genel sekreteri Celal Mura seviyesinde katılmasıyla tepe noktasına çıkan anlaşmazlıklar, Nur Partisinin seçimlerde Sisi'nin meşruiyetini fetvayla desteklemesiyle sonuçlanmıştır. Selefi cemaat, 3 Mayıs 2014 tarihinde vermiş olduğu beyanında: Abdulfettah Sisi bu dönem için cumhurbaşkanlığı görevine rakibinden uygundur ve devlet kurumlarını yönetebilecek durumdadır" ifadelerini kullanmıştır. Sonrasında, muhalifler ile Sisi'yi destekleyen güçler arasında yaşanan çatışmalar sonucunda muhaliflere uygulanan orantısız şiddete rağmen, örneğin Rabia meydanı, cumhuriyet muhafızları ve diğer çatışmalar, Nur partisi Sisi yönetimine desteğinden ödün vermedi.

Selefi cemaat ve Nur Partisi, 30 Haziran 2013 sonrası giderek zayıflamaya ve dağınıklaşmaya başlamış olup, rakiplerini korkutan bir oy potansiyeline sahip bir güçken, Ekim 2015 tarihinde düzenlenen seçimlerde kendi kaleleri olarak belirlediği bölgelerde bile yenilgiye uğramıştır. Devlet destekli "Fi Hub Mısır" listesi karşısında, Delta batısı bölgesinde sadece 8 adet bireysel koltuğa sahip olabilmiş ve sert bir yenilgiye uğramıştır. Ayrıca Sisi yönetimi Nur partisini defalarca harcadı, örneğin Nur partisi yöneticilerine ve selefi cemaatin önde gelen isimlerine hitabet yasağı getirmiştir, yasağa uğrayanların başında yönetici Yaser Berhami gelmektedir. Ayrıca partiyi çeşitli medya araçlarında yapılan yayınlarla bitirmeye çalışmıştır. Nur Partisi izinden giden İslah ve Kalkınma partisi İslami anlayışından vazgeçip, kendisini medeni bir parti olarak tanıtmış fakat seçimlerde herhangi bir koltuğa sahip olamamıştır.

Diğer selefi kitle ve partiler ise çoğunlukla partiyi temsil eden şahsi semboller haline gelmiştir. Çünkü çoğu Rabia direnişi ve Nahda direnişine destek çıkmış ve darbeyi reddetmiştir ve dolayısıyla Mısır'dan kaçmak zorunda kalmıştır. Bunların başında Fazilet Partisi başkanı Mahmud Fethi, Nahda Partisi başkanı İhab Şeyhe, ve Kahire'deki Selefilerin bariz ismi Muhammed Abdulmaksut gelmektedir. Selefilerin ilmi tarafının liderliğini yürüten selefi alimler başta Mahmut Hasan, Muhammed Hüseyin Yakup ve Ebu İshak Elhuveyni olmak üzere reddi fitne bahanesiyle Sisi yönetimine karşı sessizliği tercih etmişlerdir.

ORTADOĞU ETÜTLERİ
MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES

Genel Hususular

Ortadoğu Etütleri, Ortadoğu çalışmalarına yoğunlaşmış bir düşünce kuruluşu olan Ortadoğu Araştırmaları Merkezi (ORSAM) tarafından basılı ve e-dergi olarak yayınlanan hakemli bir siyaset, uluslararası ilişkiler ve fikir dergisidir.

Yılda iki kez yayınlanmaktadır.

Ortadoğu Etütleri'nin amacı, Türkiye'de sosyal bilimlerde Ortadoğu çalışmalarının gelişimini teşvik etmek ve uluslararası alanda Ortadoğu literatürüne nitelikli katkılar yapılmasına imkân sağlamaktır.

Ortadoğu Etütleri'nde yayınlanan çalışmalardaki değerlendirmeler, ORSAM'ın kurumsal görüşünü yansıtmamaktadır.

Yayın Koşulları

Ortadoğu Etütleri'nde yayınlanacak makalelerin, uluslararası ilişkiler bağlamında Ortadoğu coğrafyasıyla ilgili siyaset, siyasi tarih, uluslararası hukuk ve iktisat gibi konuları kapsaması beklenmektedir. Ortadoğu literatürüne katkı sağlayacak nitelikte kavramsal çerçevesi sağlam, özgün, eleştirel bakış açısı getiren, çözümlemeli araştırma ve incelemelere öncelik verilmektedir.

Yayın dili Türkçe, İngilizce ve Arapça'dır.

Makalelerde anlatım dilinin düzgün olması, düşüncelerin doğru bir mantık örgüsü içinde ifade edilmesi, referansların uygun biçimde kullanılması, varsayımların güçlü biçimde desteklenmesi, konuyla ilgili literatüre nüfuz edilebilmiş olması gerekmektedir.

Kitap değerlendirmeleri/incelemeleri, makale biçiminde hazırlanmış olmaları halinde kabul edilmektedir. İncelenen kitabın bir kopyasının, makul bir sürede iade edilmek üzere, Editör'e ulaştırılması gerekmektedir.

Makaleler yayınlanmadan önce yazarlarla eser sözleşmesi akdedilmektedir.

Telif ödemeleri, derginin yayınlanmasından en geç bir ay sonra yapılmaktadır. Ayrıca, yazarlara dergiden 5 kopya verilmekte, derginin ulaştırılmasında fayda gördükleri kurumlar/kişilerle ilgili sundukları notlar dikkate alınabilmektedir.

Biçimsel Esaslar

- Makalelerin dili Türkçe ya da İngilizce olmalıdır. İngilizce makalelerde imla ve noktalama kuralları açısından İngiltere İngilizcesi'nin kullanılması tercih sebebidir. Yazıların uzunluğu 4000-8000 kelime aralığında olmalıdır.

- Çalışmanın hazırlanmasında takip edilmesi gereken sıra şöyledir: Başlık, öz (abstract), anahtar kelimeler, asıl metin, ekler, notlar, referanslar (kaynakça), tablolar (başlıklarıyla birlikte müstakil sayfalarda), şekil açıklamaları (liste halinde), özet (summary).

- Öz bölümü (abstract) ortalama 150 kelime uzunluğunda olmalıdır. Türkçe makalelerin İngilizce özeti de sunulmalıdır.

- Makalelerde 6 ila 10 anahtar kelime bulunmalıdır. Türkçe makalelerin İngilizce anahtar kelimeleri de sunulmalıdır.

- Özetler (summary) 400 kelime uzunluğunda olmalı ve yalnızca İngilizce hazırlanmalıdır.

- Makale sahiplerinin, Editör aksini belirtmedikçe bir özgeçmişlerini sunmaları istenmektedir.

- Görsellerin yüksek çözünürlüklü olması ve siyah-beyaz baskıya elverişli olmaları gerekmektedir. Renkli görsellerin siyah-beyaz baskılarında ortaya çıkabilecek tutarsızlıklar dikkate alınmalıdır. Materyalin en uygun çözünürlükte olduğundan emin olunmalı ve metin içine yerleştirilmeden bilgisayar ortamında ayrı bir dosya olarak olarak iletilmelidir.

- Anadili İngilizce veya Türkçe olmayan yazarların makalelerini göndermeden önce, metinlerini dil

konusunda ehil bir uzmana okutmaları ve düzelttirmeleri gerekmektedir. Yoğun dilbilgisi ve anlatım hatası olan metinler değerlendirmeye alınmamaktadır.

- Latin alfabesi kullanılan dillerde isim orijinal haliyle verilmektedir. Diğer dillerde yazılan isimler ise İngilizce veya Türkçe transliterasyonuyla kullanılmalıdır.

Dipnot Yazım Kuralları

Dipnotlar açıklayıcı olmalı ve mümkün olduğunca sık kullanılmalıdır. Dipnotlar makale içinde birbirlerini takip edecek şekilde artan rakamlar ile numaralandırılmalı ve metin sonunda yer alan ve açıklamaları içeren liste ile örtüşmelidir. Söz konusu listelerde kitap, makale ve metinlere dair verilen referanslarla uyumluluk ve isimler ile önemli sıfatların baş harflerinin büyük harf ile yazılması önemlidir. Aşağıdaki uygulamalı örneklerin dikkatle incelenmesi tavsiye edilir:

Kitaplar

Norman Stone, Kitabın Adı, (London: Basic Books, 2007), s. 67.

Norman Stone (ed.), Kitabın Adı (London: Basic Books, 2007), s. 67-9.

Norman Stone ve Sergei Podbolotov, Kitabın Adı (London: Basic Books, 2005), s. 99. Takip eden referanslar: Kırımlı, Kitabın Adı, s. 99.

Dergiler ve Makaleler

Norman Stone, "Makale Başlığı", Dergi Adı, Cilt. #, Sayı. # (Ay, Yıl), s. #. Takip eden referanslar: Kırımlı, "Makale Adı", s. #.

Derleme Kitap Makaleleri

Norman Stone, "Makale Adı", Hakan Kırımlı, "Kitap Adı" (London: Crimea Publis-hing Co., 2000), s.100.

Resmi Belgeler

Meclis Zabıtları: TBMM Yayınları (Meclis Yayınları, 1988, V), 111.

Tezler

E. Beytullah, "The Crimean Khans' relations with the Arab Amirs", yayınlanmamış doktora tezi, Bilkent University, 1999, Bölüm 5, s.44.

Tekrarlar

Dipnotlarda uygun yerlerde "ibid." ibaresi kullanılmalı, ancak bu ibare önceki bilginin birden fazla kaynağa dayandığı durumlarda kullanılmamalıdır.

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