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In This Issue

In this issue of All Azimuth, we are presenting you four articles, one commentary and a review article. The issue opens with an article by Nicholas Greenwood Onuf on center-periphery relations. Drawing on acclaimed peace researcher Johan Galtung’s work on structural violence and imperialism, Onuf describes a threefold picture of the relations between the center and the periphery. Looking from his distinct ‘Onuvian’ rule-based constructivist lens, he proposes to re-write Galtung’s structural theory by assigning rules and the rule, i.e. the system for the distribution of privilege that rules create, a central role. For him, the global imperialist system is ruled through a functionally segmented hegemony, supported by hierarchical coercion against a heteronomous background. He reckons that there is a growing resistance to the global system of hegemonial imperialism, but this resistance is unfocused. Therefore, the end of hegemony may come because of the diminishing capacity of the capitalist world economy to pay for such a system rather than as a consequence of any such resistance.

The second article of this issue is by Simon Reich and Richard Ned Lebow. Following up on the main argument of their 2014 book Good-bye Hegemony, Reich and Lebow argue that American hegemony is mostly a fiction, propagated by realism and liberalism. Looking for the good side of hegemony such as economic functions and its expected benefits, i.e. global political and economic stability, they claim that the US has almost never been much of a hegemon. They contend that US hegemony was—at most—a short-lived phase in the aftermath of the Second World War. Since then, they propose, US actions have often threatened the order the US is supposed to uphold. Consequently, they declare hegemony in its current form is unnecessary and even perhaps detrimental to global stability. Conceptually, the authors argue, the commitment to hegemony stands in the way of our understanding of contemporary international relations. Substantively, it offers an inappropriate and unrealistic role model for American policymakers. These two leading articles present a well-rounded discussion of hegemony.

The third article is by Akın Ünver, another up-and-coming scholar. Combining discourse analysis with quantitative methods, his article compares how the legislatures of Turkey, the US, and the EU discursively constructed Turkey’s Kurdish question. His findings are illuminating: if a country suffers from a domestic secessionist conflict, it perceives and verbalizes the problem through a more security-oriented lens, whereas ‘observers’ focus more on the humanitarian aspects. He argues that for conservative politicians, their pre-existing political agenda about Turkey or Kurds emerge as the prevalent dynamic in shaping their discourses on the Kurdish question, whereas for liberal/pro-emancipation politicians, their ideology plays a greater role. Moreover, he finds that conservative politicians have greater variance in their definitions of the problem probably due to financial, electoral or alliance-building constraints, whereas liberal and/or left-wing politicians choose ideologically confined discursive frameworks such as human rights and democracy. All in all, Ünver offers a new and very creative model for studying political discourse on intra-state conflicts.

Our fourth article is by a young scholar, Ömer Örsün, who explores the link between foreign aid and military conflict. Building on the extant literature on aid effectiveness and the signaling processes in conflict research, he argues that the conditional relationship between democratic institutions and the effectiveness of aid in improving citizens’ life has a detrimental effect on crisis bargaining outcomes. Foreign aid, he argues, increases citizen
welfare in democratic regimes; which in turn increases governments’ re-election prospects. But it also impedes government’s ability to generate audience costs in conflict situations, and to send informative signals to their opponents. In other words, when a democratic country receives foreign aid, the opponents can no longer be sure that the democratic leader will carry out his/her threat, because s/he will be less likely to be punished by the public for not doing so. Analyzing all dyads from 1961 to 2001, Örsun concludes that foreign aid counteracts the difference democracy makes in conflict: targets resist threats issued by democratic governments as much as they do when facing autocratic governments. Perhaps more importantly, he finds that democratic states are not significantly more peaceful to each other than non-democratic pairs once we take into account the amount of foreign aid they receive.

Our commentary section hosts Ali Resul Usul, former director of the Strategic Research Center of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (SAM), and current Dean of the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences at Medipol University in Istanbul. Referring back to the discussion on hegemony in the opening articles of the issue, he provides a comprehensive observation on the contemporary crisis of global hegemony. Usul perceives Trump’s victory in the US presidential elections as a final evidence of the ongoing erosion in the fabric of the global order. He argues that this erosion is fourfold: global security challenges are exacerbated due to a proliferation and diversification of the regional and global destabilizing actors; democratic and liberal values are losing ground in the old democracies of the West; illiberal democracies, competitive authoritarian regimes and banal populist governments are becoming increasingly influential; and finally, the UN system is facing serious setbacks due to its outdated structure, deficient representation, limited capacity, and deteriorating legitimacy. These developments, he argues, call for corrective action and require a sensible outlook on the balance of power between state and non-state actors.

Our review article is by Çağla Kılıç, who focuses on two recent books on China: Chinese Hegemony: Grand Strategy and International Institutions in East Asian History by Feng Zhang, and China’s International Roles: Challenging or Supporting International Order? edited by Sebastian Harnisch, Sebastian Bersick, and Jörn-Carsten Gottwald. Giving a thorough evaluation of these works, Kılıç concludes that both books provide a deep insight into China’s history and the impact of China’s philosophical past (especially that of Confucianism) on its contemporary policies. Supported by specific and strong case studies to strengthen their arguments, both works highlight the importance of understanding China’s historical role in East Asia as well as its philosophical/cultural background in coming to terms with China’s current rise. Equally important, the books themselves are warnings against any simplistic and consolidated conception of China.
Center-Periphery Relations: What Kind of Rule, and Does It Matter?\textsuperscript{1}

Nicholas Onuf

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\begin{abstract}
In proposing ‘a structural theory of imperialism’ nearly half a century ago, Johan Galtung made center-periphery relations central to peace research theory and more generally to the way scholars from the periphery see international relations. Galtung took an imperialist system to be a special case of a ‘dominance system’; any such system enforces an unequal distribution of privilege and material well-being through mechanisms of direct, structural and cultural violence. I propose to re-write Galtung’s structural theory by taking rules and rule to perform the function that he assigned to violence. I conclude that today’s global imperialist system is ruled through a functionally segmented hegemony, supported by hierarchical coercion against a heteronomous backdrop.
\end{abstract}

\textbf{Keywords:} Galtung, center, periphery, dominance, rules, rule

One of the aims of this journal is to ‘publish pieces bridging the theory-practice gap; dealing with under-represented conceptual approaches in the field; and making scholarly engagements in the dialogue between the “center” and the “periphery”.’ In this piece, I cannot pretend to bridge the theory-practice gap. Instead I devote considerable attention to a legendary scholar who, early in his career, made a stunning contribution to peace research theory, and has, since then, dedicated himself to bridging the gap between theory and conflict settlement. I do deal with an under-represented conceptual approach to the field of International Relations (which I take to embrace ‘academic studies on foreign policy analysis, peace and development research’). In the field, this conceptual approach is a version of constructivism identified with me (hence under-represented); it emphasizes the importance of rule and conditions of rule in social relations generally.\textsuperscript{2} Finally, I argue that rule always manifests itself as the domination of those whom we may style the ‘center’ over those whom we may then style the ‘periphery.’ I have elsewhere expressed my reservations about speaking this way.\textsuperscript{3} Nevertheless, I realize that many scholars see me in the center and themselves in the periphery and that is important (for me, at least) to engage them in dialogue.

\textsuperscript{1} I presented a briefer version of this piece at the Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research, Bilkent University, 15 April 2016. I am grateful to Ersel Aydınlı and the Turkish Fulbright Commission for making my visit possible, to Gonca Biltekin for advice, and to an engaged audience for their comments.


\textsuperscript{3} Onuf, \textit{Making Sense, Making Worlds}, 195-212.
The scholar in question is Johan Galtung. A Norwegian by birth, he was educated as a mathematician and sociologist. He was instrumental in founding the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) in 1959, which he directed for a decade, and the *Journal of Peace Research* in 1964. A few years later, Galtung published two pieces in that journal, together constituting the core of his contribution to peace research theory, here emphasizing the term theory. Judging from the thousands of times that these two pieces have been cited, I am not alone in reaching this conclusion.4

In the first piece, called ‘Violence, Peace and Peace Research,’ Galtung argued for ‘an extended concept of violence’—one that included violence where there is no one actually engaged in violence, where violence is ‘structural or indirect.’5 Galtung’s incisive description of violence in this form lends itself to empirical assessment and thus leads directly to practical improvement in the welfare of vast numbers of people. In my view, this alone accounts for the extraordinary reception accorded the notion of structural violence. Yet Galtung meant for his readers to see the importance of the abstract term structural for theoretical purposes. Social orders have structures, and they range from relatively egalitarian to highly hierarchical.6

Quoting Galtung at some length:
We can now mention six factors that serve to maintain inegalitarian distributions, and consequently can be seen as mechanisms of structural violence:

1. Linear ranking order—the ranking is complete, leaving no doubt as to who is higher in any pair of actors;
2. Acyclical interaction pattern—all actors are connected, but only one way—there is only one ‘correct’ path of interaction;
3. Correlation between rank and centrality—the higher the rank of the actor in the system, the more central his position in the interaction network;
4. Congruence between the systems—the interaction networks are structurally similar.
5. Concordance between the ranks—if an actor is high in one system then he also tends to be high in another system where he participates and
6. High rank coupling between levels—so that the actor at level n-1 are represented at level n through the highest ranking actor at level n-1.7

Notice the brief mention of ‘centrality’ in the third mechanism. Rather than decoding and then commenting on this or the five other mechanisms, I turn now to the second piece, called ‘A Structural Theory of Imperialism.’8 In it, Galtung took the center-periphery relation and made it central to his theoretical work. He later reported that he wrote the piece in the course of a weekend in August of 1970, when he was 40 years old and at the height of his extraordinary powers.9 As the author or co-author of 1600 papers and 160 books (not to...

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mention mediator in 150 conflicts), he remains staggeringly productive. Yet I do not have the slightest doubt that his 1971 piece is the most important thing that he has ever written.

In my own case, reading it was a decisive moment in my early development as a scholar in the fields of International Law and International Relations. Re-reading the piece decades later, I can see this even more clearly than I could then. Consider the power and cogency of Galtung’s opening words:

This theory takes as its point of departure two of the most glaring facts about the world: the tremendous inequality, within and between nations, in almost all aspects of human living conditions, including the power to decide over those living conditions; and the resistance of this inequality to change. The world consists of Center and Periphery nations; each nation, in turn, has its centers and periphery.

Galtung then declared his normative concern: he is committed to liberation from any ‘dominance system.’ Center-periphery relations represent ‘a sophisticated type of dominance relation which cuts across nations, basing itself on a bridgehead which the center in the Center nation establishes in the center of the Periphery nation, for the joint benefit of both.’

This type of system he called imperialism. ‘Briefly stated, imperialism is a system that splits up collectivities and relates some of the parts to each other in relations of harmony of interest, and relations of disharmony of interest, or conflict of interest.’ It should be obvious that privileged Center academics speaking to privileged Periphery academics and publishing in their academic journals exemplify the very dominance relation that Galtung called imperialist. And I should also point out that virtually all of his illustrious career exemplifies the same relation. I return to the implications of this ‘structural’ condition later.

Galtung proceeded to identify two mechanisms and five types of imperialism. In his 1969 piece, he had identified six mechanisms together producing structural violence. Without expressly saying so, Galtung seems to have viewed structural violence as an effect of imperialism and mechanism as an analytic device—an observer’s construction, a way of representing the proximate cause of structural violence. That he reduced the number of mechanism from six to two simply records a shift in stance. In order to characterize imperialism fully, he needed to stand back from one of its empirically discernible effects (structural violence). Any such shift in stance or perspective confirms that structure is not inherent in objects (or systems of objects) under observation, but an observer’s construct.

Galtung implicitly confirmed this conception of structure when he titled his 1971 piece ‘A Structural Theory of Imperialism,’ and not ‘A Theory of Structural Imperialism.’ One might suppose that Galtung’s two mechanisms operate to produce five, and only five types, of imperialism. This turns out not to be so, because the mechanisms are sketches of the two operating parts of any imperialist system, however many types one might go on to identify by reference to some list of relevant properties. The causes that matter most (from any given observer’s point of view) are those that enable the system to function—to work toward the end, goal or purpose for which the system exists. In this way of thinking,
function is a species of causation.\textsuperscript{15} Mechanisms are functionally relevant structures. Any system depends on structures oriented to ends, whether those ends are a function of design or the cumulative effect of ‘natural selection.’ In an imperialist system, the defining end or goal is \textit{domination} on the part of some few, whether a conscious strategy or the unplanned result of many contingent interactions among system units (nations, corporate entities of any sort, human individuals).

Galtung called the two mechanisms a ‘vertical interaction structure’ and a ‘feudal interaction structure.’\textsuperscript{16} The first sketches the usual asymmetric relations of the few units with access to resources (center) and those many without (periphery); it is conventionally represented as a pyramid. The feudal interaction structure is a linked series of symmetric relations among the few. Those few are rough equals with an interest in coordination at the expense of the many. The relations of the few constituting the center can be represented as a circle. When the two mechanisms are combined, we visualize something resembling a flat-topped volcano.\textsuperscript{17} Galtung used the metaphor of a wheel’s hub, spokes and rim.

In my view, Galtung’s two mechanisms are not mechanisms at all, or at least not mechanisms in the usual sense, because they do not tell us \textit{how} the system works. Evidently each of the five types of imperialist systems works differently; each must have its own type of mechanism. On Galtung’s account, the five types are economic, political, military, communication and cultural. He acknowledged that the ‘order of presentation is rather random: we have no theory that one is more basic than the others, or precedes the others.’\textsuperscript{19}

With no type-specific mechanisms, there can be no way to order the list, or even to restrict it to the five possibilities that Galtung set forth. He might have argued, \textit{à la} Talcott Parsons, that any social system must perform some small number of functions to survive as a system, but this would have complicated his exposition significantly. In any event, he abjured Parsons’ structural-functionalism, perhaps because of its much-discussed normative bias in favor of system survival. I should point out, however, that Galtung’s claim, quoted above, that inequality is resistant to change implies that system survival is a functional imperative. Galtung’s structuralism dispatches such functional considerations, not to mention institutional arrangements, in favor of a metaphorical language that conveys solidity and endurance. Structure, structures, structural features and conditions are \textit{just there}.

Given Galtung’s distant perch, a dominance system has only one function, which is for the few to dominate the many. I should point out that he culled his five types from the historical record; they are inductive, conventionalized and descriptive—typical examples, and not ideal types. Indeed they are contingent modes or techniques of domination, whether discovered or designed, parading as abstract universals. All of them are present in greater or lesser degree in every example of an enduring dominance system.

Conspicuously missing from the list is law as a mode or technique of domination.\textsuperscript{20} There are a number of possible reasons for this omission: unconscious resistance to the smug liberal

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{16} Galtung, “A Structural Theory of Imperialism,” 85.
  \item \textsuperscript{17} My image, not Galtung’s; “A Structural Theory of Imperialism,” 89, fig. 2, looks like a volcano viewed from above.
  \item \textsuperscript{18} For example, Galtung, “A Structural Theory of Imperialism,” 97.
  \item \textsuperscript{19} Galtung, “A Structural Theory of Imperialism,” 91.
  \item \textsuperscript{20} ‘As used in these investigations, the concept of law has no moral connotation whatsoever. It designates a specific technique of social organization. The problem of law . . . is the problem of social technique, not a problem of morals’. Hans Kelsen, \textit{General Theory of Law and the State} (New York: Russell & Russell, 1961), 5. Galtung would surely say that law is \textit{both} a problem of technique \textit{and}, by its nature, a moral problem.
\end{itemize}
equation of law and order, careless subordination of law to politics (as when he associated politics with decision and obedience\textsuperscript{21}), cavalier dismissal of institutional arrangements in favor of structure as an all-purpose metaphor. Conceivably he thought that law results in any center’s direct domination of its periphery, while imperialism is indirect domination through a periphery’s center. If so, then he failed to see that a federal legal order law operating at two or more levels is an imperialist system. Designated agents drawn from the periphery’s center is some constitutional (emphatically legal) electoral process are said to represent the periphery’s periphery in the center’s decision-making apparatus.\textsuperscript{22}

From Galtung’s point of view, electoral representation may be a fig-leaf for a dominance system. Or it may open up possible alternatives. As a Norwegian, he might have an ingrained normative preference for social democracy. It seems unlikely, however, that he would consider law in general as a benign alternative to the modes of domination on his list. All too familiar is the positivist model of law as a coercive instrument and the state as a legal order potentially monopolizing the use of force in social relations.\textsuperscript{23} Indeed it is quite fashionable these days to day that law is physical violence by another name.\textsuperscript{24}

Not all theories or models of law make the use of force a central feature. All theories do share another feature, namely, that law takes the form of rules.\textsuperscript{25} Not all rules are legal. As a general matter, legal rules are formal, specified as to source and scope, and backed by sanctions—legal rules stipulating consequences for failing to follow other legal rules. Under the influence of sociologists, we in the field of International Relations often call informal rules of uncertain source and scope norms, while philosophers usually speak of rules generically. I follow the philosophers here: rules call for conduct consistent with their content. One ought to do what the rule says one should; if one chooses to follow the rule, or not, there are likely consequences assessed in advance.\textsuperscript{26}

Equipped with this understanding of rules, we can now take up the issue of imperialist mechanisms and take it beyond Galtung’s confused discussion. There may be other such mechanisms that I have yet to consider. For my purposes here, I will stipulate four.

1. Domination takes place by means, or use, of force—threatening the use of force often suffices, but only if the threat is periodically carried out.

2. Domination takes place by use of rules—including legal rules.

3. Domination takes place through speech—as when assign value to people or institutions and give reasons for doing so.

4. Domination takes place through intimidation and incitement—through the manipulation of emotions.


\textsuperscript{22} Galtung has since concerned himself with (con)federal systems, although in terms too sketchy to contribute to his structural theory. Johan Galtung, Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization (London: SAGE Publications, 1996), 60-9.

\textsuperscript{23} Kelsen’s General Theory of Law and the State, just quoted, is a systematic and highly influential explication of the positivist model. Among English speakers, H. L. A. Hart’s The Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960) is no doubt even more influential.\textsuperscript{24}


\textsuperscript{25} Not all theorists use the term rule—notably members of the so-called New Haven School of ‘configurative jurisprudence’ do not. See Myres S. McDougal and Harold Lasswell, “The Identification and Appraisal of Diverse Systems of Public Order,” American Journal of International Law 53, no. 1 (1959): 1-29, where the authors use the term prescription in place of rule: ‘Prescription is the articulation of general requirements of conduct’ (p. 9, their emphasis). They slipped just once in this piece and fell back on the term rule.\textsuperscript{26}

\textsuperscript{26} Onuf, World of Our Making, 66-95.
As an observer, I offer these mechanisms tentatively, fully aware that other observers will see them overlapping. Thus the positivist model of law combines the first and second mechanisms. Any attempt to draw a firm distinction between reasoned speech and emotional manipulation is a highly suspect. When Galtung introduced the concept of ‘cultural violence’ in 1990, his frame of reference included my fourth mechanism and elements of the third. We can expect all four mechanisms to appear in various combinations in actual dominance systems—in those systems that some community of observers consistently describe as such, as indeed we do in repeating what those observers have to say.

Before Galtung introduced the concept of structural violence, peace researchers tended to see the world primarily in terms of domination by use of force. Galtung’s signal innovation was to dissociate violence from coercion. Nevertheless, most peace researchers, not to mention most scholars in the field of International Relations, equate peace with the absence of violence, and violence as the material manifestation of coercion. So do most people; ordinary language defeats any effort to dissociate force as a mechanism of social control from violence as the direct infliction of damage to the human body, the experience of pain and threat of immediate death. For anyone equating force and violence, other mechanisms merely serve to make violence tolerable. The threat of violence is always latent in social relations.

In my view (as a scholar seeking, like Galtung, to understand domination), the use of rules comes first. As speaking beings, we prefer to use rules to dominate one another because they do the job better than direct violence (or, as we often say, naked force) does. Reliance on rules allows us to rationalize asymmetric social relations—make them seem reasonable, even necessary—and then to keep these relations in place for an indefinite period of time. The use of force consumes resources; as its effects wear off, it is necessary to use force again and again, all the while replenishing the resources consumed. This is, of course, exactly how many people see imperialism—a dominance system in which the costs of domination are ruthlessly extracted from its victims.

The use of rules is domination on the cheap. Other mechanisms lend support to the use of rules, thereby making it even less expensive. The benefits of using rules are so great that rules are to be found everywhere in social relations. Arguably this mechanism is humanity’s greatest, most distinctive invention. It is an invention that makes speech possible and an invention that speech makes possible. That it is a mechanism for domination is less obvious, precisely because it makes domination less visible than the naked use of force does.

I offer therefore a general rule, indeed an iron law, for social existence: Where there are rules, there is a condition of rule. As I said earlier, our conduct, singly and together, is always, if not consciously or actively, a matter of choosing whether to follow rules, or not. We typically choose to follow rules, and effectuate rule, for all sorts of compelling reasons. When we do not, we anticipate adverse consequences. Since rules are everywhere, rule is everywhere, including, I should emphasize, the relations of nations. One might be tempted to say that rule is the natural condition of humanity. Better to say, those who make the rules benefit disproportionately, if not always obviously, from the condition of rule. Ruler-ruled relations constitute a dominance system—the one that matters the most for humanity.


28 Paraphrasing Onuf, Making Sense, Making Worlds, 7.
Elsewhere in my work, I have tried to develop this conception of rule and rules into a framework for the purpose of clarifying how rule works. In doing so I have drawn on speech act theory to identify three primary kinds of rules, to which three generic forms of rule correspond. Let me summarize this framework, perhaps too briefly for anyone to assimilate it completely, before going on to show how center-periphery relations function as a system of rule.

First, the three basic kinds of rules: Instruction-rules, directive-rules, and commitment-rules.

1. **Instruction-rules** draw distinctions among members of any society and assign value to those distinctions, thus defining status and constituting status cohorts. These cohorts occupy ranks in a status-order, each rank valued more than the rank below but less than the rank above. Being valued roughly equally, rank members form a network and occupy a single plane in Euclidian space. Taken together, these networks constitute a stratified system. Rank members effectively assure the system’s integrity by initiating and following instruction-rules that are specific to their rank in the status-order. Such rules accord deference to rank members by granting titles, honors, prizes, immunities and courtesies. At the bottom of the status-order, so much is disvalued that the rules grant few privileges of any kind.

2. **Directive-rules** take the form of standing, enforceable orders, such as positivist legal theory stipulates. These rules need to be carried out, and for this purpose there will be rules (often but not always directive-rules) creating offices; officers exercise closely related powers and duties appropriate to their assigned task (such as enforcing legal rules). While a single office may seem stand above, or over, those who have no office, we might better say that there will always exist at least two offices, one over the other. Members of the lower office—the ‘rank and file’—may have few powers, but they have the general duty of following the rules, thereby carrying them out. Offices arranged by rank in descending order form an organization or chain of command. That the term *rank* is routinely applied to status orders and organizations is a source of confusion, with consequences that I will address below.

3. **Commitment-rules** are recognizable in rights that have correlative duties: for every right that I possess, others have the duty to allow me the exercise of that right, and I have those same duties when others exercise their rights. Many legal theorists put rights and rules in separate categories, in order (I suspect) to give rights a more exalted status suiting their liberal sentiments (more on this below). Only when taken as a unit does any right and correlative duty function as a rule (technique, mechanism) by which to effectuate dominance. How such rules do so is not obvious—at least it was not obvious until Parsons linked norms (informal rules) and roles (‘role-expectations’) and assumed that expectations acquire normative weight. Roles are voluntarily assumed, just as rights are voluntarily exercised. I may have the right to speak, but I may choose not to speak—to assume the role of speaker in designated institutional settings.

While roles differ in this respect from statuses and offices, they are also arranged on a horizontal plane. Thus actors, as role-holders, are members of a single status cohort, or status

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equals. Although their roles may differ greatly, they constitute an association. Insofar as rights and correlative duties make members partners of a sort, commitment-rules give rise to a generalized partnership. For Parsons, roles and associated expectations make social systems work, but only if expectations conform to rules, roles are stable, and partners acknowledge each as equals in respect to the relevant rules.

Now let me identify the three forms of rule that I believe follow from putting each of the three kinds of rule to use. In bringing the rules-rule relation to my colleagues’ attention almost three decades ago, I named them hegemony, hierarchy and heteronomy. Each of these names is variously problematic, but I have yet to come up with better alternative.

1. Hegemony is the form of rule in which instruction-rules are dominant, and this results in stratification and associated patterns of deference. Members of the top status rank (or ranks) are charged with the responsibility for leadership (in Greek, this is hegemonia). In the first instance, they lead by example or, more specifically, but exemplifying the personal qualities that identify them as holders of the highest ranks in society. Hegemonial rule (re)produces a status-order at every rank and, it is likely to produce resistance at lower ranks, most especially when a society’s leaders prove themselves to be incompetent, corrupt and unworthy of their status. While so-called traditional societies are typically status-ordered, it is naïve to think that self-styled modern societies have erased hegemony as a form of rule.

2. Hierarchy is the form of rule in which directive-rules are paramount. Rule depends on a rank-order of offices assuring that these rules are carried out. Orders or commands move down the chain and information moves up. This is, of course, the familiar Weberian model of the modern state or indeed any organization as a chain of command. When Galtung discussed ‘linear ranking order’ as the first of his six mechanisms of structural violence, he offered no clue as to whether ranking is a sign of hegemony or hierarchy at work. Trained as a sociologist, he was from the beginning attentive to status and its implications for personal conduct. He has been less attentive to organizational imperatives and their relevance to conduct. Nor, as far as I know, has he ever clarified whether rank merely registers the allocation of values in any dominance system or functions as a distributive mechanism.

In my view, rule, not rank, is the relevant mechanism. There is, however, a significant difference between ranks in a status-order and ranks in a chain of command. While successively higher status ranks will generally have fewer and fewer members, the number is rarely fixed and has no functional relevance for adjacent positions. Rank by rank, offices are routinely fixed in size and function; if there is an increase in size at any rank, offices will

31 Onuf, World of Our Making, 161-95.
tend to be divided on functional grounds while most officers will find their rank unchanged.

That the term *rank* is routinely used to describe status position and the place of an office in a chain of command is no accident. Status and office frequently reinforce each other—status justifies office, office protects status—and the term *hierarchy* is used indiscriminately for both status-orders and chains of command. Combining the Greek words for *sacred* (*hieros*) and *rule* (*archē*), the term found an important place in the celestial imagery and ecclesiastical arrangements of Western Christianity. Priestly rule combines sacralized status and formalized office. In my view, the likelihood that hegemony and hierarchy will be mutually supportive does not excuse observers from distinguishing between the kinds of rules, and forms of rule, that work in demonstrably different ways even when they are working together. I count Galtung among those observers.

3. *Heteronomy* is a term that I have taken from Kant’s moral philosophy. Kant distinguished between a ‘supersensible world’ to which belongs ‘the *autonomy* of pure reason’ and the ‘sensible world’ to which belongs ‘the *heteronomy* of choice.’ 35 The latter is the world we live in—a social world. In the field of International Relations, the term is frequently used to describe feudal arrangements.36 I take the term to have a distinctively modern sense, given the preoccupation since Kant’s time with individual autonomy and egalitarian social arrangements. Commitment-rules manifest in right and duties (whether belonging to autonomous individuals or sovereign states) constitute heteronomy as a form of rule, one that creates the appearance of a spontaneous order.37

Liberals call the exercise or rights and duties ‘the rule of law,’ exchange among putative equals a ‘self-regulating market,’ and the reciprocal commitments of a contract the constitutive basis for stable social arrangements. Joseph suggests that this condition is pretty much what Michel Foucault had come to call governmentality. ‘The majority of Foucault’s arguments about governmentality are concentrated on a specifically liberal form of rule that works, in particular, through the encouragement of free conduct, self-awareness and more generally, an appeal to the freedom of the governed.’38 Foucault just as clearly understood that governmentality (or, as I would prefer to say, heteronomy) disguises a system of rules that disproportionately benefits some members of society. Because those few need not actively make the rules in question, they are given credit for their relative success. The result is a form of rule that liberals consider just or fair, whatever their rewards for living by the rules.

Now we can ask what form or forms of rule lend themselves to the center-periphery relation. Recall that Galtung concerned himself with the relations of nations, each of which has a center dominating its own periphery. This is a direct center-periphery relation, and not an imperialist system. The latter constitutes an indirect relation by linking the centers of center nations to the centers of peripheral nations, thereby extending domination by the center’s centers to peripheral nations’ peripheries in what we might properly call a global system. In such a system, the center’s centers reward the periphery’s centers by allowing them to take what amounts to a service charge in effectuating domination ‘all the way down’

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38 Joseph, “The Hegemony of Governmentality”.
or ‘all the way out’ (depending on the imagery one prefers). As I have already argued, rule through the use of rules generally works better than other modes of domination, and we would expect this to be just as true of imperialist systems.

Extrapolating from a very wide range of societal experiences, I would further expect that an imperialist system of rule would be hegemonial in the first instance, but with significant support from a parallel hierarchy or chain of command. Insofar as we follow Galtung and speak of nations in a center-periphery relation, this is a specifically modern instance of imperialist rule. Nations are very much a modern invention, even when their inventors claim tradition as their guide. Modernization theory holds that status-ordering gives way to rationalized administration and individual rights—that is to say, hierarchy and heteronomy take over from hegemony. They do not. Hegemony may change its coloration and those who rule may claim that achievement trumps ascription, but status confers the capacity to rule much as it always has, falling back on the coercive mechanism of hierarchy when it needs to.

The key to hegemonial imperialism is the situation of the periphery’s centers. Holders of high status in the center reward their peripheral counterparts with status denominated in the currency of the center’s centers, effectively doubling up on the latter’s status. Many of them will find themselves full members of the center’s center. Collegial practices and egalitarian ideology (the promise of heteronomy) will reinforce the sense that one can be top dog in two worlds—center and periphery. Even if status gradations remain in place in the center’s center, and peripheral center members realize there is a ‘glass ceiling’ in the center’s center, they still have a distinct status advantage over traditional elites in their own societies, not to mention members of the centers’ peripheries. Their complicity in imperialist hegemony pays off for them and for modernity as a global status-order. Any Marxist would call this ‘false consciousness.’

I suggest that this global system of hegemonial imperialism is also segmented in functional terms. We may visualize it as a many-sided step-pyramid. Here Galtung’s five types become relevant. The political sphere of nations-in-relation may still rely on occasional naked force. Yet hierarchical rule through so-called spheres of influence is more pervasive. Even here institutionalized threat, ‘soft power’ and ceaseless technical innovation mitigate the resort to overt coercion retroactively validated as lawful intervention and responsibility to protect. Status considerations have effectively delivered the economic sphere into the hands of superbly educated professionals drawn from multiple centers and committed to the center’s center. Surveillance is omnipresent; advances in communication have combined with the diffusion of popular culture to pacify peripheries everywhere.

Earlier I alluded to the general tendency for organizations to divide on functional grounds as they grow in size and complexity. Functional differentiation has always been a large concern for sociologists; scholars in the field of International Relations have belatedly come to acknowledge the importance of this phenomenon. Functional differentiation within

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39 Again see Onuf, Making Sense, Making Worlds, 182-94; Onuf, “Recognition and the Constitution of Epochal Change”.
and among organizations (governments, nongovernmental organizations, multinational corporations, criminal syndicates) has sliced Galtung’s five types repeatedly in recent decades. Hegemony and hierarchy operate in tandem yet again, sliver by technically defined sliver. Specialized, certified experts belonging to high-ranking status cohorts are positioned in numerous obscure offices, where they identify problems, launch investigations and issue detailed regulations—directive-rules disguised as instructions. By this means, they rule the modern world invisibly, unaccountably.

Politics disappears into public spectacle. Most people take for granted that the relations of autonomous nation-states continue to give the world a viable structure, the legitimacy of which stems from its apparently heteronomous character. Resistance to the effects of functional differentiated status (re)ordering tends to be unfocussed, expressed as nostalgia for old ways, anger over obvious injustices and glaring inequities, and anxiety about the future. In the peripheries, the old status-order still holds sway over many of the people who benefitted least from it. They see themselves denied any meaningful status—meaningful to them—in the modern world, and they have good reason to think so.

Whether this sort of resistance can well up and disrupt the global system of apparent heteronomy, imperialist hegemony and segmented hierarchies is an open question. I suspect the answer depends less on the properties of rule in today’s world than it does on the continued capacity of the capitalist world economy to pay for such a system. Rule and rules may be cheaper than domination through the use of force. Nevertheless, hegemony on a global scale does have escalating costs, since it must pay for an increasingly monetized status-order and the proliferation of organizations that do not directly produce wealth. And this is only one reason why inequality is increasing in today’s world, Galtung’s heroic efforts notwithstanding.

Let me conclude by taking a quick look at Galtung’s career as a globe-trotting intellectual from the center’s center. As I hinted earlier, his extraordinary career would seem to illustrate the extraordinary power of hegemonial rule adapted to modern circumstances. This phenomenon prompts a large question. Is hegemony, perhaps dressed up in heteronomous conceits, a better form of rule for the planet as a whole than any of the imaginable alternatives? When I gave a talk on center-periphery relations at Bilkent University, was this another illustration of ‘good’ hegemony? After all, the event enhanced my status (in the center), just as my presence enhanced my auditors’ status (in two centers). Is the publication of this piece in All Azimuth another illustration? Or is it simply that we, as beneficiaries of hegemonial privilege, have a huge stake in believing that some sort of hegemony is best way to run a planet?

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and Kratochwil, “Cosmopolitanism, Publicity, and the Emergence of a ‘Global Administrative Law’” in The Status of Law in World Society. It should also be noted that the proliferation of technical international organizations in the 19th century prompted an earlier wave of functionalist theorizing, now mostly forgotten.
Bibliography


Influence and Hegemony: Shifting Patterns of Material and Social Power in World Politics

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Abstract

Throughout the postwar era, many realists and liberals have maintained the fiction of American hegemony. They have described it as the keystone to global political and economic stability. They have also worried that US hegemony was in decline. In the 1970s, these fears were triggered by the resurgence of Germany and Japan, and in the last decade, by the remarkable rise of China. We contend that US hegemony, to the extent it ever existed, was a short-lived postwar phenomenon; that the US frequently behaved in ways that threatened the order it is allegedly committed to upholding; that hegemony is unnecessary—perhaps inimical—to global stability; and that the functions associated with hegemony have in practice become increasingly diffused among the great powers. Conceptually, the commitment to hegemony stands in the way of our understanding of contemporary international relations. Substantively, it offers an inappropriate and unrealistic role model for American policymakers.

Keywords: Power, influence, hegemony, realism, liberalism, sponsorship, collaboration

The starting point of our argument is Charles Kindleberger’s 1973 formulation of international leadership. It has provided the intellectual foundation for so many liberal and realist arguments about hegemony and its utility. Although he never used the word hegemony, and indeed railed against the term, Kindleberger identified a series of economic functions that a dominant state must perform in order to bring about and sustain international order. Liberals and realists then layered other integral leadership and security functions on the top of these original economic ones to complete a more comprehensive list. In this article we ask the extent to which these functions are performed today and by whom? We show how a significant number of states contribute to the performance of these functions, and that their contributions are not necessarily related to conventional understandings of their power. Contra the assertions of many realists and liberals, we argue that, especially in recent years,

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the US has consistently violated its self-proclaimed hegemonic role. It has acted in ways that at times undermine global economic and political order. Europe and China, by contrast, have played differing but critical roles, and China – in contrast to many American critics - has become a major supporter of the existing economic order.

What accounts for the remarkable divergence between theory and reality? Scholars never approach problems from privileged vantage points but as members of societies, where their thinking often reflects the assumptions of the elites to which they belong or seek to influence. Realist and liberal thinking alike mirrors the relatively mechanical, culturally uninformed American approach to problems of all kinds. It also reflects and helps to sustain the American “leadership” project. This is most evident in their emphasis on material capabilities as the source of power and their equation of power with influence. We disaggregate these categories and show how capabilities are only one source of power and power only one source of influence. Influence is situation-specific and rests as much on social as material power. This is a first step toward developing a more sophisticated approach to the post-Cold War world in the 21st century and America’s role within it.

1. The Shared Liberal and Realist Research Program

It has been several decades since the term hegemony was first brought into common usage in American IR theory. Empirically, liberals and realists assert that American hegemony began in 1945 and - despite a series of cycles that seen American power wax and wane since the 1980s - it has largely retained its unipolar power and its hegemonic status. Certainly, the seminal work of realists such as Robert Gilpin and historians such as Paul Kennedy called the issue into question in the 1980s. So did a series of popularized books about the threat to US preeminence posed by the rise of Japan. The end of the Cold War, however, replaced this fatalism with a sense of triumphalism reflected in a variety of academic and populist work in which there seemed to be no limit to America’s capacity for political, social and economic engineering on a global scale. The latest stage in this cycle has been in the aftermath of the 2008 recession, in which the People’s Republic of China has replaced Japan as the prospective threat to American hegemony. Yet both academics and policymakers alike retain the view that the US has defined the contours of the global system; is a model of emulation and the source of its dominant values; is still structurally the dominant actor in the global capitalist system; and can address the threat posed by a rising challenger to retain its hegemonic status if it acts preemptively.

10. See, respectively, Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan; Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “The Future of American Power,” Foreign Affairs 89,
for decades the American led liberal, rule-based hegemonic order “has been remarkably successful.”9 Thus, although the sirens warnings of American fatalists are evident and often well publicized, they are best characterized as prognostications about what may happen, not what has happened.10

2. The Three Elements of American Hegemony

American hegemony, according to its proponents, has three organically related components: The first is leadership, which operationally means agenda setting, value prioritization and the construction of rules and institutions. The second is economic management. The foundation for this claim is, of course, the work of economic historian Charles Kindleberger.11 The leader in this system is ‘the lender of last resort’ who provides stability and liquidity to the economic system. Liberals in particular have made this assumption foundational to their analysis, although – with one recent exception -- there is little evidence of any empirical assessment as to whether the US performs these functions.12 The third component is guarantor or of the security architecture, often described in terms of the US being the “world’s policeman” or an “indispensable nation,” in enforcing rules regarding free trade, democracy and peace.13

American hegemony is largely characterized as benign, and mutually beneficial as a system that produces public goods. Thus, as Ikenberry suggests, the US has championed multilateralism, built global institutions, and provided services, security and open markets as “the “owner and operator” of the liberal capitalist political system.”14 In the absence of a hegemon, suggest realists like Michael Mandelbaum, the alternative is instability at best, chaos at worst.15

Liberals and realists define power as the determinant of behavior, and power itself is defined in material terms -- whether military capability or economic resources. New Liberal institutionalists such as Robert Keohane do mention the importance of “sets of implicit and explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures.” Similarly, Ikenberry discusses the importance of democracy as one of the “moving parts” in the construction of a liberal order.16 Yet, operationally, the emphasis firmly remains on material resources and

9 Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan, 2.
14 Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan, 2.
their capacity to orient the behavior of those subject to American hegemony.\textsuperscript{17} Thus while terms like “legitimacy” in relation to authority do lurk in the background, they are given insignificant explanatory weight.\textsuperscript{18} 

Beyond simply describing or explaining the dynamics of this global system, many American IR theorists and foreign policy and national security analysts have a normative commitment to American world leadership. Although the US as a hegemon acts out of self-interest, this scholarship claims that the US is justified in doing so because it generates public goods such as stability, prosperity and democracy. Others have willingly acceded to these arrangements. G. John Ikenberry, in \textit{The Liberal Leviathan} for example, suggests that Europeans were happy to hand over the reins to their American counterparts, in the hope that the global system would evolve largely along the lines designed and implemented by Americans.\textsuperscript{19} Others offer a one-sided reading of the early Cold War in their claim that US hegemony was “largely an empire by invitation.”\textsuperscript{20} 

Realists and liberals have historically debated about how much cost the hegemon should bear (a free ridership problem) and whether it should adopt a short or long term perspective. But they coalesce around the claim that hegemons create the institutions or regimes that routinize interaction for mutual benefit, not for domination.\textsuperscript{21} American politicians and policy makers share this view, and routinely make reference to America’s unquestioned and wholly legitimate economic and military dominance.\textsuperscript{22} 

Liberals and Realists largely concur that the US currently retains its central position, despite the disruptive effects of the 2008 recession. Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, in a Council on Foreign Relations report, for example, emphasize this point, even as they contemplate a post-hegemonic world. Similarly, Stephen G. Brooks, G. John Ikenberry and William C. Wohlfarth, in a notable \textit{International Security} article offered a resolute defense of continued American engagement. These include the “reduction of transaction costs, establishment of credible commitments, facilitation of collective action, creation of focal points [and] monitoring.” Thus the US, in the famous words of Madeline Albright, remains “exceptional and indispensable” to the stability of the global system.\textsuperscript{23} 

This work collectively highlights that American liberals and realists have a lot more in common than might be evident from the copious number of articles that dominate the

\textsuperscript{17} Ikenberry, \textit{Liberal Leviathan}, 2. 
\textsuperscript{18} Ikenberry, \textit{Liberal Leviathan}, 6. 
pages of America’s most eminent international relations journals. Why do liberals and realists continue to mine the question of American hegemony as a research program despite a welter of evidence that the term has little relevance to the evolving global system? Hans Morgenthau provides one possible explanation. In the 1950s and 1960s he repeatedly criticized international relations theory for failing to speak truth to power. In his view, the close links among universities, foundations and government made it relatively easy to co-opt the discipline’s principal spokesmen and to substantially reward those who said and wrote what those in power wanted to hear.24 But there is a second, more benign explanation for this phenomenon: scholars are products of the same culture as policymakers and are likely to share their worldviews. For this latter reason, we believe, many American IR theorists and foreign policy and national security analysts have a normative commitment to American world leadership and a substantive investment in its perpetuation as a research program even as its relevance declines. The effect has been to create theoretical, empirical and normative blinders that ironically serve to obscure reality and, somewhat ironically, undermine America interests.25

3. So How Long Did Hegemony Last?

US hegemony was a short-lived postwar phenomenon. Imre Latakos famously asserted that waning theories built auxiliary hypotheses when presented with important evidence with which they are irreconcilable.26 Liberals and realists appear to have been revising both history and theory through this means in an effort to substantiate their continued research program on American hegemony. Admittedly, they go through cycles where they assert, in the famous words of Samuel Huntington, either American “decline or renewal.”27 Although this scholarship recognizes the cycles and challenges to American hegemony, there is little dissent from the view among these scholars that unipolarity continues unabated. Certainly, the political science and historical literatures are replete with warnings about ‘imperial overstretch,’ ranging from Robert Gilpin’s seminal War and Change in World Politics to Paul Kennedy’s historical tome The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers.28 Yet the debate appears to replay, dating from the 1980s, without a consensus being agreed about any terminative date. Robert Keohane for example, published his seminal book After Hegemony in 1984. Charles Kindleberger, who coined the term “stabilizer,” and on whose analysis liberals and realists are so reliant, declared American hegemony dead even earlier - by the end of the 1970s.29 Then the rise of Japan created the specter of a power transition. Yet the end of the Cold War and the implosion of Japan’s economy provided both liberals and realists with the opportunity to resurrect the notion of continued American hegemony. A brazen arrogance led to military adventurism in Iraq – what Richard Haass famously referred to as a war of choice.30

25 For a broader discussion of this issue, see Reich and Lebow, Good-bye Hegemony!, particularly chapter 6.
Most recently, the current debate over China clearly echoes that about Japan two decades ago, as less distinguished, anxiety-generating books with titles like *Hegemon: China’s Plan to dominate Asia and the World* clearly attest. Even these sensationalist books find their counterparts in mainstream academia, with titles like those of Aaron L. Freidberg’s, *A Contest for Supremacy: China, America and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia*. The content of the latter may be sober and reflective, but the answer is based on a similar set of assumptions: the US is hegemonic, it is in decline, and the key question is when the lines with China will cross, in the process of power transition.

Yet liberals and realists are still today resolved to maintain a view of the US as hegemonic. Even now, approximately three decades after Kindleberger’s and Keohane’s declarations that hegemony had ended, Ikenberry, describes the current crisis as one “of authority within the old hegemonic organization of liberal order, not a crisis in the deep principles of the order itself. It is a crisis of governance.” As a result, “the character of rule in world politics has been thrown into question.” Although American leadership is being challenged, the liberal international order remains resilient. “As an organizational logic of world politics,” it is, however, a victim of its own success suggests Ikenberry. A new bargain needs to be struck between the US and emergent actors. It will still rest on a unipolar distribution of power, and with it, “constituencies that support a continued -- if renegotiated -- American hegemonic role” within a liberal hegemonic order.

Under such a new arrangement, the US would still qualify as a hegemon. Comparably, as evidence of the continued pervasiveness of comparable assumptions in the policy world, the introduction to a 2012 Rand report on the US’ global defense posture commissioned for the Air Force reflexively opened with declaration that the US is a global hegemon. In influential scholarship and policy work, the myth thus lives on.

Part of the problem in evaluating this claim is that there appears to have been few systematic attempts to codify, operationalize and measure the six indicators of being a “stabilizer” that Kindleberger outlined in his original work, Simon Reich’s 2015 study with Carla Norrolof being the exception. This omission has left many Liberals and Realists to claim America was a hegemon during the Cold War, when they were the dominant economy for at least a large part of that period, even though military power was clearly bipolar. It then allowed them to make the same claim after 1991 when military power was (and is) unipolar but the US clearly no longer served as the lender of last resort or stabilizer.

A more dispassionate view suggests that American hegemony was very short lived and quickly eroded. By any serious economic measure, it stopped serving as the world’s economic hegemon decades ago. In 1944, the US GDP peaked at 35 percent of the world total, a figure that had dropped to 25 by 1960 and 20 percent by 1980. Today, by way of comparison, it has fluctuated in recent years at around 25%, never approximating its peak. The US ran significant deficits during the Viet Nam war and delinked the dollar from the gold.

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31 Friedman, The Coming War with Japan; Steven W. Mosher, Hegemon: China’s Plan to dominate Asia and the World (San Francisco, CA: Encounter Books, 2000); Freidberg, A Contest for Supremacy.
32 Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan, 8.
33 Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan, 2-10.
35 Kindleberger, The World in Depression, 305. For a test of his argument examining the role of China and the U.S. in the Great Recession see Norrolof and Reich, “American and Chinese Leadership”.
standard in 1971. In the 1980s, the US ran up budget deficits and systematically reneged on its own liberal trading rules by introducing a variety of tariffs and quotas under the Reagan administration instead of bearing the costs of economic adjustments. Contemporary policymakers have done the same to China.

More specific figures support this general picture. Until the end of the 1960s, the US current account balance ran at zero or a small surplus. That position dramatically eroded in the 1980s, and the US current account deficit peaked at 6% in 2006, just before the financial crisis. This took place at a time when there was a consistent decline in net US public and private savings. American policies had the effect of making the US government and consumers increasingly reliant on foreign capital to finance their expenditures. Over-expenditure by individual Americans and their government -- reflected in low personal savings rates coupled with increased government deficits -- became important causes of global imbalances.

The growth in American personal debt has been unmistakable: from a peak of 14.6% in 1975, and an average of around 9% in the 1980s, the American net savings rate declined to around zero by the turn of the century. It reached a low of -0.5% in 2005, a statistic not seen since during the Great Depression in 1933. As savings plummeted, debt increased. By 2005, total U.S. household debt, including mortgage loans and consumer debt, stood at $11.4 trillion. A decade later, despite the salutary lessons of the Great Recession, it had increased $12.07 trillion.

The US federal budget deficit grew in a similar fashion. Since the end of second Clinton Administration, the debt of the US government has increased annually. It went from $186.2bn inflation-adjusted dollars in 2002 to over $16.8 trillion by April of 2013. The National Clock then calculated a figure: an average of nearly $53,500 owed per citizen. It ballooned during the Obama administration. Figures for the US trade deficit are just as illuminating. According to the US Census Bureau, the US has run a trade deficit in goods and services every year since 1969, with the exception of 1973 and 1975. Comparable to the budget deficit, these figures have worsened over time and have also ballooned since the turn of the century, peaking in 2006 on the eve of the financial crisis.

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42 The personal savings rate is calculated by taking the difference between disposable personal income and personal consumption expenditures, then dividing this quantity by disposable personal income.


Liberals and realists thus consistently ignore a wealth of economic data in proclaiming American postwar hegemony. The same is true in terms of its military capacity to achieve its foreign policy objectives. Triumph over Germany and Italy in World War II, the invention and use of nuclear weapons to end the war with Japan, and America’s nuclear arsenal all consolidated Americans’ sense of themselves as hegemonic. The Cold War victory consolidated that view.

Yet military failures like MacArthur’s push north in the Korean War, the Bay of Pigs Invasion, Vietnam, and more recently, failed interventions in Lebanon, Somalia, Afghanistan, and Iraq, were reconceived of as “victories” (Korea), inconsequential (the Bay of Pigs) or part and parcel of strategies that were, or will be, successful in the longer-term. Bush “hawks,” for example, in revisionist fashion, hailed the Iraq invasion as the necessary prelude to the now-aborted Arab Spring years later, despite its unprecedented cost, while Afghanistan – America’s longest serving war – is reputed to have been a key component of a successful campaign to defeat al Qaeda.\(^{50}\) For all of America’s unprecedented military capacity, it is hard to reconcile this long list of questionable military interventions with the dominance that unipolarity and hegemony implies. Yet realists and liberals continue to apply these terms despite America’s failures to achieved its prescribed policy goals stretching back over the last five decades.

More recently, liberals -- and to a lesser extent realists -- have convinced themselves that the role of this military is to ensure the global system’s stability. Often this has been inaccurate if stability is equated with the absence of war. If we calculate ‘war years’ as a simple function of each war multiplied by its longevity, since 1945, the US has fought more war years than any other country in the world, with the possible exception of the UK and France.\(^{51}\) A proportion of these wars have been justified by American policymakers as preventative interventions (such as the invasions of Iraq or Afghanistan) or humanitarian ones (such as the invasion of Grenada) and thus validated by a “just war” doctrine. Critics, however, claim it is hard to reconcile starting wars with maintaining stability, suggesting that these are merely a pretext for imperialism.\(^{52}\) Even more mainstream pillars of the establishment – such as Richard Haass, who served in the Bush White House and is currently president of the Council on Foreign Relations – have written approvingly at times of the idea of an imperial US foreign policy.\(^{53}\) Thus, by either the measure of starting wars or of winning them, American military capacity cannot be equated with hegemony. Its short preeminence has, nonetheless, been erringly rewritten as the longue durée.
4. Power versus Influence

So why has the US, if it is so powerful, failed to achieve its policy goals? Proponents of American hegemony still overwhelmingly rely on a materialist view of power. As noted earlier, many liberals do note, en passant, the importance of norms and rules. Joseph Nye Jr. have gone much further in focusing on the significance of soft power, although the concept itself is impossible to operationalize and only obtusely linked to foreign policy choices. Yet material power is often neither fungible nor the basis for achieving desired foreign policy goals, claims substantiated by the failed American interventions spanning from Korea in the 1950s to Afghanistan and Iraq today. So many failures to explain outcomes or to achieve prescribed policy goals logically suggest that Liberals and Realists need to rethink their position on the significance of power. Conversely, constructivists have erred by focusing exclusively on what Barnett and Duval characterize as social forms of power: framing, argumentation and persuasion.

We argue that the concept of “influence,” rather than that of power, is key. Influence is composed of two aspects: one is material power, defines as economic and military resources. The other is social, derived from the legitimacy of the actor and the linkage between the actor’s claim and universalistic values and principles, promoted through processes of persuasion and argumentation. Some Constructivists have recognized that social and material forms of power are related. Peter Katzenstein, in recalling the perspective of Hedley Bull on the importance of norms, for example, states that “the international system is a ‘society’ in which states, as a condition of their participation in the system, adhere to shared norms and rules in a variety of issue areas. Material power matters, but within a framework of normative expectations embedded in public and customary international law.” Yet, in practice, Constructivists largely remain agnostic on the dynamics of the relationship between social and material power. They prefer to focus on the significance of social power in isolation from material power.

We recognize different kinds of power and the diverse ways in which power might be translated into influence. In practice, material capabilities and power are related in indirect, complex and often problematic ways. Material capabilities are a principal source of power, but critical choices must be made about which capabilities to develop and how to use them. The Cold War demonstrated the irrelevance of certain raw forms of power. The USSR and US developed impressive nuclear arsenals and diverse delivery systems for them. These weapons were all but unusable. The principal purpose for which they were designed – all-out superpower war – would have constituted mutual, if not global, suicide. Intended to deter
the other side, nuclear weapons and forward deployments of their delivery systems became a principal cause of superpower conflict and greatly extended the Cold War.\textsuperscript{60}

In contrast to most IR theorists, we stress the dynamic interaction between material and social forms of power. Both state and non-state actors use combinations of material and social power in attempting to influence other actors in differing configurations and with differing degrees of success. In its most simple conception and formulation, countries can enjoy relatively high degrees of both forms of power and are thus relatively influential. The Federal Republic of Germany, for example, is a country that has established high degrees of material and social power in its post-Nazi process of rehabilitation. In global public opinion polls, it consistently scores among the most admired countries in the world and its economy is among the largest and most productive.\textsuperscript{61} While its military capacities are limited, they are consistent with the foreign policy objectives of German government. As a result, the Germans have become increasingly influential, within the European Union, beyond the Eastern borders of the EU, in a variety of multilateral forums, and even in the halls of power in Beijing, Moscow and Washington.\textsuperscript{62}

Alternatively, Iran is an example of a country whose leadership lacks much by way of material or social power, which may in part explain its sustained efforts to develop a nuclear capability for a decade, even as its economy was ravaged by the effects of sanctions. Despite the conclusion of a nuclear agreement, Teheran’s comments and actions remain distrusted by all but a handful of allies (who themselves often lack credibility).\textsuperscript{63} In comparable global opinion polls, for example, it has consistently been regarded among the ranks of the more dangerous countries in the world although that sentiment has been mitigated in many countries by the signing of the agreement.\textsuperscript{64} The same is true of North Korea, an impoverished country that lacks even Iran’s oil.\textsuperscript{65}

Other countries invariably link social and material power to different degrees and in different ways. Norway, for example, is a small country with significant social power because of its consistent, vocal and material support for civilian protection campaigns in multilateral forums. Yet it has a limited material capacity. Qatar is another country that clearly attempts to use its limited material and social resources in tandem to enhance its influence through judicious investment practices (such as buying major sports teams in France and Spain), providing aid and participating in multilateral alliances as it attempts to build legitimacy. The People’s Republic of China is an example of a country with growing material power (both military and economic). It seeks to use its economic power to generate influence through its investment in US Treasuries, European government bonds and African aid. Yet despite its

\textsuperscript{60} Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, \textit{We All Lost the Cold War} (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 324-47.
\textsuperscript{62} For a more comprehensive discussion of this issue see Andrei S. Markovits and Simon Reich, \textit{The German Predicament: Memory and Power in the New Europe} (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1997).
efforts at Sinicization, its social power is relatively limited, given the distrust of many other countries in the region.66

Endemic to the concept of influence is a recognition that legitimacy is foundational for social power. Scholars working within America’s broadly defined hegemony research program either discount the importance of legitimacy (the most evident example being the work of structural realists such as Kenneth Waltz) or they assume American legitimacy and often declare it to be the case.67 Ikenberry, for example, proclaims that “American global authority was built on a Hobbesian contract -- that is, other countries, particularly in Western Europe and later in East Asia, handed the reins of power to Washington, just as Hobbes’ individuals in the state of nature voluntarily construct and hand over power to the Leviathan.”68

An alternative formulation, and to our way of thinking, a more sophisticated one, conceives of hegemony as the result of legitimacy as well as power.69 Drawing on Gramsci, Roger Simon describes hegemony as a relation “not of domination by means of force, but of consent by means of political and ideological leadership.”70 Theorists differ about whether consent is a function of self-interest – it is better to bandwagon than oppose the dominant power -- or legitimacy -- the hegemon protects and advances shared norms, values and policies.71 Realists John Mearsheimer and Christopher Layne emphasize material interests because they see power at the core of all international relations.72 Scholars who, in contrast, stress the normative aspects of hegemony note that great power and hegemonic status rest on the recognition of rights and duties and are therefore quasi-judicial categories. In practice, powerful states, like Russia, that have not met their responsibilities in the eyes of other actors and who transgressed international law through the annexation of Crimea, are often denied the standing and respect conferred by great power status.73 Persuasion is founded on the bedrock of legitimacy. Legitimacy is a long run, low cost, means of social control as compliance becomes habitual when values are internalized. Where an actor accepts a rule because it is perceived as legitimate, that rule assumes an authoritative quality. The rule is then in some sense hierarchically superior to the actor, and partly determinate of its behavior. Over time, it contributes to the actor’s definition of its own interests. An organization that is perceived as a legitimate rule maker has authority vis-à-vis its members. The character of power accordingly changes when it is exercised within a framework of legitimate relations and institutions. The concepts of power and legitimacy might be said to come together in the exercise of “authority.”74

Ancient Greeks understood this distinction well, describing what Realists (to a greater degree) and Liberals (to a lesser degree) think of as power as *archē*. In contrast, a combination of legitimacy and material capability was described as *hegēmonia*. *Hēgemonia* described an honorific status conferred on a leading power because of the services it has provided to the community. It confers a right to lead, based on the expectation that this leadership will continue to benefit the community as a whole. *Hēgemonia* represents a clientalist approach to politics: the powerful gain honor in return for providing practical benefits to the weak. The latter willingly accept their inferior status in return for economic and security benefits and the constraints such an arrangement imposes on the powerful.

Attempts to translate power directly into influence rest on carrots and sticks. Such exercises, even when successful, consume resources and work only so long as the requisite bribes and threats are available and effective. More effective influence rests on persuasion, which manages to convince others that it is their interest to do what you want them to do. Persuasion depends on shared values and accepted practices, and when it works, helps to build common identities that can make cooperation and persuasion more likely in the future. Influence of this kind also benefits from material capabilities but is limited to shared goals and requires considerable political skills. Power is also relevant to influence of this kind. But it is most effective when enacted by skilled leaders and diplomats, enabled by shared discourses, used to advance policies that build on precedent, and exploits existing penchants for cooperation and convinces others that they are active contributors to these policies and their implementation. America has sorely failed in several of these dimensions, raising the question of how power is reflected in the current global system.

5. Taxonomy of Influence in a Post-Hegemonic World

In an article published in 1985, Duncan Snidal argued that the hegemonic functions of agenda setting and institution-building, economic management and the enforcement of security provisions could, in principle, be performed by a group of great powers in concert.\(^{75}\) Snidal’s largely theoretical position gained little traction within the hegemony research program at the time. Proponents of American hegemony argue that they are organically related and thus inseparable.

Yet a growing welter of evidence challenges the claim that only a hegemon can effectively combine these functions. Indeed, they are becoming increasingly fragmented as different actors configure material and social power to exercise influence in markedly contrasting ways. The combination of social and material power that each adopts are based on a series of historical and cultural factors, rather than determined by the structural, material factors invoked by liberals and realists – with significant implications for both the theoretical utility of liberal and realist theory and for American foreign policy.\(^{76}\)

Europe, China and the US all seek to expand their influence by focusing on different configurations of material and social power. The result is that the functions associated with hegemony -- agenda-setting, economic management (what we elsewhere term “custodianship”) and enforcement of global security protocols (what we characterize as “sponsorship”) -- are becoming increasingly fragmented.\(^{77}\)

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\(^{76}\) For a detailed analysis of the point see Reich and Lebow, *Good-bye Hegemony!*

\(^{77}\) Reich and Lebow, *Good-bye Hegemony!* For a further analysis of sponsorship see Peter Dombrowski and Simon Reich,
Agenda setting. European governments both individually, and through the EU collectively, have abandoned the basic precepts of Realism in favor of a preponderant focus on social power and only a limited stress on material power. Realists such as Robert Kagan characterize decisions made by Europeans as a result of material weakness or driven by a desire for free-ridership. European leaders and journalists respond that their level of spending is adequate to the level of threat they perceive. Their policies are therefore better understood as deliberate choices made as a product of the lessons drawn from two worlds wars and the threat of nuclear annihilation during the Cold War. Different levels of defense spending reflect different visions of the world. While the US built up its defense budget in the aftermath of the Cold War and double it in the first decade of the 21st century, the Europeans took advantage of the new circumstance to reduce their defense budgets. By the end of the first decade of the 21st century it stood at less than half of that of the US when the defense budget is measured as a percentage of GDP and only a nominal figure when measured in absolute terms. The result is that Europeans have chosen to focus on agenda-setting, using their legitimacy to define key issues and guide the process of policymaking in the context of international institutions.

The list of Europe’s achievements is significant—and it challenges some of the fundamentals of realist and liberal theory. It is common to read that the Europeans only focus on relatively “unimportant” issues such as human rights, civilian protection and the environment. Yet their deep involvement the global ban on landmines is a case where European governments and their allies (notably Canada) successfully lobbied for the eradication of a cheap defensive weapon. In many cases, states gave up their stockpiles unilaterally, even where they addressed a significant threat. This behavior confounds Realist expectations.

Just as significant a test case exists for Liberal proponents of American hegemony. G. John Ikenberry, for example, describes the US as orchestrating what he calls “an open and loosely rule-based system” in trade and finance. He offers a one-sided reading of the early Cold War in claiming that US hegemony was “largely an empire by invitation,” a benign and generous act, albeit one governed by self-interest. In this liberal version of the evolution of globalization, Ikenberry’s formative principles were encapsulated in the Bretton Woods system. They were subsequently consolidated by the policies of the Reagan and Thatcher administrations, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the subsequent opening up of Russian and East European markets through “shock therapy” and the Asian economic crisis of 1997.

Rawi Abdelal and Sophie Meunier call this Liberal variant “ad-hoc globalization.” It was characterized by a tendency to ignore “the need to legitimate the processes of cross-border market integration.” The American version “brought liberalization without organizing, or

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80 Reich and Lebow, Good-bye Hegemony!, 51-82.
82 Lundstadt, The American “Empire”; Maier, “Alliance and Autonomy; Gaddis, We Now Know; Madden, Empires of Trust.
even supervising, markets.”\textsuperscript{84} It produces a kind of Thrasymachean justice, the will of the stronger without recourse to elements of legitimacy.\textsuperscript{85}

Yet the welter of evidence suggests that the “open and loosely rule-based system” to which Ikenberry subscribes, was actually initially thwarted and then hijacked by high-ranking European policymakers at organizations such as the International Monetary Fund who replaced it with what they label a process of “managed globalization.”\textsuperscript{86} Managed globalization shares ad-hoc globalization’s goal of liberalization but has significantly different philosophical foundations, forms of authority, and social and economic implications. In this alternative version, globalization is steered by managers, politicians and bureaucrats creating codified rules and enforced by empowered institutions, not by deregulation and the elimination of institutional constraints.\textsuperscript{87} Exemplified by the way the EU functions, the rule of law is paramount, constraining the behavior of even the most powerful actors, and decisions are negotiated, the product of deliberation that is more likely to yield socially acceptable outcomes.\textsuperscript{88} Dating from the 1980s, a series of appointments of (largely) French bureaucrats -- most of who had served or were linked to the Mitterrand administration -- to senior positions in international organizations proved critical according to Abdelal and Meunier. Pascal Lamy became the head of the World Trade Organization (WTO), Michael Camdessus became the International Monetary Fund (IMF)’s managing director and Henri Chavranski chaired The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)’s influential Committee on Capital Movements and Invisible Transactions (CMIT).

In practice, this meant creating strong organizations, built on the basic supposition that global markets needed to be authoritatively managed by global institutions that enforce multilateral agreements. The WTO, set in up 1995, provides a good example of how this process evolved in practice. There, the EU “strongly supported clear rules for settling trade-related disputes.” “This meant codifying rules for reporting violations, adjudicating disputes, and implementing resolutions to facilitate trade liberalization.”\textsuperscript{89} These rules would be equitably applied to both the strong and the weak. The US, for example, was itself found in abrogation of WTO rules and fined $2 billion for imposing steel quotas under the Bush Administration.\textsuperscript{90}

Yet in addition to this top-down dimension, “managed globalization,” has a second, bottom up component in the evolution of the concept of "corporate social responsibility" (CSR). Corporate codes of conduct operate in an area in which firms, states, shareholders, NGOs and international organizations intersect around a variety of issues. European corporations, bureaucrats and activists have driven this agenda, aided by initiatives fostered by the European Union. Beyond simple trade issues, European corporations have worked to extend these codes, and their CSR activities more generally, into issues relating to environment sustainability, cultural protection, work-place employment and trading conditions.\textsuperscript{91} They and the EU have been major agenda setters in promoting socially and

\textsuperscript{84} Abdelal and Meunier, “Managed Globalization,” 351.
\textsuperscript{86} Abdelal and Meunier, “Managed Globalization,” 350-67.
\textsuperscript{87} Abdelal and Meunier, “Managed Globalization,” 352.
\textsuperscript{88} Abdelal and Meunier, “Managed Globalization,” 352-53.
\textsuperscript{89} Abdelal and Meunier, “Managed Globalization,” 357.
\textsuperscript{91} Abdelal and Meunier, “Managed Globalization".
Influence and Hegemony:... environmentally conscious corporate behavior. This is not purely altruistic: firms have come under significant pressure to demonstrate their credentials as ‘good citizens’ – a result of a variety of tactics employed largely by European NGOs and states, often discussed in venues provided by intergovernmental organizations. These practices have been exported, reflected in the evolving content of corporate codes of conduct. The European influence can be gauged in several ways. But perhaps the most revealing is the convergence in the content of American and Asian corporate codes towards those of their European counterparts in the last decade. In 2002, for example, there were distinct differences among American, European and Asian corporate views about the importance, structure, substance and application of corporate codes. Codes were then largely distinguished by region rather than, for example, by economic sector. European corporate codes were the most expansive and progressive. They referenced global norms and emphasized the importance of global protocols and conventions such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention, OECD Guidelines, and the United Nation’s Global Compact. European codes were most wide-ranging in their definition of the ‘stakeholder,’ recognizing the needs of shareholders, clients, employees, suppliers and the general community. Substantively, Europeans were most concerned with institutions that uphold the rule of law. Their firms also consistently ranked higher on a series of issues regarding environmental sustainability than American or Asian firms.92

A decade later, these national or regional distinctions are far more blurred. Just one example of this convergence towards the values promoted by both European corporations and the EU is nationality of the signatures to the UN Global Compact, a document reflective of many European core values: about how firms can best manage the effects of globalization, with its focus on social justice, environmental sustainability, fair labor practices and corporate transparency. By 2012, it listed over 8,000 participants from 135 countries among its members.93 Four-hundred-and-sixty-nine American organizations had formally ascribed, among them some of its foremost firms drawn from every sector of manufacturing production, not simply clean industries.94 Asia also has significant representation: China had 270 participants, Japan 378, and South Korea 219. Among the remaining members of the ‘BRICs,’ Brazil had 465 participants, India 280 and Russia 57. In effect, the Global Compact — reflective of values first articulated comprehensively by Europeans - has become a universal statement, widely embraced around the globe.

Whether adjudged in terms of top down or bottom up initiatives, European actors – corporations, NGOs, states and the EU itself, have thus shifted the focus of globalization from an ad-hoc to a managed one through a process of agenda setting. Again, this challenges a fundamental preconception of liberalism – of American influence over the pattern of globalization – just as the landmines case does for realism.

Economic management. Liberals and realists continue to associate the US with the function of economic management or “lender of last resort.” This claim is predicated on

94 “Participants Search,” United Nations Global Compact, accessed July 11, 2012, http://www.unglobalcompact.org/participants/search/business_type=all&commit=Search&amp;cop_status=all&amp;country[]=209&amp;joined_after=&amp;joined_before=&amp;keyword=&amp;listing_status_id=all&amp;organization_type_id=&amp;page=1&amp;per_page=250&amp;sector_id=all.
its historic position as the largest consumer market, center of finance capital and reserve currency. Yet their position largely ignores the fact that the US has increasingly disregarded its managerial role by abandoning what we referred to as custodial economic functions. The US no longer acts as the lender of last resort. It now borrows an unprecedented amount of money rather than lending it. Its domestic economic policy sowed the seeds of the 2008 economic crisis and its growing public and private debt.

Yet Realists assume that China, not the US, is the irresponsible rising power whose policies are at odds with the precepts and practices of the international economic order. They characterize it as a revisionist power seeking to challenge the US as hegemon rather than a status quo power seeking to uphold the dominant geo-political and geo-economic system. There has been plethora of governmental and popular articles and reports that accuse China of expanding its economic power at a cost of other states through its predatory trade, foreign direct investment (FDI), overseas development aid (ODA) practices, as well as its total disregard of macro-economic imbalances. Chinese FDI is often characterized as a means of enhancing outward trade and the inward procurement of much-needed raw materials. The purchase of US Treasury bills and Euro bonds are depicted as investments intended to exert political leverage in a variety of domains, including the formal recognition of China as a ‘full market economy’ within the World Trade Organization (WTO), a status it craves. Liberals offer a variant critique; they depict China as a growing but immature economy whose global engagement has not involved acceptance of global responsibilities even as it becomes increasingly interdependent.

Chinese behavior is undeniably interest-based. China is willing to provide some economic public goods such as overseas development aid, foreign direct investment and funds for the purchase of foreign bonds because the country’s leaders consider them beneficial to its national interest. It is a way for China to legitimize itself and use its economic resources to extend its influence far beyond its material power. Despite a palpable shift in its approach to international norms and institutions, China remains unwilling to invest too heavily in multilateral organizations for fear that doing so will infringe on its sovereignty and involve the country in too many missions that are strategically unimportant or even counterproductive to their interests. There is a wide consensus among Chinese leaders – in sharp contrast to their

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American counterparts -- that influence is not achieved and maintained through multilateral leadership and the blunt use of power. They prefer subtler combination of bilateral and regional diplomatic negotiations often combined with market mechanisms. This is more consistent with a Chinese domestic culture -- and resulting foreign policy that is built on "the Four No's," which read like a manifesto for multi-polarity: no hegemonism, no power politics, no alliances and no arms races."\(^{101}\)

What are China’s goals? China is the primary beneficiary of the existing international economic order. Taylor Fravel argues, in contrast to Realist expectations, that “China has pursued foreign policies consistent with status quo and not revisionist intentions.”\(^{102}\) In keeping with this orientation, we maintain that it is assuming a more expansive -- if still underdeveloped or embryonic -- custodial role through the combined use of economic resources, markets and diplomacy in a way that expands its influence while avoiding conflict.

There are at least three ways in which we can illustrate China’s new custodial functions in buttressing the global economic system in ways that are currently unmatched by any other state. The first concerns Beijing’s purchase of Euro bonds held by Greek, Italian, Irish and Spanish governments, intended to help avert a default on their debt during Europe’s financial crisis.\(^{103}\) China clearly benefitted from these purchases, maintaining the Euro’s value of China’s European portfolio.\(^{104}\) The average value of the Euro actually rose against the dollar in the first half of 2011, from $1.33 per Euro to $1.44 and oscillated in that range into early 2013. Beijing used the opportunity to negotiate several important trade agreements and to consolidate major bilateral ties across a broad range of issues. On a trip to Germany in June of 2011, for example, Prime Minister Wen Jiabao signed an agreement with Chancellor Angela Merkel, “to establish special government consultations, which means representatives of the two countries will meet regularly and will discuss a wide range of topics, like trade, investment, education, environment, human rights, security and the rule of law.” Simultaneously, trade agreements were signed as the Chinese sought to consolidate their exports to and investments in Germany. Prime Minister Wen used his country’s new leverage to voice complaints about Germany’s decision to meet the Dalai Lama and to preempt German complaints about copying infringement and the theft of intellectual property. He called for “respect for China’s system and China’s territorial integrity.”\(^{105}\) There is evidence that Chinese support of Portugal and Spain was also partly motivated by access to those economies could provide to markets and investments in Latin America.\(^{106}\) As, Nicholas Zhu, a former World Bank economist commented, “It’s a clear pattern of China’s intention to help stabilize the euro area. . . The benefit to China is that it will help in the perception of host countries if China is viewed as a responsible stakeholder in the global community”\(^{107}\)

\(^{101}\) Ramo, The Beijing Consensus, 41.


\(^{107}\) Shamim Adam and Lorenzo Totaro, “China Called On as Lender of Last Resort as Italy Faces Deepening Crisis,” Bloomberg,
China now regularly links its financial support to broader economic and political issues. In early 2011, for example, Wang Qishan, the Chinese vice-premier, met with EU officials in Beijing during the third annual China-EU High Level Economic and Trade Dialogue and pledged that China would, if necessary, purchase European sovereign bonds. Qishan asked the EU to grant China “market economy” status and lift a long-standing arms embargo. The former had been a long-term goal of China in its efforts to avoid anti-dumping claims by European producers and governments. The EU had consistently refused to recognize China as a market economy, but Prime Minister Merkel, with strikingly interesting timing, announced that Germany would actively push for China’s recognition as a market economy within the EU.

The second example of China’s new custodial role concerns its efforts to institute domestic reforms intended to help redress global economic imbalances. Until the end of the 1960s, when the dollar was the world’s undisputed reserve currency, the US current account balance ran at zero or a small surplus. That position dramatically eroded in the 1980s, the US current account deficit peaking at 6% in 2006, just before the financial crisis. This shift was symptomatic of a far larger problem. In aggregate, average global imbalances grew by 1% between 1970 and 1990. Between 1990 and 2007, they accelerated by a yearly average of 11%. More troubling still, account imbalances became concentrated in specific regions, specifically the United States, East Asia and in what subsequently became the Eurozone. The average regional imbalance as a share of regional GDP increased about 2.6% in the United States and East Asia, and by 1.7% in the Eurozone, compared to 1.1% in the rest of the world. This growing distortion in balances between China, Europe and the US on the one hand, and those involving the rest of the world on the other, led to a greater policy focus on China and the United States in the aftermath of the Great Recession.

Fundamental to this problem has been the US’ unprecedented levels of government, private and corporate debt, coupled with low savings rates and declining exports. This behavior stands in stark to their Chinese counterparts. High Asian savings rates have been the result of several reinforcing conditions that promote what is known as precautionary savings: the high cost of housing, the lack of a social safety to assist the ill and elderly, low fertility rates and the high cost of education. Galloping Chinese exports that made extra cash available and traditionally low rates of personal consumption in China, where the virtues of “deferred gratification” are deeply ingrained, accelerated the difference between the US and China. Chinese private consumption rates as a proportion of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) declined from 50.6% to 36.4% between 1990 and 2007. Furthermore, Chinese...
personal saving rates are among the highest ever recorded. The Chinese household savings rate exceeded 53% in 2008, far above OECD countries such Germany, known for prudent savings, but at 26%, still less than half the rate of China.

What sets China apart historically, according to Guonan Ma and Wang Yi, is not just this high household savings rate, as many Western commentators suggest, but the combination of high household, corporate and government savings rates. Chinese corporate consumption rates, as measured as a ratio of GDP, are also estimated to be below 40%. This compares to an average of 55% for the rest of Asia, which is a very low figure in comparison to the rest of the world. China is awash in private and corporate money. Ben Bernanke, chairman of the US Federal Reserve during the Great Recession, identified this “global savings glut” as the major cause of global macroeconomic imbalances.

Recognizing the implications of this imbalance for global financial liquidity, China has moved to address this problem. At the March 2011 annual meeting of the Peoples’ Congress, the Communist Party Leadership announced that raising China’s exceptionally low consumption rate us its top economic priority. Given demographic and structural impediments, changing consumption patterns is no easy task. Recycling corporate and government money through loans, aid and the investments is easier.

It is perhaps ironic that prodding Chinese consumers to spend more has become harder than moving in the direction of becoming the global “lender of last resort.” Yet China has moved to address this liquidity problem by injecting cash in the global system through a massive expansion of its global aid and investment through its sovereign wealth funds.

Aid is notoriously difficult to calculate and compare outside of the OECD states. This is clearly true of China. The Chinese government does not use standard World Bank reporting guidelines to account for its aid, nor does the broad swathe of assistance and loans it offers all fall within strict definitions for aid, making comparison difficult and often resulting in exaggerated estimates. Yet what is clearly evident, however, is a remarkable shift in the course of last two decades -- from China as a recipient of aid to a donor -- as the amount of Chinese ODA has surged in the form of grant program, zero-interest loans, youth volunteer programs and technical assistance. The Chinese now generally use their own companies, materials and even their own labor to build infrastructure projects rather than simply handing out money, food or other resources as aid. China’s ODA is often strategic, designed to stimulate trade with developing markets, foster Chinese foreign direct investment, and secure access to natural resources. The overwhelming proportion of Chinese imports from Low Income Countries (LICs) consists of fuel of various kinds. Beyond immediate economic

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118 Ma and Yi, “China’s High Saving Rate”.
119 Lim, “Rebalancing in East Asia”.
121 Bernanke cited in Lim, “Rebalancing in East Asia”.
122 Pettis, “Rising Chinese Consumption”.
124 Bräutigam, “China, Africa and the International Aid Architecture,” 27.
126 “New Growth Drivers for Low-Income Countries: The Role of BRICs,” International Monetary Fund, January 12, 2011,
goals, much of the purpose of this ODA is to foster Chinese influence with countries desperate for its funds with “no strings attached,” and at lower interest rates than loans offered by World Bank. Deborah Bräutigam suggests that “China’s grant aid and zero-interest loans usually promote broad diplomacy objectives, while the concessional foreign aid loans operated by China Eximbank mix diplomacy, development, and business objectives.”

Since 2005, Chinese aid has mushroomed, dwarfing that of the United States. That year, China increased its overseas food aid by 260%, making it the third largest donor of food. A second upswing in overseas aid came during the global financial crisis. Eximbank awarded loans of at least $110 billion to governments and companies in 2009 and 2010. This exceeded the $100.3 billion loaded by the World Bank. Indeed, Chinese assistance has become so important to developing economies that the World Bank sought ways to cooperate with China “to avoid escalating competition over loan deals.” By 2013, China has become a larger source of loans to Latin America than the World Bank and the InterAmerican Development Bank combined.

Sub-Saharan Africa serves as a good example of the dynamics of Chinese aid. It is generally linked to “tied” expenditures designed to enhance Chinese investments and trade. Africa reportedly received 14% of Chinese investment in 2010, a sum that again surpassed the World Bank’s contribution. Chinese government assistance has enhanced local market competitiveness, often displacing traditional protected producers and criticism from the West is plentiful. Yet this aid helped to increase employment and boost African exports, which had been negligible in value a decade before, to over $120 billion. Aid has been accompanied by other critical injections of finance through investments in local banks, such as the Chinese government-owned Industrial and Commercial Bank’s purchase of 20% of South Standard Bank, the largest bank, measured by assets, in Africa. Chinese aid and investments have bought the Beijing considerable goodwill among Africa’s political leadership, one South African commentator describing it as “the single most important development of the previous decade for the continent. China is now Africa’s largest trading partner. Sino-African trade now represents 10.4% of the continent’s total trade, is more than 10 times what it was in 2000, having increased from $11-billion to $129-billion. By 2012, Chinese-African trade may rise to as much as $400-billion a year.”

China and Africa have bypassed global multilateral institutions and effectively displaced the traditional influence of the World Bank, the US and the former European colonial powers. The same true of Latin America.


131 Dyer, Anderlini and Sender, “China’s Lending Hits New Heights”.
135 The Economist, “Trying to Pull Together.”
137 Atkins, “Europe’s Debt Woes”. 
Finally, and perhaps most critically, China buttressed the global economic system by bailing out key American banks and financial services firms at critical moments in the 2007-2009 financial crisis through its sovereign wealth funds. The Chinese Investment Corporation (CIC) was created in 2007 as a partner for the older State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE). By June of 2010, SAFE (with an estimated $347 billion in assets) and CIC (with $289bn) were the fourth and fifth largest sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) in the world. Their total assets reputedly outstripped those of all hedge funds and private equity combined. Their extensive array of assets include financial instruments such as treasury bills, mortgage backed securities and bonds. As noted earlier, they have been very active in the purchase of US Treasuries and Euro-bonds. Their mandate also provides for investments in individual stocks and real estate. It is in this latter area that they arguably played their greatest strategic role in the midst of the financial crisis.

In 2007, major American banks became the center of public attention as their exposure in the US subprime mortgage market became evident. The resulting bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers Holdings threatened the viability of the entire American banking system. Stock values plummeted and major investors withdrew their funds from large banks and other financial institutions. Governmental efforts to shore up the banking sector proved ineffective. Some firms, such as Merrill Lynch, were folded into others.

At the epicenter of this meltdown was Morgan Stanley, among the world’s largest global financial services firms (and then the second largest in the US). The bank was hemorrhaging cash in the winter of 2007 and reputedly lost $300 million in one day, in large part due to its involvement in Beazer Homes USA, a major victim of the bursting US housing bubble. With investors fleeing and the value of its assets falling precipitously, China’s CIC took a large market position in Morgan Stanley. It provided a $5.6 billion capital infusion in the form of mandatory convertible securities as a passive investor in exchange for securities that would be convertible to 9.9% of the firm’s total shares in 2010. This arrangement was similar to its $3 billion investment in the Blackstone Group earlier that year.

Chinese officials told reporters that the “CIC believes that Morgan Stanley has potential for long-term growth, particularly in its investment banking, asset management and wealth management businesses, as well as new business development opportunities in emerging markets.” The value of both stocks continued to decline but the CIC held firm their passive investor position despite widespread criticism in China, ensuring that the market momentum towards meltdown was halted.

The CIC’s response, in the face of Morgan Stanley’s ailing fortunes, was to announce in March of 2009 that it would invest a further $1.2 billion in the company, purchasing 44.7 million shares of common stock and thus raising its equity ownership to 9.86%. The CIC’s total investment of $6.8 billion was only exceeded by that of the Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group’s purchase of $9bn of convertible shares.

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139 Aridas, “Largest Sovereign Wealth Funds”.


Morgan Stanley trailed its major rival, Goldman Sachs, for six consecutive, disappointing quarters before posting a $1.96 billion profit in the second quarter of 2010. Yet even a year later, its stock still stood at less than half of its value in December 2007; $49.89 a share on 19 December 2007 versus $22.73 on 1 July 2011. If the CIC’s goal had been to profit directly from Morgan Stanley’s misfortune, then it had failed miserably. A more plausible explanation is that, as a representative of the Chinese government, CIC recognized the critical importance of supporting a pivotal US financial institution. The effects of a Morgan Stanley bankruptcy (hard on the heels of the Shearson Lehmann debacle) for global capitalism and inevitably, China’s economic interests, would have been hard to overstate. Thus this lender of last resort proved critical in propping up this bastion of global capitalism.

The pattern is the same whether viewed through the indicators of global macro-economic balances, government bond purchases, aid or investment: China has sought to use its huge capital surpluses to provide liquidity to the global system. In performing the role of global lender of last resort, even in a relatively limited manner compared to the US in the immediate postwar period, it has combined its material power with bilateral diplomacy to expand its interests.

Security provisions. The final function of a hegemon is upholding and enforcing the security architecture, one we characterize as ‘sponsorship.’ As mentioned, Liberals and Realists alike regard the US as crucial in this respect, their only dispute being the time horizon involved. Robert Keohane, for example, observes that hegemony rests on the twin premises that “that order in world politics is typically created by a single hegemonic power” and “that the maintenance of order requires stability.” The evidence clearly points to the US maintaining that role, even as it has lost the credibility required for leadership and thus spends increasing amounts of effort underwriting global protocols that are advocated by others while still serving American interests.

Like their European and Chinese counterparts, domestic historical and cultural factors have largely imbued America’s leaders with a culture of national security. This culture hesitates to prioritize threats and assumes that America’s vast military arsenal gives it the capacity to adequately address them -- generally through the use of force as an early (if not first) option rather than a last one. Domestic interests that benefit from America’s bloated military budget bolster this cultural propensity. Obvious examples include defense contractors, politicians from states whose economies rely on military bases and resource firms who benefit from America’s global military presence. The product is a military budget that is regarded by both a large percentage of policymakers and the public as sacrosanct, even it a period of fiscal austerity.

Indeed, the growth in the military budget since the turn-of-the-century has been nothing short of spectacular. Between 2001 and 2010 the US defense budget increased by 128

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145 For a more systematic assessment of the relative contributions of China and the United States as lenders of last resort during the 2008 financial crisis see Norrlof and Reich, “American and Chinese Leadership”.

In 2003, the US spent $417 billion on defense, 47 percent of the world total. In 2008, it spent 41 percent of its national budget on the military and its two ongoing wars. By 2010 the US defense budget stood at $693 billion and still accounted for over 43 percent of world defense spending. In absolute terms this was twice the total of Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, Germany and China combined. By 2012 the U.S. defense budget stood at over $700 billion and climbed to an estimated figure of over $868 billion if the cost of foreign wars, homeland security and other related expenses are included. Subsequent sequestration reduced the US’ base defense budget to $598 billion by 2015. But that figure is projected to increase over the next five years. China spent approximately 2% of its GDP on defense between 2008 and 2012 and vowed to reduce the rate of growth in its military budget in 2016. Europe spent -- far less, prompting President Obama to call for NATO members to increase their defense in the Spring of 2016. Both China and Europe’s expenditure is a mere fraction of the 4.7 percent spent by the US in the first decade of the century and still dwarfed by the American figure of 3.5 percent by 2014.

Liberals and to a lesser extent Realists have convinced themselves that the role of this military is to ensure system stability. But, as note earlier, America has fought more wars than any other country (bar, possibly, the UK and France) since 1945. Yet there is a growing American trend towards the use of American military and technological capability that addresses accusations of it being simply an instrument of dominance. It entails the US responding to global protocols that are built on consensus, and are thus multilateral rather than unilateral in character. They involve – in the famous words of an anonymous White House source reputedly cited during the invasion of Libya – “leading from behind.” Examples are surprisingly plentiful: In addition to Libya, they include the global campaigns against human trafficking and piracy, and the humanitarian and technological assistance provided in the aftermath of the Japanese tsunami in 2011. In practice, these sponsorship initiatives have several advantages over traditional hegemonic ones: notably they are politically bipartisan, relatively low cost, involve easy exit strategies and help to rebuilt America’s diminished credibility. Yet either way, the American self-perception as an indispensable nation means that the academic and political voices calling for retrenchment are largely sidelined in academic...
or policy debates.\textsuperscript{157} Thus whether traditional hegemonic or, alternatively, sponsorship strategies, the US continues to perform the security functions associated with hegemony even as it has relinquished or forfeited the capacity to set the global agenda or underwrite the global economy.

6. Rethinking Power and Influence in a Post-Hegemonic World

Traditional Liberal and Realist conceptions of power offer a one-dimensional analysis in which material power predominates. Based on this assumption, they have constructed a narrow formulation of hegemony that has demonstrated a surprising degree of rhetorical resilience, despite all evidence to the contrary. Their formulations have been used to justify a distinct, privileged position for the United States in the global order by offering an alternative vision of a dystopia in the absence of a hegemon. It is one in which the key functions of agenda setting, economic custodianship and buttressing the security architecture will remain unfulfilled if the United States has to relinquish its hegemonic position as the indispensable nation.

In this paper, we have offered both a theoretical and an empirical critique of that position. First, we have suggested that a hegemon is not required for these functions to be accomplished. No state or region need monopolize any one of these three functions. They are divisible if the incentives exist for states to act - substantiating Snidal’s suggestion first voiced three decades ago.

Empirically, we suggested that this has happened. The United States long ago relinquished the status of a hegemon. Indeed, it occupied that position for only a brief period in the immediate aftermath of World War Two. Subsequently, its politicians, policymakers and some of its scholars have invoked the claim of America’s continued hegemony to serve one interpretation of America’s interests. But in a new global context, one in which material and social forms of power can configure in various ways, the capacity for the United States to coerce, cajole or lure other actors to conform with its objectives has become increasingly problematic.

Critics may argue that the shift we identify is problematic. Heightened levels of violence in the Middle East, the proliferation of failed and fragile states, the unprecedented growth in refugee populations and the continued resilience of Jihadism and militancy on a global basis all buttress the claim that a void has been created as a result of America’s hegemonic decline.

Yet that perspective may nostalgically overstate the former capacity of the United States to influence global events. And it clearly fails to recognize the exigencies of a new security environment. It is one where the proliferation of new forms of security actors (from only states to non-state actors), in organizational forms (from simple hierarchies to include cells, networks, and franchises), of technologies that makes asymmetric warfare increasingly costly for powerful states (such as cyber) – all coupled with the new politics of identity -- have made stability harden to achieve. Even the fundamental character of threats has multiplied, from overwhelmingly anthropogenic ones (such as nuclear weapons and conventional warfare) to

increasingly naturogenic ones (such as climate change and new forms of pandemics). Even a truly hegemonic America, comparable to the immediate postwar period, would be unable to stabilize this system.

This new era has been characterized as one shifting towards multipolarity by commentators, scholars and policymakers. This misrepresents the pattern of development because that term is still founded on a bedrock of Liberal and Realist assumptions – particularly that material power predominantly (and in some cases exclusively) determines the behavior of states. We have suggested, in contrast, that elements of social and material power configure in distinct ways to create a new pattern of global politics, better depicted as one where influence can take many forms. It is one that often confounds traditional patterns of power. Inevitably, states will have to address this challenge in meeting new challenges -- and new threats – in the next decade.

Bibliography

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Influence and Hegemony:...


Ideology, Political Agenda, and Conflict: A Comparison of American, European, and Turkish Legislatures’ Discourses on Kurdish Question

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Kadir Has University

Abstract

Combining discourse analysis with quantitative methods, this article compares how the legislatures of Turkey, the US, and the EU discursively constructed Turkey’s Kurdish question. An examination of the legislative-political discourse through 1990 to 1999 suggests that a country suffering from a domestic secessionist conflict perceives and verbalizes the problem differently than outside observers and external stakeholders do. Host countries of conflicts perceive their problems through a more security-oriented lens, and those who observe these conflicts at a distance focus more on the humanitarian aspects. As regards Turkey, this study tests politicians’ perceptions of conflicts and the influence of these perceptions on their pre-existing political agendas for the Kurdish question, and offers a new model for studying political discourse on intra-state conflicts. The article suggests that a political agenda emerges as the prevalent dynamic in conservative politicians’ approaches to the Kurdish question, whereas ideology plays a greater role for liberal/pro-emancipation politicians. Data shows that politically conservative politicians have greater variance in their definitions, based on material factors such as financial, electoral, or alliance-building constraints, whereas liberal and/or left-wing politicians choose ideologically confined discursive frameworks such as human rights and democracy.

Keywords: Intra-state conflict, conflict discourse analysis, legislative politics, Kurdish question

1. Introduction

In the ongoing debate on linguistic methodology, the dominant position argues that discourse analysis is a strictly qualitative “methodological meta-other” of quantitative methods such as statistics,¹ while the opposing position maintains that statistical analysis and its quantitative results can be used as an alternative to mainstream discourse analysis.² Attempts at combining
these approaches\textsuperscript{3} are mainly confined to the domain of linguistics; few have been carried out in the domain of politics. This methodological gap is even deeper in the field of conflict studies, where discourse – as a tool that determines power relations in a political setting – and its impact on conflict are relatively untouched.

René Lemarchand establishes one of the earlier works that connects discourse to political violence in his manuscript on ethnocide in Burundi.\textsuperscript{4} Lene Hansen’s work on the Bosnian War conflict discourse,\textsuperscript{5} Richard Jackson’s analysis on how discourse establishes state-society power relations in Africa,\textsuperscript{6} Helle Malmvig’s incorporation of discourse analysis into sovereignty and intervention in Kosovo and Algeria,\textsuperscript{7} and Patrick M. Regan’s study of how outside powers instrumentalize discourse to justify intervention into civil wars\textsuperscript{8} establish the foundations of the literature on discourse and armed conflict. More-detailed studies such as Ivan Leudar et al.’s work on otherization discourses as a form of political violence,\textsuperscript{9} or Stathis Kalyvas’ study on how discourse constructs action and identity in civil wars,\textsuperscript{10} can also be offered as literary precursors of the study presented in this article.

The relationship between political discourse and the Kurdish conflict is also an understudied area, and Turkey’s Kurdish question offers a rich case study with ample opportunities for diverse research agendas. This article holds the view that qualitative and quantitative approaches to discourse analysis are complementary in conflict analysis. Classical/mainstream discourse analysis data can be fed into appropriate statistical methods, especially with studies on institutional discourse over extended periods. Studies of legislative discourse are examples of the adoption of this two-tier methodological approach. The methodology offered in this article may provide future studies with a working model in terms of observing cognitive mechanisms and competing interests related to intra-state conflicts over extended periods. Furthermore, by expanding the works of Mesut Yeğen,\textsuperscript{11} Cengiz Güneş,\textsuperscript{12} Jaffer Sheyholislami,\textsuperscript{13} Yusuf Çevik,\textsuperscript{14} and Serhun Al\textsuperscript{15} on Turkish state discourse on the Kurds, this article offers discursive perspectives from all bands of the political spectrum in Turkey, the European Union (EU), and the US Congress (USC).

My hypothesis is that we can test the connection between political agenda and political ideology and the effect of this connection on the way a politician perceives and talks about a

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{5} Lene Hansen, Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War (Abingdon, OX: Routledge, 2006).
\textsuperscript{8} Patrick M. Regan, Civil Wars and Foreign Powers: Outside Intervention in Intrastate Conflict (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2002).
\textsuperscript{10} Stathis N. Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
\textsuperscript{11} Mesut Yeğen, “The Kurdish Question in Turkish State Discourse,” Journal of Contemporary History 34, no. 4 (1999): 555-68.
\textsuperscript{13} Jaffer Sheyholislami, Kurdish Identity, Discourse, and New Media (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).
\end{footnotesize}
particular conflict. I argue that conservative politicians perceive intra-state conflicts primarily as terrorism or security problems, whereas liberal politicians talk about these conflicts within the context of democratic deficits and poor human rights standards. To test these hypotheses, I have carried out content analysis of legislative open-floor transcripts from the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA), European Parliament (EP), and USC (both the Senate and the House), on the Kurdish question through the conflict’s most intense, violent, and ‘busy’ period, from August 1990 to February 1999. Selection rationale for this period is based on time-series data from the Global Terrorism Database on Turkey-origin incident frequency perpetrated by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). On defining conservatism and liberalism as they appear in this article, I rely on the following:

1. European Parliament hemicycle seating system – whereby left-wing/liberal groups are seated to the left and conservative/right-wing groups are seated to the right. Additional placement is conducted based on Simon Hix’ works on party competition in the European Parliament.17
3. As it is harder to situate Turkish political parties of the 1990s along the conservative-liberal axis, I relied on their discursive data on the Kurdish question, in addition to getting expert help: Prof. Hasan Bülent Kahraman (Kadir Has University) and Prof. Fuat Keyman (Sabancı University) aided me in better situating these parties along the said axis.

This study is crucially significant for two reasons, one methodological and one empirical. Methodologically, it introduces discourse analysis and quantitative methods into the domain of conflict psychology in a mutually supportive hybrid. Empirically, it addresses a surprisingly overlooked but central aspect of an otherwise saturated topic (the Kurdish question), which is: If we were to introduce a set of solutions, what exactly would it entail? I answer this question by recalling another severely overlooked truism: One cannot resolve a poorly defined question. Thus, I argue that the reason why the Kurdish question has remained unresolved for so long is that it has been misdefined by the Turkish state, which exclusively looked at the problem as one of security and terrorism, omitting other components that make up the problem. Rather than attempting to offer another subjective definition, this study aims to offer a mirror to these discursive preferences and constructions, prioritizing the empirical demonstration of these subjectivities in a comparative fashion. In that, the study is analytical and critical rather than descriptive.

2. Methodology

Discourse analysis can explore all levels and aspects of language, but here, we are concerned...
with semantics and lexicon. Lexicalization is a major domain of ideological expression and persuasion, as the well-known terrorist versus freedom fighter pairing suggests. When referring to particular persons, groups, social relations, or social issues, language users generally have a choice of several words, depending on discourse genre, personal context, social context, and socio-cultural context. This study adds to the field of discourse analysis by introducing the dimensions of time and frequency to examine how (whether) those discourses have changed over time in terms of context and rate of recurrence. These findings will help us examine the particular events chosen for debate in parliaments. Thus, discourse, as defined for the purposes of this study, is

a) strategic function (argument) and
b) a context within which an argument is constructed.

Within this framework, parts and phrases of a parliamentary speech are considered discourse if they are arguments (criticism-defense/support-opposition) and/or if those arguments are made within a specific context (human rights, democracy, ethnicity, etc.).

Speech-act theory introduces the concepts of illocutionary or performative acts, which regard communication as a factor affecting belief and construction of personal reality. Developed by John L. Austin, the illocutionary act concept asserts that speech is actually a performance, undertaken towards what Austin calls “conventional consequences” such as arguments, commitments, or obligations.21 From this perspective, speech-act theory diverges from discourse theory, as the latter takes speech as a dependent variable – affected by structure – and the former takes it as an independent variable – affecting structure. Speech acts, therefore, distinguish between two types of communication: speech in order to express reality and speech in order to affect or alter it.

Austin identifies three processes of action beyond speech itself. The first is the act of utterance, which has three additional qualities: locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary acts. For example, when a Turkish parliamentarian utters the words: “There is no such thing as a Kurdish problem (A1). This is a problem of terrorism (A2),” he informs the audience that the assertion A1 is – in his view – empirically not true, whereas the A2 assertion – again, in his view – should replace the initial assertion since it carries a greater truth value. Of course (because of his/her subjective immersion into the context), the parliamentarian does not recognize that the truth-value being asserted is not reality but perception. Maybe less directly – given the appropriate context – his/her statements may also be inferred as telling other parliamentarians to vote in favor of a security measure. With an inferential and contextual reading, parliamentarians must infer that given A2 is true, they are asked to support a bill or resolution in favor of increasing troop count in the emergency-measure provinces. The A2 assertion also aims to knock down other definitions of the “problem in the south-east” (since within this context, it is not defined as the Kurdish problem) such as human rights, democratization, or excessive force, and establish the supremacy of one verbal construction of a conflict’s nature over other constructions.

Different from discourse theory, which deals with macro-level communication, speech-act theory looks at micro-level communication (speech, dialogue). In that respect, speech-act theory is more technical than discourse theory, since the former looks into lexical, syntactic, and grammatical structures of communication. The importance of speech-act theory for the purposes of this study comes from its exploration of the three levels of speech: directness-

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indirectness, literal-nonliteral meaning, and explicitness-inexplicitness based on the context of communication. For example, when a Member of the European Parliament (MEP) says: “It is in the Turkish army where real power lies,” that statement can be regarded as a direct, literal, and explicit observation: the Turkish military has the real power. But from the perspective of democratic standards, the statement becomes an indirect, nonliteral, and inexplicit criticism, where an accusation of the Turkish democratic system is made about the excessive weight the armed forces exert on the functioning of a representative system and party politics. From that perspective, indirectness, nonliterality, and inexplicitness become important illocutionary tools in a communicative setting where restraints on speech are heavier. Such comments have been an important pattern in Turkish Parliament debates, especially where construction of the ‘Kurdish question as the Kurdish question’ was immediately inferred as recognizing Kurds as a separate entity within Turkey; a threat against the unitary character of the nation and against territorial integrity.

Previous literature on political linguistics looks at language either in terms of time (short-term event: speech act; versus longer-term phenomenon: discursive structures)\(^{22}\) or power relations\(^{23}\) (structure-agency debate). Moreover, even in the literature on belief and language, a body of beliefs or images is taken either as a dependent or an independent variable, without sufficient discussion of the relationship between speech act and discourse. This study, therefore, attempts to establish the link between speech and discourse, arguing that they are mutually dependent structures. Moreover, I argue that although speech acts do not immediately lead to policies, they affect discourses and linguistic constructions of images over an extended period of time and create belief systems and norms out of which decisions arise in the long run. From this perspective, a speech act – during the time and space of its utterance – contains three versions of subjective time: past (affected by discourse), present (competing against other discourse candidates), and future (affecting discourse). Although a particular speech does not become policy in the long run, it becomes part of a discursive structure, and that discursive structure will either become the hegemonic discourse out of which policies arise or become a counter-hegemonic discourse, trying to overthrow the hegemonic discourse. In the latter case, the speech act will still affect policy by causing the hegemonic discourse to define itself along the lines of what the counter-hegemonic discourse is not, leading to policies in reaction to it.

2.1. Methodology step 1: data collection
Given the definition of discourse above, I assembled entire debate records from parliamentary sittings between January 1990 and December 1999. Most search results were read and sorted according to relevance. Debate sessions were considered relevant if they conformed to the following criteria:
1. The topic of the debate was the situation of the Kurds in Turkey.
2. The topic of the debate was human rights and/or democratization in Turkey but with references to the situation of the Kurds in Turkey.


3. The topic of the debate was Iraqi Kurds, but references were made to Turkish Kurds or the Turkish state.
4. The debate was on an internal matter, but at least one legislator made at least one extended intervention directed toward the situation of the Kurds in Turkey.

2.2. Methodology step 2: data evaluation

The selected material was subjected to a second round of evaluation in which sentences and phrases were evaluated according to their discursive value, comprising

1. strategic function (argument, assertion, proposal),
2. evaluation of a strategic function (criticism-defense or support-opposition), and
3. context and theme (frequently recurring subjects, contexts, and argumentative positions).

The content analysis carried out on all legislative open-floor deliberations on the Kurdish question in the three legislatures revealed ten major discursive contexts within which intra-state conflict was debated. These discursive contexts, made up of recurring speech acts that defined the essence of the Kurdish question and their corresponding ‘solutions,’ defined Turkey’s Kurdish question as one of the following:

1. A human rights (HR) problem that would be solved by building awareness within the police and military forces about approaching non-combatants in a non-violent manner.
2. A democratization (Dem) problem that exposes Turkey’s lack of democratic checks and balances, to be solved by improving institutions and undertaking reform.
3. An excessive force (ExF) problem stemming from disproportionate responses by Turkish security forces against the Kurdish population, which would be solved if such forces could exercise restraint and caution.
4. An ethnic-identity (Ethn) conflict that stems from the ‘Kurdishness’ of the Kurds and their separateness from Turkey, which could be solved by granting ethnic and cultural rights to the Kurds and allowing autonomy to their region.
5. A conflict intensified by the Turkish military (TRmil), its self-imposed role as the guarantor of democracy, and its involvement in politics. The problem would be solved if the Turkish military could take a step back from politics and leave the domain to democratically elected representatives.
6. A conflict intensified by PKK terrorism (PKK-t) in the Kurdish region. The conflict would be solved if the PKK laid down its weapons.

The above six contexts were frequently used within all three legislatures. Four additional contexts were exclusive to the TGNA:

1. An artificially created problem fueled by “dark foreign powers” (For) aiming at the partition and destruction of Turkey through support of the PKK. The conflict would be solved if foreign countries stopped aiding the PKK.
2. A problem emerging from the poor application of and non-adherence to constitutional principles (Law), which creates an environment of lawlessness that hurts the region’s Kurds. Conducting proper legal reforms and strengthening their enforcement would solve the problem.
3. An issue originating in a lack of security or mismanagement of the security forces (Sec) in the region, which would be solved by putting more financial, material, and human resources at the disposal of the armed forces.
4. A problem arising from a lack of education and development (Ed-Dev) in the region, which could only be solved through the allocation of more money for schools, infrastructure, jobs, and living standards for the region’s inhabitants.

Figure 1 shows how such evaluations were made using German MEP Claudia Roth’s statement during the EP debate of March 10, 1994, in response to the arrest of Kurdish members of the Turkish Parliament.

Figure 1: Evaluation of EP speech by Claudia Roth (Germany - Green Party), March 10, 1994
These discursive contexts were then sorted according to:

a. Party affiliation of the legislators: Who adopts HR arguments the most? Which political parties choose to talk about the Kurdish question within the context of terrorism and security? Is there an ideological bent to how a politician perceives and talks about the Kurdish question? Table 1 is a discourse activity chart for the Motherland Party (ANAP) of the Turkish parliament from June 27, 1995, to April 22, 1996.

Table 1- Sample discourse activity table showing Motherland Party distribution (June 27, 1995 to April 22, 1996)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>HR</th>
<th>Dem</th>
<th>Ethn</th>
<th>Law</th>
<th>Sec</th>
<th>Ed-Dev</th>
<th>For.</th>
<th>iTRc</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>27-Jun-95</td>
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<td>5</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
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<td>28-Oct-95</td>
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<td>18-Apr-96</td>
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<td>21-Apr-96</td>
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<td>22-Apr-96</td>
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My hypothesis is that party affiliation and ideology matter most among leftist and/or liberal politicians. We can hypothesize that liberals and/or leftists express their ideological priorities – human rights, democratization, etc. – more readily than right-wing or conservative politicians, who mainly operate within the domain of agenda politics rather than ideology.

b. Political agenda: In the three legislatures, politicians’ interest and stakes in the Kurdish question differ. To identify agenda items that contributed to politicians’ interests, I carried out a series of interviews with the politicians themselves, legislative experts, and academic experts on the history of the legislatures. As a result, the primary agenda fault lines in these legislatures as they relate to the Kurdish question are as follows:

i. Country affiliation and the Kurdish Diaspora in the EP. European MEPs generally express the national interests of their respective countries vis-à-vis Turkey when it comes to debates on the Kurdish question. Greece, whose political relations with Turkey have been tense because of a number of diplomatic issues, has chosen to internationalize these disputes via EP debates on the Kurds. Germany, on the other hand, has been a significant arms supplier to the Turkish military, and the excessive force practiced by the latter has led German MEPs to protest Turkish-German military agreements. Other countries approach the issue within the context of their NATO
commitments; the post-Gulf War context necessitated an air force buildup at the NATO base in southern Turkey. In addition, the presence of a significant Kurdish Diaspora in Germany, Austria, and France has led these countries to express in the EP the concerns of their highly politicized Kurdish constituencies.

ii. Caucus and interest group membership in the USC. The ideological differences between Republican and Democratic legislators in the USC have less of an effect on agenda and discourse when it comes to the Kurdish question. The main determinant of a congressperson’s discourse on the Kurdish question appears to be his/her caucus memberships. Therefore, I propose that if a member of Congress belongs to a legislative group or special interest caucus whose agenda overlaps with Kurdish interests, she/he constructs the Kurdish question within the context of liberties and emancipation. If a member of Congress does not belong to any such group, she/he will construct the Kurdish question increasingly on par with state discourse. These groups, identified after a long expert-interview process, are the Human Rights Caucus, the Hellenic Caucus, and the Armenian Caucus.

iii. Constituency and voter pressure in the TGNA. Representing a Kurdish-majority constituency or coming from a predominantly Kurdish city are the main factors affecting agenda in the TGNA. The 13 predominantly Kurdish cities that have seen the most intense bursts of violence were under the jurisdiction of the Emergency Super-governorate, a special enforcement mechanism with expanded powers, from 1987 to 2002. The Super-governorate became synonymous with suppression, human rights violations, and security excesses. Ideology and agenda also play some role in TGNA discourses on the Kurdish question, but I propose that if a legislator represents cities under the jurisdiction of the Emergency Super-governorate, she/he will construct the Kurdish question within the context of liberties and emancipation. If, however, a legislator comes from outside that jurisdiction, she/he will construct the Kurdish question within the context of terrorism, state security, and territorial integrity.

Following the content analysis findings, quantitative operationalization was necessary. The primary operationalization method involved counting and sorting the aggregate number of discourses according to their type. Another re-sorting was necessary, this time according to legislator, to analyze the discourse type and frequency of reference to the Kurdish question by party affiliation, caucus affiliation, and constituency. The rest of the article discusses these variances in quantitative terms.

3. Results

3.1. The European Parliament (EP)

In analyzing the EP discourse on the Kurdish question, we will first look at how agenda (country affiliation: which country an MEP represents) affects legislative discourse. Later, we will test whether party (ideology) affiliation has any effect.

3.1.1. Agenda: country affiliation

In the EP in the time period studied, there have been 563 references to the Kurdish question (total number of n = discourse; see Table 1). Agenda, as defined by country activity in the EP, can be measured in two ways. First, one can look at the total number of discourses adopted by
each country, and second, at the total number of discourses in ratio to the country’s number of MEPs. The most active countries in terms of total number of discourses are shown in Table 2.

Table 2- Top five most active countries in the EP on the Kurdish question, January 1990 to December 1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aggregate discourses</th>
<th>Activity in percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany 112</td>
<td>19.89%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece 111</td>
<td>19.71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom 71</td>
<td>12.61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France 63</td>
<td>11.19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands 60</td>
<td>10.65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others 146</td>
<td>25.95%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These countries are followed by Italy, Belgium, Sweden, Austria, Spain, Ireland, and Denmark in descending order of discourses.

Two hypotheses may help explain the frequency for an EU country with regard to its MEPs’ speech activity on the Kurdish issue. The first is:

**MEPs of a country with a large Kurdish population speak more on the Kurdish issue.**

The size of Diaspora membership is strongly linked to electoral interest in constituencies; as MEPs are primarily representative of their constituents, the Kurdish population (Diaspora strength) is the most relevant data to be tested. To test this, the relationship between the dependent variable (aggregate number of discourses) and the independent variable (Kurdish population) must be measured. This finding will provide us with a general pattern within the EP with regard to this hypothesis, as well as outliers that render this hypothesis insignificant.

The estimated numbers of the Kurdish population are collected from the Paris Kurdish Institute, and shown in Table 3.

Table 3- Kurdish diaspora strength and MEP activity per EP country*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Estimated Kurdish population24 as of 1995</th>
<th>Number of MEP discourses</th>
<th>Kurdish Population represented per discourse</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany 600,000</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>5357.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France 100,000</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>1515.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands 70,000</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>1166.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium 50,000</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>1428.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria 50,000</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3571.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden 25,000</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>1190.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom 20,000</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>281.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece 20,000</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>180.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark 8,000</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1142.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy 3,000</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>75.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland 2,000</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*European countries not mentioned in this graph do not have statistically substantial Kurdish populations and are not listed in the Paris Kurdish Institute figures.

In terms of “Kurdish population represented per discourse” measurements, German MEPs (most notably Claudia Roth of the Green group) have produced most of the discourse on the Kurdish question, with their country hosting the largest Kurdish Diaspora in Europe. However, a hypothesis asserting that MEPs of countries with a large Kurdish population produce more discourses on the Kurdish question appears not to be true for the rest of the EU countries. Two of the countries that follow Germany in terms of MEP activity on the Kurdish question (Greece and United Kingdom) host two of the smallest Kurdish Diasporas in Europe, an estimated 22,000 Kurds each. These two countries are also runners-up in the “Kurdish population represented per discourse” measurements; however counterintuitively, Italian MEPs stand out as being the most representative of their country’s Kurdish Diaspora, representing 87.5 Kurds per discourse.

Therefore, the first hypothesis seems to be flawed: the size of the Kurdish Diaspora in an EU country does not necessarily affect its MEPs’ activities in the EP. Germany seems to support our hypothesis in the sense that German MEPs have produced the most discourses on the Kurdish question and is the country with the largest Kurdish Diaspora in Europe. However, the fact that Greek, British, and Italian MEPs have represented the smallest group of Kurds in their country per discourse they have uttered is evidence against this hypothesis.

The second hypothesis that may explain an EU country’s activity in the EP relates to the number of MEPs a country has:

*Countries with more seats in the EP produce more discourses on the Kurdish question.*

Put simply, more MEPs mean more speeches. To measure this hypothesis, we have to measure discourse per MEP, which will tell us how many discourses relating to the Kurdish question a country uttered divided by its seats in the EP. To do this, we look at the ratio of the total number of discourses (n) to the arithmetic mean (AM) of the number of the MEPs for each country in two EP election terms. The higher the discourse-per-MEP number, the more active that particular country’s MEPs have been, which will imply outlying special interests with regard to that country’s relation to the Kurdish question. According to this measurement, Greece tops the list (Table 4).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of discourses</th>
<th>Average mean of MEPs in 1989 and 1994 EP elections</th>
<th>Discourse per MEP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Greece has been the most active country in the EP on Turkey’s Kurdish question, just behind Germany on aggregate discourses (19.71% of total discourses) but way ahead on the discourse-per-MEP measurement (4.62 discourses per MEP).

Curve statistics in Figure 2 also verify that Greek MEPs have been significant outliers of the trend and the most active members of the EP on a discourse-per-MEP measurement. The Greeks are followed by the Dutch, whereas Italian and Finnish MEPs stand out as the least active, based on the same measurement. Our second hypothesis is thus not perfectly
valid either. While Greek MEPs again top the list in terms of discourses, Greece is one of the countries with fewer seats in the EP. This also applies to the Netherlands. Countries with more seats in the EP (France, the United Kingdom, and Italy) have been less interested in the Kurdish question compared to Greece and the Netherlands.

A country-based analysis of EP discourses on the Kurdish issue provides us with few recurring patterns from which to derive a successful hypothesis, and thus supports our claim that agenda (as defined by country) does play some role in the EP. Among EU member countries, however, Greece is the outlier with regard to the Kurdish question in Turkey, topping country activity lists both in terms of “Kurdish population represented per discourse” and “discourse per MEP” measurements. It is safe to argue, then, that in the 1990s the EP became a forum in which Greece could internationalize its problems with Turkey by hijacking debates on the Kurdish question, aiming perhaps not so much to improve the situation of the Kurds, as to portray the Turkish state as an excessively militaristic and undemocratic entity. To conclude, Greek MEPs’ perceptions of the Kurdish question come out primarily as agenda-oriented.

This finding is supported by looking at a breakdown of country discourses by discourse types, as shown in Table 5.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>HR</th>
<th>Dem</th>
<th>ExF</th>
<th>Trmil</th>
<th>PKK-t</th>
<th>iEUc</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This overview shows that Greece was the most frequent critic of Turkey on the Kurdish question, especially within the HR and ExF discourses. In addition, Greek MEPs have criticized PKK violence less than other MEPs, while they are the most frequent critics of EU policy with regard to Turkey’s Kurdish question. Overall, the most frequently adopted discourse in the EP has been the HR discourse, followed by the Dem and ExF discourses. Although the ExF discourses are more frequent than the PKK-t discourses, the EP focused less on the Turkish military as the source of this excessive force and generally used arguments that were directed toward all the security forces involved. Greece emerges as the only country whose criticisms of the Turkish military overwhelmingly surpassed its criticisms of the PKK; the remaining EU countries appear to criticize the PKK more than they do the Turkish military. While Greece has been the most frequent critic of Turkey’s human rights practices, Germany was the predominant country in constructing the Kurdish issue within the context of democratization. Greece was the most frequent critic of Turkey’s security activities against the Kurds, criticizing the PKK only once in the 1990s. Germany and France, by contrast, were the most frequent critics of the PKK as a terrorist organization. Germany also criticized the Turkish army as the source of the Kurdish problem more frequently than any other country, perhaps because the Turkish military used German-sourced weaponry in the predominantly Kurdish southeast. A general view of the human rights- and democratization-focused EP discourses is shown in Figure 3.

![Radar graph showing comparative discourse type preference in the EP](image_url)

Figure 3: Radar graph showing comparative discourse type preference in the EP

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Key to terms: HR = Human Rights; Dem = Democracy/democratization; ExF = Criticism of excessive use of force; TrMil = Criticism of the Turkish military; PKK-t = Criticism of PKK/reference to terrorism; iEUc = Criticism of EU policy on the Kurdish question

25 Includes European Commission and Council of Europe discourses.
No clear correlation exists between a particular MEP’s discourse activity on the Kurdish question and the number of Kurds living in the MEP’s country or the number of seats that a country has in the EP. Therefore, we will only analyze the legislature according to party affiliation (ideology), with the main finding of this section being that agenda played an important role in Greek MEPs’ perception and vocalization of the Kurdish question. While we cannot use the findings from our country-based analysis, this method is very valuable in terms of identifying outliers; that is, countries that either over- or under-performed on the basis of the main trends in the EP.

3.1.2. Ideology: group activity

One of the primary hypotheses of this study is that party affiliation (an indicator of ideology for the purposes of this study) determines a parliamentarian’s discourse on the Kurdish issue. To test party activity within this context, a similar calculation to that used in the first section must be undertaken. Overall party activity in the EP, based on the total number of discourses (n) for all the groups (555), is presented in Table 6.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Aggregate number (n)</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Socialist Group, PSE</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>31.53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confederal Group of the European United Left – Nordic Green Left, GUE-NGL</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>23.24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group of the Greens</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>13.69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe, ALDE</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>12.61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group of the European People’s Party (Christian Democrats) and European Democrats, EPP-ED</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>11.35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independence-Democracy Group, I-D</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>7.56%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To complement this list of party/group aggregate activity, it is important to look at the discourse-per-MEP measurement again, this time according to party affiliation. Member of European Parliament figures used in these calculations are the average mean of a group’s number of seats after the parliamentary elections in 1989 and 1994 (Table 7).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>1989 seats</th>
<th>1994 seats</th>
<th>Average MEPs</th>
<th>Discourses per MEP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GUE-NGL</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>3.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greens</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>2.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-D</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>1.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALDE</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>1.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSE</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>0.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPP-ED</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>169.5</td>
<td>0.37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Members of the European Parliament from the European United Left-Nordic Green Left (GUE-NGL) group have engaged in an average of 3.68 discourses on the Kurdish question, making them the most active on the Kurdish question in Turkey. When we compare EP’s aggregate party output on the Kurdish question, Figure 4 gives us a clear dominance of PSE and GUE-NGL groups.

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26 Excluding Council and Commission discourses, because these are technocratic bodies where party affiliation cannot be observed.
27 For a breakdown of European Parliament seats based on party affiliation (1989-1994), see the Europe Politique website (www.europe-politique.eu/).
28 For a breakdown of European Parliament seats based on party affiliation (1994-1999) see the Europe Politique website (www.europe-politique.eu/).
I stated earlier that the relationship between a country’s number of seats in the EP and that country’s activity on the Kurdish question was weak. A similar analysis can be made about the relationship between the number of MEPs in a group and that group’s corresponding aggregate discourse.

An initial hypothesis may be derived as follows; this hypothesis is tested in Figure 5 and Table 8:

Table 8 - Discursive performance of EP political parties and European Council and Commission activity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>HR</th>
<th>Dem</th>
<th>ExF</th>
<th>Trmil</th>
<th>PKK-t</th>
<th>iEUc</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PSE</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPP-ED</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALDE</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GUE-NGL</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greens</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-D</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council-Commission</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 4: Radar graph showing comparative party group activity (number of references to the Kurdish question) in the EP.

Figure 5: Trends and outliers in discourse-per-MEP measurement
As the number of a group’s MEPs increases, so do the group’s aggregate discourses on the Kurdish question.

This hypothesis appears to be weak, but the groups that meet it are the European Socialist Group and the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe, whose discourses on the Kurdish question appear to be on par with their seats in the EP. The curve estimation is valuable because it allows us to see the outliers to the main trend: the Independence-Democracy and the Christian Democrat-European Democrat groups appear to be “uninterested” in the Kurdish question, whereas the Greens and Nordic Left have been the most active groups. The curve estimation analysis thus confirms our findings in the cross-tabulation.

The above overview shows that the European Socialists have constructed the Kurdish question within the context of HR, Dem, and ExF discourses more than any other group. It is also the group in the EP most critical of PKK violence. The Greens have identified the Turkish military as the cause of the Kurdish problem more often than any other group, whereas the United Left-Nordic Green Left has been overwhelmingly the group most critical of EU policies and the stance of European institutions on the Kurdish question. While all other EP groups have constructed the Kurdish question within the context of the HR discourse, the Green group has primarily referred to the Kurdish problem as a Dem issue. The Nordic Green Left also constructed the Kurdish question as an ExF problem far more than any other group in the EP as a percentage of total discourses adopted per group. Council and Commission members have also constructed this problem as an issue primarily of HR and then Dem. These bureaucratic bodies seldom referred to the ExF dimension, however, and regarded the Kurdish question essentially as a PKK-t problem, the second most common type of discourse adopted by the Council and Commission.

The European Parliament attempted to be careful not to condemn the PKK more than it did Turkish security practices. In general, the European Parliament adopted critical discourses towards Turkish security forces (without distinguishing between the police, military or gendarmerie) 103 times, making it the third most frequent discourse adopted, at 19.3%. This may at first appear higher than cases where Parliament criticized the PKK (referring to it as a “terrorist organization” or condemning its methods), which constitute 9.4% of the discourses. However, discourses that criticized the Turkish military directly for its human rights abuses or excessive use of force are much lower (1.5%) than those criticizing the PKK.

Compared to the MEPs, the Commission and Council can generally be seen as favoring Turkey on the Kurdish issue. While they criticized PKK terrorism (18 in total) much more than Turkish army abuses (three in total), they were less critical and more encouraging in their human rights-democracy discourses. Moreover, although the Council and Commission adopted discourses that condemned PKK terrorism (eight and 10 times respectively, they did not specifically target the Turkish military and conveyed their worries on excessive force in general wording.

The difference in discourses between the Parliament and the Council-Commission stems from the age-old tension between elected representatives and the executive bureaucracy; the Roman Senate and the Consul. Although an apparent reason for this difference is the raison d’être of parliaments and bureaucracies – where parliaments emphasize liberties, freedom of speech, and individualism, and bureaucracies emphasize state security, manageability, and realpolitik – another, less explicit reason for this difference is the essence of politics: the struggle against power in order to assume power. The difference between the European
Parliament and the Council-Commission in the Turkish debate is not because Parliament was more sensitive towards ethnicity, but because Parliament had been in a constant push for more say over European external affairs. Therefore, by adopting a different discourse than the bureaucratic branches, Parliament attempted to gain a foothold on arguably the most important item regarding the EU’s external relations – Turkey – and arguably the most critical issue in Turkey – the Kurdish question.

The first hypothesis I proposed for the EP is somewhat valid here. Ideology (measured by party affiliation) does play an important role in terms of the discursive construction of the Kurdish question. Two of the leftist groups in the EP (Nordic Greens and Greens) share the discursive pattern of emphasizing Turkish security force violations and playing down PKK terrorism, whereas the center-right European People’s Party referred less to Turkish military excesses and constructed this issue more within the domain of PKK terrorism. The data thus validates my hypothesis: As an MEP’s position approaches the political right, she/he constructs the Kurdish question increasingly within the state discourse (terrorism, territorial integrity, perpetuation of the state, and security). If an MEP’s position approaches the political left, on the other hand, she/he constructs the Kurdish question increasingly within the context of liberties and emancipation (human rights, democracy, state violence, and identity recognition).

That said, there is no clear pattern on data that can validate the hypothesis regarding country affiliation and the Kurdish discourse. We can nevertheless infer much from looking at outliers to test our hypothesis. Although Germany produced the most discourses on the Kurdish question in Turkey, this accords with our test hypothesis because Germany has the largest Kurdish Diaspora in Europe and the largest number of MEPs in the EP. It must be acknowledged, however, that Claudia Roth, the chairperson of the Green group, produced a great majority of German discourses on the Kurdish question in Turkey, so Germany’s dominance in the EP on this topic owes more to Roth’s activism and her constituency than to Germany’s sensitivity to the Kurdish question.

We can infer from this analysis that Kurdish discourse in the EP as well as criticism of Turkey in the 1990s was shaped by the statements of Greek MEPs of the Nordic Green Left and German MEPs (most specifically Claudia Roth) of the Green group. To conclude, it was mostly ideology and party affiliation that determined how an MEP ‘talked about’ the Kurdish question in Turkey in the EP, while country affiliation had a lesser influence on the discourse (with the slight exception of Greece). Later in this study, I will compare the EP’s discourse on the Kurdish question with that of the USC and TGNA.

3.2. The United States’ Congress

In this section, we will look at how the discourse on the Kurdish question in Turkey was shaped in the USC between 1990 and 1999 by separately analyzing three lines of demarcation: membership in the Senate or the House of Representatives, party affiliation, and caucus membership.

3.2.1. Ideology: Democrats vs. Republicans

The primary fault line of analysis in the USC is party affiliation. For our analysis, I have adopted a discourse count-and-sort methodology similar to that in the above section on the EP (Table 9).
Table 9- Senate and House Republicans’ and Democrats’ activity and discursive preferences

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>HR</th>
<th>Dem</th>
<th>ExF</th>
<th>Trmil</th>
<th>iUSC</th>
<th>PKK-t</th>
<th>Party total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Senate-Dem</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senate-Rep</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House-Dem</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House-Rep</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discourse total</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>583</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As Table 8 shows, the House of Representatives was the most active floor for the Kurdish question in Turkey, with an aggregate 380 discourses, as opposed to 203 for the Senate. We can see that Democrats dominate in the Senate, with 186 of aggregate discourses to the Republicans’ 17. Just as Claudia Roth single-handedly produced the majority of German discourses in the EP, Senator Dennis DeConcini (D-AZ) generated the overwhelming majority of Senate Democrats’ discourses. One can argue that through the 1990s, Senator DeConcini shaped the Senate narrative on the Kurdish question in Turkey. Although Democrats have also been active in the House of Representatives, party activity is more balanced there than in the Senate; House Democrats generated 207 of the discourses to the Republicans’ 173. Figure 6 shows the discursive priorities of the USC through 1990-1999:

![Figure 6: Radar graph showing aggregate Congressional discursive preferences in defining the Kurdish question](image)

The USC constructed the Kurdish problem primarily within the context of the HR discourse, both within the Senate and the House. Democrat members of the House and Senate have been the most dominant advocates on HR; the topic was also the most frequently adopted discourse of Republican representatives in the House. The second most frequently adopted discourse type was ExF, which deviates from the pattern in the EP, where Dem discourses were the second most frequently adopted. Republican representatives took the ExF position almost as often as HR discourses; ExF was the most frequently used argument of the generally inactive senators of the Republican Party. One can infer from this pattern that Republican members of Congress were more concerned about the ExF aspect of the Kurdish question, seeing it primarily as an issue of unnecessary violence. While constructing the Kurdish question within the context of Dem discourse was the third most frequent tendency in Congress, it was the second choice of discourse for Democratic senators, behind HR. Democratic senators
were the most critical of the PKK as a terrorist organization, and Republican senators did not refer to the organization at all. After Republican senators, Democratic representatives were the least critical of the PKK and the most critical of Turkey’s military approach. Democratic representatives of the House were also the most critical group of US policy, the president, and the executive branch on the Kurdish question; Republican senators refrained from any such criticism.

United States’ Congress discourse on the Kurdish question is shaped not by party affiliation but by individual interest, as we shall see in the following section. There was a considerable amount of discourse concentration among certain members of Congress, more so than in the EP and, as we shall also see later, than in the TGNA, to the extent that a handful of members of Congress were the primary sources of Congressional discourse on the Kurdish question. This finding renders a party-based discourse analysis unimportant and raises the need to focus on individuals, narrowing the level of analysis down to agency.

In the US Senate, the most active figure on Turkey’s Kurdish question was Dennis DeConcini, the Democratic senator from Arizona, who served between 1977 and January 1995. DeConcini produced half (50.2%) of the discourses in the Senate and 17.49% of the entire Congressional output on the Kurdish question. Other prolific senators on the Kurdish issue were Claiborne Pell (D–RI) and Patrick Leahy (D–VT) (Table 10).

Table 10- The three most active Senators on the Kurdish question in Turkey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Discourse Type</th>
<th>Senator</th>
<th>Discourse Type</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11-Apr-91</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Dennis DeConcini</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>05-Sep-95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13-Nov-91</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15-Sep-95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02-Mar-94</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17-May-94</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23-Jun-94</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04-Aug-94</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>29-Jun-94</td>
</tr>
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<td>11-Aug-94</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>22-Sep-95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-Nov-94</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As we can see observe from Table 9, the most active senators produced “pro-Turkish” discourses often to encourage or praise a reform process. On the basis of the aggregate number of discourses, DeConcini was the most approving senator of Turkey as well as being its most frequent critic. However, Claiborne Pell generated the highest proportion of approving discourses (one-third of her total discourses).

While the Democrats dominated the Senate and House discussions on Turkey’s Kurdish question, two Republican members were the most active individual figures in the House. Table 11 shows that Edward Porter (R–IL) emerged as the most active representative in the House (58 discourses) and Christopher Smith (R–NJ) was almost equally as active (57 discourses). They are followed by two Democratic representatives: Frank Pallone (NJ) and Lee Hamilton (IN).

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29 S = Senate, H = House of Representatives, D = Democrat, R = Republican. Final acronyms indicate legislators’ states.
Table 11 shows that while the most active senators used a combination of discursive ‘carrots and sticks,’ the representatives’ statements tended more toward criticism. The most critical senator was Edward Porter (R-IL), who was also the most frequent participant in debates on the Kurdish issue. Porter produced 33.52% of Republican statements on the Kurdish issue in the House of Representatives. The Republican runner-up, Christopher Smith (NJ), adopted slightly more supportive positions than Porter did, which formed 15.78% of his discourses. The third most active representative of the House (also the most active Democratic representative) was Frank Pallone (NJ), who was also the only representative in the list to make no positive reference to Turkey’s policies on the Kurdish question. Another active representative, Lee Hamilton (D-IN), was the most pro-Turkish among the most anti-Turkish, whose approving discourses constituted 23.52% of his total references.

Our hypothesis that party and ideology are the primary determinants of parliamentary discourse appears to be invalid for the USC because criticism and praise were bi-partisan and equally present in the Senate and the House. Given that party affiliation is not a statistically significant way of explaining Congress members’ activity on the Kurdish issue, we need to seek a different connection between the various members of the Senate and the House and the Democratic and Republican parties.

3.2.2. Agenda: caucus affiliation

As primary political identity (party affiliation) does not yield a conclusive pattern to explain discursive preferences, a second layer of identity (caucus affiliation = political agenda) should be introduced. Our second hypothesis thus states that Congressional caucus memberships (agenda) are the main influence on a congressperson’s approach to the Kurdish question. Based on suggestions received during the interview phase of this research, we test
the Congressional membership of three caucuses: Human Rights, Hellenic, and Armenian. We examine in Table 12, whether (how) membership in these caucuses corresponds to the percentage of a congressperson’s critical discourses, based on a list of members who have spoken on the Kurdish question more than once in the 1990-1999 period.

Table 12- Members of Congress active in debates on the Kurdish question and their affiliation with Human Rights, Armenian, and Hellenic caucuses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HR</th>
<th>Armenian</th>
<th>Hellenic</th>
<th>% of critical discourses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Edward Porter</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christopher Smith</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frank Pallone</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lee Hamilton</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carolyn B. Maloney</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elizabeth Furse</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George Gekas</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James Bunn</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michael Bilirakis</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peter John Visclosky</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard A. Zimmer</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steny Hoyer</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The list shows that while appraisal/criticism dynamics were more fluid in the Senate, discourse within the House of Representatives was rigid, either entirely critical or entirely supportive. Moreover, with the exception of Lee Hamilton, all three senators were members of the Human Rights, Hellenic, and/or Armenian caucuses. In the House of Representatives, five of the seven representatives whose discourses were entirely critical were members of one or more of the three caucuses analyzed here; four of these representatives were members of all three caucuses. James “Jim” Bunn is the only non-critical representative, and he was not a member of any of these caucuses.

The human rights discourse in Congress had two dimensions; one focused on the situation of Kurds in Iraq, and the other focused on Kurdish rights in Turkey. Congress was overwhelmingly critical of Turkish practices on both fronts, and not even Turkish contributions to Operation Provide Comfort (OPC)33 could disperse a strictly critical stance in either the House or the Senate. In terms of Kurds in Iraq, Congress was critical of what they perceived as a lack of willingness by Turkey to aid Kurdish refugees fleeing Saddam Hussein’s army at the end of the Gulf War. After the Gulf War, Congress was critical on what they thought to be Turkey’s restriction of international aid and the access of the Red Cross into northern Iraq, as well as reports on Turkish army misconducts during cross-border operations, such as burning and evacuating Iraqi villages. With respect to Kurds in Turkey, Congress emphasized illegal killings, torture, and disappearances under detention. Village burnings and evacuations were also a part of the human rights discourse in Congress, and in

30 Founded in 1983.
31 Founded in 1995.
32 Founded in 1996.
33 OPC was the name of the no-fly zone enforcement operation run by the United States Air Force through 1991-1996 to prevent Iraqi jets from harassing Kurdish refugees trapped close to the Iraqi-Turkish border.
some instances certain congresspersons referred to such misconducts as “ethnic cleansing” and “genocide.” Human rights discourses were frequently adopted to back up arguments in favor of cutting or restricting aid to Turkey, as well as the sale of military hardware. The general sense in Congress was that Turkey had been undertaking human rights abuses in a systematic manner and such approaches were pursued as state policy. Some congresspersons (such as Bob Filner) even initiated off-Congress efforts, such as fasting protests in front of the Capitol in order to attract Congress attention to the abuses in Turkey and Iraq. In many ways, Congress discourses varied little since most representatives were usually critical of Turkey, almost never voicing praise or encouragement about constitutional changes, human rights trainings within the military, or other positive steps taken. Such almost non-existent mobility in discourses suggests that congressional positions on human rights were predetermined through lobbying efforts and other affiliations; an overwhelming majority of the members of the Congress were either rigidly ‘anti-Turkish’ or staunchly ‘pro-Turkish,’ with extremely rare cases of cross-argumentation.

In terms of the democracy-democratization discourse, congressional statements were somewhat more fluid than those made on human rights. For example, while certain congresspersons were rigidly anti-Turkish, some (such as DeConcini) actually praised Turkish democracy in rare instances, such as after fair elections or amendments made to Turkey’s notorious Article 8 of the anti-terror law. One possible reason for these statements could be Turkey’s role as a uniquely democratic (although troubled) country in an overwhelmingly authoritarian and fundamentalist neighborhood. Indeed, DeConcini himself conveyed his hope that “Turkish democracy [...] can serve as a model for its less democratically inclined neighbors [...].” However, with the intensification of the insurgency and the democratic restrictions that followed, Congressional discourses turned completely critical. By the mid-1990s, Turkey, once a success story of American foreign democratization policies, was increasingly compared to the repressive Soviet regime in terms of restrictions on free speech. This critical tone heightened after the arrest of Kurdish parliamentarians of the Turkish Assembly, which led Congress to question whether democracy existed at all in Turkey, rather than arguing on its quality. Still, it is possible to frame such ‘negative’ discourses as inclusionist because Turkey’s democracy was debated within the context of Turkish obligations to the treaties and conventions that are part of the Western system, as opposed to certain exclusionist discourses in the European Parliament that regarded Turkey outside of the Western system of beliefs and conducts. By 1997, however, Turkish democracy was already being likened to that of ‘non-Western’ countries such as China, and the fact that the executive branch of the US government was still cooperating very closely with Turkey elicited Congressional statements that the executive branch was encouraging Turkey in its repressive policies.

The excessive-force discourse was one of the most frequent discourses adopted in Congress in the time period analyzed. Such discourses focused on perceived Turkish security heavy-handedness and the inability (or unwillingness) to distinguish between terrorists and non-combatants in cross-border operations, as well as police measures within Turkey. The biggest criticism of the Turkish military in this respect was its usage of heavy weaponry,

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34 This refers to a revoked article, which used to allow prosecution of statements that are deemed ‘propaganda against the indivisibility of the state’. Due to a very broad and unclear definition of what specific statements were prosecuted, this article was used as a way of restricting opposition or criticism of state practices on the Kurdish question.

such as cluster bombs and napalm against PKK bases surrounded by villages, which resulted in more civilian casualties than destroyed PKK targets. As the US and Turkey were major security partners and the US had provided almost 80% of Turkish arms, Congress was extremely critical of President Clinton and the executive branch for authorizing the sale of advanced weaponry to Turkey. The second line of criticism of the Turkish army was not distinguishing between civilians and PKK operatives. Most congresspersons believed that by burning villages and expelling their inhabitants (who then became potential recruits for the PKK), the Turkish army was creating conflicts that could have been avoided. The ‘ethnic cleansing’ and ‘genocide’ arguments were also frequently tied to this discourse, and the arguments cited many similarities between the events of 1915 against the Armenians and the invasion of Cyprus.

To conclude, although party and ideology were the primary predictors of how legislators spoke about the Kurdish question in the European Parliament, neither party membership nor membership in the House or Senate had any correlation with legislators’ approach to the Kurdish question in the US Congress. I believe that the primary influence over legislative discourse in the USC was legislators’ agenda (reflected by their caucus membership, constituency, or origin of campaign contributions), and within this context, Greek and Armenian interest groups (rather than Kurdish ones) were hugely influential in USC discourse on the Kurdish question. In many ways, one can argue that Greek and Armenian interests exerted heavy influence on US-Turkish relations in the 1990s by hijacking the topic of the Kurdish question and creating connections between apparently unrelated issues, such as the Kurdish question, the invasion of Cyprus, the Armenian genocide, US support for Turkey’s EU membership, and US arms sales to Turkey. Congressional discourse thus had a heavier Greek-Armenian bias than a genuine Kurdish or HR perspective, which reflects the influence that donations have in shaping political agenda. In arguing so, however, I am not dismissing the effect of ideology on a congressperson’s choice of agenda and the source of his/her donations. The findings I report here are merely what we can observe through available data on Congressional activity on the Kurdish question.

3.3. Turkish Grand National Assembly

As the political body for the host country of the conflict in question, the TGNA is critical to the study of conflict perception and discourse. Analyzing the TGNA allows us to identify similarities and differences in perception between the host of the conflict and those of outside observers. Does the country experiencing domestic conflict see the problem differently than outside observers do, or are there similarities? Here, we deal with how Turkish political-legislative discourse contextualized its internal problem and whether ideology or agenda exerted a more influential weight on discursive construction. I will test whether and (how) party affiliation (ideology), constituency (agenda), and membership of a governing or opposition party affected a legislator’s discourse on the Kurdish question in Turkey. We expect a similar trend to those observed in the two previous legislatures; namely, that conservative politicians define the question as a security and terrorism problem, and liberal politicians focus on the humanitarian and emancipatory aspects.

3.3.1. Ideology: party affiliation

Ideology in the Turkish National Assembly through the 1990s can be summed up as follows:37

- Motherland Party (ANAP): Center-right, moderate nationalism, economic liberalism, populism
- True Path Party (DYP): Center-right, moderate nationalism, economic liberalism, populism
- Social Democratic People’s Party (SHP): Social democracy, center-left, secularism and Republican People’s Party (CHP): Kemalism, center-left, social democracy (SHP joined CHP in 1995)
- Welfare Party (RP): Conservative, right-wing, Islamism, economic isolationism
- Nationalist Action Party (MHP): Right-wing, nationalism
- Democratic Left Party (DSP): Center-left, Kemalism, moderate nationalism

Within this context, I show in Table 13 and Figure 7 whether our previous finding on the effect of party ideology on legislative discourse in the EP is also valid for the TGNA.

Table 13- Political parties’ performance and discursive preferences in the TGNA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>HR</th>
<th>Dem</th>
<th>Ethn38</th>
<th>Law</th>
<th>Sec</th>
<th>Ed-Dev</th>
<th>Foreign</th>
<th>iTRc</th>
<th>SF/VG</th>
<th>ExF</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANAP</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSP</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S-C/HP</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RP</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DYP</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MHP</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>29</td>
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<td>State</td>
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<td>14</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>1108</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 7: Radar graph showing TGNA discursive preferences on the Kurdish question

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37 As Turkish political party ideologies are often fluid and difficult to determine fully from their manifestos, these ideological definitions were made by the author, with the help of Prof. Hasan Buğent Kahraman (Kadir Has University) and Prof. Fuat Keyman (Sabancı University).

38 Please note new discursive contexts exclusive to the TGNA: Ethn = the argument that the Kurdish issue is essentially an ethnic identity question; Law = legalistic discourses; Sec = security discourse; Ed-dev = the argument that the Kurdish question emerges from a lack of education and development in the region; For = emphasis on “foreign dark powers” or foreign instigation; iTRc = criticism of Turkish policy on the Kurdish question; SF-VG = criticism of security forces or paramilitary village guards’ brutality toward the Kurds.
Ideology, Political Agenda,...

From Table 13, we see that in aggregate discourses the RP was the most active party on the Kurdish question (273), followed by the SHP-CHP (219) and the ANAP (212). However, because the 1990s witnessed one of Turkey’s most politically fragmented periods, when the TGNA’s composition frequently changed due to collapsing coalition governments, we must verify this activity using a ‘discourse-per-MP’ measurement. Moreover, while the total number of MPs was 450 until 1995, it was raised to 550 MPs thereafter.

Based on the average MP numbers, in Tables 14 and 15 I show a discourse-per-MP measurement, as I did for the EP.

Table 14- MP numbers of the main political parties in the TGNA across three general elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1991</th>
<th>1995</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DYP</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>132.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANAP</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHP-CHP</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>45.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RP</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>110.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSP</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MHP</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 15- Number of discourses in proportion to average number of MPs in the TGNA to determine party activity on the Kurdish issue

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number of discourses</th>
<th>Average number of MPs</th>
<th>Discourse per MP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DYP</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>132.6</td>
<td>0.905</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANAP</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>1.909</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHP-CHP</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>45.6</td>
<td>4.802</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RP</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>110.3</td>
<td>2.475</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSP</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>1.013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MHP</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>0.674</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When we level out party discourses according to their average number of seats in the TGNA through 1991-1999, we find that MPs of the left, particularly the SHP (whose ranks joined the CHP after 1995), were the most active on the Kurdish question in Turkey. They were followed by members of the RP and the ANAP. Thus, our hypothesis on ideology and discourse appears to be partially valid for the TGNA. It is true that the most active MPs belonged to the SHP-CHP, which are both center-left parties, but the runner-up was the right-wing/conservative RP, followed by the center-right ANAP. The TGNA also conformed to the trend in the EP (as you go left-liberal in the political continuum, there is more interest in the Kurdish question, and if you go right-conservative, there is less interest), as shown by the disinterest of the right-wing MHP, the least active party, measured both by aggregate discourses and discourse-per-MP measurements. However, the political left-right pattern was

39 Data derived from the TGNA webpage (https://global.tbmm.gov.tr/) on parliamentary composition by year.
40 The Welfare Party was closed down in January 1998, after the military intervention in February 1997, which accused the party of anti-secular activities. After its closure, most party members switched over to the Virtue Party in December 1998, and then split between the Felicity Party and the Justice and Development Party in June 2001. The Felicity Party was closed down in 2001 for the same reason. The figure here refers to the Felicity Party.
41 In our case, the center-left. The military coup of 1980 eradicated far-left groups and outlawed such ideologies, requiring any leftist party to redefine its ideology along Kemalist lines. Thus, all the center-left parties had to adopt a certain level of Kemalist discourse to function within the political system so as not to be marginalized by the establishment. Center-left parties were thus as left as Turkey could go in the 1990s.
not clear in the TGNA. Although the most active party belonged to the center-left and the least active party belonged to the right, this does not necessarily validate the claim that as one goes left in the political continuum, there is more interest in the Kurdish question, or vice versa. Another party of the center-left, the DSP, was among the least active parties in the TGNA according to the discourse-per-MP measurement, while the right-wing RP was among the most active.

In the following section, I present and test another hypothesis, which will enable us to better see these discursive fault lines.

3.3.2. Agenda: constituency

In the previous section, I discussed how ideology and party affiliation shaped MPs’ discourses in the TGNA through the 1990s. Here, I will introduce a second hypothesis with regard to a legislator’s agenda, shaped by constituency:

*If a legislator represents a district (city) that is under emergency law, she/he will construct the Kurdish question within the context of emancipation and rights, whereas if a legislator does not represent such a district, she/he will define the Kurdish question as a security and territorial integrity problem.*

Cities in south-eastern Turkey (Diyarbakır, Mardin, Siirt, Batman, Şırnak, Van, Hakkari, Bingöl, Muş, Tunceli, Bitlis, and Elazığ) were brought under emergency law and the jurisdiction of the Emergency Super-governorate in 1987 by a decision of the Council of Ministers. Here, I compare discourse preferences of the parliamentarians representing these cities with representatives from the rest of Turkey. Table 16 and Figure 8 show discourse types classified according to whether the representative comes from the emergency region (ER) or not (Non-ER).

| Table 16- Aggregate discursive output and preference among emergency region and non-emergency region MPs |
|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
|             | HR  | Dem | Ethn | Law | Sec | Ed-Dev | For | iTRe | SF-VG | ExF | Total |
| ER          | 28  | 7   | 3    | 11  | 21  | 29     | 30  | 18   | 24     | 31  | 202   |
| Non-ER      | 66  | 62  | 37   | 52  | 222 | 99     | 240 | 94   | 45     | 51  | 968   |

Figure 8: Radar graph comparing emergency region MPs’ discursive preferences with those of MPs from the rest of the Turkey
We can see that ER representatives provided 17.26% of the discourses in the TGNA on the Kurdish question. While ER representatives understandably focused on ExF, SF-VG, and HR, they were critical of foreign countries (For) and pointed to the underdevelopment of their region (Ed-Dev) with the same degree of frequency. Non-ER representatives, on the other hand, focused mainly on For and Sec discourses, paying no more attention to the Ethn, ExF, and SF-VG aspects than they did to Dem and Law.

In terms of the human rights discourse, the TGNA was divided. On the one hand, there was a sub-discourse in which parliamentarians argued that Turkey respected human rights, even of the Iraqis across the border, and on the other hand, a sub-discourse that converged with the critical discourses of the EU Parliament and US Congress. One conservative sub-discourse on human rights focused on the safeguards in the Turkish legal system that prevent torture and other abuses, arguing that it was impossible for such abuses to exist in Turkey. The second conservative sub-discourse pointed to human rights abuses in other countries, asserting that there was nothing wrong with the Turkish approach to the Kurdish question. Further, human rights monitors or organizations were constructed as ‘separatists’ within the conservative discourse, who helped the propaganda activities of the PKK. The primary liberal discourse on human rights criticized the conservative argument that pointed to the legal safeguards in the constitution and argued such that an easy escape prevented any conclusive settlement on identifying the torturers. The second line of liberal discourse argued that torture was systematic and now an everyday occurrence with prisoners and convicts. The third line of liberal discourse criticized the security force’s excuses about torture (either that it was necessary because of security concerns, or a tool to maintain order), arguing for the necessity of establishing governmental institutions that could provide an alternative channel of observation.

Discourses on the democracy aspect of the Kurdish question also showed variance. The first line of liberal discourse focused on the danger of granting electoral rights to the constituents of evacuated villages, arguing in favor of adding them to the constituencies of the cities they had migrated to. A conflict between the liberal and conservative definitions on democracy was also explicit in terms of recognizing Kurds as Kurds. While the liberal line constructed democracy within the context of free expression and recognizing minorities, the conservative discourse on democracy focused on the equality and Turkishness of all citizens. The first line of distinctly conservative arguments favored limiting democracy, since too much of it would lead to the disintegration of the country. The liberal variant of this argument favored debate and free discussion of all ideas (even separatist ones) even though one might not identify with them. The crux of this distinction appears to be the acceptance of two different versions of democracy, one favoring the early-twentieth-century European version, which emphasizes equality and citizenship, and the second adopting the postmodern definition, which emphasizes recognition, political identity, and free expression.

Based on this difference, the Emergency Measures or Emergency Super-governorships were constructed as ‘democratic’ within the conservative discourse (since they tried to establish security equally to all citizens), whereas within the liberal discourse they were considered exceedingly ‘undemocratic’ (since they had bypassed Constitutional rights and engaged in a wide array of counter-terrorism methods, from limiting freedom of expression to authorizing arrests without indictment).

Liberal parliamentarians generally adopted excessive-force discourses. While some parliamentarians constructed security force abuses as ‘state terrorism,’ others constructed it within the context of ‘government incompetence.’ Village burnings were an important topic.
of excessive force arguments. In terms of such burnings, the liberal argument pointed to the utility of villages for PKK needs such as supplies or accommodation, arguing that the PKK would not want villages to be burned, an argument sharply contrasting with the conservative argument that if a village was burned, it was the doing of the PKK. In parliamentarians’ reports on excessive force, quoting or mentioning meetings with regional administrators was an observable trend. While this tendency indirectly showed parliamentarians’ lack of trust in official statements that explained village burnings through PKK violence, it also became a discursive tactic, in which liberal parliamentarians defended their arguments against conservative politicians, who adopted the official state discourse. Liberal parliamentarians generally explained the practice of excessive force by pointing to a lack of communication between super-governors and military branches, as well as within the military branch itself. Moreover, such reports of misconduct generally ended with a statement criticizing decision-making bodies for their disregard of these abuses. While parliamentarians in the liberal line argued that village evacuations benefited the PKK in the long run, they also complained about security forces’ lack of accountability.

The security discourse was another multi-partisan discourse, albeit used more by conservative parliamentarians. One type of argument constructed security within the context of parliamentarians’ obligations towards their constituencies, highlighting the state’s responsibility in providing security. Within this parent-type discourse, military and police chiefs were criticized for their lack of awareness and preparedness, and governing coalitions were told to ‘step down’ if they could not provide security. In defense of security-deficit criticisms, governmental discourses, regardless of the political group, focused on the difficulty of combatting the PKK even in violent incidents. To highlight the difficulties in fighting terrorism, security discourses were also generally supported by statistical data, such as villages or hospitals destroyed by the PKK.

4. Discussion

A comparative analysis of the legislative discourses on an intra-state conflict enables us to see the difference in priorities within each setting with regard to that conflict, as well as each legislature’s culture and tradition with regard to intra-state conflict in general. With regard to the Kurdish question in Turkey, we see from Figure 9 how such priorities compare for five of the most frequent themes: HR, Dem, ExF, Sec, and SF-VG.

Figure 9: Radar graph comparing EP, USC, and TGNA aggregate discursive output over five of the most frequently adopted contexts
The **HR** dimension of the conflict is the primary context of choice within the USC and EP; according to both of these legislatures, the Kurdish question in Turkey was essentially an **HR** problem, which could be solved by providing special status and rights to Turkey’s Kurdish population. These two legislatures parted ways when it came to their second most frequent discursive context; for the USC, the Kurdish problem had an **ExF** secondary dimension, whereas for the EP it was secondarily a **Dem** issue. Predictably, the TGNA had a very different agenda and perception of the issue. There, the Kurdish problem was primarily a **Sec** problem, which could only be solved by military and security forces, specifically by increasing military presence in the ERs and by increasing pressure on the PKK though cross-border raids and airstrikes. Moreover, although not presented in the radar graph above (since this discourse type is not valid for the USC or EP), the Kurdish problem according to the TGNA was primarily caused by foreign countries (**For**), instigated and financed deliberately to partition and destroy Turkey. However, rather counterintuitively, the TGNA also emerged as the most frequent critic of security force and village guard abuses (**SF-VG**) in the south-east. We observe that the EP was quite reluctant to put the blame on Turkish security forces directly, instead *implying* criticism of security institutions. In this respect, the USC was more confrontational with such institutions, mostly because an overwhelming majority of the materiel used by these institutions was American in origin, the export of which depended upon Congressional consent. This finding also explains the second discursive context of choice in the USC, the **ExF** dimension. The EP’s second choice of discursive context (**Dem**) was strongly connected to Turkey’s EU membership process, which is greatly affected by the EU accession (Copenhagen) criteria, requiring the improvement of democratic institutions and practices in a candidate country. It must also be noted that the EP emerged as more sensitive toward Turkey’s right to defend its citizens against the PKK, highlighting the security dimension (**Sec**) more often than criticizing Turkish security forces (**SF-VG**). The USC, by contrast, highlighted the security aspect of the conflict but also criticized Turkish security forces and village guards more frequently than the EP did.

As mentioned earlier, ideology and party affiliation were important factors in legislators’ approaches to the Kurdish question, both in the EP and the TGNA; we also saw that ideology and party affiliation played a very minor role within the USC. A tri-legislatorial comparative analysis of how ideology shaped legislators’ discourses on the Kurdish question reveals the differences of degree between them. Table 17 and Figure 10A show the discursive context used by liberal parties in each legislature as a percentage of their respective aggregate discursive outputs.

### Table 17- Discursive preferences of parties/groups taking a liberal-emancipatory position on the Kurdish question

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>HR</th>
<th>Dem</th>
<th>ExF</th>
<th>SF-VG</th>
<th>Sec</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PSE</td>
<td>34.46%</td>
<td>33.72%</td>
<td>19.18%</td>
<td>2.32%</td>
<td>9.30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GUE-NGL</td>
<td>33.33%</td>
<td>30.70%</td>
<td>26.31%</td>
<td>3.50%</td>
<td>6.14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greens</td>
<td>21.12%</td>
<td>35.21%</td>
<td>26.76%</td>
<td>8.45%</td>
<td>8.45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHP-CHP</td>
<td>18.65%</td>
<td>16.41%</td>
<td>32.83%</td>
<td>18.65%</td>
<td>13.43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senate-D</td>
<td>31.15%</td>
<td>21.85%</td>
<td>18.57%</td>
<td>8.74%</td>
<td>19.67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House-D</td>
<td>37.95%</td>
<td>20.51%</td>
<td>31.79%</td>
<td>6.15%</td>
<td>3.59%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 10: Radar graph comparing (A) liberal-emancipatory parties’/groups’ discursive preferences and (B) discursive priorities of conservative and security-oriented political parties.

Conservative Parties’ discourses
- EPP
- ANAP
- DYP
- TR State

Liberal Parties’ discourses
- PSE
- GUE
- NGL
- Greens
- CHP
- SHP
- CH
- CHP
Perhaps the most important convergence of liberal party discourses within all three legislatures was the low use of the *Sec* discourse. Indeed, with the exception of US Senate Democrats, the security and terrorism aspect of the Kurdish question was not highlighted by liberal parties. It is interesting to see that the GUE-NGL discourses on the Kurdish question accorded almost exactly with Democrats from the US House in terms of *HR* and *ExF* dimensions, whereas the Nordic Left converged with the Green group and the European Socialist group in the EP in terms of the *Dem* dimension. Turkish Social Democrats, by contrast, converged with the Democrats in the US House and, to a lesser extent, with the European Green group and the Nordic Left in terms of *ExF*. With regard to the *HR* aspect, a significant convergence exists between the European Socialists, the Green group, the Nordic Left, and Democrats in both House and the Senate. It is also interesting to see that the Senate Democrats emerged as the most frequent adopter of the *Sec* discourse, followed by Turkish Social Democrats, whereas Democrats in the House used this discourse least.

With regard to conservative/right-wing parties, the trend changes greatly. We can see in Table 18 and Figure 10B that ideology plays a much lesser role in explaining right-wing discourses on the Kurdish question (I have included Turkish state discourse here to compare against other conservative discourses).

Table 18- Discursive preferences of parties/groups that took a conservative and security-oriented stance toward the Kurdish question

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>HR</th>
<th>Dem</th>
<th>ExF</th>
<th>SF-VG</th>
<th>Sec</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EPP-ED</td>
<td>37.28%</td>
<td>23.72%</td>
<td>11.86%</td>
<td>6.78%</td>
<td>20.34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council-Commission</td>
<td>35.85%</td>
<td>22.64%</td>
<td>5.66%</td>
<td>1.89%</td>
<td>33.96%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House-R</td>
<td>32.52%</td>
<td>17.79%</td>
<td>31.90%</td>
<td>7.98%</td>
<td>9.82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANAP</td>
<td>14.29%</td>
<td>14.29%</td>
<td>11.43%</td>
<td>50.48%</td>
<td>9.82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RP</td>
<td>15.09%</td>
<td>14.15%</td>
<td>16.03%</td>
<td>20.75%</td>
<td>33.96%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DYP</td>
<td>19.51%</td>
<td>14.63%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12.19%</td>
<td>53.66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TR State</td>
<td>16.88%</td>
<td>18.18%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>64.94%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Importantly, we find that conservative party performances have very little convergence and each highlights a different aspect of the Kurdish question. Predictably, the Turkish state made greater use of the *Sec* discourse than any conservative source in the TGNA, EP, or USC, with the DYP the most security-oriented political party within Turkey’s political-conservative continuum. It is also worth highlighting that another of Turkey’s center-right parties, the ANAP, emerges as one of the least security-oriented, adopting the *SF-VG* discourse more than other conservative parties did. By contrast, the EPP-ED and European Council and Commission representatives opted for *HR* and *Dem* discourses from a conservative position, while House Republicans emerged as the most vocal critics of Turkey’s excessive-force practices (*ExF*). The RP is perhaps the most ‘balanced’ of Turkey’s conservative parties; although it prioritized *Sec*, it gave voice to *HR*, *Dem*, and *ExF* concerns in equal measure. Interestingly, House Republicans did not appear to have adopted a conservative discourse at all; their emphasis on *HR*, *Dem*, and *ExF* placed them closer to the European Nordic Left.

Therefore, while we can observe a particular discursive trend within liberal politics with regard to the Kurdish question, we cannot observe a similar trend within conservative politics. Most notably in the TGNA, right-wing party discourse accorded less with ideology
than with whether or not the party is in government or opposition. In the EP, conservatives made equal reference to Sec, HR, and Dem issues. We can thus argue that political ideology was a more important variable in left-wing/liberal legislative discourse on conflict because it does not play a clear role in right-wing/conservative discourse; for right-wing parties, agenda was a more important factor in their members’ discourses on the Kurdish question.

5. Conclusion

This study proposes that countries that suffer from intra-state conflicts perceive such conflicts differently than outside observers do. An intra-state conflict is essentially a security or terrorism problem for the country that experiences it. Outside stakeholders, by contrast, tend to view such conflicts within the context of emancipation, including human rights, democratization, and the use of excessive force. In our example, the Kurdish question was defined primarily as a Sec issue by the TGNA, an HR and Dem problem by the EP, and an HR and ExF problem by the USC.

Conspiracy and export of responsibility emerge as interesting features of host-country discourses. Host countries that operate semi-democratic or non-democratic political systems, where dissent and opposition cannot find channels of expression, tend to fail to grasp the full extent and demand of their internal conflicts. This situation leads to state failure on a smaller scale, where the state is able to maintain security and authority occasionally but fails to conclusively settle its domestic problem and incorporate its demands into its political system. Such conflicts, when violent, generate a fog of war, in which the host country’s government fails to address the measure necessary to end the conflict and turns to conspiracy instead. The “dark foreign powers” argument used in this case represents the Turkish equivalent of such conspiracy and an export of responsibility. Inability to politically or militarily address the full extent of such conflicts forces host countries to blame an indeterminate number of vague outsiders and leads to the emergence of a new political sense of inferiority as the host country diverts public opinion away from blaming the government and toward a cloud of external influences.

The transnational comparison of political ideologies yields some insights into the ‘order versus emancipation’ debate on conflicts: political conservatism tends to define domestic conflicts within the Sec realm, whereas political liberalism chooses emancipatory frameworks such as HR and Dem. The argument made here is that agenda rather than political ideology explains why politicians view intra-state conflicts differently. Agenda items differ across political systems and affect how politicians are connected to a particular intra-state conflict. In our case, Turkish politicians were linked to the Kurdish question by their constituent city and based on whether they were representing Kurds or not. In the EP, an MEP’s country affiliation and that country’s relations with Turkey, together with whether that country has a large Kurdish Diaspora, comprised the MEP’s agenda considerations. In the USC, membership in the Human Rights, Armenian, or Hellenic caucus mainly determined a congressperson’s approach to the Kurdish question.

Methodologically, this study adds to the existing attempts at bridging quantitative and discourse realms in conflict analysis and attempts to make the case for the higher explanatory value of long-term quantitative discourse analysis. While the existing literature bridges this methodological gap in the field of linguistics and political philosophy, a working model is offered here for the study of long-term conflict perception/expression dynamics and data
collection, evaluation, and synthesis. The same model could be used to explore conflict discourse dynamics in other protracted conflicts, such as the Israel-Palestine or Russia-Chechnya cases, where legislatures reveal much about the political culture within which they operate.

**Bibliography**


The Politics of Effective Aid and Interstate Conflict

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Abstract

The link between foreign aid and military conflict has received little attention in both aid effectiveness and interstate conflict research. This study provides a first-cut analysis of the impact of foreign aid on interstate conflict among recipient countries. In doing so, it opens the black box of state and builds on the previous research in the aid effectiveness literature and on the signaling processes in the conflict literature. Previous research indicates that the effectiveness of aid in improving citizen welfare is conditional on the presence of democratic institutions. This study shows that this conditional relationship has a detrimental effect on crisis bargaining outcomes. Foreign aid, on the one hand, increases citizen welfare in democratic regimes; hence, also governments’ ex-ante re-election prospects. On the other hand, foreign aid retards government ability to generate audience costs and to send informative signals to their opponents. Analyzing all dyads from 1961 to 2001 yields robust support for this view. As aid inflows increase, targets’ resistance propensity against threats issued by democratic governments becomes statistically indistinguishable from threats issued by autocratic governments. Moreover, democratic states are not significantly more peaceful to each other than non-democratic pairs once we take into account the amount of foreign aid they receive.

Keywords: Democracy, aid effectiveness, audience costs, interstate conflicts

1. Introduction

Foreign aid has been among the “real innovations which the modern age has introduced into the practice of foreign policy,” according to Hans Morgenthau.1 This innovation in the developing world constitutes a large claim on government budgets. For many, foreign aid constitutes a significant part, on average ten percent, of the average recipient’s national income. With this amount, aid has been used as an interesting tool of change in recipient countries. It is also a focal point of debate and an issue of contention in academic and policy circles alike. Preoccupied with foreign aid’s effect on economic growth,2 democratization,3

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civil war\(^4\) and many other areas, economists and political scientists have paid much less attention to other potentially important dimensions of aid’s effect on recipient countries, particularly its effect on interstate conflicts.

Foreign aid, unlike other explanatory parameters of interstate conflict, is a highly flexible tool for policy making. This flexibility in character may do as much harm as good to recipient countries, as it creates a higher level of responsibility for policy makers, as well as a need for a broad understanding of whether, where, and how foreign aid is effective in promoting peace or war among recipient countries. Moreover, many studies in various research programs within political science and economics have suggested the use of aid to improve conditions related to their variables of interest without paying specific attention to how aid intake in itself changes the value of other important variables. This study criticizes this frictionless conception of foreign aid and analyzes how aid receipt induces a change in various domestic actors’ behaviors, which in turn translates into foreign policy outcomes.

To date, only a few studies analyze foreign aid’s effect on interstate conflicts, and they focus on how foreign aid affects a recipient’s conflict behavior toward a donor.\(^5\) The link between aid and interstate peace among recipient countries receives almost no attention, save for some mention by area specialists,\(^6\) and has not been analyzed through large-N analysis. Moreover, although previous analyses\(^7\) stress a supply-specific effect of aid on interstate peace and employ donor motives as a main driving force of peace, how foreign aid enters into the state machine and produces foreign policy outcomes for recipient countries with differing domestic structures is not well known. In addition, an extensive literature developed in recent years indicates foreign aid’s tenure-prolonging effect for recipient governments.\(^8\) The impact of foreign aid on domestic power balances, hence, requires going beyond a supply-specific approach, and calling for a second-image explanation of how varying domestic factors condition the use of aid, which in turn affects leaders’ decisions during crisis bargaining. It is the intent of this study to fill this identified gap in the literature. In doing so, this paper juxtaposes the domestic politics and foreign policy nexus by interweaving insights from various areas of comparative politics, international security, and international political economy.

The remainder of this study is structured as follows: The next section reviews previous research on the politics of effective aid. Section 3 develops the theoretical model. Section 4 constructs the procedures for creating a suitable setting for testing the proposed theory.


\(^7\) Polachek, Robst, and Chang, “Liberalism and Interdependence”; Hurlburt, “Gaining Leverage for International Organizations”; Lasensky, “Chequebook Diplomacy”.

Section 5 presents the results of the empirical enquiry. The concluding section focuses on the broader implications of the study.

2. Politics as a Friction on Aid Effectiveness

Since Griffin and Enos’ influential analysis of how aid affects growth in receiving countries, a large literature has developed over whether, how, and why aid affects various economic phenomena such as growth, quality of life, inequality, and poverty in target countries. Since then, aid effectiveness has been an issue of contention among scholars, and the literature has been divided into two broad camps: aid optimists and aid pessimists. Griffin and Enos’ findings of a negative bivariate correlation between foreign aid and growth were later overturned by Gulati, who finds a significant positive relationship with a better sample (almost doubling the size of country coverage). Boone’s highly influential study raises the bar both by increasing country coverage to 96, and year coverage to 21 (1971-1990), as well as accounting for the effect of aid in countries with different political regime types, and finds a null effect of aid on investment and growth. Since then, responses (what we today call aid effectiveness literature) to Boone’s influential work constitute two main strands: an orthodox economic approach, which analyzes aid-growth nexus, and a politics approach, which conditions effectiveness to the compatible interests of domestic political actors. In the first strand, scholars utilize/develop cutting-edge econometric models, generating new data to show aid has a positive, null, or negative effect on the well-being of people in recipient countries. The politics approach focuses on incentives facing the key decision makers in recipient countries and assesses aid effectiveness using various important dependent variables such as economic growth, quality of life, poverty alleviation, and inequality reduction. Although this literature does not address foreign aid’s effect on interstate war, it has insights on how aid directly and indirectly affects political leaders’ incentives, which in turn, affect the conflict behavior of recipient countries. Previous research within this literature finds that aid effectiveness in promoting economic growth, poverty alleviation, and quality of life in recipient countries is conditional on the presence of democratic institutions; whereas in autocratic countries, aid is highly fungible and used for economically non-productive goals.

Building on Boone’s analysis and correcting errors in his model specification, Svensson argues that the effect of aid on economic growth depends on the accountability of government officials.
In a conceptual model, he shows that governments’ incentives are shaped by the degree of political accountability in a polity. Where governments are accountable to their voters, they risk defeat if they divert aid resources to policies that are valuable to the government but not to voters. As accountability increases, governments must use aid resources for productive public investment in order to remain in office. In the alternative scenario, where accountability is low, governments’ optimal strategy is to divert resources to areas that only benefit its members. The results of empirical analyses show that as a regime becomes more democratic, aid has an increasingly positive impact on growth. Similarly, Kosack finds that aid is effective and significantly increases quality of life in democracies; whereas it is ineffective and potentially harmful in autocracies. Kosack argues that the tendency of democratic governments to meet the popular demands of their constituents will have no discernible effect on quality of life if the country is poor and not receiving foreign aid. If a democratic government has sufficient resources, its investments in quality of life will translate into better living standards for voters. In contrast, for autocracies, aid is ineffective in enhancing quality of life and may even have an adverse effect. Isham et al. find that World Bank-financed government investment projects are more likely to be effective in countries with strong civil liberties. They argue that the freedom of dissent and criticism and citizens’ ability to organize protests facilitate greater citizen voice and hence more-effective government policies. Bjella shows aid effectiveness with a different dependent variable: poverty alleviation. She notes that not only accountability, but also political inclusiveness affects whether aid is used as a means to improve living conditions within the recipient countries. Building on the selectorate theory, Bjella shows that aid is more effective in democracies than in autocracies because the leaders of the former rely predominantly on the provision of public goods to remain in office, which necessitates the use of aid money for poverty alleviation; whereas leaders of the latter seek to distribute private goods to key supporters in order to remain in office. However, whether aid is effective or fungible has important implications on how leaders make foreign policy, which I elaborate in the next section.

3. Aid Effectiveness as a Friction in Crisis Bargaining

War is costly and risky; yet, it recurs. Given its costs and risks, rational actors should be able to locate a negotiated settlement preferable to the gamble of war. As long as there are costs to fighting, war is ex-post inefficient because parties in a dispute could be better off if they achieve the same outcome through negotiation. Fearon, however, shows that rational leaders may not be able to reach a mutually preferable negotiated settlement due to private information about relative capabilities or resolve as well as the parties’ incentives to misrepresent this information. This means that leaders know their own resolve and their capabilities but are uncertain about their opponent’s willingness to fight and their capabilities.

20 Svensson, “Aid, Growth and Democracy”.
21 Kosack, “Effective Aid”.
23 Bjella, “Democracy and Foreign Aid”.
Given this uncertainty, both parties have incentives to misrepresent their capabilities and resolve to get a better deal on the table; that is, they may exaggerate their true willingness or capability to fight and hide their vulnerabilities. These incentives create disagreements about parties’ relative capabilities. Hence, states face a dilemma: Normal forms of diplomatic communication will prove useless to reach a mutually preferable bargaining outcome because these methods do not lift the uncertainty about parties’ true preferences. Schelling suggests that the central way leaders address this dilemma is by making their threats credible through costly signals. He summarizes the essence of costly signaling as the “irreversible sacrifice of freedom of choice,” in other words, the power to communicate informative signals to an opponent depends on one’s ability to issue a threat that carries high costs for failure to follow through. That is, backing down from a previous threat that meets resistance is associated with a cost at least as large as the cost of war for the issuing party. As a result, a more credible signal brings better information, which in turn increases the likelihood that the dispute is resolved on the table rather than in a battle.

The audience-cost theory suggests that leaders in democratic regimes can send informative signals and allow their opponents to learn their resolve by making public threats in international crises. They do so by tying their own hands through public threats, which makes backing down a costly option because of the domestic audience’s ability to punish leaders who are caught bluffing. As a result, the domestic political structure influences leaders’ abilities to signal their willingness to fight and to make credible threats against their opponents by putting their own tenure at stake. This situation leads to the substantial conclusion that democracies can signal their willingness to fight to other states more credibly than authoritarian states can, which explains the separate peace we observe between democracies.

In Fearon’s model, audience costs are exogenous and they can take any mechanism that may increase the domestic political cost of retreat once a challenge is issued, because failure to follow through on a threat gives the opposition an opportunity to deplore the international loss of credibility, face, or honor. However, the fact that leaders misrepresent their resolve and issue a challenge they may not follow through on is done to derive greater benefit on behalf of the domestic audience; a successful bluff means higher benefits for the audience as a whole. As a result, there is no rational incentive for the audience to punish; hence, the threat issued by those leaders should not separate them from unresolved types. In turn, a peaceful solution cannot be the equilibrium. So the question turns to reasons for the audience to punish leaders caught bluffing. Why should backing down result in punishment? Smith suggests that citizens want to retain competent leaders and thus remove incompetent ones. The domestic audience uses crisis bargaining outcomes as a signal of the leader’s competence, and since

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29 Audience-cost theory provides answers to two fundamental puzzles about the nature of crisis bargaining: (1) it explains what makes threats costly to issue, hence, their rarity, and (2) it shows why some states leave the bargaining table for the battlefield and prefer war despite its ex-post inefficiency. This logic has been so influential that it is also applied to issue areas such as central bank independence, economic disputes, and economic sanctions. See, J. Lawrence Broz, “Political System Transparency and Monetary Commitment Regimes,” *International Organization* 56, no. 4 (2002): 861-87; Marc L. Busch, “Democracy, Consultation, and the Paneling of Disputes under GATT,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 44, no. 4 (2000): 425-46; Han Dorussen and Jongryn Mo, “Ending Economic Sanctions Audience Costs and Rent-Seeking as Commitment Strategies,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45, no. 4 (2001): 395-426.
following through on a threat is less costly for a competent leader, those who do not carry out their threats signal incompetence. This main conclusion, however, is not without a caveat. Leaders with high ex-ante probability of re-election will have difficulty generating audience costs. Hence, citizens’ positive bias toward a leader decreases her ability to tie hands, and thus, diminishes her ability to send costly signals to opponents.32

Juxtaposing these insights with those in the aid effectiveness literature allows us to address how foreign aid shapes the incentives facing leaders in the domestic arena and how this situation leads to changes in outcomes during crisis bargaining. Aid scholars show that aid effectiveness in promoting economic growth,33 poverty alleviation,34 and quality of life35 in recipient countries is conditional on the presence of democratic institutions. These findings in the aid effectiveness literature have important implications for audience cost and democratic peace. Foreign aid effectiveness sends strong signals about a leader’s competence in improving citizen welfare, hence, increases her ex-ante chances of re-election.36 This creates problems for foreign policy in general and interstate crises in particular: As citizens’ perception of their government’s competence increases in areas other than the current dispute during peace years, the government continues to stay in power until this surplus increase in the competence of the leader is undone through serious foreign policy failures. As a result, given the surplus increase in ex-ante re-election probabilities, aid-recipient democratic governments will have difficulty generating credible threats. As a result, as the amount of aid increases, the ability of leaders in democratic regimes to send informative signals is likely to decrease, hence, foreign aid is likely to retard leaders’ ability to commit themselves to following through on previous threats.

Hypothesis 1: Foreign aid decreases the ability of democratic regimes to generate audience costs.

Hence, when a state is targeted by a democratic initiator, we should observe that the targeted state will be less likely to resist that challenge compared to a challenge issued by a non-democratic state. As the amount of aid to the initiator increases, the targeted state should not be less likely to resist a challenge issued by a democratic initiator. The main implication of this deduction is profound: As aid flows increase, democracies lose the informational advantage, which audience-cost theorists argue is responsible for democratic peace.

Hypothesis 2: Foreign-aid-recipient democracies are not significantly more peaceful to each other.

In the next section, I explain the procedures for a test of these two hypotheses on audience costs and interstate conflict onset.

4. Research Design

4.1. Audience cost

Given that the first hypothesis focuses on the role of aid on audience-cost generation, I assess the role of foreign aid on dispute reciprocation through a directed-dyadic level of analysis.

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33 Svensson, “Aid, Growth and Democracy”.
34 Bjella, “Democracy and Foreign Aid”.
35 Kosack, “Effective Aid”.
36 Kono and Montinola, “Does Foreign Aid Support Autocrats, Democrats, or Both?”, Licht, “Coming into Money”.

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In this setting, the implications of the hypothesis are two-fold: Democratic states face less resistance once they initiate a conflict. However, as aid flows to the democratic initiator increase, we should observe an insignificant relationship between democracy and resistance behavior by the targets. To test this hypothesis, I investigate the impact of foreign aid on targets’ reciprocation propensity for the period 1961 to 2001. Given the hypothesis is related to the potential behavior of a target once it is challenged, I use a sample of cases where an initiator challenged the status quo and I analyze the target’s behavior depending on the regime type of the initiator and the amount of aid it receives. As a result, the dependent variable is whether the target state chooses to resist the initiator’s challenge. Following Schultz, I code the dependent variable as 1 if the target reciprocates a given challenge in kind or escalating the dispute to a fatal battle or full-scale warfare, and as 0 if the target takes no militarized action.37 The data for reciprocation is acquired from the Correlates of War project.38

4.1.1. Foreign aid

Foreign aid is the disbursed amount of net official development assistance and official aid (constant 2009 US$) for each country for any given year, and data is acquired from the World Bank. To avoid biases that may be a result of the list-wise deletion method, I follow several imputation rules: If countries have missing data for the entire period of analysis, I treat these as MNAR (missing not at random) and impute them with a 0, assuming that these countries received no aid for the entire period. Next, I treat the remaining missing data as MCAR (missing completely at random) and interpolate between missing observations. To account for the role of foreign aid in altering the actor’s pay-off from negotiation and conflict, I introduce aid variables in terms of per capita and as a percentage of GDP. For example, we cannot think the same amount of aid has the same impact in a country like Kenya, with a population around USD 40 million and GDP around USD 70 billion, and in a country like Niger, with a population around USD 15 million and GDP around USD 15 billion. The data for population and GDP are acquired from Gleditsch.39 To account for the potential endogeneity between conflict and foreign aid and the underlying lagged effect of foreign aid on conflict behavior, I incorporate a lag structure in all models. Following the standard employed in other conflict studies, I lag all independent variables by one year.

4.1.2. Regime type

The reciprocation model includes a variable, DemocracyI, indicating whether an initiator is democratic or not. I also include a variable, DemocracyT, indicating whether a target is democratic or not, as well as another variable, Both Democratic, indicating whether both the initiator and the target are democratic or not. The data for regime type comes from the Polity IV dataset,40 which ranges from -10 to 10; a state is coded as democratic if it achieves a score of 6 or higher in the composite index.

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4.1.3. Control variables
Following the practices in the literature,\textsuperscript{41} I also consider various other factors relating to reciprocation behavior: I create three dummy variables to account for relative military power, \textit{Major Power-Major Power}, which is coded as 1 if both states in a dyad are major powers; \textit{Major Power-Minor Power}, which is coded as 1 if the initiator is a major power and the target is not; and \textit{Minor Power-Major Power}, which is coded as 1 if the initiator is not a major power but the target is. Reciprocation is not meaningful if the initiator cannot reach the target. Thus, I include \textit{Distance}, measuring inter-capital proximity, and \textit{Contiguity}, a measure that equals 1 if two states are directly contiguous by land or water. I also account for the presence of an alliance between the initiator and the challenger. Moreover, I control for the nature of the demand made by the initiator; hence, I code whether the demand involves a revision of the territorial status quo, a policy, the target’s regime type or government, or something else. For each revision type, I include four dummy variables: \textit{Territory}, \textit{Policy}, \textit{Government or Regime}, and \textit{Other}. Data for major power status, distance, contiguity, and revision types are generated by EUGene Software 3.204.\textsuperscript{42}

4.2. Interstate peace
Given that the second hypothesis concerns the role of aid inflows on democratic peace, I assess the role of foreign aid on conflict onset at a non-directed dyadic level. Following the implications of \textit{Hypothesis 1}, the implications of \textit{Hypothesis 2} are two-fold. Two democratic states should be peaceful towards one another. However, as aid inflows increase in a given pair, the informational advantage of democratic pairs should disappear; hence, democracy should have an insignificant effect on conflict onset. In order to analyze the implications of the theory on conflict onset, I utilize three measures of conflict onset: the Correlates of War project’s definition of militarized interstate disputes (MIDs), Fatal MIDS (MIDs with at least one battle-related death), and the International Crisis Behavior project’s definition of interstate crisis.

4.2.1. Foreign aid
Similar to the reciprocation analyses, I utilize two operationalizations of foreign aid, \textit{Aid Per Capita} and \textit{Aid/GDP}. The non-directed dyadic implications of the hypothesis are, however, different: Consider two democratic states \(S_i\) and \(S_j\). \(S_j\) receives less aid than \(S_i\) does. Hence, the leader of \(S_j\) can increase the welfare of her fellow citizens better than the leader of \(S_i\). In this case, \(S_j\) sends more-informative signals to \(S_i\) than \(S_i\) to \(S_j\) does. The quality of the signal in a given pair decreases as \(S_j\) starts to receive more aid, given that \(S_j\) still receives more aid than \(S_i\). As a result, following the weak-link assumption, aid variables indicate the lowest aid inflows in a given pair: \textit{Aid per Capita}_{L} and \textit{Aid/GDP}_{L}.\textsuperscript{43}

4.2.2. Dyadic regime
The models also include \textit{Democracy}_{L}, the smaller democracy score in a dyad.\textsuperscript{44} The data

\textsuperscript{41} Detailed justifications and operationalizations of these control variables can be reviewed elsewhere, e.g. Schultz, “Do Democratic Institutions Constrain or Inform?”


\textsuperscript{44} Dixon, “Democracy and the Peaceful Settlement”.
The Politics of... comes from the Polity IV dataset and the variable ranges from -10 to 10.\textsuperscript{45} Larger values of this variable indicate a higher democracy score for both members of a dyad. Moreover, to account for the conflict-inducing effect of regime distance, the model includes \textit{Regime Difference}, calculated as the absolute value of the difference between the higher and smaller democracy score in a dyad. This operationalization is adopted over the standard higher democracy score in a dyad – \textit{Democracy}_H – because \textit{Democracy}_H conflates both the allegedly conflict-dampening impact of joint democracy and the conflict-exacerbating impact of political distance, making it difficult to distinguish between the competing processes. Moreover, \textit{Democracy}_H implies that if the regime difference is 0, that is, the democracy scores for state A and B are identical, countries will be more conflict prone as they democratize. This implication obviously contradicts the core hypothesis that the more democratic two countries are, the more likely peace exists between them.

\textbf{4.2.3. Control variables}

\textit{Capability Ratio}, defined as the natural logarithm of weaker states’ capabilities (composed of military, economic, and demographic capabilities by computing each state’s average share of system-wide capability) in relation to the stronger state’s capabilities, is included to account for the distribution of capabilities, as power preponderance deters conflict, while equal distribution increases the risks of conflict.\textsuperscript{46} The models also take into account the dramatic growth in the number of sovereign nations since WWII. In addition, a conflict is unthinkable if at least one state cannot reach the other. Thus, I include \textit{Distance}, measuring inter-capital proximity, and \textit{Contiguity}, a measure that equals 1 if two states are directly contiguous by land. For the same reason, I add \textit{Major Power} status, coded as 1 if a dyad includes at least one great power. The data for the Polity IV score, number of states, capability ratio, contiguity, distance, and major power status are generated by EUGene Software 3.204.\textsuperscript{47}

\textbf{5. Results}

\textbf{5.1. Audience cost}

The empirical analyses reveal strong evidence that foreign aid reduces leader ability to generate audience costs. As the amount of aid received by a state increases, the disputes it initiates do not systematically differ from those initiated by autocratic states. I begin by examining the rate at which democracies face resistance once they initiate a MID. The Correlates of War dataset records 971 disputes between 1961 and 2001. In 450 of these cases, the targets reciprocated in kind or escalated the dispute to a higher hostility level (46.3\% of total cases). In 521 cases, the targets took no recordable action (53.6\% of total cases). The democratic advantage becomes visible when we compare the percentage of targets who reciprocated against democratic initiators and the percentage of those who reciprocated against non-democratic initiators. There were 361 democratic initiators and only 36.8\% of these initiators faced resistance by their targets. This quantity for non-democracies is 51.9\%. As a result, we clearly see that democratic regimes are less likely to face resistance from their targets than non-democratic regimes. However, when we take into account the foreign aid received by

\textsuperscript{45} Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr, \textit{Polity IV Project}.
\textsuperscript{47} Bennett and Stam III, “EUGene.”
the initiator state, a dramatic pattern surfaces. Figure 1 plots the percentage of reciprocation by distinguishing whether the initiator is democratic or non-democratic and an aid recipient or not an aid recipient based on a cut-off of Aid/GDP being equal to or greater than 1%. The light gray bars show the percentage of reciprocation against aid-recipient initiators and the dark gray bars show the percentage of reciprocation against non-aid-recipient initiators. The difference between non-aid-recipient democracies and the other three categories is evident: Non-aid-recipient democracies faced resistance only in 31.5% of cases, whereas aid-recipient democracies faced resistance from their targets in 61.9% of cases. On the other hand, the difference between non-democracies that received aid and those that did not is not as high: Disputes initiated by aid-recipient non-democracies were reciprocated 55.4% of the time, whereas those initiated by non-aid-recipient democracies were reciprocated at a rate of 49.9%. As we can see, non-aid-recipient democratic initiators are starkly different from the other three categories, whose threats face similar resistance rates by their targets.

![Figure 1: Percentage of Dispute Reciprocation by Aid Status and Regime Type](image)

**Notes:** Light gray indicates reciprocation rates for aid-recipient states in the sample. Dark gray indicates reciprocation rates for non-aid-recipient states.

Controlling for potential confounders is important to partial out the effect of foreign aid on the ability of democracies’ audience-cost generation. For one thing, the observed relationship might be driven by factors that may complicate the causal relationship in a way that the observed relationship has nothing to do with audience-cost generation. As a result, I include various control variables utilized in the audience-cost literature: major power status, distance, contiguity, and alliance between the initiator and the target, as well as the nature of the revision sought by the initiator. I test the hypothesis with multiple regressions. Given that the dependent variable, reciprocation, is dichotomous, I employ a logit model.

Table 1 reports the empirical results of analyzing all the reciprocation behavior of targets over the period 1961 to 2001. As the model includes an interaction term, the coefficients are not illuminating on their own, and we have to calculate substantively meaningful marginal effects and standard errors for each specification. Following the practice suggested by Kam

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[48] Schultz, “Do Democratic Institutions Constrain or Inform?”
and Franzese, I report the effect initiator regime type on reciprocation at different values of Aid per Capita and Aid/GDP. In calculating the marginal effect of democracy on different values of aid on the probability of reciprocation, I set all other variables to their observed values. The observed-value approach varies only the parameters of interest, while keeping the other variables at their observed values, and averages out the political quantities of interest. Moreover, to calculate the uncertainty around these estimates, I create 1000 simulations of the probability of dispute initiation to approximate the distribution of the marginal effect of regime type at different levels of aid flows.

Table 1-Foreign Aid, Democracy, and the Probability of Dispute Reciprocation, 1961-2001±

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aid per Capita</td>
<td>-0.04 (0.02)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy * Aid per Capita</td>
<td>0.080 (0.03) ***</td>
<td>-0.02 (0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aid/GDP</td>
<td>-0.02 (0.03) **</td>
<td>0.09 (0.03) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy * Aid/GDP</td>
<td>-0.26 (0.21) **</td>
<td>0.06 (0.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>-0.13 (0.20)</td>
<td>-0.18 (0.20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both Democratic</td>
<td>-0.35 (0.32)</td>
<td>-0.30 (0.32)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

International Controls

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contiguity</td>
<td>0.87 (0.21) ***</td>
<td>0.84 (0.21) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance</td>
<td>0.10 (0.09)</td>
<td>0.11 (0.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance</td>
<td>0.41 (0.17) **</td>
<td>0.39 (0.17) **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Power – Major Power</td>
<td>-1.20 (0.51) **</td>
<td>-1.17 (0.51) **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Power – Minor Power</td>
<td>0.25 (0.28)</td>
<td>0.29 (0.28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minor Power – Major Power</td>
<td>-0.11 (0.27)</td>
<td>-0.12 (0.27)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Revision Type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Territory</td>
<td>0.12 (0.22)</td>
<td>0.11 (0.22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy</td>
<td>-1.20 (0.19) ***</td>
<td>-1.21 (0.19) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government or Regime</td>
<td>-0.08 (0.34)</td>
<td>-0.08 (0.34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>-1.29 (0.36) ***</td>
<td>-1.30 (0.36) ***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Intercept | -0.65 (0.70) | -0.76 (0.69) |

Observations | 971 | 971 |
Pseudo R² | 0.13 | 0.13 |
Log Likelihood | -580 | -580 |

± Standard errors corrected for clustering by dyad are in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10.

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Confirming the descriptive statistics presented in Figure 1, we observe that if a democratic state does not receive foreign aid, the disputes it initiates are significantly less likely to face resistance by the target. More substantively, if a state does not receive aid, a change in regime type from non-democratic to democratic decreases the probability of a reciprocation by 26% (Model 1 in Table 1) and by 21% (Model 2 in Table 1). However, as aid to a state increases, reciprocation behavior ceases to be different between democratic and non-democratic challengers, confirming the robustness of the bivariate relationship presented in Figure 1 to the inclusion of various control variables.

To summarize, for foreign aid to be effective in promoting aid growth, poverty alleviation, and improving quality of life, the presence of democratic institutions is essential. However, the very quality that increases aid effectiveness has important consequences during crisis bargaining: Foreign aid decreases the ex-ante probability of leader removal, hence, this surplus decrease due to aid makes it difficult to convince the target that the government’s re-election is at stake if it fails to follow through on its threat. This finding implies that the issued threat has no informational value for the target to distinguish resolved-type challengers from non-resolved types. As a result, both parties’ incentives to extract a larger concession on the table will prevent them from reaching a mutually preferable negotiated settlement. Thus, democratic states are not more peaceful to each other than other types of pairs as the aid flows they receive increase.

I now turn to the implications of the study for interstate peace.

5.2. Interstate peace

The results presented in Table 2 provide strong support for Hypothesis 2. Model 1 and Model 2 in Table 2 analyze the impact of foreign aid on the likelihood of an onset of all types of MIDs for the period 1961-2001. Militarized interstate disputes involve explicit threats,

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53 Kono and Montinola, “Does Foreign Aid Support Autocrats, Democrats, or Both?”; Licht, “Coming into Money.”
54 Slantzhev, “Politicians, the Media, and Domestic Audience Costs.”
55 I also conducted analyses using the Heckman selection model. These results are highly similar to those reported in Table 1, and they are available upon request.
displays, or actual uses of military force. As the logistic regression coefficients are not illuminating on their own, Figure 3 reports the predicted probability of a MID onset in year $t+1$ by setting all other variables to their observed values. As evident in Figure 3, the marginal effect of changing the regime type of both states from the lowest democracy score (-10) to the highest democracy score (10) significantly decreases the probability of a MID onset by 20.6% in Model 1 and by 16.9% in Model 2 if both states do not receive foreign aid and if we set all other variables at their observed values. Holding aid at 0, the same amount of shift in Democracy, decreases the conflict propensity of the dyad by around 48% when we consider the most conflict-prone scenario. However, as aid received by both states increases, the effect of democracy on the probability of a MID onset becomes statistically indistinguishable from 0, as predicted by Hypothesis 2.

Table 2- Foreign Aid, Regime Type and the Probability of a Conflict Onset, 1961-2001±

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Militarized Interstate Disputes</th>
<th>Fatal Militarized Interstate Disputes</th>
<th>International Crises</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aid per Capita</td>
<td>Aid/GDP</td>
<td>Aid per Capita</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model 1</td>
<td>Aid per Capita</td>
<td>Aid/GDP</td>
<td>Aid per Capita</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aid per Capita</td>
<td>-0.03***</td>
<td>-0.04*</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy × Aid per Capita</td>
<td>0.01***</td>
<td>0.01***</td>
<td>0.01***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative Capability</td>
<td>-0.04***</td>
<td>0.06**</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Power</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.02**</td>
<td>0.06***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contiguity</td>
<td>-0.16***</td>
<td>-0.16***</td>
<td>-0.17**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of States</td>
<td>1.66***</td>
<td>1.71***</td>
<td>1.48***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.20)</td>
<td>(0.20)</td>
<td>(0.43)</td>
<td>(0.41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance</td>
<td>2.80***</td>
<td>2.76***</td>
<td>4.49***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.26)</td>
<td>(0.25)</td>
<td>(0.42)</td>
<td>(0.39)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R²</td>
<td>0.347</td>
<td>0.346</td>
<td>0.375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log Likelihood</td>
<td>-4320</td>
<td>-4315</td>
<td>-1044</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

± Standard errors corrected for clustering by dyad are in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10. Peace years and cubic spline variables, calculated for disputes back to the start of the Cold War in 1947, are not shown for reasons of space.

Audience-cost theory indicates that democracies can communicate resolve to each other without resorting to an actual fight. Hence, a reduction in audience-cost generation capacity is more relevant for bargaining failure if we observe an outcome that involves battle-related fatalities rather than ones involving only an exchange of explicit threats. As a result, to increase the leverage in testing the theoretical dependent variable, Table 3 adopts an alternative operationalization of conflict. Rather than analyzing all MID types, it analyzes the conflicts that result in battle-related fatalities: Fatal MIDs. Shifting attention to Fatal MIDs also allows us to avoid biases in MID reporting. For example, the media may be more likely to report non-fatal MIDs occurring in Europe than those occurring in Central Asia. However, if a MID involves at least one battle-related death, it is less likely to go unannounced in the international media regardless of its geographic location. Moreover, testing Hypothesis 2 in the context of Fatal MIDs serves as an additional robustness check for the findings reported here so far.57

Models 3 and 4 in Table 2 replicate the first two models, except the dependent variable is now Fatal MIDs. The results reported using Fatal MIDs also confirm the findings in the specification using MIDs of all levels. Figure 4 presents the impact of the relationship between aid and dyadic democracy on the probability of a Fatal MID onset. As evident in Figure 4, the marginal effect of changing the regime type of both states from highly autocratic (-10) to highly democratic (10) significantly decreases the probability of a Fatal MID onset by 10.7% in Model 3 and by 7.6% in Model 4 if both states do not receive foreign aid. However, as the amount of foreign aid allocated to both states within the pair increases, the effect of democracy on the probability of a violent conflict onset becomes statistically indistinguishable from 0.

57 The implications of the theoretical framework, despite additional analyses provided on reciprocation behavior, might mimic the influential finding that democracy has a pacifying effect only if the members of a pair are both above a certain wealth threshold. See, Michael Mousseau, Håvard Hegre, and John R. Oneal, “How the Wealth of Nations Conditions the Liberal Peace,” European Journal of International Relations 9, no. 2 (2003): 277-314. Hence, I control for Development*Democracy as an additional robustness check. The findings remain highly similar to those reported in Table 2 and they are available upon request.
Figure 4: Foreign Aid, Regime Type, and Fatal Military Inter-State Dispute Onset

Notes: The figures present the marginal effect of changing regime type from a non-democracy to a democracy on the probability of a fatal dispute onset at different values of foreign aid and the corresponding 95% confidence intervals. The quantities of interest are extracted from Table 2, Model 3, and Model 4 by setting all other variables to their observed values.

One last point warrants discussion: The Correlates of War project does not distinguish between conflicts that are intentionally initiated by key decision makers from those initiated without the direct authorization of the government, that is, those initiated by low-rank military officials operating at borders. Even though MID and Fatal MID record the non-authorized category as a conflict onset, the logic of audience-cost theory begs a more nuanced research design that allows analyzing conflicts that are intentionally initiated or escalated by the respective governments. Fortunately, the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) project’s dataset on interstate crises allows us to disentangle the conflicts initiated by key decision makers from those initiated by others. For the ICB project, a crisis occurs when key decision makers in a state “perceive a threat to one or more basic values, along with an awareness of finite time for response to the value threat and a heightened probability of involvement in military hostilities.” In addition to its value in testing the empirical implications of audience-cost theory, Hewitt suggests that when theories are supported in both MID and ICB settings, the results can be viewed more confidently and not as a function of any idiosyncrasies in one particular conceptualization, which further ensures result robustness across various definitions of conflict.

Hence, Models 5 and 6 go beyond MID and adopt the ICB project’s definition of crisis onset. The results are starkly similar to those reported in Models 1 to 4. All the variables have the expected signs and significance levels. Figure 5 presents the impact of the relationship between foreign aid and a dyadic democracy on ICB crises. As evident, changing Democracy from its minimum to maximum significantly decreases the probability of a crisis onset by 9.3% in Model 5 and 8% in Model 6 if both members of the dyad do not receive foreign aid. However, as the amount of foreign aid allocated to both states within the pair increases, the effect of Democracy on the probability of a violent conflict onset becomes statistically indistinguishable from 0.

The implications of the theoretical framework, despite additional analyses provided on reciprocation behavior, might mimic the influential finding that democracy has a pacifying effect only if the members of a pair are both above a certain wealth threshold. See, Michael Mousseau, Håvard Hegre, and John R. Oneal, “How the Wealth of Nations Conditions the Liberal Peace,” European Journal of International Relations 9, no. 2 (2003): 277-314. Hence, I control for Development*Democracy as an additional robustness check. The findings remain highly similar to those reported in Table 2 and they are available upon request.
6. Conclusions

I began this study by recognizing that foreign aid, unlike the vast majority of explanatory variables used in conflict studies, is highly flexible for policy making. Therefore, scholars in the aid effectiveness literature as well as policy makers have focused on directing foreign aid to improve certain independent variables such as economic growth and poverty and inequality alleviation. In doing so, they overlook the fact that setting these variables at their most favored values sets other variables to undesirable and often the least intended values.

Drawing on the aid-effectiveness and audience-cost literatures, I show that foreign aid is highly fungible and the victim of grabber activities in non-democratic settings, whereas it is highly effective in improving citizen welfare in the presence of democratic institutions. Although this fact should be celebrated as an achievement in itself, the findings in this study indicate that not all good things go hand in hand: Autocratic leaders’ propensity to amass aid resources and keep them undistributed is dramatically higher than that of democratic leaders. Aid in democracies is almost completely spent on development projects, which increase citizens’ welfare and citizens’ perceptions of their respective government’s performance. As this surplus performance due to aid increases, governments remain in power until the surplus increase is undone through serious foreign policy failures. The implications of such situations are profound: Democratic governments lose their edge in credibly communicating their resolve to their opponents. As a result, targets cannot glean information about the willingness of an initiator by observing the initiator’s explicit threats because the surplus increase in governments’ re-election prospects decreases their ability to put their political survival at stake.

The analysis of reciprocation behavior indicates that targets resist less often against challenges issued by non-aid-recipient democratic states than those issued by non-aid-recipient non-democracies: The net average effect of changing the regime type of a non-aid-recipient polity from a non-democracy to a democracy decreases the target’s probability of reciprocating in kind or of escalating the dispute to a higher hostility level by 26% percent. However, as aid flows increase, the effect of initiator regime type becomes statistically indistinguishable from 0, meaning that foreign aid retards democracies’ ability...
to generate audience costs, hence, removes their ability to send informative signals to their opponents during crisis bargaining. This situation, in turn, removes the ability of democratic governments to reduce uncertainty about their relative resolve, which prevents them from reaching a mutually preferable negotiated settlement. The logical conclusion of this effect is straightforward: Democracy does not operate as a cause of peace among aid-recipient states; the net average effect of changing the regime type of two non-aid recipient states from autocratic to democratic decreases the probability of a MID onset by 20.6%, a Fatal MID onset by 10.7%, and a crisis by 9.3%. However, as the amount of aid both states receive increases, the effect of democracy becomes statistically indistinguishable from 0.61

This study is not only of theoretical relevance, but also suggests practical implications for policy makers. In order to aid peace among democracies, aid donors should at least condition foreign aid to posterior annual public announcements of how each cent of aid money is consumed within the recipient country. In that way, the average citizen in democracies will be able to differentiate between the actual performance of the government and the surplus benefits they enjoy due to foreign aid. Otherwise, unable to make this separation, citizens will be more tolerant of government foreign policy failures as long as they enjoy the surplus benefits that come as a result of aid, as they would assume the real cause was the government’s domestic policy performance. Failure to adopt this policy suggestion will not only make domestic politics less competitive, but also give the government a higher level of foreign policy failure threshold, therefore more likely to adopt more risky foreign policies.

This option is, however, not the only one available to policy makers. There are two others that may also prove helpful to reach the desired outcome of peace. First, aid donors should place a non-belligerence condition on the recipient country and require peaceful resolution of the dispute of interest. For example, after the Baltic States achieved independence in 1991, the Estonian and Latvian governments’ non-recognition of Russian minorities’ citizenship status brought both countries to the brink of war with Russia. Western bilateral donors and regional organizations prevented a war through promises of aid in exchange for recognition of citizenship status and the associated rights and privileges.62

Apart from this opportunity-cost perspective, conditioning aid disbursement to non-belligerence of the recipient countries can also prove useful in compensating for the problems aid poses during interstate crisis bargaining. On the one hand, foreign aid reduces leader ability to put their survival at stake if they fail to follow through on their previous threats, as discussed throughout the study. On the other hand, aid-recipient governments can use foreign aid commitments, the disbursement of which is conditioned on non-belligerence, as a way to credibly communicate their resolve through costly signaling without resorting to violent conflict. If both parties know the initiator will have to face drastic cuts in foreign aid in response to its belligerence, a recipient government can reveal private information about its resolve by issuing a threat that will be retaliated by its donors. However, for this mechanism to work, the donor should (1) have a very high sensitivity to a threat to use force, (2) be clear

61 I draw evidence from statistical techniques, where I subject each of the intermediate links in the causal chain to further analysis. This method is a form of quantitative process tracing, as advocated by the proponents of case study and multiplies the implications from each observation. Analyzing the individual links for the theory’s empirical implications on two major conflict processes - reciprocation and conflict onset - is a means of bolstering confidence in the theory. Future studies should employ an in-depth process-tracing case-study approach to derive more-specific results that are not visible through large-N analysis, which, in turn, will provide more insight.

62 Hurlburt, “Gaining Leverage for International Organizations”.
about the types of threats that will face punishment in aid disbursements, and (3) ensure that the amount of aid is high, so that it has a signaling value.

However, the main policy implication proposed in this study, an annual announcement of what portion of aid resources are responsible for a surplus increase in an average citizen’s welfare in a given year, is the least costly option for donors and recipients. This policy implication may not only keep recipient governments more peaceful, but also increase positive attitudes toward the aid donor. To conclude, these findings on the relationship between foreign aid and crisis bargaining is novel, yet profound knowledge. To serve the cause of peace, international relations scholars and policy makers must heed the lasting effects of this powerful and highly malleable instrument of war and peace.

Bibliography


Finkel, Steven E., Aníbal Pérez-Liñán, and Mitchell A. Seligson. “The Effects of US Foreign Assistance on


Appendix

Table A.1- Summary Statistics

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American Elections and the Global (Dis)order

Ali Resul Usul
İstanbul Medipol University

Abstract

Donald Trump’s unexpected victory in the presidential elections came as a great shock to liberal internationalist circles in the US and abroad. Whether Trump will string the liberal order that the US has largely created is without a plain answer. It is clear, though, that there is already significant erosion in the basic architect of global order. Detritions to the fabric of global order can be observed with respect to four interrelated developments: the exacerbation of security challenges due to proliferation and diversification of the regional and global destabilizing actors, the reversal of democratic and liberal values in the West, rise of illiberal democracies and competitive authoritarianism elsewhere, and finally, a UN system mired with serious shortcomings in representation, capacity and legitimacy. The international society must address this erosion of global order and the first step in that regard is coming to terms with the fact that “the world is bigger than five” not only in terms of the re-alignment of major powers, but also of the distribution of power along state/non-state spectrum.

Keywords: US hegemony, presidential elections, UN reform, global order, populism

Donald Trump’s unexpected victory in the presidential elections came as a great shock to liberal internationalist circles in the US and abroad. Accordingly, some liberal pundits and commentators started to point it out that the Trump’s triumph meant further erosion in the ideational/ideological nature of the liberal world order – probably the greatest since its institutional establishment in the aftermath of the end of the Cold War. The election in the US is all the more important, as it is not only the most powerful state in the world, but - despite claims on the contrary1 - it is the ultimate “hegemon”.

The contents of all debates and controversies during the American elections and Trump’s eventual victory have substantiated my earlier conviction that the world has been going through a “twilight” period. This observation stems from the increasingly elusive and ambiguous nature of the current global (dis)order. The cool breezes of anti-liberal, “illiberal”, anti-globalist, anti-internationalist, nativist, sometimes xenophobic, protectionist and authoritarian tendencies have already been blowing from the many parts of Europe, let alone the non-Western parts of the World. Therefore, the electoral victory of a leader like Trump might simply be regarded a sort of “tipping point”!

Whether America will string the liberal order that it has largely created up during Trump’s reign is a question already being discussed among American and international intellectual

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circles without a plain answer, but significant erosion in the basic architect of global order is clear and real. Detriment to the fabric of global order can be observed with respect to four interrelated developments. First and perhaps most alarming is the proliferation and diversification of the regional and global destabilizing units, i.e. states or non-state actors that the global security architecture has already been struggling to deal with. The second development is related to the slow but sure erosion of the liberal democratic values in the old, consolidated democracies, especially in Europe. The third is the rise of authoritarian regimes as centers of attraction in the international system. Finally, the erosion in the institutional capacity and legitimacy of the UN undermines the foundation of the global order.

The current global security system under American leadership has unfortunately not been able to live up to the global expectations in regard with the growing security challenges emanating from both conventional and transnational forces in the last decade. Russian invasion and annexation of Crimea as well as its destabilizing actions in the eastern part of Ukraine are against all established norms and rules of international law. Nevertheless, neither the global system nor the American-led NATO has been able to provide an effective way to counteract these actions. In a similar vein, the tools and methods of the Western diplomacy have succeeded nothing but the aggravation of serious problems in the Middle East in the last decades. The emergence of the ISIS in Iraqi and Syrian territories per se could be seen the concrete evidence for the terrible fiasco of the Western diplomacy in the Middle East in the last decades. The current “global fight” against the transnational terrorism and radicalism suffer from the same weakness of absence of cooperation and leadership in the world politics. The same is also true on the growing racist, xenophobic and Islamophobic populism that has appeared in almost all parts of the Western world.

The second development indicative of the ideational or ideological crisis of the liberal hegemonic order is the gradual erosion of the liberal democratic regimes, not only in the newly democratic or semi-democratic countries, but also in the “consolidated democracies” at the heart of Europe and the US as well. In the aftermath of the end of Cold War, the world has experienced a “global resurgence of liberal democracy” effecting even places where authoritarian governments in different guises had been quite widespread. That was very much in parallel with the declaration of the victory of the liberal values and democracy and “end of history.” Though the pundits have not yet officially declared the end of the “third wave of democracy”, it could be easily argued that “old democracies” in the Western Europe, such as Britain, Germany, France or Belgium, are currently suffering from growing political attractiveness of xenophobic, racist, nativist and authoritarian populist political movements and parties. No matter which sides of the national political spectrums these populist movements are located, mainstream democratic political forces have been encountering great difficulties in countering their effect. Perhaps, in some cases, these mainstream parties and actors fall prey to the increasing populist pressures. For example, imposing more restrictions on some religious practices of Muslim people living in the European countries is becoming quite widespread. Ban on burkini, a full-body swimsuit worn typically by Muslim women, by mayors of more than 30 towns in France, was the most visible and absurd one among all restrictions in this regard. It is even more alarming to witness that the mayors, most of who are from right-wing National Front Party, refuse to accept the ruling by the highest administrative

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court in the country, which stipulates that mayors do not have the right to outlaw burkinis. The so-called “European values”, like tolerance to the others and multiculturalism, have all been the most precious export products of the “Judeo-Christian Western Civilization” until very recently. But they seem to have already become obsolete, outdated, very démodé and less politically attractive. The constant flow of refugees and the shortcomings in the treatment they receive have just exacerbated the situation in the Western countries from bad to terrible. The banal fascist and authoritarian inclinations among civil and political societies in the Western countries have come up with the most outrageous arguments against refugees. They are called “intruders” and “potential terrorists,” who are on a cruise to destroy the Western civilization. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has even argued that migration is a form of “poison.” He seems to have convinced (or been convinced by) a significant portion of Hungarian population who voted against the settlement of refugees in Hungary. Sometimes, the poor treatment even took the form of inflicting physical violence to these violence-stricken people. The immigration and social cohesion has long been on the list of hard-pressing issues on European agenda, but the new inflow coupled with increasing extremism both in the Middle East and in Europe, brought about almost a rupture in these societies. It is longer possible to keep the façade of a harmonious Europe, let alone a cosmopolitan one. Such decline in European peace and prosperity is particularly telling about the prospects of the US hegemony, because European project was the most precious offspring of American-led global order.

Another important success of the new liberal global order has been resurgence of liberal democracy across the globe in the post-Cold War era. Many authoritarian regimes in Asia, Africa, the Latin America and the Central and Eastern Europe have realized a transition to democracy, taking the European democracies as role models. Therefore, it is not a surprising to see that the democratic erosion in the “consolidated democracies” also had a dramatic impact in these newer democracies. In the past decade, the moral authority of liberal democracy has come under a great challenge in many new democracies in different parts of the world. According to the most recent democracy/freedom indexes of there is a clear global orientation to “illiberal” and/or semi-democratic forms of political regime. For example, UK-based Economist Intelligence Unit reports that almost one-half of the world’s countries are democracies. However, the number of “full democracies” is particularly low at only 20 countries. Moreover, as the subtitle of their Democracy Index 2015 report, “Democracy in an age of anxiety” suggests, that number may continue to dwindle. Freedom House also sees diminishing prospects for democracy. 2016 is the 10th consecutive year of decline in global freedom. In the past decade, 105 countries have experienced a net decline, whereas only 61 had a net improvement in their freedom levels. In 2016, the number of countries that made gains has been only 43.

As the scholars of “competitive authoritarianism” truthfully point out new democracies have been under great pressure due to the growing attractiveness of strong leaderships with populist appeals. Although there is no clear-cut transition to a full-fledged despotic/authoritarian regime, these populist strong leaders easily curb some essential freedoms to suppress their political rivals and other opposition. Russia under Vladimir Putin is succinct example to this kind of political regime. What is more alarming to the liberal-democratic forces in the world is the fact that the political sphere of influence of these regimes have been increasing. For example, Russian influence has been expanding even in some members of the EU, where pro-Russian political parties have won the general elections. Rather than the US, or other Western democracies, these usually far-right parties and movements in Europe perceives Russian President Vladimir Putin as the epitome of a powerful, conservative leader who upholds traditional values and opposes the US. In 2015, Marine Le Pen, the leader of French party National Front, has led the campaign to create the Eurosceptic far-right faction Europe of Nations and Freedom (ENF) in European Parliament. It now has 38 members from eight countries. ENF is just the last one in a string of pro-Russian factions such as British parliamentarian Nigel Farage’s Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy, or far-left groups such as the European United Left.10

The growing influence of authoritarian regimes is not endemic to Russia and its sphere of influence. The growing influence of China in the international economy is evident in almost all economic and financial measures. Perhaps, the most visible example in this regard is the Chinese currency, renminbi. Beating Australian and Canadian dollars; it has recently become of the top five most used currencies, and by 1 October 2016 joined U.S. Dollar, Euro, Yen, and Sterling in IMF’s Special Drawing Rights (SDR) basket. SDR is an international reserve asset and inclusion of Chinese currency is a testament to China’s status as one of the most important actors in the international economy. In a similar vein, IMF’s 2010 quota and governance reforms which finally became effective in early 2016, gave emerging markets like BRICS more power and greater say at the institution.

China now has the third largest IMF quota and voting share after the United States and Japan. The IMF reforms again show increasing Chinese impact over the international economic and financial structure. One should keep in mind, however, despite China’s ongoing contribution to the consolidation of the existing system; it also seems construct its authentic economic and financial ecosystem through some new international initiatives such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and One Belt One Road initiative. While the former provides funds to the development of infrastructure and other productive sectors in Asia, and hence is an important generator of soft power, the One Belt One Road initiative is a giant strategic investment project connecting China and the rest of Eurasia through both land-based and maritime routes. While the Belt countries comprise of the historical Silk Road countries, the countries of Southeast Asia, Oceania, and North Africa will be bound by “21st Century Maritime Silk Road” operating through several contiguous bodies of water. If

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China decides to (and is able to) come up with an alternative economic order, it may increase China’s attractiveness, and could even hasten the current wearing down of the global order.

The final development related to gradual erosion of global order is the growing problems related to the UN system. The UN was created in the aftermath of the end of the Second World War by the victors of the Great War and therefore reflected the global political conjuncture of the time. However, it is evident from the above developments that the world has become a place that is much more complicated and complex, which makes it dangerous to be governed by a system constructed in 1940s. The UN had been many times paralyzed during the Cold War because of the hostilities and rivalries between the Western and Eastern blocs. Today, there is not an Eastern/Communist bloc and hence, no rival blocs in the world politics. Still the UN system fails to live up to the political expectations, and indeed falls quite short to address basic security needs and other regional and global problems. At the heart of the UN system lays the Security Council with five permanent seats. Whom to those seats were allocated essentially reflected what we had in the global state system when the UN was created. What we have been observing since the end of the Cold War though, is a much more dispersed distribution of political and economic power at the global level. The world is much more complicated at both state and non-state levels. While non-western states in Latin America, Asia and even Africa have started to consolidate their political and economic strength at regional and international arena; non-state actors, whether benign or malevolent, have come to a point where they can compete with the sovereign governments even in spheres deemed to be exclusive to states, i.e. military. The most horrible example is obviously the ISIS case.

The world leaders seem to have already abandoned their hopes and trust that the global and regional security problems could be solved within the current structure of the UN system. Therefore, new semi-global or pseudo-global “institutions” like G20, which was originally invented to deal with global financial issues, has increasingly been used as platforms to discuss the global and regional security issues and other problems. Thus, if a “hegemony” refers to a global leadership in terms of value construction, agenda setting, building global institutions, financial and economic governance of the world and providing a global security; we can easily talk about the deep crisis of hegemony in the current world politics and economy. However, a crisis of hegemony does not refer to a sudden end of the existing hegemonic system. This fact is particularly true for the financial and economic nature of the global system. Therefore, the international society must address this gradual erosion of global order with a long-term vision in mind. The first step in that regard is coming to terms with the fact that “the world is bigger than five” as it is repeatedly put by Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. This is true not only in terms of the re-alignment of major powers, but also of the distribution of power along state/non-state spectrum.

Bibliography
Chinese Hegemony: What Kind of Global Power?

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Review article of two books:


Chinese foreign policy behavior has become a central concern for scholars and countries as China has become increasingly pivotal in international politics. Questions being explored include: Will China be the next hegemon? If so, what kind of hegemon will China become? Would it be a different global power as it claims to be ‘peaceful’ and ‘just,’ or would we have the same international order with a different principal actor? Is it possible for China to have a normatively desirable relational strategy in the present? And more importantly, what is the role of China’s ancient philosophical past, such as *tianxia* (meaning ‘under-earth’) and the tribute system, in understanding these arguments? These concerns highlight the need for more awareness of the political mindset that underlies China’s foreign policy. Examining this mindset is a response to the proliferating global interest in China and enhances the awareness of Chinese leaders’ governing philosophy(ies). This review will focus on two recent books, both of which aim to provide answers to above questions.

*China’s International Roles: Challenging or Supporting International Order?* by Sebastian Harnisch, Sebastian Bersick and Jörn-Carsten Gottwald, is an edited volume providing a wide range of perspectives on role theory and newly emerging hegemons. Role theory is interdisciplinary, and provides a descriptive conceptual language using different levels of analysis. According to Yudan Chen, role theory is very suitable to study China since it melds well with Chinese thought. For example, the Chinese historical mentality regarding state governance gives different roles to the state, such as ‘teacher’ (as in Confucian understanding, where it is believed that the state’s main duty is to educate society and help people gain moral values) or the ‘central state’ (as in the *tianxia* conception, associated with a political system where the earth is divinely appointed to the Chinese emperor, who rules the

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2 Chen, “Philosophy, Identity, and Role Theory,” 78.
world in harmony and provides stability). The Chinese perception of roles is also rich enough to provide new insight and comprehension to role theory itself. *China's International Roles* not only provides insight to the formation of Chinese roles by analyzing role conceptions, but also explains the changes in China’s roles over time, and is well-grounded in the historical evidence. Therefore, the book goes beyond a ‘snapshot’ role-theory analysis of Chinese foreign policy at a specific time, as it is an attempt to provide an overall and longitudinal picture of the country’s foreign policy history.

*China’s International Roles* consists of three sections. The first establishes the theoretical basis for the next sections and mostly focuses on the historical and philosophical backgrounds that inform China’s contemporary roles. The second section mainly concentrates on the manifestation of China’s roles in the global context, such as its relationship with the United States and its engagement in international economic and financial institutions. The third section focuses on the regional context and deals with China’s relationships with other countries or entities such as the European Union, Africa or socialist states from a role theory framework. The concluding chapter (written by the editors) points to China’s hard choices between conflicting domestic and external expectations regarding its international roles, and presents three arguments: First, that China’s international roles are a product of domestic debates on the legitimacy of one-party rule. Second, that China’s domestic role expectations are variable and have changed over time, from a revolutionary great power to peaceful co-dependence. Finally, as for almost all states, China’s roles and the domestic order supporting them are partly a product of international altercasting, learning and socialization.

The first section of the book provides a theoretical framework that enables the reader to analyze China’s contemporary roles. The section is composed of five chapters, with the last one particularly interesting: Yudan Chen shows how early theoretical or philosophical Chinese thought provides insight into China’s current roles. He argues that China’s behavior is not rooted only in power and survival, but is also determined by the roles China established for itself and the roles that have been established through its interaction with others. Chen proposes that analyzing China with the existing assumptions of role theory is not sufficient because of the embeddedness of its unique history and deep culture. Accordingly, Chen provides three essential concepts of “Chinese Characteristics” to interpret and comprehend Chinese behaviour roles: the *Weiqi* metaphor, the fantasy novel metaphor and the flower and butterfly metaphor. *Weiqi* is the Chinese word for the famous game of ‘Go.’ As in the game, the metaphor proposes rapid change and a flowing nature instead of stable and predefined roles. In *Weiqi*, one must speculate on a certain token’s role not by what attributes it has but by its movement. The role is determined by the token’s momentum, which can be grasped through experience and comprehension, or as the Chinese call it, *shi.* Therefore, the meaning of each role depends on where, how and when it appears and in which situation. With its distinct pieces playing different roles, chess may represent a Western understanding of the international order. Similarly, *Weiqi* illustrates the philosophical world view and strategic thinking of the Chinese people.

The second metaphor, the fantasy novel, refers to Chinese philosophers’ belief in the harmony of intra- and inter-roles, or the “co-implication” of polarities and the mutually

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3 Chen, “Philosophy, Identity, and Role Theory,” 79.
4 Chen, “Philosophy, Identity, and Role Theory,” 80.
5 Chen, “Philosophy, Identity, and Role Theory,” 79.
6 Chen, “Philosophy, Identity, and Role Theory,” 81.
inclusive co-existence of counter-roles. Apparently, there is little role conflict between Chinese roles, just as there are no sharp distinctions between a student and teacher in Confucian understanding. Teachers can continue to learn by maintaining their student role and students can have a certain amount of knowledge that gives them the status of teacher. Having two ‘opposite’ roles does not necessarily lead to a role conflict; instead, it can lead to role harmony, like Ying and Yang. This Ying-Yang duality can be seen in Sino-US relations: On the one hand, China has an active and assertive foreign policy in the South China Sea, and on the other, it espoused a ‘peaceful development’ rhetoric during Hu Jintao’s time in office. Thus the two roles may exist without an existential conflict.

The final metaphor, the flower and the butterfly, implies that both the ‘objectified’ self and ‘subjectified’ other are significant when creating or altering a role. For example, when a Western poet sees a flower, he plucks it to pursue the knowledge about ‘what is.’ When an Eastern poet notices the flower, he leaves it be and contemplates it in its sono-mama (natural) state, ignoring the distinction between the self (subject) and the object. This blurring between object and subject is best exemplified in the famous poem, Butterfly Dream, by the Taoist poet Zhuang Zhou. The narrator dreamt of being a butterfly and when he woke up, he was not sure whether he was a butterfly dreaming of being a human or a human dreaming of being a butterfly. This blurry situation between the self and other reflects the internalization of other and the distinct understanding of Chinese roles.

The above three metaphors imply that China’s roles are fluid rather than stable, adapting through time and space. They are also instrumental in comparing the formation of China’s grand strategy to that of the US9. The former appears to be more ambiguous than the latter, despite similar interests such as security, political stability and prosperity.10 The two strategies mainly differ in the way they view the world. While the American grand strategy wishes to promote a specific set of norms or rules (because other rules or existing norms are perceived as potential threats and must be changed), the Chinese grand strategy does not promote a substantive norm, and China has the image of a role conformer. As a result, the image of the US as a ‘liberal nation’ translates into interventionist policies. The US measures friends and foes against its own standards and values, which were created by its own practices, including market openness and competitive elections. In contrast, China encompasses all other players and promotes recognizing a greater self. It does not care whether others have different normative values (even in border disputes with India, Vietnam or North Korea); it is more important to achieve a common understanding.

The self-ascribed roles of China and the US further differentiate the two countries’ grand strategies. China embodies a sociological role conception with a relationship-based style; its self-ascribed role is as a ‘responsible major power’11 that wants to build a harmonious world in which there are no universal values or norms. America’s foreign policy, on the other hand, adopts a psychological identity-based role with an ego-oriented style. Hence, having the power to impose sanctions in order to spread its ‘universal’ values is central to the American grand strategy, where Chinese grand strategy is mainly about achieving harmony through

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7 Chen, “Philosophy, Identity, and Role Theory,” 81.
10 Shih and Huang, “The Identity and International Role of China,” 60.
11 Shih and Huang, “The Identity and International Role of China,” 60.
multi-lateral cooperation, Chinese networking (guanxi) and win-win cooperation. China’s guidelines for operation are based on multilateral benefits, and, as a hegemonic power, China would ensure this system works to achieve a harmonious, stable and peaceful world.

The second section of *China’s International Roles* is composed of four articles, which mostly highlight the dynamics at play between China’s new status as a role-maker and its previous status as a role-taker. Two articles stand out in this section. The first is Cameron Thies’ article on China’s changing relationship with the US, especially the former’s response to altercasting attempts by the latter. Thies defines altercasting as endowing “a particular identity or role type”\(^\text{12}\) onto someone (or some country) to persuade them to behave in a desired manner. During the US’ open-door-policy period, it projected a series of roles onto China, including ‘great power,’ ‘troubled modernizer,’ ‘failed modernizer’ and ‘protectee.’\(^\text{13}\) Currently, however, China is less likely to adopt a role identity given by the US. For example, China rejected the role of ‘failed modernizer,’ which changed the course of Sino-US relations. China is also starting to counter-cast roles to the US, which is a challenge to US hegemony and the existing international system.\(^\text{14}\) In the final article of this second section, Mikko Huotari argues that China’s inclination to exercise leadership began\(^\text{15}\) with the global financial crises in Asia, when China wanted to be known as a ‘great power’ for the first time since the Deng Xiaoping era. The crises reminded China of the importance of an informal ‘neighborhood policy,’ and accordingly, China’s new security concept included sustained development and multifaceted economic security.\(^\text{16}\) The description of Sino-US relations as “great power relations” by Xi Jinping can also be evidence of this change. China’s push for greater regional leadership gained momentum especially after 2001.\(^\text{17}\)

In the third section, Nele Noesselt’s article presents a rather distinct take on role theory. He argues that national role conceptions are used to justify countries’ political decisions. He emphasizes that while China praises the regimes of Vietnam, North Korea and Cuba as socialist brothers, the deficits and failures of socialist states such as the USSR are utilized to legitimize China’s economic reforms. In official Chinese discourse, it is claimed that open market regulations and engaging in international trade are not indications of Chinese capitalism. Rather, they are a strategic move, compulsory for the survival of socialism in the twenty-first century. Thus, China’s ‘socialist role’ should mostly be viewed as a system of justification rather than as a direct guide to China’s foreign policy behavior in the international system.

Noesselt claims that China’s self-identification as a *daguo* (great power) and as part of the developing countries of the Global South currently dominate Chinese role conceptions. Equally important, however, is China’s promotion of itself not only as a nation-state (*guojia*) but also as a *tianxia* (modern empire), which constructs the country’s identity in contrast to expansionist/colonial empires. Thus, *tianxia* has a huge impact on the formation of China’s current roles as a peaceful rising power that proposes a harmonious, stable, Confucian world under a benevolent hegemon.

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\(^{13}\) Thies, “The US and China,” 102.

\(^{14}\) Thies, “The US and China,” 100.


\(^{16}\) Huotari, “A New Role in East Asian Financial Order,” 147.

\(^{17}\) Huotari, “A New Role in East Asian Financial Order,” 150.
China’s International Roles not only captures the evolution of Chinese roles through time and space but also provides a philosophical and historical perspective to understand the emergence of these roles. It implies that China may become a different hegemon than the previous or existing hegemons in terms of its unique roles, but definitely not an unusual one in terms of its aggressive practices. That is, despite China’s harmonious goals, it may still need to engage in warfare.

In the book Chinese Hegemony: Grand Strategy and International Institutions in East Asian History, Feng Zhang provides a different (and more positive) answer to the initial questions. Zhang acknowledges the importance of the following questions: What will China do with its new power? and What will China want?18 He explains that despite the Chinese government’s persistent denial of any hegemonic ambition throughout the reform era, some scholars in the country predict that China will evolve into a “humane authority”19 hegemon. In contrast, some foreign scholars think that China will become a different but not unusual global power in terms of its aggressive practices or it will be the same type of hegemon as the US.20 Acknowledging that China is economically and politically rising, Zhang cautions that the historical analogies do not offer great insight, and the current trends are not sufficient or reliable enough to answer the following question: Will China become a hegemon? He suggests that China will be a different hegemon in terms of its aggressive practices, values and attitudes than previous or existing hegemons (in this case the US), and that a strong China can be as peaceful and benign as its imperial predecessor supposedly was. This book also suggests revisions to Western-dominated IR theories by offering certain cases from East Asia.

Chinese Hegemony consists of seven chapters. The first is an introduction emphasizing Chinese material primacy in East Asia during the Ming Dynasty. In the second chapter, Zhang establishes a three-part conception of the relational international structure in the East Asian context and explores the implications of this framework for China’s grand strategies in general. The third, fourth and fifth chapters apply the relational theory to three sets of bilateral relations: Sino-Korean relations, Sino-Japanese relations and Sino-Mongol relations. Chapter Six explores the implications of Zhang’s relational theory with respect to the “fundamental institutions in [the] East Asian order,”21 and argues that a distinct international society existed during the early Ming Empire. Finally, in Chapter Seven, Zhang focuses on the value of relationalism in examining and understanding IR in East Asia, and proposes ethical relationalism as a critical and normative IR theory that partially informs Chinese foreign policy.

Zhang’s analysis introduces the expressive side of the Chinese strategy by examining one of the major dimensions of East Asian IR – relationality, and argues that the theoretical framework of relationalism is a distinct feature of Chinese diplomacy.22 Rather than an actor-based ontology, he proposes a relational ontology,23 which takes mutual relations as the primary unit of analysis. An actor is regarded as a “process of becoming” rather than

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19 Zhang, Chinese Hegemony, 1.
20 Zhang, Chinese Hegemony, 2.
21 Zhang, Chinese Hegemony, 154.
22 Zhang, Chinese Hegemony, 22.
23 Zhang, Chinese Hegemony, 23.
as a “being” 24 embedded in interconnected events with an interdependent co-existence. This theory thus provides a non-Western perspective in understanding Chinese and Asian networking and patterned relationships.

Zhang indicates that there are three main relational structural components of the East Asian system: ordering principles, differentiation of roles and distribution of ties focusing on actor-degree centrality. The ordering principle of the international system can be expressive or instrumental. Instrumental logic is pragmatic, and aims to maximize one’s interests, whereas expressive logic embodies Confucianism and aims to create ethically endowed relations merely for the sake of doing so. The differentiation of roles, also inspired by Confucianism, implies that different roles require different ethical principles of action, and these determine the quality of relationships. Roles are differentiated along two hierarchical axes: a sovereign-subordinate and a father-son relationship. The emperor of China is the father or the sovereign of the world and the rest of the people are his subordinates or sons. Finally, the distribution of ties focusing on actor-degree centrality, which is derived from social network analysis, assumes that the central actors in a social network are the most. Hence, their social power depends on the degree of their centrality, which is indicative of their prominence in the system.

Zhang argues that it is possible to reestablish the Confucian value of humaneness and practice it in IR. China’s common historical model for such interactions is the tribute system, a network of trade and mutually beneficial economic relations between China and its independent tributaries. Zhang makes a two-fold argument around this model. On the one hand, he accepts that the tribute system can be usefully conceptualized as a distinct international society, but on the other, conceptualizing the East Asian order as such is inadequate to fully comprehend the region’s relational dynamics. The tribute system contained inherent limits, and was only one of several fundamental institutions that helped maintain regional order. Moreover, tributary diplomacy was not always the dominant or most significant in the system.

Hegemony entails a high degree of hierarchical authority, which not only requires material capability but also a sense of social purpose, the capacity to control significant outcomes in the international system and a certain degree of consent to, as well as social recognition and acceptance of, the hegemon by other states in the system. According to Zhang, in the early Ming Dynasty the Chinese possessed a reasonable but incomplete regional hegemony given the politics. Zhang believes that hegemony is always incomplete – including that of the US. Setting the rules of the game does not necessarily guarantee the obedience of the rivals or even the supporters. Recognition makes a hegemon’s international rules and institutions legitimate, thus central to an understanding of relational hierarchy, that is, a relationship of legitimate dominance. Questioning the true meaning of the word ‘hegemon’ in the first place, Zhang proposes an interesting way to understand China’s rise. He presents China’s historical domination in East Asia by providing a deep understanding of its historical past, and allows the reader to contemplate its new (possibly hegemonic) role by providing a theoretical, historical and philosophical background. He claims that a hegemonic relationship does not necessarily need to be malignant, as the concept of domination implies.

Chinese Hegemony contributes to the debate on the title subject by providing a historical perspective into IR’s strategic and institutional dynamics and the hegemonic experience in

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24 Zhang, Chinese Hegemony, 23.
East Asia. By emphasizing the importance of historical analogy and theoretical deduction, Zhang suggests that we should take lessons from the past if we want to predict the future and understand its contemporary policy implications. This approach, however, does not mean that historical instructions can be utilized in the strategic development of a re-emerging East Asian order; doing so may risk historicism.

The two studies agree on one major point: To understand China’s current rise in the region we need to understand its historical role in East Asia. From this point of view, both books provide deep insight into China’s history and the impact of the country’s philosophical past (especially that of Confucianism) on its contemporary policies. Both present specific and strong case studies to strengthen their analyses and contribute to the IR literature in unique ways. Equally important, they warn the reader against simplistic and consolidated conceptions of China.

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Etkili Yardım Politikası ve Devletlerarası Çatışma

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Öz
Dış yardım ve askeri çatışma arasındaki bağlantı, hem yardımların etkinliği hem de devletlerarası çatışma araştırmalarında pek az ilgi görmüştür. Bu çalışmada, yardım alan devletler arasındaki devletlerarası çatışmaların dış yardımların etkinliğini analiz etmek ve bunu yaparken, devletin kara kutusunu açarak yardım etkinliği literatüründeki önceki araştırmaları ve çatışma literatüründeki uyma süreçini esas almaktadır. Önceki araştırmalar, yardımların vatandaşların refah düzeyini yükseltmeye yönelik etkinliğinin demokratik kurumların varlığına bağlı olduğunu göstermektedir. Bu makale, bu koşullu ilişkinin kriz görünümeleri
Anahtar Kelimeler: Demokrasi, yardım etkinliği, seçmen maliyetleri, devletlerarası çatışma

Amerikan Başkanlık Seçimleri ve Küresel Düzen(sızlık)

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Öz

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