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CONTENTS

YOUTH AND SOCIAL MEDIA IN GCC
CHANGING TRENDS IN COMMUNICATION, SOCIAL PARTICIPATION AND IDENTITY

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Abstract

Social Media has revolutionized the communications and connected people across continents; its effects are seen worldwide. In Middle East, societies have been transformed through the influence of social media platforms and new trends in social participation, identity making and communication. The Gulf States have witnessed high usage of social media amongst its youth. The Middle East and Gulf have the highest population of youth in the world and one of the highest rates of social media usage. The combination of the two has translated in to new realities for the region. Social media has become a tool for progress, social participation and overcoming traditional boundaries placed on communication and information sharing.

Key words: Social Media, Youth, Gulf, Qatar, Identity, Twitter
Word Count: 6559

Introduction

Social Media has revolutionized the communications and connected people across continents; its effects are seen worldwide. In Middle East, societies have been transformed through the influence of social media platforms and new trends in social participation, identity making and communication. In the recent decades, the Gulf States have witnessed high usage of social media amongst its youth. The Middle East and Gulf have the highest population of youth in the world and one of the highest rates of social media usage. The combination of the two has translated in to new realities for the region. Social media has become a tool for progress, social participation and overcoming traditional boundaries placed on communication and information sharing.

The youth in Gulf States has experienced the influence of social media unlike any generation before them, leading to trends that did not exist before, hence creating new modes of scholarship, concepts, norms and codes. In this paper, I will discuss the role of social media amongst the youth in Gulf countries in creating a sense of social participation, changing concepts of identity, and reshaping communication. The paper will be divided in to 7 parts; the first part will explain the background on Social Media, the second part will contextualize Social Media in Gulf States, third part will discuss "Twitter and Social Participation in Gulf," the fourth part elaborate on "Social Media and Identity in Gulf", fifth part will explain "Social Media and Communication Trends in Gulf", sixth part will analyze Individual Choices and Social Media in Gulf and the last part will conclude all of the sections discussed above.

Methodology

The purpose of this paper is to study and analyze the role of social media amongst the youth and in Gulf countries in particular look at the factors of sense of social participation, changing concepts of identity and reshaping new communication trends. All of these factors are to be studied in relation to the social media platforms such as Twitter, Instagram, Facebook, Snapchat and Youtube. Social Media has become an increasingly important field of study in relation to human societies. Although the field has been studied from various aspects, this papers looks at the philosophical standpoint of set a theoretical framework suitable to study human behavior on social media

and how it influences new societal trends. In this regards the paper build son certain theories such as Habermas "communicative action" and Goffman's theory of "presentation of self" as relevant theories to study some of the prevalent social media trends in Gulf States. The paper will mainly use secondary sources such as quantitative and qualitative studies on social media trends in the Gulf region and covering broad concepts and theories in general. In addition to this, the paper will use cyber-ethnography to analyze relevant social media public accounts to study common and emerging topics relevant to the focus of the study.

1. Background on Social Media

Social media has revolutionized Internet usage all around the world. It is shaping societies and individual identity globally. The evolving effects of social media are prominent in the Middle East specifically in the Gulf region. The region has one of the world's highest populations of youth. According to a study more than "33% of the GCC population is under 25 years old." [1]The impact of social media is evident in the fact that GCC has one of the highest penetration rates of mobile Internet in the world.[2] The access to Internet on mobile phone makes social media accessible from anywhere and any part of the world. This has tremendously shaped the way youth in GCC communicates not only with each other but also with society as a whole.

There are many definitions of Internet, however most post-modern narratives describe it as a "virtual space, characterized by its ability to create places apart from social life".[3] Social anthropologists take a different approach and challenge the separation between the real and the virtual, Daniel Miller and Don Slater explain "the Internet is not a monolithic or placeless 'cyberspace'; rather, it is numerous new technologies used by diverse people, in diverse real-world locations" [4]. Social media is an extension of traditional media and can be defined as "forms of electronic communication, such as websites for social networking and micro blogging, where users create online communities to share information, ideas, personal messages, and other content such as videos"[5]. Lev Manovich further explains that "social media enhances the pace and quality of interactions through an electronic net of people, cultures and organizations"[6].

Social media has become one of the most relevant fields of study in academia. Social Media is an innately multi-disciplinary field of study. While one aspect of this field is to study it from the technological lense, another research stream focuses Information system (IS) to study social media. This stream uses multiple disciples such as data science, data design, social science and behavioral science to understand social media. This paper considers some philosophical and sociological theoretical standpoints to study the human's social media usage behavior. Qi et all (Qi et all) suggest that the social media usage can be elaborated through a framework of philosophy. They suggest looking at the intersection between the considerations of "others" in the use of social media versus the presentation of the "self", the individual's life world. The consideration of others may be viewed in two different lenses, either looking at others as means in the form of instrumentalization or using others as an end. The question of consideration of the "others" relates to Habermas theory of "communicative action"[7]. He raised the question of how we consider others, do consider them as instruments in achieving our objectives or do we consider them ends in themselves. Similarly the question of self relates to Goffman's theory[8] of the presentation of the self. In his book the Presentation of the Self in Everyday Life, he explains that "regardless of the particular objective which the individual has in mind" (p. 3), and ''thus, when an individual appears in the presence of others, there will usually be some reason for him to mobilize his activity so that it will convey an impression to others which it is in his interests to convey" (Goffman 4). These theories of "Self "and "Others" are essential in locating human social behavior in social media platforms and why people may act or behave the way they do on these mediums.

The youth in Gulf States use social media for various purposes, these include, political, humanitarian, entertainment as means of social participation by engaging in online debates on issues of common interest. This is rapidly changing the way societies are shaped in the region and how individuals place themselves within their countries and globally. However, despite the positive aspects of social media, it has also been used for spreading fake news and propaganda. Although fake news is not new or pertinent to social media, it is the ways in which social media capitalizes on and spreads fake news and propaganda, which is relevant to the social and political development of the world. Konrad Niklewicz explains that 'The sharing of fake news on social media is deliberate,

1 Abdul Ghaffar, Mahmood. "Social Media: Impacts on Arabian Gulf Youth and Governments." *State and Society Relations in the Arab Gulf States*: Gerlach Press, n.p., n.d. 61-76. Print.

2 "The Growth of Social Media in the Gulf." Chatham House. N.p., n.d. Web. 03 June 2017.

3 Assaf, Laura. "The Internet and Youth in the United Arab Emirates." State and Society Relations in the Arab Gulf States. N.p.: Gerlach Press, n.d. 13-33. Print.

4 Assaf, pg. 15

5 Abdul Ghaffar, pg. 61

6 Ibid

7 Habermas J. The theory of communicative action. Volume 1: Reason and the rationalization of society McCarthy T, translator. Boston: Beacon Press; 1984.

8 Goffman E. The presentation of self in everyday life. New York: Bantam Doubleday Dell Publishing Group, Inc.; 1959.

undertaken by an organization or an individual, with the aim of fabricating and disseminating information that is fully or partially false in nature in order to influence opinion or stir controversy, or for financial gain.[9] J. Gillin further explains that 'fake news' usually contains "kernel of truth" which is blown out of context and exaggerated to add false details.[10] The intentionality of fake news may vary from one context to another, it is not always directed at changing people's minds such as in American presidential elections of 2016, sometimes the aim is to polarize the society and or to create a sense of emergency and or chaos. Relating to this changing nature of fake news, the concept of "bots" more specific to Twitter. Bots are "special programs able to operate autonomously, mostly pretending to be a genuine profile managed by a human being. Bots can mass-send content, and share or retweet chosen items at machine-gun speed, reacting to a pre-programmed sequence of words, hashtags and so on". [11]

In Gulf societies, where conventional civil societies are weak, the "virtual civil society" created through social media out lets such as (Twitter, Youtube, blogs, Facebook) may provide some space for individual agency within power structures. This experience of social media creates a sense of empowerment within the youth and allows them to be active participants within the virtual civil society created through social mediums However, the strength of "virtual civil society" is questionable as explained by Mark R. Beissinger[12] but with an illusion of "civil society". He explains that a robust "virtual civil society in combination with a weak conventional civil society "reinforces already weak political organization, breeds a false sense of representativeness, dilutes collective identities within oppositions"[13].

2. Social Media in the Gulf States

The popularity and widespread use of social media in Gulf countries is due to the tremendous development of telecommunications and Internet infrastructures in these countries and due to the declining costs of these services, high income and a young population.[14] As a result, youth in Gulf has increasingly adapted to social media and "nurtured avenues for relatively free forms of self-expressions, relative economic empowerment and global connectedness."[15] They have surpassed older generations in this technological experience, creating a generational gap in some ways.

According to Chatham House video on "Growth of Social Media in Gulf", the world is now in the 'pockets' of youth in Gulf. The fact that they can do everything online has created a radical change.[16] In addition to this, social media has challenged and changed the hierarchy of communication in the region. The rules and traditions relating to communication have been overcome through social media"[17].

Social media usage is linked with certain types of social networking websites such as Facebook, Twitter, blogging and Youtube. According a study, by March 2012, Facebook had over 830 million active users and Twitter had 200 million active users in the region.[18] Facebook allows the youth to share thoughts, information and ideas and to access restricted content. As a result it has challenged Internet censors in the region and illustrated how youth has developed new methods of overcoming the regulated content.[19]

Twitter is a 'micro-blogging' platform and is increasingly becoming more popular in the region. It allows the youth to share their thoughts on latest issues concerning the society, individual or the State. Twitter is a unique platform with its own cyber-culture, it has distinct vocabulary, such as RT, # and @ for user interactions. The most significant function of Twitter is the concept of 'retweet', it allows information to spread amongst wider audiences.[20] According to a survey 'Go-Gulf' to study the trends of social media in Middle East, about 88% of the population in the Middle East uses social media networks daily and 52% of the population uses Twitter. Twitter has highest user rates in Bahrain, UAE and Qatar and Saudi Arabia.[21]

Twitter rose to prominence in the Middle East during the Arab Spring. It became a popular social media platform to engage in debate, express personal opinions, and connect with global audience and share information. When protests started in Bahrain in 2011, popular mainstream media like Al Jazeera channel and local news channels

9 Niklewicz, Konrad. "Weeding out fake news: an approach to social media regulation." European View 16.2 (2017): 335-335.

10 . Gillin, 'Fact-Checking Fake News Reveals How Hard It is to Kill Pervasive "Nasty Weed" Online', Punditfact, 27 January 2017

11 Niklewicz, pg. 18

12 Beissinger, Mark R. "" Conventional" and" Virtual" Civil Societies in Autocratic Regimes." Comparative Politics 49.3 (2017): 351-371.

13 Beissinger, pg. 352

14 Abdul Ghaffar, pg. 64

15 Abdul Ghaffar, pg. 62

16 "The Growth of Social Media in the Gulf." Chatham House. N.p., n.d. Web. 03 June 2017.

17 Ibid

18 Abdul Ghaffar, pg. 64

19 Abdul Ghaffar pg. 65

20 Ibid

21 "Social Media Usage in Middle East - Statistics and Trends [Infographic]." Dubai Web Design. N.p., n.d. Web. 03 June 2017.

ignored them. However, social media empowered and mobilized the Bahraini citizens as they voiced their opinions through Twitter and Facebook. Nabeel Rajab, the president of Bahrain Centre for Human Rights at the time clearly stated that 'Most media sources, including the well-known Arabic news source Al- Jazeera, are ignoring and silencing Bahrain'. However, social media was a strong alternative in this case, Rajab stated "Bahrain is very much educated in social media, and now every level of age group and every level of society are very aware, Thank God it's not yet been blocked."[22]

The increase in the use of social media in the Gulf States has also lead to a larger degree of State control and surveillance on the type and quality of content, discourse created and discussed on line[23]. The new cyber laws introduced mainly after the Arab Spring have arguably led to higher "level of intrusion into its citizens' lives than pre-existing legislation has done"[24]. Many of these laws that have been associated with fighting terrorism and extremist tendencies in their respective States have been vague and used as a blanket to cover heavy censorship. However, at the same time, technological advances and trends in social media have led to new security issues, which have to be addressed legally. The growth in social media usage has also changes in State-society dimensions. While some scholars have referred to the concept of "virtual civil society" others have highlighted the higher level of State accountability on certain matters as they are discussed publicly on social media platforms. A recent workshop by Chatham House called "State, Society and Social Media in the Gulf" stated that "debates on social media platforms have forced Gulf governments to accept a greater degree of accountability as scandals, unpopular policies and current affairs are posted and commented on in real time"[25]. Resultantly there has been an increased political and civic awareness amongst the Gulf citizens. They may even feel a sense of participation in political debates especially since some social media debates have directly influenced political decisions by decision makers. However, the strength of this influence in decision-making remains a question. It may be that such participation online creates an illusion of political participation while in reality such participation remains minimum. It is critical to note that international audience views citizens' criticism of ministers or State policies on social media, as the content is available across the world. This would create a sense of pressure on the local governments to respond to some of the citizens' demands in order to avoid negative international image.

Despite the controlled freedom on social media, there is a general move away from the dominant discourse of consistent positive public representation of overly exaggerated and mostly positive images of State figures and heads through mainstream media outlets. There is a shift away from the idea of "senior leaders being above reproach or infallible is disappearing, as is any sense of insulation from societal concerns, participants agreed"[26]. The nature of social media and the availability of multiplicity of options for profile creation mean people have the option of choosing different names and identities. This ultimately makes it more challenging for the official authorities to permanently silence voices as users can simply create new profiles with different names and disguise themselves in a different identity. Social Media users have alternates of speaking through different identities and names[27].

In addition to an increased sense of political participation, social media usage has facilitated the emergence of counter narratives on issues of identity, which have existed all along but were rarely discussed in the open. Both the citizens and government is faced with alternate realities and identities present within the State, there is an increasing "awareness of different perspectives and historical narratives while previous ideas of close-knit communities and homogeneous national identities fade into the background"[28]. Finally, while social media may encourage personal expression and freedom of alternate identities, it may alternatively also encourage more individualistic societies as opposed to more collective and cohesive ones.[29].

3. Twitter and Social Participation in Gulf

In addition to helping youth and society voice their opinions during Arab Uprisings, Twitter is also shaping the way youth communicates and participates in the developments in the society. As a powerful Internet tool, it can be seen as a "place to intervene on society or take a stance on social issues"[30]. In Qatar, Twitter accounts such as Qatari Feminist, The Social QA, I'm Half Qatari and many others generate debate on issues concerning the society. The Social QA account discusses social issues of interests specific to Qatari society. These issues range from

22 Bahrainrights.org. 2011. IPS: No Unplugging This Revolution | Bahrain Center for Human Rights. [online] Available at: http://www.bahrainrights.org/en/node/4662

23 State, Society and Social Media in the Gulf. Chatham House, 2017.

24 State, Society and Social Media in the Gulf, pg. 3

25 State, Society and Social Media in the Gulf, pg. 5

26 Ibid

27 Ibid

28 Ibid

29 Beissinger, Mark R. "" Conventional" and" Virtual" Civil Societies in Autocratic Regimes." Comparative Politics 49.3 (2017): 351-371

30 Assaf, pg. 31

gender inequality, economic participation, lifestyle, marriages, education and more. In addition to this many young Qatari girls and boys use their personal accounts to voice their opinion, initiate a debate and discussion on latest developments within the country. This has created a sense of virtual civil society for the youth that previously could not discuss these issues openly. They have found social media an empowering tool. An example of this is Qatari Feminist, this account a more rebellious one, as it discusses issues of gender equality in Qatar with reference to local incidences. The account spark controversy and discussion over women's status in Qatar. The account invites great criticism from local twitter users but generates strong debates, which has far reaching results. Qatari Feminist account claims that its purpose is to "build a better future with social justice"[31]. It is a first of its kind account in Qatar and brings forth real life issues related to gender equality that were previously ignored.

The importance of such accounts is that there is no limit to their impact. Twitter is a popular social media platform within leadership and Minsters. The tweets are visible to government officials and policy makers "social media is a medium allowing citizens to interact with officials who influence policy making"[32]. A young Emirati girl commented "Through social media, the government provides that space to its people and they also listen to concerns and do their best to help people out and ease their processes," said Emirati Deema Al Shamsi, 22." [33]

Hence, the impact of tweeting on social issues can be seen as the new form of social participation in Qatar and Gulf countries in general.

In addition to discussing social issues, Twitter is also used to discuss political events both on a regional and international level. An example of this is the recent GCC crisis over the hacking of Qatar's news agency. The event itself was related to social media as the account on twitter was hacked and used to post fake statements on behalf of the Emir. As a response to the event, a hashtag was initiated on Twitter explaining the outrage and opinion of Qatari society and youth in particular[34]. The hashtag started a media war between the residents of Gulf countries, supporting and criticizing the incident that had taken place. Twitter was the medium where information and content was created that effected real life politics, perceptions and actions. Many twitter users used hash tags such as #Gulfcrisis and other similar hash tags in Arabic to comment on latest developments in the crisis[35]

. As a result, blockade may not have been discussed officially on negotiation tables but it was indeed discussed by citizens, residents, academics, analysts and journalists on social media. After a year of blockade in 2018 BBC news commented on the prominent trends of the blockade "A year-long political conflict between the tiny, wealthy state of Qatar and its larger neighbors - including Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates - has been fought with a new arsenal of weapons: bots, fake news and hacking."[36] The concept of fake news was further highlighted in through this political row between the Gulf States. Social media has proven thus to be a double-edged sword, just how citizens can use twitter to voice their opinions and views in political and social issues, state institutions can use fake accounts and news to present counter-narrative to spread propaganda that may serve their political motives

4. Social Media and Identity in Gulf

Furthermore, social media platforms are not only used for social participation but also for creating a sense of new national identity. The new national identity is seemingly participatory in nature and engages youth on the concept of what it means to be a national in the modern Arab Gulf States. Laura Assaf presents an example of a website called "Emiratweet", an initiative started by an Emirati woman. She calls this project a 'virtual majlis' the website "uses Social Media platforms to maintain and preserve the National Identity by providing information, facts, and news about Emirati individuals and society"[37]. Another initiative is 'ThinkUp GCC" founded by a young Emirati man, in order to promote businesses, events and initiatives organized by GCC citizens.

Social media has also challenged the common narrative on identity what it means to be local or a citizen in the Gulf States. The youth is exposed to various cultural influences available at hands through social media platforms like Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, YouTube and more. One cannot predict the amount and intensity of influences the global ideas can have on the youth. A look at the twitter accounts of some of the young Qataris will provide a clear insight to the multiplicity of influences on the identity of these youths. They are unapologetic in their views and confident in their opinions. (**See appendix1).** They have a clear understanding of global cultures, concepts and use social media to contextualize these ideas into their own realities.

Social Media can also be used to promote religious and political identities. This was the case in Bahrain following the 2011 protests. Bahrain has a majority population of Shia Muslims, they have historically faced disagreements

31 قطريات نسويات" ,نسويات ,قطريات (@QatariFeminists)." *Twitter*. Twitter, 31 Jan. 2017. Web. 03 June 2017.

32 Abdul Ghaffar, pg. 67

33 Reporter, Jumana Khamis Staff. "Social media is a tool for change, say Emirati youth." GulfNews. Gulfnews, 16 Nov. 2016. Web. 03 June 2017.

34 #قطر_امير_تصريحات- Twitter Search." *Twitter*. Twitter, 03 June 2017. Web. 03 June 2017.

35 News, 7D. "#Qatarcrisis Hashtag on Twitter." *Twitter*, Twitter, 18 Aug. 2019, https://twitter.com/hashtag/qatarcrisis?lang=en.

36 Pinnell, Owen. "The Online War between Qatar and Saudi Arabia." *BBC News*, BBC, 3 June 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-trending-44294826.

37 Assaf, pg. 31

with the government over matters of governance, opportunities and more. After the famous protests of '*The Bahrain Day of Rage, The Bahrain Revolution and Alliance of February 14 revolution*" social media was used in "negotiating, constructing and strengthening a transnational Shi'a identity"[38]. Social media played a key role in creating a collective Shi'a identity across borders by '"invoking historical narratives of the suffering Iman Hussain and his companions in Karabala" and comparing persecution of the Bahraini to the "suffering and martyrdom of Karabala"[39]. The social media websites are used by the Shi'a community to form "support groups" for Shias in Bahrain. Karolak and Guta explain the social support element of social media is rooted in two characteristics 1) "it helps people to transcend geographical boundaries, thus creating a unity around a common cause, purpose or affiliation" 2) "it makes more information available to a greater number of people, more easily and from a wide array of sources than any instrument of information and communication in history"[40].

Furthermore, social media is being utilized by youth to overcome cultural difference and to promote cultural integration within their respective societies. This is a particularly significant trend, as previously the Gulf societies were much reserved and closed to sharing culture with foreigners within their own countries. In Qatar, initiatives like Embracedoha and Seemyculture are using Instagram, Twitter and YouTube to engage audience in understanding and appreciating the local Qatari culture. These initiatives have changed the traditional notion of a fixed and closed concept of culture and identity and created a participatory and engaging one or at least as presented by some citizens. Social media has allowed citizens and residents to present their own views and discourses on what the Qatari culture is and provide an insight to the diversity of narratives that exist within one culture. A prime example of this is, IloveQatar.net[41]. This online initiative uses social media as a platform to spread awareness about Qatar culture, lifestyle, trends and serves as a guide for local events. Twitter usage has also given rise to the concept of influencers/social media personalities who highlight social, societal and political issues. The level of tweet engagement and the number followers measures the influence and fame of social media personalities. In Qatar some of these famous twitter personalities include Tahani Al-Hajri[42] , Shaima Al-Sultan[43] , they use their accounts as a platform to discuss sensitive and controversial issues relating to public interest and have sometimes come under criticism from more conservative voices within twitter (Appendix1, figure 1 and 2). Others including academics like Dr. Nayef bin Nahar is famous for his intellectual discussions on national and regional politics as well as commentary and analysis of societal issues from a philosophical and academic perspective. All of these discussions impact the national conscious and debates around identity in Qatar and region as a whole. Dr. Nayef's tweets[44] (Appendix, figure 3) discuss issues such as freedom of opinion and power structures, society, identity and Islamic identity in both academic and constructive manner, as he engages in conversations on these issues with his followers. Dr. Jassim Al Sultan, a well-known thinker, philosopher uses twitter to discuss issues relating to culture, identity and values. Dr. Jassim's tweets[45] (Appendix, figure 4) highlight the importance of human values and revival of Islamic identity and values in connection to modern day life and State identity. These interactions on twitter by well-known public figures can be explained through Goffman's theory of "presentation of self in everyday life" whereby individuals present themselves in a particular way to others in order to convey a message, in this case as intellectual figures, academics and social activists who have a role and influence over their audience. They also arguably view 'others' as an end "being-with" much like Habermas "communicative action". Similarly, these engagements also create a sense of "virtual society" as explained by Beissinger. Whether or not this virtual civil society is an illusion or a real alternate of civil society remains an on-going debate.

Another emerging trend of social media has been the use of platforms like Twitter, Youtube and Facebook during conflicts. The recent blockade of Qatar by its neighboring States highlighted the importance of social media in the present day world and how it can challenge historical and traditional narratives on culture, history, identity and politics. Since the start of the Gulf Crisis, Twitter played an instrumental role in uniting people, in defying propagandas of blockading states and in spreading hatred through fake accounts by those who wanted to stir rebellion amongst Qatari citizens and residents. It was observed that twitter was used for direct and indirect attacks on Qatar by UAE, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain both by officials and citizens. In response many official media personalities as well as citizens engaged with response to false accusations and debates relating blockade in Qatar. Through these responses and twitter war, sense of separate national identities emerged for all Gulf States;

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38 Karolak, Magdalena, and Hala Asmina Guta. "Social Media and the Forging of a Transnational Shi'a Identity: the Case of the Kingdom of Bahrain." *State and Society Relations in the Arab Gulf States*. N.p.: Gerlach Press, n.d. 37-60. Print.

39 Karolak, pg. 56

40 Karolak, pg. 57

41 "Qatar's Biggest Guide for Events, Culture, and More!" *ILQ*, https://www.iloveqatar.net/.

42 account الهاجري تهاني Verified. " الهاجري تهاني (@Tahani_alhajri)." *Twitter*, Twitter, 14 Aug. 2019, https://twitter.com/Tahani_alhajri.

43 السلطان شيماء. "شيماء السلطان (@ShaimaJS)." *Twitter*, Twitter, 28 July 2016, https://twitter.com/ShaimaJS.

44 account نهار بن نايف .دVerified. "نهار بن نايف .د (@binnahar85)." *Twitter*, Twitter, 15 July 2017, https://twitter.com/binnahar85.

45 السلطان جاسم.د. "السلطان جاسم.د (@DrJassimSultan)." *Twitter*, Twitter, 8 Sept. 2019, https://twitter.com/DrJassimSultan.

previously the citizens would highlight the common "khaleeji" identity under the slogan of "khaleejna wahid"[46] (Gulf is one and united). In this case, twitter is being used by individuals used social media as means to an end, to highlight their political stance with their governments denying the precious unity with other Gulf citizens based on shared history and culture.

5. Social Media and Communication Trends in the Gulf

Internet and social media have transformed the way youth communicates and connects with others within their own society and to a global audience. Social media allows youth to engage with news and developments worldwide "Being able to comment on everything stimulates youths' minds, making them want to read and learn more about opposing views, different cultures and new ideas. As our generation reads newspapers a lot less, and prefers to check social media on a daily basis"[47].

The changed trends in communications are inter-linked with changing identities in the Gulf. Amongst the youth, social networking sites have impacted the language within Gulf. The Arabic language used in chat mediums and on social media is usually transliterated and numbers makeup for the missing letters. Many young users prefer to type in English as it makes it easier to use social media.[48] This has an impact on the way youth formulates their ideas, communicate and expresses themselves. The impact on the language is linked to the impact on identity as well. The use of social media creates a generation unlike the generations before with a "certain number of codes, which transform widely throughout time and are dependent on new trends, can only be understood and practiced by experienced users of these technologies"[49].

The norms and codes created by social media connects the youth in Gulf with youth globally, the limitation of time and space are no longer an obstacle between societies. This has empowered youth in ways unknown before. It means that youth can now reshape traditions, defy norms and codes and are not bound by any limitations that existed before. Laura Assaf provides an example of this from her fieldwork in Abu Dhabi. A young Emirati girl, liked to watch Japanese animation films and read about them, a hobby disliked by her family. Sara found an alternative way to pursue her interests, she participated in online websites that provided her tools to draw and connect with members of international community who shared similar interests[50]. Another young girl used social media to chat with friends and stay connected even when she was not physically allowed to host those friends at her home[51]. Social media has defied the traditional boundaries of communication, even when the young girl could not invite her friends at her home, she still could stay connected to them via social media platforms. Caline Malek contextualizes these growing changes in the norms of expression in the Arab world including the Gulf region. She explains "Social media offer opportunities for creative expression and interaction, which were not previously possible. This takes place within a cultural framework shaped by the traditional and conservative values of many countries."[52] People now communicate with each other, through social platforms on issues relating to religion, comedy, daily news, politics and culture. A prime example of these changes in personal expressions is an Instagram account called "majlis_qatar"[53], the account aims to provide people a platform for everyone in the Gulf States to discuss any personal or social issues and ask for solutions by engaging in discussions with the followers of the account. The identity of sender of messages is kept as anonymous to protect their privacy. It is common to see followers sending their queries on issues related to marriage, children, work and social life. The details expressed in some of the messages indicate that users find the platform both useful and trustworthy to seek advice and discussions on personal matters. In addition to this there is the growing trend of using Twitter personal self-expression whether through asking general questions, twitter polls or uploading pictures of daily activities. A prime example of this form of personal expression is account of a twitter user Hind (appendix, figure 5). Hind uses her twitter account to discusses issues of self-empowerment, share her personal experiences and outlook on life. She also posts photos of her daily engagements making her account more interactive and create a sense of virtual community via social media platform. This kind of personal expression reaches a wider audience both regionally and internationally. It allows youth to break certain taboos on previously sensitive topics, as they highlight both individual and social issues and engage on dialogue and debate alternate perspectives and solutions to some of these issues. It is also common to see that increasingly the younger generation tweets in English rather than in Arab, sometimes creating

46 "" الخليج أونلاين ".خليجنا واحد" يلهب أقلام "تويتر" فرحاً https://alkhaleejonline.net/سياسة/خليجنا-واحد-يلهب-أقلام-تويتر-فرحا/.

47 Reporter, Jumana Khamis Staff. "Social media is a tool for change, say Emirati youth." *GulfNews*. Gulfnews, 16 Nov. 2016. Web. 03 June 2017.

48 Assaf, pg. 28

49 Assaf, pg. 29

50 Assaf, pg. 26

51 Ibid

52 "Social Media Shaping Norms of Expression in the Arab World: Caline Malek." *AW*, https://thearabweekly.com/social-media-shaping-norms-expression-arab-world.

53 "الجميع وفضفضه مجلس (@majls_qatar) • Instagram Photos and Videos." *Instagram*, https://www.instagram.com/majls_qatar/?hl=en.

communication gaps between generations and at others leading to criticism by more conservative groups of the society.

6. Individual Choices and use of Social Media

It is therefore, clear to see that Internet and social media have allowed the youth in Gulf to make more individualistic choices. Everyone can use social media platforms for a use considered important to them personally "Everyone's Internet experience reflects a series of choices and selections from accessible social worlds, depending on what is put forward and valued by individuals."[54] The use of social media has expanded in the past two decades, youth has been using social media to communicate, connect with like-minded people, make themselves heard and also find new ways of being economically independent. A recent trend has been to establish a run a business through social mediums such as Instagram and Facebook. Assaf mentions a young Emirati man who started his business through online network marketing to support his family.[55] Such online businesses are common within Qatar and other Gulf countries as well, as they require minimum resources, higher freedom and a wider audience. Online businesses are famous amongst women, as they provide them option of working from home and gaining financial independence. Some of the most common online businesses in Qatar are in the field of fashion, food and services. Internet and social media offer the youth with opportunities to "bypass constraints imposed on them according to their economic status, national origin, gender, or family duties"[56].

In addition to the above, a new trend of fashionistas popular through 'Snapchat' and Instagram has changed the entire concept of private and public sphere. The young women in Gulf mostly from Kuwait and UAE are using social media to share details of their life throughout the day. The share and promote personal style and fashion. They have revolutionized the concept of beauty in the Gulf and normalized many taboos related to fashion and beauty. They discuss topic of cosmetic surgery, superficial beauty trends, and new dressing styles in a way that these become more acceptable and common amongst the youth. The influence these fashionistas and beauty bloggers have on the youth in not measured until now. However, a look at the social media accounts of these social figures will give an understanding of how much of private life has become available for public as a method of socialization, marketing, business and communication purpose.[57] These bloggers over share their life and hence make it a business strategy and blur the lines between private and public sphere.

Conclusion

In conclusion, social media has created new norms and codes for youth in the Gulf. Social media sites and applications like Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, Snapchat and YouTube has allowed the youth to overcome traditional boundaries of communication and create new ways of information and idea sharing and connecting with likeminded people. Social media has also created a sense of virtual society which is argued to be replacing the lack of presence of a real civil city in most of the Gulf States. In this way, social media has defied traditional norms and boundaries of communication. Websites like Twitter are used to engage in social participation both by youth, society and leadership alike, connecting them in ways that were not available before. Social media played a central role in progressing protests and political agenda in Bahrain Uprisings in 2011, it promoted a sense of Shia solidarity across borders. Twitter was instrumental in Qatar Crisis, the 2017 blockade. Fake news and hacked account is what led to the official start of the blockade and throughout the developments of crisis, news, information and debates were communicated via social media.

Social media has also contributed towards creating new identities that are based on individual choices and personal preferences. It is common to see famous pubic figures including academic, activists and analysts to use social media specifically twitter as a platform to engage on debates around identity, nationalism and social changes within their specific countries. These are influenced by a huge plethora of ideas and cultural exchange available through content online. Although social media has created many benefits in terms of information sharing and creating new ideas, it has also had negative influence in merging the private sphere with public and normalizing trends previously considered taboo or inappropriate for youth. The effects of social media are continuously shaped by fast changing technological advances, developments in these platforms and changes in political and social fabric of Gulf States. Social media is merely a tool that is used by humans and shaped by their attitudes and developments in their relevant societies. In conclusion then, many questions need to be asked, will these platforms bring a positive change in the society? Can social media and online participation really make up for a lack of civil society? Is it social media that shapes the contemporary society in the Gulf or is it vice versa?

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Appendix

Twitter accounts based in Qatar

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Haya. "Haya (@Hayabntalwaleed)." *Twitter*, Twitter, 6 July 2017, https://twitter.com/hayabntalwaleed.

Figure 1

In the tweet below Tahani Al Hajri talks about the relationship citizenship and nation. She argues that every person should have the right to express him or herself independently and directly and that State laws should not discriminate between citizens

Source:

account تهاني الهاجريVerified. "تهاني الهاجري (@Tahani_alhajri)." *Twitter*, Twitter, 14 Aug. 2019, https://twitter.com/Tahani_alhajri.

Figure 2a

Figure 2b

Source:

السلطان شيماء. "شيماء السلطان (@ShaimaJS)." *Twitter*, Twitter, 28 July 2016, https://twitter.com/ShaimaJS.

In Figure 2a, Shaima Al Sultan talks about society's double standards in dealing with women's issues, asking her to be obedience and follow the burden of society's rules and still treating her as weaker human. In figure 2b she talks the need for a better understanding of freedom of speech and expecting other people perspectives.

Figure 3a

In the tweet above, Dr. Nayef bin Nahar discusses the Islamic Identity in relation to national identity in the Gulf States and a tendency to escape or even deny this identity. Dr. bin Nahar comments on another tweet, which discusses the broader issues of national identity in the Gulf States.

Figure 3b



In the tweet above, Dr. bin Nahar engage in a more philosophical discussion on the issue of "freedom of opinion" vs. the "supporting opinion" and whether or not the opinions harmful to the society should be openly endorsed.

Figure 3c

Source:

account نايف بن نهار. Verified. "د. نايف بن نهار (@binnahar85)." *Twitter*, Twitter, 15 July 2017, https://twitter.com/binnahar85.

In the tweet above, Dr. bin Nahar discusses another societal issues relating the superficiality of educational credentials. He explains that most students attain education merely as means to employment. In addition to this, there is an increasing trend by students buying their research through ghost writing and many academics produce superficial research just for the sake of promotion.

Figure 4

Source:

السلطان د.جاسم. "د.جاسم السلطان (@DrJassimSultan)." *Twitter*, Twitter, 8 Sept. 2019, https://twitter.com/DrJassimSultan.

In the tweet above, Dr. Jassim makes a statement about how the collapse of the States is linked to the ignorance of the intellectual elite of the importance of nation. He often tweets using the hashtag (The renaissance), which is also his larger intellectual, cultural project in Qatar.

Figure 5a

Figure 5b

Source:

هند . "هند (@Whatthehend)." *Twitter*, Twitter, 5 Mar. 2016, https://twitter.com/whatthehend.

TEACHING NON-ROMANIZED LANGUAGES THROUGH A ROMANIZED SCRIPT

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Abstract: In a world where non-Romanized foreign languages like Arabic, Chinese and Russian have started gaining popularity for economic and professional reasons, the necessity to look at effective teaching methods and approaches rises. Educators are acknowledging the new non-traditional means of facilitating and speeding language learning to accommodate the needs of the learners who live in a fast-paced marketplace and seek fast results. With pinyin, the Chinese Romanized script, as a point of reference due to its tried and tested effectiveness in the Chinese as a foreign language classroom, it is argued that the same concept applies to other non-Latinized languages. Data from foreign language classes in Lebanon and relevant research will be collected to prove the expediting feature of the Romanized script in the foreign language learning. Its use has already started to seep into the non-Romanized foreign language classroom. The importance of such a study lies in its contribution to the field of foreign language teaching. Through the somewhat untraditional and informal nonstandard Latinized scripts that are specific to each language, learners can learn to speak and communicate earlier and faster with the acquisition of vocabulary and pronunciation that are enhanced through reading, which in turn is made possible before the complete acquisition of the foreign language.

Keywords: Teaching, foreign language, Romanized script, non-Romanized language
Word Count: 5651

Introduction

Language enthusiasts who are always seeking to pick up a new language and explore its culture, heritage individuals who want to reconnect with their original linguistic roots, career-driven employees who wish to add a critical need language to their qualifications, and students looking to use their humanities credits on foreign language electives are but some of the population samples interested in quick and easy ways to speak a foreign language (FL). The teaching of foreign languages has always drawn the attention of educators, linguists and researchers from all fields who are intrigued by languages, whether native or foreign. And in this highly technological age we live in, the helpful tools available for learning and teaching a language are numerous. Computer-Assisted Language Learning (CALL), a discipline on its own, is playing a major role in almost all native and FL learning programs across the world. Nowadays, it has become so integrated in education that no class is complete without it.

With the rising use of smartphones, tablets and other internet-accessible gadgets, both FL teachers and learners are adapting or perhaps improving their methods to make use of the online resources available to them. However, technological devices can act as double-edged weapons. Though they may increase learners' interest and supply them with FL material and interface as well as provide teachers with enough resources for their classrooms and teaching aids, they could also be misleading, misinformative, or distracting (Golonka, Bowles et al. 2014). Despite this dichotomy, their effectiveness cannot be denied. Users should therefore be cautious, thorough, and intelligent in separating the helpful from the harmful. Among the helpful CALL (computer-assisted language learning) material are audiovisual tools that allow users to listen to and interact with the target language. However, the main problem with CALL is that it mostly focuses on English (Golonka, Bowles et al. 2014). While material on learning Arabic, Russian and Chinese is readily available, it is not as extensive or as systematic as the English CALL. When it comes to FL teaching, technology has proven effective, especially in the many language practice applications on smartphones, tablets, laptops or desktops with an active internet connection, automatic speech recognition (ASR) and pronunciation programs, grammar checkers, electronic dictionaries, chat forums, blogs, social networks, and many other operational tools.

Now that the learning of foreign languages has incorporated technology-based instruments and aids, even the textbooks have been modernized to fit the updated teaching trends and methods. Assignments and activities involve internet research, blogging, chatting on forums, etc. Most, if not all, learners these days are prolific internet users with more than one account on social media, so including the internet in the study of a language connects their learning to daily-occurring virtual and real dynamics they can easily relate to. This makes learning more accessible.

In *Arabic For Dummies*, the author Amine Bouchentouf introduces the Arabic alphabet in the first chapter with a proper transliteration of the sound.

Languages that share their alphabet with English, or rather other Roman languages, are easier to learn for those who are familiar with or speak a Roman language. The closer a foreign language is to the native language or a second language that a learner is familiar with, the quicker he can learn it because he can associate more with it. The similarities allow for him to grasp it more easily. Studies have shown that rote memorization is frustrating and sometimes debilitating to the learner. There is a common myth that those learning a foreign language must never rely on their native language, but that is easier said than done. People do it unconsciously anyway. It is instinctive and automatic to compare between the two languages. (Roberts, Kreuz 2015) Many languages share many similarities, sometimes words that sound the same which have the same meaning. For instance, ***camisa*** in Spanish and ***chemise*** in French sound very similar and have the same meaning, ***shirt***. Though similar-sounding words may not always have the same meaning, this does not override the fact that many cognates between roman-based languages are accurately comparable. Heeding these similarities and even noticeable differences could give the learner an advantage, especially in transferring similar patterns from one language to another (Roberts, Kreuz 2015).

Yet what of languages that have different roots? If I am an American and want to learn Arabic or Chinese, it is assumed that it is more challenging but not impossible. Some may even master a language with a completely dissimilar alphabet or script from their native language. But it requires more time, effort, motivation, and immersion. Learning Arabic is not without its problems. There are outdated textbooks that have just started to adapt to technological demands, the dilemmatic choice between the colloquial and the Modern Standard Arabic (MSA) and the learners' confusion about diglossia, the austere curricula in language programs that could be boring or demotivating to students, and strict adherence to governmental language policies. (Wahba, Taha et al. 2014) Despite all these obstacles, the focus of this paper is on the linguistic difficulties that learners struggle with in their learning process, especially when learning a language with a completely unfamiliar alphabet or script.

The difficulty of learning a language depends on the amount of time it takes to master it or become proficient in it. They range from low level difficulty languages like Spanish, Italian, Swedish, Dutch and Portuguese, midlevel difficulty languages like German, Swahili, and Indonesian, high level difficulty languages like Urdu, Russian, and Burmese, and extra difficult languages like Arabic, Japanese, Korean and Chinese (Roberts, Kreuz 2015). The time of learning to reach proficiency varies between 24 weeks with the first group of languages and 88 weeks, or an equivalent of two years, with the last and most difficult group. (Roberts, Kreuz 2015)

A testimony of how difficult it is to teach Arabic to non-Arabs is given by a Pakistani engineer who tried to teach the Koran to his fellow inmates after he was captured in 1972 when in war with Bangladesh. During his two-year imprisonment, Syed Khairulbashar took it upon himself to teach the other prisoners Arabic, but it proved difficult for the learners to read without understanding the language, a trend that is shared by millions of Muslims around the world. That is where the idea of inventing a new Arabic alphabet to simplify learning Arabic to non-Arabs was born. He called this novel script the Easy Recite Arabic (ERA). However, that personal quest became his life's work, and he admitted that after more than 30 years of working on it, it is still not done. The difficulty lay in color coding the different pronunciations of the Arabic letters, sounds, and expressions of Koranic verses.

With the road ahead seeming so lengthy and tedious, AFL (Arabic as a Foreign Language) or any other non-Roman language learner wonders if he/she could in some way make it shorter and less bumpy. Using a Romanized script as a classroom resource to represent a non-Roman language has been shown to help cut down learning time, especially in the early stages when acquiring an unfamiliar alphabet takes weeks and sometimes months to grasp. This resource helps learners skip this early stage and delve directly into vocabulary acquisition and reading.

Methods

By looking at the literature on pinyin, the Romanized Chinese script that has become the standardized writing format since the eighties for the teaching of Chinese to both natives and foreigners, we shall establish that a more familiar script to the learner, especially to speakers of English as a first or second language, hastens the learning of a language with an unfamiliar script. A comparison between traditional classes that begin the lessons with the alphabet or script and trendier classes that use a Romanized chat variety to facilitate pronunciation and reading is done after data from both classes are presented. The methodology is qualitative, as it focuses on content analysis, observation, and interviews.

Content analysis

This method is commonly used in qualitative data analysis. It is an objective descriptive instrument of concepts, patterns, and categories that emerge from the research. Selection and collection of the most appropriate data must be based on careful thought and on the degree of credibility of the source of the data and the data itself. (Elo, Kääriäinen et al. 2014) In this study content analysis shall be applied to written text, observation notes, and interviews. The data is semi-structured and mostly open-ended for the interview questions. Texts from Chinese as a Foreign Language (CFL) classrooms as well as texts from Arabic as a Foreign Language (AFL) classrooms and Russian as a Foreign Language (RFL) classrooms were randomly selected to observe the main trends in teaching a foreign

language and compose a general view of the main focus, material, and methods. Several institutions in Lebanon that offered courses in AFL, CFL, and RFL readily shared their textbooks and handouts with the researcher for study. The researcher selected the first lesson as a sample from each of the classes observed. They are included in the Appendix section in the mentioned order: AFL=Appendix A, CFL=Appendix B, and RFL=Appendix C.

Observation

AFL, CFL, and RFL classes were observed in order to understand the teacher-student rapport, to evaluate the teaching methods that interested or bored the students, and to compare the different types of classes given in a country like Lebanon. The observations complemented the concrete material. They are significant to any qualitative research because they add depth. Observers tend to remember important details during or after an observation, make noteworthy claims and incorporate data learned from a multitude of sources (Taylor, Bogdan et al. 2015). Observation as a research and feedback tool should not be disregarded. It is a basic component in qualitative research and in language teaching classrooms in particular. Finding the most suitable teaching method in a certain context or setting and noticing problems that arise in the classroom and impede learning can only be done through systematic observation, which allows the observer to keep a visual, audio, audiovisual or written record of classroom proceedings, a record he/she can review and study at any time (Allwright 2014)

Questionnaire

Interviews are the last instrument in the data collection methods. They are part of the content analysis strategy. The interviews were carried out in person (pre-interviews) and online through a questionnaire on www.surveymonkey.com (https://www.surveymonkey.com/r/JPKNYWX). Online questionnaires have several advantages including their low cost since the researcher is saving money on printing, time because s/he does not have to travel distances and ask people face-to-face and the fact that most online questionnaires are designed to be short and quickly filled, ease of navigation and use for both researcher and respondent, higher response rate than distributed printed questionnaires due to lack of spatial boundaries and the mentioned easiness. (Flick 2015) Qualitative interviews are usually semi-structured allowing for flexibility in adapting the follow-up questions according to the respondents' answers. (Brinkmann 2014) In order to answer the main research question on the effectiveness of the use of a Romanized script to teach a non-Roman language, the right questions must be asked in order to better understand the phenomenon under study. To do that, pre-interview questions helped the researcher polish and structure the main questions (Elo, Kääriäinen et al. 2014). The questionnaire addressed both learners and teachers in each of the three classroom languages. A sample of the questionnaire questions is included in Appendix D.

The pre-interviews gave way to final survey questions which were posted online on the surveymonkey website (see Appendix D). Both teachers and students answered them after they were posted at the beginning of January 2018. They were asked to fill the questionnaire by email and on whatsapp (chat application) through a link that opened directly on their laptops or phones. It was composed of seven questions that were divided into two parts: demographic information and points that revolved around teaching foreign languages and the effectiveness of the use of a familiar Romanized script on the promptness of teaching and retention. It took approximately one to two minutes to fill in, and it was designed in a clear and easy format so that respondents complete it with minimal hassle.

Results

The results from the data collected show a strong correlation between using a familiar script to teach a foreign language with a non-familiar alphabet and quicker retention. From the content analysis, it is obvious that only one class did not use a single letter of the target language alphabet, and that is the AFL class. The lesson was given in French, meaning the teacher explained the terms in French and wrote the handouts and prompts in French (See Appendix A) because the students all came from a French background. The Arabic was written in Arabizi, the Romanized Arabic script, and the students were asked to answer the questions or do the exercises by using Arabizi. For the CFL class, the textbook lessons are structured in the way presented in Appendix B. The utterances are typed in Chinese characters, pinyin, the Romanized Chinese script, and English equivalents and prompts. In more advanced lessons, pinyin is used less and less until only characters appear on the page. As for the RFL class, the tables organized by the observer were divided between English, Russian, and Pronunciation (see Appendix C). The three were offered simultaneously in the first lesson. The Cyrillic alphabet was used but it was not stressed; more emphasis was placed on the pronunciation rather than the alphabet.

It was evident from the observations that the teachers did not stress the alphabet as much as they did pronunciation and accurateness. They were more interested in teaching basic words and their meanings starting with greetings and polite responses to those greetings. Because of that, all three teachers used audio recordings of dialogues that included topics on everyday issues like going to the market, asking about the other person's health and family, or inquiring about directions. In the AFL class, the teacher wrote on the board in Arabizi to facilitate pronunciation for the students and also to make it easier for them to follow in the handouts, which were also typed in Arabizi. In the CFL class, the teacher used PowerPoint slides with each slide depicting a picture of the word to be learned in the lesson, its English equivalent, the Chinese character representing it, and the pinyin pronunciation.

The students had to repeat the word out loud in Chinese after the teacher, sometimes several times, until they uttered it in the right intonation. Most lessons were focused on pronunciation and the four main tones that make up the basis of Chinese sounds. After two or three lessons, the students were able to say simple words that are essential in all greetings, face-to-face conversations or online communication. The exercises in those lessons were filled by the students using pinyin, which they were taught in the first lesson.

The questionnaire yielded the following results: 70% were female respondents and 30% were male, 70% were between the ages of 33 and 42, 70% had completed graduate school, 70% spoke three languages, and more than half of the respondents admitted that a Romanized representation of the target language is effective in enhancing listening and speaking, vocabulary acquisition, pronunciation, and cultural knowledge. Moreover, 50% rated the effects of technology on language and culture learning as effective and 40% as highly effective. As for the effect of working with a Romanized script on students' confidence, motivation, interest, anxiety, proficiency, and cultural empathy, the results are presented in Table 1:

	RAISES IT	LOWERS IT	NO CHANGE	TOTAL	WEIGHTED AVERAGE
Confidence	50.00% 5	10.00% 1	40.00% 4	10	0.00
Motivation	60.00% 6	0.00% 0	40.00% 4	10	0.00
Interest	60.00% 6	10.00% 1	30.00% 3	10	0.00
Anxiety	10.00% 1	70.00% 7	20.00% 2	10	0.00
Proficiency	40.00% 4	10.00% 1	50.00% 5	10	0.00
Cultural empathy	60.00% 6	10.00% 1	30.00% 3	10	0.00

Table 1

Discussion

The findings from the content analysis and observations show that the three foreign language classes use a Romanized script to teach the language to new students, two of them alongside the target alphabet. What this indicates is that the method has been successful in the early learning classes, and that is why it is being used methodically. The observed AFL classroom, which used only French and Arabizi (See Appendix A) without introducing the Arabic alphabet, was efficient and accessible to the learners. The questionnaire confirms the positive respondents' attitudes towards learning a language with an unfamiliar alphabet using a more familiar Romanized one. This and other AFL classes have started to teach the dialect through Arabizi. Arabic teaching apps available on android and iphone stores also employ Arabizi. In the CFL class, pinyin was used next to the English translation and Chinese characters; pinyin was established as the standard script for the teaching of both foreigners and Chinese more than three decades ago.

Numerous studies to test its effectiveness on pronunciation, reading, and vocabulary have already been carried out (Chung 2002, Yongbing 2005, Tan, Xu et al. 2013, Bassetti 2007, Chung 2007, Dan Lin, Catherine McBride-Chang et al. 2010), and it is due to these studies and many others across the years that it was standardized in Chinese language textbooks. In the observed classroom, the textbook used shows the extensive use of pinyin (See Appendix B) and the PowerPoint slides and board notes included English and pinyin, as well as Chinese characters. This proves that the methods used to teach Chinese to foreign and Chinese learners in China has been adopted all over the world, and the confidence, motivation, interest, and cultural empathy of more than half the learners who answered the questionnaire and who admitted that the Romanized script boosted those components were in line with the literature review findings. A staggering 70% answered that the script lowered their anxiety and led to more efficient learning. This is not something to be taken lightly as classroom or learning anxiety can be a barrier to proper learning and lifelong retention (Zhao 2009, Elkhafaifi 2005, Abou El-Goukh 2014). As for RFL classes (see Appendix C), the researcher noted that the lessons which employed the Cyrillic alongside its Romanized representation and English translation led to faster learning of the sounds and words. Those beginners who had no previous knowledge of Russian were able to compare between the familiar Romanized script and the unfamiliar Cyrillic script, and with time learn the Cyrillic script naturally. (Hayes-Harb, Hacking 2015)

To better gauge the effectiveness of this 'speedy' method of teaching, a comparison with the traditional one that uses the target language alphabet has to be made. Gunna Funder Hansen (2010) conducted a study on Arabic word recognition for foreign learners. She cites many researchers of the Arabic language, especially reading and decoding Arabic script, but the most relevant to this study is Khaldieh (1996) who highlights Arabic phonology and script as the main hurdle for American learners. Out of the 36 students at four different proficiency levels participating in his study, the ones who struggled the most with differentiating between graphic and phonological distractors were the beginners. The more proficient or advanced learners made fewer mistakes, but compared to native speakers, he surmised that they acquired the Arabic alphabet (writing system) and sounds (phonological system) at a much slower pace. Hansen believes that text direction has no direct correlation to the difficulty of

reading Arabic; "letter architecture" (p. 571), however, is of utmost importance. Arabic represents a complex script, and acquiring it requires time, effort, training, and practice.

Hansen (2010) conducts her own study on 71 AFL university students from American and European origins by administering three tests: Test A measures the reading effect of semantically unfamiliar graphemes and phonemes; Test B tests the role of vowels in reading comprehension and speed; and Test C assesses their knowledge of native speakers' morphological structures that are used to decode pseudowords and vowel patterns from words with missing vowels. The cumulative results from these tests show that the Arabic alphabet stands in the way of fast and accurate word recognition for all level learners. Even the most advanced learners could not reach native-like reading speed and correctness. Beginning learners especially struggled with vowel formation and all the additional graphemes that native speakers and high-level learners were able to surpass. On the other hand, Roman-alphabet pseudowords with Arabic sounds were read much more quickly than Arabic-alphabet pseudowords by all the learners. This indicates that the graphemic, orthographic, and phonological systems of the Arabic script indeed impeded the AFL learner's progress in the reading and decoding process and made them commit many errors.

Conclusion

The use of Romanized script to teach a language with an unfamiliar alphabet to the learner is not new. Pinyin was created by the Chinese people when the teaching of the language became popular between the 16th and 19th centuries. It was when missionaries or western scholars wrote textbooks, word glossaries, and other instructional material on teaching CFL (Xing 2006). The Chinese have devoted their teaching of the Chinese language through pinyin for decades. Attempts to use pinyin have been ongoing in earnest since 1956 and shortly after, it became an official standardized script in Chinese books for both natives and Chinese as a Foreign Language (CFL) learners (Bassetti 2007, Celebi 2006, T. Chen 2014, Chung 2003, Lee, Kalyuga 2011, Yongbing 2005, M. J. Chen, Chak-Kau Yuen 1991). It was and has been used as a tool to encourage students to learn and write Chinese words more expediently and to familiarize them with the Chinese sounds and accents before moving on to the more challenging task of writing the Chinese ideograms. Employed in a systematic manner as a learning resource by both teachers and students, pinyin can act as a shock-absorber for the CFL learner in traditional or modern Chinese language classrooms. In Lebanon, pinyin is used in the same way in the CFL classroom and was found to be effective in expediting their learning of basic sounds and words.

Similarly, the AFL and RFL classrooms, which have recently started to use a Romanized version of Arabic and Russian respectively, particularly due to the scripts' expansion on CMC (Computer-Mediated Communication) platforms, have found this script to be effective in teaching a language with an alphabet that is unfamiliar to the learner. The observations, analysis of lessons, and questionnaire employed to collect and examine data confirm the findings in the literature review. Teachers of AFL, CFL, and RFL across the globe who still have not resorted to the 'easier' script can now introduce it in their classes, as it has been noted that it can boost learners' motivation, interest and confidence and lower anxiety and feelings of unease and insecurity that are usually associated with speaking a foreign language incorrectly or imperfectly, especially in the early learning phases. It can also enhance listening and speaking, vocabulary acquisition, and pronunciation inside and outside the classroom and allow the learners to practice communicating online with native language users.

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Appendix

Appendix A
AFL COURSE

Séance 1

I. Apprenons comment saluer et répondre au salut en dialecte libanais.

A- Ecoutez le document 1 puis reliez chaque expression à sa réponse.

Mar7aba	•	Masa el nour
Saba7o	•	2ahla w sahla
Masa el 5ēr	•	Sabā7 el nour
Sabā7 el 5ēr	•	Hala

II. Apprenons le salut en contexte.

A. Ecoutez le document 2 puis écrivez les mots que vous connaissez.

……
……

B. Employez les mots écrits dans des phrases à l'oral.

C. Lisez la transcription du document :

Mounira: Sabā7 el 5ēr ya Karim.
Karim: Ahla w sahla. Sabā7 el nour ya Mounira.
Mounira: Kifak ya Karim?
Karim: ktīr mnī7 7amdella. Enté kīfik?
Mounira: ana kamen mnī7a.
Karim: kīf es-so77a?
Mounira: 7amdella, chou fi a5bār?
Karim: mafi chi jdid.
Mounira: chou a5bār ech-cheghel?
Karim: mnī7, kel chi tamēm.

D. Repérez les phrases interrogatives dans le document.
……
……
E. Par quels mots commencent les phrases interrogatives relevées ?
……
F. Que signifie chacun des interrogatifs relevés ?
……

N.B : L'interrogatif « chou » est invariable. Cependant « Kīf » varie selon la personne. il s'accorde en genre et en nombre avec la personne à qui on s'adresse.

III. Rappelons-nous les pronoms personnels d'agent (sujet) :

	Pronoms			
	Singulier		**Pluriel**	
Personne	**Masculin**	**Féminin**	**Masculin**	**Féminin**
1ère	Ana	Ana	Ne7na	Ne7na
2ème	Enta	Enté	Ento	Ento
3ème	Houwwé	Hiyyé	Henné	Henné

IV. Apprenons les pronoms suffixes :
A. Observons :
1. Lisez les phrases suivantes :
   a. Enta esmak Samir ?
   b. Henné men Fransa bas ref2ātoun men Lebnēn.
   c. Ne7na men 3allim bel madrasé. Moudīrna esmo Jamil.
   d. Mar7aba, kīfkoun ento?
   e. Hiyyé esma Jana, ana esmé Nada.
   f. Enté chou esmik? Houwwé esmo Karim.
2. D'après les phrases ci-dessus, complétez par le pronom suffixe qui manque. (essayez de ne pas les regarder)
   a. Enta esm… Samir ?
   b. Henné men Fransa bas ref2āt…. men Lebnēn.
   c. Ne7na men 3allim bel madrasé. Moudīr…. esmo Jamil.
   d. Mar7aba, kīf….. ento?
   e. Hiyyé esm…… Jana, ana esm….. Nada.
   f. Enté chou esm….? Houwwé esm…. Karim.

B. Récapitulons :

Pronom d'agent	Pronom suffixe
Ana	
Ne7na	
Enta	
Enté	
Ento	
Houwwé	
Hiyyé	
Henné	

C. Déduisons :

Ana	Kīf…..
Ne7na	Kīf…..
Enta	Kīf…..
Enté	Kīf…..
Ento	Kīf…..
Houwwé	Kīf…..
Hiyyé	Kīf…..
Henné	Kīf…..

V.Passons à la pratique :

A. Quelques mots et expressions utiles.

Fi	Chwey
Mafi	5alas
Chi	W
Machi	Bas
Kel chi	Kamen
Ktīr	Halla2
A5bār	Lyom
So77a	Nchalla
Chou	Nochkour alla
A5bār	Rawē2/rey2a

B. Question- réponse.

Questions	Réponses possibles
Kīfak, kīfik,…	• Mnī7, mnī7a, mnē7. • Ktīr mnī7,… • El 7amdella, nochkour alla,… • Kel chi tamēm. • Machi jdīd ? • Mēché el 7āl. • Ya3né
Kīf es-so77a ?	
Kīf el 7āl ?	
Chou a5bār+pronom suffixe ?	
Chou fi mafi	

C. Répondez aux questions suivantes :

a. Kīfkoun ?
b. Chou fi mafi ?
c. Chou a5bārak/ik ?
d. Kīf el 7āl ?
e. Kīf es-so77a ?

D. Créez une conversation entre deux dames, Samira et Leila.

……

……

VI. Un peu de tout :

« 2ahwit 2ahla w sahla ! »

On utilise souvent l'expression « 2ahwit 2ahla w sahla » quand le café vient d'être préparé et que quelqu'un arrive sans l'avoir planifié. On l'invite alors au café en disant et voilà « 2ahwit 2ahla w sahla » !

VII. Prenons congé :

Tout comme le salut, la prise de congé en dialecte libanais se fait de différentes manières. Voici quelques mots, expressions, questions et réponses utiles afin de le faire.

Questions	Réponses
Baddak chi ?	La2, salēmtak/ la2, alla ma3ak.
Bel2ezen	Eznak ma3ak
Ya3tik el3āfieh	Alla y3afik
Ma3 es-salēmé	Alla ysalmak
Bye	Bye
B5ātrak	Alla ma3ak/b5ātrak
5allina nchoufak	Akid, men3ādé
3īda/3idia/3īdouwa	Akid men3ādé/ men kel bedd
Sallim	Wosil

Appendix B
CFL COURSE



第二课 你叫什么

4

New Words

1. 叫 jiào to call; to be called	2. 什么 shénme what	3. 是 shì to be
4. 哪 nǎ which	5. 国 guó nation; country	6. 人 rén people; person
7. 中国 Zhōngguó China	8. 英国 Yīngguó UK	9. 美国 Měiguó USA

Sentence Patterns

1. 你叫什么？ Nǐ jiào shénme?
2. 我叫李小龙。 Wǒ jiào Lǐ Xiǎolóng.
3. 你是哪国人？ Nǐ shì nǎ guó rén?
4. 我是中国人。 Wǒ shì Zhōngguórén.

1. Number the words according to the recording.

jiào to call	Yīngguó UK	Zhōngguó China	guó nation; country	Měiguó USA
shénme what	shì to be	nǎ which	rén people; person ①	

2. Read aloud.

什么 shénme　叫什么 jiào shénme　你叫什么？ Nǐ jiào shénme?　我叫李小龙。 Wǒ jiào Lǐ Xiǎolóng.

中国 Zhōngguó　英国 Yīngguó　美国 Měiguó　哪国 nǎ guó　哪国人 nǎ guó rén

你是哪国人？ Nǐ shì nǎ guó rén?　我是中国人。 Wǒ shì Zhōngguórén.　我是英国人。 Wǒ shì Yīngguórén.

我是美国人。 Wǒ shì Měiguórén.

5

3. Number the pictures according to the recording.



① ____ ____ ____

4. Make dialogues.

5. Read and match.

1) 叫 jiào	a)
2) 什么 shénme	b) which
3) 是 shì	c) what
4) 哪 nǎ	d)
5) 人 rén	e)
6) 中国 Zhōngguó	f) to call; to be called
7) 英国 Yīngguó	g)
8) 美国 Měiguó	h) to be

6

6. Translation.

1) 你叫什么？ Nǐ jiào shénme?
2) 我叫李小龙。 Wǒ jiào Lǐ Xiǎolóng.
3) 你是哪国人？ Nǐ shì nǎ guó rén?
4) 我是英国人。 Wǒ shì Yīngguórén.

7. Write characters.

中 丨 口 口 中

国 丨 冂 冂 冃 冃 国 国 国

人 丿 人

8. Pronunciation practice.

ī	í	ǐ	ì
ū	ú	ǔ	ù
ǖ	ǘ	ǚ	ǜ

7

第三课 你家在哪儿

8

New Words

1. 家 jiā home	2. 在 zài to be (in/at/on)	
3. 哪儿 nǎr where	4. 北京 Běijīng Beijing	
5. 上海 Shànghǎi Shanghai	6. 香港 Xiānggǎng Hong Kong	
7. 他 tā he; him		

Sentence Patterns

1. 你家在哪儿？ Nǐ jiā zài nǎr?
2. 我家在北京。 Wǒ jiā zài Běijīng.

1. Number the cities according to the recording.

2. Read aloud.

家 jiā　我家 wǒ jiā　你家 nǐ jiā　他家 tā jiā

哪儿 nǎr　在哪儿 zài nǎr

北京 Běijīng　上海 Shànghǎi　香港 Xiānggǎng

你家在哪儿？ Nǐ jiā zài nǎr?　我家在北京。 Wǒ jiā zài Běijīng.

他家在哪儿？ Tā jiā zài nǎr?　他家在上海。 Tā jiā zài Shànghǎi.

3. Listen and match.

Míngming	★ Běijīng 北京
Xiǎohóng	★ Shànghǎi 上海
Lili	★ Xiānggǎng 香港

9

4. Make dialogues.

5. Read and match.

1) 家 jiā	a) he; him
2) 在 zài	b)
3) 哪儿 nǎr	c)
4) 北京 Běijīng	d) to be (in/at/on)
5) 上海 Shànghǎi	e)
6) 香港 Xiānggǎng	f)
7) 他 tā	g) where

6. Translation.

1) 你是哪国人？ Nǐ shì nǎ guó rén?
2) 我是中国人。 Wǒ shì Zhōngguórén.
3) 你家在哪儿？ Nǐ jiā zài nǎr?
4) 我家在北京。 Wǒ jiā zài Běijīng.
5) 他家在哪儿？ Tā jiā zài nǎr?
6) 他家在上海。 Tā jiā zài Shànghǎi.

10

7. Write characters.

我 一 二 千 手 我 我 我

在 一 ナ 大 右 在 在

北 丨 丬 丬 北 北

京 丶 亠 亠 亠 亠 京 京 京

8. Pronunciation practice.

b:	bā	bá	bǎ	bà	bū	bú	bǔ	bù
p:	pā	pá	pǎ	pà	pū	pú	pǔ	pù
m:	mā	má	mǎ	mà	mū	mú	mǔ	mù
f:	fā	fá	fǎ	fà	fū	fú	fǔ	fù

Xiānggǎng 香港

11

单元小结

1. 你好！	
2. 你好吗？	
3. 我很好。	
4. 某人＋叫＋什么？	例句：你叫什么？ 他叫什么？
5. 某人＋叫＋名字	例句：我叫Mary。 他叫李小龙。
6. 某人＋是＋哪国人？	例句：你是哪国人？ 他是哪国人？
7. 某人＋是＋国家＋人	例句：我是中国人。 他是英国人。
8. 某人＋家＋在＋哪儿？	例句：你家在哪儿？ 他家在哪儿？
9. 某人＋家＋在＋某地	例句：我家在英国。 他家在北京。
10. 课堂用语	老师好！ Lǎoshī hǎo!
	你们好！ Nǐmen hǎo!
	我们上课。 Wǒmen shàngkè.
	请你说。 Qǐng nǐ shuō.
	下课。 Xiàkè.

12

Appendix C
RFL COURSE

-Basic Russian for beginners-
LESSON 1: HELLO, HOW ARE YOU?
In this lesson you will learn:
- how to say hello to a friend.
- basic rules of the verb "to be" in the Present tense.
- basic rules about the gender of nouns.

1. USEFUL PHRASE IN RUSSIAN
Listen and repeat the following sentence:
http://www.russianforfree.com/resources/audio_course/sentences/L01 - privyet kak dyeLa.mp3
- HI, HOW ARE YOU? - ПРИВЕТ, КАК ДЕЛА?
(pri-vyet, kak dye-La?) La is pronounced like ʏ
Привет is an informal greeting equivalent of our "hi". It is used when meeting friends.
Как дела? is the short form of "как твои дела?" (literally "how (are) your things?"). It's an informal question used with friends.

2. RUSSIAN VOCABULARY
Read, listen and repeat the basic vocabulary of this lesson:
In every lesson you'll find a short list with new words. You don't need to memorize them now, because later in the lesson you are going to listen to dialogues which contain this new vocabulary. At the end of this course you'll have learnt more than 200 Russian words, which is enough to have a basic conversation. Listen carefully to the pronunciation and repeat each word.
http://www.russianforfree.com/resources/audio_course/vocabulary/L01 - Vocabulary.mp3

ENGLISH	RUSSIAN	PRONUNCIATION
Hi	Привет	pri-vyet
Russian (masculine)	Русский	rus-kij
Russian (feminine)	Русская	rus-kaya
Yes	Да	Da
No	Нет	Nyet
I	Я	Ya
You	Ты	Ty

3. DIALOGUES IN RUSSIAN
These dialogues will help you memorize this lesson's vocabulary:
As you can see, you'll find plenty of dialogues in the course. If you want to learn Russian, you have to listen to Russian. It's as simple as that. We have developed original dialogues, which are entertaining and easy to understand. Each lesson uses the vocabulary from the previous ones, so you'll be learning little by little, lesson after lesson. We hope you enjoy this method.

DIALOGUE 1:
http://www.russianforfree.com/resources/audio_course/dialogues/L01 - Dialogue 01.mp3

ENGLISH	RUSSIAN	PRONUNCIATION
Hi!	Привет!	pri-vyet
Hi! How are you?	Привет! Как дела?	pri-vyet. kak dye-La?

I (am) Elena, and you?	Я - Елена, а ты?	Ya ye-lye-na, a ty?
And I (am) Michael.	А я Майкл.	a ya maj-kl.
(Are) you Russian?	Ты русский?	ty rus-kij
No, and you?	Нет, а ты?	nyet a ty?
Yes, I (am) Russian.	Да, я русская.	da ya rus-ka-ya

DIALOGUE 2:
http://www.russianforfree.com/resources/audio_course/dialogues/L01 - Dialogue 02.mp3

ENGLISH	RUSSIAN	PRONUNCIATION
(Are) you Russian?	Ты русская?	Ty rus-ka-ya?
Yes, I (am) Russian.	Да, я русская.	Da, ya rus-ka-ya.
And you? (Are) you Russian?	А ты? Ты русский?	A ty? Ty rus-kij?
No, I (am) American.	Нет, я американец.	Nyet, ya a-mye-ri-ka-nyets.

Appendix D
QUESTIONNAIRE

Foreign Language Classrooms

Foreign Language Classrooms

The effectiveness of the use of a Romanized script to teach a non-Roman language or a language with a non-Roman alphabet or script.

*** 1. What is your gender?**

- ○ Male
- ○ Female

*** 2. To what age group do you belong?**

- ○ 16-25
- ○ 26-33
- ○ 33-42
- ○ 43 and above

*** 3. What is the highest level of education you have completed?**

*** 4. How many languages do you know?**

*** 5. How would you rate the effectiveness of a Romanized representation of the target language script on ... ?**

	Strongly ineffective	Ineffective	Neither effective nor ineffective	Effective	Strongly effective
listening and speaking	○	○	○	○	○
vocabulary acquisition	○	○	○	○	○
pronunciation	○	○	○	○	○
cultural knowledge	○	○	○	○	○

*** 6. How would you rate the effects of technology on language and culture learning?**

Strongly ineffective	Ineffective	Effective	Neither effective nor ineffective	Strongly effective
○	○	○	○	○

*** 7. How would working with the Romanized script affect students'...?**

	Raises it	Lowers it	No change
Confidence	○	○	○
Motivation	○	○	○
Interest	○	○	○
Anxiety	○	○	○
Proficiency	○	○	○
Cultural empathy	○	○	○

Done

EXAMINING THE IMPACT OF GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE ON COMMUNITIES IN EAST GERMANY AND NORTHERN IRELAND IN THE 1970S AND 1980S

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I am a PHD research candidate in the school of Media in the Technological University of Dublin under the supervision on Dr Tom Clonan. My current area of research focuses on the impact and influence of surveillance on society as a whole. This paper aims to compare the historical surveillance practices used in Northern Ireland and East German Stasi during the 70s and 80s to e help determine the impact of mass surveillance on the wider community.

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Abstract

With the advent of the digital age, the world is at a surveillance crossroads; past tactics, such as wiretapping, are becoming obsolete. We are hurtling towards a world in which virtual information is accessed through covert data mining. Citizens have little or no protection from this intrusion, and moreover, little is known about the ways this information is used. The impact this will have on society and its influence on how we interact and communicate have yet to be determined.

An historical look at the GDR and NI as examples of heavily monitored societies provides a unique perspective on the impact of surveillance. The main areas of focus will look at the impact on the citizen, the community, and the wider society. By undertaking a detailed examination of the literature and comparing how these two surveilled societies interacted during these periods of heavy surveillance, insight can be gained into the future impact on generations, living in the context of new advanced surveillance technologies.

This paper will compare two surveillance states—East Germany, or the German Democratic Republic (GDR), and Northern Ireland (NI) during the 70's and 80'. With this historical context the aim is to examine the roles and impacts of surveillance operations on these two communities and constructing a detailed comparison between these two surveillance societies.

Word Count: 7000

Introduction: The Context of Surveillance in Northern Ireland and East Germany

To compare surveillance strategies used in East Germany, or the German Democratic Republic (GDR), and Northern Ireland (NI), the history of and rationale for surveillance operations in each state must be taken into account. Both cases can be examined and analysed using Foucault's model of surveillance; he described traditional models as power flowing from the surveyors (government or corporate actors) to the surveilled:

> In this concept, power is something possessed by an authority that is exerted over things, which can modify use, consume or destroy. (1982, p. 786)

For 40 years, the East German State Security Service, commonly known as the Stasi, had a frightening reputation for surveillance, infiltration, and terror in the GDR. Its sole objective was to control citizens and prevent the growing tide of emigration to West Germany, which nearly caused the economic collapse of the East German communist regime. By creating an atmosphere of fear, disharmony, and mistrust, the State surveillance tactics prevented the spontaneous communication and social cohesion that were critical for change. As Foucault suggested, 'People under surveillance are—as in the Panopticon—to be seen but to never know when or by whom; under control but without physical intervention' (1977, p. 204).

In contrast, the NI surveillance state had its roots in civil rights protests of the late 60's enacted in which the Catholic minority were looking to end discriminatory voting, housing, and employment policies. Their demands led to intensified political tension and intercommunity violence between the Protestant/Unionist and Catholic/nationalist communities. This, in turn, resulted in the deployment of the British Army to quell the cycles of violence, terrorist attacks, and street. The tactical aim was to end the violence and restore order through on-the-ground tactical surveillance strategies. Drawing on its colonial experience, the British establishment chose a coercive and militarised policing response to civil rights and liberties. This provocative approach exacerbated the Troubles,

essentially becoming a threat-multiplier. Numerous similarities can be drawn with today's police forces, which face increasing threats from radical elements; O'Malley and Hutchinson suggested this by noting that the 'development of police as a quasi-military form of organization and the growth of a police culture which emphasizes a form of masculine heroism' (2007, p. 385).

The Concept of the State Society

Surveillance is a form of power and control that has a direct bearing on how we live our lives, interact in our communities, and participate in our political systems. As Foucault said, 'Freedom disappears everywhere power is exercised' (1982, p. 790). This is most often at the expense of the individual because state institutions prioritise security.

One popular hypothesis among academics is that this constant surveillance will lead to a more segregated and polarised society, as suggested by Norris and Armstrong: 'It is feared that surveillance will lead to a "vicious-circle of defence". It is likely to make urban space segregated, polarised, more difficult to approach and stay in, less lively, less spontaneous and even "dead"' (1999, p. 92).

Numerous academics refer to societies that function under the governmental gaze as 'surveillance societies', a phrase coined by Lyon, who defined the surveillance network as 'societies which function, in part, because of the extensive collection, recording, storage, analysis and application of information on individuals and groups in those societies' (2007, p. 119). According to this definition, the GDR and NI societies of the 1970s and 1980s fit into the 'surveillance societies' category. However, two significant differences exist: in GDR, every citizen had the potential to be impacted by surveillance operations, while in NI, operations were split between polarised communities—that is, the Catholic nationalists and Protestant loyalists.

Citizen Impact

In a surveillance society, the concept of the individual is ignored to justify the state's exertion of control over the collective. Due to the emphasis that the state placed on loyalty, preference is often given to those groups deemed to be good or compliant citizens. As Foucault argued in *Surveillance and Power*, 'The state is envisioned as a kind of political power which ignores individuals, looking only at the interests of the totality or, I should say, of a class or a group among the citizens' (1982, p. 782). In *Discipline and Punishment*, Foucault took this a step further by showing how modern governments replaced the clumsy, inefficient power of the monarch with a system of general surveillance that 'produces a self regulating citizenry with the individual exercising this surveillance over and against himself' (1979, p. 155).

The long-term impact on an individual under constant surveillance is fear, mistrust, and self-censorship, which have led many people targeted by surveillance to retreat deeper into their private life as they spheres as they move away from community engagement to becoming more become family centric. As Kirstie Ball explained in her seminal *Exposure: Exploring the Subject of Surveillance*, the 'subject appears in the panopticon: as a mere shadow or outline only assumed to be reflexive, internally focused and self-regulating' (2009, p. 644).

In GDR, self-censorship became a measure of self-protection that people applied to all facets of life because they believed that everything they said was monitored. As Bruce explained, 'East Germans also practiced self-censorship in other, more private areas, including mail and telephone, where it would be very unlikely for East Germans to speak openly for fear of Stasi interception' (2010, p. 156). This form of self-censorship also affected the citizens of NI, often as a result of the ever-increasing violence in both the communal and private life rendering people unable to communicate, speak, and interact freely. As Dermot Feenan pointed out, 'The only others with such mobility were the police and army.' Within his developing awareness of a 'culture of political surveillance and confessional communities', he added, 'I had to constrain the body as well as the voice. Finally, in order to know, I had to become expert in demonstrating that there were things, places, and people I did not want to know' (2002, p. 148).

The literature examining surveillance issues in both GDR and NI emphasises how a sense of mistrust dominated citizen interactions and how this impacted citizens' ability to express their opinions liberally. In the case of GDR, Barbara Miller said:

> Although IM (Unofficial Informers) had not only been physically omnipresent, they had helped to create a general atmosphere of distrust and conspiracy which had ensured that many a critical sentiment was never voiced lest it should be reported to higher powers. (1997, p. 253)

In both the GDR and NI, many testified that a cloud of suspicion and fear hung over communities as a result of constant state surveillance. Philipsen noted this in his work documenting the GDR revolution: 'This was an ever-present fear; somehow it permeated all walks of life; this haunting fear that you could be arrested anytime right off the street. The Stasi heard everything, knew everything, were everywhere, and everybody knew that' (1998, p. 158). In GDR, the Stasi threat also produced a certain discourse that fuelled fear and small acts of defiance and resistance, such as mocking the alleged eavesdroppers on the telephone or speculating on perceived spies among colleagues.

In their work on surveillance societies, Lyon and Marx make continuous reference to the theory that in a securitised state, everyone is perceived as a risk, and this notion usual takes the place of the reasonable-cause

model of policing: 'Reasonable cause gives way to categorical suspicion where, for example, police may stop and search vehicles in a given locality' (Lyon, 2003, p. 89). This concept of reasonable cause played a crucial role in policing practices in NI and the GDR and prevented many citizens from exercising their right to due process. In NI, the violent backdrop against which people lived often compounded this fear of surveillance. Feldman discussed this issue in *Political Terror and the Technologies of Memory:*

> The risks of violent recourse, imprisonment, being on the run, or equivalent retaliation were negligible for Sean. By simply living a life of non-involvement in Belfast he could also, at any time, become the object of loyalist assassination, police interrogation and torture, and shoot-to-kill 'arrests'. (2016, p. 59)

Whyte examined the work of Rosemary Harris, an anthropologist who studied a rural community near the NI border, and observed the feelings of mistrust on both sides of the divided community: 'She found that, despite a careful courtesy in everyday relations, deep mistrust and grotesque misconceptions existed on both sides of the community divide' (1976, p. 273). This sense of fear often had long-lasting mental health consequences. Regarding the GDR, Bruce stated, 'Certainly, there were real, long-term mental health consequences similar to post-traumatic stress syndrome to having been a Stasi target and which are being treated in dedicated clinics in Germany today' (2010, p. 150). In his report regarding NI Policing, Wilson came to the similar conclusion that a combination of constant state surveillance and increasing violence led many to suffer lasting mental health issues: '24 per cent of women and 17 per cent of men in Northern Ireland have a mental-health problem—rates over 20 per cent higher than in England or Scotland, due to excess unemployment, social deprivation and the "Troubles" overhang' (2016, p. 137). This element is more relevant in todays every encroaching use of surveillance powers. This can be seen clearly seen in the example of Bush's use of the Patriot act, which provided over arching surveillance provisions, the details of which were leaked by Edward Snowdon. This legislation went on to be used in the highly publicised cases of Chelsea Manning and Reality Winner who were subsequently jailed for leaking information on crimes they witnessed in their work for the security forces.

Many theorists have argued that constant surveillance has a chilling effect on people's ability to speak freely and may stunt their development and the ability to interact freely. Until the consequences of surveillance are seen, the true extent of its power cannot be understood:

> Citizens cannot, in effect, legitimate laws that result in the mass and pervasive surveillance of the population based on the potential that one person may be a danger; such surveillance practices would stunt the individuals' development and the development of the communities that individuals find themselves within, as people limit what they say to avoid experiencing the (unknown) consequences of their speech. (Parsons, 2015, p. 16)

Due to this atmosphere of mistrust and citizens' inability to express their true selves, people in NI resisted telling the truth, as Kevin Myers described in *Watching the Door*:

Everyone lied in Northern Ireland . . . Everyone, without exception: republicans, loyalists, soldiers, police—everyone. Lying is easy in such a place. It is the default mode to which everyone turns when there is no consensus about truth. In the absence of an agreed reality, truth is whatever you're having yourself. (2008, p. 117)

Now as then, this can lead to the blanket acceptance of the surveillance state, as can be seen in the case of China's rolling out of the social credit score. This system, which was put forward with little opposition, can determine whether a person's loan application is approved, or whether they can travel outside the nation's borders. Many refer to this as the institutionalisation of the individual—due to the state's exertion of power over citizens. Foucault argued as follows:

> Forms of institutionalization: these may mix traditional pre-dispositions, legal structures, phenomena relating to custom or to fashion (such as one sees in the institution of the family); they can also take the form of an apparatus closed in upon itself, with its specific loci, its own regulations, its hierarchical structures which are carefully defined, a relative autonomy in its functioning (such as scholastic or military in-situations); they can also form very complex systems endowed with multiple apparatuses, as in the case of the state, whose function is the taking of everything under its wing, the bringing into being of general surveillance, the principle of regulation, and, to a certain extent also, the distribution of all power relations in a given social ensemble. (1982, p. 792)

The impact of surveillance and repression was often supported by intimidation and physical repercussions for those who expressed an alternative opinion to that of the state. This was the case for both NI and the GDR. In NI, physical intimidation was more blatant. In his analysis of NI, Feldman found that although one might not have been directly involved in the violence, one could have become unwittingly embroiled in it. In the GDR, there was a subtle, psychologically erosive effect that occurred over time through interference with people's life choices. (2016, p. 65)

In the GDR, the surveillance state and subsequent intimidation often led to the intentional breakdown of the targeted individual. The surveillance of the targeted individual entrapped not only him or her but also his or her relations and everyone with whom he or she communicated, thereby granting the surveyor the potential power to exert influence over the targeted individual's close relationships. As Justice Brandeis Olmstead v United States in 1928, which was the first wiretapping case in the Supreme Court, argues, 'The tapping of one man's telephone line involves the tapping of the telephone of every other person whom he may call, or who may call him' (Brandeis, 1928).

In a surveillance state, the control exerted on citizens often forces them to become compliant, and the need to adapt to the regime and live a normal life becomes a survival mechanism. Parsons takes this further, arguing that this constant state of control through surveillance leads to the dissipation of social bonds; hence, in the need to live a normal life, citizens learn to adapt and accept the limits of the surveillance state, complying with and working within its limits: surveillance 'weakens the bonds needed for populations to develop the requisite relationships for fostering collective growth and inclusive law-making' (Parsons, 2015, p. 2).

Citizens' compliance in the face of physical and physiological methods of control in both NI and GDR was essential to the securitisation strategies of both states. In NI, citizens' compliance was fundamental to restoring law and order, and in the context of the GDR, it was vital in guaranteeing the state's stability and survival. The individual, therefore, ceased to exist in the eyes of the state and was replaced by a set of judgments based on a set of behaviours and partial information that someone with control and power deemed hostile. These judgments were often made in secret without the knowledge of the targeted person or with any type of context taken into account:

> Past activities can be queried to determine the relative hostility of a person, their intentions, or their past activities and communications partners, and without a person being able to rebut or contextualize their past behaviours. They are effectively always subject to secret evaluations without knowing what is being evaluated, why, or the consequences or outcomes of the evaluations undertaken. (Parsons, 2015, p. 3)

In the case of NI and GDR in through the 70's and 80's, many citizens attempting to lead normal lives in these surveillance societies remained largely unaware of the true extent of the pervasive nature of surveillance operations. These ordinary citizens were not seen as a threat and were largely unaffected by the surveillance operations therefor no one person could be identified as the watcher. As Bell pointed out in her exploration of surveillance and everyday resistance, 'It may also be the case that individuals are ambivalent towards surveillance because there is sometimes no identifiable "watcher" or perceivable "control" being asserted' (2009, p. 3). What ensures discipline simultaneously erodes confidence, and guilt and embarrassment guarantee (self-)control. As Tabor wrote, 'The very idea of surveillance evokes curiosity, desire, aggression, guilt, and, above all, fear—emotions that interact in daydream dramas of seeing and being seen, concealment and self-exposure, attack and defence, seduction and enticement' (2001, p. 135). In todays social media world how are data is being used and misused is now coming to the public forum, however people who use these tool continue to be complacent about the data they share. This may be due to the fact that citizens today are unaware of the consequences the misuse personal information can have, because as in the case of the ordinary citizen in NI and GDR the have not experienced the impact.

In the GDR, as a result of the covert characteristic of surveillance operations, many who were unaffected by the Stasi were unaware of the extent to which it had penetrated and controlled civil society. Only when the wall came down and the Stasi files on the surveillance operations carried out during this period were made public did the full scope of Stasi operations become known.

2. Community Impact

In pre-digital eras, snooping, eavesdropping, gossiping, and otherwise furtively gathering information about people in whom one was interested was normal. In *Eavesdropping: An Intimate History*, John Locke chronicled countless examples of people overhearing others, peering through keyholes or over ladders, and snapping photographs on the street, all of which were part of what he called 'the lifelong quest for all humans to know what is going on in the personal and private lives of others' (2010, p. 6).

The extent to which government surveillance permeated the everyday lives of GDR citizens has been well documented. Many studies have noted that surveillance targets who opt to disengage with their community because they could no longer trust their neighbours; insecurity and indifference followed. This erosion of confidence in the support of one social network ultimately led to a breakdown of the community in its traditional sense, as Helen Nissenbaum described in *Privacy in Context*:

> The norms that can be violated are themselves developed based on force of habit amongst persons and their communities, their conventions, as well as a 'general confidence in the mutual support' of information flows that 'accord to key organizing principles of social life, including moral and political ones.' (2009, p. 231)

The impact of surveillance does not automatically mean a complete shutdown of communication with others; rather, it has an altering effect on the types of conversations citizens are willing to have, as they feel less free to express their true thoughts publicly. Cohen suggested the following in *Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object*:

> While the monitoring of such communications will not end all conversations, it will alter what individuals and groups are willing to say. Such surveillance, then, negatively affects communicative processes and can be critiqued on its capacity to stunt or inappropriately limit expressions of private or public autonomy. (2000), p. 1426)

Noting the breakdown in community bonds in the GDR, Bruce implied that for many, 'the idea that there was a sense of community in East Germany that has since evaporated, is common in some circles of East Germany today' (2010, p. 157). Further, when describing life in the GDR in *The File*, Timothy Garten Ash depicted this sense of suspicion and insecurity that became an everyday fact of life: '"Suspicion is everywhere,' I wrote. 'It strikes in the

bar, it lurks in the telephone, it travels with you in the train. Wherever two or three are gathered together, there suspicion will be"' (2009, p. 72).

This atmosphere in the GDR was compounded by the general perception that the enemy was everywhere, as the noted academic historian Mary Fulbrook observed in her work on the GDR and twentieth-century dictatorships: 'There was a more general atmosphere of suspicion and on occasion well-grounded fear with East Germany too in context where the class enemy was held to be everywhere' (1992, p. 323).

Communities often became built on and around the sanctuary of the church, and numerous dissident groups, usually comprising oppressed and harassed young Christians, sprang up from these open spaces. One example is the case of Protestant pastor Christian Führer, a leading figure and organiser of the 1989 Monday demonstrations in GDR, which eventually led to the collapse of the state in 1990. The church mostly remained independent from the state, allowing people this elusive freedom; however, it was infiltrated by Stasi informers, resulting in vocal members becoming surveillance targets, which led the limiting of their life choices:

> Young Christians in particular generally preferred to lead their social life within the circles of the 'Young Parish Community' (Junge Germeinde) members of which were subjected to considerable harassment in the early 1950s, with negative consequences for plans to study or pursue careers in the GDR. (Fulbrook, 1992, p. 333)

The regime made a conscious attempt to fabricate and manipulate public opinion at all levels of community activity. The division created among East German citizens not only affected had a corrosive effect on personal and family bonds as well as on the external community relationships. As Major stated, 'the sudden amputation of the two halves of Berlin sliced through innumerable personal bonds and family ties' (2010, p. 127).

As a result of the lack of trust in the wider community, many ordinary citizens often had to change their outward political views out of fear of denunciation and backlash for voicing any opposition to the political regime. According to Fulbrook, 'Political instability and radical changes of regime meant that Germans frequently had to change their outward allegiances or at least adapt their behaviour patterns in order to pursue what they had constructed as their personal life projects' (1992, p. 9).

In NI, fissures between Catholics and Protestants caused these divided communities to become more entrenched within themselves. In many cases, these communities provided protection from the on-going violence that the state failed to provide, and this allowed for extreme elements within the community to exert control over it.

> A system of internal vigilance and social control: in order to successfully 'watch the enemy'. The central argument here is that the inter community conflict in Northern Ireland fostered external surveillance of the 'Others' community and in turn necessitated and facilitated the internal surveillance of one's own community. (Zurawski, 2005, p. 499)

This created a power shift from state to community; this system of community surveillance in NI reflects the two faces of surveillance that Lyon (2001) identified: care and control. In this case, these communities perceived this exertion of control as providing a much-needed sense of security. 'The effect on the watching, intelligence and surveillance were paramount for these systems, which served as social control and an instrument of power as well as a life insurance for the people in these neighbourhoods'; any outside influence was seen as a threat, and 'to watch your own was part of the strategy for social order within the community. Any activities that might have threatened its integrity had to be controlled and eventually sanctioned' (Zurawski, 2005, p. 505).

Thus, there developed an environment in which everyone was watching everyone. Zurawski explained:

> While watching the other was important and for some people involved a necessity, it also meant that at the same time they were being watched by themselves—not only by the perceived enemy, but also by their own communities. Being a traitor or an informer to the police was among the biggest fears for many and among the most important reasons for suspicion of the police and thus for establishing 'alternative' systems of justice and policing within the community to 'watch your own.' (2005, p. 504)

Tim Pat Coogan, a renowned reporter author, in his book *The Troubles*, observed that 'For one thing, I have noticed that the various communities that were under attack are much more closely knit than ever before. You have young people, and elderly people, all closely knit' (2002, p. 103). This ultimately had a divisive effect on the building of understanding, trust, and community cohesion, which further fuelled the segregation of Catholics and Protestants. This encouraged the 'them and us' mentality that dominated the mindset of working class communities on both sides of the divide. 'In all of these working-class streets, there of course existed a strong sense of "them and us" and a concomitant fear that the "them" would be returning to stage a Clonard-style repeat performance' (Coogan, 2002, p. 124). This communal division was used as an instrument to mobilise community support for the extremist agenda for both loyalists and republicans. The timing of the punishments meted out by these groups was carefully planned to garner maximum attention and reinforce strategic goals. Feldman pointed out the following:

> The PIRA will manipulate the timing of punishment violence in order to mobilize community support revealing that paramilitary punition is a mnemo-technique reserved for special times and political moments dedicated to the performance and display of cathartic communal memory on the bodies of others. (2016, p. 65)

This led to tight-knit communities closing themselves off to any outside contact. This siege mentality, which resulted from a lack of trust in the security forces, enabled intercommunity bias because alternative voices and

opinions were not encouraged. From his time undertaking research involving a prolonged participant observation in the nationalist and republican parts of Belfast during periods of high-level political conflict, Burton indicated that there were 'physical dangers as well as challenges in accessing tight-knit communities', also noting 'his developing awareness of a "culture of political surveillance" and "confessional communities."' He reported, "I had to constrain the body as well as the voice. Finally, in order to know I had to become expert in demonstrating that there were things, places, and people I did not want to know' (1979, p. 79).

In 2012, a wide-reaching study was conducted in NI on the attitudes of citizens currently living in the shadows of the peace walls; this study revealed that although the atmosphere among communities is improving, people are not yet prepared for the walls to come down. Most believe that the peace walls should come down in the future (58%). More concerning is the fact that over a fifth of the respondents living closest to the peace walls (22%) thought that they should remain as they are. This atmosphere of fear and distrust remains in the psychic backgrounds of these communities. Byrne, Gormely-Heenan, and Sturgeon suggested the following:

> These attitudes were underpinned by expressed fears of potential 'loss' of community; a fear of violence; and a fear that the police would be unable to maintain law and order in the event of the 'constant problems' that might result from the walls being removed. Indeed, 17% of respondents living closest to the walls said that they would try to move away if the walls in their areas were to come down. (2015, p. 17)

Criminological theories of informal social control also extend to the role of 'surveillance' by residents and the 'norms of conduct' by which residents are regulated. Brewer and Rodgers (1997) concluded that 'political violence' has ironically protected NI from some of the 'worst vagaries of community breakdown and dislocation witnessed in Britain's inner cities' (1997, p. 216).

As was the case with NI, the modern surveillance state runs the risk of creating polarised communities, especially when profiling individuals becomes a normal method of surveillance and security. Graham took this a step further, suggesting that this control through surveillance will have an altering effect on community and societal behaviours, as people have to make compromises when navigating these controlled spaces: 'Surveillance is used to monitor the groups, whose visual appearance is interpreted as somehow deviant, producing a particular type of "normative space-time ecology"' (1998, p. 491).

In NI, the idea of the 'other' was accelerated by pre-existing ethnic, religious, and political differences. Therefore, in a surveillance society, what was diverse now became polarised, divided, and radicalised. Similar comparisons can be drawn from the perceived Islamist threat today. Norris argued that the power provided by systems and techniques of surveillance encourages and fuels community division: 'It is a "powerful tool in managing and enforcing exclusion"' (2003, p. 267). This gives rise to the justification of the securitisation of these communities, as Starr et al. suggested, because surveillance 'gives rise to a security culture; which can have devastating impacts on inclusivity, solidarity, bonds of friendship and community' (2008, p. 262).

3. Societal Impact

The societal impact of surveillance has a direct bearing on the citizen's relationship with the political system, and this, in turn, affects people's attitudes to how they interact and engage with government institutions. As Lyon pointed out in *Surveillance After September 11*, 'Surveillance has become a routine and mundane feature that is embedded in every aspect of life and operates in a wide range of agencies well beyond the confines of the central state' (Lyon, 2001).

With the increasing use of surveillance techniques in modern security and policing strategy, the state's control over these institutions appears to have grown, unlike the case of the GDR and NI; however, this power does not appear to be wielded to the same extent in contemporary society. Foucault made the following observation:

> It is certain that in contemporary societies, the state is not simply one of the forms or specific situations of the exercise of power—even if it is the most important—but that in a certain way all other forms of power relation must refer to it. But this is not because they are derived from it; it is rather because power relations have come more and more under state control (although this state control has not taken the same form in pedagogical, judicial, economic, or family systems). (1982, p. 793)

Despite ever-increasing intrusions into the private sphere via new invasive technologies and laws, the impact these systems of surveillance will have on the way in which we function as a society remains unclear. In a surveillance state, the control exerted on citizens often forces them to comply with policies and actions they oppose under a free system. This has a chilling effect on socially beneficial behaviour, which results in the deterioration of our interaction with state institutions, hampering our ability to vocalise any concerns regarding the way in which our state is governed. In a recent study undertaken in 2016 by Elizabeth Stoycheff highlights this fact, as the majority of participants who were aware of government surveillance were significantly deterred from speaking out in an environment that was hostile to alternative opinion. As Parsons suggested, surveillance 'weakens the bonds needed for populations to develop the requisite relationships for fostering collective growth and inclusive law-making' (2015, p. 3). This is in keeping with Hirschman's *Shifting Involvements: Private Interest and Public Action* in which he offered critical insights into the understanding of collective action. His findings maintained that, 'Realizing that efforts to change public life are either forbidden or unrewarded, people will predictably withdraw from public affairs and pursue individual interests until such a time as an opening becomes available' (1982, p. 101).

Surveillance can be used to justify the censorship of voices that do not conform to self-serving state narratives. As Marx argued, the surveillance of protesters conducted by the United States authorities such as in the case of the Black Lives Matters movement (LAURA LY, Mark Morales, 2019) could 'seriously distort the life of a social movement; they can serve as mechanisms of containment, prolongation, alteration, or repression' (1974, p. 403).

Much of the justification behind current surveillance practice is based on the perception that it improves behaviour and creates safer public spaces, as Bentham envisaged in his seminal work 'The Panopticon. (1787) In *The New Transparency: Police Violence in the Context of Ubiquitous Surveillance,* Ben Brucato made a similar finding: 'This preventative power, provided by the visibility cameras produce, recalls Bentham's claim that "behaviour improves when people are strictly observed"' (2015, p. 48). Foucault drew similar conclusions regarding the deep connection between surveillance and the state security apparatus, identified by Stephen Pfaff: the '[a]uthoritarian model of social organisation in which absolutist states enlisted police powers in the service of political security and popular welfare'. He went on to argue that in a surveillance state, these systems of repression work in tandem to exert control over '[a] secret police dedicated to uncovering the hidden threats to the regime from within and without took an increasingly prominent place alongside conventional agencies of social control' (Pfaff, 2001, p. 401).

For people living in the GDR, the need to live a normal life despite the repressive regime became the main focus. Major recognised this need to blend in or live under the radar in a society in which citizens are under scrutiny, stating that 'the population had to "come to an arrangement" with the regime and "make the best of their situation", simply because they had no other choice' (2010, p. 159). Political establishments and police were provided with big budgets to ensure that strict party loyalty was enforced. Their only allegiance was to the GDR's regime, which they aimed to protect and uphold regardless of whether state policies benefitted society: 'The ministry had an annual budget of 4 billion Marks, 27 separate divisions entrusted with matters ranging from party loyalty to economic surveillance and oversaw the operations of the formally separate civilian police in the Ministry of the Interior' (Pfaff, 2001, p. 392).

The close relationship between the state and the police was one of the greatest assets utilised by the GDR's governing powers and can be considered one of the main reasons the system of repression lasted for almost four decades. In *The KGB and the Control of the Soviet Bloc*, Popplewell described this deep-rooted connection between the state and police:

> The close intertwining of Party and secret police apparatus was one of the main reasons why the East German regime endured for so long and with so little popular opposition. This unity between Party and security organs lay at the heart of the Stasi's work. In MfS documents, the Stasi and the Party were presented as the vanguard of society. To echo the Stasi's own words, both were meant to lead society and to shape it. (1998, p. 276)

The overt and pervasive nature of this surveillance was so divisive that it successfully silenced the voice of any dissent. Popplewell added the following:

> The most important role of the local secret police of Eastern Europe was thus to spy upon their own populations. Generally speaking, the 'secrecy' of these agencies was not the key to their success. Rather by their very ubiquity they were designed to cow all potential opponents within their societies. (1998, p. 255)

The system depended on the maintenance of mystique around the state's actions. When this veil was removed, the party's power disappeared and citizens felt empowered to make life choices and take their freedom back. Jaraucsh described the re-empowering of GDR dissidents in his depiction of the negotiation of the unification talks: 'Krenz's dialogue policy as well as Modrow's negotiations at the Round Table recognized the opposition groups as legitimate partners. When these changes demystified the Stasi, reducing their capacity to instil fear, its power evaporated' (2014, p. 76).

Everyone in GDR society was viewed as a hostile element whose trust had to be earned, thus enabling this state of perpetual paranoia. This paranoia led to the misreading of the dissented voices, who ultimately wanted to make changes within in the system rather than destroy it completely. This misreading of popular sentiment proved to be counterproductive, resulting in the downfall of the GDR: 'Fundamental misunderstanding of system-immanent dissenters like Havemann, Biermann, and Bahro, they were seen as agents of foreign subversion instead of as idealists trying to democratize socialism' (Jarausch, 2014, p. 76).

In the GDR, once the fear of those in power diminished, people felt that they could finally come together to voice their opinions and concerns publicly. The peaceful revolution, which saw the tearing down of the Berlin Wall and the overthrow of the government, occurred without a single bullet fired, and as Albrecht described in *The Role of Social Movements in the Collapse of the German Democratic Republic,* there 'no single window [was] broken during the Leipzig autumn' (1996, p. 161).

It can be said that the stability of the state and the maintenance of the regime resulted from the cooperation of the elite, the containment of dissent, and the isolation of potential opposition. The survival of the GDR depended on the success of the forced compliance of its citizens. The following is outlined in Miller's work on the GDR:

> Various analyses of the average citizen's behaviour in the GDR have been proposed since 1989. Psychologist Hans-Joachim Maaz describes the East German psyche as having been characterised by a split personality . . . This split in personality enabled East Germans to betray their private convictions in public, and explains why,

> for example, well over 90% of the population went along with the farcical voting procedure. (1997, p. 187)

In NI, by comparison, many citizens in besieged communities looked to radical alternatives as they sought safety. Communities became the social environments from which paramilitaries emerged and by means of which they sustained their support. For many, the state and the army became symbols of the discrimination and violence that dominated NI communities: 'Catholic west Belfast became an occupied zone. Public buildings such as schools, recreational halls, even blocks of flats and football grounds including the Casement Park GAA ground, were all occupied by soldiers' (Coogan, 2002, p. 187).

Between 1973 and 1999, there were 2,168 'punishment' shootings and beatings. Between 1982 and 1999, the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) recorded 1,427 'punishment' beatings, which were often carried out with the knowledge of state security forces:

> Alleged forms of collusion were said to include: the illicit disclosure of security information, such as photo montages (created by the military as a recognition tool for the security forces and including the date of birth and sometimes the home address of a terrorist suspect); facilitation of acts of terrorism; failure to provide adequate protection or to warn people at risk; failure to vigorously investigate terrorist incidents and provision of weaponry to terrorist groups. (Cochrane, 2013, p. 78)

As Pfaff suggested, in a surveillance society in which the state virtually eliminates the public sphere, informal ties become critically important. He stated that 'these groups often provide the only opportunity for genuine participation in public life and an opportunity to define actual interests and needs that are otherwise prohibited or ignored by the regime' (2001, p. 397).

The targeting of peaceful demonstrations alongside the disenfranchisement of the Catholic population led many to believe that engaging with the state was futile: 'What had happened in Derry had been merely a legal rerun of what the RUC had done in October 1968 to trigger off the entire conflict—i.e. trapping the demonstrators in a confined area and then attacking them—no further comment is necessary' (Coogan, 2002: 177).

The fact that the Catholic population had very little say in the day-to-day operations of the state made these communities opt out of engaging in government institutions: 'One of these "established local authorities" was Fermanagh County Council. At the time of the publication of the Macrory Report, had thirty-five Unionist councillors, while the Catholic majority was represented by only seventeen' (Coogan, 2002, p. 143).

The gerrymandering of voting boundaries in NI further created a barrier to Catholic participation in the democratic process. The voting practices in both NI and the GDR were ultimately prohibitive to citizen participation in state governance. As Flusty pointed out in his work on paranoia, this segregation and disenfranchisement of citizens is counterproductive to a health society: 'Via segregation, purification and exclusion of particular groups, surveillance encourages conflict. The urge for security "has generated a defensive arms race"' (1994, p. 49).

In the case of NI and GDR, both systems of surveillance had clear connections and operated hand in hand with the security services, police, judiciary, and army. Levin drew similar comparisons from the examples of many repressive regimes that exist today:

> There is a clear military connection. Further, seemingly harmless surveillance technology is used in non-democratic regimes and used to police undesirable groups and movements. China, where surveillance images were used to identify the student leaders of the Tiananmen Square demonstration, provides an example of this. (2002, p. 579)

However, Foucault argued that in the modern era of the surveillance society, shows of force are obsolete because all that is required for the state to control its citizens is for the latter to know that they are being watched, as evidenced by the systems of surveillance that existed in the GDR. The 'absence of force' creates the force of our times:

> There is no need for arms, physical violence, material constraints. Just a gaze. An inspecting gaze, a gaze that each individual under its weight will end by interiorising to the point that he is his own overseer, each individual thus exercising this surveillance over, and against, himself. A superb formula: power exercised continuously and for what turns out to be a minimal cost. (1980, p. 155)

The 'nothing to hide' argument is one of the primary standpoints used in the debate on the need to balance privacy and security. In its most compelling form, this suggests that people's privacy interest is generally minimal to trivial, thus making the balance against security concerns a preordained victory for security: 'When surveillance and sousveillance are both treated equally—a more appropriate state—one can say that there is "equiveillance." More typically, however, there is "inequiveillance"' (Boiler, 2013).

The individual is shaped by society, and the good of both the individual and society are often interrelated rather than antagonistic. Therefore, it is vital that democratic institutions protect the individual as much as the state. As Solove noted, 'We cannot think of ourselves save as to some extent social beings. Hence we cannot separate the idea of ourselves and our own good from our idea of others and of their good', and 'Dewey contends that the value of protecting individual rights emerges from their contribution to society' (2008, p. 761).

Norris also concluded that '[r]ather than promoting a democratic gaze, the reliance on categorical suspicion further intensifies the surveillance of those already marginalized and further increases their chance of official stigmatization' (2003, p. 266). Moreover, if surveillance is seen as 'an extension of discriminatory and unjust policing, the consequential loss of legitimacy may have serious consequences for the social order' (Norris and

Armstrong, 1999, p. 151).

Unchecked powers of surveillance are inherently toxic and corrosive to healthy democratic growth and progress. If a cost–benefit analysis is conducted, the enormous investment in surveillance ultimately benefits a tiny number in power and stalls normal, healthy growth in society. This eventually leads to such dysfunction that the society becomes unsustainable, leading to the collapse of the state, as in the GDR, or to increasingly violent retaliation, as in the case of NI. These outcomes often have worse consequences for all stakeholders than the perceived threats in the first place.

Conclusion

While the era of the modern surveillance state provides many with a sense of security, some fear that the danger lies in the potential for communities to be governed exclusively in the name of security. Marc Schuilenburg suggested that '[t]he punishment of harmful behaviour is only important when it leads to a reduction of risk' (2015, p. 37). Therefore, surveillance techniques used as part of a wider security strategy may create a disenfranchised population due to stereotype-induced profiling. It can be argued this was the case in NI, where the majority-Catholic population was seen as the potential threat. Conversely, in the GDR, every citizen who spoke out in defiance of the state was viewed with suspicion; in other words, everyone was a potential target. Therefore, one can argue, as Deleuze suggested, that in surveillance societies, such as NI and the GDR, there is a shift from Foucault's disciplinary enclosure to a fluid 'control society' (1995, p. 178–179), leading to 'ceaseless control in open sites' (1995, p. 175).

When examining the NI and GDR contexts, both surveillance state systems had the same aim of rooting out all opposition and controlling dissent and dissonance through voluntary or forced compliance: 'The function of the secret police in such regimes is not only to root out opposition and discourage dissent but to regulate the political and moral conduct of both ordinary citizens and functionaries of the state' (Pfaff, 2001, p. 400). While in NI, a secret police force was not prevalent, the British Army carried out a similar function under the guise of preventing terrorist attacks and restoring law and order.

The literature reveals that long-term surveillance in these two societies had a lasting impact on the citizen, communities, and society at large. It broke down social and community bonds, as mistrust, fear, and suspicion dominated people's lives. In this atmosphere of saturated surveillance, silence, invisibility, and anonymity became weapons of survival. From these two examples of surveillance societies, we see that surveillance can create chilling effects on free speech and free association, which are essential for democracy to thrive. Even the surveillance of legal activities can inhibit people from engaging in the judicial system itself, as in the cases of NI and the GDR, where people's faith in legal institutions was severely reduced.

In both NI and the GDR, surveillance became a part of day-to-day life, its presence becoming a normalised and accepted intrusion into the private sphere of the citizenry. As Foucault suggested, 'The broadly shared experience of being watched has been normalized, such that publics have internalized the surveillant gaze of the state' (1979). However, as Pfaff argued, the long-term acceptance of surveillance is not guaranteed, as evidenced by the historical experiences of NI and the GDR: 'Such a regime may secure compliance so long as its power seems unassailable, but once its authority is threatened it may suddenly experience a revolt that is a more accurate reflection of the popular sentiments' (2001, p. 21). Pfaff also provided a stark warning to governing powers, noting that '[f]or the most part, policymakers should focus on past examples of harm, but they should not ignore undeniable indicators of future harm' (2001, p. 21)

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MAIN CRITERIA FOR CLASSIFICATION OF THE TYPES OF INFORMATION CONFRONTATION

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The article discusses the grounds for the classification of the information confrontation types. A comparative analysis was used to consider psychological operations conducted in the information space. The various bases of psychological confrontations have common points that unite them into a single whole. As a result of the study, it was possible to identify the most typical grounds for the classification of information wars, determine the classification criteria and highlight their main types. The authors proposed an original approach to the classification of information wars on geographical basis. System analyses was one more method used in the study. Terms such as informational operation, informational impact, psychological warfare, behavioral warfare and cyberwarfare are the elements of a system to describe information warfare. The use of various methods in the study allowed to identify the basis for the classification of information wars.

Keywords: *information war; information operation; psychological war; behavioural war; cyberwarfare.*

Word Count: 4999

Information wars have a long history, but only recently, they have become an object of research. The article aims to examine various classifications of information warfare, also comparing the Russian and Western approaches.

Definition of the information war

An American sociologist and psychologist Harold Lasswell is one of the pioneers of the research on the issue of information wars. He considered propaganda almost the most effective weapon in the modern war, to which in his opinion the First World War belonged. "The conduct of war, conceived as a psychological problem, may be stated in terms of moral. A nation with a high moral is capable of performing the tasks laid upon it." (Lasswell 1929, p. 27) In his book "Propaganda Technique in the World War", he examines different methods of propaganda, which raises the morale of country's own population and lowers the enemy's one.

The single and universally recognized definition of the information war does not exist nowadays. Nevertheless, it is obvious that the information warfare is a very complex and multifaceted phenomenon. In our work, we examine information war only in the context of confrontation of states, societies and geopolitical systems. While formulating the definition, it is necessary to take into account all factors of that confrontation, the purpose of which is to achieve an undeniable advantage over the enemy by obtaining, processing and using different information.

Russian scientist A.V. Manoilo suggests to characterize information war as an information activity undertaken by a political entity (for example, state) to weaken and destroy another political entity; as an information battle between competing rivals; as an informational military conflict between two mass enemies, for example armies (Manoilo 2003, p.9).

According to the definition, proposed by the researcher G.G. Pochepcov: "Information warfare is a communicative technology aimed to impact the mass consciousness with short and long-term goals. The goal of the impact is to make changes in the cognitive structure in order to obtain appropriate changes in the behavioral structure"

(Pochepcov 2001, p.20). In our opinion, this definition in the best possible way reflects the psychological aspect of information wars, which can be distinguished as a separate class of information wars - "psychological warfare" (Pochepcov 2000, p.14). The term "psychological warfare" is closely related to the word "propaganda" and can be interpreted as a "propaganda warfare".

Approaches to classification of information wars

It should be acknowledged that classification of the term "information war" is quite ambiguous. In our work we deal with the problem of classifications of information wars. On what reasons and for what, types and subtypes information wars can be classified?

It is important to mention the difference in the approaches of Russian and Western researchers in studying the problem of information wars. Russian scholars consider the concept of "information warfare" more broadly, as an information confrontation, including propaganda confrontation, psychological and manipulative influence, information operations (for example, information theft and disinformation), as well as cyber warfare. In doing this, Russian scholars emphasize the first aspect of the concept of "information war" - the war for the minds of people (psychological warfare), while Western scholars mainly consider the information war in a narrower militaristic dimension, as a cyber war. In the latter case, the information war or cyberwar is a military strategy aimed at creation of unfavorable situation, in particular, by disabling enemy's computers that control the vital functions of state or a separate company, intercepting and distorting information, introducing viruses, tabs and logic bombs. This understanding of information warfare is typical for American researchers Cronin and Crawford. They note the future superiority of the "digital David" over the "armored Goliath". Moreover, these researchers note the public-civilizational context of the information war, which includes "propaganda and disinformation" (Cronin and Crawford 1999, p.260). A classic example of this approach is the propaganda efforts in the American media against the regime of Saddam Hussein in 2003 and the demonstration in the United Nations of a substance in a test tube, a so-called sample of the chemical weapons that Iraq had. Thus, it is typical for the Western specialists to consider the information war, firstly, as a separate type of military operations and, secondly, as a propaganda preparation for them.

Another Western researcher Martin Libicki, who is considered as one of the first theorists of information wars, defined information wars as an informational impact, that has elements of protection, manipulation, distortion and refutation of information. M. Libicki also proposed the first classification of forms of information measures (information warfare) (Libicki 1995):

- Command and control - the impact is directed to communication channels between the command and the subordinated troops, depriving them of the opportunity to maintain control and coordination of actions;
- intelligence - the impact in which the collection and protection of information of military importance is carried out;
- electronic warfare - under this influence, electronic means of communication and computer equipment are disabled;
- psychological warfare - psychological manipulation of the population in the enemy's territory using information, the analogue of "brainwashing";
- hacker warfare - exposure through computer viruses, carried out by specialists of the appropriate field whose actions lead to communication failures;
- economic- information warfare - blocking of trade channels, information blockade;
- cyber warfare - actions similar to hacking, but for a different purpose, namely with the purpose of capturing information.

This classification given by Libicki is too cumbersome; some items can be combined, for example, electronic countermeasures and cyberwar.

D. Denning proposes to divide the information war by its nature into offensive and defensive (protective) (Denning 1999). This underpinning for the classification of information wars can be considered one of the most important.

From the perspective t of sociologists Yu. Surmin and N. Tulenkov, information wars are divided into:

- information aggression, implying the destruction of the enemy's information system and the imposition of another value system;
- information expansion, which is based on a long evolutionary impact, through its own information means in order to subordinate the enemy;
- Information and psychological civil war, which involves confrontation of various social groups within society itself.

Also Yu. Surmin and N. Tulenkov propose to distinguish the following types of information wars according to the subject of the conflict:

- the psyche of the enemy's population is the subject of psychological warfare;
- the system of information communications is the subject of the communication war;
- the struggle for acquisition of information is an information war;
- political, spiritual, ethical and other values are the subject of a value or a worldview war (Surmin and Tulenkov

2004, p.113).

The drawbacks of this classification include the confusion of the basis on which classification is made and the insufficiently persuasive division of notions, for example, “aggression” and “expansion.”

However, it should be noted that in recent years the term “information warfare” is often replaced by the term “information operation”. Many Western researchers note that in wartime information warfare is a war in the literal sense of the word, i.e. a mode of combat. In peacetime, the notion of “information operation” is more suitable for information warfare. Thus, experts call for classifying the information war into two types based on such an important basis as a “peace / war time”.

Information operations also have their own classification, proposed by V.G. Krysko:

1. Psychological operations: a planned information and psychological impact on the population of foreign countries, whose goal is to evoke the desired emotional response, to change motivation and internal goals, to make necessary adjustments in the actions of government, public and other organizations, various groups and citizens.

2. Disinformation operations: actions for deliberate misleading of decision-makers, which should induce the enemy to take steps in line with the objectives of the initiator of the operation.

3. Counterintelligence or security operations: actions to identify critical information for implementation of military, political and economic activities, as well as fields that are vulnerable to the enemy’s intelligence and his operations.

4. Electronic confrontation: –military action, in which electromagnetic radiation or other techniques are used, to control the electromagnetic range or the goal of defeating the enemy is achieved.

5. Operations in computer networks, including network attacks, protection of computer networks and assistance activities aimed at collecting and analyzing information about the enemy’s computer networks and methods of organizing network attacks (Krys’ko 1999, p.96).

This classification represents a certain step forward, but it is not deprived of any shortcomings. For example, the point 4 is necessary to be removed as not conforming to this classification.

As can be seen from the above classifications, nowadays information wars are actively studied and classified from the perspective of political, military and technical sciences. However, there is not enough research in psychology, although the impact of information wars is achieved using psychological methods. It is necessary to deeply and thoroughly study the tools used by the enemy in order to create an adequate counteraction system.

In our opinion, the classification proposed by V. Ovchinsky and E. Larina is interesting, as they distinguish three main types of information wars. The first type is mental (psychological) war that actually represents wars of content, purpose of which is to change the consciousness or psyche of masses, groups and / or personality, i.e., the object of influence is values and attitudes (Ovchinskij and Larina 2015, p.25).

American scholars Lazarsfeld and Merton propose to distinguish mental (psychological warfare) into two types - conducted in the war and peacetime. So, in peacetime, the psychological war gains features of a psychological operation. When conducting a psychological operation, information flows must be controlled through formal means, the media, educational structures, social networks, etc., as well as informal means, distributed through rumors, opinions, etc. Use of the leaders’ opinion plays an important role, as it has a determining influence on the formation of opinions within the group. P. Lazarsfeld’s multistage information flow concept serves as a model in this approach (Lazarsfeld and Merton 2004).

The second type of information war by V. Ovchinsky and E. Larina is cyberwar, considered by the author of the work “Against all enemies”. : - Cyberwar – a system of actions of one state with the purpose of penetrating into the computers or networks of another state to cause damage or destruction. The famous American specialist R. Clark regards cyberwar as a separate type of the information war, essentially identical with military actions (Clark 2011, p.48).

Another Western scientist P. Cornish offers the following classification of cyberwar. Cyberwar consists of cyber attacks, cyber defense and espionage. The cyberattack is targeted at information systems supporting functioning of power, industrial, military and other facilities, as a result of the attack they fail. The cyber defense involves the possibility of repulsing the enemy’s cyberattacks. Espionage is aimed at the extraction of useful information and penetration into the enemy’s information system. It is also proposed to classify cyberwar into two types: 1. State cyberwar; 2. Private cyberwar. State cyberwar is conducted under the aegis of the state and means that the state (group of states) has declared or continues to declare war to another state (group of states). Private cyberwar may be initiated by an individual (a group of individuals) or a private non-state organization against state, economic institutions (Cornish 2010). The difficulty of the latter classification lies in the fact that, for example, a state-sponsored cyberattack can be carried out by a private structure and it is extremely difficult to establish their relationship. According to the American journalist and writer Sh. Harris, cyberwar can accept a variety of hybrid forms (Harris 2016, p.78).

The transition from a trivial information war to a cyberwar is threatening by its unpredictable consequences. Therefore, certain rules and restrictions must be developed in a collective way with the help of the international community and adopted at a conference like the Hague Conference of 1899 and 1907.

Finally, according to V. Ovchinsky and E. Larina, the third type of the information war is behaviuoral war - it is based on technologies of manipulation of behavioral algorithms, habits, stereotypes of activity imbedded into us by

the society. The toolkit of behavioral wars is used to to separate the habit from the established type of the activity that shaped the situation, and use behavioral patterns to achieve other goals. Yet the theme of "behavioral" wars, their essence, content and, most importantly, practical methods of implementation are tabooed to the great extent. It is kept secret in the global information space, covered with powerful media information noise, which present this topic, either as another conspiracy scarecrow or proves the technological impossibility of conducting this type of war. But here is an example: out of 500 supercomputers in the world, 233 are in the USA. For comparison, Russia holds the ninth place with 8 supercomputers. For what purposes such powerful computing power and data storage is needed? The most plausible explanation for the emergence of such excess computing power and storage is their use to implement technologies for the formation and management of human behavior.

As M. Kaldor points out, the example of some modern Asian and African states, on whose territory civil wars do not cease for years and even decades simultaneously with the interference of other states, is not unique. In principle, the same fate can await any other state (Kaldor 2015, p.197). As Western researchers note, behavioral weapons serve as means of behavioral warfare. It is based on technology, called "nudge" (from English nudge - "pushing"). Its essence is simple - using habits and stereotypes, by creating certain situations, you can push a person or a group of people to make certain decisions and implement certain actions based on them. In fact, we are talking about a new programming technology and external management of human behavior (van Creveld 2005, p.236).

US military experts are introducing another type of the information war - network-centric wars. The US military theorists A. Cebrowski and J. Garstka developed the concept of «network-centric warfare» in the late 90s of the last century. At the heart of the network-centric war lies an increase in the total combat power of military formations by combining them into a single network. This network has two main features: speed of control and self-synchronization. The speed control is achieved through information superiority by the introduction of new control systems, tracking, intelligence, control, computer modeling. As a result, the enemy is deprived of the opportunity to conduct effective operations, because all its actions will be delayed. Self-synchronization refers to the ability of the organizational structure of military formations, the forms and methods of accomplishing combat missions, to be modified at its discretion, but in accordance with the needs of the higher command. As a result, military actions take the form of continuous high-speed actions (operations, campaigns) with ambitious goals. Thus, the network allows geographically dispersed forces (related to different types and kinds of troops) to be combined in a single design of the operation and at the expense of information superiority. It aims to use these forces with greater efficiency by ensuring the unity of views of the leaders (commanders) of the various troops (forces) and the place of interaction in the operation, as well as by self-synchronization of their actions in the interests of achieving the overall goal of the operation (Cebrowski and Garstka 1998).

This description emphasizes the properties of network-centric warfare as manifestations of cyberwar. Therefore, we cannot distinguish the network-centric war as a separate type of information war and consider it a kind of cyberwar.

We propose to supplement a given classification of information wars by introducing a territorial feature. It is very important to determine the territories on which the information war is conducted relative to the source of information impact, since the goals and objectives of information wars being conducted on its own population as an object of influence and the population of the enemy's country as the object of influence will differ fundamentally. Using this base of classification, it is first necessary to distinguish types of territories:

- external in relation to the source. In this case, the population of the enemy country or population of neutral countries will be the target of impact.

- internal territories. In this case, the population of the country to which the source belongs will be targeted.

Let us consider objectives of the psychological impact according to this division of information wars on territorial basis. When the population of the enemy's country is affected, the following types of mental wars can lead to a gradual weakening of the enemy's country:

1. Psychological / propaganda war. The goal is to change the picture of the world and the attitudes of the target object, that is, the population of the enemy's country. In this case, information is broadcasted in the territory of the enemy's accessible communication channels and as a result, the necessary public opinion desired by the initiator of operation is created. Public opinion, in turn, can impact the adoption of political decisions by the elite of the state. It also influences the behavior of the population, both its active forms (protest peace actions or, for example, actions to prepare for emigration), and passive forms (apathy, inaction, lack of planning for the future and actions to achieve previously set life goals), which, of course, leads to further weakening of the enemy's country.

The psychological warfare of some media on Russian territory can be used as an example. In the 1990s, a lot of media in Russia belonged to oligarchs. Instead of a healthy pluralism of opinions and discussions, based on norms of civilized society, patriotism acts as a natural feeling and conviction of the citizens, the oligarchic and clannish media conducted a rampant denigration of Russian reality. It resulted in citizens' melancholy and depression, lack of self-confidence and shame for their own Homeland. Over the past 15 years in Russia individual organizations and individuals adopted similar function of discrediting the whole of Russia. Often the sources of such communication are popular media persons, bloggers, etc.

The manifestation of a psychological war is a value-based (ideological) war. There is a term "consciental war",

but, in our opinion, it is not precise enough. The consciental war assumes that the impact is on the mind of a person, changing it. In our opinion, the impact is three-level in this type of the war:

- distortion and destruction of the value system;
- destruction of identity;
- formation of a new identity.

The changes in consciousness are secondary to these processes.

An example of the destruction of the old and the imposition of a new identity are the events taking place on the territory of Eastern and Central Ukraine during 2014 - 2018. The glorification of Nazi collaborators of S. Bandera and his accomplices, tolerance and acceptance by a part of society of the far-right radical nationalism of West-Ukrainian origin led to large-scale changes in mass consciousness in Ukraine. These changes form a new "Banderite" identity that is completely incompatible with the traditional identity of Eastern Ukrainians.

On a microscale, an example of a value-identity war is recruiting conducted by ISIL (banned in Russia).

On a society-wide scale, such a war nearly ended with the defeat of Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union. And the dramatically increased mortality, was caused among other factors by the fact that part of the population could not go through to the third stage, losing their values and identity. People simply perished by launching self-destructive processes, passive (psychosomatic) or active (self-destructive behavior).

2. V. Ovchinsky and E. Larina distinguish the behavioral war separately. It is also conducted, first of all, on the territory of the enemy. By collecting and analyzing large data, patterns of behavior and trigger processes are identified. By using the "stimulus-response" connection, appropriate stimuli are selected that cause the revealed reactions in other conditions that are not similar to the original ones, which makes it possible for the source to gain an advantage. At present, this type of information impact on indirect data available in open sources is being actively developed in the United Kingdom and the United States. To a certain extent, this kind of warfare can be attributed to "color revolutions", when disinformation and provocative actions lead to the active-aggressive reaction of the masses and trigger the process of confrontation with the power structures. It results either in overthrow of the existing power or bloody suppression of unrest. In any case, it sharply weakens the position of the enemy's country in relation to the source of information impact. Information, reinforced by the impact of strong emotions, is spread and used at the local level in a variety of ways to increase the degree of "mobilization outrage". Distribution of such information in social networks is carried out by means of SMS, local blogs, images and video films, for which cameras are used on mobile phones, for example.

3. The goal of external mental wars, the targeted object of which is the population of neutral countries, is to strengthen the influence of the country-initiator of the attack on the population, including the political elite of a neutral country, whereby the enemy's country is weakened in the future. The objective of such war is to destroy contacts of the country whose population is affected, with the country-opponent of the source of information impact at all possible levels, from the political to the everyday.

In this situation, the war is primarily conducted through information attacks in the media, using Internet channels and personal impact with the transfer of information (international events, forums, conferences), which result in the formation of negative public opinion and leads to a reduction of contacts. Reducing contacts is the basis for minimizing the flow of objective information, creating barriers to the use of soft power tools, increasing economic isolation, etc. It creates opportunities for strengthening the influence of the source of information impact on the society of the country. An example of such a war is the actions of the collective West in the territory of the countries of the former USSR on the formation of a negative image of Russia.

Another vivid example of the effect of reducing the number of contacts with representatives of a country that is an adversary in the information war through information impact was a creation of a negative image of Russia in order to minimize Russia's visit to European countries. "FIFA and the organizing committee reported that 700,000 FanID (special document, without which it is impossible to get to the stadium during the match) is given to foreign fans. China (60,000) is the leader in the list of states that delegated, followed by the United States (49,000), Mexico (43,000), Argentina (35,900), Brazil (32.000), Colombia (29,000) and Peru (26,000). Of all the European countries, only Germany (28.6 thousand fans) managed to squeeze into this list. But, for a correct comparison, it is worth remembering that about a million foreign tourists arrived in South Africa in 2010 for the World Cup. Four years ago, 1,015,035 foreigners arrived in Brazil. Of course, most of them in 2014 were residents of neighboring countries with Brazil and the United States, but after all, most of the football tourists came to Russia from there. On closer examination, it turns out that 700 thousand is not a miracle and not a record, but rather an ordinary indicator. A call for a boycott and terrible stories in the media played its role - European teams were half of the tournament participants, European fans in terms of income are not inferior to Latin American. Much more Poles, Belgians, Swedes, Spaniards and Englishmen were supposed to come to Russia but preferred to stay home.

Contrary to the established opinion, to manipulate an educated person proficiently is more easy. The manipulator in this case will more accurately achieve the goal, since an educated person will be a more effective tool in the hands of the manipulator. This requires non-standard, creative approaches in the formation of such information and the ways of its distribution in order to penetrate into the consciousness of the manipulated educated person and push him/her to the desired behavior. Often a method of comparison is used - "they" (usually in the West) are compared to "us". Such comparisons usually do not withstand any criticism, since they are extremely incorrect.

With the advent of modern media, social networks and other Internet platforms, the opportunities for information wars have grown many times. Fake news, thousands of reposts of unverified information, provocative videos in YouTube, etc. can blow up stability and consolidation in society. Modern "color revolutions" have been already largely the offspring of Internet platforms.

For the war on internal territories (the second type) the impact is on the population of its own country, the key goal is to create the basis for political decision-making - the formation of public opinion and the creation of conditions so that this public opinion is not subject to correction with the reciprocal influence of the enemy.

An example of the creation of the negative public opinion in the conduct of psychological warfare on its own territory is the war against the Taliban movement on the territory of Afghanistan. To prepare for a decision on the invasion of Afghanistan, the US population was actively processed by the leading media.

Conclusions

Information wars exist for long time and became comprehensive in the era of the distribution of media (newspapers, magazines, radio, television) and general literacy. But the comprehensive research on such wars is just developing. The article examined how modern scholars conceptualize and classify various types of information wars.

Most classifications in the modern literature dwell on the political and technological platforms. We note that it is very important to account for a psychological aspect of the information warfare.

Psychological war has three directions: in relation to its own population, neutral population, the population of the country - the enemy.

Each kind of information warfare has its own types. The psychological war involves a mental war and a behavioural war. Both kinds can act in two qualities - attacks and defenses.

Information wars have actually become an integral part of our lives. The sophistication of the methods of influence will only increase, which makes the research of this problem highly relevant and necessary to be studied further from various angles, including from the point of view of psychology. It should be identified what tools are used in this field, methods of suggestion and manipulation. It is needed to develop adequate countermeasures.

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RECONCEIVING THE REASONABLE PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS CRITERION

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Abstract

The Reasonable Probability of Success criterion is widely considered one of six individually necessary requirements that must be satisfied for it to be ethically permissible to resort to war. For evaluations of this criterion success is understood to mean successful achievement of one's Just Cause. Modern Just War Theory narrowly defines Just Cause as self-defence or defence of others. Many contemporary just war theorists interpret this to mean mitigating or averting a perceived imminent threat. Such an understanding has generated a problem that has puzzled many just war theorists. Whilst there are clear moral reasons for requiring that the Reasonable Probability of Success criterion is satisfied, the demands of the contemporary understanding of this principle conflict with widespread, robust intuitions.

One case that elicits such intuitions is Belgium's decision to resist German aggression in 1914. In this case the relevant Belgium decision-makers knew that violent resistance could not mitigate or avert the imminent threat posed by Germany. Despite this they chose to defend themselves regardless. What transpired as a result is commonly referred to as the Rape of Belgium, with an estimated 30,000 casualties over the course of World War I. Resistance only managed to delay German forces for two days, and Germany maintained control of Belgium until the end of the war. Despite the fact that Belgium's decision violated the contemporary understanding of the Reasonable Probability of Success criterion, most commentators believe that it was ethically permissible for Belgium to resort to force.

This paper will attempt to vindicate these intuitions and solve the puzzle generated by the Reasonable Probability of Success criterion. It will argue that despite appearances, the Reasonable Probability of Success criterion could have been satisfied when Belgium resisted German aggression in 1914. It will contend that resisting aggression in such circumstances can achieve defence of others. This can be achieved by deterring the aggressor state, or other would-be aggressors, from invading one's own state, or other states, in the future. Crucially, it will be argued that this can be achieved even if the threat that is currently underway is not mitigated or averted. This will be linked to the importance of expressing an affirmation of the values of territorial integrity and political sovereignty. This paper will conclude by arguing that these consequences of resistance are both more likely to be brought about, and are of much more significance, given the anarchic international state system that exists.

Key Words
Reasonable Probability Of Success; Just War Theory; Political Philosophy; Applied Ethics.
Word Count: 7,864 words

Problem For The Reasonable Probability Of Success Criterion

According to orthodox Just War Theory there are six individually necessary and jointly sufficient criteria that must be satisfied for it to be ethically permissible to wage war. These are: Just Cause, Legitimate Authority, Right Intention, Proportionality, Last Resort, and Reasonable Probability of Success. As the title suggests, the Reasonable Probability of Success criterion stipulates that it is not ethically permissible for a state to wage war unless it has a reasonable probability of achieving a Just Cause. Modern Just War Theory asserts that the only ends that can constitute a Just Cause for war are self-defence or defence of others. Most just war theorists believe that successful realisation of these aims can only be achieved by mitigating or averting a perceived imminent threat. The contemporary understanding of the Reasonable Probability of Success criterion is thus taken to require a state to

have a reasonable probability of mitigating or averting a perceived imminent threat for it to be ethically permissible to resort to war.

The moral rationale for requiring that the Reasonable Probability of Success criterion is satisfied is to prevent the likely gratuitous harm that would result from a state waging war when it does not have a reasonable probability of achieving a Just Cause. A state's decision to initiate hostilities typically causes combatants and non-combatants in both belligerent states to suffer harms. According to Just War Theory, realising a Just Cause is the only objective that can justify bringing about such harms. When a leader decides to subject combatants and non-combatants to likely gratuitous harms these harms constitute wrongs partly attributable to that leader (they may also be partly attributable to the adversary decision-making leader depending on the circumstances). An additional positive effect of including the Reasonable Probability of Success criterion in *jus ad bellum* is to force leaders to acknowledge and reflect on the harms that the decision to wage war will cause. It also provides a useful measure by which leaders can be held to account in the aftermath of a failed war effort.

Whilst there are clear moral reasons for requiring that the Reasonable Probability of Success criterion is satisfied, the contemporary understanding of this principle conflicts with widespread and robust intuitions towards historical cases. One case that elicits such intuitions is Belgium's decision to resist German aggression in 1914. Briefly, on the 2nd of August 1914 the German minister to Belgium delivered an ultimatum to King Albert and the Belgian government demanding unfettered passage through Belgian territory for German troops. German officials claimed that they had no choice other than to violate Belgian territorial integrity as they had purportedly received information that French troops were going to be deployed through Belgium (if this information actually existed it was erroneous). King Albert and the Belgian government promptly refused Germany's demand.

What transpired as a result is commonly referred to as the Rape of Belgium. It included 5,000 non-combatant casualties in August alone, and an estimated 30,000 over the course of World War I. Over 1,000,000 Belgians were displaced to foreign states, and 20,000 Belgian structures were destroyed. The resistance only managed to delay the German forces for two days, and Germany maintained control of Belgium until the end of the war. Even at the time of the invasion German officials acknowledged that what they were doing was unjust. From the outset the Chancellor of Germany declared: "This is contrary to the prescriptions of international law… We shall repair the injustice we are committing as soon as our military object is attained" (cited by Gerlache, 1915, p.24). Crucially, there is much evidence to suggest both that the Belgium decision-makers knew that resistance could not mitigate or avert the German threat, and that resistance had the popular support of the Belgians who would suffer the costs of war.

Belgian agents knew that their six divisions were hopelessly outmatched by the might of the German army. During the Crown Council meeting to decide how to respond to the German ultimatum, the Belgian Chief of Staff was asked "can our army fight a defensive battle alone with a chance of halting the enemy?" and "is our army completely ready to meet the attack?" He emphatically responded: "No, the war has caught us in the very act of reorganizing the army; our officer cadres, especially those in the reserve, are still inadequate, our field artillery is still below establishment; we have absolutely no heavy guns" (Steele, 2008, p.110). Belgian decision-makers were also not naïve of the costs that would be incurred by the decision to resist. Although there was widespread misapprehension across Europe prior to World War I concerning what contemporary military technology was capable of achieving, the brutal German policy of *Schrecklichkeit* was well-known and it was anticipated that Belgian non-combatants would suffer.

Evidence also suggests that the decision to violently resist Germany had the popular support of the citizens of Belgium. This is important because these were the people who would suffer most from hostilities. Writing at the time of the conflict, Maxweiler (1916, p.33) claimed that the "man in the street would have found himself in agreement with the Government as to that program, for it came from the very soul of the people." He continued that not "for one moment was there in Belgium any hesitation on the part of those who direct the policy of the country or on the part of the people, and nobody imagined that it would be possible to adopt the attitude of the money dealers in the temple" (1915, p.59). This is supported by the testimony of Gerlache (1915, p.27), who was also writing during the conflict. He observed that "it was our sole voice, the voice of an entire people, which rose, vibrating, in a single impulse of patriotism… as one man… its first thought and first care were to make ready for battle." Gerlache explained that this attitude remained even after hostilities had ceased. He wrote:

"There is not at the present moment a single Belgian family which has not been horribly tried by this war... All are mourning… Ask any Belgian, whether he be a minister or a modest clerk, a manufacturer or an artisan, a wholesale merchant or a small shopkeeper, a great stockbreeder or a poor tenant-farmer: ask the widow, or the orphan, or the parents who have lost one or several sons, ask any Belgian, no matter whom, be he Catholic, Liberal, or Socialist, if he does not feel to-day that it would have been better to have accepted the bargain which Germany proposed to us on the 2nd of August, 1914. There is not one who will not reply, without hesitation: 'No, we could not have done otherwise than we did, and if it had to be done again we should do the same'" (1915, p.238).

Despite the fact that Belgium decision-makers knew prior to commencing hostilities that they could not mitigate or avert the German threat, most individuals believe that resistance was ethically permissible (some even claim ethically praiseworthy). For instance, Fabre (2014, p.98) argued that "if any country ever had a case for going to war, Belgium in 1914 certainly did." Similarly, Steele (2008, p.15) declared that "even though Belgium's decision

contradicts… the just war 'reasonable chance of success' condition, few scholars or theorists would interpret the Belgian decision in normatively negative terms." Thus, there is a tension between the demands of the contemporary understanding of the Reasonable Probability of Success criterion and robust intuitions. This paper will resolve this tension by arguing that the contemporary understanding of the Reasonable Probability of Success criterion is mistaken.

Deterring Others By Reducing Their Capacity To Wage War

It is widely agreed that there are two key elements to achieve successful military deterrence of a potential aggressor. These work together to influence a state's expectations of what will occur if it pursues invasive policy. The first and most obvious is an assessment of a potential victim state's ability to respond with military force. For an aggressor, this takes the form of a comparison between the military capacity at their disposal and the military capabilities of the potential victim state. The second is an assessment of a potential victim state's will to respond with military force if attacked. Miscalculations of this second crucial variable have resulted in a large percentage of conflicts throughout history. It will be argued that states that resist aggression, even when they cannot mitigate or avert the imminent threat they face, can positively alter assessments of both of these variables for states contemplating aggression in the future. For this reason, states that cannot mitigate or avert the imminent threat that they face can still achieve defence of others through violent resistance, and can satisfy the Reasonable Probability of Success criterion.

The first way that defence of others can be achieved through waging a war that cannot mitigate or avert a present threat is by deterring one's specific aggressor from invading one's own state, or other states, in the future. Failed military resistance can deter an aggressor state by damaging its military hardware to such an extent that its leaders believe it does not have the capacity to successfully carry out future aggression. In other words, it will alter future comparative assessments made by one's aggressor of their own military capabilities and those of a potential victim state. The Reasonable Probability of Success criterion can be satisfied if it is believed that resistance will inflict sufficient military costs to prevent one's aggressor from harming others in the future. Crucially, achievement of this outcome does not require the victim state that is currently being invaded to mitigate or avert the present threat that it faces. Failure to recognise this possibility constitutes one way in which the contemporary understanding of the Reasonable Probability of Success criterion is mistaken.

This element of deterrence is only worth pursuing if it is likely that an aggressor state will pursue invasive policy again in the future. Sjoberg (2009, p.108) emphasised the importance of this calculation in her discussion of the Reasonable Probability of Success criterion. She believed that this criterion ought to be concerned with "not only whether or not the opponent will lose the war, but whether or not fighting the war would make it more likely that the opponent will behave in a way more conducive to justice in politics in the future… This part of success is crucial… war is… *a way to try and fix a problem*." According to Fletcher and Ohlin (2008, p.68), frequently an "attack is evidence of a hostile purpose and may be a prelude to a larger campaign against other countries in the region." This trend has also been observed by several just war theorists. McMahan (2014, p.154) has warned that if "the victims of lesser aggression capitulate without resistance, both the successful aggressor and other potential aggressors may be emboldened to engage in further aggression… in the hope of achieving a similar costless success." Similarly, writing specifically on the contemporary understanding of the Reasonable Probability of Success criterion, Lee (2012, p.95) warned that it "can lead to appeasement of aggressors, as was shown by the period prior to World War II in Europe, whetting their appetites and making the eventual war more costly."

To summarise this first form of deterrence, it has been argued that states can be dissuaded from initiating wars of aggression if their leaders believe that the military capacity at their disposal is insufficient to subdue a potential victim state. Wars of resistance can damage an aggressor's military capacity even if such resistance fails to mitigate or avert the present threat faced. For this reason, it is possible that a war of resistance can achieve defence of others even when it does not mitigate or avert the present threat faced. This has practical relevance because it has been widely observed that when states pursue invasive policy they tend to continue to act in an aggressive manner. Factoring in the harms that can be averted in the future entails that it is possible that the Reasonable Probability of Success criterion can be satisfied by a war of resistance that cannot mitigate or avert a present threat.

Deterring Potential Aggressors By Demonstrating A Will To Resist

The second way that defence of others can be achieved through waging a war that cannot mitigate or avert a present threat is by demonstrating a will to inflict retaliatory costs on an aggressor. Historical analysis has demonstrated the importance of this variable in relation to deterring aggression. Discussing the causes of the major conflicts of the twentieth-century, Fearon (1995, p.394) wrote that "Germany miscalculated Russian and/or British willingness to fight in 1914; Hitler miscalculated Britain and France's willingness to resist his drive to the east; Japanese leaders in 1941 miscalculated U.S. willingness to fight a long war over control in the South Pacific; South Korea miscalculated China's willingness to defend North Korea; and so on." Whilst each of these conflicts had many other contributing causes, it has been argued that they would have been prevented if the relevant actors communicated a strong will to resort to military force.

Further, Stranksy's (2011) detailed analysis of the Falkland's war revealed that the occurrence of this conflict can

be attributed to Great Britain's inability to effectively communicate its will to respond to aggression with military force. In the months preceding hostilities, Argentina engaged in a number of limited probes in the South Atlantic. These did not elicit a firm response from Great Britain. Drawing from this evidence, Stranksy (2011, p.510) argued that the "British government simply did not demonstrate a will to use force to protect the Falklands, which contributed to an escalation of Argentine aggression." This is supported by the testimony of Galtieri (cited by Stranksy, 2011, p.486), the President of Argentina, who acknowledged that: "though an English [military] reaction was considered a possibility, we did not see it as a probability. Personally, I judged it scarcely possible and totally improbable." Stranksy (2011, p.524) summarised that despite the fact that "Great Britain had the 'ability' to defeat Argentina with military force, it repeatedly failed to demonstrate the 'will' to do so, a key aspect of military deterrence." In other words, this conflict (that included 907 deaths) could have been avoided if Great Britain broadcasted their incentives for action effectively.

Basic game theory supports these historical interpretations. Game theorists have long employed the surprisingly complex game of *Chicken* to demonstrate that a player can deter their opponent by simply communicating a willingness to suffer costs. Briefly, the basic version of this game involves two players driving a car towards each other, with each of them having the choice to either continue driving straight or swerve out of the way. The three possible outcomes for each player listed in preferential order are to successfully continue driving safely, swerve and be a chicken, or continue driving straight and crash. Schelling (1960) maintained that the best tactic in order to deter your opponent from continuing to drive straight is to signal a strong willingness to accept the costs of not swerving. He suggested feigning irrationality, an effective tactic that does not actually alter the force at one's disposal. Paraphrasing Jervis (1989) and applying this logic to international conflict, Zagare (1996, p.376) summarised that "a leader could dramatically increase the probability of prevailing in a crises by 'making a commitment to stand firm.'"

Through violently resisting aggression a state demonstrates its willingness to forgo immediate harm reduction in order to inflict costs on an aggressor. This strengthens the credibility of any deterrent threat that that state may make in the future. Inflicting costs through armed resistance sets a precedent that aggression is costly. States that otherwise may have been tempted to instigate acts of aggression may be dissuaded after observing that the victim state tends to inflict retaliatory costs when attacked. Crucially, a victim state does not have to mitigate or avert the present threat that it faces in order to communicate its willingness to resist. In fact, Fearon (1995) has argued that this rationale actually explains why militarily weak states have waged wars historically when they knew that they could not mitigate or avert the threats that they faced. According to Fearon (1995, p.400), this was done "in order to develop a reputation for being hard to subjugate." He continued by explaining that "states employ war itself as a costly signal of privately known and otherwise unverifiable information about a willingness to fight" (1995, p.400), pointing to Finland's resistance to the Soviet Union in 1939 as evidence for this assertion.

It is not just one's current aggressor that may be deterred from resorting to force again in the future after observing a victim state resist aggression. Third-party states that may otherwise have considered invasive policy can also be deterred. Fishback (2016, p279) noted this possibility in his discussion of a domestic case whereby an individual responded to a threat of robbery by shooting some of the assailants. He maintained that by "threatening unjust harm, the four [aggressor] youths probably encouraged others to commit unjust harm, compromising deterrence." He continued: "Shooting the four youths probably protected others indirectly by generally deterring unjust aggression. Appeasement of conditional threats invites aggression, and standing up to conditional threats prevents aggression" (2016, p.279). The likelihood that any relevant third-party will receive this message is even greater in the international context given the exposure that all acts of war receive.

To summarise this second form of deterrence, it has been argued that an aggressor state can be deterred from employing invasive policy if that state's decision-makers believe that the potential victim state has the will to inflict retaliatory harm. Many international relations theorists believe that a large proportion of conflicts throughout history could have been avoided if the existence of such a will was known by the relevant parties. Through resisting aggression a state clearly communicates a will to inflict costs if attacked. Such a communication does not require the victim state to mitigate or avert the threat that it presently faces. Resistance not only communicates a willingness on behalf of the specific victim state that is attacked. It also conveys the broader message the victim states in general will inflict retaliatory costs when invaded. This constitutes a second mechanism by which states can defend others and thus satisfy the Reasonable Probability of Success criterion in circumstances when they cannot mitigate or avert the present threat that they face.

The Importance Of Deterrence Given The International State System

Resistance to aggression that cannot mitigate or avert a present threat can achieve defence of others by deterring future aggression. This can be achieved by inflicting sufficient costs on an aggressor to prevent them from harming individuals again in the future, and by demonstrating a willingness to resort to force. Deterrence is both more likely to be brought about, and of much more significance, when states resort to force (rather than individuals in domestic society) given the international state system that exists. Fishback (2016) has recently shone some much-needed light on the necessity of factoring the conditions of the international state system into any discussions concerning the ethics of war. A crucial difference between interactions in domestic society and interactions between states is that the latter occur in a context without reliable security institutions. The international state system can best be

described as a self-help anarchic society.

By describing the situation as anarchic it is not meant that there exists chaotic disorder. Rather, it is simply meant that there is no security apparatus or effective governing body to resolve disputes and protect vital interests. Balancing principles buttress the international state system and ensure that it remains relatively stable and peaceful. Hurrell (1977, p.xx) explained that "[c]entral to the 'system' is a historically created, and evolving, structure of common understandings, rules, norms and mutual expectations." One of the most important principles is that states will resist aggression and inflict costs on any state that disrupts the existing equilibrium. In other words, wars of resistance are prescribed as instruments for maintaining order and the balance of power in international society.

Not only do wars of resistance become critically important given the contemporary international state system, but wars of aggression become more damaging than aggression in a context that has a functioning security apparatus. Wars of aggression do not just threaten the individual victim state that is invaded. They also damage the entire international system itself. The precedent of aggression destabilises the balance of power and erodes security. This is especially the case if aggression is costless, and if it is witnessed by a wide range of actors (as any act of aggression on the international stage inevitably will be). Fishback (2016) aptly observed that this social aspect of resistance to aggression would also license a more permissive understanding of when resort to force is justified in domestic society, if it too lacked a reliable policing structure. He suggested that "confronting conditional threats and standing one's ground can be important to achieving deterrence and maintaining order… [in] anarchic situations, where necessity often permits citizens to inflict severe harm as a means to defeat and deter nonimminent threats because there are no less harmful means of achieving the same defensive end" (2016, p.283). To reiterate, the international state system is such an anarchic situation.

To summarise the relevance of the anarchic international system, given the fact that power is decentralised it is crucial that states take action to deter aggression. Any such action contributes to the stability of the international landscape. Resistance to aggression that cannot mitigate or avert an imminent threat can still have this positive impact. As such, it can achieve defence of others by decreasing the instances of violent aggression in the future. Significantly, this means that resistance to aggression that cannot mitigate or avert an imminent threat may still satisfy the Reasonable Probability of Success criterion. This entails that the contemporary understanding of this criterion is mistaken.

The Benefits Of Expressing An Affirmation Of Political Sovereignty And Territorial Integrity

A third way that resistance to aggression that cannot mitigate or avert one's present threat can achieve defence of others is through expressing an affirmation of the values of political sovereignty and territorial integrity. The benefits of such an affirmation can be linked to the importance of communicating a will to resist aggression, but they are also broader. Lazar (2010) provided a helpful explication of the values of political sovereignty and territorial integrity. He wrote: "Each of these are complex concepts, and I can define them only heuristically and stipulatively. Political sovereignty is, roughly, the ability of a group to exercise primary political authority over itself. Territorial integrity is the territorial expansion of this control. Neither sovereignty nor territorial integrity are binary concepts: each is composed of a range of different powers, and can be realised to a greater or lesser degree" (2010, p.18).

The fact that state-based aggression threatens these values was also highlighted by Lazar. He maintained that "[a]ggressors target not only lives and well-being, but also the state itself… and the international society of states of which it is part. Attacking an adversary's political sovereignty and territorial integrity amounts to an attack on the institution of the state. And any attack on one state is an assault on the society of states because that society is held together by a principle of non-aggression" (2010, p.25-27). It must be noted that there is a tendency to romanticise the concepts of political sovereignty and territorial integrity. Most contemporary territorial borders are the result of aggressive conquests, and many groups that exist within them feel alienated from their existing political sovereign. However, it is also clear that most times these values are threatened through military aggression individual lives are also threatened. It does not seem controversial to suggest that overall individuals would benefit from there being less frequent violations of political sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Expressing an affirmation of these values can have the positive effect of stabilising the international system. Walzer (1977, p.59) maintained that the values of political sovereignty and territorial integrity "must be vindicated, for it is only by virtue of those rights that there is a society at all… If they cannot be upheld, international society collapses into a state of war or is transformed into a universal tyranny… Resistance is important so that rights can be maintained *and* future aggressors deterred." Bull's (1977) work on international relations also discusses the importance of formulating norms (or rules) between states. He maintained that if political sovereignty and territorial integrity are to be reckoned as factors when states make decisions, then the significance of these values must be clearly communicated. Belief in the significance of these values can only be engendered by states behaving in such a manner that emphatically communicates a commitment to these values. Resistance to aggression can ensure the continued efficacy of these values, and the perception that they are of vital importance.

Expressing a commitment to these values can also achieve defence of others by generating circumstances in which the possibility of invading another state does not exist in a would-be aggressor states' choice-set. In other words, the very inclination to threaten these values will develop less frequently. This may result from states holding these values in high esteem. Further, affirming these values may also encourage victim states in the future to similarly

resort to force to defend their political sovereignty and territorial integrity. Such future resistance may actually be capable of mitigating or averting the threat faced, and at the very least it will again assist in promoting deterrence. This possibility was actually noted by Statman (2008, p.666) in his paper on the Reasonable Probability of Success criterion. He suggested that by "seeing an example of a victim rising up against evil and wrongdoing, other victims would be empowered to act thus themselves, thereby refusing to submit to domestic or other violence." Linking this idea back to the benefits of deterrence, Statman then noted that "the deterring and empowering aspects of resistance work together to reduce crime and violence" (2008, p.666). This is critical in the context of the anarchic international state system.

Several prominent just war theorists have contended that resistance to aggression can effectively express the values of political sovereignty and territorial integrity even if such resistance does not mitigate or avert the threat faced by the victim state. For instance, Childress (1978, p.437) argued that: "if a nation has a good reason to think that it will be defeated anyway, its vigorous resistance may preserve significant values beyond the number of lives and retention of territory or sovereignty." Coates' (2016) extended discussion on the Reasonable Probability of Success criterion also reinforced this idea. He stated that "when military failure or defeat seems certain, just recourse to war is not thereby excluded… A war that is fought to defend fundamental human values can be successful even though it ends, *predictably*, in defeat… In such a case war is thought to be worthwhile precisely as a vindication of values- a vindication that does not require victory in a military sense, a vindication that may in fact be more complete the greater the certainty of military defeat" (2016, p.198). It is telling that Coates believed that resistance to aggression that cannot mitigate or avert a present threat actually expresses a stronger affirmation of the values of political sovereignty and territorial integrity than resistance that can.

Whilst not explicitly mentioning the Reasonable Probability of Success criterion, some of Walzer's remarks are directly applicable to this discussion. Commenting on states that have practised appeasement, Walzer (1977, p.68) noted that "we feel badly in such cases, not only because we have failed to serve the larger communal purpose of deterrence, but also and more immediately because we have yielded to coercion and injustice… in international society appeasement is hardly possible unless we are willing to surrender value far more important." Concerning the idea that failed military resistance can effectively express the values of political sovereignty and territorial integrity, Walzer (1977, p.71) declared that there is "a natural sympathy for the underdog in any competition, including war, and a hope that he can pull off an unexpected victory… But in the case of war, this is specifically a moral sympathy and a moral hope… Our common values are confirmed and enhanced by the struggle, where appeasement, even when it is the better part of wisdom, diminishes those values and leaves us all impoverished." These statements support the claim that the values of political sovereignty and territorial integrity are affirmed through resistance to aggression.

Applying These Arguments To The Case Of Belgium In 1914

This paper has argued that resistance to aggression that cannot mitigate or avert a present threat can achieve defence of others. This can be achieved through inflicting costs on one's aggressor, through communicating a will to inflict retaliatory costs if attacked, and by expressing an affirmation of the values of political sovereignty and territorial integrity. It was asserted that these outcomes of resistance are both more likely to be brought about, and are of much more significance, when states employ force (rather than any other entity) because of the anarchic international state system. For this reason, resistance to aggression that cannot mitigate or avert a present threat can satisfy the Reasonable Probability of Success criterion. Recognition of these factors alone constitutes a significant shift in the way that this principle is understood. It will now be suggested that conceiving of this criterion in this manner can alleviate the problems that stem from intuitions towards historical cases. Belgium's decision to resist German aggression in 1914 will now be reconsidered.

It is difficult to assess whether or not Belgium's decision to resist German aggression successfully deterred any instances of aggression in the future. It must be noted that after supressing the Belgium resistance, Germany immediately continued on with its invasive policy. Further, Germany actually invaded Belgium again some 26 years later. However, as with any appraisal of deterrence when it comes to war between states, this does not constitute decisive proof that war was not deterred. An essential problem with appraising the success of deterrence is that when it succeeds nothing happens. Without attempting the fruitless task of analysing counterfactuals, it is impossible to verify whether or not Belgium's resistance did in fact prevent more conflicts breaking out than what actually occurred. However, there is evidence to suggest that concern for the safety of others constituted part of the Belgium decision-makers' reasoning when deciding to resort to war.

At the Crown Council meeting held to determine a response to Germany's ultimatum, Hymans (the Liberal Party leader) described appeasement as "a betrayal of our duty to Europe" (cited by Steele, 2008, p.103) He continued: "The army may be beaten, but we must resist an action that will revolt the world. We must say no and do our duty" (cited by Steele, 2008, p.103). In the same manner, the official reply to Germany referenced Belgium's "international obligations" (cited by Steele, 2008, p.104). This theme was also reiterated in a telegram from the Foreign Minister that was sent to all Belgian Ministers who were abroad when Belgium received the ultimatum from Germany. The telegram stated: "All necessary steps to ensure respect of Belgian neutrality have nevertheless been taken by the Government… The Belgian army has been mobilized and is taking up such strategic positions… They are intended

solely to enable Belgium to fulfil her international obligations" (Maxweiler, 1915, p.31). The Belgium decision-makers seemingly believed that their decision to resist aggression would have broader effects, even though it would not mitigate or avert the physical threat that they faced.

Further, some just war theorists who have considered Belgium's decision believe that it may have achieved defence of others through deterrence and through affirming the values of political sovereignty and territorial integrity. Fotion (2002) contended that Belgium's resistance may have had a deterrent effect not just on Germany, but also on other third-party states. He maintained that "[o]ne good thing in having the Belgians and their allies resist the Germans is to teach them a lesson that aggression is costly… The lesson will even apply to nations not involved in the war, but who are contemplating aggression" (2002, p.94). Significantly, Fishback (2016, p.290) also employed the case of Belgium as an example in his discussion of the anarchic international state system He declared that "even lost wars can achieve deterrence so long as they inflict harm, such as Belgium's resistance to Germany's invasion in the First World War."

Steele (2008) wrote at length on the valuable expressive function of Belgium's decision to resist German aggression in 1914. According to Steele (2008, p.96), the "Belgian case demonstrates that small powers possess the ability to influence the social structures of their community, or that, in short, the actions of such small states also have important societal consequences." The societal consequences he is alluding to notably includes reducing acts of aggression in the future. Adding to this empirical claim, Steele posited the normative point that "sacrifice is hardly unjust if it serves to strengthen community-based principles… suffering can be a useful method for demonstrating adherence to principles, especially when it acquires moral significance in the eyes of a community of observers" (2008, p.110).

Steele then summarised: the "fact that Belgium was so overmatched by the Germans, the fact that it was so materially incapable of defending territory but its agents chose to do so anyway, strengthened the *principles* of sovereignty and independence even more than if such principles had been ensured by one of Europe's 'great power' states" (2008, p.106). Whilst it is impossible to ascertain whether or not Belgium's resistance actually achieved defence of others, it is clear that some notable just war theorists believe that it did. More importantly, the evidence presented suggests that the leaders of Belgium (reasonably) believed that it could achieve this outcome, and this is all that is required for the Reasonable Probability of Success criterion to be satisfied.

An Objection To Broadening The Scope Of Ethically Permissible Wars

A possible objection to the views that have been asserted in this paper is that they are in danger of appearing insensitive to the overall goal of *jus ad bellum*. This paper has proposed a more permissive understanding of when resorting to war is ethically permissible. It has maintained that some of the wars that seemingly violated the Reasonable Probability of Success criterion could be ethically permissible because they could have achieved defence of others. If this view is widely endorsed, this will lead to more instances of war being deemed ethically permissible in the future than would have been if the contemporary understanding of the Reasonable Probability of Success criterion remains in force. This is despite the fact that the purpose of *jus ad bellum* is to limit the frequency of war. This field is meant to constrain agents and it advocates a strong presumption against resorting to force. For this reason, it could be argued that the prescriptions of this paper are contrary to the very purpose of Just War Theory.

The proposals of this paper also run counter to the general direction of the just war tradition in the last few centuries. Coady (2008, p.72) has summarised: the "history of just war theory has shown a distinct, though not altogether uniform, tendency to limit the right of war under the pressure of increasing scepticism about the motives of statesmen, the reliability of their calculations and the supposedly beneficial effects of war." In other words, there has been a progressive narrowing of the scope of Just Cause, which in turn has restricted what constitutes success for the Reasonable Probability of Success criterion. Almost all commentators take this trend to represent moral progress. Conversely, this paper has proposed a more expansive understanding of the Reasonable Probability of Success criterion in light of the fact that some wars that cannot mitigate or avert an imminent threat can achieve defence of others. Whilst Just Cause is still interpreted to mean self-defence or defence of others, this paper has advocated a reunderstanding of when this is achieved. Again, it may seem peculiar that the proposals put forward in this paper are not in line with the general development of Just War Theory throughout history.

In response, firstly it must be reiterated that this paper is not advocating the removal of the Reasonable Probability of Success criterion altogether. It is also not advocating a shift in the way that the Just Cause criterion is understood. For it to be ethically permissible to wage war one is still required to have a reasonable probability of achieving a Just Cause, and Just Cause is still narrowly interpreted to mean self-defence or defence of others. This paper is simply attempting to demonstrate that some wars of resistance that have traditionally been taken to violate the Reasonable Probability of Success criterion because they could not mitigate or avert the threat faced could have satisfied this criterion because they could have achieved defence of others. As such, the broadening of the scope of ethically permissible wars may actually be slighter than it seems.

In addition, it is crucial to note that the key variable of probability is still in play. There will be wars that cannot mitigate or avert a present threat whereby resistance will also not have the beneficiary effect of achieving defence of others. Civil wars, wars fought for religious reasons, and humanitarian interventions are some instances of war

where the deterrent and expressive value of resistance may not occur, or they may be minimised because hostilities will not impact the international state system. It is also conceivable that some wars of resistance fought between states will not achieve defence of others because they lack a sufficient audience of observers (this is true of many historical wars from the distant past, and will impact ethical appraisals of them), or because the costs that can be inflicted on an aggressor are too small to have a psychological effect on potential aggressors. It is only being asserted that *some* wars can achieve defence of others even when they fail to mitigate or avert the present threat.

It is also important to remember that the Reasonable Probability of Success criterion is only one of the individually necessary conditions governing the ethical permissibility of resorting to war. Each of the other criteria must still be satisfied. For instance, a state may find itself in the same situation as Belgium in 1914, but it will not be ethically permissible for it to resort to war unless it satisfies Right Intention. In this case, the intention of those resisting must be to achieve defence of others (rather than some sort of retribution or for punitive reasons). The Proportionality criterion is another requirement that will weigh heavily on a state's decision to resort to war when it cannot mitigate or avert the present threat that it faces. Although violent resistance may satisfy the Reasonable Probability of Success criterion because it is expected to achieve defence of others, such resistance may still be ruled out because the costs that will be suffered by the victim state will be too great.

It must also be emphasised that wars that satisfy each of the *jus ad bellum* criteria remain only ethically permissible. Actions can be taxonomised into four ethical categories. These are: actions that are ethically forbidden, actions that are ethically permitted, actions that are ethically obligatory, and actions that are ethically supererogatory. Very few just war theorists believe that it can be ethically obligatory for a state to wage war. Whilst it has been argued that moral benefits can be reaped when a state resists aggression (even when such resistance cannot mitigate or avert the present threat it faces), such resistance typically entails significant costs for the victim state. It is too much to demand that any state suffer such devastation. The decision-making leader of a state has an obligation to prioritise their own citizens' well-being. This is why it is important that the decision to resist has the (informed) popular support of the victim population in cases when the present threat cannot be mitigated or averted. A leader has not acted wrongly if they decide to preserve the lives of their citizens, even when this entails that more lives may be threatened in the future through appeasement.

Moreover, although the conditions required for war to be ethically permissible may be less stringent given the understanding of the Reasonable Probability of Success criterion that has been proposed in this paper, if the arguments that have been put forward are valid, then these conditions ought to arise less frequently if some of the newly permissible wars are fought. In other words, the overall instances of war should actually decrease. This idea was succinctly put by Walzer (1977) invoking the domestic analogy. He explained: "When people talk of fighting a war against war, this is usually what they have in mind… The domestic maxim is, punish crime to prevent violence; its international analogue is, punish aggression to prevent war" (1977, pp.62-63). When considered in this light, it should be clear that the proposals put forward in this paper are in fact compatible with the purpose of *jus ad bellum*, and of Just War Theory more generally.

Summary

It has been argued that resistance to aggression that cannot mitigate or avert a present threat can still achieve defence of others. This can be achieved by inflicting costs on an aggressor, by demonstrating a will to resist aggression, and by expressing an affirmation of the values of political sovereignty and territorial integrity. This is both likely to be brought about, and is of great significance, given the anarchic nature of the international state system. These considerations can alleviate the existing tension between the contemporary understanding of the Reasonable Probability of Success criterion and intuitive reactions towards historical cases of war.

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