TÜRKİYE ORTADOĞU ÇALIŞMALARI DERGİSİ

Turkish Journal of Middle Eastern Studies

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Türkiye Ortadoğu Çalışmaları Dergisi

CONTENTS

EDITORIAL

Scientific Studies Association (ILEM) has organized 5th STT-MENA Conference on "Migration and Socio-Cultural Change" on December 12-13, 2016 in Sakarya hosted by Sakarya University Middle East Institute. In this conference, scholars from various disciplines have discussed different aspects and effects of migration in societies of the region and the world. This conference aimed to go beyond current agenda and perspectives on the topic and highlight new dimensions to promote new ideas in the study of migration through theoretical and methodological discussions and cases of interdisciplinary fieldwork.

Migration is a catalyst for socio-cultural change at both macro and micro levels in sending and receiving societies. However, examining different aspects of the migration relates to socio-cultural change is a daunting task. Migration presents big opportunities and challenges for researchers and policymakers at the same time in an era that numbers of moving people have been rising and mobility patterns have become increasingly complex. It creates spaces for interaction between migrants as individuals; and between communities of origin, transit and destination as a whole. Migrants establish connections between societies and cultures, as well as causing many social problems. As a result of migration, societies experience some rapid changes in terms of social structures, identities, attitudes, norms, and practices. Effective migration policies can help harness the drawbacks of migration while maintaining social cohesion and facilitate inclusion for the benefit of both sides.

This special issue consists six papers from the conference specifically related to the Middle Eastern societies. These papers have been selected after a rigorous evaluation and review process. I am very thankful to the authors for their collaboration in the process and patience.

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Lütfü Sunar
Special Issue Editor

The Role of Internal Migration on Regional Inequality: Turkey Example

Yüksel Bayraktar[*] & Ayfer Özyılmaz[**]

Abstract

Internal migration, where individuals leave where they live and move to another residential area within the same country due to the social, political or economic reasons, affect the both the migration-receiving and emigrating regions. Internal migration that accompany regional differentiations depending on time and space, gave rise to social and economic differentiations on a regional basis with the redistribution of the population. The aim of this study is to analyze the effect of internal migration on regional inequality in Turkey.. In this context the effect of internal migration on regional inequality will be analyzed with panel data econometrics. Level 1 based migration data concerning the years of 2008-2015 was used for the migration statistics. The findings of the study are as follows; internal emigration increases regional inequality, whereas receiving internal migration decreases the regional inequality.

Keywords: Internal Migration, Regional Inequality, Income Inequality, Gini, Remittance

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İç Göçlerin Bölgesel Eşitsizlik Üzerindeki Rolü: Türkiye Örneği

Yüksel Bayraktar* & Ayfer Özyılmaz**

Öz

Toplumsal, siyasal veya ekonomik nedenlerle bireylerin aynı ülke sınırları içerisinde yaşadıkları yerleşim yerlerini bırakarak başka bir yerleşim yerine gitmelerini ifade eden iç göçler, sonuçları itibari ile hem göç alan bölgeleri hem de göç veren bölgeleri etkilemektedir. Zamana ve mekana bağlı olarak bölgesel farklılaşmaları beraberinde getiren iç göçler, nüfusun yeniden dağılımıyla bölgesel bazda sosyal ve iktisadi farklılaşmalara neden olmaktadır. Bu çalışmanın amacı, Türkiye'de iç göçlerin bölgesel eşitsizlik üzerindeki etkisinin analiz edilmesidir. Bu kapsamda iç göç hareketlerinin eşitsizlik üzerindeki etkisi panel veri ekonometrisi ile analiz edilecektir. Göç istatistikleri için 2008-2015 yılları arasında düzey 1 bazında göç verilerinden faydalanılmıştır. Çalışmanın bulguları şu şekildedir: Verilen iç göçler bölgesel eşitsizliği artırmakta, alınan iç göçler ise bölgesel eşitsizliği azaltmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: İç Göç, Bölgesel Eşitsizlik, Gelir Eşitsizliği, Gini, Göçmen Transferleri

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1. Introduction

Internal migration is the population movement that takes place due to economic, political and social reasons within the boundaries of a country between cities or villages. It is generally from underdeveloped regions to developed regions since internal migration is related to spatial redistribution of a country's population.

Since migration has a fundamental role in the redistribution of the population and regional development, there is significant literature related to it both in sociology and economy. Migration and inequality are interconnected concepts. The presence of regional inequalities and regional wage differences bring about migration; and migration contributes positively to the regional development[1] Many of the studies demonstrate that internal migration has a Significant role in economic development and poverty reduction.

The effect of internal migration on regional growth rates and inequalities is one of the controversial topics[2] Suggested that income inequality would increase if there was a shift of labor from the agricultural sector to non-agricultural sector during the first stages of economic development.[3]Migration causes income per capita to grow in immigrating regions and migration-receiving regions. The fact that the more developed regions incline to be more migration-receiving regions has an important role in this effect. On the other hand,[4] drew attention to the fact that migration between regions in the United States caused convergence in per capita income since 1860.[5] Suggested that it is theoretically impossible to measure the effect of migration on regional inequality. According to Okun, knowing the economic and

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[1]   Xiaobo Zhang, *The effects of internal migration on regional inequality in China,Evidence from panel data analysis*., Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Pittsburgh 2015, p.1.

[2]   Simon Kudnetzs.“*Economic growth and income inequality*”, ”*American Economic Review*, 2015, 45(1): 1–28.

[3]   Gunnar Myrdal,Economic Theory and Under-developed Regions, London: Duckworth, 1957.

[4]   Richard A Easterlin,“Regional income trends,In S. Harris (Ed.), American Economic New York: McGraw-Hill, History, 1961, pp. 525-547.

[5]   Bernard Okun,” *Interstate population migration and state income inequality*”,A simultaneous, equation approach. Economic Development and Cultural Change,1968, 16(2): 297–313.

demographic structures of the regions is one of the necessary conditions; however it is not sufficient by itself. In addition to this, it should be known whether the time dimension is short or long and whether the fast-growing regions are more developed regions or not. Okun analyzed this relationship by using the data concerning the years of 1940 and 1950 in the United States of America, however, concluded that more data and research would be required in order to confirm findings of the research.[6]

In many of the studies conducted for determining of the effect of migration on regional inequalities and income inequalities, internal migration and international migration differs from each other concerning their effects. Many determinants such as the socio-economic differences between people taking place in internal and international migration, differences in income obtained together with the migration, cause different results to emerge from the studies. Therefore, the effects of national and international migration on regional inequality may differ. Internal migration has a more effective role in decreasing inequality in comparison with international migration due to reasons such as their low costs and containing low risks. The fact that the international migrants are relatively rich and are a talented workforce, results in the differentiation of the results of internal and international migration.[7]

One of the significant studies in the literature about the relationship between migration and inequality was discussed[8] In accordance with the study that emphasized that there is an inverse u relationship between inequality and migration, the short-term and long-term results of migration differ from each other. During the first stages of migration, despite the willingness of poor families to migrate, only wealthy families may be able to afford migration costs and the fact that the post migration income is transferred to the wealthy families and this situation further increases inequality. However, the migration costs, which decrease along with the expanding and

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6   Xiaobo Zhang, The effects of internal migration on regional inequality in China,Evidence from panel data analysis. Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Pittsburgh, 2015, p.24.

7   Hein De Hass, "Mobility and human development" New York: United Nations Development Programme 2009.

8   David Mackenzie and hillel Repaport," *Network effects and the dynamics of migration and inequality: Theory and evidence from Mexico. Journal of Development Economics*", 84(1), 1-24.

accreting migration networks in time, provide low-income families the opportunity to migrate; and therefore the inequalities reduce in conjunction with the transfer of the post migration income to the poor families.

In case the immigrants are very poor, one of the most significant factors for migration to decrease inequality is the network. In case there is a network, the very poor segment may have the chance to migrate depending on the decrease of the risks and costs; however, if the network is lacking, this segment may only be able to migrate if the related costs are very low[9] The households who migrated before or any of the family members migrated before, may have the opportunity to reduce their migration costs due to the relationships they developed with migration. Especially when the cost of international migration is taken into consideration, it is seen that this advantage has a clear role in migration. This situation, which allows both the wealthy and poor segments to migrate, brings about different results on inequality depending on the social conditions of the migrants. On the other hand, these networks reduce uncertainty for individuals and accelerate the migration movement.

The hypothesis that rises to prominence in the studies emphasizing that migration will reduce the regional inequality with remittance. In the studies emphasizing that remittance will decrease inequality, the argument stating that migration increases the income of the poor households more than wealthy households comes into prominence.[10] When developing countries are examined, internal migration has the characteristic of a valuable source with remittance to rural areas and also contributes to rural development.

Another significant channel of studies analyzing the effect of internal migration on inequality is labor mobility. When the relationship between labor mobility and regional inequality is examined, it can be stated that the labor channel may bring along two different consequences on regional inequalities. These are, consequences arisen by the migration between regions with regards both to labor demand and labor supply. On the side of labor supply,

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[9]   Christian Hubert Ebeke and Maelan Le Goff "*Why Migrants Remittances Reduce Income Inequality in some*Countries and not in Others ? ".Working paper, 1-41,2011. https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00554277/document

[10]   Lall Somik Vilay ,Selod Harris and Shalizi Zmarak "Rural-urban migration in developing countries" *A survey of theoretical predictions and empirical findings.* World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, 3915,2011.

workers may migrate to more developed regions and therefore reduce the regional inequality. In migration receiving regions, labor demand increases and later the wages decrease correspondingly. For immigrating regions, the situation is the exact opposite. For this reason, the wage differences between the regions decrease and therefore unemployment ratios reduce. When the situation is examined in terms of labor demand, the migrants cause the total spending to raise depending upon the increase in the demand for goods and services in migration receiving regions[11] The qualification of labor may lead to results that decrease or increase regional inequalities by generating inequalities in the labor market. In case the migrants comprise of qualified labor, efficient labor is clustered in developed regions, labor distribution in rural areas may be affected negatively due to the inefficient labor as well as reasons such as the inability of people who are old or in bad health to migrate and therefore this situation may lead these under-developed regions to be more stagnant. However, if not all the migrants comprise of qualified labor and not all the non-migrating individuals comprise of a dependent population; migrations may increase employment by extending job opportunities for the ones who stay in rural areas.

In studies explaining the effect of migration on regional imbalance with labor mobility, migration with employment purposes has a more efficient role than migration with climate, security and educational purposes. Migration with an employment purpose decreases inequality by means of improving living conditions through increasing income in rural areas and labor immigrating households with remittance. When the situation is examined with regards to non-migrating people, in view of immigrating regions that are rather underdeveloped and rural regions, migration may have an employment increasing effect in rural regions for the remaining people. In this sense, internal migration provides employment opportunities to migrating people as well as providing employment opportunities to the remaining people in rural regions.

One of the determinative factors in migration movement is the spatial inequalities. The geographical advantages and disadvantages between regions lead to population clustering in certain regions and therefore may

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[11]   ElenaVakulenko,"Does migration lead to regional convergence in Russia?". *International Journal of Economic Policy in Emerging Economies*, 2016,9(1), 1-25.

affect the labor distribution negatively or positively. In a similar manner the effect of geographical conditions, clustering of the tourist industry and business enterprises produce an increase of efficient labor and this may increase the inequality between regions in some countries whereas it may also have a decreasing effect on inequality in some other countries.

Primarily, the literature concerning the effect of internal migration on regional inequalities is discussed in this study. Data concerning the years 2008-2015 was used in order to analyze the effect of internal migration on regional inequalities and its results in the Turkish economy. In the study, the data concerning the level 1 based migration-receiving and immigrating internal migration and other variables was tested with panel regression analysis.

2. Literature

The effects of migration on regional inequalities may generally differ depending on whether the migration is national or international. When the studies concerning the relationship of internal migration and regional inequality are examined, it can be seen that the effect of migration on inequality may differ depending on social conditions, time and effect channels. The studies analyzing the effect of migration on regional inequalities generally emphasizes that migration increases inequality, while discussing migration within the context of internal migration, the view suggesting that it will decrease the inequality gains wide currency. However, there are some studies that emphasize that only internal migration increases regional inequality. Moreover, some studies suggest that migration does not have any effect on inequality. When the migration-inequality relationship is evaluated generally, it can be seen that the results may differ depending on the direction of the migration and the qualifications of the migrants as well as the time and country dimensions.

The most significant factor rising to prominence in the relationship between migration and inequality is the remittance. There are many studies in literature concerning the effect of post-migration remittance on inequalities. The fundamental view of many studies, which emphasize that inequality would decrease with remittance obtained along with the international migration, is that the poverty level of immigrating regions would de-

crease with the transfer of the income obtained by migration.[12] Suggest that inequality would decrease with remittance obtained after the migration;[13] suggest that inequality would decrease in rural regions with the additional income provided by the income transfers;[14] suggests that remittance would decrease the inequality between rural regions and urban regions by generating a multiplier effect in economy.

The same findings were reached in the study of[15] concerning developing countries. 20, in the study of concerning Latin American economies and in the study of [16]concerning African regions. While it was emphasized that internal and international migration decreases regional inequalities via remittance[17] in Guatemala,[18] in Nepal and[19] in Ghana[20] and [21] emphasized that remittance increases the regional inequality.[22]

When studies evaluating the functioning channel of migration on inequality from a different point of view are taken into consideration, it can be

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[12]   Xiaobo Zhang,*The effects of internal migration on regional inequality in China, Evidence from panel data analysis*., Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Pittsburgh 2015, p.1

[13]   Nong Zhu veXubei Luo "*The impact of migration on rural poverty and inequality: A case study in China. Agricultural Economics,*" 2010, 41(2), 191-204.

[14]   Michael Philip Guest, "*Assessing the consequences of internal migration: Methodological ıssues and a case study on Thailand based on longitudinal survey data. Migration, Urbanization and Development: New Directions and Issues,*"*UNFPA*, New York, 1998.

[15]   Richard.Adams Jr, Alferdo Cuhecuecha and Jhon Page "The impact of remittances on poverty and inequality in Ghana", *World Bank Policy Working Research Paper*,2008, 4732.

[16]   Sanjevv Gupta, Catherine a Pattillo, and SmitaWagh, "Effect of remittances on poverty and financial development in Sub-Saharan Africa",*World Development*,2009, 37.

[17]   Richard Adams Jr, "Remittances and poverty in Guatemala", World Bank Policy Research WorkingPaper 3418, 2004.

[18]   Michael Lokshin, Mikhail Bonctch and Elena Glinskaya, "Work-Related migration and poverty reduction,in Nepa*," World Bank Policy Research Working Paper* 4231,2007

[19]   Richard Adams, J."Remittances and Poverty in Ghana"*World Bank Policy Working Research Paper 2006,* 3838.

[20]   Richard Adams, J. "*The effects of international remittances on poverty. Inequality and development in rural Egypt*, "Research Report 1991, 86.

[21]   Richard Adams, J., Alferdo Cuecuecha and Jhon Page "The impact of remittances on poverty and inequality in Ghana". *World Bank Policy Working Research 2008.*

[22]   Jeevanath Devkota, Impact of migrants' remittances on poverty and inequality in Nepal, Forum of International Development Studies, 2014, 44, 36-53.

seen that there are studies emphasizing the different factors in the migration and inequality relationship.[23] Concluded in their study, where they gave particular importance to the regional distribution of migration, that inequality would decrease if the migration movement is towards advanced industrial centers[24] concluded that together with the inequality decreasing effect, the remittance also decreases inequality by leading to a decrease in the population of rural areas and therefore resulting in the absorption of excess labor.[25] Emphasized that the migration with employment purposes decreases inequality and[26] reached to the conclusion that migration increases inequality by corrupting the educated labor distribution between regions.

When studies analyzing the effect of migration on inequality in accordance with the socio-economic conditions of the migrants are examined;[27] it can be seen that emphasized that regional inequality would increase after the migration due to the inability of the very poor segment to migrate because of the migration costs,[28] emphasized that the inequality would only decrease if the migrants are very poor, and[29] emphasized that migration would increase inequality due to it having a the high cost.

In Table 1, the literature study concerning the effect of internal migration on regional inequality is presented. When the results are examined, it can be seen that the migration effects vary from country to country. Within the studies conducted different post-migration transmission channels were emphasized, which brought along different results. Emphasizing remittance produced results stating that regional inequality would decrease, whereas

[23]   Diep Phan, Coxhead,Inter-Provincial migration and inequalities during Vietnam's transition. Journal of Development Economics,2010, 91(1), 100–112.

[24]   Nong Zhu ve Xubei Luo "The impact of migration on rural poverty and inequality: A case study in China. Agricultural Economics,"2010, 41(2), 191-204.

[25]   Nguyen DucLoc, K.Raabe and U.Grote, Rural–Urban migration, household vulnerability,and welfare in Vietnam: World Development,2013,71, 79-93.

[26]   Charles Ackah and Denis Medvedev, Internal migration in Ghana, Determinants and welfare impacts. International Journal of Social Economics,2012, (39) 10, 764-784.

[27]   Xiaoqıan Wang, Migration, remittances, poverty and inequality in China: A counterfactual analysis. GATE Lyon Saint-Etienne Research Center of UniversitLumire Lyon,2014.

[28]   Fleur Stephainie Wouterse," *Migration, poverty, and inequality: Evidence from Burkina Faso*," *IFPRI Discussion*, 2008, Paper 00788.

[29]   Michael Lipton, "Migration from rural areas of poor countries: The impact on rural productivity and income distribution," World development, 1980,8(1), 1-24.

giving prominence to the inequalities within labor distribution was considered as a factor increasing the regional inequality. The qualifications of the migrants were shown up as one of the effect channels that lead to differentiation of the results.

Table 1. Literature Study Concerning the Effect of Internal Migration on Regional Inequality

Author (s)	Period	Country	Method	Conclusion
Zhang (2015)	1992-2008	China	Panel data analysis	Intraprovincial migration decreases inequality, Interprovincial migration increases inequality
Wang (2014)	2007	China	Heckman model	Inequality decreases if very poor people migrate
Nguyen et. al. (2013)	2007-2010	Vietnam	Panel data analysis	Ineffective
Ackah and Medvedev (2012)	2005	Ghana	Regression analysis	Inequality increases
Zhu and Luo (2010)	2002	China	Heckman model	Inequality decreases
Phan and Coxhead (2010)	1984–1989 and 1994–1999	Vietnam	Regression analysis	Inequality decreases
Wouterse (2008)	2003	Burkina Faso	Gini and concentration coefficient decomposition	Inequality decreases
Du et. al. (2005)	1997-2001	China	Panel data analysis	Inequality decreases
Yang (2004)	1988-2000	Thailand	Cross-sectional OLS regression	Inequality decreases
Yang (2003)	1986-1999	China	Panel data analysis	Inequality decreases
Zhai et. al. (2003)	1998-2007	China	Computable general equilibrium model (CGE)	Inequality decreases
Guest (1998)	1992	Thailand	Gini coefficient	Inequality decreases
Adams (1996)	1986-1989	Pakistan	Panel data analysis	Inequality decreases
Stark et. al. (1986)	1982	Mexican	Pearson correlation analysis	Inequality decreases
Oberai and Singh (1981)	1977	India	Multiple regression analysis	Inequality decreases

Lipton (1980)	1955-1970	India	Cross-section analysis	Inequality increases

The widest literature concerning the relationship between migration-regional inequalities are the studies on the Chinese economy. When the strict measures against migrating from urban areas and settling in rural areas in China are taken into consideration, the internal migration regional inequality problem stands out as a significant problem due to the destabilizing effect of this practice on rural and urban areas. This situation leads to many studies to be conducted about the Chinese economy. The main view of many of these studies conducted on China is that internal migration decreases regional inequality. The high levels of income inequalities in rural and urban areas of China play a significant role in this result. One thesis of these studies is the conditional hypothesis, which emphasizes that whether migration increases or decreases inequality may differ under certain conditions.[30]

When the internal migration in Turkey is analyzed; it can be seen that the migration movements showed an increase after the year 1990 due to terrorism. Moreover, while an increase in migration movements was observed after the transformation of agriculture together with the industrialization process, the direction of the migrations was from the rural regions to the coastal regions and to developed regions and cities. On the other hand, the need for a labor force in agriculture disappeared along with the mechanization and as a result of this, people who became unemployed started to migrate to the cities that were going through an industrialization process. As a consequence, the geographical inequalities between regions in Turkey, terrorism and clustering of industrialization in certain regions contributed towards a concentrated internal migration flow and the relationship between the migration movements and regional inequality lead to a vicious cycle. Within this cycle, internal migration may cause regional inequalities to decrease or increase and regional inequalities may cause an increase in the migration ratios.

Employment problems are significant in order to analyze the reasons and results of migration movements. Because the individuals with the highest

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[30]   Xiaoqıan Wang, *Migration, remittances, poverty and inequality in China: A counterfactual analysis.* GATE Lyon Saint-Etienne Research Center of Universit Lumire Lyon, 2014.

migrating tendency in immigrating regions are unemployed people, migration of these individuals from underdeveloped regions, where the unemployment ratio is high, to developed regions, where the unemployment ratio is low, is expected[31] In the General Consensus of Population conducted in the year 2000, the participants were asked the reasons for migration and it was understood that 20% of the migrating population migrated in order to look for employment or because they found employment. It is observed that when migration due to appointments and assignation are added, migration with employment purposes correspond to 33,5% of the total migration. It may also be seen that, when dependent population is added to this group, the part of the population migrated due to economic reasons is at a very large scale[32] When the fact that the migration movements in Turkey are mostly done with employment purposes is taken into consideration, these employment-based migrations have an active role in decreasing the imbalances between regions by decreasing the income inequality in migration-receiving regions. The migration, which is in parallel with labor demands an increase in migration-receiving developed regions, may result in deduction of wages in these regions and a decrease in income inequality. As for the immigrating regions, the most important factor underlying the fact that migration does not have any effect on inequalities is that in Turkey the migration movements are carried out with family members rather than on an individual level. This situation results in the inefficiency of remittance channel and therefore weakens the decreasing effect of migrations on inequality.

The inequality between regions in Turkey comes into prominence as a significant economic problem, depending on the quality of labor, investments, spatial inequalities and many other factors. When the relationship between migration and inequality in Turkey is analyzed; it is observed that the direction of migration is from underdeveloped regions such as Eastern Anatolia, Southeastern Anatolia and Eastern Black Sea to industrialized regions with high income per capita such as Western Anatolia, Eastern Marmara, İstanbul and the Aegean region. The inequality difference between regions concerning the years of 2008-2015 was examined by tak-

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[31]   Pınar Narin Emirhana,"Göreli yoksunluk ve bölgelerarası göçler: Türkiye örneği," *Business and Economics Research Journal,2015,*6(2), 79-89.

[32]   Alpay Filiztekin,*Türkiye de bölgesel farklar ve politikalar.* İstanbul: Türk Sanayicileri ve İşadamları Derneği Yayını 2008, No: 471.

ing the average of 8 years of gini data, and the region that had the highest regional inequality ratio was found to be the Mediterranean Region with 0.390. The regions following the Mediterranean Region were Northeastern Anatolia with 0.387, the Aegean region with 0.385, Western Anatolia with 0.379, Southeastern Anatolia with 0.373, Middle Eastern Anatolia with 0.369, Western Marmara with 0.368, İstanbul and Middle Anatolia with 0.363, Western Black Sea with 0.350 and Eastern Black Sea with 0.342. The lowest regional inequality belongs to Eastern Marmara with 0.340. When the data is examined, it is seen that the inequality is high in coastal regions such as the Aegean and Mediterranean regions. The differences between the cities of the region and the clustering in the tourism industry play a significant role in this observation. Eastern Marmara, which is one of the leading regions, is the region with the lowest regional inequality ratio. Herein, the high industrial and commercial volume of Kocaeli city has a primary importance.[33]

When the migration movements are evaluated in general, it can be seen that the migration from rural and underdeveloped regions to coastal and industrialized regions are more employment-oriented rather than migration with other purposes such as securety and educational purposes. Aside from the migration movements, the differences in private sector investments as well as unfavorable geographical conditions, securety concerns related to terrorism and labor differences of the underdeveloped regions lead to an increase in inequalities. Since it is one of the most significant problems of regional imbalances before regional development, to what extent these inequalities between regions are affected, finding solutions for these inequalities and policy implementations seeking solutions should be discussed.

3. Data Set and Method

In this study, the effect of internal migration on regional inequalities was attempted to be determined by using panel data regression analysis. Panel data set includes the data concerning the years of 2008-2015 based upon level 1 region (12 regions) in Turkey. The data used in the panel regression analysis is presented below.

Regional gini data was used as dependent variable. The gini inequality in-

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[33]   TUİK bölgesel verileri. https://biruni.tuik.gov.tr/bolgeselistatistik/2016.

dex is the leading inequality measurement method that is most commonly used in literature. Gini coefficientcan range from values 0 to 1 and when the coefficient value gets closer to 0 it means that the inequality decreases and when the coefficient value gets closer to 1 it means that inequality increases. The gini variable that is used to express regional inequality was obtained from the regional values of Turkish Statistical Institute[34]

The independent variables used in the study comprise of internal received migration and immigration, environmental expenditure and educated labor working in technology and intensive industries. Since internal received migration and immigration between regions has different effects on regional inequality, both migration receiving and immigrating variables are included in the study. The data concerning the internal migration receiving and immigrating of level 1, which consists of 12 regions, data set was obtained from the migration statistics of the Turkish Statistical Institute[35] and the data base of the Address-Based Population Registration System (ADNKS). The Public investment expenditures were used to represent public expenditures. Another independent variable is export per capita and import per capita. Figures concerning the educated labor working in technology and information intensive sectors were included as another independent variable. The related variable was obtained from the data base of the European Statistical Office.[36]

The model related to the variables used in the study, where panel regression analysis was used, is presented below.

$$G_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1 M_i + \beta_2 M_O + \beta_3 \mathsf{G} + \beta_4 \mathsf{H} + \beta_5 E + \beta_6 I + u_t$$

$G_t =$ Regional gini index

$M_i =$ Internal immigration variable

$M_o =$ Internal emigration variable

G = Regional government investment expenditures variable

H = Regional educated labor working in intensive technology and information sectors variable

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[34]   ibid

[35]   ibid

[36]   EUROSTAT http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat 2016.

E=   Regional per capita exports variable

I =   Regional per capita imports variable

4. Descriptive Statistics

The descriptive statistics used in the study are presented on Table 2. When Table 2 is examined, it can be seen that the average value of gini index stating the regional inequality is 0,36. The maximum gini value of the aforementioned years belong to Northeast Anatolia (data of year 2008) with 0,43 and the minimum gini value belongs to Eastern Black Sea region (data of year 2013) with 0,32. When the average of years 2008-2015 is examined, the region with the highest inequality level is the Mediterranean region with 0,39 and the regions with the lowest inequality level is the East Marmara region with 0,43. The average value of internal migration between regions is 171031, the lowest migration receiving figure belongs to Northeast Anatolia (data year of 2008) with 57012 and the highest migration receiving ratio belongs to İstanbul (data of year 2015) with 453407. The average of internal immigration ratio is 171031 and the lowest immigration ratio belongs to Western Marmara (data of year 2008) with 76453 and the highest immigration ratio belongs to İstanbul (data of year 2014) with 424662. The lowest average of educated labor working in technology and information intensive sectors belongs to Northeast Anatolia (2009) with 646 and the highest figure belongs to İstanbul (2015) with 5301. When the government investment expenditures are taken into consideration, it is observed that the highest public expenditures belong to Western Anatolia and the lowest public expenditures belong to North Eastern Anatolia. And the highest per capita export belongs to Eastern Marmara and the lowest to Istanbul; the highest per capita import belongs to Istanbul and the lowest is in Middle Eastern Anatolia.

Table 2: Descriptive Statistics

	GINI	LNGOV	LNINMIG	LNOUTMIGR	LNPEREXP	LNPERIMP	LNHTEC
Mean	0.367240	14.22372	11.91097	11.96207	6.545079	6.364444	5.728519
Max.	0.433869	15.53330	13.0179	12.95905	8.663715	9.228082	7.345042
Min.	0.322980	12.79367	10.95102	11.24443	4.290459	3.332205	4.371976
Obsv.	84						

The correlation matrix belonging to the variables used in the study concerning the years of 2008-2015 is presented on Table 3.

Table 3: Correlation Matrix

	GINI	LNGOV	LNINMIGR	LNOUTMIGR	LNPEREXP	LNPERIMP	LNHTEC
GINI	1						
LNGOV.	-0.081606	1					
LNINMIGR.	-0.074724	0.721074	1				
LNOUTMIGR	0.056835	0.730532	0.866036	1			
LNPEREXP	-0.203649	-0.055143	-0.109167	-0.127229	1		
LNPERIMP	-0.130065	0.628302	0.912088	0.738311	0.063709	1	
LNHTEC	0.001405	0.711319	0.954294	0.788566	-0.055069	0.915574	1

When the correlation analysis results are examined, it is observed that there is a positive correlation between gini variable and internal emigration. Similarly, there is a positive correlation between gini and labor working in technology and information intensive sector variables. However, there is a negative correlation between the gini index and migration receiving variables. In accordance with this, as the received migration increases, the gini coefficient increases correspondently and this means a decrease in regional inequalities. Besides, there is a negative relationship between gini and government expandtures; there is a negative relationship between gini and per capitaimport-export .

The analysis results are given on Table 4 below. In the study, the relationship between internal migration and regional inequality was tested with panel regression model by using data concerning the years 2008-2015.Internal migration receiving and emigrating migration were examined separately since they contain different results. In this study, where the gini index was used as the dependent variable, internal migration data, public investment expenditures, qualified labor working in technology and information intensive sectors, regional per capita import and export were taken as independent variables. In accordance with the results of the analysis, the relationship between regional per capita import and gini was statistically insignificant. Therefore, this finding let us conclude that regional per capita importhas no effect on regional inequalities. It is found that there is a statistically significant relationship between internal migration receiving

variable and gini. In accordance with this, within the relationship between migration and inequality, the migration receiving of regions decreases the regional inequality. Another significant relationship is between gini and regional internal emigration. It is found that there is a positive relationship between two variables. According to internal emigration, regional inequality increases.On the other hand there is positive relationship between gini and educated labor working in technology and information intensive sectors. In another sense, the increase in educated labor working in technology and information intensive sectors increases gini and this means there will be an increase in regional inequality. There is also a negative relationship between public investment expenditures and regional inequality. That is, public investment expenditure reduces regional disparities. Per capita exports are among the variables that reduce the regional inequality. As a result, it is observed that emigration increases regional ineqaulitybut migration receiving of the regions decreases gini coefficient and hence decreases regional inequality.

Tablo 4: Results of the Analyses

Dependent Variable: GINI Method: Panel Least Squares			
Variable	**Coefficient**	**t-Statistic**	**Prob.**
LNINMIGR	-0.073588	-3.458106	0.0009
LNOUTMIGR	0.045141	3.428991	0.0010
LNGOV	-0.011877	-2.061026	0.0427
LNHTEC	0.043528	4.200355	0.0001
LNPEREXP	-0.003893	-1.769171	0.0808
LNPERIMP	-0.006409	-1.513621	0.1342
C	0.689605	4.383894	0.0000

5. Conclusions

When the inequalities between regions are taken into consideration, it is seen that regional policies have a supplementary role in the economic development process. In this regard, many countries give weight to regional policies within the context of regional development. Migration policies are

accepted as one of the primary topics within the context of the regional policies. The migration, which leads to different regional consequences in different countries, contributes positively to regional development by decreasing regional inequalities by way of executing efficient policies considering the countries' conditions. When evaluated generally migration decreases inequalities with labor migration in some regions, whereas it causes development differences to grow in certain regions.

While the studies emphasizing that inequality will be increasing in the relationship between migration and inequality accept factors such as the migration of qualified and productive labor, the ability of only middle and upper class segments to migrate due to the very high migration costs, the low remittance and remaining people being old, sick and helpless are determining factors; in the studies emphasizing that inequality will be decreasing the views, which suggest that income growth will be provided in the poor segment through the decrease in employment along with employment-oriented migration and remittance realized by the migrants, gain weight.

In this study, the effect of level 1 regional-based internal migration movements in Turkey on regional inequality was analyzed with panel regression by using data concerning years 2008-2015. In the analysis, it is concluded that internal emigration increases regional inequalities but migration receiving regions decreased inequalities. Inefficiency of remittance plays an important role in obtaining these findings. Because migration takes place more often with family members and this undermines the positive effect of remittance on regional income distribution in Turkey. Moreover, the more skilled workforce of migrants contributes positively to the regional equilibrium in migrating regions. On the other hand, no study analyzing the relationship between internal migration and regional inequality in Turkey has been found in the literature. Given the role of regional development of regional inequalities, it is expected that this article will make a significant contribution to the literature in terms of the regional development policy proposal.

When it is taken into consideration that the regional development difference is a significant problem in Turkey, all the factors that may contribute to the regional development gain importance with regards to the policy makers. When the historical process is examined, the process starting with

regional development plans in Turkey, presents the economic importance of the regional policies along with the activation of the development agencies and policies aimed at regional development. Within the context of these results and when the effects of the migration are taken into consideration on a national level, the migration policies that will be applied become more of an issue. Carrying out the migration practices both in migration receiving and immigrating regions, in the manner that will not cause any negative problems (unemployment insurances, agricultural supports or providing financial resources when it is necessary to support migration, and regulating the migration costs), has a significant role in migration – inequality relationship.

Therefore when considering the results of the study that internal emigration increases the regional inequality whereas receiving internal migration decreases the regional inequality, bringing rural areas to the status of migrated areas will reduce inequality in these regions. In this context, regulations under policies to encourage migration to rural areas are important. also, improvement of employment conditions are among the measures to be taken by increasing public investments in these regions. On the other hand, given the impact of security issues on internal migration, reducing the security problems is one of the measures that can be done. At this point, the living standards in developed regions are also related to the migration regions and it is important to improve regulations such as housing, fixed capital investments, agricultural support policies, and health and education investments with public support. If these policies are implemented effectively, it is expected to contribute to reducing the high level of regional disparities in emigration regions.

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National Identities and Identity Documents in between Wars: Palestinians of Syria along Multiple Displacements

Stefano Fogliata[*]

Abstract

Despite the sense of "otherness" between refugees and the host society has been a prerogative of the Palestinian exile, the intensity of this distancing process varies according to the country of exile. This paper will study the consequences of the socio-political events and dispositions over Palestinian refugees from Syria fleeing the current civil war in order to find a sanctuary in the neighbouring Lebanon. The core of the work inquires how a previous experience of displacement serves as a social and cultural resource and questions the current Palestinian presence in the Middle East. Moving from these interrogatives, I tried to shed a light over the way the concept of "Palestine" seems to act as a catalyst for the individuals in determining how their own identity of "double refugees" is shifting nowadays. I argue that the current emigrations towards Europe constitute a pattern in redefining assumption concerning Palestinian refugees' relations with national memory and collective spaces. Trying to connect refugees' narratives around national identity and identity documents, I will show how the current international refugee legal system is structurally inappropriate to effectively deal with stateless persons who currently find themselves once more on the way.

Keywords: Migration, Syria, Palestine, Refugees, Borders, Identity

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Savaşlar Arasında Ulusal Kimlik ve Kimlik Belgeleri: Suriye'deki Filistinlilerin Göç Hikayeleri

Stefano Fogliata[*]

Öz

Filistinli Mülteciler ve ev sahibi toplum arasındaki "ötekilik" duygusu, her ne kadar Filistin sürgünü için ayrıcalıklı bir durum olsa da iki grup arasındaki uzaklaşma mesafesinin yoğunluğu ülkeden ülkeye değişmektedir. Bu makale, Suriye'den iç savaşın etkisiyle uzaklaştırılan Filistinli mültecilerin komşu ülke Lübnan'da sığınma yeri taleplerini ve sosyo-politik olayların sonuçlarını incelemektedir. Çalışmanın özü esasen yerinden olma deneyiminin sosyo-kültürel kaynaklarını inceleyip Ortadoğu'daki mevcut Filistin varlığını sorgulamaktadır. Bu sorgulardan hareketle, "çift mülteci" kimliğinin günümüzde nasıl değiştiğini belirlemek adına "Filistin" kavramının bireylere karşı nasıl katalizör görevi gördüğüne ışık tutulacaktır. Bu çalışma ise Avrupa'ya doğru göçlerin, Filistinli mültecilerin ulusal bellek ve kolektif alanlarla ilişkileri hakkındaki varsayımını yeniden tanımlamada bir model oluşturduğunu iddia etmektedir. Mülteci anlatılarını ulusal kimlik ve kimlik belgeleri etrafında birleştirerek mevcut uluslararası hukuk sisteminin vatansız kalmış mültecilerin sorunlarını çözme noktasında etkili olmadığı ve yapısal düzenlemeye gitmesi gerektiği savunulacaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Göç, Suriye, Filistin, Mülteciler, Sınırlar, Kimlik

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"The quintessential Palestinian experience, which illustrates some of the most basic issued raised by Palestinian identity, takes place at a border, an airport, a checkpoint: in short, at any one of those many modern barriers where identities are checked and verified. What happens to Palestinians at these crossing points brings home to them how much they share in common as people".

(Khalidi, 1997: 1)

1. Introduction

Analyses and debates on the reconfiguration of rights, democracy, social justice and dignity in the Middle East "suffer from a chronic methodological nationalism, which perpetuates the idea that people seek and fight for rights and self-determination solely in their national territory, seen as the natural context for achieving a full social personhood".[1] Despite quite recent enthusiasm for the development of a "global law without the state" emphasised during the last decades, the States still remain the distributors and guarantors of rights. In this realm, the individual who is stateless becomes a non-person, "a body that can be moved around by armies and police, customs officers and refugee agencies".[2] While this statement may apply to several past and contingent situations, we should consider how forced population movements have extraordinarily diverse historical and political causes and involve people who find themselves in qualitatively different situations and predicaments.[3]

Even within the current debate following the Arab Uprisings, refugees regularly find themselves excluded and silenced, if not represented as unintended and desperate victims in need for material support. This paper collocates within the contemporary debate emerging in the aftermath of the current displacements experienced by millions of people fleeing the war-torn Syria. Within this recently expanded framework, I will shed a light on the peculiar migrating trajectories experienced by Palestinian refugees

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[1]   Ruba Salih . From Bare Lives to Political Agents: Palestinian Refugees as Avant-garde. Refugee Survey Quarterly, (2013), p.1.

[2]   Seyla Benhabib . & Robert Post. Another cosmopolitanism. The Berkeley Tanner lectures. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (2008), p. 175.

[3]   Liisa H. Malkki, Refugees and Exile: From Refugees Studies to the National Order of Things, in Annual Review of Antropology, (1995), Vol. 24, pp. 495-523.

fleeing Syrian war and recently finding a sanctuary in the neighbouring countries.

With media mainly focusing on political and sectarian rifts dominating the Syrian scenario, national communities such as Palestinian refugees have turned into hyper-visible in the media solely in the aftermath of the government siege and almost complete depopulation of the Palestinian refugee camp of Yarmouk.[4] Just recently, Al-Hardan and Gabiam have recently published two monographs hinging on this community.[5] While the former focuses on significances the *Nakba[6]* among the Palestinians in Syria, the latter expounds on the humanitarian situation of the camps before and during the current conflict. Nevertheless, no exhaustive work has rather been published about the trajectories experienced by the Palestinians fleeing Syria and the meanings associated with the current multiple displacements around the neighbouring countries.

With the aim to contribute to the development of this recent argument, this paper will shed a light on the consequences of the socio-political events and dispositions over Palestinian refugees from Syria around the region. Indeed, in respect with Syrian citizens, the Palestinians of Syria have fled the country carrying a previous burden of a "general condition of homelessness"[7] after the 1948-expulsion from Palestine. While most of the past researches investigated forms of commitment and belonging between homeland and the current place of residence, Palestinians experienced several transnational discourses and practices between various so-called Host States. During the last decades, Palestinians have endured a progressive reconfiguration of spaces in the region in the aftermath of several displace-

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4 Nell Gabiam & Fiddian-Qasmiyeh E, Palestinians and the Arab Uprisings: political activism and narratives of home, homeland, and home-camp, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies. (2016).

5 Anaheed Al-Hardan, Palestinians of Syria: Memories of a Shattered Community. New York: Columbia University Press, (2016). Gabiam, (2016), The politics of Suffering. Syria's Palestinian Refugee Camps. Indiana University Press Griffiths, (2001).

6 It is the Arabic term meaning "The catastrophe", that refers to the Palestinians' collective memory for the military collapse in the 1948 Arab-Israeli war and the consequent exile of around 700.000 Palestinians around the region. About the issue, Nasim, Ahmad (2012) *Understanding The Nakba. An Insight Into The Plight Of Palestinians*. Palestinian Return Centre

7 Edward Said, Zionism from the Standpoint of Its Victims, in Social Text No.1, Duke University Press. (1979).

ments occurred in several countries, such as Kuwait in 1991, Libya in 1996 and Iraq in 2003.[8] Despite the sense of "otherness" between refugees and the host society has been a prerogative of the Palestinian exile, the intensity of this distancing process varies according to the country of exile.

Therefore, the core of my work inquires how the current Palestinians' migration from Syria contributes to reconsider the issue of national attachment and collective belonging. Focusing on the overlapping trajectories currently emerging the Palestinian camps around Lebanon, I will expound on how the specificity of the place of exile determines the intensity of "distantiation" from the host country and contributes to practices of invisibility towards national fellows sharing the national origin but confined for decades in different national contexts. Therefore, how is the mutual interaction between Palestinians from Syria and Lebanon contributing to reshape refugees' imaginaries and perspectives grounded in decades of exile? Moving from a reflection connecting national identity and identity documents, I will show how the current international refugee legal system is structurally inappropriate to effectively deal with stateless persons who are currently once more on the way.

2. Displacements and Identity: Theory and Methodology of the Research

Within the recent scholarship on migration, several authors from different fields have grasped the evolution of refugee identities during their respective trajectories of displacement. The anthropologist Malkki, one of the most relevant scholars on the issue, underlines how "the implicit functionalism of much work in refugee studies is especially clear when one is dealing with questions of identity, culture, ethnicity, and tradition".[9] For instance, the same Malkki focused on how the lived experiences of exile shape the construction of national identity and historicity between two groups of Hutu refugees inhabiting very different settings in Tanzania.

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8   Noura Erakat. "Palestinian Refugees and the Syrian Uprising: Filling the Protection Gap during Secondary Forced Displacement" in International Journal of Refugee Law, (2014), Vol. 26, No. 4, pp. 581–621.

9   Malkki, Refugees and Exile: From Refugees Studies to the National Order of Things, p.508.

Contextually, El Boushra's analysed how identity is perceived relevant for understanding the nature of violent conflict and especially for probing the motivations of different actors in the conflict.[10] Moreover, dealing Kurd refugees in Europe, the psychotherapist Griffiths expounded on the complicated process of identity reformulation as a result of displacement.[11]

In the case of the Palestinian exile going on since 1948, both collective traumas and major obstacles have played a role in shaping and expressing a separate Palestinian identity.[12] In this way, the national political identity is connoted as a function of collective memory and collective claims making.[13] Therefore, the Palestinian identity is constituted also through the suspicion, mistrust and outside categorization: in this way, numerous boundaries of exclusion reinforce the articulation of Palestinian-ness.[14] Indeed, Palestinian refugees spread around different exiles around the region, especially the ones living in the refugee camps, have never ceased to demonstrate their allegiance to the value and meaning of Palestinian nationalism.[15] Grounded on the paradigm of resistance and memory reinvigorated by international solidarity networks, the collective political identity and camps have always been considered as deeply interconnected aspects of the so-called Palestinian cause.

While the danger of "identity politics" in contexts of fragile states, transitional governance and ethno-political division has been well documented[16], the scholarship has given less attention to how contested identities or the

[10] Judy el-Boushra, Transforming Conflict: Some Thoughts on a Gendered Understanding of Conflict Processes. In Jacobs S., Jacobson R. & Marchbank J.(eds.), States of Conflict, Gender, Violence and Resistance. London; Zed Bookd Ltsd, (2000).

[11] Pamela Griffiths, Counseling asylum seekers and refugees: a study of Kurds in early and later stage of exile. In European Journal of Psychoterapy, Counseling & Health 4 (2), (2001).

[12] Rashid Khalidi, Palestinian Identity: The Construction of Modern National Cosciousness. New York, Columbia University Press, (1997).

[13] Diana K. Allan, Refugees of the revolution: Experiences of Palestinian exile. Stanford: Stanford University Press, (2014), p.6.

[14] Juliane Hammer, Palestinians born in Exile: Diaspora and the search for a homeland. University of Texas Press, (2005).

[15] Luigi Achilli, Palestinian Refugees and Identity: Nationalism, Politics and the Everyday. London, New York: I.B. Tauris, (2015), p.11.

[16] Craig Larkin, Memory and Conflict in Lebanon: Remembering and Forgetting the Past. London: Routledge, (2012).

"politics of Othering" are transmitted and maintained through processes of remembering through self-narratives of the daily life.[17] In this context, while refugees experience has almost exclusively understood through the ideological and orthodox lens of national attachment, the everyday aspects experienced by refugees are mainly occluded since emergent subjectivities do not conform to the communitarian ideals of nationalism.

In this field, processes of multiple displacements and allegiances endured by Palestinian refugees of Syria contribute to grasp on the impact of deterritorialization on the resources of local and transnational experiences.[18] Indeed, deterritorialization affects the loyalties of groups, especially in the context of long-terms displacements such as the Palestinian exile. Especially around within refugee camps, the relationship between place and identity may be regarded as mutually constitutive, where the construction of identity involves establishing opposites and "others" whose actuality is always subject to the continuous interpretation and reinterpretation of their differences.[19]

With numerous Palestinian camps in Lebanon currently turning into a "transitional zone of emplacement"[20] providing refuge to a huge number of Syria's refugees, I focused on which extent the mutual interaction between Palestinians from Syria and Lebanon reshapes self-narratives of collective belongings grounded in decades of exile.

The paper adopts a multi-disciplinary methodology moving from the implications of international relations and border studies within the field of refugee studies into a socio- anthropological attempt to probe the people's living experiences in a transnational perspective. As regards the researcher's positionality in the fieldwork, I have fruitfully benefited from Al Hardan's critical approach towards a current epistemological approach treating "Palestinian refugees in Syria as objects, rather than subjects, of

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[17]   John McGarry & O'Leary, B. The politics of ethnic conflict regulation: Case studies of protracted ethnic conflicts. London: Routledge, (2003).

[18]   Arjun Appadurai, Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization. Public Worlds Volume 1. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, (1996).

[19]   Said, Orientalism. New York: Panteon Books, (1978), p.332.

[20]   Maja Janmyr & Knudsen A. J. "Introduction: Hybrid Spaces" in Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development, (2016), Volume 7, Number 3, Winter 2016, pp. 391-395.

history and memory".[21] Her paper deeply constituted a relevant reference point in my research, together with Mitchell's reflections on the outsider's shifting role in stories of resilience, survival and pain narrated from Palestinian refugee camps.[22]

The on-going fieldwork for this paper has been conducted in the twelve official Palestinian camps in Lebanon since July 2014. Undertaken as an attempt to examine in depth the causes and implications of the current trajectories of displacement, my research has been constantly reformulated in parallel with several episodes occurred in the course of my fieldwork. Throughout my fieldwork, my attention has thus been shifting in focus from a political analysis, mainly dependent on external networks, to the exploration in depth of refugees' daily experiences and self-narratives. Inspired by works such as the ones carried out by Bayat[23] and Cronin[24], I stress the importance of focusing on daily contingencies as a key to better especially grasp human dynamics dealing with dispossession and marginality.

Therefore, this socio-anthropological work combines long-term participant observation, informal discussions, focus groups and interviews in depth. Especially during the first year of my fieldwork, I had the opportunity to conduct long and durable observation sessions and interviews in depth with forty individuals from the twelve official camps in Lebanon[25].Among them, fifteen female and eighteen male adults coming from Yarmouk camp represent the core of my informants. Since my research questions metanarratives conditioned by "outsiders" or internal political networks[26], I have

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21   Al-Hardan, Palestinians of Syria: Memories of a Shattered Community, p. 64.

22   Mary Mitchell, "Who tells the stories? Storytelling project in Lebanon camp". In Index on Censorship, March 2015,vol. 44 no.1, pp. 31-33.

23   Asef Bayat, Life as Politics: How Ordinary People Change the Middle East, Stanford: Stanford University Press, (2010).

24   Stephanie Cronin, Subalterns and Social Protest: History from Below in the Middle East and North Africa. Routledge, (2007).

25   The interviews in depth were performed in Arabic and English. As per the interviews in depth performed in Arabic, I availed myself of cultural mediators coming from the same Lebanese camp where I held the interviews. All interviews were confidential: the full names of interviewees are withheld by mutual agreement.

26   About the issue, see S.Hanafi, *The emergence of a Palestinian globalized elite: donors, international organizations and local NGOs*, Jerusalem: The Institute for Palestine Studies and Muwatin, the Palestinian Institute for the Study of Democracy, (2005)

carefully tried to include within my informants numerous people not directly affiliated with political organizations parties.

3. Contested Past Integrations in view of the Current Catastrophe

Before focusing on how Palestinians from Syria reshape their political identity along multiple displacements, we should consider that, if compared to their national fellows in Jordan or Lebanon, their trajectories were not extensively researched in the literature. This "under-exposition" mainly finds its reason in the "fair assimilation" of the Palestinian experience in Syria if compared with the antipodal conditions of displacement in Jordan and Lebanon. In respect with the former, the Hashemite Kingdom has granted the citizenship to most of the refugees. On the contrary, Palestinians in the Syrian have maintained the legal status of stateless persons. On the other side, in sharp contrast with the negation of civil rights imposed by Lebanese policies, the Palestinians in Syria have been regarded as Syrians in origin in terms of civil and economic rights. On the same perspective, most of the refugee camps in Syria were considered as an integral part of the national social fabric and could benefit of the national public services.[27]

Indeed, after having rebuilt their own life in Syria, Palestinians had on the other hand developed a strong affiliation with the country and its people. Mahmoud, a young guy coming from Yarmouk, confirms how "the relations between Syrians and Palestinians were very good, at least before the war. We respected each other. In the camp, as well in our building, it was even rare to distinguish who was Palestinian and who was Syrian."[28] While stressing on the affiliation developed by Palestinians in Syrian exile, it should be also remarked how the collective political identity of the refugees was affected by the direct intervention of the Syrian regime inside the Palestinian political affairs due to Assad's tutelage over some affiliated factions. In this perspective, the relatively fair treatment of Palestinian refugees inside Syria did not hinder the country's leaders from systematically using the Palestinian resistance as a political tool and ensuring that no independent Palestinian power centre emerged in the region, as it could

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[27]   Hamad S. al-Mawed, The Palestinian Refugees In Syria: Their Past, Present and Future. Ottawa: IDRC, (1999).

[28]   Interview with Mahmoud (September 2016,4) in Burj el Barajneh camp

have challenged his hegemonic position.[29] Nassar, a father on his forties met in a tiny dwell around Burj el Barajneh camp, resumes this ambiguous situation:

> *We as Palestinians enjoyed life in the same way as Syrians did. In the same way, when they used to suffer, we did too. As per myself, I was arrested by the regime with some Syrian friends in the 1990s after we had criticized Syria's occupation over Lebanon at the end of the Civil War.[30]*

Despite the strong level of integration within Syrian dynamics reported above, the refugee community officially tried to keep itself out of the direct violent confrontations erupted since March 2011. Due also to the absence of an institution representing effectively the Palestinian community, refugees in the camps were aware of the dangers related to a direct involvement in the fighting. Ns, any attempt of invoked impartiality has rapidly vanished after that most of the camps turned into battlefields just few months after the beginning of the clashes. Moreover, the violent fights in Yarmouk camp broke out into bloody intra-Palestinian bloody clashes.[31] Ghassan, an old man who left the camp at the end of 2013 recalls:

> *During the first year of the war the camp stayed neutral, we as Palestinians did not side with any group. Meanwhile, the camp had welcomed hundreds of thousands of Palestinians as well as Syrians coming all over the country. This is why we were considered as traitors by the Regime. Nowadays you cannot even know who is sided with whom; all the ones who were able to flee left the camp. There is no life in the camp, Yarmouk itself is dead.[32]*

The camp, which had hosted not less than 150.000 Palestinians before the war, has been under siege seized by Islamist factions since December 2012 after being sieged by the regime forces. The rapid collapse of the cultural and political capital of the refugee community became the emblem of the Palestinian tragedy and resulted to become the key-date for all the community. Following the same violent dynamics pervading most of the country starting from 2012, the security situation has deteriorated in almost all the

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[29] Magda Qandil, "The Syrian Revolution and the Palestinian Refugees in Syria: Realities and risks.". Doha: Al Jazeera Center for Studies, (2012).

[30] Interview with Hassan (December 2014, 13) in Borj el Barajneh camp

[31] Nidal Bitari, Yarmuk Refugee Camp and the Syrian Uprising: A View from Within. Journal of Palestine Studies, 43 (1), pp. 61–78, (2013).

[32] Interview with Ghassan (February 2015, 10) in Al-Buss camp

camps around the country. After several years of fighting storming most of the camps in the war-torn Syria, both UNRWA and several agencies claim the death of thousands of Palestinians[33].

4. "There Was No Other Way than Lebanon"

Following a trajectory similar to the one experienced by millions of Syrian refugees, more than half of the about 600.000 Palestinians in Syria are currently displaced due to the violence and the extension of the conflict.[34] Being *de facto* stateless, Palestinians' trajectories differ from their Syria's counter parts due to a more severe immobility, since their condition of homelessness is strictly connected with the one of "passportlessness". Moreover, due to an "exclusion clause" stated both in UNHCR's Statute and in the 1951 Refugee Convention, Palestinians from Syria fall within the competence of UNRWA and cannot so that legally benefit from the assistance and the protection offered by UNHCR to Syrian nationals[35].

Due to these overlapping legal implications, "double refugees" have been currently facing additional restrictions on entering Syria's neighbouring States. Therefore, since 2014 Palestinians are left with nowhere to legally seek a second refuge out of Syria. Indeed, even if the number was quite insignificant if compared to the Syrian citizens who crossed the same borders, Palestinians refugees from Syria had to face additional obstacles to flee the country. Since most of the Palestinians used to reside around Damascus before the conflict, very few thousands of people tried to get into Turkey because it implied crossing Syria through a long and dangerous route scattered around fragmented territories. Therefore, especially before the "inauguration" on mass scale of the so-called Balkan route through

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[33] Among the other, one of the most updated accurate source is the Action Group for Palestinians in Syria, a group based in London working on different levels with regards to Palestinians of Syria in terms of documenting and monitoring daily field events to their situation, and directing humanitarian appeals for them.

[34] Information included in "UNRWA Syria regional crisis response: january-december 2014". Cfr http://www.unrwa.org/resources/reports/unrwa-response-and-services-. Check all the data about Palestinians refugees and Syria crisis at http://www.unrwa.org/syria-crisis(accessed March 30, 2015)

[35] This is not the case of Turkey, where UNRWA is not operative and therefore the government and the UN Agencies do not legally make distinctions between Syrians and Palestinians.

Turkey, most of the Palestinians from Syria tried to find refuge either in Jordan or in Lebanon.

The impact of an international and national distinguished legal treatment has become crushing on Palestinians' daily lives, especially concerning borders politics in Jordan and Lebanon. Concerning the Hashemite the Kingdom, which is currently hosting around more than 600.000 Syrian refugees[36], the State authorities started denying entry to Palestinians from Syria in April 2012 and officially declared a non-admittance policy in January 2013.[37] Consequently, at the time when Yarmouk as well as many other camps finally collapsed causing the displacement of thousands of people, Jordan had already closed its doors for Palestinians. Abu Khaled, a father of four children who left Yarmou at the end of 2012, states:

> *At that time we as Palestinian were forbidden from entering Jordan. I personally know some Palestinian families who went to the border and were not sent back by the Jordanian authorities. At the same time, I did not go to Turkey because I was afraid the Syrian government would not have allowed us to come back. Lebanon was the only choice available to leave Syria.[38]*

Therefore, also benefiting from numerous pre-established Palestinian transnational familiar networks between the two countries, most of the Palestinians of Syria took refuge in the neighbouring Lebanon. Mahmoud, a Syrian young guy from Aleppo countryside whom I met in Beirut, reveals the fundamental role played by this kind of pre-established familiar connections beyond the borders:

> *My father is Syrian and my mother is Palestinian from Lebanon: I was born in Borj el Barajneh camp in Beirut and moved to Syria when I was 15 years old. My village was so close to the Turkish border that few years ago we used to walk there. Once I decided to leave my village in order to avoid the military conscription I have immediately thought about coming back to Borj el Barajneh. I was used to living here and I knew a lot of people who could support me to find an accommodation for my family.*

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[36]   All the data regarding Syrian refugees in the Middle East can be found on the website of UNHCR at http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php

[37]   On the issue, check Human Rights Watch report: "Not welcome: Jordan's Treatment of Palestinians Escaping Syria". https://www.hrw.org/report/2014/08/07/not-welcome/jordans-treatment-palestinians-escaping-syria

[38]   Abu Khaled (November 2014, 7). Personal interview, Beddawi camp.

> *Even if I am just Syrian by citizenship I really do also feel Palestinian: this camp is part of us.[39]*

In the first half of 2013 around 6.000 Palestinians were monthly crossing the border areas between Syria and Lebanon, till reaching the overall number of 66.000 people in July of the same year[40]. Although Palestinians represented a very small proportion of the total number of refugees entering the country[41], the Lebanese authorities issued new and cumulative arbitrary entry policies on the entry of Palestinians from Syria. After that they were made official in May 2014, fewer and fewer Palestinians have tried to cross the border: almost just the ones who have a valid ticket and visa for a third-country get a 11-hour transit permit to reach the airport. Due to the restriction at the border with Syria and the contemporary high emigration rate toward Europe, the number of the Palestinians from Syria in Lebanon has levelled off at around 44.000 persons[42].

Palestinians of Syria in Lebanon have to deal with further obstacles as regards their legal status in the country. The historical and political origin of these mistreatment must be retraced in the past: Palestinians from Syria currently inherit the "special" system implemented for the about 300.000 Palestinians of Lebanon. Specifically, the newcomers have to deal with further obstacles as regards their legal permanence in the country. Also due to arbitrary national policies intertwined with regular misunderstandings between the government and UNRWA, more than 80% of the Palestinians are living in Lebanon without legal valid papers[43].The lack of formal le-

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[39] Mahmoud (October 2016, 13). Personal interview, Borj el Barajneh camp.

[40] Interview with Zizette Darkazally (07/11/2014) UNRWA *Pubblic Information Officer, Beirut*

[41] Although numbers are extremely volatile due to gaps in the registration system as well as the huge rate of transnational mobility among the refugees, more than one million Syrian refugees have been registered by UNHCR in Lebanon since 2014. As per the last update held at 31/01/16, 1,07,785 Syrian are registered in the country as refugees. All the data regarding Syrian refugees in the Middle East can be found on the website of UNHCR at http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php(last access on January 31, 2016)

[42] According to an official survey carried by UNRWA in July 2014.

[43] These numbers collected during my fieldwork were later confirmed by an overall survey conducted by UNRWA in 2015. See "Chaaban, J., Salti, N., Ghattas, H., Irani, A., Ismail, T., Batlouni, L. (2016), "Survey on the Socioeconomic Status of Palestine Refugees in Lebanon 2015", Report published by the American University of Beirut (AUB) and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA)."

gal protection of Palestinian refugees transforms them de facto into illegal migrants subject to potential *refoulement* towards Syria.[44] In such a significant extended situation, the concrete risks of arbitrary detention by the Lebanese authorities put their own mobility patterns at stake. As Zaher- a young activist coming from Yarmouk- reports:

> *You have restrictions on movement because they may be arrested if they pass through checkpoints around Lebanon or the ones nearby the camps. They are illegal so that basically they can be detained and arrested. The authorities are not deporting people, so that they release them after being detained with a stamp ordering they have to leave the country within a certain amount of time".[45]*

Within this context, the concrete risk of arbitrary detention prevents most of the refugees interviewed from going out of the camps. This recurrent strategy is motivated by the will of keeping yourself away from areas perceived as potential problem spaces in order to avoid experiencing hostility in an already discordant environment. According to a survey conducted by UNRWA, most of the Palestinians from Syria currently reside in the pre-established Palestinian camps in Lebanon.[46] Indeed, the "forced invisibility" guaranteed by the overcrowded camps is vital in order to avoid security problems related to their precarious legal situation. Therefore, most of my interviewees complained how, in opposition with the former experience in Syria, discrimination and spatial marginalization have been the daily prevalent features of the Lebanese experience. "We could not imagine the situation was so catastrophic" says a Palestinian man coming from Yarmouk camp. "Here the situation is unbearable: you have to pay for everything, even for water! And there is no way to find a job: nothing is going well here. Palestinians from Lebanon are somehow used to it, but for us it is still more difficult because in Syria we were used to have some rights[47]."

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[44] Kamel M. Doraï, "Palestinian Refugees and the current Syrian conflict: From settled refugees to stateless asylum seekers?". Allegra Lab, (2015).

[45] Mahmoud (October 2016, 13). Personal interview, Nahr el Bared Camp.

[46] For more information, see Chaaban, J., Salti, N., Ghattas, H., Irani, A., Ismail, T., Batlouni, L. (2016), "Survey on the Socioeconomic Status of Palestine Refugees in Lebanon 2015", Report published by the American University of Beirut (AUB) and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA).

[47] Interview with N.A. (October 2014, 3) in Al Buss camp.

5. Distancing Individual and Collective Narrations

After being "settled refugees" throughout the last decades in Syria, Palestinians currently find themselves once more on the move looking for protection in an adverse national and international environment. Moreover, after being violently scattered in different countries since 1948, several generations of Palestinians from Syria and Lebanon currently find themselves forced to share the tiny premises of inhospitable refugee camps. How do the mutual interactions emerging between them contribute to reshape refugees' perspectives and certainties grounded in decades of exile? What are the intimate and communal implications related to the reconnection of time and space in terms of national unity and identity?

Historically, the current Palestinians' displacement from Syria is not the first one throughout the several trajectories following 1948-*Nakba.* As significantly recapped by Edward Said, "Palestinians are a people who move a lot, who are always carrying bags from one place to another. This gives us a further sense of identity as a people".[48] In this way, the paradigm of "Palestine", within spatial and social contracted spaces such as refugee camps, has been supposed to work as a catalyst for the individuals in determining the social pattern of their exile. Consulted about the way he perceives the newcomers, the director of a local association explains: "We consider them as Palestinian refugees and we have to help and support them as much as possible. Even if we have not so much to offer, we should divide everything with them. The bread itself should be split, as everything in the house."[49] This reflection goes far beyond the idea of fair hospitality between compatriots, in a situation where the host community sharing with the new comers the perpetual situation of exile.[50] Within the Palestinian camps in Lebanon, both the communities are thus deeply grounded in the diaspora and the search from a homeland.[51] In this way, the director's quotation cited above recalls the official national rhetoric based on the unity

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[48]   Said, The Politics of Dispossession: The Struggle for Palestinian Self- determination. New York; Pantheon Books, (1994), p. 115.

[49]   Interview with C.C. (November 2014, 7) in Beddawi camp.

[50]   Said, Zionism from the Standpoint of Its Victims, in Social Text No.1.

[51]   Juliane Hammer, Palestinians born in Exile: Diaspora and the search for a homeland. University of Texas Press, 2005.

of the Palestinian people defined as "a part of the Palestinian collective narrative central to its formation".[52]

Peculiarly linked to this assumption, the relationship between an official discourse and individual elaborations recall Maria Holt's works on the discrepancy between a collective and an individual identity, focusing on how Palestinian women chase this gap through personal stories and trajectories.[53] Therefore, the depravation the minimal rights thus causes in the refugees "a disjuncture between the places in which they feel rooted and the places where they currently reside".[54]

In the case of the Palestinians of Syria, the second exile in an unwelcoming country cannot that challenge the refugees' identitarian certainties and feelings of collective belonging. "They are left in an unexpected time their home to start a new life in a country that is not very friendly to them. They are people who had a life a couple of years ago and now they have no perspective".[55] After being born in exile as refugees far from their collective homeland, these individuals are once more experiencing "the loss of home (*beit*), which doesn't imply enclosure and privacy but rather a sense of sharing a common space with others".[56] Therefore, the new catastrophe faced in the last years inevitably turns into a distinctive factor in questioning the whole experience as Palestinian refugees in the Middle East. Even the 1948-Nakba has been experienced and elaborated at the light of the Syrian civil war, generating pervasive and fluent comparisons between the two tragedies. Revoking the mass displacement following the bombardment by the regime aircraft over Yarmouk camp in December 2012, Hussein recalls:

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[52]   Meir Litvak, Palestinian Collective Memory and National Identity. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, (2009).

[53]   Maria Holt, "The wives and mothers of heroes: Evolving identities of Palestinian refugee women in Lebanon", in The Journal of Development Studies Vol. 43 , Iss. 2, 2007, pp. 245-264.

[54]   Holt, Women & conflict in the Middle East: Palestinian refugees and the response to violence. Library of Modern Middle East Studies: Vol. 123. London, New York: I.B. Tauris. (2014), p. 99.

[55]   Interview with Zizette Darkazally (November 2014, 7) in Beirut.

[56]   Rosemary Sayigh, Insecurity of Habitat for Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon. In: C. Brun and Forced Migrant Review (eds.) House: Loss, Refuge and Belonging, Conference Report, Oxford, Trondheim: Forced Migrant Review, NTNU, (2004).

> *During that dark day, I was looking at thousands of people living their homes and saw a very old man, I guess he was around 90 years old, keeping the hand of his nephew and saying: "When I left Palestine in 1948, I was more or less on your age. Now we are leaving Yarmouk together and we are on our own and do not have anywhere to go.*[57]

During my fieldwork I grasped on the meanings behind a further split between a collective and an individual narration, with the latter shifting in an on going process according to the current situation the daily constraints. When precariousness and deep vulnerability affect the ordinariness, the stability of personal feelings and beliefs are inevitably affected by these kind of vital concerns. Contextually, many people have been wondering about the uncertainties regarding a collective Palestinian presence in a post-war Syria. Yaser, a young father of three children coming from Yarmouk, reveals:

> *Once the war is over I guess I will not go back to Syria because the country is broken in thousands of pieces. Since the war started, the government refused us as Palestinians and we also started to split along two sides. More importantly, Yarmouk camp is over. If I could choose, I would go back to Palestine. But I know I cannot nowadays, so I would like to travel to Europe in order us to restart a new life as human beings. Palestinians of Syria do not have anything left anymore: we had rebuilt a new life and it has been destroyed once more after 60 years.*

6. Conclusions and Further Perspectives

Double refugees' current displacement sheds a light over the misalignment between the urgencies of the ordinary and a pure orthodox narration pervading the literature related to Palestinian refugees. In a specific historical moment characterized by a shift in the alignment of people and place, the pattern of Palestinians from Syria to Lebanon may contribute to disrupt the archetype of the refugee as a mere resilient victim. Tricked in a new perilous context not perceived and experienced as "home", these persons are experiencing new forms of explicit disaffiliation against a nationalist discourse mainly focused on an all-embracing past and far from daily contingencies. As previously occurred in different contexts throughout the region, we cannot neglect how the role of refugee documents as-

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[57] Interview with Hussein (December 2014, 17) in Borj el Barajneh camp

sumed paramount importance in post-Palestine generation. Reconnecting the past with the present displacements, we should consider how borders and checkpoints have been the bane of Catastrophe, a constant reminder of being out of place, an intruder and an unwelcome guest with no protection. Specifically, when these dispositions come into their own inside a country like Lebanon marked by historic discriminatory policies towards the Palestinians, effects over refugees' daily life achieve a more deplorable status. Paraphrasing several statements collective during the fieldwork, the relevance of identity cards goes far beyond any aprioristic debate regarding identity as itself.

With the unlikely perspective of the return to Palestine and the interrogatives pervading Palestinians' future presence in Syria, the trajectories of this community may be considered as a paradigm of the inconsistencies pervading the actual international refugee regime. Without any exhaustive presumption, my work would like to push the current debate beyond a mere legal approach anchored on the three alternatives proposed by UNCHR as solutions to any refugee crisis. Namely, as in the case of Palestinians from Syria, the eventualities of either return or integration within their Host States country risk fatherly entrap any kind of life trajectories.

Referring to the issue of "integration in the host country", this paper may be conceived as a contribution for a new approach where Palestinian camps are interpreted not just as "time machines" deeply grounded on a univocal nationalist rhetoric. As underlined in the previous pages, Palestinians from Syria are reinterpreting refugee camps as a temporary "departure base" where new migrations towards Europe can be imagined, planned and later on implemented. Within this perspective, discourses about daily-lived practises emerging along the tiny narrows of Palestinian camps contribute to delineate a picture less orthodox and at the same time closer to refugees' imaginaries.

Finally, as per the eventuality of a resettlement into a third State, Palestinians face the last but not least discrimination. Because of their "exclusive affiliation" with UNRWA in Jordan and Lebanon, they are barely involved in the resettlement policies by UNHCR and cannot thus benefit from this last legal opportunity. Subjected to further discriminatory forms of access and rights, Palestinians from Syria attest that they are nowadays living events that are questioning their perceptions and imaginaries. In this situ-

ation, the idea of return to Palestine as the only solution to their exile is deeply questioned by a chance of further emigration they had never even could imagine before 2011. Assumed the tidy rejection of the discriminatory system implemented in Lebanon, I could witness how a great majority of the refugees considerer an "illegal" emigration towards Europe as the only practicable solution for their future. A vast majority of these have re-invented the trajectory of their own life, interpreting it once again through and beyond physical borders and legal boundaries.

Along these vibrant trajectories, the transnational connections generated by these movements are nowadays being reinterpreted as a key for appropriating a more dignified life. "We do not claim great slogans anymore" says Khaled, an English teacher coming from Yarmouk. "We just need to live a decent life: we are looking for peace, security, health care and a house where to sleep."[58] Finally, while describing refugees' refusal of the status quo and new imaginaries and practices oriented to new emigration patterns, I underline how migration to Europe constitutes nowadays an inescapable component in the reformulation of Palestinian-Syrian refugees' national identity.

Broadly speaking in terms of academic engagement and future perspectives, innovative researchers hinged on the connections between the ordinariness in refugee camps and patterns of further migrations may offer some qualitatively alternative insights into a discourse still univocally focused on oppositional ideological lenses. Without any exhaustive presumption, a deeper emphasis on the concrete ordinary may also contribute to shed a light over the reasons behind current transnational discriminatory policies univocally performed through strict legal boundaries and reified material borders.

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[58]   Interview with N.A. (December 2014, 2) in Borj el Barajneh camp.

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From 19th Century to Syrian Civil War: South America as a Syrian Migration Destination and the Case of Brazil

Segâh Tekin[*]

Abstract

Since the beginning of the Syrian Civil War in 2011, many South American countries have declared open door policies for the Syrians seeking refuge. Although the number of people who have reached South America is quite low, the attitude of South American countries has gained special international attention due to political, social and historical reasons. In this respect, Brazil has a special status as the main destination of immigration from the Levant to South America since the 19th century. Brazil is already the home of a large Syrian diaspora. The country has accepted 2,298 Syrian refugees since the beginning of the civil war according to the official data and hosts more Syrians whose application process is ongoing. Today Brazil is the main receiver of the Syrian refugees in South America. This paper discusses the underlying reasons of recent open door policy of South American states, the current situation of Syrian refugees in the region and the problems encountered at the level of policy-making and policy implementation phases with a special emphasis on the developments in Brazil.

Keywords: Syria, Brazil, South America, Migration, Refugee, Asylum

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19. Yüzyıldan Suriye İç Savaşına: Suriyeliler için Göç Destinasyonu Olarak Güney Amerika ve Brezilya Örneği

Segâh Tekin[*]

Öz

Suriye'deki iç savaşın başladığı 2011 yılından bu yana pek çok Güney Amerika ülkesi, iltica etmek isteyen Suriyelilere açık kapı politikası uygulayacaklarını ilan etmişlerdir. Her ne kadar Güney Amerika'ya ulaşabilen kişi sayısı az olsa da Güney Amerika ülkelerinin bu tutumu siyasal, sosyal ve tarihsel nedenlerle uluslararası alanda dikkat çekmiştir. Bu açıdan Doğu Akdeniz'den Güney Amerika'ya 19. yüzyılda yaşanan göç hareketinin ana destinasyonu olan Brezilya, özel bir konuma sahiptir. Brezilya, halihazırda sayıları dört milyona ulaşan kalabalık bir Suriyeli diaspora nüfusuna ev sahipliği yapmaktadır. Ülke, iç savaşın başlangıcından bu yana resmi verilere göre 2,298 Suriye vatandaşına iltica hakkı tanımıştır ve başvuru işlemleri süren daha fazla sayıdaki Suriyeliye ev sahipliği yapmaktadır. Günümüzde Brezilya, Güney Amerika'da en fazla sayıda Suriyeli mülteciye ev sahipliği yapan ülkedir. Bu çalışma, Güney Amerika ülkelerinin yakın geçmişte uygulamaya başladıkları açık kapı politikasının ortaya çıkışındaki nedenleri, bölgedeki Suriyeli mültecilerin hali hazırdaki durumunu ve politika yapımı düzeyinde ve mültecilere yönelik politikaların uygulaması sürecinde karşılaşılan zorlukları Brezilya'daki gelişmelere özel atıfla incelemektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Suriye, Brezilya, Güney Amerika, Göç, Mülteci, Sığınma

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1. Introduction

Today, the displaced people living all around the world come from different countries of Asia and Africa but due to the ongoing civil war and the extensive media covering, attention is mainly focused on Syrian refugees.[1] According to the latest data provided by the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), the number of Syrian asylum seekers registered by the institution has exceeded 5 million people by April 2017.[2] Since the beginning of the Syrian Civil War in 2011, many South American countries have declared open door policies for the refugees from Syria. These countries are Brazil, Chile, Venezuela, Colombia, Uruguay, and Argentina. Although the total number of Syrian refugees scattered across South America is trivial when compared to the millions living in the neighbors of Syria and thousands in Europe, the open-door policy of South American countries gained special international attention due to political, social and historical reasons. The tradition of Arab immigration to South America, multi-ethnic and multi-racial population compositions of the South American countries and the sympathy of the South American left to the Assad regime in Syria are the underlying reasons for the current policies of the South American countries on the Syrian issue.

Brazil, as the fifth largest country in the world comprising almost the half of the territory and population of South America, was also the main destination of immigration from the Levant to South America during the 19th and 20th centuries. And today, Brazil is the main receiver of the Syrian refugees in South America, having accepted more Syrian refugees than the total number residing in other South American countries. Within this framework, this paper aims to briefly explain the history of Syrian migration to South America since 19th century and discuss the underlying reasons of recent open door policy of South American states, current situation of Syrian refugees in the region and the problems encountered at the level of policy-making and implementation phases with a special emphasis on the situation in Brazil.

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[1]   Lily Ballofet, "Latin America & the Arab World: One Hundred Years of Migration.", Retrieved November 8, 2016, https://lebanesestudies.news.chass.ncsu.edu/2015/09/30/latin-america-the-arab-world-one-hundred-years-of-migration/

[2]   "Registered Syrian Refugees", UNHCR. (2017a), Retrieved April 28, 2017, http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php

2. Immigration from the Levant to South America

Arab immigration from the Levant, the then territory of the Ottoman Empire to the Americas started in the last quarter of the 19th century and continued at a considerable pace until the 1930s. It is estimated that during this period, around 250-300.000 people emigrated from Levant, mainly from what is today Lebanon and Syria to South America. Main receiver countries in South America were Argentina and Brazil.[3] Arab migrants, the majority of whom were Christian Arabs coming from Syria and Lebanon, started to arrive Brazil, just as many other countries in the Americas, during the 1880s alongside Armenian and Jewish migrants.[4]

Today, the Arab descendants living in Brazil prefer to call themselves as Syrian or Lebanese due to their country of origin or as Arabs due to their ethnicity,[5] while the word "Turco" seems to be outdated for the 21st century. Despite the lack of data, Brazil officially claims that the country currently hosts millions of Arab descendants with the majority of seven to ten million Lebanese descendants.[6] Main causes of immigration that continued until the World War I and lost its speed since then, were political, religious and economic problems. In the case of Brazil, which is today the home of more Lebanese people than the total population of Lebanon and millions of Syrian descendants, the first generation of migrants faced many difficulties just as the other migrants from various nations of the world did. Most of the Syrian and Lebanese migrants came to Brazil with little financial resources and started work as peddlers. In the following decades, many of them succeeded as businessmen and established family companies. Beginning from the second generation, due to the wealth gained, Arab diaspora in Brazil started to provide better educational

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[3]   Ballofet, "Latin America & the Arab World,".

[4]   Ignacio Klich & Jeffrey Lesser, "Introduction: "Turco" Immigrants in Latin America", *The Americas*, (1996), vol. 53, no:1, p.1-14. James G. Thomas, Jr., "Mississippi Mahjar: Lebanese Immigration to the Mississippi Delta", *Southern Cultures,* (2013), vol.19, no:4, p.35-54.

[5]   John Tofik Karam, *Another Arabesque: Syrian–Lebanese Ethnicity in Neoliberal Brazil,* Philadelphia: Temple University Press 2007, p.12. Jeffrey Lesser, "Middle East Migration to Brazil: Constructing Latin Levant Ethnicity", *Travessia – Revista de Literatura,* (1999), vol. 39, p.57-72.

[6]   "República Libanesa", MRE. (2016b), Retrieved November 14, 2016, http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=5373&Itemid=478&cod_pais=LBN&tipo=ficha_pais

opportunities for their children and a wave of educated Arab descendants started to occupy respected positions in the society as physicians, lawyers, and politicians.[7] Many descendants of the Arab immigrants in other South American countries also enjoy a respected economic and social status. Many of them served as presidents of Argentina, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, and Colombia.[8] Just to give an idea, today, besides the position of the Lebanese descendant Temer as the President of the country, 10% of the members of the Brazilian Congress is claimed to be descendants of the Arab migrants.[9] Immigration from Syria and Lebanon alongside Palestine, Iran and Egypt to Brazil is still ongoing in relatively smaller numbers due to ongoing political problems and conflicts in the Middle East.[10]

3. South America and the Syrian Civil War

Since the beginning of the conflict in Syria in 2011, South American countries preferred to stay either neutral or to adopt a pro-Assad policy. In both occasions, leaders of the South American countries called for non-interventionist policies. This non-interventionist stance based on a strong pre-conditioned view on the US interventionism in the Middle East put them out of the discussion table or caused them to be labeled as supporters of the Assad regime. On the other hand, their choice of handling the Syrian refugee problem brought these countries to the center of attention at the international fora. In opposition to the situation in Europe and in the US where different countries and politicians have contrasting views on the refugee flow from Syria, leaders of the South American countries with governments from different political views, took almost the same welcoming stance for the Syrians. What makes the situation more interesting is that they have not positively or negatively discriminated the refugees according

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[7]   Karam, *Another Arabesque: Syrian–Lebanese Ethnicity in Neoliberal Brazil*, p.12

[8]   Ishaan Tharoor, "The enduring success of Latin American politicians of Arab origin", *Washington Post,* Retrieved November 11, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/05/16/the-enduring-success-of-latin-american-politicians-of-arab-origin/.

[9]   "From Syria to Brazil: Following a century-old route to a new life", Retrieved November 19, 2016, http://www.middleeasteye.net/in-depth/features/brazil-syrians-welcome-here-1860804555, 16.062016

[10] Roberto Rodolfo Georg Uebel, "International Migrations to Brazil in the 21st Century: Profile, Outlook and Trends", *Population Review,* (2017), vol.56, no: 1, p.90.

to any ethnic or religious criteria and decided to open the borders despite their own internal economic, social and security problems.

The political stance of the South American countries towards the Assad regime in Syria is diversified. Not only Venezuela but also other members of the ALBA project have reiterated their support to the Assad government in Syria, which holds observer status in ALBA, on different occasion.[11] For example in the official announcement on the decision of the Venezuelan government to admit Syrian refugees, Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro reiterated his country's support to the President of Syria, Bashar al-Assad whom according to Maduro is "the only authorized leader in Syria".[12] In contrast, Brazil has refrained from giving political support to the Assad regime while insisting that there is "no military solution to the Syrian conflict".[13] Even in 2011, at the very beginning of the conflict, Brazil in coordination with the two other IBSA states namely India and South Africa which were interim members of the UN Security Council at the time, adopted a non-interventionist stance on the conflict in Syria and Brazil reiterated this view on many different occasions.[14]

The non-interventionist approach of Brazil is unanimously shared by other South American countries[15] and the two leading regional organizations of South America, UNASUR, and MERCOSUR, share the same approach. Due to the efforts of Brazil, the ASPA initiative bringing Arab League and UNASUR member South American countries together within the framework of UNASUR to promote bi-regional economic and political

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[11]   "ALBA joins efforts to halt aggression against Syria", Retrieved October 11, 2016, http://guyana.embajada.gob.ve/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=179%3Aalba-realizara-esfuerzos-para-detener-agresion-contra-el-pueblo-de-siria&catid=3%3Anoticias-de-venezuela-en-el-mundo&Itemid=19&lang=en

[12]   Nicolás Maduro, "Venezuela ofreciórefugio a 20.000 sirios", .Retrieved September 11, 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=22cA2amrvR4

[13]   "Participação do BrasilnaConferênciaInternacionalsobre a Síria (Genebra II) - Montreux, Suíça", 22 de janeiro, MRE.(February 21, 2014a), Nota 12.

[14]   Adriana Erthal Abdenur and Monique Sochaczewski, "Brazil in the field of humanitarian aid: mapping out its role in the Syrian conflict" in *Humanitarian Crises, Cooperation and the Role of Brazil*, Rio de Janeiro: Médicos Sem Fronteiras 2016, p.83.

[15]   Ministry of External Relations of Brazil (MRE), "Declaração do Conselho de Chefes de Estado e de Governo da UNASUL sobre a situaçãona República Árabe da Síria", September 3, 2013, Nota 311.

relations was established in 2005.[16] ASPA members have been gathering in regular summits and final declarations of these summits have also become a channel for UNASUR to reiterate its approach to the ongoing conflict in Syria. The fourth and the last ASPA Summit took place in Riyadh in 2015. According to the Article 25 of the Riyadh Summit Declaration, UNASUR and Arab League member countries declared that they reaffirmed "…their commitment to Syria's sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity and their commitment towards a political solution to the conflict" with reference to the Geneval Communiqué (2012). They also welcomed "the results of Vienna International Conference of the Foreign Ministers to reach a political solution to the Syrian conflict". Article 25, in accordance with the related UN resolutions also "condemned use of chemical weapons in Syria" by any party involved in the conflict. On the issue of displaced Syrians and the refugees, the declaration called for more humanitarian and financial assistance without any specific action plan for a partnership with South American countries.[17]A similar approach was adopted by MERCOSUR which officially reiterates its support to a "political process" as the "only" way of a solution to the conflict in summit declarations which gather the heads of the MERCOSUR member states. MERCOSUR has also declared its support to the refugees and emphasized the facilitation of the visa granting and resettlement procedures in addition to offering support to the UN, without mentioning any promises on behalf of the member states.[18]

In addition to the pro-Assad and/or non-interventionist state policies of the South American countries, most of the Arab diaspora organizations in the

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[16]   "Summit of South American-Arab Countries (ASPA)" ,(MRE), Retrieved July 6, 2017, http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/en/politica-externa/mecanismos-inter-regionais/9967-summit-of-south-american-arab-countries-aspa

[17]   "Riyadh Declaration", Retrieved July 5, 2017, http://www.lasportal.org/ar/summits/PublishingImages/Lists/Summits/AllItems/RD_english.pdf.

[18]   "ComunicadoConjunto de las Presidentas y losPresidentes de losEstadosPartesdel Mercosur y EstadosAsociadoscon Ocasión de la XLVlReuniónOrdinaria del Consejo del MercadoComún", MERCOSUR, Retrieved July 5, 2017, http://www.mercosur.int/innovaportal/file/5956/1/comunicado_conjunto_estados_partes_y_estados_asociados.pdf. "Declaração Especial dos EstadosPartes e EstadosAssociados doMercosulsobre a CriseHumanitária de Gestão dos MovimentosMigratórios", MERCOSUR, Assunção., Retrieved July 5, 2017, http://www.mercosur.int/innovaportal/file/4677/1/declaracioncrisishumanitaria_pt.pdf

region, including the ones in Brazil, positioned themselves as supporters of the continuation of the existing regime in Syria.[19] The reasons for this support vary but clearly is not sourced from democratic considerations. Support of the Arab diaspora of South America to the Assad regime in Syria is mainly based on opposition to the idea of foreign military intervention and opposition to the general Middle East policy of the US. However, the Arab diaspora in Brazil, as opposed to the fierce pro-Assad discourse of the civil society organizations in Venezuela, at first tried to keep a neutral stance but then focused its attention on the situation of the Christians in Syria and defense of the existing regime against foreign intervention.[20]

Despite their hesitation in playing active role in the solution of the conflict Syria, many South American countries have declared that they would unconditionally accept the Syrian refugees. Brazil started to implement a special two-year humanitarian visa regime for the Syrian asylum seekers as early as 2013. This visa regime was initially planned for two years but was prolonged in 2015 for another two years. In September 2015, President of Venezuela, Nicolas Maduro declared that his country was prepared to accept 20.000 Syrian refugees.[21] In 2015, the government of Chile decided to accept Syrian refugees starting with 100 families. Totally, the Chile has provided 277 visas to Syrian nationals to enter Chile in 2014 and 2015.[22] In 2016, Argentina, which has already accepted 1000 Syrians offered the EU to accept 3000 more.[23] Argentina accepts the Syrian refugees via a special

[19] Cecilia Baeza & Paulo Pinto, "Building Support for the Asad Regime: The Syrian Diaspora in Argentina and Brazil and the Syrian Uprising", *Journal of Immigrant and Refugee Studies,* (2017), vol.14, no: 3, p. 334-352.

[20] "The Syrian-Lebanese Diasporas and the Syrian conflict (Venezuela, Brazil and Argentina*)*", New Generation Consulting (NGC), November 2014, Beirut.

[21] "After deporting 1,400 Colombians, Venezuela pledges to take 20,000 Syrian refugees", Retrieved 15 November, 2016, http://qz.com/497494/after-deporting-1400-colombians-venezuela-pledges-to-take-20000-syrian-refugees/

[22] "Chile government says it will take in Syrian refugees", Retrieved November 14, 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-chile-idUSKCN0R82AM20 150908. "Chile acogeráun "número importante" de refugiados sirios", Retrieved November 15, 2016, http://www.elnuevodia.com/noticias/internacionales/nota/chileaco geraunnumeroimportantederefugiadossirios-2096444/. "SiriosRefugiadosen Chile", Retrieved November 19, 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AemYkQlf8Uw

[23] Federico Rivas Molina, "Argentina recibirá a 3.000 refugiadossirios.*El Pais*", Retrieved November 18, 2016,http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/…

action plan known as "Programa Syria"[24] and applies a special humanitarian visa regime to facilitate their entrance into the country, just like Brazil.[25] Colombia has also decided to accept the Syrian refugees despite the fact that the country has more than six million internally displaced people due to internal security problems.[26]

4. The Open-Door Policy of Brazil for the Syrian Refugees

4.1. The Asylum Granting Policy of Brazil

In contrast to the history of Brazil as a country of migration destination, it has never been a considerable destination for asylum seekers. Brazil is one of the signing parties of the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. In Brazil, permanent legal arrangements for asylum granting were formulated as late as 1997. However, the country was a regional pioneer in this respect as the 1997 legislation was "the first comprehensive refugee law in South America".[27] In 1977, UNHCR opened an office in Rio de Janeiro in order to deal with the asylum seekers from Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay and Argentina which were ruled by military dictatorships at the time in order to resettle these asylum seekers in countries such as the US, Australia, and the European countries. While most of these people temporarily stayed in Brazil and were resettled in other countries, starting in the 1970s, Brazil accepted small numbers of asylum seekers from different countries such as Vietnam,

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[24] "Acerca del Siria" Retrieved November 18, 2016, http://www.migraciones.gov.ar/ programasiria/?acercaprograma

[25] "Global Responsibility Sharingthrough Pathways for Admission of Syrian Refugees", UNHCR. (2016c), Retrieved April 30, 2017, http://www.refworld.org/ docid/588b4ddf4.html

[26] Francesca Fontanini, "Syrian refugee serves up a taste of home in Colombia", Retrieved July 8, 2017, http://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2015/10/561e7fa76/syrian-refugee-serves-taste-home-colombia.html. "Global Overview 2015: People internally displaced by conflict and violence", Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) & Internal Displacement Monitoring Center (IDMC), (2015, May), http://www.internal-displacement.org/assets/library/Media/201505-Global-Overview-2015/20150506-global-overview-2015-en.pdf

[27] Claudia Cruz Leo and Mary Beth Morand, PDES & Vinicius Feitosa, "Building Communities of Practice for Urban Refugees: Brazil Roundtable Repor", UNHCR, (2015).

Cuba, Angola, and Iran as either migrants or refugees.[28] Especially during the 1990s, Brazil started to emerge as a country of refuge; not as the primary destination but as a resettlement country. In 2002, first refugees to resettle in Brazil, a group of Afghans, entered Brazil via the country's collaboration with the UNHCR. Acceptation of the refugees from Afghanistan was also the first open door policy of Brazil targeting the victims of a conflict. Just as the welcoming Brazilian approach to the Syrians, the welcoming stance of Brazil to the Afghan refugees was declared by Fernando Henrique Cardoso, the President of Brazil at the time.[29] Since the 1990s, during the presidencies of both Cardoso and his successor Lula da Silva, Brazilian authorities continued to work on improving the capabilities of Brazil as a country of resettlement.[30]

It is worth noting that Brazil accepts the refugee definition of the Cartagena Declaration (1984)[31] which was issued by the Latin American states and has a more comprehensive and human rights oriented perception on asylum granting than the definition of the 1957 Convention.[32] In the years following 1984, Latin American countries reiterated their views on the situation of refugees on different occasions taking Cartagena Declaration as a basis. Lastly in 2014 at the occasion of the thirtieth anniversary of

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[28]   Julia Bertino Moreira, "Redemocratização e direitoshumanos: a política para refugiados no Brasil. *RevistaBrasileira", PolíticaInternacional*, (2010), vol.53, no:1, pp. 115-116. "Refugiados no Brasil", ADUS, Retrieved April 29, 2017, https://www.adus.org.br/refugiados-no-brasil/

[29]   Eloísa Escalate, "Brasil y la problemática de losrefugiados: el casodelPrograma de ReasentamientoSolidario", *Fronteira*, (2015), vol. 10, no:20, pp.41-42.

[30]   Moriera, "Redemocratização e direitoshumanos: a política para refugiados no Brasil. *RevistaBrasileira"*, p. 121

[31]   *Dados sobrerefúgio no Brasil.*, UNHCR. (2016a), Retrieved November 19, 2016, http://www.acnur.org/portugues/recursos/estatisticas/dados-sobre-refugio-no-brasil/. MRE. (2016a). "Refugiados e CONARE", Retrieved November 18, 2016, http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/pt-BR/politica-externa/paz-e-seguranca-internacionais/153-refugiados-e-o-conare.

[32]   Cartagena Declaration was issued as a non-binding advisory document by the Latin American countries which were dealing with the refugee situation caused by political instability and violence occurring in Central America at the time. The refugee definition recommended by the Cartagena Declaration "…in addition to containing the elements of the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol, includes among refugees persons who have fled their country because their lives, safety or freedom have been threatened by generalized violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive violation of human rights or other circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order." (Cartagena Declaration, III (3), 1984).

the Cartagena Declaration, ministers from Latin American and Caribbean countries met in Brasília and adopted the document known as the Brazil Declaration and the Plan of Action in order to improve the situation of the refugees, displaced and stateless persons in the region.[33]Besides their ongoing contribution to the discussion on asylum granting worldwide, both declarations reveal the innovative, democratic and participatory characters of the decision making on the issue, at the regional level. Both texts were adopted with the support of the participating countries and with the involvement of the civil society in the preparatory processes. Moreover, both support broad and human rights-oriented approach to the question of refuge and claim regional responsibility alongside the goal of international cooperation.[34] There is no doubt that hosting of the anniversary summit by Brazil provided the country the chance to lead the implementation of the ten-year action regional action plan envisaged by the document and share with the regional audience the success stories of the integration of refugees in Brazil which came from different conflict regions of the world .[35]

In Brazil, National Committee for Refugees (CONARE), which was established in 1997 as an interministerial body working under Ministry of Justice, is the main official unit in the country responsible for the evaluation of asylum requests working in collaboration with the UNHCR and Brazilian NGOs.[36] Since 1999, Brazil has been collaborating with UNHCR via CONARE as a country of resettlement. Until recently, citizens of African and Latin American countries, especially people from Angola and Colombia constituted the majority of the refugees in Brazil. In the

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[33] "Declaración y Plan de Acción de Brasil", ACNUR, Retrieved April 29, 2017, http://www.acnur.org/cartagena30/declaracion-y-plan-de-accion-de-brasil/. "Brazil Declaration",Brasilia, Retrieved 29 April, 2017, http://www.acnur.org/t3/fileadmin/ Documentos/BDL/2014/9865.pdf.

[34] Carlos Maldonado Castillo, "El proceso Cartagena: 30 años de innovación y solidaridad", *RMF 49,* .https://rua.ua.es/dspace/bitstream/10045/47660/1/RMF_49_43.pdf

[35] "Cartagena+30: innovación y flexibilidad en las Américas y el Caribe", ACNUR. (2014, December 2), Retrieved April 29, 2017 from http://www.acnur.org/cartagena30/ cartagena30-innovacion-y-flexibilidad-en-las-americas-y-el-caribe/

[36] Julia Bertino Moreira & Rosana Baeninger, "La integración local de losrefugiadosenBrasil" *RevistaMigracionesForzadas*, (2010), p.48. Yasa Rochelle Santos de Araujo & Patricia Fernandes Bega, "Public Policies in Support of Refugees in Brazil: Reflections and Challenges", V. O. da Silveira et al. (ed.)XXIV Encontro Nacional doConpedi – Ufs,*DireitoInternacional Dos DireitosHumanos*. Florianópolis: CONPEDI, p.202. "*Dados sobrerefúgio no Brasil*", UNHCR. (2016a).

last years, people fleeing from the conflict in Syria and fleeing from the political and economic problems in Haiti, have been occupying the center of attention in the asylum granting policy of Brazil. However, the people coming from Haiti are not regarded as eligible for refugee status in Brazil. But the Brazilian authorities deal with them considering the vulnerable humanitarian conditions in their home country and also apply a specific humanitarian visa system for the Haitians. Civil society organizations are actively contributing to the asylum seekers in Brazil by providing financial help, healthcare services and support for social inclusion such as participation in Portuguese language classes. With more than 100 organizations involved in the activities supporting the asylum seekers and refugees, Brazil has the largest web of such kind in whole Latin America.[37]

4.2. The Humanitarian Visa Regime of Brazil

Brazil has been granting asylum to Syrians since the beginning of the conflict in Syria in early 2011.[38] But until the launch of the humanitarian visa system, number of Syrians that have arrived the country and registered as refugees was very low (6 in 2011 and 37 in 2012). These numbers increased rapidly with the launch of the humanitarian visa regime.[39] According to the data of the Brazilian Federal Police Department, number of the people seeking asylum from Brazil, coming from around 80 different countries of the world, has reached 28,670 in 2015 from 966 in 2010. By the year 2016, totally 8,863 them were granted refugee status with the 2,298 Syrians comprising the majority.[40] Since 2013, CONARE has been implementing

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[37] Moreira & Baeninger, "La integración local de losrefugiadosenBrasil". "Missão", ADUS, Retrieved November 19, 2016, http://www.adus.org.br/sobre-nos/historico/. "*Sistema de RefúgioBrasileiro: Desafios e Perspectivas*", CONARE. (2016), Retrieved November 09, 2016, http://www.acnur.org/fileadmin/scripts/doc.php?file=fileadmin/ Documentos/portugues/Estatisticas/Sistema_de_Refugio_brasileiro_-_Refugio_em_ numeros_-_05_05_2016

[38] Karin Fusaro and Luiz Fernando Godinho, "Hands Across the Water: Brazil's large Syrian community absorbs refugees", Retrieved November 18, 2016, http://www. unhcr.org/news/latest/2013/8/5201079e9/hands-across-water-brazils-large-syrian- community-absorbs-refugees.html?query=syrian refugees brazil.

[39] Gabriel Gualano de Godoy de." A crisehumanitárianaSíria e seuimpacto no Brasil. *Cadernos de Debates Refúgio* "*Migrações e Cidadania,*, Brasília: InstitutoMigrações e DireitosHumanos, (2014), vol.9, no:9, p.89.

[40] "*Dados sobrerefúgio no Brasil*", UNHCR. (2016a).

a special humanitarian visa regime for the Syrians in collaboration with the Brazilian consulates abroad in order to facilitate the arrival of Syrian asylum seekers to Brazil, in accordance with the governmental policy of open doors, all the Syrian nationals requesting asylum from the Brazilian state are granted a humanitarian visa to enter the country easily.[41] According to the data of the UNHCR, a total number of humanitarian visas issued by Brazilian authorities since 2013 has reached 8,450 in addition to the 3000 Syrians that have resettled in Brazil.[42] But the number of Syrians who have arrived the country since the beginning of the conflict in Syria in 2011 can be expected to exceed this number as it is not clear whether all the Syrians entering Brazil have applied for refugee status.

By the year 2017, the Brazilian government has adopted a new Immigration Law in order to change the relevant legislation adopted in 1980 during the military regime. The new legislation was initially proposed in 2013 by Aloysio Nunes who is today the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Brazil. Although not directly targeting the issue of Syrian refugees, the new law reveals the three dimensions of the contemporary Brazilian approach to the issues of asylum and immigration. First of all, it can be expected that asylum seekers will continue to be regarded as potential migrants albeit in a receptive approach. Strong support of the civil society organizations including UNHCR to the new law explains that besides the improvements it is expected to bring to the lives of immigrants, it is also seen as a permanent legal basis and facilitator for the incoming of asylum seekers.[43] Secondly, it shows the humanitarian and non-discriminatory stance of Brazil in a period when the developed Northern countries are mainly dealing the issues of immigration and asylum seeking as problems. The new legislation based on the principles of equality and non-discrimination simplifies the bureaucratic paperwork and offers equal rights to immigrants including social, economic and political participation. Based on the prioritization of human rights, it institutionalizes the humanitarian visa system and makes it available also for the asylum seekers with needs of

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[41]   Ibid.

[42]   "Resettlement and Other Admission Pathways for Syrian Refugees*",* UNHCR (2017b, April 30), .http://www.unhcr.org/573dc82d4.pdf

[43]   "Em carta, mais de 100 entidadespedem a Temersanção da Lei de Migração.*"* Retrieved April 29, 2017, http://www.aloysionunes.com/em-carta-mais-de-100-entidades-pedem-a-temer-sancao-da-lei-de-migracao/

"special asylum" from countries other than Syria and Haiti.[44] And thirdly, the ongoing discussion on the law within the Brazilian society and among the politicians has revealed the fact that, not all segments of the society are in favor of the legislation change. Although Brazilian government managed the legislation preparation process in a transparent and democratic way, many people from the right political view are uncomfortable with the new legislation. The possibility of terrorist threats and the potential financial burden of providing public services to foreigners having immigrated to Brazil are among the main concerns of the opponents.[45]

4.3. The Situation of Syrian Refugees in Brazil

In September 2015, President of Brazil Dilma Rousseff made her famous statement and announced on different occasions that Brazil has adopted a policy of "open arms" for the refugees who would like to live in Brazil and contribute to the "prosperity and peace" of the country.[46] The Brazilian government also decided to release a 15 million R$ fund to be invested in the programs targeting migrants and refugees.[47] In October 2015, CONARE made an agreement with UNHCR in order to use the humanitarian visa regime of Brazil, which was also prolonged for the following two years, more efficiently in order to help the Syrian refugees.[48] Since the launch of

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[44] "New Immigration Law passed by Congress", CONECTAS, Retrieved April 29, 2017 http://www.conectas.org/en/actions/foreign-policy/news/47198-new-immigration-law-passed-by-congress

[45] Renan Barbosa, "Nova Lei de Migraçãoenfatizadireitoshumanos, mas críticospedem veto", *Gazeta do Povo*. 2017, April 25, http://www.gazetadopovo.com.br/vida-publica/justica-e-direito/nova-lei-de-migracao-enfatiza-direitos-humanos-mas-criticos-pedem-veto-73gx8w8g94mjekn4rvtzb982c

[46] "Rousseff: "A pesar de momentos de dificultadtenemoslosbrazosabiertos para losrefugiados", Retrieved November 19, 2016 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=caoilo7ySYM. "Brasilesunpaís de acogidaabierto a recibirrefugiados, señala Dilma Rousseff", Retrieved November 19, 2016 http://www.un.org/spanish/News/story.asp?NewsID=33426#.WDAfW2PJPIU

[47] "Brasil tem quase 9 mil refugiados de 79 nacionalidades", UNHCR. (2016b), Retrieved November 19, 2016 http://www.acnur.org/portugues/noticias/noticia/brasil-tem-quase-9-mil-refugiados-de-79-nacionalidades/. "Centro de Referência e Atendimento para Imigrantes*", Retrieved November 19, 2016 http://www.prefeitura.sp.gov.br/cidade/secretarias/direitos_humanos/migrantes/crai/

[48] "Brasil tem quase 9 mil", UNHCR. (2016b). "Sistema de RefúgioBrasileiro: Desafios e Perspectivas*", CONARE. (2016)

the humanitarian visa regime by the Brazilian authorities, Brazilian asylum granting system has been working in two ways. One is the evaluation of the asylum requests of the people who have already entered the country by legal or illegal means. The second one is the issuing of humanitarian visas to foreign nationals via Brazilian consulates. Humanitarian visas provide facilitated entrance procedures to foreign nationals so that they can travel legally and safely to Brazil and apply for the refugee status upon their arrival. In October 2015, Ministry of Justice released another fund of 5 million R$ to contribute to the activities of the UNHCR. In addition, Attention and Reference Centres for the Immigrants and Refugees (CRAIs) were established in collaboration with municipalities in order to provide legal, social and psychological support the migrants and refugees regardless of their legal status.[49] Brazilian institutions are planned to provide Portuguese classes and courses for employment for a limited number of people including not only refugees but also asylum seekers and migrants. An average number of the annual participants of these services from the mentioned groups will be around 200 people.[50]

Some members of the Arab community in Brazil, just like the cases in other countries of South America and alongside with civil society organizations, have been trying to help the Syrian refugees by their own means.[51] But despite the strong social status of the Arab diaspora in Brazil, significant and institutionalized support for the Syrian refugees from the diaspora is missing. Indeed, both Christian and Muslim charity organizations, some of the Arab diaspora organizations, NGOs without specific ethnic or religious orientation, universities and municipalities are involved in activities targeting both Syrian refugees and refugees from other countries.[52] A distinguished example is the initiative of a church in Rio de Janeiro. Due

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[49]   "Brasil tem quase 9 mil", UNHCR. (2016b).

[50]   "En Cumbre de Líderes, Brasil reafirma compromiso con protección y dignidad de refugiados", ACNUR, Retrieved April 29, 2017 http://www.acnur.org/noticias/noticia/en-cumbre-de-lideres-brasil-reafirma-compromiso-con-proteccion-y-dignidad-de-refugiados/

[51]   "Gualeguaychú: El Centro SirioLibanésrecibirá a unos 40 refugiadossirios", Retrieved November 18, 2016, http://www.apfdigital.com.ar/despachos.asp?cod_des=258889&ID_Seccion=12&fecemi=21/09/2015

[52]   Victor Begeres Bisneto, "Refugiados Sírios em Campinas/Speum Aladdins em a Lâmpada Mágica" *Malala*, (2016), vol.4, no:6, p.105.

to the efforts of the church and with the help of the Catholic NGO Caritas, around 30 Syrians most of whom are Muslims were brought to Brazil. These refugees had the chance to start a new life and receive regular help from the Catholic community in Rio de Janeiro.[53] It can be evaluated that while the successful integration of the Arab migrants to the Brazilian society might have played an important role in the decision of the Brazilian politicians to invite the Syrian refugees to the country, the role of the diaspora in both the policy-making phase of this decision or in helping the incoming refugees is quite limited.

By means of financial support, the refugees receive limited monetary allowance via the cash transfer program of the Brazilian government – Bolsa Familia-[54] and the ones who were not able to find jobs, have been through serious difficulties in their new lives in Brazil. While regarded as one of the best countries for refugee resettlement alongside the US, Germany, and Sweden,[55] refugees in Brazil face many difficulties in their daily lives despite their low number. A study concluded soon before the arrival of Syrian refugees in Brazil had revealed the fact that main challenges faced by the refugees in Brazil were difficulties in finding jobs, receiving proper salaries, finding places to live in, accessing basic public services and lastly the discriminative approach of the Brazilian society towards the refugees due to lack of knowledge ofwho a refugee is.[56] Other studies and testimonials of the refugees reiterate the same findings and especially highlight the difficulty of pursuing a life in dignity without sufficient financial means or job opportunities. Xenophobia and discrimination are also other problems which are strongly related to the approach of the Brazilian society to the entrance of foreigners no matter they are refugees or not, to the job market.[57]

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[53] "EnBrasil, unaiglesiacatólicarecibea decenas de refugiadossirios", Retrieved November 18, 2016 http://www.diariolibre.com/mundo/latinoamerica/en-brasil-una-iglesia-catolica-recibe-a-decenas-de-refugiados-sirios-XX1231572

[54] "From Syria to Brazil: Following a century-old route to a new life", Retrieved November 19, 2016 http://www.middleeasteye.net/in-depth/features/brazil-syrians-welcome-here-1860804555, 16.062016

[55] Elisabeth Becker, "The Four "Best" Countries For Refugee Resettlement", *UN Dispatch*, Retrieved July 8, 2017 https://www.undispatch.com/the-four-best-countries-for-refugee-resettlement/

[56] Moreira &Baeninger, "La integración local", p. 48

[57] Araujo, & Bega, "Public Policies,".

Syrian refugees in Brazil have been encountering similar difficulties such as the limited monetary help from the government in addition to the lack of official help in finding habitation. Many of them cannot prove their level of education or work experience due to the absence of necessary documents.[58] Limited support for social and economic inclusion such as language classes and consultancy for entrance to the job market are other problems. Despite the needs of the refugee families coming from a zone of conflict, psychological or physical healthcare services for refugees are rare and are mainly provided due to efforts of local authorities and civil society. Although refugees are eligible for free healthcare, it is not easy to be reached in practice[59] when considered that public healthcare services are not even sufficient for the Brazilians. In the case of the Syrian refugees, especially women and children who are either dependent on the income of their husbands or parents, suffer more from the harsh conditions.[60]

It can be said that Syrian refugees have been encountering similar problems of survival just as the refugees from other countries with possibly an exception of discrimination due to the media coverage on the situation of the civilians in the Syrian Civil War and speeches of the Brazilian politicians such as the former President Rousseff in support of the refugees. For example, on August 19, 2015, on the occasion of the World Humanitarian Day, Brazilian authorities and UNHCR launched an awareness raising social media campaign in collaboration with the civil society organizations in order to inform the Brazilian public on the refugee problem in the world.[61] In accordance with the awareness raising activities of the Brazilian authorities regarding the refugees, a Syrian refugee girl settled in Brazil carried the Olympics torch at the Rio 2016 Olympics torch relay.[62] It should be mentioned that awareness raising is quite important since the refugees are legally eligible as beneficiaries of some of the social

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[58] Gerardo Lissardy, "Cómo Brasil se volvió el mayor refugio para sirios en América Latina", Retrieved November 17, 2016, http://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias/2014/12/141202_brasil_refugio_sirios_alatina_en. "From Syria to Brazil", 2016

[59] Araujo & Bega, "Public Policies,", p. 207

[60] "En Brasil, una iglesia católica recibe a decenas de refugiados sirios", 2015

[61] "*Dados sobre refúgio no Brasil*", UNHCR. (2016a).

[62] "A refugiada síria Hanan Daqqah", Retrieved September 11, 2016 , http://www.brasil.gov.br/cidadania-e-justica/2016/05/brasil-abriga-8-863-refugiados-de-79-nacionalidades/hanan.jpg/view

programs just as the Brazilian citizens and this is prone to cause a negative reaction among the Brazilian society towards the refugees.[63]

5. Conclusion

The emerging open door policy of South American countries towards the Syrian refugees have gained considerable attention due to the already existing large Arab diaspora in the sub-continent and thanks to the media coverings featuring the welcoming speeches of the statesmen from the region and stories of a handful of refugees who had the chance to start a new life in South America. On the other hand, neither the existence of a wealthy diaspora nor the embracing policies have proven sufficient to provide a sustainable life for the refugees. The outstanding examples of solidarity and generosity towards the Syrian refugees among the Arab diaspora organizations are relatively low. When the existence of a wealthy and populous Arab diaspora in South America is considered, Syrian refugees living elsewhere in the region seem to receive little support from the earlier generations that have settled in South America.

Regarding the fact that South American countries have been using their open-door policy as a tool of promotion in the international arena, the initial success of brand-making the region as a safe and hospitable heaven seem to backfire as the problems occur. A recent example is a case in Uruguay where only a handful of Syrian refugees were accepted into the country with an applauding national and international media coverage. Soon after, the refugees declared that they wanted to return as they were not able to find jobs and financial support of the Uruguayan government was not.[64] Similar cases of failure in the struggle for survival on the side of the refugees occur in the other countries of the region. This fact reveals that many South American countries have adopted open door policies as symbolic gestures of solidarity without adequate institutional and financial preparation. Despite the merits of the humanitarian stance of South American countries in granting asylum, Syrian refugees in South America have been through many difficulties which reveal that cultural

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[63]   Moreira &Baeninger, "La integración local" , p. 49

[64]   "Refugiadossiriosquierenirse de Uruguay", Retrieved November 19, 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KfnkYYT5-7o

differences, being lack of language skills and skills for entrance to the job market in addition to the absence of financial and material support from the host countries, cause problems not only for refugees but also for the host countries. Consequently, the existence of thousands of Syrian refugees in South America is prone to trigger discussions on the role of diasporas in foreign policy decision-making processes and on asylum granting, social inclusion and religious diversity policies of these countries.

The history of Arab immigration to South America which surely effected the official policy of the countries in the region, plays an ambiguous role in this story. Despite their welcoming stance, in South America, the concept of refuge is still regarded within the general concept of migration which leads to the treatment of refugees as welcomed people but no more than migrants who are expected to find their way in the social structure based on "self-help" culture, just as the millions of people had done in the past. The story of the Arab migrants in South America is a revelation of the self-help culture deeply rooted in the socio-economic structures of these countries. In accordance with the image of a migrant who is supposed to make his/her own way, today the newcomer Syrian refugees are expected to act as the same. For example, the statement of the Venezuelan president Maduro on the Syrian refugees as ''They are welcome to share this land of peace and contribute to our country's development''[65] reveals the fact that South American nations regard the arrival of Syrian refugees as a new wave of Arab immigration. Similarly, President of Chile, Michelle Bachelet referring to the Syrian refugees has declared that her country "has always had open doors for the ones coming most of the time from distant lands".[66] This approach of regarding refugees as new migrants are explicitly mentioned in the discourse of the politicians and disregard the specific humanitarian needs of the refugees. On the other hand, this attitude provides the refugees an opportunity to become contributing and both legally and socially accepted equal members of the host societies.

In the case of Brazil, despite the efforts of both Brazilian government and civil society to improve the situation of the refugees in Brazil, it is

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[65] Willa Frej, "Venezuela Plans To Take In 20,000 Syrian Refugees", Retrieved November 5, 2016 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/venezuela-maduro-syrian-refugees_us_55ef279ce4b03784e276bc8b

[66] "Chile acogerá un "número importante" de refugiados sirios", 2015

clear that today what Brazil can offer for the future refugees is limited to legal status and hospitable political climate.[67] However, it should not be forgotten that during the course of history "Brazil had been a recipient of humanitarian cooperation more than a provider" as highlighted by the former Minister of Foreign Affairs.[68] And today, by means of legal protection, the humanitarian stance adopted by the Brazilian authorities has carried the country beyond the international standards.[69] The recently humanitarian approach of Brazilian foreign policy is a novelty for Brazil which needs to be improved and supported with adequate financial resources and institutional mechanisms and should go beyond the granting of humanitarian visas.[70] Although Brazilian laws provide many rights to the refugees such as the rights to work, to get education or access to the public healthcare system,[71] supportive mechanisms are needed for the refugees to integrate into the society and participate the economic life. On the other hand, the steps taken by the Brazilian government in order to re-establish both the asylum granting system and the immigration laws of the country in collaboration with the UNHCR and the civil society shows that as an emerging country, Brazil deals with the matters of immigration and asylum seriously and is being prepared for taking more responsibility in the name of humanitarianism worldwide.

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[67] Marília Calegari & Rosana Baeninger, "De Siria a Brasil", *Revista Migraciones Forzadas*, (2016), 51. Leo, Morand, and Feitosa,"Building Communities of Practice for Urban Refugees".

[68] Celso Amorim, "Humanitarian cooperation in Brazil: testimony and reflections" in *Humanitarian Crises, Cooperation and the Role of Brazil*. Rio de Janeiro: MédicosSemFronteiras, (2016), p.103.

[69] Luiz Paulo Teles Ferreira Barreto, "La protección internacional de los refugiados en Brasil", M. Lettieri (ed.) *Protección internacional de refugiadosen el sur de Sudamérica*, Buenos Aires: Remedios de Escalada : De la UN La Universidad Nacional de Lanús, (2012), p.417.

[70] Duval Fernandes et al. "O fluxo de imigraçãorecente para o Brasil e a políticagovernamental: ossinais de ambiguidade. Notaspreliminaries", *Cadernos de Debates Refúgio, Migrações e Cidadania*, Brasília: InstitutoMigrações e DireitosHumanos, (2014), vol. 9, no: 9, p.93-102.

[71] "Refugiados e CONARE.", MRE. (2016a), Retrieved November 18, 2016 http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/pt-BR/politica-externa/paz-e-seguranca-internacionais/153-refugiados-e-o-conare

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UNHCR. (2016b). *Brasil tem quase 9 mil refugiados de 79 nacionalidades*. Retrieved November 19, 2016 from http://www.acnur.org/portugues/ noticia/noticia/brasil-tem-quase-9-mil-refugiados-de-79-nacionalidades/

UNHCR. (2016c). *Global Responsibility Sharingthrough Pathways for Admission of Syrian Refugees*. Retrieved April 30, 2017 fromhttp://www. refworld.org/docid/588b4ddf4.html

UNHCR. (2017a). *Registered Syrian Refugees*. Retrieved April 28, 2017 from http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php

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The Effects of the Syrian Crisis on German Politics

Şeyma Akın[*]

Abstract

Although migration has been an issue throughout human history, migration in the modern world was and is handled and discussed in a different way. It affects social structures causing bitter disputes within politics since – in an era dominated by nation-states based on a single identity- migration is considered a threat challenging local identities. It also bears challenges for politics especially for societies protected with high walls. Even countries like the USA, which normally adopt open migration policies, manage migration policies with strict criteria today. However, it is obvious that migration will continue due to various political and economic reasons and that this will be mainly to wealthy regions such as Europe; therefore, countries affected by the fact need to develop policies in order to cope with the problem. Particularly the recent Syrian crisis and migration led to discussions in politics, economics and social life both in the region and in Europe which can even be seen in the agenda of the EU. One of the countries directly affected by the crisis is without doubt Turkey, and it even led to reopening negotiations to access the EU; thus it brought Turkey and EU together despite disagreements. At the same time, there are heavy disputes within the EU related to the migration crisis; here, the position of Germany is significant since it both takes a leading role in shaping EU policies and advocates that the migration crisis needs to be solved within EU politics. Yet, Germany also dealt with the problem in its domestic policies with the Merkel government –though selective- in favour of an open migration policy. Mixed with the generous welfare system of Germany, the country certainly attracts migrants from all over the world –whether they are economic migrants or others. Concepts like "solidarity, responsibility, Willkommenskultur" can be seen and heard in daily life when discussed how to handle the matter.[**] This paper aims to analyse how Germany positions itself within the negotiations in the EU concerning the migration crisis and how it handles migration in its domestic policies. In this context, priority will be given to the attitudes and publications of institutions supporting the position of the Merkel government, and subjects on which the matter is merely discussed.

Keywords: Syrian Refugees, Germany, Migration Policy, Labour Market, Integration.

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Suriye Krizinin Alman Siyaseti Üzerindeki Etkileri

Şeyma Akın[*]

Öz

Göç, insanlık tarihi boyunca önemli bir mesele olagelmişse de modern dönemde çok daha farklı biçimde ele alınmakta ve tartışılmaktadır. Toplumsal yapıları etkilemekte ve bu bağlamda siyaset içinde sert tartışmalara neden olmaktadır, zira tek bir kimliğe dayalı ulus devletlerin hâkim olduğu bir dönemde göç, yerel kimliklere meydan okuyan bir tehdit olarak algılanmaktadır. Bu gelişme, özellikle yüksek duvarlarla korunan ülkelerdeki siyaset için de sonuçlar doğurmaktadır. Açık göç politikaları yürüten ABD gibi ülkeler dahi günümüzde katı göç politikaları uygulamaktadır. Ancak çeşitli siyasi ve ekonomik nedenlerle göçün devam edeceği açıktır ve bu göçler büyük ölçüde Avrupa gibi daha müreffeh bölgelere yönelik olacaktır; dolayısıyla, bu durumdan etkilenen ülkeler mevcut sorunlarla başa çıkmak için siyaset üretmek zorundadırlar. Özellikle yaşanan Suriye krizi ve göçü hem bölgede hem de Avrupa'da siyasette, ekonomide ve toplumsal hayatta tartışmalara neden olmuştur; ki bu da AB'nin gündemine de yansımaktadır. Krizden doğrudan etkilenen ülkelerden biri şüphesiz Türkiye'dir ve bu durum AB müzakerelerinin yenden görüşülmesine neden olmuş ve bütün anlaşmazlıklara rağmen AB ile Türkiye'yi bir araya getirmiştir. Aynı zamanda, göç krizi ile ilgi tartışmalar AB içinde de yoğunlaşmış ve Almanya'nın bu bağlamdaki konumu önem kazanmıştır çünkü bir yandan AB içinde öncü bir rol oynarken öte yandan göç krizinin AB siyaseti bağlamı içinde çözülmesi gerektiğini savunmuştur. Ayrıca Almanya, bu meseleyi kendi içi işlerinde de ele almış ve Merkel hükümeti seçici de olsa açık bir göç politikasını desteklemiştir. Refah devleti olması nedeniyle dünyanın çeşitli yerlerinden göçmen çeken bir ülke olduğu açıktır. Bu konu tartışıldığında "Dayanışma, sorumluluk ve Willkommenskultur" gibi kavramlar günlük yaşamda duyulmakta ve görülmektedir . Bu makale, göç krizinde Almanya'nın kendini nasıl konumlandırdığını ve iç politikalarında göçü ne şekilde ele aldığını incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır[**]. Bu bağlamda Merkel hükümetini destekleyen kurumlar ve yayınlara ve de konunun hangi çerçeve etrafında tartışıldığına öncelik verilecektir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Suriyeli Sığınmacılar, Almanya, Göç Politikası, İş Piyasası, Entegrasyon.

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1. Introduction

The debate over the refugee crisis has been going on for many years now, but reached a peak in 2015 when people suddenly arrived in thousands in the EU every day. Each day we saw pictures and videos of refugees fleeing through the Mediterranean in tiny boats; thus, risking their lives in order to reach any of the Greek islands. Though they aimed for Greece, their final destination had to be other wealthier countries; such as France, the UK and especially Germany. The reason why Germany was usually the final destination for refugees was that it carried out an open door policy and had a generous welfare system, which led to the arrival of more than one million newcomers last year. This new situation forced the German government to find solutions to handle the matter along with a public debate and opposition against the Merkel government. Germany was divided: news in the media either criticised the policies or presented positive examples, thus supporting the open door policy of Merkel. Merkel herself not only was confronted with opposition from other parties but also from her coalition partners and even her own party. Despite all the opposition it is quite interesting to see how Merkel managed the situation and moreover received support from various groups in society. Mainstream media, though sometimes somewhat critical, tried to pave Merkel's way by producing articles supportive of the policies, and by highlighting opportunities and positive examples in the refugee issue. As can be seen, although the refugee crisis was a challenge for Germany, it tried to manage the problem instead of closing down its borders. This article aims to understand and present the attitude of Germany, and tries to draw conclusions on why the German government is willing to take a leading role in the solution of the issue. Therefore, the article presents a description of the situation and continues with reactions to the issue and implementations to deal with it, and interprets the current situation.

2. The Refugee Issue in the German Political Agenda

The refugee crisis affected not only the region but was also felt in remote areas, such as many parts of Europe. However, the reaction of these countries to the problem varied with some being completely ignorant. Germany was one of the countries considering the matter as a chance and

trying to find solutions, but it was also very well aware that it needed the support from other EU member states and had to look for coordination. Therefore, German politicians and especially Merkel called for support in the refugee issue but did not find much resonance since some countries either completely rejected taking refugees or did not feel responsible in solving the problem. Thus, the level of burden shared among industrialized countries was not the same, with countries like Germany or Sweden providing high levels of protection for refugees.[1] It is true that most of the EU countries took refugees, but their distribution among member states is not even; with Germany, Sweden, Austria and Hungary taking more than the average (it should be mentioned that the latter two later changed their policies and avoided more refugees coming into their countries). Member states like France or the UK and most of the South and East European countries remained under the average.[2] It should also be mentioned that Germany was and is much more affected than the others especially due to its geographic proximity when compared to Sweden or the UK, leaving it merely on its own. Therefore, it is no surprise that it called for more cooperation within the EU and looked for flexible refugee allocation, and that it wanted to include the Visegrad states.[3] For the EU on the other hand, the year 2016 brought many other problems to cope with; it was, e.g., preoccupied with Brexit and its potential outcomes during the first half of the year. The refugee problem seemed to be in their agenda but no real or long-lasting solutions were suggested or implemented.

One of the attempts to settle the matter on the EU level and the domestic level was the demand to revise the Dublin Regulation. The Dublin Regulation sets rules related to the organization of asylum applications

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[1]   Nicole Ostrand, "The Syrian refugee crisis: a comparison of responses by Germany, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States"*, Journal on Migration and Human Security*, 3(3), 2015, p.273.

[2]   Karl Brenke, "Flüchtlinge sind sehr ungleich auf die EU-Länder verteilt - auch bezogen auf die Wirtschaftskraft und Einwohnerzahl", [Refugees are distrubuted inequally in the EU-countries – also related to the economic power and population] DIW-Wochenbericht, 82(39), 2015, p.869.

[3]   EU-Parlamentspräsident Schulz für flexible Flüchtlingsverteilung, [President of the EU-parliament Schulz in favour of a flexible refugee distribution], Thomas Gutschker, *FAZ*, (2016, Sep 24). retrieved October 4, 2016, from http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/fluechtlingskrise/f-a-s-exklusiv-eu-parlamentspraesident-schulz-fuer-flexible-fluechtlingsverteilung-14451064.html.

on the European level; thereby, member states, in which the application was made, are responsible for the asylum seeker, by which multiple asylum claims can be avoided. The first Dublin regulation went in effect in 1997 due to potential problems with the Schengen agreement and to determine a common policy in terms of asylum and refugee issues. The latest agreement, Dublin III, came into effect in 2013 and set rules on the application and the responsibilities of member states.[4] However, with the latest Syrian refugee crisis, Germany did not apply the rule.[5] Here it should be mentioned that the discussion of the Regulation caused controversies within Germany and also the coalition partners – that is the CDU and CSU.[6] Related to the matter, the European Commission started a Communication for the reform of the Common European Asylum System to present options for the solution of the current crisis. One option is to change the system, thus making the deportation of asylum seekers to the country of first entry impossible; the other is to maintain the present system but add an emergency clause.[7] It is yet not possible to say what policies will be adopted since there seems to be no ideal solution and no consensus, and the interests of each country differ in the asylum and refugee system. Supporters of the second option, e.g., claim that statistics prove that border countries of the EU did not necessarily take more refugees than the others as it was the case with Spain[8] thus a change of the Dublin system is not

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4   Wido Geis, & Anja Katrin Orth, "Flüchtlinge: Herausforderung und Chance für Deutschland, [Refugees: challenge and chance for Germany], IW policy paper, 26/2015, p.12.

5   *Germany suspends Dublin Agreement for Syrian refugees*, A. Dernbach, (2015 retrieved March 15, 2016, from https://www.euractiv.com/section/migrations/news/germany-suspends-dublin-agreement-for-syrian-refugees/.

6   Wenn aus einer Obergrenze ein Kontingent wird, [When an upper limit becomes a quota], Albert Schaffer, (2016, Sep 16) .FAZ, retrieved September 17, 2016, from http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/fluechtlingskrise/csu-und-cdu-finden-weiterhin-nicht-zueinander-14438581.html Rhetorik Ohne Obergrenze, [Rhetoric with no upper limit], Tobias Rüther, (2016, Sep 25). FAZ, retrieved September 30 2016, from http://www.faz.net/aktuell/feuilleton/ fluechtlingsdebatte-rhetorik-ohne-obergrenze-14451012.html.

7   EU unveils plans to overhaul asylum system in an attempt to address chaotic influx of refugees, Leo Cendrowicz, & Oliver Wright, (2016, Apr 6) The Independent, retrieved April 7, 2016, from http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/refugee-crisis-eu-unveils-plans-to-overhaul-asylum-system-in-an-attempt-to-address-chaotic-influx-of-a6971751.html.

8   Wido Geis, & Anja Katrin Orth, "Flüchtlinge: Herausforderung und Chance für Deutschland, [Refugees: challenge and chance for Germany]", *IW policy paper*, 26/2015, p.13.

an answer to the current crisis. Supporters of the first option claim that changes need to be made on the European level; e.g. the Dublin regulation needs to be revised, or countries like Italy or Greece have to take a heavy burden when compared to other countries. Such demands - that is to solve the issue on the European level by jointly assuming responsibility - often came from the German side because it is the EU member state dealing with the issue without just restricting the flow of migrants. Countries like Denmark, Netherlands, Poland do not want to take any refugees, Austria is not willing to take more, and countries in the North remain silent in the matter.[9] Nevertheless, authorities within Germany offer solutions; such an example is the report of the "Sachverstandigenrat für Integration und Migration" in Germany, which suggests to set certain quotas and directly accept the refugees since the migration flow will not stop and lead to illegal and dangerous travel routes. This is partly implemented at the moment, but some criteria applied in the process needed to be changed.[10] As a further strategy to manage the crisis, Germany also took steps outside the EU, one of which is the agreement between Turkey and the EU. Despite all the controversies and tense relations between Turkey and the EU, and Germany and Turkey, they decided to continue its relations.[11] In March 2016, the two parties signed a deal in order to damp the refugee numbers coming to Europe, which immediately had results in the following months. The tense relations, however, have worsened over the past months after the coup attempt in Turkey in July and the resignation of the Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, who had conducted the negotiations with the EU and Germany.

The refugee crisis has certainly had its effects on many fields in the public and political life of Germany, which can be observed both in public

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[9] Karl Brenke,., "Flüchtlinge sind sehr ungleich auf die EU-Länder verteilt - auch bezogen auf die Wirtschaftskraft und Einwohnerzahl, [Refugees are distrubuted inequally in the EU-countries – also related to the economic power and population] *DIW-Wochenbericht*, 82(39), 2015, p. 879.

[10] *Flüchtlinge: Kontingente statt Chaos*, [Refugees: quotas instead of chaos], Kay-Alexander Scholz, (2015, Oct 20). retrieved January 26, 2016, from http://www.dw.com/de/fl%C3%BCchtlinge-kontingente-statt-chaos/a-18792975.

[11] Das Flüchtlingsabkommen liegt in unserem Interesse,[The refugee agreement is in our interest], Klaus-Dieter Frankenberger, (2016, Aug 8) FAZ, retrieved August 9, 2016 from http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/ausland/europa/tuerkei/mit-einer-kuendigung-des-fluechtlingsabkommens-waere-nichts-gewonnen-14376618.html.

debates and in the agenda of policymakers. Such an example is a visit of the German Minister of the Interior to the Maghreb countries in order to declare them as countries of safe origin.[12] What is the reason behind the declaration of various countries as safe origins, when asylum seekers from these countries were accepted for many years? It is obvious is that most of these countries have not changed that much over the past years so that they can all of a sudden be classified as safe countries. Furthermore, these countries still are torn with the consequences of the Arab spring. Such a move by the German government seems to be a strategy to manage the present problem since it gives Germany an elbow room to manage the Syrian crisis and be more selective in taking migrants which provide more benefit for it.

3. The Attitude of Germany in the Refugee Issue

As stated before Germany handled the refugee crisis not like the other European states and tried to take a leading role in finding solutions within the EU. There are certainly many reasons for Germany to make an effort in the refugee problem; the most important probably the effect of migration on economic growth. Industrialized countries need the workforce to maintain their production capabilities and therefore take migrants from various parts of the world. Although refugees are not allowed to take part in the labour market, they will do so in the long run; thus qualified refugees or migrants are usually welcome. A further effect of migration on economies that it triggers growth since spending will increase. Such an argument is supported by statistics; hereby, economic growth was positively affected by public spending made for the needs of the refugees.[13] Reports on the refugee crisis also try to clarify Germany's position, and its challenges and chances for the country. Such an article is written by Fischer, which tries to

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[12] Warum die MaghrebLänder jetzt als sicher gelten, [Why Maghreb countries considered safe now], Christoph Sydow & Philipp Wittrock, (2016, Jan 29) *Der Spiegel,* retrieved March 14, 2016, from http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/marokko-algerien-tunesien-sollen-sichere-herkunftsstaaten-werden-a-1074634.html.

[13] Staatsausgaben für Flüchtlinge stützen Wachstum (2016, Jan 12). [Public spending for refugees support growth], FAZ, retrieved February 12, 2016, from http://www.faz.net/aktuell/wirtschaft/konjunktur/bruttoinlandsprodukt-steigt-im-vierten-quartal-um-0-3-prozent-14066098.html.

understand the situation and claims that the policy followed by the German chancellor is right. According to the text, there are various factors on why the refugee policy of Merkel should be welcome; e.g., due to demographic factors, that is, in an aging Germany, migrants will provide a balance since most of them are under the age of 35. That, at the same time, means a positive effect on the labour market, not just because they are young but also quite well educated (here the stress is especially on Syrian refugees). Thus, public spending for the newcomers can be considered as an investment to the future, though in the short term it means a burden on the public budget. It is often stressed that Syrian refugees are well educated and highlighted that most Syrian refugees reaching Europe are from the middle class since they were able to pay the money for human traffickers.[14] Unemployment is an issue in Germany as it is in many other countries, so the fear that it will rise with all the new migrants is often discussed within the public; also, the number of those against economic migration is quite high. However, there are also arguments supporting the integration in the labour market despite fears of higher unemployment, which is based on the idea that migrants are more likely to found new firms because of the hardship they would probably face in finding jobs. This usually results in new job creation and an increase in the labour market.[15] Thus, the effort of the EU member states to make a distinction between refugees and economic-led migration is not an easy and meaningful task because it also keeps the qualified migrants away.[16]

Many publications such as reports or academic articles suggest solutions or provide ideas for future developments both for their own countries and for the region. Fischer, e.g., draws conclusions on what kind of policies Germany should adopt in order to provide a smooth integration of refugees. For a better integration there are various suggestions, such as the transmission

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[14] And Angela Merkel is right: the refugees as opportunity for renewing German society, J. A.V Fischer,.(2015). MPRA Paper, No. 67315, retrieved February 12, 2016 from https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/67315/.

[15] Holger Hinte, Ulf Rinne & Klaus F. Zimmermann,"Flüchtlinge in Deutschland: Realismus statt Illusionen, [Refugees in Germany: realism instead of illusions], IZA Standpunkte, 83, 2015, p.9.

[16] Ulf Rinne,.,& Klaus F. Zimmermann, "Zutritt zur Festung Europa? Anforderungen an eine moderne Asyl- und Flüchtlingspolitik, Analysen und Berichte Migration, [Access to the fortress Europe? Requirements for a modern asylum and refugee policy, analyses and reports on migration]," Wirtschaftsdienst, 95(2), 2015. p.116.

of values in educational institutions. This aspect is especially pronounced when it comes to radicalisation. However, the counter argument is that the fear of radicalisation is not a realistic one for the newcomers since events prove that it is merely caused by discrimination and seen usually in future generations. However, to avoid radicalisation they need to be welcome and addressed positively; here the involvement of grass-root movements will be of great help. It is also argued that the transmission of Western values should be adopted on the European level, so it will not be sufficient to handle the matter only in the domestic field. Europe should be involved in the region to provide and assist the development especially in democratic values.[17] In this context, education should not just be within the context of the labour market but also in general terms since many of the migrants are quite young. Therefore, the funding of education needs to be revised and included in the budget; the cost for education in Germany only is expected to be about 13 billion Euro.[18]

4. The Challenges Germany Faces

Despite all the optimistic views related to the refugee problem, one thing that is certain is that the government has to struggle with many aspects, one of which is the fear of the public from the newcomers and their "strange" culture. A large number of the population is not only not supporting the policies of the government, there also protests against these policies. This can be especially observed in the developments of political movements such as Pegida or the AfD. Concerns that a Neo-Nazi movement will scale up are not without reason since latest elections in various states in Germany prove a rise in far-right parties.[19] The AfD was able to gain seats in local elections; the Pegida movement, on the other hand, attracts more and more supporters by mainly protesting against "the Islamization of the West".[20]

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[17]   And Angela Merkel is right: the refugees as opportunity for renewing German society, Justina A.V. Fischer, *MPRA Paper,* No. 67315, 2015, retrieved February 12, 2016 from https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/67315/.

[18]   Dieter Dohmen, "Ein Refugee Impact Fund zur Finanzierung von Bildung und Qualifizierung für Flüchtlinge, [A refugee impact fund for the financing of training of refugees],". FiBS-Forum 57. 2015.

[19]   Adnan R. Khan, "Germany is full", Maclean's, 128(40), 2015, p.32.

[20]   Rand Richards Cooper, "Germany, Eurabia & the end of Europe: the rise of the identitarian right", Commonweal, 2016, May 6 143(8), p.12.

Thus, one might say that public opinion is much divided when it comes to settling the refugee crisis; but despite all these, surveys show that there is also support in favour of the present policies. According to the survey the majority of the population considers migration as one of the most pressing and urgent problems; they also agree with the idea that foreigners and refugees will bring more risks than opportunities. However, polls also prove that a temporary admittance is found appropriate; which is supported by 69 %.[21] Such figures certainly do not prove that refugees are welcome with open arms; nevertheless, they show that the majority tolerates the implementations of the present government but for how long they will do is uncertain. One incident displaying how fragile the situation is, was seen on New Year's Eve in Cologne, which led to an outrage in all parts of society; however, such incidents were actually nothing new but were downplayed by authorities. Such an effort can also be seen in the attempt of the government to come to an agreement with Google and Facebook in order to restrict anti-immigration posts.[22] The attacks in Cologne reminded the public of their fears and the politician of how critical the situation is and will be in the future.

The situation is not an easy one for the country and its government; Merkel's "Wir schaffen das" (we will succeed/we can do it) is often challenged with many events like terrorist attacks or the detection of potential terrorists especially taking the same route the refugees take. As mentioned, the incident in Cologne on New Year's Eve was heavily discussed in the public; here a number of men mainly from North Africa and the Middle East sexually assaulted women who were out on the streets to celebrate.[23] This led to an outrage in the public since the incident meant also an attack on basic values, which many people already felt to be threatened with the huge number coming into their country. A further challenge for politics was to cope with the attacks on migrants and the shops or houses of migrants. Despite all these things, it is interesting to see positive or at least optimistic

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[21]   J.ürgen Gerhards, Silke Hans, ., & Jürgen Schupp, "German public opinion on admitting refugees", DIW Economic Bulletin, 21, 2016, p.243.

[22]   Germany on the Brink*, The New York Times*, Ross Douthat, 2016, Jan 9, retrieved September 9, 2016, from http://mobile.nytimes.com/2016/01/10/opinion/sunday/germany onthebrink.html?smid=twnytimes&smtyp=cur&_r=1&referer=https://t.c o/W2tLnz329Y.

[23]   Simon Shuster, "Fear and Loathing", Time, 187(3), 2016, Feb 1. p.42.

opinions regarding the handling of the situation. For instance, it is claimed that Germany has the ability to cope with the problem, since it was confronted with such issues –as in the 1990s and 2000s- and was able to manage it. This argument[24] is supported with the fact that previous migrants integrated into the system by both learning the language and later entering into the labour market. This view is supported with many other samples happening today; such an example is presented in one article of "die Zeit", from which we learn that 50.000 refugees found jobs in Germany.[25] The article states that refugees who came in 2015 had better qualifications than expected and showed more respect to women and respected democracy.

5. Effects on the German Policies and Strategies to Cope with the Problem

There is an uncertain future for Germany with xenophobia on one side and "Willkommenskultur" (culture of welcome referring to the open policy towards refugees) on the other.[26] Both sides have their own arguments and supporters; one claiming that the problem is there and needs not only to be solved but also handled wisely, and the other fearing its future because of unemployment due to the newcomers and the challenge by the new culture they bring with them. But it is possible to say that there are many positive reflections on the refugee issue to overcome xenophobic sentiments such as in the mainstream media; but what is interesting here is that sometimes the refugees are reflected as the ones deserving to be protected whereas other type of migrants are presented as economic opportunists.[27]

The Merkel government has, from the beginning on, had an interest in the Syrian refugee issue, when many other EU countries overlooked the matter

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[24] Philipp Eisnecker, Johannes Giesecke, ., Marcus Kroh, Elisabeth Liebau, Jan Marcus, Zerrin Salikutluk, et al. "Integrating refugees: insights from the past", DIW Economic Bulletin, 6(34/35), 2016, p.387.

[25] Flüchtlinge sind besser ausgebildet als erwartet, (2016, Nov 14), [Refugees are better qualified than expected], *Die Zeit,* retrieved November 16, 2016, fromhttp://www.zeit.de/gesellschaft/2016-11/bundesamt-fuer-migration-frank-juergen-weise-fluechtlinge-ausbildung.

[26] Seth M. Holmes, & Heide Castaneda, "Representing the 'European refugee crisis' in Germany and beyond: Deservingness and difference, life and death", American Ethnologist, 43(1), 2016, p.13.

[27] Ibid, p.17.

or considered it to be a matter outside the scope of the EU or their domestic interests. There are certainly various reasons behind this, such as economy or having an upper hand in politics, but one reason is certainly the role of Germany wants to play on the global level. Such a role is discussed for instance by Steinmeier in an article[28], in which he evaluates the position of Germany as a global player and stresses Germany's will to resolve the crisis along with other EU members. The current refugee policy is certainly also justified by demographic factors. German needs and will need immigration to balance its labour market due to its aging population; statistics show that about 500.000 migrants are needed until 2050.[29] This positive attitude is, e.g., reflected in media coverage, where anti-migration movements are usually labelled as right-wing extremists.[30]

The rapidly increasing number of asylum seekers in 2015 was certainly quite alarming for German authorities, leading Chancellor Merkel not only to find solutions on the political level but also to call on support to volunteers. Local authorities were unable to process and handle the large number of newcomers on its own, so any help from nongovernmental organizations and others was welcome. This resulted in support from various groups and even families taking refugees in their homes.[31] Cities such as Munich were the first to experience a challenge like this[32] and also to provide support to the newcomers.

The influx of refugees undoubtedly caused a public debate in Germany leading to more right-wing movements and support; however, it is also possible to see that the positive sides of the crisis are often discussed in terms of economic effects. One such effect is presented as the stimulation of economy through participation in the work force on the supply side, and on the demand side through refugee-related expenditures.[33] There are

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[28] Frank Walter Steinmeier, "Germany's New Global Role", Foreign Affairs, 95(4), 2016, p.106-113.

[29] Sybil Andra Stefan, "Considerations regarding the social and economic impact of migration", Case Study: Germany Revista Academiei Fortelor Terestre, 21(1), 2016, p.54.

[30] Mark Falcoff, "Germany's open door", *New Criterion*, 34(5), 2016,. pp.50-51.

[31] Naina Bajekal, The Welcome, Germans open their doors to refugees ,Time,186(15), (2015, Oct 19). p. 86-91.

[32] Mark Falcoff, "Germany's open door", New Criterion, 34(5), 2016, p.50.

[33] Marcel Fratzscher, & Simon Junker, Integrating refugees: A long-term, worthwhile investment DIW Economic Bulletin, 5(45/46), 2015, p.614.

many articles or papers which handle the matter in terms of economic developments and the contribution the refugees may make for economic development. One such argument is that economic stagnation could be overcome due to the refugee crisis since public spending for refugees triggered growth.[34] Various scenarios are being discussed on how the refugee crisis will continue and affect the region and especially Germany. However, in many cases it is claimed that the refugees will contribute to the economy in the long run and the economy will reach a break-even point by 2021 to one scenario and 2035 to another. Therefore, ideas such as "smart integration" into the labour market are considered as measures to be taken to overcome the crisis. Another suggestion is the sustainability of employment of refugees into the skilled labour market since the German labour market needs skilled workers and the chances to find employment in these areas are higher.[35] This optimistic attitude is strengthened with reports in the media or others, which present samples of successful integration in the labour market. These claim that especially younger refugees have a higher chance to enter the market and that refugees are usually loyal to their workplace.[36]

The issue is also being handled with legal and administrative measures since it is naïve to believe that the integration of refugees into the labour market and the system as a whole would be a smooth one. There is certainly a stress on the need for training since it provides opportunities in the German labour market, which can be strengthened by the change in legislation ensuring asylum seekers legal certainty; thus, it encourages them to commence vocational training.[37] However, one of the first things to

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[34] Staatsausgaben für Flüchtlinge stützen Wachstum (2016, Jan 12). [Public spending for refugees support growth], FAZ, retrieved February 12, 2016, from http://www.faz.net/ aktuell/wirtschaft/konjunktur/bruttoinlandsprodukt-steigt-im-vierten-quartal-um-0-3-prozent-14066098.html.

[35] Volker Brühl, "Die Kosten der Fluchtlingskrise in Deutschland - eine Investition in die Zukunft?", [The cost oft he refugee crisis in Germany – an investment in the future?] Wirtschaftsdienst, 96(7), July 2016, p.484.

[36] Es dauert lange und kostet viel Geld [It takes long and costs a lot of money], Sven Astheimer, (2016, Sept 21). FAZ, retrieved September 23, 2016, from http://www.faz. net/aktuell/politik/denk-ich-an-deutschland-1/wie-fluechtlinge-in-deutschland-arbeit-finden-14436677.html.

[37] Elisabeth Liebau, & Zerrin Salikutluk, "Many refugees have work experience but a smaller share possess formal vocational qualifications", DIW Economic Bulletin, 6(34/35), 2016, p.398.

be done for a successful integration is the acquisition of the language; there is also the demand to get the newcomer acquainted with Western culture in order to avoid tensions between the two different cultures. Turning back to economy, another argument in favour of migration is, e.g., the tendency of migrants to set up businesses in the countries they arrive, thereby supplying employment. Here the number of refugee entrepreneurship is said to be higher than other immigrants and natives.[38] It should also be kept in mind that refugees want to find work and do so through informal channels no matter what their educational background is, that is they integrate into the labour market mainly with the help of acquaintances (with a rate of 53 %).[39] It is also possible to observe suggestion and measures on the social level – thereby increasing the chances for the integration of newcomers. Next to learning the language, suggestions like using libraries to provide access to internet and resources, and spare-time activities for families are pronounced very often.[40] This is especially essential since, next to economic matters, challenges in the cultural field and their handling are especially of importance.[41]

A further effort both for a better integration and their acceptance in the public can be seen in the way the issue is covered in the media, thus shaping the perception of the population by representing the refugees in a positive way. One may find a positive coverage of Syrian refugees in the media; whereby they are presented as people willing to integrate or participate in the German daily life. Such one example is "the heroes of Leipzig", praising Syrian refugees who helped the police in detecting an ISIS member.[42] Another argument is the educational background of the

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[38] Claire Groden, "Germany Needs Migrants. Do We?", Fortune, 172(5), 2015, Jan 10, p.13.

[39] Philipp Eisnecker, & Diana Schacht "Half of the refugees in Germany found their first job through social contacts" DIW Economic Bulletin, 6(34/35), 2016, p.416. Elisabeth Liebau,, Jan Marcus, Zerrin Salikutluk,., Diana Schacht, Katharina Spieß, Franz Westermaier, "Integrating refugees: Insights from the past, DIW Economic Bulletin, 6(34/35), 2016, p.390.

[40] Barbara Lison, "Germany's new culture of welcome—Our Libraries are an Essential part of it", Journal of Library Administration, 56:2, 2016, p.183.

[41] Hans Feichtinger, "Refugees in Germany, First Things" A Monthly Journal of Religion and Public Life, 260, 2016, p.22.

[42] Die Syrischen Helden von Leipzig, [The Syriand heros of Leipzig], Fabian von der Mark, (2016, Oct 11) retrieved October 11, 2016, from http://m.dw.com/de/die-syrischen-helden-von-leipzig/a-36010499.

Syrian refugees; despite the lacks they show in test, their education is considered high[43] when compared to other migrant groups.

Calls for changing the present legislation in order to cope with and manage the problem are one of the main themes brought into question. Opening up the market to refugees and at the same time granting a residence permit is directly linked to the better integration of refugees; which in turn enhances the ability to support oneself.[44] For the management of the crisis some legislation in Germany was already changed; thereby, access to professional training was eased and issues such as creation of job opportunities or allocation of residences altered.[45] Nevertheless, a change in legislation does certainly not mean that the problem is solved; weaknesses and strengths of the administrations need to be determined, the ability of employees evaluated, information on the newcomers collected etc. One such problem to be solved is the settlement of refugees; the places chosen for them are usually small settlements without much experience with foreigners or are temporary settlements due to the tight housing market. The problematic situation is usually intensified with last minute notice to local administration making it even harder to cope with not to mention needs to be covered such as food, health or education.[46] Therefore, the government needed to employ more personnel both to process the increased number of asylum applications and to take care of their accommodation.[47] Such settlement can also mean less integration for migrants, since they are isolated from daily life in Germany and are not able to socialize.

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[43] Die Wahrheit über die Bildung syrischer Flüchtlinge,[The truth about the education Syrian refugees], *Die Welt,* Philipp Vetter, (2016, May 2), retrieved November 1, 2016, from https://www.welt.de/wirtschaft/article154928441/Die-Wahrheit-ueber-die-Bildung-syrischer-Fluechtlinge.html.

[44] Zerrin Salikutluk, Johannes Giesecke & Martin Kroh, "Refugees entered the labor market later than other migrants", DIW Economic Bulletin, 6(34/35), 2016. p.413.

[45] Volker Brühl, Die Kosten der Fluchtlingskrise in Deutschland - eine Investition in die Zukunft?, [The cost oft he refugee crisis in Germany – an investment in the future?] Wirtschaftsdienst, 96(7), July 2016, p.484.

[46] Adnan R. Khan, "Germany is full", Maclean's, 128(40), 2015, pp. 30-31.

[47] Karl Brenke, Flüchtlinge sind sehr ungleich auf die EU-Länder verteilt - auch bezogen auf die Wirtschaftskraft und Einwohnerzahl, [Refugees are distrubuted inequally in the EU-countries – also related to the economic power and population] *DIW-Wochenbericht*, 82(39), 2015, p.867.

There are also suggestions related to administrative aspects in solving the problem. One such suggestion is in the collection of data; although refugees and asylum seekers are registered and data is collected at once, these are usually limited to gender, age or origin. However, few are known about the educational or professional background of the newcomers; therefore, it is advised to gain information in the matter. This would help to identify potential asylum grants and help to accelerate their involvement in the labour market; but admission procedures should be followed by language courses.[48] A change in the labour market is one of the expected outcomes; though not as fast as expected, it will lead to better integration when organized from the very beginning. Thus, the following need to be improved in the integration of asylum seekers: asylum proceedings, identification of qualifications, and assistance in language acquisition. There is a strong emphasis on language acquisition since this is the gateway to integrate into the system; however, it needs to be mentioned that not all refugees or migrants are successful in acquiring the language, younger people or those with a higher educational background learning more quickly.[49] Coordination with Muslim associations on the national level could also be supportive for a better integration of refugees.[50] The hindrance of economic migrants due to their incompatibility with the law for migration and their integration in the labour market is sometimes criticised. One reason for this is that these people will come anyway despite refoulement and the second that it is not realistic to classify these. A revision of law in terms of obstacles for economic migrants and their possibilities in the labour market would be a measure to deal with the problem.[51]

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[48]   Hinte, H., Rinne, U., & Zimmermann, K. F. (2015).Flüchtlinge in Deutschland: Realismus statt Illusionen, [Refugees in Germany: realism instead of illusions], IZA Standpunkte, 83 p.3. Wido Geis., & Anja Katrin Orth, "Flüchtlinge: Herausforderung und Chance für Deutschland [Refugees: challenge and chance for Germany]", IW policy paper, 26/2015. p.19.

[49]   Elisabeth Liebau, & Diana Schacht, "Language acquisition: refugees nearly achieve proficiency level of other migrants", DIW Economic Bulletin, 6(34/35), 2016, pp. 402-403.

[50]   Holger Hinte, Ulf Rinne, & Klaus F. Zimmermann, Flüchtlinge in Deutschland: Realismus statt Illusionen, [Refugees in Germany: realism instead of illusions] IZA Standpunkte, 83, 2015, pp. 7-8.

[51]   Herbert Brücker, Zur Integration von Flüchtlingen, [On the integration of refugees] IABStellungnahme, 5/2015 p.9.

The allocation and settlement of refugees in Germany is a further aspect often discussed and called for revision; at the moment, it is done according to the tax income and number of inhabitants of a region. However, the condition of the labour market is not taken into account thus leading to improper settlement and less employment chances of them. One of the steps to be taken is to consider the labour market situation in various regions when settling refugees and asylum seekers. One further suggestion to cope with the situation is to revise present labour market instruments in terms of their suitability and adapt them to the new conditions.[52]

6. Conclusion

The refugee crisis, starting in 2011 with the Syrian civil war and reaching its peak in 2015 for Europe, has led governments to take positions in order to be able to cope with the problems. However, it is not possible to say that each government took similar measures; they ranged from completely open doors, like in Turkey, to almost closed gates or the selection of "desirable" migrants. Germany was actually one of the few countries which were ready to solve the problem and not look away and thus tried to push other EU states to cooperate. Germany (through the EU) managed to sign a deal with Turkey in order to control the refugee influx; nevertheless, it failed to persuade other member countries to cooperate and faced many challenges within the country. It not only had to cope with the huge numbers when settling, providing food and healthcare for them, it also had to face opposition even within its own coalition.

Why, then, was Germany willing to take the entire burden when it could decide to close its borders and send all the refugees back? It is definitely not sufficient or logical to claim that it did so due to humanitarian concerns though often presented from a humanitarian aspect. Germany saw certain opportunities for itself in the crisis and took a clear position in the issue but it was also well aware that it needed the support of other countries; that is mainly other EU countries and also Turkey. It could close its borders as many other countries did so; however, sending them back is easier said than

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[52]   Volker Brühl, Die Kosten der Fluchtlingskrise in Deutschland - eine Investition in die Zukunft?, [The cost of the refugee crisis in Germany – an investment in the future?] Wirtschaftsdienst, 96(7), July 2016, pp.484-485.

done because all the refugees suddenly arrived after Turkey had decided to open its borders and let them all pass through Turkey in 2015. Before that, Turkey had led an open door policy to Syrian refugees and made an effort to keep most of them in the country. A Germany not willing to take them and provide shelter for them would certainly seem "weak" or "incapable"; certainly not an image Merkel's government would like to present. When considered that Germany is trying to become one of the global players – which needs more than just to be an industrialized country – the crisis seemed to be an opportunity. This aspect seems to be quite significant since Germany was often criticised due to its past and considered a country not equal to countries such as France or the UK. However, the country has gained much prestige and started to gain the role of regional if not global player over the past decades. This can also be seen in its position within the EU; it had provided money to solve crises, such as the recent economic crisis in Greece. Furthermore, it provides one of the highest contributions to the European budget. The recent refugee influx must have seemed like an opportunity to strengthen its position in the EU and also on the global level.

There are certainly economic reasons behind the attitude of Germany towards the refugee crisis; a country open to migration and with a generous welfare system, especially when compared to the UK, attracted many migrants. The UK, USA or Canada also receive migrants but at the same time are able to draw the more educated and skilled ones. It is very well known that industrialized countries all are confronted with the fact that they have an aging population, thus are in need for a younger generation to support and balance their social security system. This fact must have been one of the major drives for the German government to lead an open door policy. One might certainly ask why taking the burden when there were already receiving migrants from various parts of the world. However, when looking at the discussions in the media, one might come to a conclusion that Germany saw this as an opportunity since some of the refugees had good educational backgrounds. This point is quite significant because Germany has had a systematic migration policy since the 1960s; during these years, Germany received "*Guest workers*" from various countries one of which was Turkey. It can be said that these are in general integrated now, but it took a few generations until it did so. As previously said, Germany usually

attracts migrants with less educational backgrounds or professional skills when compared to the USA, Canada or the UK most probably due to its generous welfare system. The latest refugees must have seemed like an opportunity to overcome such problems. Therefore, it was quite open to refugees from Syria and, at the same time, selective in choosing the ones with a higher chance of integration both in the labour market and German society.

The Syrian refugee crisis seems to be an opportunity for the German government despite all the challenges and problems it bears. It is an opportunity to balance its labour market and to select the ones it considers more "useful", but it is well aware that this will be possible in the long run and with a proper management and training. It still is optimistic since the belief that Syrian refugees will integrate into the labour market through skilled labour or through founding their own enterprises is high. However, as stated above, Germany has still a long way to go, and shifts in policies and priorities of other countries will certainly affect its policies and positions; thus leaving Germany with uncertainties at least in the refugee issue. The Brexit negotiations consume a huge amount of time and energy, thereby leaving the matter unresolved. Relations with Turkey, which has a key role in the Syrian refugee crisis, remain tense due to the conflict of interests of various countries. Consequently, the refugee crisis will remain an issue that needs to be solved for a very long time both for Germany and other countries in the region.

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Asylum-Seekers Experience and Acculturation: A Study of Syrian-University Students in Turkey

Yusuf Ziya Karipek[*]

Abstract

This study explores specific factors that impact the acculturation process among Syrian immigrants at a Turkish University. While providing deeper analysis of Berry (1997)'s acculturation theory, the paper addresses the impact of linguistic, ethnic, and cultural differences and similarities on acculturation among refugee university students based on fifteen individual interviews. Given the gap in the literature, the aim of this qualitative research is to understand how Syrian-university refugee students adapt and integrate by examining how they obtain linguistic skills, cope with ethnic and cultural differences and develop their educational objectives in relation to future goals. Language barrier is noted as the biggest obstacle against acculturation but for all participants, the linguistic acculturation and short cultural distance contribute to the acculturation process by increasing the ability to interact and communicate with the members of majority culture. Next, ethnic difference poses threat against acculturation but nearly all participants, including Syrian Turkmen, appeal to broader statuses, rather than Turkish per se, for example the ummah consciousness, to create mutual understanding and solidarity between themselves and the majority group. Finally, Syrian university students consider their experiences in Turkey as sojourning and hold firm intentions to return to home country after a period of time.

Keywords: Migration, Acculturation, Asylum-seekers, Assimilation, Integration

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Mülteci Deneyimi ve Kültürel Etkileşim: Türkiye'de Suriyeli Üniversite Öğrencileri Üzerine Bir Çalışma

Yusuf Ziya Karipek[*]

Öz

Bu çalışma, Türkiye'de bir devlet üniversitesinde eğitim gören Suriyeli göçmen öğrencilerin kültürel etkileşim süreçlerini etkileyen belirli faktörleri ele almaktadır. Berry (1997)'ın kültürleşme teorisini derinlemesine analiz ederken, mülteci üniversite öğrencileri arasındaki kültürel farklılıkların ve benzerliklerin kültürleşme üzerindeki etkisini, on beş bireysel mülakat temelinde ele alıyor. Literatürdeki boşluğu göz önüne alarak, bu araştırmanın amacı, Suriyeli üniversiteli mülteci öğrencilerin dil becerilerini nasıl elde ettiklerini, etnik ve kültürel farklılıkların üstesinden gelip gelmediklerini ve eğitim hedeflerini geleceğe yönelik olarak nasıl geliştirdiklerini inceleyerek Türk toplumuna uyum ve entegrasyonlarını anlamaya yönelik bir nitel çalışmadır. Dil engeli, kültürel etkileşime en büyük engel olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır fakat tüm çalışmada yer alan öğrenciler için, dil açısından çabuk uyum sağlama ve Suriye ile Türkiye arasındaki yakın kültürel mesafe, çoğunluk kültürünü oluşturan Türk halkı ile etkileşim ve iletişim kurma olanaklarını artırmaktadır. Yine, etnik farklılıklar kültürel etkileşime karşı tehdit oluşturmaktadır. Yaklaşık olarak tüm katılımcılar, Suriyeli Türkmenler de dahil olmak üzere, kendilerini tanımlarken, Suriye ile ilişkilendirmektedirler. Ancak, yerel halk ile ilişkilendiğinde ise, Türk ve Suriyeli kimliği yerine, daha kapsayıcı kimliklere, örneğin ümmet bilincine sığınarak çoğunluğu oluşturan ev sahibi toplumun bireyleriyle karşılıklı anlayış ve dayanışmayı geliştirmeyi hedeflemektedirler. Son olarak, Suriyeli üniversite öğrencileri Türkiye'deki öğrenim hayatlarını geçici süreli öğrenci olarak değerlendirmekte ve belli bir süre sonra Suriye'ye geri dönme konusunda sabit fikirlere sahiptirler.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Göç, Kültürleşme, Mülteci, Asimilasyon, Çokkültürlülük

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1. Introduction

Since the start of the Syrian civil war in 2011, there has been a large influx of Syrian asylum-seekers into Konya, a city in the Central Anatolia Region of Turkey. Nearly three million Syrians have taken refuge in Turkey and Konya has accepted nearly 65,000 asylum-seekers in recent years. The two neighbor countries—Turkey and Syria—shared long history under Ottoman rule until the beginning of the 20th century. Furthermore, the recent influx of Syrian asylum-seekers has brought two communities into continuous first-hand contact. New waves of Syrian asylum-seekers have continued to enter Turkey but unfortunately Syrian-university students have been largely ignored in the academic research. Given the gap in the literature, the aim of this research is to understand how Syrian-university refugee students adapt and integrate in Turkish society by examining how they obtain linguistic skills, cope with ethnic and cultural differences and develop their educational objectives in relation to future goals.

2. Literature Review

2.1. Early Definitions of Acculturation

The decision to leave one's country of origin, voluntarily or involuntarily, brings two groups of people in close contact and the term "acculturation" refers to the changes that take place between the members of these groups presumably so that they become more compatible with each other. The early classical definition of acculturation was proposed by Redfield, Linton and Herskovits[1] "those phenomena which result when groups of individuals having different cultures come into continuous first-hand contact, with subsequent changes in the original culture patterns of either or both groups."[2] In other words, it is the process of change and adaptation as a result of continuous contact between individuals of different cultural origins, for instance asylum-seekers and host country members. In addition, the emphasis on *continuous* in the definition distinguishes acculturation as "the result of long-term contact among individuals from different cultures

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[1]   Robert Redfield, Ralph Linton, and Melville Herskovits, Memorandum for the study of acculturation. *American Anthropologist*, 1936, v. 38, p.149–152.

[2]   Ibid, p.149.

(excluding other short-term interactions)" and highlights the change in both immigrant and host cultures, not just on the acculturating group that is accommodating into the host culture.[3] The bidirectional nature of acculturation allows room for accommodation between the dominant and non-dominant groups. According to Redfield et al (1936), acculturation did not indicate that assimilation would ensue automatically[4].In other words, the early definitions of acculturation by Redfield et al (1936) acknowledge the change in both groups but do not necessarily offer more sophisticated acculturation measures.

In 1954, Social Science Research Council incorporated a psychological dimension into the understanding of acculturation and stated:

Acculturation is a...culture change that is initiated by the conjunction of two or more autonomous cultural systems. Its dynamics can be seen as the selective adaptation of value systems, the processes of integration and differentiation, the generation of developmental sequences, and the operation of role determinants and personality factors.[5]

Basically, in addition to assimilation, social scientists added three more kinds of acculturation: *reactive* (triggering resistance to change in both groups), *creative* (stimulating new cultural forms, not found in either of the cultures in contact), and *delayed* (initiating changes that appear more fully years late).[6] What makes the definition by SSRC different is the fact that it embraces change in the host culture and intergroup relations as important units of the acculturation process.[7] These two early definitions—developed by Redfield et al. and researchers at SSCR—broaden our understanding on how new comers react to the surrounding culture and change as a result of exposure to members of the host nation.

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[3]   Pamela Balls Organista, Gerardo Marin and Kevin M.Chun, *The psychology of ethnic groups in the United States,* Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2010, p.6.

[4]   Amado M. Padilla and William Perez, Acculturation, social identity, and social cognition: a new perspective, *Hispanic Journal of Behavioral Sciences,* 2003, p.35-55, p.37.

[5]   Social Science Research Council, "Acculturation: An exploratory formulation", *American Anthropologist*, 1954, v.56, p.973-1000, p.974.

[6]   John Berry, "Acculturation: living successfully in two cultures", *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, 2005, vol.29, issue 6, p.697-712.

[7]   Rupert Brown and Samuel L. Gaertner, *Blackwell Handbook of Social Psychology Intergroup Processes.* Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 2008.

2.2. Contemporary Definitions of Acculturation

Furthermore, two major theories in the field of cross-cultural psychology explain and guide studies on acculturation: "bipolar" or undimensional model[8] and plural bidimensional model.[9] Firstly, Milton Gordon (1964) who studied the assimilation of minorities in America suggested that immigrants would be eventually integrated into the host society in an undimensional process. In other words, Gordon (1964) constrains the definition of acculturation and identifies with only one phase of assimilation—cultural or behavioral assimilation. He assumed that minority groups ultimately become an integral part of dominant society; thus explained acculturation as "change of cultural patterns to those of the host society."[10] The immigrated group changes until they lose different aspects of their traditional culture and become like the receiving nation. For instance, it is expected that migrants achieve proficiency in the language of the receiving country and decrease proficiency in their heritage language. Secondly, on the other hand, developed a bidimensional model in which an immigrant may follow more than one path in acculturation: they could embrace only dominant culture or embrace only culture of origin or embrace two cultures at the same time or possibly reject them both at the same time.

So using a bidimensional model, found that not all incoming groups become like the dominant group. Instead they develop four distinct models of acculturation,: assimilation, marginalization, separation and integration. Simply, the model was based on two important decisions as part of acculturation strategies, how well the immigrant maintains relationships with members of the receiving country; and how much the immigrant retains of his or her cultural identity and characteristics.[11] In this assimilation strategy,

8   Milton M. Gordon, *Assimilation in American life: The role of race, religion, and national origins,* New York: Oxford University Press, 1964.

9   John Berry, *Human Ecology and Cognitive Style: Comparative Studies In Cultural And Psychological Adaptation*. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1976.

10   John Berry, "Acculturation: living successfully in two cultures", *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, 2005, vol.29, issue 6, p.697-712 and David Sam and John Berry (edts), *The Cambridge handbook of acculturation psychology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006, p.12.

11   Matthew John Soerens, A participatory assessment of immigrant integration in a low-income suburban neighborhood. *College of Liberal Arts & Social Sciences Theses and Dissertations., 2010, Paper 13. http://via.library.depaul.edu/etd/13* and Bellah

individuals may abandon their culture of origin and prioritize the culture of the receiving country. On the contrary, in separation strategy, individuals may have little interest with the new culture and may resort to retaining the culture of origin. In marginalization strategy, individuals neither maintain their cultural identity nor build relationships with those of the receiving country. Finally, in integration strategy, immigrants maintain their culture of origin and adopt their culture of destination at the same time. It is this group of people who will value both cultural maintenance and intergroup relations. Taken together, the newcomers develop four strategies based on their desire to maintain their culture of origin and their desire to embrace the values of the receiving country.

Figure 1. The Berry Model From the Point of View of Migrants

Furthermore, Berry distinguished acculturation in terms of 'group level' and 'individual level' impacts. At the individual level, factors existing prior to acculturation and during acculturation contribute to, or limit, the outcome of acculturation process. Factors prior to moving into a new country include variables such as an individual's age, gender, education, status, motivation, cultural distance (language, religion, etc.) and factors during

Nanjekho Kiteki, Acculturation and Psychosocial Adjustment of African Adolescent Refugees in the United States: The Role of Social Support, Greensboro. 2011.

acculturation process include variables such as length of acculturation, acculturation strategies (attitudes and behaviors), social support, and social attitudes (prejudice and discrimination).[12] The outcome of an individual's acculturation depends on all the features that he or she brings to a new culture and all the factors that he or she encounters in the receiving culture. These factors are examined extensively to understand how they impact the acculturation process.[13]

Furthermore, migrant groups may go through profound changes at group-level on multiple areas including physical, biological, economic, social and cultural changes. Physical changes include urbanization, population density while biological changes include new dietary intake and exposure to new diseases. In addition, loss of status and new employment opportunities for the group are related to economic changes. Social changes include changes such as disrupted communities and the need to form new relationships. Finally, cultural changes—the core of acculturation process—range from superficial changes such as food and clothing to deeper changes such as language shifts, marital assimilation and religious conversions. All the group level context variables including physical, biological, economic, social and cultural changes which occur on a larger scale also play an integral role in migrants' acculturation process.

2.3. Acculturation in Youth

Acculturation and adaptation of adults in the host nation have been studied extensively however; there is considerable lack of research on these phenomena among youth.[14] The levels of acculturation for young adults may differ from those of adults because people who immigrate at younger ages are more likely to make faster transition to the receiving culture than immigrants who come at much older ages and similarly older immigrants tend to

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[12]   Ben Kuo, "Coping, acculturation, and psychological adaptation among migrants: a theoretical and empirical review and synthesis of the literature", *Health Psychology and Behavioral Medicine,* 2014*,* vol.2, issue 1, p.16-33.

[13]   David Sam, "Psychological adaptation of adolescents with immigrant backgrounds", *The Journal of Social Psychology*, 2000, vol.140, issue 1, p.5-25

[14]   Micheal Aronowitz, M., "The social and emotional adjustment of immigrant children: a review of the literature. *International Migration Review",* Summer 1984, vol. 18, no.2, p. 237-251.

retain their native cultures compared to younger immigrants. For instance, Berry examined over 5,000 immigrant youth in 13 countries (ages 13 to 18; mean age = 15 years and4 months for both groups) based on three core questions. [15] These questions included: How do immigrant youth deal with the process of acculturation? How well do they adapt? Are there important relationships between how they acculturate and how well they adapt? He concluded that the four distinct acculturation profiles described above were common in immigrant youth: the largest number of immigrant youth fell into the integrated cluster; the second largest cluster for separation; the third cluster fell into assimilation; the remaining opted for marginalization.

Consistent with these findings, integration is the most preferred and practiced by immigrant youth in other research studies.[16] Contrary to earlier models[17], it is found that it is possible for a migrant to maintain the culture of origin and adapt to the culture of the receiving country.

2.4. The Case of Syrian Asylum-seekers in Turkey

In this study, these models of acculturation will be applied to the case of Syrian refugee university students in Turkey. Since its beginning, the Syrian civil war has killed hundred thousands of people and led to the displacement of more than nearly five million people as asylum-seekers mostly in neighboring countries. Nearly three million Syrians have taken refuge in Turkey. As a result, Syrian asylum-seekers now came in close contact with Turkish citizens and began to adapt use of the Turkish language and culture. Similarly, Turkish citizens came in close contact with Syrian asylum-seekers and began to learn more about people of different

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[15] John Berry, "Acculturation: living successfully in two cultures", *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, 2005, vol.29, issue 6, p.697-712.

[16] Seth Schwartz and Jennifer Unger, Byron Zamboanga, Jose Szapocznik, "Rethinking the concept of acculturation: implications for theory and research", *American Psychologist,* 2010, vol.65, no.4, p. 237-251 and David Sam, "Psychological adaptation of adolescents with immigrant backgrounds", *The Journal of Social Psychology*, 2000, vol.140, issue 1, p.5-25 and Derya Güngör and Marc H. Bornstein, "Culture-general and –specific associations of attachment avoidance and anxiety with perceived parental warmth and control among Turkish and Belgian adolescents", Journal of Adolescence, 2010, vol. 33, issue 5, p.593-602.

[17] Milton M. Gordon, *Assimilation in American life: The role of race, religion, and national origins,* New York: Oxford University Press, 1964.

language and culture. And in Turkey, there are 2,764,500 registered Syrian asylum-seekers as November 3, 2016. In addition, it is estimated that roughly 10% of the total Syrian population in Turkey is 18 to 22 years old based on demographic statistics from Syrian Central Bureau of Statistics.[18] This particular study focuses on university-age Syrian young adults and their acculturation process.

Figure 2. Syrian Asylum-seekers in Turkey

Source: United Nations Human Rights Council

2.5. The Case of Syrian-University Students in Turkey

To date, nearly all of the literature on acculturation and migration focuses on the experiences of migrants in Europe and North America (i.e. USA and Canada) and ultimately, the literature reflects the experiences of voluntary migrants (i.e. immigrants, international students/sojourners). The experiences of specific involuntary migrants, such as asylum-seekers, are

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[18]   Keith D. Watenpaug and Adrienne L. Fricke, "Uncounted and Unacknowledged: Syria's Refugee Students and Academics in Jordan" (May 2013), https://www.academia.edu/3474289/Uncounted_and_Unacknowledged_Syria_s_Refugee_University_Students_and_Academ. (n.d.)Retrieved May 31, 2015.

very much neglected in acculturation studies.[19] Furthermore, most refugee studies do not focus on teenagers and young adults. And, the case of the integration and adaptation of Syrian refugee university students is rarely addressed in the literature.

The current reports indicate that Syrian university-age young adults face two major barriers: difficulty of learning Turkish (and English if instruction takes place in English) and the complexity of Turkish educational system.[20] In addition, the need to work constitutes another barrier to education across all age groups for Syrian university age students since financial problems have some or a large impact on supporting themselves and their families[21]. Marriage and early marriage (marriage that occurs under the age of 18 years) have been utilized as alternative strategy for financial difficulties.

Taken together, much of the existing literature on acculturation and migration focuses on the experiences of migrants in Europe and North America (i.e. USA and Canada) and ultimately, the literature reflect the experiences of voluntary migrants (i.e. immigrants, international students/sojourners). The experiences of specific involuntary migrants, such as asylum-seekers, are very much neglected in acculturation studies[22].This is a weakness in the literature. In addition, there exists a lack of literature on Syrian university in Turkish universities and much less attention has been paid in the literature to the experiences of their experiences in a new country. It is hoped, in addition to providing a brief overview of literature on acculturation, that this study will attempt to address the experiences of Syrian university students and examine their acculturation process.

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19 Kuo, B., "Coping, acculturation, and psychological adaptation among migrants: a theoretical and empirical review and synthesis of the literature", *Health Psychology and Behavioral Medicine,*2013, vol.2, no.1, p.16-33.

20 Keith D. Watenpaug and Adrienne L. Fricke, "Uncounted and Unacknowledged: Syria's Refugee Students and Academics in Jordan" (May 2013), from https://www.academia.edu/3474289/Uncounted_and_Unacknowledged_Syria_s_Refugee_University_Students_and_Academ. (n.d.), Retrieved May 31, 2015.

21 Stephanie Dorman, "Educational Needs Assessment for Urban Syrian Refugees in Turkey", 1 September 2014, Retrieved May 31, 2015, from http://www.alnap.org/resource/19464

22 Ben Kuo, "Coping, acculturation, and psychological adaptation among migrants: a theoretical and empirical review and synthesis of the literature", *Health Psychology and Behavioral Medicine,* 2013, vol.2, no.1, p.16-33.

3. Method

3.1. The Present Research

The purpose of this research is to assess Syrian university students' perceptions of migrating to a new country and to explore students' coping strategies during their acculturation process. This study will apply the acculturation theories described above to assess how factors, including ethnicity, religion and language influence Syrian university-age students' academic aspiration and shape the acculturation process. Pursuing these questions and drawing on data collected through in-depth interviews with fifteen Syrian asylum-seekers at a Turkish university, I explore how language learning affects acculturation process; what role ethnic and religious identities play in acceptance; what role cultural distance between two countries plays in adaptation process; and how future goals shape how they evaluate university education.

3.2. Methodology

The study was conducted at a public university—Necmettin Erbakan University (NEU)—located in Konya, Turkey that enrolled approximately 26.000 degree-seeking students in the beginning of Fall 2014. University students of Syrian origin who have attended NEU were the targeted population for this research project. For the academic year 2014-2015, NEU have enrolled twenty-six (26) Syrian students of varying associate degree and undergraduate programs. The list of the students which included only the name of the students and their departmental affiliation was obtained from Department of Student Services at NEU. No contact information such as e-mail address, or cell phone number was divulged to the researcher for confidentiality and safety reasons. Additionally, application and permission to conduct research with human subjects was submitted and approved by the CUNY Human Research Protection Program (HRPP).

These 26 Syrian students were compromised of 10 males and 16 females. The participants were recruited by using social media and word of mouth. All the participants were expected to take part in the study but only 15 students agreed to participate in interview sessions. The duration of years Syrian university students had lived in Turkey ranged between 1 and 4 years (M = 2.8 years). Additionally, participants' ages ranged from 18 to 23

years (Median = 20.4).Next, for this study, data was collected in the forms of semi-structured interviews. In two cases, two participants were interviewed at once and all the other participants were interviewed individually. The interviews lasted eight minutes to two hours and were conducted in Turkish language. The primary methods of recording data in this research are voice-recording and note-taking during the interviews. Seven interviews were recorded, to which all interviewers consented and two of these interviews were conducted on Facebook messenger: one male participant was in a distant location and the other female participant rejected face-to-face interview but agreed to participate for an interview on the Internet.

Table 1. Syrian Students at Necmettin Erbakan University by Department

Department	Number
Economy Department	1
Business Administration	3
International Relations	1
Science Department	1
Department of Theology	7
Department of Medicine	3
Department of Education	5
Department of Health Sciences	3
Engineering Department	2

The written report of the interview was an amalgam of summaries and notes of what the participant said generally. Themes were identified in all interviews and the data were coded with relation to these themes. Therefore, in any qualitative research, analysis is not a separate entity from the research process and "the collection, coding and analysis of data are inextricably bound up with each other". [23] Before the interview, participants

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[23]   Robert Emerson, *Contemporary Field Research: Perspectives and formulations* (2nd ed.). Prospect Heights, Ill.: Waveland Press, 2001.

were informed about the purpose and nature of the study and were given assurance that participant will remain anonymous in any written reports. In addition, if they find some of the questions farfetched or difficult to answer, then they may refuse to answer the questions and even withdraw from the study at any point.[24]

Therefore, each participant was given written and oral consent forms. An interview guide was employed for semi-structured interviews. Even though the questions were content-focused, the interviewer was not restricted to deploying those questions. The role of the interviewer was to redirect the conversation in a way that would be relevant the research questions. As data was coded and systematized; emerging themes were analyzed in the light of the existing literature. Next, general similarities and differences with the literature review were addressed in discussion and suggestions for future studies were identified.

The grounded theory approach, first proposed by Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss in 1967 was implemented in this qualitative research. This data-driven approach relies on "discovery and theory development rather logical deductive reasoning which relies on prior theoretical frameworks."[25] In other words, while data is collected, it is also subsequently analyzed at the same time. The data was divided into initial codes along the process of coding interview transcripts and further focused coding has preceded. Coding allowed the researcher to identify similarities and differences within bits of data to categorize and label the data. Next, written elaborations of ideas about the data and the coded categories were written.[26] Based on the data, the researcher developed a theory derived directly from the data.[27]

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[24]   John Lofland and Lyn H. Lofland, *Analyzing social settings,* Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company, Inc, 1984.

[25]   Kathy Charmaz, The grounded theory method: An explication and interpretation. In: Emerson, R. M. (ed.). *Contemporary field research*, Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press, 1983, p.110.

[26]   Ibid.

[27]   Ian Dey, *Grounding grounded theory: Guidelines for qualitative inquiry*, San Diego: Academic Press, 1999.

4. Findings

This section will present the main findings of the research, including 1) the importance of language acquisition, 2) cultural distance, 3) ethnic identity, and 4) desire to return to homeland.

4.1. Language Acquisition

Language competency is one of the primary predictors of socio-cultural integration[28]; all of the participants expressed that learning Turkish is the primary step to communicate with others which in turn influences the level of integration. Three participants who transferred to one of the high schools in Turkey continued their education without participating in special language courses because there were no available language courses for high students. Except one individual who passed the placement exam, others who essentially obtained their high school diploma in Syria report that they had participated in Turkish and Foreign Languages Research and Application Center (TOMER) courses for at least 6 months. It is also important to note that few people in Turkey speak Arabic and therefore newcomers feel the pressure to learn the language of the host nation in order to converse with them.

In this research, some clearly found learning the language easier than others did, but for all learning the language of the host country was a key piece of acclimating to Turkey. With the exception of Turkmen who speak fluent Turkish before they arrive, all Arab Syrians who participated in the interviews felt it necessary to put in the considerable effort to learn the language.

The living and social arrangements affected how long it will take to master the language: Those who spend more time among the host nation members and interact with native speakers in the target language were more likely to

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28   Walter McManus and William Gould, Finis Welch, "Earnings of Hispanic men: the role of English language proficiency", *Journal of Labor Economics,* 1983, vol.1, issue 2, p.101-130; Emily Keyes and Catherine Kane, "Belonging and adapting: mental health of Bosnian refugees living in the United States", *Issues in Mental Health Nursing,* 2004, vol.25, issue.8, p.809-831; Elisabeth Elmeroth, "From refugee camp to solitary confinement: illiterate adults learn Swedish as a second language", *Scandinavian Journal of Educational Research,* 2011, vol.47, issue.4, p.431-449.

learn the new language more quickly and easily than others. One such case is Ali who is a 20-year-old male student residing in a district with very low Syrian population who said:

> It was very easy. I learned the language in eight months. I stayed in a dorm and I learned by speaking a lot. There are not a lot of Syrians in Seydisehir [a district that is 90 km away from Konya].

Language acquisition process is not very easy for others and one student who is a 24-year-old described how he couldn't even master pronunciation of a very basic phrase and:

> Turkish is a difficult language. Ooh! I remember how I was not able to pronounce Nasilsiniz? (How are you?). I worked on simple sentences for days…If I interact more with native speakers, I will learn and pronounce quickly but I speak Arabic at home all the time. Some of my friends who stay with native speakers have really improved their understanding and pronunciation. [Besir, Male].

Clearly, not all students find comfortable authentic learning environment to interact with native speakers and thus language learning experience can sometimes lead to isolation, depression and other psychological problems.[29] Similarly participants blame language inadequacy as the reason why they feel inadequate and insecure in the host nation. Feeling worthless and abandoned had strong ties with linguistic ability. Feeling unworthy described by a number of participants is a recurring theme among recently asylum-seekers in the first months. Most interviewees express great difficulty with Turkish and highlighted that Turkish proficiency was the core challenge for them and stated that inability to interact with people heavily affected their self-confidence. Participants' ability to communicate with the native speakers is particularly important for socialization and acculturation. However, willingness to acquire the host nation language and willingness to communicate are more likely to lead to multicultural social ties (i.e., contact with people from outside of Turkey), and bicultural social ties, (i.e., contact with people from the host country).

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[29]   Sun- Mee Kang, "Measurement of acculturation, scale formats, and language competence: their implications for adjustment", *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology,* 2006, vol.37, issue.6, p.669-693, and H. Colin Gallagher, "Willingness to communicate and cross-cultural adaptation: l2 communication and acculturative stress as transaction", Applied Linguistics, 2013, vol.34, issue.1, p.53-73; Edwin Gómez, "The ethnicity and public recreation participation model", Leisure Sciences, 2002, vol.24, issue 2, p.123-142.

Some clearly found language acquisition relatively easier than others did, but learning the language of the host country was a crucial part of acclimating to Turkey for all participants. The more learners immersed themselves in the new culture, the quicker they felt comfort and improved linguistic skills. In Turkey, Arab Syrians usually speak their native language with their family members and other Syrians. Therefore, learning the language of the host country is a substantial aspect of acculturation because it allows the individual to make connections with the others and become accepted more quickly as a member of society.

4.2. Cultural Distance

The distance between asylum-seekers' culture and the culture of the host community plays a vital role in adapting to a new environment. [30] First, Turkey is a country surrounded by water on three sides and share the longest border—822 km (511 mi)—with Syria. Turkey and Syria are neighbor countries and families, especially in border cities such as Sanliurfa, Hatay and Gaziantep have or had families across the border. For instance, currently 20% of the Syrian asylum-seekers living in city center of Hatay stay with their Turkish relatives[31]. Similarly, in this study, eight out of fifteen interviewees expressed that they either have been to Turkey or have family members, including brothers, aunts and parents who have lived in Turkey. Another participant whose father graduated from college in Ankara shared how he felt comfort in coming to Turkey. It is evident that having acquaintances in Turkey provided a heightened sense of connection to Turkey and Turkish culture.

In fact, Syria and Turkey are geographically and culturally close countries. All the interviews refer to a short cultural distance as the reason of com-

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[30]   Irina Galchenko and Fons Van de Vijver, "The role of perceived cultural distance in the acculturation of exchange students in Russia", *International Journal of Intercultural Relations,* 2007, vol.31, no.2, p.181-197; John Berry, *Human Ecology and Cognitive Style: Comparative Studies In Cultural And Psychological Adaptation*. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1976, and Colleen Ward and Antony Kennedy, "Locus of control, mood disturbance and social difficulty during cross-cultural transitions", International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 1992, vol.16, issue 2, p.175-194.

[31]   ORSAM Report, "Suriyeli Mültecilerin Türkiye'ye Ekonomik Etkileri: Sentetik Bir Modelleme", Retrieved May 31, 2015, from http://www.orsam.org.tr/tr/trUploads/Yazilar/Dosyalar/201519_rapor196tur.pdf. , p.26.

fort believing that cultural similarities between two communities lead to a higher level of acceptance and appreciation of the host nation for asylum-seekers.

One of the key elements that make Syrian asylum-seekers comfortable in Turkey has been sharing the same religion. Sharing the same religion means having similar customs, beliefs, norms and festivals including Eid. In this study, subjects express that sharing the same religion represents an advantage and strengthens the bond between the two groups. It is clear that sharing the same religion of Islam—more specifically sharing the same sect of Sunni Islam—provides communality between recently arrived asylum-seekers and Muslim Turkish citizens.

> Our cultures, religions, sects are approximately the same. It is the same, it is the same. The food is the same and clothing is the same. It does not matter. It is not different from Aleppo, even the buildings, villages are similar. Even domes of mosques are similar [Ahmad, Male].

Six participants reported that they have attended religious vocational schools known as imam-hatips or the Quran Courses Centers known as Kur`an Kursları, for at least a year. Participants expressed that engagement in these activities not only has initiated contact with the members of the host nation but also has boosted her self-confidence to attend a university in this new country.

As shown above, benefits of joining such religious institutions and community centers provide a common ground between members of two groups and ease the acculturation transition for the newcomers. Not all participants believe that that sharing the same religion yields an additional benefit in acculturating to the host nation. But for most, sharing the same religion—despite their ethnic and linguistic differences—allows them to share the same religious institutions such as mosques, religious vocational schools and make them more like an "insider".

4.3. Ethnic Identity

Syrian asylum-seekers entering Turkey today represent a particularly diverse range of ethnic groups, including Arab, Turkmen, Christians, and Kurds. In this study, all the participants were asked to self-identify ethnicity. In response, 10 have identified themselves as Syrian Arab, 5 partici-

pants as Syrian Turkmen and among these one defined as yörük [nomad] specifically. All participants, regardless of their ethnicities, called Syria as homeland and expressed a high-level of attachment to their background in Syria.

Turkmen is a minority group in Syria which consists of 16 percent of Syrian population. Nearly 1.5 million Turkmen speak Turkish and another two million Turkmen only speak Arabic Similarly, Turkmen Syrian participants noted that they used to follow two courses of action in Syria: stay in compact Turkmen communities and assimilate into Arab community. They feel that assimilation policy in Syria required Turkmen identity and traits to melt into the existing Syrian Arab identity. After the start of civil war in Syria, Turkey was their primary choice. Syrian Turkmen participants noted that have expressed identity crisis of not being able to quite fit in either culture yet manage to work as feeling ostracized in both societies. Their high expectations of being accepted for their Turkish ethnic heritage and linguistic competence in the receiving country were not fulfilled and therefore display the resentment of feeling ostracized and lesser. One Turkmen participant who is a 21-year-old male describes how he hoped to be defined as Turkish in Turkey but he found himself still labeled as Syrian:

> In other areas of life, sometimes you are treated like less-human or less-deserving just because we came from Syria. *[I say]* We are Turkmen just like you are Turk*; [they say]* no you came from Syria. We were not able to hold high positions in Syria either; because we were Turkmen. Did not we fight for the unity of the Ottoman Empire together? Did not we defend our empire against Western imperialism? We sent soldiers and fought for the well-being of the empire. Now, when you are treated and labeled as traitor, you feel sorrow, pain in your heart [Necip, Male].

In this refugee crisis, not being accepted by the receiving culture as a group member is a common experience for participants. The core issue is not necessarily about racial or ethnic discrimination but *rather is about the refugee phenomenon*. The receiving community construct quite number of negative image associated with the Syrian community. In short, the refugee group—regardless their ethnic similarities and differences—can be regarded as the unwanted, inferior group in the receiving culture because of the nature of being refugee. Nevertheless, the scope of this short study is limited to investigating the acculturation experiences of Syrian univer-

sity students. Further research could include studies on attitudes of Turkish public toward Syrian population.

In dealing with issue of identity, refugee university students develop adaptive coping strategies and usually take refuge in broader aspect of social identity. The concept of ummah—the consideration of Muslims as whole body—is such as a phenomenon that encompasses all the different ethnic groups. When discussing the importance of solidarity, a 21-year-old Syrian Arab participant explained how one should think outside their ethnicity and should consider other people as part of a whole:

> We have to think about our children, our ummah… We should not think about ourselves only, we should think about the entire ummah. We should not think about Arabs only. There are Turks, Arabs, Kurds, and Turkmen. All of them are the same ummah [Necip, Male].

Nearly all participants, including Syrian Turkmen, appeal to broader statuses, rather than Turkish per se, for example the ummah consciousness, to create mutual understanding and solidarity between themselves and the majority group. These broad concepts provide tolerance for ethnic diversity and open space for a common ground. Although short cultural distance helps asylum-seekers to adapt to the new environment relatively easy, it is not enough. These common identity traits, for example the concept of ummah, prevent tension and conflicts that may arise as a result of direct interaction between two members of two groups.

4.4. Desire to Return to Homeland

Our interviews also suggest that most respondents, including Turkmen, clearly affiliate themselves with Syria and display a high level of desire to return to homeland in Syria. While two participants expressed uncertainty about the future, all the others indicated that they intended to return to Syria eventually. Whether they resettle in another country, or remain in Turkey during this civil war, it is clear that they share a profound sense of responsibility to be part of the process of renewal and rebuilding in the post-war Syria.

Compulsory military service raises concerns among young adults in Syria. Instead of serving in compulsory military service, interviewees regard uni-

versity education even at the expense of living in a new country and away from parents, as a profound investment for the future.

Syrian students pursuing higher education abroad embrace the challenges and believe that their investment in education will benefit the entire society by constructing a bright future and a better life in Syria. They agree that their sense of rebuilding Syria depends how much they equip themselves with skills in university and how they prepare themselves for future careers.

5. Discussion

In short, four key dimensions of acculturation were identified: 1) Acquisition of the majority language, 2) cultural distance, 3) ethnic identity and 4) desire to return to homeland. Major similarities exist with previous research studies. First, acquisition of the language *over time* has strong effects in facilitating adaptation for Syrian university students. Though proficiency in the language varies, all the participants improve their familiarity with the members of the host nation and eventually develop a sense of belonging and identification in the host society while learning the language.[32].All the participants in the study—all native Arabic speakers—discussed their language acquisition process as a key tool for social communication. In other words, the findings corroborated claims in the literature that dual language competencies considered the optimal outcome of the acculturation/ dual culture acquisition process.[33]

In addition, individuals who were less motivated to learn the host country's language expressed higher levels of frustration and confusion. Participat-

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[32]   Walter McManus and William Gould, Finis Welch, "Earnings of Hispanic men: the role of English language proficiency", *Journal of Labor Economics,* April 1983, vol.1, issue 2, p.101-130; Emily Keyes and Catherine Kane, "Belonging and adapting: mental health of Bosnian refugees living in the United States", *Issues in Mental Health Nursing,* 2004, vol.25, issue.8, p.809-831; Elisabeth Elmeroth, "From refugee camp to solitary confinement: illiterate adults learn Swedish as a second language", *Scandinavian Journal of Educational Research,* 2011, vol.47, issue.4, p.431-449.

[33]   Teresa La Fromboise and Hardin L.K. Coleman, Jennifer Gerton, "Psychological impact of biculturalism: evidence and theory", *Psychological Bulletin,* 1993, vol.114, issue.3, p.395-412; Claudio Toppelberg and Brian A. Collins, "Language, Culture, and Adaptation in Immigrant Children", *Child and Adolescent Psychiatric Clinics of North America,* 2010, vol.19, issue. 4, p.697-717.

ing in community centers has improved linguistic skills and has alleviated the level of frustration. In addition, our findings correlate with how leisure activities strengthen their sense of community.[34] This alone should demonstrate that participation in community-based centers, in addition to extracurricular activities, will help asylum-seekers see their commonalities with the members of the host nation and break down the barriers of fear.

Second, this study confirms previous findings in the cultural distance literature by demonstrating how shorter cultural distance leads to more positive adaptation. This is the case for sojourners and immigrants[35] and for indigenous people.[36] Our study resonates with Berry's suggestion that the assumption that the smaller the difference between the host culture and one`s own, the easier the acculturation process.[37] The findings advance research on cultural distance by proposing short cultural distance lead to fewer sociocultural difficulties and allow young adults—particularly female adolescents—to participate in the mainstream culture.

Third, ethnic identity stands as a significant barrier to adaptation and integration, as when both the refugee population and the host society desire to remain distinct from each other. Ethnic identity is the feeling of belonging to a specific ethnic group and the extent to which one affirms association in the group.[38] Participants clearly affiliate themselves with Syria and clear affiliation leads to distinguishing the refugee population from the majority.

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[34] Baruti Amisi, "An exploration of the livelihood strategies of Durban Congolese refugees", *The UN Refugee Agency Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit,* Working Paper No.123, 2006, Edwin Gómez, "The ethnicity and public recreation participation model", *Leisure Sciences,* 2002, vol.24, issue 2, p.123-142.

[35] Colleen Ward and Antony Kennedy, "Locus of control, mood disturbance and social difficulty during cross-cultural transitions", *International Journal of Intercultural Relations,* 1992, vol.16, issue 2, p.175-194; Colleen Ward and Wendy Searle, "The impact of value discrepancies and cultural identity on psychological and sociocultural adjustment of sojourners", *International Journal of Intercultural Relations,* 1991, vol.15, issue 2, p.209-224.

[36] John Berry, *Human Ecology and Cognitive Style: Comparative Studies in Cultural And Psychological Adaptation*. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1976.

[37] Ibid, p.27-40.

[38] Jean Phinney, "The multi-group ethnic identity measure: a new scale for use with diverse groups", *Journal of Adolescent Research,* 1992, vol.7, issue 2, p.156-176; James Hsiao, Michele Wittig, "Acculturation among three racial/ethnic groups of host and immigrant adolescents", *American Journal of Community Psychology Am J Community Psychol,* 2008, vol.42, issue 3-4, p.286-297.

On the other hand, Turkmen Syrians, who once came with the hope of being accepted for their Turkish ethnic heritage and linguistic competence, also resort to affiliation with Syria. While hoping to be identified as "Turkish", they are more likely to be recognized as "refugees" or "Syrians" by the host society. It is because both Turkmen and Arab Syrians move to Turkey from a specific geography as a result of the war and therefore all of them encounter the stigma of being labeled as "refugee", regardless of ethnic and linguistic similarities. These narratives about refugee include inferiority, ostracism which in return fails to provide a secure identity for Syrian university students in Turkey.

However, when ethnic identities are defined by national territories, minority groups appeal to shared identities and broader statuses, rather than Turkish per se, in order to feel belonging in the receiving culture. Therefore, the umma (the community of faith) generates sense of wider loyalty or community between settled and new asylum-seekers. In this context, the concept of umma encourages ethnically different (Syrian Arabs) and ethnically similar (Turkmen Syrians) minority groups to integrate into the receiving culture. As a basic equalizing mechanism, it allows collective identities to be formed, and maintained[39] because both the majority and the minority groups share the same religion. On the other hand, application of the concept ummah, in a non-Muslim majority setting, may actually produce distance between the majority group and minority group such as Muslim-minority groups in Britain and Japan.[40] Contrary to Syrian experience in Turkey, Muslim minority groups in non-Muslim majority societies may be encouraged to remain separated from the mainstream culture when relied onto the ummah (the community of faith). In short, while ethnic differences affirm the distinction in identities between groups, but the application of the concept of ummah created connections and cohesion between groups in the study.

Lastly, Syrian university students hold optimistic views of their country left behind and maintain high level of interest in going back to the homeland. They feel highly responsible to participate in the rebuilding process

[39]   Manuel Castells, *The power of identity*. Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 1997.

[40]   Akiko Onishi and Stephen Murphy-Shigematsu, "Identity narratives of Muslim foreign workers in Japan", *Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology,* 2003, Vol.13, issue 3, p.224-239.

of the country and re-establish cohesion in Syrian society. Syrian university students compare their experiences to the experiences of sojourners in terms of learning a new language and gaining proper knowledge in a university setting with firm intentions to return to home country after a period of time. In the midst ofpost-war issues, these students prioritize university education. While demonstrating resilience in acculturating to the mainstream culture, they want to bring back a range of knowledge and experience to homeland.

6. Limitations and Suggestions for Further Research

The findings of the present research should be carefully interpreted because this research focused only on Syrian university students at a particular university in a city far from the cities bordering Syria. Compared to living in the refugee camps and in the cities bordering Syria, this context does not provide convenient opportunities to be in close contact with culture of origin. Therefore, findings should not be generalized to the total university-age Syrian students in Turkey and other hosting countries. In addition, the research has only focused on Syrian university students and may have produced a skewed picture of asylum-seekers in general. Furthermore, the study only assessed the attitudes of Syrian students and neglected the attitudes of the majority members. In future acculturation studies, difference age groups and the host community's attitudes also must be analyzed in a sensitive manner.

One major reason for exclusion of the attitudes of Turkish people was the short-term nature of the project. The study findings are based on cross-sectional research in spring of 2015 and are limited to assess longitudinal changes. The length of stay also needs to be taken into account in understanding how it impacts the acculturation process of these university students.

7. Conclusion

The current research sought to investigate the acculturation experiences of refugee Syrian university students in Turkey. More specifically, the research aimed to explore specific factors that impact the acculturation pro-

cess. The responses of Syrian university students were evaluated and found that language barrier is the biggest threat against acculturation but all participants tended to overcome this barrier over a period of time. In addition, ample of evidence proved that short cultural distance enabled them to feel insider and showed that the smaller the difference between the receiving culture and one`s own, the easier the acculturation process. Next, ethnic identity poses an obstacle for both Turkmen and Arab Syrians because they feel that Turkish people are more likely to classify all Syrians as inferior. However, by identifying as Muslim and relying on the concept of ummah, participants create connections and cohesion between themselves and the majority group. Lastly, Syrian university students consider their experiences in Turkey as sojourning and hold firm intentions to return to home country after a period of time.

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The Role of Turkish NGOs in Social Cohesion of Syrians

Emrin Çebi*

Abstract

Turkey is struggling with the fast and increasing flow of refugees accompanied by internal disputes and involvement in the unfortunate war of Syria. The complexity of the situation put the government in difficult situation in developing social projects and strategies to meet the need of the refugees. Cultural differences and language barriers create different problems compared to previous migrations at the societal level. The most important challenge is the spread of Syrian disputes to Turkish territories, which has resulted in the loss of many lives. This has stirred unrest amongst citizens who are affected against Syrian refugees who they see as complicit in the ongoing war. While there are remarkable projects and facilities initiated by governmental agencies and NGOs on the ground, there are still obstacles to meaningful integration and the creation of a cohesionary process for the Syrians. The effectiveness of NGOs' inputs and contributions cannot be measured because of intensive flow of refugees and Turkey's internal problems. NGOs-especially faith based NGOs- recently started to criticize their work area, which focused on humanitarian aid rather than social cohesion, which is urgently needed. The unknown course of the war does not allow people to settle down and attain some stability, however, in spite of the challenges posed by the influx of migrants and Turkey's internal problems, most people in the society tolerate the migrants largely from the compassion of their religious beliefs and because of the committed efforts of NGOs which play a crucial role in dealing with migration and the problems it presents in Turkey. This paper focused on the projects, programmes, campaigns, and discourses of some NGOs in order to display their role in the social cohesion process of Syrians. IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation that has the enormous relief projects for Syrians has been introduced as an example in showing the peoples' awareness in supporting the relief projects, which are run only by donations. According to findings of this paper, faith based Turkish NGOs are very crucial mechanisms in moderating huge differences between Syrians and Turkish. They ease the works of other governmental or semi governmental agencies by conducting huge relief projects by mobilizing Turkish people.

Keywords: Civil Society, NGOs, Syrian Refugees, Cohesion, Aid campaigns, Aid projects, IHH

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Suriyelilerin Uyum Sürecinde Türk STK'larının Rolü

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Öz

Türkiye hızlı ve artan mülteci akınıyla, iç problemleri ve bu talihsiz savaşa dahli eşliğinde mücadele etmektedir. Problemin çetrefilliği hükümeti mültecilerin ihtiyaçlarına cevap verebilecek sosyal proje ve stratejiler geliştirmede zor bir duruma sokmaktadır. İki halk arasındaki kültürel farklılıklar ve dil bariyeri önceki göçlerle karşılaştırıldığında sosyal boyutta daha ciddi problemler yaratmıştır. Buradaki en önemli problem ise Suriye iç savaşının Türkiye topraklarında birçok hayata mal olan saldırı ve patlamalarla yansıması olmuştur. Bu olaylar Türk kamuoyunda, Suriyeli mültecilerin devam edegelen bu savaşın taşıyıcıları olarak algılanmalarına sebep olmakta ve buna bağlı huzursuzluklar yaratmaktadır. Hükümet organları ve STK'lar tarafından gerçekleştirilen dikkate şayan projelerle mültecilere olanaklar sağlanırken, halklar arasında anlamlı bir bütünleşme (entegrasyon) ve Suriyelilerin uyum sürecinin başlatılmasına engel unsurların da varlığı devam etmektedir. STK'ların faaliyetlerinin ve bu sürece katkılarının verimliliği/etkililiği yoğun mülteci akımı ve eş zamanlı gelişmiş olan Türkiye'deki iç sıkıntılardan dolayı odaklanılıp ölçülememektedir. Tüm bunlarla birlikte SKT'lar-özellikle de inanç temelli STK'lar-genel olarak acilen ihtiyaç duyulan sosyal uyum sürecine yönelik projelerden ziyade insani yardıma odaklı çalışma alanlarını kritize etmeye başlamışlardır. Savaşın bilinmeyen kaderi ve gidişatı mültecilerin yerleşik bir hayata geçip bir düzene kavuşmalarına izin vermezken, bununla birlikte Türkiye iç problemlerine de rağmen toplumdaki birçok insan genel olarak dini hüviyetlerinin verdiği sorumlulukla ve de mülteciler ve problemleriyle ilgilenmede hayati öneme sahip STK'ların muazzam çabalarıyla mültecileri kabullenebilmiş ve hoş görüyle yaklaşmıştır. Bu çalışma Suriyelilerin uyum sürecinde SKT'ların rolünü gündeme getirmek üzere bunlardan bazılarının proje, kampanya ve kampanya söylemlerine odaklanmıştır. Sadece bağışlarla yürütülen yardım projelerini desteklemede halkın farkındalığını göstermek üzere, Suriyelilere dair devasa projeler gerçekleştiren İHH İnsani Yardım Vakfı, bu çalışma çerçevesinde tanıtılmıştır. Bu çalışmanın bulgularına göre Suriyeliler ve Türk halkı arasındaki önemli farklılıkların –yaratacağı problemleri en aza indirmede- inanç temelli Türk STK'lar hayati bir rol öneme sahip mekanizmalardır. Bu kurumlar ayrıca diğer devlet ve devletin yardım kurumlarının çalışmalarını, Türk halkını mobilize ederek gerçekleştirdikleri dev projelerle kolaylaştırmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Sivil Toplum, STK'lar, Suriyeli Mülteciler, Uyum, Yardım Kampanyaları, Yardım Projeleri, İHH

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1. Introduction

Anatolia has witnessed huge migration waves from the ancient times that brought thousands of cultural diversities together. However, the modern era brought many casualties to the whole world as happened in these territories. Since the mid-19th century until the present day, because of the ongoing wars and internal disputes, forced migration became a regular phenomenon in the Ottoman and Modern Turkish Republic. The most important mass migrations to Turkish territories are migrations of 19th century, mass migrations after WWI, migrations following the establishment of Turkish Republic and 21th century migrations.[1]

Final migration flow created a new agenda for Turkish society. According to data given by 15.06.2017, the number of registered Syrian refugees is 3,049, 879 (İçişleri Bakanlığı Göç İdaresi Genel Müdürlüğü). The number fluctuates on a daily basis and there is uncertain number of unregistered refugees. Whilst most of the refugees have been settled in the southern part and in Istanbul, there are still significant numbers of Syrians who have been dispersed all over Turkish cities.

Despite many concerns, people are still performing at their best to overcome the refugee crisis. Specifically, media outlets impose negative images of refugees and stimulate a sense of refugee occupation. These feelings have been accompanied by violent explosions in many cities. These stirred sense of horror, and intensified tension against refugees. Despite these negative inputs, specifically escalated by the media, the Turkish peo-

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[1] Some examples of prominent migrations such as migration of Albanians who were placed in Arnavutköy in 1468, migration Polonian villages during 19th century upon their annexation by the Russian Empire, migration of Crimeans after the invasion of Russia in 1783, migration of 2.5 milyon Circassions, migration of Azeri people to Anatolia after 1877-1878, migration of Bosnians, Pomaks and other muslim ethnicities. Georgian migrations started during Ottoman-Russian war beetween 1828-1829 and continued until 1921. After the establishment of Turkish Republic migrations to Anatolia did not stopped and Greek Turkish population exchange took place in 1923 and 384 thousand people migrated to Anatolia between 1922 and 1938. Mass migration from Macedonia is antoher important migratory movement in 1924 and followed by the third wave in 1953. With Turkish-Bulgarian residence agreement in 1925, 218.998 people migrated to Turkey and these migrations continiued till 1989. With the occupation of East Turkistan migration from these lands started by 1950s and still continiues. Iranian Revolution, invasion of Afghanistan by Russia, Gulf war in 1991 war in Bosnia brouhgt many new migrants to Turkey. İçişleri Bakanlığı Göç İdaresi Genel Müdürlüğü http://www.goc.gov.tr/icerik/hakkimizda_308_309.

ple are still willing to host the migrants into their territories. According to a study, which has been published in 2015, 30 percent of Turkish people have helped Syrians directly or indirectly.[2]

NGOs play a big role in overcoming the refugee crisis in two aspects. While they are very active in meeting the refugees' basic needs, they also help them to adapt to the society. Another role of NGOs is their help Turkish society to embrace Syrians.

This paper generally aims to understand the role of civil society in managing smooth transition of refugees' existence in the country, by focusing on some projects and initiations of Turkish NGOs. I have chosen NGOs with easy access. My involvement in an NGO named as IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation has helped me in observing the process more closely.

2. Methodology

The study based on survey of the reports, thesis, and articles. The website of Development Workshop (Kalkınma Atölyesi) that collected 233 studies from 2011 till 2016 related to Syrian refugees helped a lot in reviewing the materials. Additional to written materials, telephone conversations and face-to face interviews have been made for the study.

Visuals of aid and awareness campaigns have been collected via Internet. The campaign discourses also has been included in the study in order to see how the NGOs carries the awareness to the society via campaigns. Finally some educational projects that are the result of social awareness have been chosen.

3. Literature Review

There is three important works that related to the subject of this study, have been come across during literature review.

One report about NGOs activities toward Syrians is a report of a workshop made on 28.05.2014. Twenty-one NGOs has joined the workshop and the

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2   Murat Erdoğan, *Türkiye'deki Suriyeliler Toplumsal Kabul ve Uyum*, İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2015, pp. 180.

report includes brief information about activities of participant NGOs, the problems they faced, and summary of similar workshop, which took place in Ankara (Mavi Kalem Sosyal Yardımlaşma ve Dayanışma Derneği).

Another study with the name "Report on the Activities of NGOs for Syrian Refugees in Turkey, has been prepared on 2013 by İGAMDER (Research Centre on Asylum and Migration). The report is a product of short time duration and introduces the works of some national, international and local NGOs. This report has been prepared with participant observation and semi-structured interviews in three cities as Şanlıurfa, Gaziantep, Kilis. The aim of this study has been stated as analysing the role of NGOs in solving the problems of Syrian refugees. These cities have been chosen because of their intense Syrian population and the high number of refugee camps.[3]

Among these studies, the largest scale study has been prepared on December 2014 by Hacettepe University Migration and Politics Research Center HUGO with the title "Syrians in Turkey Social Acceptance and Integration Research". Data has been collected through interviews with Turkish and Syrian interviewees on media and NGOs. This study has became a book and been published on February 2015. One section of this study has analysed the situation and the role of NGOs.[4]

According to this report while the capacity of NGOs and their approach are different from each other they spend massive effort in the case of Syrian and these efforts contribute the social acceptance enormously. The most active NGOs are the faith-based NGOs working in first aid, whilst human right-based NGOs are more active outside of the region. While there are professional NGOs, there are other NGOs, which are newly established.[5] According to information given in the research, thirty-eight NGOs have been visited and interviewed. Their approaches to social acceptance and cohesion, activities, report, press statements have been reviewed.[6] But the

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[3]   Metin Çorabatır ve Fikret Hassa, "Report on the Activities of Non Governmental Organisations for Syrian Refugees in Turkey" , Retrieved June 29, 2017, from http://www.igamder.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/Suriye-STK-Raporu.pdf., p.2.

[4]   Erdoğan, Ibid, pp. 165-172.

[5]   Ibid, pp. 213.

[6]   Ibid, pp.104.

study does not contain these analyses. According to the study more than ninety Syrian NGOs have been established during this process. In terms of the subject of the paper, the other important analyses are about NGOs' approach concerning temporariness of Syrians and reflection of this idea on the projects and activities.[7] Other important point according to information given by NGOs is the readiness of Syrians for the cohesion, while the hesitation still continues among Turks.[8]

4. Brief Background of the Increasing Importance of NGOs in Turkey in terms of Their Works toward Refugees

Growing role of NGOs in the refugee issue in Turkey starts 1960's. UN-HCR and Turkish offices had worked in close contact on asylum seekers who arrived Turkey specifically from former Soviet Union and her surrounding countries to seek asylum in a third country. The intensive years that Turkey received refugees from Middle East and African countries mostly were during 1988, 1989, and 1991 and Turkey prioritized internal security and had not applied non-refoulement policy. From 1996's UN's initiatives and the efforts of Turkish police department had entered a new reform process that had three main focuses as allowing the asylum seekers filing appeals against deportation, initiation of Turkish authorities' cooperation with NGOs and training of bureaucrats on the refugee issue.[9]

Turkey stood as model country in the process of asylum seeking following years and worked compatible with EU Legislations between 2002-2003. But Turkey could not display further development in the process because of Turkey-EU negotiation process has entered a halt from 2005. Besides, change in regulations on June 2006 has shown negative reflections in implementation procedures toward refugees. With 2006, EU regulations which are defined as building *European Stronghold* implemented strict control on entrance of asylum seekers. This has created tension between Turkey and EU specifically with intensification of war in Iraq, hunger in

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7   Ibid, pp.168.

8   Ibid, pp.170.

9   Murat Kirişçi, "Osmanlı ve Cumhuriyet Türkiye'sinde Göç ve Sığınma", *Düşünce Gündem*, 2008, vol. 44., pp.29.

Somalia and etc. Therefore before Syrian War broke out, ambiguity of the refugee issue had remained with many question marks.[10]

At the legal level of the problem while the solutions could not be found because of international controversies. The problem was very serious in affecting big amount of people at the humanitarian level. At this point NGOs and civil platforms played very crucial role in helping refugees whose status remained unclear and NGOs carried important initiations to overcome the problems of those years.[11]

While the NGOs played important role in meeting basic needs of refugees such as food, accommodation, education, employment, and etc, they also played a big role in supporting refugees for the judicial support. Especially parallel to the increase in asylum seeking 2006 onward, NGOs activities have been intensified in raising awareness in the protection of refugees. They have organized symposiums on refugee issue and future developments. Main NGOs which were working on these issues were; Helsinki Citizens' Assembly, Amnesty International, The Association for Human Rights and Solidarity for the Oppressed -known as MAZLUMDER-, IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation, Human Rights Association İHD, Deniz Feneri, The Association for Solidarity with Asylum Seekers and Migrants SGDD (Sığınmacı ve Göçmenlerle Dayanışmga Derneği) The Association for Solidarity with Refugees-Mülteci Der, Human Rights Research Association İHAD, Human Resource Development Foundation.[12]

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[10]   İbid.

[11]   Türker Kılıç, "Mültecilik Mevzuatından Kaynaklanan Sorunlar ve Çözüm Önerileri", *Düşünce Gündem*, 2008, vol. 44., pp. 29.

[12]   For example in 2008 number of NGOs make news release about refugees who lost their life in Tigris, and deportation of Uzbek refugees. They call for an action to the government authorities and tried to get attention of public opinion. They started to work on some specific areas such as Kırklareli Refugee camp, İstanbul Kumkapı Hostel, transit zones in airports to deal with the problems refugees faced. *Mültecilik Sorunlar, Sorunlar Tanıklıklar ve Çözüm Önerileri, İHH İnsani Yardım Vakfı İlmi Seriler Toplantısı 2, Haziran 2009*, p.88

5. Why is there a Need for Cohesion?[13]

On January 2016 Pakistani journalist *Javid Siddiqi* gave an interview to a news agency and evaluated the flow of Syrians to Turkey. He identified the similarities that faced both countries dealing with refugee crises. Siddiqi's use of the term *Pakistanization* of the country was used to depict what Turkey can face in the future if long-term refugee policies are not put into place. According to Siddiqi, Pakistan coped well and managed with the refugees for as long as aid arrived from the Muslim world and from international organizations. The economic assistance that has been utilized by Pakistan to manage the Afghan migrants, delayed for almost 30 years from developing social policies that would form a basis for future management.[14] Siddiqi's this comment needs to be considered upon the repatriation of Afghan refugees that stands as a major catastrophe for Pakistan, Afghanistan and the international community.

Pakistan is hosting approximately 3 million Afghans for 30 years. During the 30 years of stay, Afghans had settled their houses, set up their businesses, and even married local people. Nonetheless, by the increasingly devastating attacks in Pakistan following the US invasion of Afghanistan, the country decided to repatriate Afghans. Should this happen it will possibly be considered as the biggest migration of modern history.

What makes this last repatriation crucial that is that it has created a great deal of controversy and hatred among two peoples. While Pakistani people had criticized the Afghans for having created social disorder, their Islamic identities have managed to live together because of their common cultural background. A similar situation is occurring in Turkey. Although NGOs responded effectively to meet the basic needs of the Syrians, the prolonged war and the ambiguity of the return of refugees require developing policies in order to facilitate a meaningful and cohesive integration of Syrians

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[13]   Turkish authorities prefer the term "uyum" which is the exact translation of "cohesion" instead of "integration" that associates with assimilation. This study emphasizes the importance of giving highest possible initiative to the civil society https://www.academia.edu/11575259/Syrians_in_Turkey_Social_Acceptance_and_Integration_Türkiyedeki_Suriyeliler_Toplumsal_Kabul_ve_Uyum, p.5

[14]   F. Çarpar, "Mülteci Sorunu Türkiye'yi de Pakistanlaştırabilir", interview with C. Sıddıkı, Retrieved September 21, 2016, from http://www.sozcu.com.tr/2016/dunya/multeci-sorunu-turkiyeyi-de-pakistanlastirabilir-1040754.

into Turkish society. A major obstacle to the integration policy is the fact that Turkey has many restrictions and limitation on migrants and refugees because of the excessive influx of people seeking asylum due to prolonged conflicts on its borders. As a result, many migrants and refugees opt to migrate to Europe instead of Turkey, knowing full well that Turkish policies are very restrictive. For the Syrians, the restrictions and limitations pose as a barrier to meaningful integration and an acknowledging of Turkey's generosity because they struggle to identify with the policies of the state.

6. Some Samples of Campaigns and Discourses Involved

Relief campaigns are important carriers of messages and serve as tools to accomplish what is being targeted. In fact, there is a need for a professional focus for the campaigns in terms of capability in reaching a wide audience. Scientific measurements of the effects of campaign discourses and visuals in presenting Syrians to the society can yield significant results. Whilst most of the visuals contain of images of women and children, the basic message is to display the vulnerability and disadvantageous conditions of the people. While the "helplessness" mobilizes the public more in raising awareness and assistance, this situation may be coded in the minds that Syrians always "deprived and needy", causing us to ignore the potential of contribution to Turkey. Appreciation of those qualified Syrian population would ease social acceptance and cohesion.[15]

Figure 1: Syrian muhajirs are our brothers and sisters

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[15]   Erdoğan, ibid, pp.171.

While the Turkish government formalizes some judicial arrangements for Syrians to benefit from governmental services, in the meantime it considers the sensitivity of the issue and this can be observed from official statements. For instance, on 18 January 2013, government officers sent an issue to the governors of 11 cities stating that Syrian *guests* must be provided with health services.[16] The usage of the term "guest" is an important indicator as the state's intention to create a positive attitude in the society about the Syrians even though they are defined by the status of temporary asylum seekers. According to this status, while Syrians cannot have the rights of refugee such as traveling to a third country, they cannot be sent back to Syria unless they themselves give consent or desire to return. The implementation has been applied only to Syrian refugees fleeing from the trauma of a violent and brutal war.

The terminology that have been used for Syrians are as *refugee, asylum seeker, migrant, stateless* and *internally displaced person.* Migrant, refugee, asylum seeker, and guests constitute the terminology used to describe the legal status of Syrians inside Turkey.[17]

When it comes to the general reflections on migration in the society, one additional term has been included in this paper - that is *muhajir.* The term *muhajir* which is an Arabic word from within the Islamic tradition, means a Muslim who migrates from one place to another because of oppressions and tyranny that prevent him/her to practice his/her Islamic way of life.[18] Early usage of *muhajir* goes back to the time of the Prophet Muhammad when the Muslims migrated to another place by giving up their settled life, homes, and business just to follow the principles of Islam as a whole without any confrontation.

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[16]   Halim Yılmaz, Türkiye'de Suriyeli Mülteciler-İstanbul Örneği Tespitler, İhtiyaçlar ve Öneriler, Retrieved October 5, 2016, http://istanbul.mazlumder.org/webimage/suriyeli_multeciler_raporu_2013.pdf.

[17]   According to a research, the percentage of the term *Asylum-seeker %26, Migrant %15, Syrian %8, Refugee % 4, Guest %3* in the academic papers. *Erdem Selvin, Göçün Bilimsel Anlatısı: Türkiye 'Akademiya'sının Suriyeli 'Mülteciler' ile İmtihanı Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Avrupa Çalışmaları Merkezi Öğrenci Forumu Bülteni, Mayıs / 2016, p.20, v:5*, Dosya: Suriye Krizi, Avrupa Birliği ve Türkiye, retrieved from; https://acmof.files.wordpress.com/2011/04/bc3bclten-dosya-5-suriye-krizi3.pdf

[18]   İHH Araştırma ve Yayınlar Birimi, *Mültecilik Sorunlar Tanıklıklar ve Çözüm Önerileri Sempozyumu, Tanımlar,* 2009, pp.13, İstanbul: İHH İnsani Yardım Vakfı.

Figure 2. Humanity do wear mercy! Aid Campaign for our Syrian Brothers

Muhajir is a word derived from the word *hijrah* that is literally means "to leave a homeland and to migrate another land". In Islamic literature hijrah is being described by the emigration of first Muslims following the pressures from the leaders of Makka. They had migrated from Mecca to Abyssina and later to Medina in 622 AD. Historically, after the Muslims setting their states, the term gained different approach and has been expressed as abandoning what God has forbids.[19] After gaining independence of from colonizers, new nation states of Muslims brought different complexities. Modern structure of new Muslim nation states and tendency in secularization created different discussion and different new approaches in some terminologies. Dictator regimes of new Muslim states forced people for different pursuits. These initiatives had met with very harsh oppressions. Hama massacre in 1982, in Syria, is still very alive in the mind of Islamist

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19   Arafat Madi Shoukri, Refugee Status in Islam: Concepts of Protection in Islamic Tradition and International Law, Retrieved June 12, 2017, https://books. google.com.tr/books?id=4YYAwAAQBAJ&pg=PA45&lpg=PA45&dq=concept+of+muhajir+in+Islamic+literature&source=bl&ots=6A_xSxtXP8&sig=tzihNFcLsBj7SCHRfiXWvfciP5E&hl=tr&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiu-tzG-7jUAhWNZlAKHRH7COYQ6AEIWjAH#v=onepage&q=concept%20of%20muhajir%20in%20Islamic%20literature&f=false, Pp. 51-52.

masses. Therefore some people and NGOs prefer to call the Syrians and other refugees from Muslim communities as *muhajir*.

The argument, for this usage, is to avoid applying a western term with all its connotations on the Syrian people as it projects a sense of statelessness and humiliation. The understanding that these people fled their country because of oppression and because of an assault on their Islamic identity, is a very important determinant in this usage.

Figure 3: "This is a call for flour relief; Let's consolidate our being ansar"

Figure 4: Syrian Refugees are our brothers! Don't touch my brother!

Figure 5: Do not ignore! Let's look after Syrians who are under difficulties and let's together heal their wounds

Figure 6: "I am freezing, help!" "Winter is cold and freeze but brotherhood of Istanbul warms. Help for our Syrian refugee brothers and sisters".

Figure 7: Protest about attack and discourses against Syrians

In an interview with one of the NGOs representative in Şanlıurfa, which hosts the largest Syrian population in Turkey, the representative expressed that the concept muhajir reminds people the generosity of the ansar who hosted the first Muslims migrants in their homes. For this reason, there may be significant benefits in using such terminologies. The spread of these uses may encourage harmony, compassion, empathy, generosity and compassion in society.[20]

Ansar means "helper" in Arabic and the word refers the people of Medina who welcomed Muhajirun from Mecca. After the migration spiritual brotherhood had been established between Muhajirun and Ansar by the prophet. Ansar hosted muhajirun as their family members and shared with them their houses, properties. Qur'an defines Islamic brotherhood as "Those who believed, and adopted exile, and fought for the Faith, with their property and their persons, in the cause of Allah, as well as those who gave (them asylum and aid-these are (all) friends and protectors of another (Al-Anfal 8/72).

A group of students who visited Syrian camps in the frame of IHH projects, decided to start a project which was named as *Weaving for Brotherhood* (Kardeşlik Örgüsü). The project was launched in October 2013 with the support of IHH. It was announced in the cities and universities and received remarkable support.[21] The project was also supported by other NGOs. Handmade sweaters were sent to the refugee camps at the beginning. The cost of materials which have been distributed to volunteers to weave, has been provided by the income from the bookmarks which are prepared by a university student. In the second stage of the project Syrian women were provided with wools and knitting needles to weave sweaters for their children and people. The project received cash donations and this led to the purchasing of first-hand clothes for Syrians who were settled in refugee camps.[22]

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[20]   E. Çebi, *Social Cohesion Works of IHH*, personal interview with Behcet Atilla, 16 November 2016.

[21]   E. Çebi, *Kardeşlik Örgütü,* personal interview with Nurgül Karagül, 16 November 2016.

[22]   İki Tır Dolusu Kardeşlik Örgüsü, Retrieved November 15, 2016, from Yeni Şafak: http://www.yenisafak.com/gundem/iki-tir-dolusu-kardeslik-orgusu-594081.

Figure 8: "The project aims to help a tiny bit our Syrian brothers and sisters who experience the war very painfully, to protect them from freezing colds of the winter and the most importantly to show that we never forget them and we will not allow the world to forget.

Figure 9: Weaving for brotherhood! We are weaving weal and muffler for our Syrian brothers/sisters.

Figure 10: Bookmarks prepared and sold by university students to purchase equipment for weaving

Figure 11: Announcement is about collecting winter clothes in Üsküdar square between certain hours of the day related too Weaving for Brotherhood.

The important detail about the project was that volunteers came together from different ages and even different countries. This has been an important contribution in fostering the idea of the "humanity for all" and for improving the sense of brotherhood and awareness about Syrians.

The project further stimulated individuals to improve some other ideas through social media and resulted forming a platform that collected two trucks of winter clothes.[23]

Figure 12: About announcement of the event which composes few social formations, in Istanbul Bilgi University

7. Foundations, Projects, Platforms

While there is a clear division in the society in general about the war in Syria, division has also had a strong impact on the religious and conservative population of Turkey. This has resulted in a stagnation in relief campaigns which are mostly run by faith based NGOs, for a long time. With the intensification of the war, people became aware of the issue and NGOs increased their relief effort, which focused largely on humanitarian aid. While 5 years of drastic war exhausted much of faith based NGOs, many local and small scale organizations had to stop their projects because of lack finance and staff during this period. However there are NGOs which

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23   Ibid

still persist and continue in their efforts from the first day of war to meet the needs of Syrians.

First aid is being provided mainly by local faith based NGOs in many cities. Human rights organizations focus on reporting the conditions, observing the refugee problem and offering solutions to state or international authorities. International organizations have remained unwilling or incapacitated to resolving the Syrian- refugee's crises.[24]

Faith based NGOs mostly do not have a connection with international foundations such as UNHCR whose activities have been allowed in 2012. However UNCHR has positioned itself very hesitantly and only joined the process for observation and education for the volunteers. By 2014 International NGOs and UNHCR operated some projects, specifically in the field of education. UNICEF cooperated with mostly secular NGOs[25] , which were not active on the ground and reached a limited number of Syrians and had little acted for refugees in the cities.[26]

NGOs generally are not allowed to conduct any relief projects inside the 23 refugee camps all over Turkey. *AFAD Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency* which is the governmental entity takes care of all the processes inside the camps. However, the majority of refugees live outside of the official camps and most of them were not registered. The low levels of registration prevented Syrians from being recognized officially and deprived them from benefiting official facilities. In this regard, refugees outside the camps need aid more. However *Directorate General of Migration* Management has set up a law enforcement as *Foreigners and International Protection* which was published on 11.04.2013 with law no. 6458; *Law on Foreigners and International Protection* which is an assurance for the rights of migrants and international protection seekers. "The legal framework of the rights of migrants and refugees has been brought in line with the international standards". Directorate General of Migration Management aims to be structured in 81 provinces, 148 districts and outside Turkey. This protection law is considered "as an assurance of the

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24   Sivil Düşün, "Sivil Toplum Örgütlerinin Türkiye'deki Suriyeli Mülteciler İçin Yaptıkları Çalışmalar İle İlgili Rapor", Retrieved September 26, 2016, from http://www.igamder.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/Suriye-STK-Raporu.pdf., pp.13.

25   Sivil Düşün, Ibid, pp. 18-19.

26   E. Çebi, *Porject of Olive Branch*, personal interview with Tuğba Öztürk, 16 November 2016.

rights of migrants and international protection seekers by basing an effective asylum and migration management on a strong legal ground".

While there is significant progress in the field, there is insufficient coordination between NGOs. [27] Since the catastrophe of the war has escalated, the need for cooperation between the various NGOs have come into the spotlight in order to initiate a system that would help to disperse relief more effectively and ensure that families are not overlooked.

The platform composition of eleven NGOs and two individuals in Ankara aims to gather all activities and relief organizations to ensure coordination between those NGOs. According to the project organizers Syrians who are living in Ankara will be determined and their addresses will be collected in one particular software program. These families will be supported financially to ensure that they are able to send their children to the schools. Another aim is to determine professions of Syrian society in Ankara for future projects and coordination. Coordination between those NGOs is important in terms of preventing any chaos on the ground, work definition of each NGOs and involvement of civil society in the relief and cohesion process. [28]

Figure 13: Announcement about "Neighborhood talks" with Syrian Youths

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[27] Mustafa Tutkun, "Sivil Tolumun Sürece Sistematik Şekilde Dahil Edilmeli", *Türkiye'deki Suriyeli Çocukların Eğitimi Paneli*, Ankara, Retrieved November 8, 2016, from http://setav.org/tr/turkiyedeki-suriyeli-cocuklarin-egitimi/etkinlikler/36907.

[28] Tutkun, Ibid.

Şanlıurfa branch of IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation founded another humanitarian relief platform which is composed of local NGOs and it has implemented full-scale projects. The platform maintains contact with the governorship, municipality, and with office of religious affairs in the city. Platform functions as bridge between refugees and the various official and non-governmental structures. NGOs platform of Şanlıurfa also initiated cooperation with other cities' and countries' NGOs in conducting relief projects.[29]

There are noteworthy efforts in Şanlıurfa such as weekly meetings of Turkish and Syrian youths in the houses of volunteers or Syrian madrasas in the city. Conversations between the two nations' youth are based on the problems, solutions and projects needed. IHH representative of Şanlıurfa states that during the meetings, Turkish participants introduce themselves by adding names of cities in Syria after their own names and try to make their names sound like Syrians -such as *Behcet Abu Muhammed Shami*- with the aim of honoring their guests. Other activities that contribute to the cohesion of the society, include initiating seminars under the name Ansar and Muhajir, participating in funerals, condolences gatherings and wedding ceremonies of Syrians and meeting the expenses of those events. A noteworthy incident narrated by IHH Şanlıurfa representative is an important example in seeing the importance of aid activities. A boy from Deir-ez-Zor was mistakenly shot by Turkish gendarmerie and Syrian youths in the city were planning to organize a protest. Nonetheless the family of the victim opposed the protests and prevented youths from gaining momentum by explaining the good intention of the local people from whom they received a warm welcome when they arrived the city. This is a very sad and touching story about how people mutually try to overcome many sorrows. IHH offers important services such as assisting individuals to find the families of missing persons in the city and to help them to meet. IHH uses Arabic banners in their activities and programs to indicate their inclusive intentions.

Additionally, refugees are not asked to come to the offices to fetch their aid, rather relief materials are delivered to the homes of refugees to avoid any unintentional harm and disrespect. Women officers of the branches invite Syrian women to help with handmade foods for selling in charity

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[29]   Sivil Düşün, Ibid.

bazaars for Syrians. This environment allows women to socialize and to get to know each other. Turkish students in the faculty of theology teach Turkish to the Syrian students in Syrian madrasas while Syrians teach Arabic to their Turkish friends. Fifty percent of the 14 staff are Syrians. IHH office initiated the foundation of Syrian NGOs in the city and maintain regular contact with the NGOs to generate a close understanding and feeling of togetherness which helps in the relief planning and execution. They support 21 madrasas in the city.[30]

From the first day of the disputes IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation which was founded in 1995 during Bosnian War, exerted efforts to create an awareness in the society about its' relief projects. It was the first Turkish NGO that provided aid materials and had been transferred to AFAD to be used inside the camps.[31]

The foundation has spent 307.601.725 USD for Syria relief projects which are categorized under social, food, accommodation and health relief between 2011-2016. The foundation has settled specific offices and hired staff only for projects in Syria. IHH is working with 643 volunteers of whom 360 of them are Syrians. The Organization also works with over 100 Turkish and 100 international and 92 Syrian civil structures in conduction projects. Total activities are based on 200.000m² open area. Administrative centers, schools, university, storages for materials, bakeries, public kitchens, offices, houses for orphans and widows, social reinforcements have been established on 95.000m² (Provided data is limited to December 2016).

There are 5 operation centers which are based in Reyhanlı, Kilis, Şanlıurfa, Yayladağı, Karkamış and four in as Syria as Bab-ul Hava, Bab-us Selam, Türkmendağı, Cerablus. In total there are 8100 containers in Siccu, Reyyan, Bab-ul Iman, Shuheda, Bab-u Nur, Öncüpınar, Elbeyli Bab-us Selam container towns. Total 60.000 Syrians are living in those containers. There are 22 tent camps which compose 12.500 tents and 90.000 Syrian, in Yayladağı, in districts of Idlip, Halep, Azez. [32]

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[30]   Çebi, Ibid.

[31]   Sivil Düşün, Ibid.

[32]   İHH İnsani Yardım Vakfı, *Advertisement Movie of Damascus*, Unpublished Internal Document, 2016.

While the emergency relief projects are the first agenda of IHH, there are very important long term projects which should be instituted to support the welfare of the people. In the first years of war, when the number of refugees increased in the camps as well as out of the camps, education centers and clinics, have been set up.

Recently there are very impressive projects are under preparation such as the *Children Living Center* which has been built in Reyhanlı, district of Hatay. The center has been designed by professional architects with the aim of providing a warm environment rather than hosting the children and their mothers in the shelters. Almost 990 children who are the victim of ongoing war will be accommodated with their mothers in the complex.[33]

Figure 14: Final condition of the project

Figure 15: Final condition of the project

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[33]   There are 20 villa-type houses, and 3 clinics, meeting and entertainment buildings, mosque, administrative building, playgrounds, green areas for plantation is taking place. The aim of the project is to take care of the children's physical and spiritual well-being, providing them with accommodation, education, healthcare, food, cloth, counseling for their traumas and protecting them against criminal organizations.

Since the beginning of war from 2011, 10.000 trucking rig of food were sent to Syria with the help of countrywide campaigns. 17.400 ton of flour, 7840 dry food 19.790-ton stable food, and 266.190.000 unit of bread sent Syria only during 2015. Beside first aids, there are other important relief activities such as orphan protection and education. 6.450 orphan children are under sponsorship. 11 orphanages have been established inside Syria and 2.940 children are taken care under those orphanages with their mothers.[34]

Over 10.000 orphans receive stationery, rent allowance, psycho-social rehabilitation. 11 schools in Turkey and 18 schools have been established in Syria. 347 schools and 157.000 students who are studying in these schools are supported logistically. The University of Damascus which is composed of four faculties and with the capacity of 1.750 students, started its education in Azez's camps regions.[35] As a result of protocols with the Ministry of Education, students who study in vocational courses can have training certificates. Syrian university students are given scholarships. Reports and workshops on education problems and solutions are being prepared on regular basis.[36]

8. Joint Campaigns of NGOs

I need you was an important joint campaign which was composed of local NGO's and governmental relief organizations.[37]The campaign which was very impressive in the society created awareness and received a huge amount of relief. Another campaign which was initiated by Turkiye Diyanet Foundation has been named as Winter came…a bread, a blanket for Syria!. This campaign has also been supported by many NGO's.

In the press conference of the campaign, this platform has been described as state, nation, NGO and media cooperation. Head of Religious Affairs Mehmed Görmez expressed the relief as "*mobilization that is not the help*

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[34] IHH, Ibid.

[35] IHH, Ibid.

[36] IHH, Ibid.

[37] Presidential Office Press and Public Relations AFAD, Retrieved September 25, 2016, from https://www.afad.gov.tr/tr/2987/Sana-Ihtiyacim-Var-Yardim-Kampanyasi-Tanitim-Programi

for a friend, brother, neighbour, relative; we are as a nation going to save the mankind from being hostage". He stated that death of a human being in Syria means the death of all humanity" "death of our humanity". He again addressed the common consciences of the Turkish nation which responded earlier from the state and from any other public enterprises. These words are very inclusive and supportive.

Figure 16: Campaign for winter clothes "Make the six missing"

His speeches were very detailed and clear about the challenges and difficulties faced by the Syrians and he gave examples of previous campaigns launched by the NGOs. He stated that it did not matter to which faction the Syrians belonged or what ideology they espoused, what mattered was that the nation was being called upon to assist and provide relief. Accordingly therefore, he declared that this was not an issue of Muslims only, this was an issue of all humanity.[38]

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[38] Suriye İçin Başlatılan Yardım Kampanyasının Tanıtımı, İstanbul'da Yapıldı. Retrieved October 3, 2016, from http://arsiv.diyanetvakfi.org.tr/200/guncel/suriye-icin-baslatilan-yardim-kampanyasinin-tanitimi-istanbulda-yapildi.

Figure 17: Campaign visual of "I need you"

Figure 18: Winter came! A bread and a blanket for Syria!

Figure 19: Turkish Red Crescent relief truck which is covered with word that "you are not alone"

9. Some Examples of the Educational Project

Education is an important factor in the healing, cohesion and development of the Syrians. Currently there are 1,395,455 0-18 aged Syrians in Turkey and total number between 5-18 is 1,020,598. The 0-4 years old population is about 374,847 (İçişleri Bakanlığı Göç İdaresi Genel Müdürlüğü). While 311.526 Syrian children have a chance to study in temporary education centers and governmental schools since 2012, 523.583 children could not continue their schooling process.[39]

9.1. Zeytin Dalı- Olive Branch

The project which has been named as "Olive Branch" launched in June 2015, with the cooperation of Muntada AID which is an England-based medical relief organization and AID Alliance of International Doctors. This project aims to promote "response" programs, to diminish risk factors and to develop supporting life factors for Syrian children and women (Project of Olive Branch).

A Moroccan teacher who lived in Syria for 12 years before the war and migrated to Turkey collected a group of children who were selling paper tissues in the streets of Fatih, a district of Istanbul. She organised a class with these students and asked for help from AID regarding class materials. Later the children who were mostly from rural areas of Aleppo were taken for psychological support under AID supervision. The program has been planned for six months of therapy for 36 children. Those who show positive development complete the program while those who need more therapy continue for other six months until the therapist decides positively. Until now there 60 physiotherapies have been completed with 73 children and 80 women.[40] The fourth period of the project was completed between 01.12.2016 and 31.05.2017 with 61 children and 154 women (Project of Olive Branch).

Within this project volunteers are playing an important part in the supervision of professionals. While there are professional therapy programs sup-

[39] Coşkun İpek ve Müberra Nur Emin, Retrieved November 7, 2016, from http://file.setav.org/Files/Pdf/20160906135243_turkiyedeki-suriyelilerin-egitiminde-yol-haritasi-pdf.

[40] Öztürk, Ibid.

ported by handmade workshops, playgroups, cultural tours for children, mothers are joining Turkish language courses, needlecraft, calligraphy, marbling art and etc. These activities are considered as part of the treatment process and based on feedback from these activities helped with the healing of both groups' social relationships. While these efforts are paid for in terms of the refugee children, there are some obstacles psychologists and volunteers face. Syrian women consider therapies as a process which are applied only by mentally disturbed people. Therefore at the beginning they agreed to send their children and hesitated to meet with psychologists. They considered releasing their sorrows as complaining about their fate and a react against God's will. Another pressure on them was their concern about confidentiality. It has taken time for them and for the volunteers to trust each other and to start the rehabilitation process. Another obstacle is their temporariness in Istanbul since Turkey is considered as a transition center. Therefore the center focused more on making vocational courses for women to be able to stand on their own. Aside from all of these obstacles, there are participations, which are ongoing and increasing on a daily basis. These activities are considered as treatment processes and provide some means of relief and healing but they need a lot of interaction and opportunities to spend more time with each other. Specifically Turkish language courses attracted women participants and directors of centers needed to develop extra backup lists (Project of Olive Branch). In the center there is very meaningful harmony between Syrian and Turkish teachers, translators, even Turkish orphans who took therapies in previous times and are now involved in the process as group sister/brother. The center also provides translators for women and children when they need to go to hospitals, schools or governmental offices. Volunteers in AID also took professional seminars especially from lawyers who are interested in refugee and migration issues in Turkey. They are provided with the information on the rights of refugee, and their access to social services.

While the center dedicates huge efforts to meet the most important needs of those people, it has to deal with the complexity of Syrian society. The director of the center gives interesting information that Syrian society has many factions inside and they had to spend quite a time to overcome serious difficulties of this complexity. While the center hires translators for therapies from Aleppo, a patient who is from Damascus may not feel comfortable with this. While the center directs refugees to other relief organiza-

tions, which are funded, by non-Arab refugees of Syria, to receive relief, non-Arab NGOs may not agree in helping Syrian Arabs. Therefore another issue of cohesion among Syrians has emerged as a major concern. AID officers warn about not the mistake of identifying the Syrians as a homogeneous community and has directed that the developing projects must respond to this complexity.[41]

9.2. Onun İşi Okumak- Labour of the Child is Education

The project which was initiated in January 2016 gave birth to the association named as *Children of the Earth* (Yeryüzü Çocukları). This was an initiation upon hearing the news of a Syrian child named Muhammed Girrez who lives in Istanbul. Muhammed lost his father in Syria and had to work for a livelihood. He stated in the interview that he would like to be a doctor if he could have a chance to study. Many people tried to reach Muhammed to donate his education and support his family. Upon the news about Syrian child labors, Turkish NGOs and civilians initiated projects to reintegrate these children with education.[42]

A group of volunteers decided to help these children who are deprived of education because they have to work. While the project received remarkable support from the society, the idea needed to be projected and this led to formation of the foundation of Children of the Earth. The project was named as *Labour of the child is education* (Onun İşi Okumak). The aim of the project is to prevent the children from giving up their studies to earn an income for their families. The first target of the project was Syrian children who are between 6-18 in Istanbul. 96 children have rejoined the schools and 13 families have been provided financial aid to be able to maintain their children's study (Data limited to 2016). The project is also being supported by other NGO's such as IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation, ÖNDER Association of Imam Hatip High Schools, Turkish Red Crescent, Zeyd Bin Sabit Association in the context of joint cooperation. Ministry of Education is also involved in the process.

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[41] Öztürk, Ibid.

[42] Sümeyye Ertekin, "Suriyeli Muhammed Artık Çalışmıyor", Retrieved November 7, 2016, from http://www.aljazeera.com.tr/al-jazeera-ozel/suriyeli-muhammed-artik-calismiyor-okullu-oldu.

With the help of cooperating foundations children are determined and are settled in official schools. The registration process of these children has been accompanied by volunteers and their study is being supported by additional courses that are basically Turkish language courses. Volunteers have an important role in communication between families and the schools, between children and teachers. There are a certain number of volunteer supervisors for each family of a sponsored child. Volunteers are also in the position to audit the family should they abuse the given scholarship for the child and send him/her back to work. Long term targets of the association is to spread the idea in Turkey and to reach as many refugee children as possible who are forced to work. The association set up a center for children to recover their educational loss and speed up their Turkish language learning process while trying to register the children for the school at the same (Yeryüzü Çocukları).

9.3. Farkındayım Yanıbaşındayım-"I am aware of you, I am with you"

The Woman, Family and Youth Center KAGEM has launched a project to ensure the maintenance of the education of Syrian orphan girls via informal education. Successful students according to their demand will be supported by transferring them to governmental schools. At the same time Turkiye Diyanet Foundation provided informal Qur'anic and religious education in the mosques. The main target of the project is girls who are between 10-25 years. The pilot scheme was planned for Ankara and 150 girls have been chosen for the project in the beginning. Syrian girls who are living in Ankara are provided transportation during weekends to go their homes during their participation in this project. Social and cultural activities are being planned for those girls to improve their social and psychological developments.[43]

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[43]   "Suriyeli Yetim Kızlara Eğitim Desteği", Retrieved November 13, 2016, from http://arsiv.diyanetvakfi.org.tr/527/guncel/suriyeli-yetim-kizlara-egitim-destegi

Figure 20: Do you want to be involved by Ansar

The campaign, named as *Farkındayım Yanı Başındayım - I am aware of you I am with you* has been run in Ankara, Gaziantep, and Şanlıurfa. The Ministry of Education assigned 17 schools in which 12.978 benefited. In the website of the project launch it is stated that the values of the brotherhood of Ansar and Muhajir was the fundamental principle in launching the project. The aim of this approach has been explained as a tool to educate "our young brothers and sisters who take refuge in our country, hold their hand and launch projects that will allow them to meet knowledge and learning" (Farkındayım Yanıbaşındayım).

Figure 21: Humanity do wear mercy! Relief Campaign for our Syrian brothers and sisters.

10. Conclusion

Civil Society in modern conceptualization- has a strong base as an extension of religious motivation and a long history of *Waqf* tradition in Turkey. Turkish society has had to confront tough and severe repressive systems and institutional policies that attempted to erase their Islamic identity. This process strengthened the people's awareness of social and educational services which were first initiated by building thousands of mosques and supporting the religious educational process by building Islamic High Schools, hostels for students, Qur'anic teaching centers etc. all over the country. The struggle of existence and identity is reflected reflections in the foundation of most NGOs, which contribute the largest part to social welfare work today.

The war in Syria depolarized Turkish society, which is a reflection of Syrian deterioration. While NGOs had to struggle with this situation, the ongoing war economically exhausted many small scale Turkish NGOs. The Government agencies and some NGOs have persisted providing relief to Syrians whilst Turkey is holding more than 3 million refugees as the war continues and expands on its borders. The 15 July Coup shocked the country and Turkey entered another very critical period in its existence which drastically shook up many institutions. The effect of the coup still lingers. The war in Syria is playing out across the borders as well as inside Turkey due to the attacks by ISIS. The battle with the PKK has also caused many internal displacements plus the displacement of the Syrians.

Remarkable efforts by Turkey with her civil society which includes NGOs, platforms, schools, municipalities, semi-governmental agencies and individuals are being made and are very important in repulsing countless dangers. But there is a lot more to do for the future due to the uncertainty and escalating conflict on the ground.

NGOs, which represent the concrete form of civil society, meet the humanitarian needs for a social cohesion process. However other elements such as education, language, protection of Syrian identity and Turkish identity stand as important essentials of the cohesion. Many Syrians have been settled in cities, started their business, or have been employed, and many of them register in schools. The local people encounter Syrians everywhere. Turkey needs to transform this situation to its advantage, which will help

both the people (Syrians and Turks). The NGOs are playing a critical role in this episode of Turkey's history of Waqf and generosity of Ansar and Muhajir relations. There is a need to improve long-term strategies as a matter of urgency even as the primary forms of humanitarian aid, which are necessary, continue.

This paper aimed to present some of the works that are implemented by NGOs by showing their vitality in preventing social chaos in our country, which is encountering significant challenges and efforts to destabilize the nature and essence of the Turkish society. While NGOs have many drawbacks and can be weak in professional approaches to the conditions they find themselves in, their practical experiences should be considered in the development of policies and plans by the state and by the academic world as well. As a community of the history of the Waqf, we must reflect on these experiences if we are to engage in bigger discussions about cohesion, brotherhood and Islamic spirit. Finally, we must pay attention to the internal dynamics of communities and how we label their experiences if we are truly committed to the work of serving humanity.

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Eğer muhabiri belli ise:

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Fahrettin Altun, İstanbul, 10 Mayıs 2015, kişisel görüşme.

Daha önce geçen bir kitap ya da makale için kısaltmalar

Pamuk, "Money in the Ottoman Empire, 1326-1914", s. 10-11.

Çakır, *Tanzimat Dönemi*, s. 103.

Bütün Kaynak Türleri İçin Not

Eğer kaynağın başlığı Arapça ya da Farsça dillerinde ise ilgili dilde ve alfabede yazımının yanı sıra parantez içinde Türkçe tercümesi de belirtilmelidir.

Örnek:

"پلیس با هرگونه تجمع غیرقانونی مقابل سفارت ترکیه برخورد می‌کند" (Polis, Türkiye elçiliği önündeki her türlü izinsiz gösteriye müdahale edecek)", ISNA, 19 Aralık 2016.

Diğer kısaltmalar

aynı yazar: a.mlf.

bkz./ çev.

cilt: c./ sayı: sy./ sayfa: s.

tarihsiz: ts.

2. Arapça isimler okunuşları dikkate alınarak Türkçe imlâ ile yazılmalıdır. (Örnek: Mahmoud değil Mahmud) Eğer bir ismin Türkçe imlası bilinemiyorsa İngilizce yazılışları kullanılabilir. Ancak öncelik Türkçe'ye verilmelidir. (Not: Aynı isim içinde hem Türkçe hem de İngilizce imlâ kullanılmamalıdır).

3. Dipnotlarda ya da alıntılarda yer alan Arapça isimler ise, alındıkları kaynakta nasıl yazıldıysa, o şekilde muhafaza edilmelidir.

4. "el" takısı —paragraf başında olsa da— küçük harfle yazılmalıdır. "bin" ve "binti"nin de ilk harfi küçük yazılmalıdır. "el" takısından son-ra "-" (tire) işareti bitişik yazılarak kullanılmalıdır. Örnek: el-Sabah

5. Kenarlıklar her dört taraf için 2.5 cm olmalı, paragraflar ise 1 cm olacak şekilde düzenlenmelidir.

6. Dipnotlardaki dergi, gazete isimleri için ortak bir tercih kullanılmalıdır. Mesela *Voice of America*, *Voice of America News*, *VOA News*, voanews.com örneğinde olduğu gibi 4 farklı biçim kullanılmamalı; biri tercih edilmelidir. Ayrıca başına *the* alan dergi ya da gazete isimlerinde "the" takısını kullanılmamalıdır.

7. İngilizce yayın yapan Ortadoğu kaynaklı gazeteler dipnotlarda İngilizce yazılışı, metin içinde okunuşu Türkçe imlâ dikkate alınarak yazılmalıdır. [Msl. *Asharq Alawsat* (dipnotta), *eş-Şarku'l-Evsat* (metin içinde)]

8. Dipnotlardaki kitap, makale, haber başlıklarının yazımında kaynağa riayet edilmelidir. Yazının bulunmasını zorlaştıracak şekilde başlık kısaltılmamalıdır. Tarihlere de dikkat edilmelidir.

9. Baskı sayısı, kitap isminden sonra yazılmalıdır: İrfan Gündüz, *Osmanlılarda Devlet-Tekke Münasebetleri*, 2. baskı, İstanbul: Seha Neşriyat, 1990.

10. Ana başlıklar ile alt başlıklar birbirinden ayrılırken farklı tercihlerin yapılması mizanpajda sorun olmaktadır. Bu sebeple başlıklar numaralandırılmalıdır.

11. Terimlerin yazımında ortak bir imlâ kullanılmalıdır.

12. Yıllar ek aldığı zaman apostrof kullanılmalıdır (msl. 1 Ekim 2007'de). 11 Eylül'de olduğu gibi işaret ettiği günün özel ismi haline gelmedikçe ay adları için apostrof kullanılmaz (msl. 1 Ekimde).

14. Büyük harfle yazılıp apostrof kullanılacak yerler şunlardır: Savaş, din, mezhep, ülke, kurum ve kıta adları; şahıslar ve kısaltmalardır. Büyük harfle yazılan diğer durumlarda (msl. ünvan, kriz, devrim, ihtilal, coğrafi isimler) apostrof kullanılmamalıdır. [Bunlar birer tercih olarak kabul edilebilir; yani yazar kendi tercihini de uygulayabilir. Ancak bu tercihe yazı boyunca riayet edilmelidir.]

15. Kitap adları ve makaleler için dipnot ya da kaynakçada geçerli olan kural, metin içinde de geçerlidir: Kitaplar italik, makaleler çift tırnak içinde olmalıdır.

16. Alıntılarda, kaynağa riayet edilmelidir. Eğer, alıntı yapılan ifadede bir değişiklik yapıldıysa, bu duruma mutlaka işaret edilmelidir.

17. Alıntılar 3-4 cümleyi geçiyorsa ya da vurgulanmak isteniyorsa ayrı bir paragraf yapılmalıdır. Çok gerekmedikçe uzun alıntılar koyulmamalıdır.