Journal of Balkan and Black Sea Studies

International Advisory Board

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General Information

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Journal of Balkan and Black Sea Studies is an interdisciplinary refereed journal focusing on the humanities and social sciences of the Balkan countries and the former Soviet republics. The journal welcomes contributions in the fields of history, economics, politics, international relations, culture, art, geography, literature, theology, ethnography and environmental sciences. The idea behind this initiative is to extend a cross-cultural and cross-disciplinary approach over issues of regional importance. Under this light, the journal aspires to act as an academic forum for scholars in historical as well as contemporary context on a wide range of cross-regional issues and to provide the epistemological framework for a comparative investigation, which would enhance our understanding of the Balkan, and Black Sea societies, polities and communities. Furthermore, manuscripts connecting the region with wider scopes, such as technological applications, will be also considered.

The journal will be published online with two issues per year (June and December) commencing in 2018 and themed issues are anticipated. Submitted manuscripts should be original and not published or under consideration for publication elsewhere. Their length should not exceed 8.000 words. The manuscript will be subject to anonymous peer-review by at least two members of the scientific committee. The use of graphics and images in colour is encouraged and not subject to limitations (within reason). However, it is the responsibility of the individual authors to acquire copyright permission if needed. The language for manuscripts is English and Turkish. Articles, other than in English or Turkish, will be occasionally accepted. Articles must have an abstract of up to 150 words in English.

Design and Page Setting

Zeyneb Gökçe

Conditions of Publication

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Guidelines for Submission: Each issue will include articles, review essays, and shorter book reviews. All articles are to be submitted in electronic form to the journal editorial board at http://dergipark.org.tr/balkar and at balkar@yildiz.edu.tr. Submissions are to be up to 8,000 words in length and may be accompanied by footnotes and a bibliography. Transliterations will be kept to a minimum, and when used will follow the standard adopted by the appropriate scholarly bodies in the respective language areas. Articles are expected to be written in English though submissions in other languages can also be considered. Review essays are to be up to 4,000 words in length. They may review one or more books and may also focus on multiple works of a single author, works in a series, or publications around particular historical sources. Book reviews are to be 1,000 words in length.

Review of Submissions: All submissions are evaluated through a double-blind review process and include review both by editorial board members and external reviewers. *Publishable Copy*: Articles are to be submitted via electronic means in Word format and accompanied by a copy in pdf format. The pictures and figures should be sent separately in 200 dpi resolution in tif format.

General Style Rules: 1. The text must be formatted with 1.5-inch margins and be double-spaced. 2. A separate cover sheet must be included with the manuscript title, author's name, professional affiliation, complete mailing address and telephone number. 3. A short abstract of 70–100 words in English should accompany the article. 4. Capitalization: authors should be consistent in their use of capitalization. 5. Italics: the titles of works and periodicals should normally be italicized. Foreign words should also be italicized. 6. In general, foreign words and phrases, both in main text and footnotes should be provided in translation. All non-Roman alphabets should be transliterated according to the rules of international transliteration. 7. All articles should include footnotes. 8. All articles should have a bibliography at the end of the article. 9. Illustrations, tables, maps and figures must be numbered consecutively in the text and captions identifying the source of any image or data should be used. Figure title: below the picture; Table title: above the table. 10. For further reference, The Chicago Manual of Style Online (http://www.chicagomanualofstyle.org) is recommended.

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Journal of Balkan and Black Sea Studies is an Istanbul-based journal aiming at strengthening academic exchange among social scientists from Turkey, the Balkans, the Caucasus and Eastern European countries.

We published the first number of the journal in December 2018 with six research articles and two book reviews. The second number of the journal (June 2019) consists of six research articles, four in English, one in French and one in Turkish.

The first article by *Stefan Troebst* deals with the geopolitical and historical position of Black Sea under the title "Black Sea as Historical Meso-Region" and examines different views and positions about this topic.

The second article by *Cengiz Çağla* discusses the nation-building process of Azerbaijan in the beginning of the 20th century. He examines how nationalist ideas reached the southern Caucasus in the second half of the 19th century and led to the declaration of the first Turkish-speaking republic in the region.

The third article by *Muhidin Mulalić* discusses the catastrophic effects of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1990ies and the demographic changes caused by the war. He explains the change of ethnic structure of different regions because of ethnic cleansing and genocide carried during the war.

The fourth article by *Jochen Töpfer* dwells on the Albanian attitude towards religion and particularly Islam in Albania. He examines the policies of the government in the context of religious freedom, the religious organizations and the organization of Muslim community in the region.

In the fifth article of this issue (in French) *Mihai Sorin Rădulescu* deals with the biography and works of the Romanian architect Victor G. Ştephănescu (1876 – 1950) and explains the history of the construction of the biggest mosque "Carol I" Mosque in Constanţa, Romania, in 1910. The paper includes also photos to visualize the history and

actors.

The sixth and last article of this issue (in Turkish) by *Deniz Ertuğ* deals with the views of the French philosopher of Greek origin, Cornelius Castoriadis (born in 1922 in Istanbul and died in 1997 in Paris), about the European modernity and the modernity in general. The author explains the emphasis of Castoriadis on the ancient Greek concepts as a valuable source for current European society and civilization.

The issue includes also a review article by Tsvetelina Tsvetkova on the historiography on the Russian colonization of Caucasus, and two book reviews by Jahja Muhasilovic and Keisuke Wakizaka.

Finally, I would like to thank the authors for their valuable cooperation.

Mehmet Hacısalihoğlu, Prof. Dr.

Editor in Chief

The Black Sea as Historical Meso-Region:
Concepts in Cultural Studies and the Social Sciences

Stefan Troebst[*]

Abstract:

The concept of historical meso-regions, developed by German-speaking historians of Eastern Europe, has been *avant la lettre* employed by a number of authorities in the field of the history and culture of the Black Sea Region – Arnold Toynbee, Mikhail Rostovtzeff and Gheorghe Ion Brătianu, implicitly also by Fernand Braudel. In their footsteps Neal Ascherson and Charles King wrote their popular monographs while Eyüp Özveren elaborated his historical 'Framework for the Study of the Black Sea World'. Still, however, research results on the Black Sea as a historical meso-region remain mostly in the regionalist community and are rarely perceived in fields like Middle Eastern, Mediterranean, Balkan, East European, Eurasian or West Asian history. It has to be seen whether the recent resurfacing of the Black Sea Region in international geopolitics will bring about a change.

Key words: Black Sea, meso-region, geopolitics, historical region, regionalism

With the annexation of the Crimea by Russia in the spring of 2014, 150 years after the Crimean War the Black Sea has returned into the center of world history. Again the Black Sea Region turned into the arena of shifts in Europe's basic order. It proofs the geopolitical significance as well as the strong symbolic and affective connotations of the Black Sea.

Batumi, Odessa, Trabzon. Cultural Semantics of the Black Sea in the Perspective of Eastern Port Cities. Outline of a research project of the

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Introduction: What is a historical meso-region?

The concept of historical meso-region as an analytical framework for transnational-comparative research has its genesis in the historical sub-discipline of Russian and East European history, as it emerged in the German-speaking world. Consequently, the level of awareness of this middle-range theory has been confined to a narrow guild. It is a concept, that is to say, a working hypothesis utilized for comparative historical research. As such, it serves as a heuristic device for analysing de-territorialized, yet time-specific, conceptual units that traverse the boundaries of states, societies, and even civilizations. The aim of this type of comparative analysis is to identify and differentiate clusters of structural attributes over the *longue durée*. From this perspective, it is the various combinations of markers of this type, rather than the individual markers themselves, that make it unique and therefore cluster specific. A cluster covering a large geographic space and limited to one or more specific epochs, can be referred to as a historical meso-region[1]; some well-established examples include 'East-Central Europe', 'Northeastern

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[1] Arno Strohmeyer, "Historische Komparatistik und die Konstruktion von Geschichtsregionen: der Vergleich als Methode der historischen Europaforschung," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte und Kultur Südosteuropas* 1 (1999): 39-55; Stefan Troebst, "What's in a Historical Region? A Teutonic Perspective," *European Review of History* 10:2 (2003): 173-88; idem, "'Historical Meso-Region': A Concept in Cultural Studies and Historiography," *EGO – European History Online*, March 2012 (URL http://www.ieg-ego.eu/en/threads/crossroads/the-historical-region); idem, "Historical Mesoregions and Transregionalism," in *The Routledge Handbook of Transregional Studies,* ed. Matthias Middell (London: Routledge, 2018), 169-78; Frithjof Benjamin Schenk, "The Historical Regions of Europe – Real or Invented? Some Remarks on Historical Comparison and Mental Mapping," in *Beyond the Nation: Writing European History Today* (Bielefeld and Saint Petersburg: Zentrum für Deutschland und Europastudien, 2004), 15-24; Holm Sundhaussen, "Die Wiederentdeckung des Raums: Über Nutzen und Nachteil von Geschichtsregionen," in *Südosteuropa. Von vormoderner Vielfalt und nationalstaatlicher Vereinigung*, eds. Konrad Clewing & Oliver Jens Schmitt (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 2005), 13-33; Maria Todorova, "Spacing Europe: What Is A Historical Region?," *East Central Europe* 32:1-2 (2005): 59-78.

Europe', and 'Southeastern Europe.' [2] Here too, the specific is inconceivably removed from its surroundings; one historical meso-region can only be understood in the context of others. Accordingly, relationality and relational dependency complement the internal structures of a historical meso-region.

Only in recent years historians, art historians, and literary scholars as well as those in other fields of the humanities and social sciences have made use of the concept of historical meso-region, thereby rediscovering the Polish historian-in-exile Oskar Halecki's seminal book *The Limits and Divisions of European History of 1950*.[3] The early modernist Heinz Schilling can be mentioned as representative example in Germany[4]; internationally notable examples include the Icelandic expert on comparative

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[2] Klaus Zernack, *Osteuropa. Eine Einführung in seine Geschichte* (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1977), 20-30 and 88-92; Dietmar Müller, "Southeastern Europe as a Historical Meso-Region: Constructing Space in Twentieth-Century German Historiography," *European Review of History* 10:2 (2003): 393-408; Holm Sundhaussen, "Was ist Südosteuropa und warum beschäftigen wir uns (nicht) damit?," *Südosteuropa-Mitteilungen* 42:5-6 (2002): 93-105; Stefan Troebst, "Vom *spatial turn* zum *regional turn*? Geschichtsregionale Konzeptionen in den Kulturwissenschaften," in *Dimensionen der Kultur- und Gesellschaftsgeschichte. Festschrift für Hannes Siegrist zum 60. Geburtstag*, ed. Matthias Middell (Leipzig: Leipziger Universitätsverlag, 2007), 143-59; idem, "Nordosteuropa: Geschichtsregion mit Zukunft," *Scandia. Tidskrift för historisk forskning* 65:2 (1999): 153-68; idem, "Northeastern Europe?," *Herito. Dziedzictwo, kultura, spółczesność / Heritage, Culture & the Present* 2015:3 (20), 70-81; idem, "'Intermarium' and "Wedding to the Sea': Politics of History and Mental Mapping in East Central Europe," *European Review of History* 10:2 (2003): 293-321.

[3] Oscar Halecki, *The Limits and Divisions of European History* (London: Sheed & Ward, 1950). See also Stefan Troebst, "European History," in *European Regions and Boundaries. A Conceptual History*, eds. Diana Mishkova & Balázs Trencsényi (Oxford, New York, NY: Berghahn, 2017), 235-57 (= European Conceptual History, 4); and Diana Mishkova, Bo Stråth, and Balázs Trencsényi, "Regional History as a 'Challenge' to National Frameworks of Historiography: The Case of Central, Southeast, and Northern Europe," in *Transnational Challenges to National History Writing*, eds. Matthias Middell & Lluis Roura (Houndsmill, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan,, 2013), 257-314.

[4] Heinz Schilling, "Die europäischen Mächte und Mächtezonen," in idem, *Konfessionalisierung und Staatsinteressen. Internationale Beziehungen 1559-1660* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2007), 191-419.

civilizations Johann Arnason[5], the Swiss ethnologist Christian Giordano[6], and the British sociologist Gerard Delanty.[7]

The Black Sea Region as a histor(iograph)ical meso-region

The concept of historical meso-regions is strongly associated with Eastern Europe and specifically the Black Sea area, namely in the form of an interdisciplinary and also intercontinental lregional frame that at times has been called 'Black Sea World' and at others 'Southeastern Europe' (i.e. broadly defined and used as a synonym for the Balkan-Black Sea-Caucasus area).[8] Most importantly, the restoration of communication lines in the states and societies surrounding the Black Sea that had been disrupted during the decades of East-West confrontation has prompted historians to approach conflict and cooperation in the Black Sea area from a meso-regional perspective. Naturally, these historians have looked for precedents in earlier historical writings and in past writings of related disciplines and have made some interesting discoveries. Thus, this essay will undertake a historiographical journey through those genres of social and cultural studies that have now created a veritable research direction. The question as to whether the spatial concept of Southeastern Europe, as developed in political science [9], is transferable for our purposes (transnational comparative research) to a Balkan-Black Sea-Caucasus space[10] can by now be answered positively.

The Black Sea region appeared on the European horizon in connection with the Eastern Question, i.e. the international problem

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[5] Johann P. Arnason, "Interpreting Europe from East of Centre," in *Domains and Divisions of European History*, ed. Johann P. Arnason & Natalie J. Doyle (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2010), 139-157.

[6] Christian Giordano, "Interdependente Vielfalt: Die historischen Regionen Europas," in *Europa und die Grenzen im Kopf*, eds. Karl Kaser, Dagmar Gramshammer-Hohl & Robert Pichler (Klagenfurt/Celovec: Wieser, 2003), 113-35; idem, "Südosteuropa – eine Region eigner Art?," in *Kulturelle Orientierungen und gesellschaftliche Ordnungsstrukturen*, eds. Joachim Jesko von Puttkamer & Gabriella Schuber (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2010), 19-39.

[7] Gerard Delanty, "The Historical Regions of Europe: Civilizational Backgrounds and Multiple Routes to Modernity," *Historická sociologie* 3:1-2 (2012): 9-24.

[8] Stefan Troebst, "Schwarzmeerwelt. Eine geschichtsregionale Konzeption," *Südosteuropa-Mitteilungen* 46:5-6 (2006): 92-102.

[9] See, e.g., *The Southeast European Challenge: Ethnic Conflict and the International Response*, eds. Hans-Georg Ehrhart & Albrecht Schnabel (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1999).

[10] Stefan Troebst, "Eine neue Südosteuropa-Konzeption? Der Balkan-Schwarzmeer-Kaukasus-Raum in politikwissenschaftlicher Sicht. Ein unvorgreiflicher Vorschlag zur Diskussion," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte und Kultur Südosteuropas* 2 (2000): 153-59. See also *Handbook of the History of the Black Sea Region*, ed. Kerstin S. Jobst, Stefan Troebst & Stefan Rohdewald (Berlin, Boston, MA: De Gruyter, forthcoming).

posed from the late eighteenth to the early twentieth century by the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. It arose particularly vividly during the Crimean War from 1853 to 1856 and on this basis assumed a prominent role in geopolitical considerations at the turn of the century. The global importance of this war had been ignored in recent historical scholarship, until Orlando Figes rescued it from oblivion in his 2010 bestseller *Crimea: The Last Crusade*, which appeared in print just a few years prior to the Russian Federation's annexation of Ukrainian Crimea in March 2014.[11] In general, the pre-imperial age brought about a global geopolitical discourse on the maritime dimension of great power politics—with "Russia's urge to the warm waters" and "Rule, Britannia! rule the waves" as prominent slogans. In the 19th century then historians followed suit, and points of culmination were and are the concept of coastal societies like 'Indian Ocean', 'Adriatic' or an 'Atlantic World'[12] as well as the intense and ongoing historiographic debate on the role of seas in globalization processes.[13]

Mackinder, Toynbee & Rostovzeff: An early cohort and its followers

In 1904, the London-based British geographer Halford Mackinder situated the 'geographical pivot of history' as the overlapping hegemonic spheres of tsar and sultan, specifically in southern Russia and in the Black

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[11] See Orlando Figes, *Crimea: The Last Crusade* (New York: Lane, 2010). See, however, also the multi-volume document edition by Winfried Baumgart *Akten zur Geschichte des Krimkriegs 1853-1856* (Munich, Vienna: R. Oldenbourg, 1979-2006).

[12] Kurti N. Chaudhuri, *Trade and Civilisation in the Indian Ocean from the Rise of Islam to 1750* (Cambridge: CUP, 1985); idem, *Asia before Europe: Economy and Civilisation in the Indian Ocean bevor the Rise of Islam* (Cambridge: CUP, 1990); *Der Indische Ozean. Das afro-asiatische Mittelmeer als Kultur- und Wirtschaftsraum,* eds. Dieter Rothermund &Susanne Weigelin-Schwiedrzik (Vienna: Promedia, 2004); *Space on the Move. Transformations of the Indian Ocean Seascape in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Century*, eds. Jan-Georg Deutsch & Brigitte Reinwald (Berlin: Schwarz, 2002); *L' Adriatico. Mare di scambi tra Oriente e Occidente*, ed. Marina Cattaruzza (Pordenone: Ed. Concordia Sette, 2003); *Adriatico mare d'Europa. L'economia e la storia*, eds. Eugenio Turri & Daniela Zumiani (Bologna: Silvana,2002); Predrag Matvejevitch, *La Méditerranée et l'Europe. Leçons au Collège de France et autres essaies* (Paris: Favard, ²2005); Barry Cunliffe, *Facing the Ocean: The Atlantic and its Peoples 8000 BC - 1500 AD* (Oxford: OUP, 2001); *The British Atlantic World, 1500-1800*, eds. David Armitage & Michael J. Braddick (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002); *The North Sea and Culture (1550-1800). Proceedings of the International Conference Held at Leiden 21-22 April 1995*, eds. Juliette Roding & Lex Heerma van Voss (Hilversum: Verloren, 1996).

[13] Felix Schürmann, "Raum ohne Ort? Meere in der Geschichtsforschung," *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* 67:51-52 (18 December 2017), 41-6.

Sea region.[14] The decade of war in the region from 1912 to 1922 also attracted the interest of international historical scholarship. In 1922, Arnold Toynbee published his antithetically titled book, *The Western Question in Greece and Turkey: A Study in the Contact of Civilizations*, in which he introduced a meso-regional approach under the rubric 'Near East'. His 'Near East' encompassed both the Balkans and the Caucasus.[15] That same year, the Russian émigré historian of antiquity, Mikhail Rostovtzeff published his seminal work *Iranians and Greeks in South Russia* that took a much more explicit meso-regional perspective:

I take as my starting-point the unity of the region which we call South Russia: the intersection of influences arriving by way of the Caucasus and the Black Sea, Greek influences spreading along the sea routes, and the consequent formation, from time to time, of mixed civilisations, very curious and very interesting.[16]

To this day, Mackinder, Toynbee, and Rostovtzeff continue to influence how the Black Sea region is represented in historical studies. For example, in his 1995 well-known book *The Black Sea*, the British historian Neil Ascherson took Rostovtzeff's work as his starting point,[17] while his German colleague Dan Diner explicitly referenced Mackinder's 'pivot of history' in his 1999 history of the twentieth century, *Das Jahrhundert verstehen: Eine universalhistorische Deutung*, published in English translation in 2008 as *Cataclysms: A History of the Twentieth Century*. Diner took Mackinder's reference literally, telling the history of the century 'from its eastern periphery – from the periphery inward.'[18] 'Such a vantage point', Diner continued, 'starting from the fringes of the continent, might be that of a virtual narrator situated on the legendary steps of the Odessa, looking outward South and West.'[19] Accordingly, Diner constructs his interpretation, utilizing the East, i.e. East-Central Europe, Southeastern Europe, and the Middle East as the geographical

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[14] Halford J. Mackinder, "The Geographical Pivot of History," *The Geographical Journal* 23:4 (April 1904): 421-37 (Discussion, 437-44). See also Geoffrey Sloan, "Sir Halford J. Mackinder: The Heartland Theory Then and Now," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 22:3 (1999): 15-38.

[15] Arnold J Toynbee, *The Western Question in Greece and Turkey: A Study in the Contact of Civilizations* (London: Constable, 1922).

[16] Mikhail Rostovtzeff, *Iranians and Greeks in South Russia* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1922), 1.

[17] Neal Ascherson, *Black Sea* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1995).

[18] Dan Diner, *Das Jahrhundert verstehen. Eine universalhistorische Deutung* (Munich: Luchterhand, 1999); for the English edition, from which the above quotation has been taken, see Diner, *Cataclysms: A History of the Twentieth Century from Europe's Edge*, trans. William Templer with Joel Golb (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2008), 6. For the reference to Mackinder, see ibid., 7.

[19] Diner, *Cataclysms*, 7.

focal point for a history of the twentieth-century Europe; his against-the-grain orientation provides a history that is just as consistent and enlightening as more traditional approaches. With a view to the post-war confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States in the Balkans, the Black Sea region, and the Caspian region, Diner represents 'the recurring Eastern Question as the midwife of the Cold War.'[20] From this perspective, the Cold War was born in the Balkans, namely with the Greek Civil War from 1946 to 1949. Its certificate of birth is marked by President Harry Truman's speech on March 12, 1947, in which before a joint session of the US Congress he explicitly asked for American assistance for Greece and Turkey to forestall Soviet expansionism – the so-called Truman Doctrine. Here too, the pivot of history is situated in the Black Sea region. Indeed the Cold War in Greece and the Megali idea of establishing a Greek state that would encompass all ethnic Greek-inhabited areas were dialectically linked.

Gheorghe Ion Brătianu—the 'obscure Braudel of the Black Sea'

However during the interwar years, it was a Romanian, who was primarily responsible for propagating the meso-regional concept of the Black Sea. The economic historian Gheorghe Ion Brătianu, who in the 1930s and 1940s developed the concept in a two-volume history titled *La Mer Noire et la Question d'Orient*. Unfortunately, the second volume covering the Black Sea region during the Ottoman period remains missing to this day (The author was a political prisoner in Stalinist Romania and died in prison in 1956). However, Part One, covering the region's pre-sixteenth century history as part of the Byzantine Empire, was published posthumously in 1969 as *La Mer Noire des Origines à la Conquête Ottomane*. Interestingly, the Munich-based publishing house 'Societas Academica Dacoromana', established by an exiled Romanian, brought it to print.[21]

At the same time as Brătianu, but without any knowledge of his yet to be published opus, the French historian Fernand Braudel was also intensively working with the concept of historical meso-region in general and in relationship to the Black Sea region. In his well-known 1949 study on the Mediterranean region during the early modern period, he came to the conclusion that the Black Sea was little more than an 'Ottoman lake,'

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[20] Diner, *Das Jahrhundert*, 266.
[21] Gheorghe Ion Brătianu, *La Mer Noire des origines à la conquête ottomane* (Munich: Societas Academica Dacoromana, 1969).

albeit a 'well-guarded' one. He went on to describe it as a 'fringe area' of the 'extended Mediterranean' (not unlike the Sahara) and as a 'hunting ground of Constantinople.' In short, it was no historic region *suis generis*.[22] The American-Macedonian historian Traian Stoianovich assessed the Black Sea region essentially in the same light as Braudel. Utilizing Braudel's concept of the Mediterranean world as his model, Stoianovich postulated a Balkan world in numerous studies from the 1960s until the 1990s, including in his 1994 monograph *The First and Last Europe*. In his conceptualization of the Balkan world(s), the Black Sea figured as a mere backyard.[23]

1989 and all that

The actual breakthrough for a historical meso-regional concept of the Black Sea world, as noted earlier, was facilitated by the epochal year of 1989. As had happened in earlier times, it opened the region, making it once again relevant from an economic standpoint as well as from a geo-strategic perspective. One result of the events of that year was the creation of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), which took place at Turkey's initiative in 1992; BSEC's membership includes neighbouring

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[22] Fernand Braudel, *La Méditerranée et le monde méditerranéen à l'époque de Philippe II*. 2 vols., (Paris: Colin, 1949). For Braudel's ancient history of the Mediterranean published posthumously, see Fernand Braudel, *Les Mémoirs de la Méditerranée. Préhistoire et antiquité* (Paris: Éd. de Fallois, 1998), for discussions of Braudel's work see Peregrine Horden and Nicholas Purcell, *The Corrupting Sea: A Study of Mediterranean History* (Oxford, Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2000). This first of two planned volumes triggered a large response. See Brent D. Shaw, "Challenging Braudel: A New Vision of the Mediterranean," *Journal of Roman Archeology* 14 (2001): 419-53; Elizabeth Fentress & James Fentress, "The Hole in the Doughnut," *Past and Present* 173 (2001): 203-19. For the authors' response to this reaction, see Nicholas Purcell, "The Boundless Sea of Unlikeness? On Defining the Mediterranean," *Mediterranean Historical Journal* 18 (2003): 9-29 and Peregrine Horden & Nicholas Purcell, "Four Years of Corruption: A Response to Critics," in *Rethinking the Mediterranean*, ed. William V. Harris (Oxford: OUP, 2005), 348-75. For a synopsis of the discussion, see Stefan Troebst, "*Le Monde méditerranéen – Südosteuropa – Black Sea World*. Geschichtsregionen im Süden Europas," *Der Süden. Neue Perspektiven auf eine europäische Geschichtsregion*, eds. Frithjof Benjamin Schenk & Martina Winkler (Frankfurt/M., New York: Campus, 2007), 49-73, here 55-60.—Incidentally, it is also often overlooked that Braudel not only constructed the regions making up the Mediterranean world, but also divided all of Europe into four regions or isthmuses: the Russian, the Polish, the German, and the French isthmus.

[23] Traian Stoianovich, *Between East and West: The Balkan and Mediterranean Worlds*, 4 vols. (New Rochelle, NY; Caratzas, 1992-1995); idem, *Balkan Worlds: The First and Last Europe* (Armonk, NY, London: Sharpe, 1994).—In a recent German handbook on Mediterranean studies the Black Sea does not figure at all: *Handbuch der Mediterranistik. Systematische Mittelmeerforschung und disziplinäre Zugänge*, eds. Mihran Dabag et al. (Paderborn: Fink, 2015).

states as well as other states such as Greece and Albania. The official language of this multilateral organization for practical reasons, rather than political, is Russian. Another result of '1989' was the founding of GUAM in 1996, which in 1999 became GUUAM; the acronym is short for Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and Moldova. If we consider the geographic relation of Tashkent, Baku, Erevan, Tbilisi, Kiev, and Chişinău, it becomes clear that here we are primarily dealing with a transport route for Caspian oil to the EU via the Black Sea that explicitly circumvents the territory of the Russian Federation. The likewise russophone GU(U)AM was temporarily robbed of its raison d'être by the proposed Gazprom South Stream Pipeline. However, with the annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014 that could change; but it would be without Armenia. The BSEC appears now to be dead, because its members have only been able to reach a consensus in the area of economics and ecology.

The prospect in the 1990s of Romania and Bulgaria gaining membership in NATO and the EU also generated demand for a regional identity, which especially in Romania provoked a veritable Brătianu-Renaissance. Thus, the yearbooks *Il mar nero: Annali di archeologie e storia* has appeared in Romania since 1994 and the book series *Bibliotheca Pontica* since 1996, both in Italian. The first issue of *Il mar nero* included the following programmatic statement:

In the course of its one thousand-year existence, the Black Sea has played a dual role, i.e. a role in regional history and one in global history. As an area of contact between neighbouring civilizations and peoples, whose contact it has always facilitated, the Black Sea was also a crossroads for movements of major intercontinental trade, civilizations, and ideas. Like the sea, which is the object of its research, the journal IL MAR NERO serves as the meeting place of scholars, who in the East and the West dedicate their research to this factor in world history.[24]

The Brătianu-Renaissance in Romania should be seen against the backdrop of Bucharest's new *Ostpolitik*. Thus, the former Romanian President Ion Iliescu advocated in 2003, prior to his country's accession to NATO, the idea of the Black Sea as a 'future "European" sea' that together with the Caucasus would form the 'proper Southeastern Europe'.[25] In addition to Romania, this 'real Southeastern Europe', according to Iliescu, would include Bulgaria, Moldova, the Ukraine,

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[24] *Il mar nero* 1 (1994): 7.

[25] [Konrad Schuller,] "Iliescu für EU-Beitritt der Türkei. ‚Die EU sollte sich nicht als das christliche Europa definieren'," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 27 September 2003, 6.

Turkey, Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan. Thus, they too should have the prospect of EU accession. Iliescu deliberately excluded the Russian Federation from his conception of the Black Sea countries. In the academic sphere, Iliescu's 'real Southeastern Europe' found expression in a political science journal called *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*. The product of a 2001 Greek initiative, this journal is now firmly established in the highly competitive market of international periodicals. Even within West German political science a 'broad' Iliescu-like concept of Southern Europe is occasionally used.

Enlightenment from Mt. Uludağ: Y. Eyüp Özveren

In the world of historians, the ground-breaking essay, 'A Framework for the Study of the Black Sea, 1789-1915' by the Turkish economic historian Eyüp Özveren of Bursa's Uludağ Universitäy marked a decisive push in the direction of the meso-regional concept of the 'Black Sea world'; the essay first appeared in *Review*, a journal founded by Immanuel Wallerstein in 1976 as the official publication of the Fernand Braudel Center for the Study of Economies, Historical Systems and Civilizations at Binghampton University in New York. [26] Özveren substantiated his view of an interactive Black Sea world using the momentous effects of the 1774 Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, which ended the Russo-Turkish War of 1768-1774. Under the terms of the treaty, the Sultan was forced to concede to the Russian Empire access to the heretofore-Ottoman *mare clausum*, including the Bosporus, Dardanelles, and the Danube. According to Özveren, an internal economic dynamic arose that transcended the economic spheres of both the Russian and Ottoman Empire, crossing the borders of each. A series of Black Sea port cities, i.e. Trabzon in East Anatolia with its proximity to the Persian trading metropolis Täbriz, the new Russian city of Odessa, which served as a gateway to the Ukrainian breadbasket, and Brăila and Galați on the lower Danube in Ottoman Empire territory but oriented toward the Habsburg Empire, took advantage of Istanbul's loss of absolute control over the Black Sea region to create a new trade relationship. 'These ports', Özveren concluded now, 'could trade among themselves, thereby creating a newngular trade, escaping control of the once dominant Istanbul.'[27] The fact that this transnational movement of goods across the borders of the Ottoman, Habsburg and Russian empires in the long

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[26] Y. Eyüp Özveren, "A Framework for the Study of the Black Sea World, 1789-1915," *Review: A Journal of the Fernand Braudel Center* 20 (1997): 77-113.
[27] Ibid, 85.

nineteenth century was initiated from below by mercantile actors in the above-mentioned ports, rather than by the authoritative seats of power of said empires, Özveren interpreted as proof of 'the unity of geography'.[28] 'We now recognize this geography', Özveren stated, 'as a historically-constituted unit of analysis, a "world", the reality of which precedes in importance the actors placed on it'.[29] For Özveren, merchants figured prominently among these actors, and more specifically Pontic Greeks, whom he identified as part of the Byzantine heritage of the region. In keeping with this research direction, he studied other coastal societies, focusing on their specific trans-maritime interactions and parallels – for example, those surrounding the Indian Ocean and more recently the North Sea; and asked after the relationship between the constituent elements and the whole. His hypothesis was: 'The level of integratedness among themselves of the constituent elements of the Black Sea world is greater than the integration of each element by itself to the circuits of the outer world.'[30] In other words, at least in the sphere of commerce, Özveren's Black Sea world operated as a cohesive unit; accordingly, it was as dominant in shaping its constitutive elements as the respective competing political units (e.g. Ottoman, Russian, Habsburg) to which these elements belonged.

For the period of the Eastern Question, Eyüp Özveren postulated a historical Black Sea region, created by means of regional exchanges of goods, and thus also cultural transfers. Theses exchanges owed to the ubiquity of an ethnic, large group of professional traders, namely Greek merchant, as also Stoianovich had claimed earlier.[31] Özveren provided historical back-references for his perspective (e.g. Byzantium and the Kingdom of Trebizond and also the Pontus Euxinus of antiquity) and invoked a unifying, almost timeless, geography. Through the Ottoman re-captioning of the palimpsest 'Black Sea', so one could paraphrase Özveren, the original ancient text resonates as a Byzantine text at the latest since Küçük Kaynarca. Put differently, even empires cannot permanently resist the power of economic geography. However, he also stressed that the spatialization of social and economic processes, i.e. the mercantile activities (including their cultural dimensions) of Pontic Greeks and other merchants in the Black Sea port cities, turned the concrete space of action into a perceptual and imaginative space. Indeed,

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[28] Ibid, 82.

[29] Ibid, 86-7.

[30] Ibid, 89.

[31] Traian Stoianovich, "The Conquering Balkan Orthodox Merchant," *Journal of Economic History* 20:2 (1960): 234-313.

a system formed from a contemporary cognitive map made up of economic centres and their catchment areas that heretofore had not interacted and which had even taken on similar structures. For in the entrepreneurial coordinate system of a Trabzon merchant, Cairo, also under Ottoman rule, was situated far beyond the horizon, while Russian Odessa was only a short, albeit dangerous, sea passage away.[32]

In a 2001 essay, 'The Black Sea World as a Unit of Analysis', Özveren utilized his 1997 empirical findings to create a theoretical foundation for his concept of a historical meso-region.[33] In contrast to the *Annales* approach of Braudel and his student Stoianovich, who classified the Black Sea respectively as a largely passive annex of the Mediterranean Sea and the Balkans, Özveren assigned the region great significance; in fact, he turned the tables, describing the Black Sea not as an appendage of the Balkans, but the Balkans as an appendage of the Black Sea: 'It is my contention that the Balkans constitute a zone within the Black Sea world, rather than being a meaningful unit of analysis itself.'[34] Özveren's primary inspiration is Brătianu, who according to him is 'the obscure Braudel of the Black Sea'[35] and whose work Özveren comprehensively details and reviews.

According to what could be called the Özveren-Brătianu thesis, the meso-regional features of the Black Sea world consist of two axioms. First, the Black Sea region is characterized by a North-South opposition, whereby during antiquity, the Middle Ages, and the early modern era, the innovative impulses originated from the South, with tsarist Russia encroaching from the North. Second, the Black Sea world has been defined by long periods of imperial hegemony and *mare clausum*-policy – as enforced under Byzantine, Ottoman, and Soviet rule – interrupted by periods of openness and multilateralism (e.g. in the late Byzantine era with the economic penetration of Genovese and Venetian traders, during the long nineteenth century, which here extended to the beginning of World War II, and again since the end of the East-West conflict).

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[32] The history of founded in 1794 Odessa is particularly well-researched. Cf. Patricia Herlihy, *Odessa. A History, 1794-1914* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1991), and Evrydiki Sifneos, *Imperial Odessa: Peoples, Spaces, Identities* (Leiden: Brill, 2017) (= Eurasian Studies Library, 8).

[33] Eyüp Özveren, "The Black Sea World as a Unit of Analysis," in *Politics of the Black Sea: Dynamics of Cooperation and Conflict,* ed. Tunç Aybak (London, New York: I. B. Tauris, 2001), 61-84.

[34] Ibid, 71.

[35] Ibid.

Brătianu 2.0? Charles King

Also following in Brătianu's footsteps is the American historian, Charles King, whose monograph *The Black Sea: A History* was published in 2004.[36] King's book is original in so far as the chapter titles read 'Black Sea' in five different languages: Pontus Euxinus, Mare Maggiore, Chernoe More and Black Sea, thereby clearly indicating the imperial orientation of each respective epoch: Hellenic antiquity, Byzantine-Venetian-Genovese medieval era, Ottoman early modern era, the 'Russian' long nineteenth century and East-West bloc confrontation in the twentieth century. However, King's justification for the Black Sea region as a framework for investigation and a unit of analysis is much less innovative:

The lands surrounding the Black Sea share a colourful past. Though in recent decades they have experienced ethnic conflicts, economic collapse, and interstate rivalry, their common heritage and common interests go deep. Now, as a region at the meeting point of the Balkans, Central Asia, and the Middle East, the Black Sea is more important than ever.[37]

Compared with Özveren's highly sophisticated analysis of structural factors, the rather simple reasoning in Charles King's *The Black Sea* appears a throwback to Rostovtzeff's description of the region as 'very curious and very interesting.' King's Black Sea world is not based on structural or regional history nor is it limited to a specific time period. Instead it is static, timeless, and thus almost essentialist.

Even when King does attempt to identify the region's structural characteristics, his analysis remains orthodox, and essentially considers only one factor: insufficient modernisation in the region. The modern territorialized state, the culturally based nation, and eventually the nation-state, according to his argument, arrive here only in the twentieth century – much later than elsewhere. In keeping with this negative assessment of the region's progress, his book ends on a pessimistic note: The integration of large parts or the entirety of the Black Sea region into NATO and the EU will trigger a process of migration that will leave the region largely depopulated and consequently will change the social, economic, and ecological structure of the region.

The gloomy outlook of Charles King, a professor of international affairs and government at Georgetown University in Washington DC,

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[36] Charles King, *The Black Sea: A History* (Oxford: OUP, 2004).
[37] Ibid, see book jacket, back cover.

differs sharply from that of his Turkish colleague, Eyüp Özveren, whose thesis King inexplicably ignores. Özveren, in fact, is quite optimistic about the future of the Black Sea world:

Present trends in the region reveal a momentum for the Black Sea to recuperate its losses and assume an important role with respect to both the states and peoples of the region as well as in relation with the global political economy in-the-making by way of blocs along the Eurasian axis.[38]

Thus, he sees a 'return' to a political polycentrism similar to the regional integration of the late Byzantine era or of the long nineteenth century as being within the realm of possibility, so long as one central condition is met: 'the effective – and hopefully this time voluntary – constitution of law and order within the Black Sea world'.[39]

Conclusion: Once more 'a geographical pivot of history'

The current *pax turco-rossica* brought about by presidents Putin and Erdoğan most probably does not provide the law and order hoped for by Özveren. To the contrary, the Russian-Georgian tensions, the ongoing aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine in the Donbass region and the Azov Sea, the unresolved conflicts in the Dniester Valley in Eastern Moldova and in Abkhazia in Northwestern Georgia, but above all the Russian intervention, occupation and ultimately annexation of the Ukrainian peninsula of Crimea destabilize the region for the foreseeable future. This goes, in particular, for Moscow's massive extension of its exclusive economic zone in the Black Sea in the wake of the annexation of the Crimea. This extension cuts off Ukraine from the resources of offshore natural gas and oil, not to mention the so far untapped deposits of manganese on the bottom of the sea. Also affected is the pipeline project from Baku in Azerbaijan via Poti in Georgia to the EU territory of Romania. The impact of actors like the European Union with its "Black Sea Synergy", the People's Republic of China with its "New Silk Road" and a "16+1 Initative" (16 East European countries plus China) or Poland with her concept of a "Trójmorze" (Three Seas Initiative), aiming at the region between the Baltic, the Adriatic and the Black Seas, will most probably be limited.

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[38] Özveren, "The Black Sea World as a Unit of Analysis," 79.
[39] Ibid.

The discussion on a Black Sea meso-region, now in full swing, should be of interest to historians for multiple reasons: First, it directly affects how we construct meso-regional spaces, such as 'Southeastern Europe', 'East-Central Europe', or 'Eurasia.' Second, it offers possibilities for comparison with other maritime-based meso-regional concepts, such as 'the Mediterranean', 'the Levant', 'the Adriatic' or 'the Baltic Sea'/'Northeastern Europe'. Third, it provides a gateway to a global historical approach to trans-maritime seascapes and coastal societies, such as 'Atlantic world', 'Red Sea', or 'Indian Ocean'. Finally, it sharpens our understanding that the historical meso-regions of Europe extend far beyond the conventional political, geographic, or cultural structures of 'EUrope'.

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Nation-Building in Southern Caucasus:

The Case of Azerbaijan (1900-1920)

Cengiz Çağla∗

Abstract:

This article deals with the specificities of Azerbaijani nation-building between 1900 and 1920. To do this, first it explores the rise of nationalism and the main theoretical approaches trying to illuminate this process. Secondly, it investigates the scholarship about the Azerbaijani national movement in the beginning of the XXth century using first and second hand sources. It shows that, backed by the wealthy classes, the Azerbaijanis first looked for the recognition of their particularity in a colonial context to protect their rights and culture and that gradually the movement evolved from a rights-based reformism founded on religious identity to a secular political movement of national autonomy and independence. The article defends also that the success and popularity of the movement was due to its leaders' rich intellectual formation and political experience which enabled them to formulate a strong ideology rooted in the national identity, conditioned by regional political facts and a realistic understanding of western civilization including its modern political institutions.

Keywords: Azerbaijan, nation-building, reformism, autonomy, independence

Introduction

The opening of the XXth. century was an important period for the Russian Azerbaijanis in terms of articulating their national aspirations. The Azerbaijani nationalism rose out of the unusual cultural and political atmosphere of Baku: liberal constitutionalism, nationalism and socialism were all acting in the same environment. The aim of this article is focusing on the specificities of Azerbaijani nation-building in the first two decades of the XXth. century.

The beginning of the century is chosen as a reference point because it symbolizes the crystallization of Muslim reformism. It also witnessed to a decisive phase in the rise of the Azerbaijani intelligentsia. The defeat of Russia by Japan in 1904 and the revolution of 1905 contributed to the acceleration and politicization of the national reformism. Then, from 1905 onward, Azerbaijan was subject to a sequence of major changes and crises that influenced its political development. One should mention the three revolutions in Russia, the Persian revolution of 1906, the Ottoman revolution of 1908, the First World War and also, the Ottoman and British occupations of the Azerbaijani territory. All these events had undeniable effects on Azerbaijani politics. The apogee of the national movement came in spring 1918 when the independence became a reality, and the overthrow of the nationalist government by the Soviet regime happened in 1920. Although the period of the independence was very short, the article claims and suppose to illustrate that the Azerbaijani example of nation-building lasted as an astonishingly rich and modern experience and remarkably inspired later generations. To do this, first of all we will try to explore the rise of nationalism in general and secondly we will focus on the Azerbaijanis' national movement.

The rise of nationalism

Although there are several different theories on the emergence of nationalism, most of them place its rise in the late eighteenth or the early nineteenth century. Progressively, nationalism became a shared "state of mind" on a world scale perspective[1]. The nation is the most efficient form of social organization and accordingly the nation-state is

[1] Hans Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism, A Study in its Origins and Background*, 2d ed. (New York: Collier, 1967), ii.

the most popular political structure. From the age of revolutions on, the most important loyalty of the individual is the one towards his/her nation.

As Ernest Gellner pointed out, the age of nationalism does not consist of only a time period in which "awakening and political self-assertion of this, that or the other nation" took place, it constitutes the emergence of a "standardized, homogeneous, centrally sustained high culture" through education, published books and newspapers which were shared not only by an elite, but also by "entire populations".[2] It is obvious that this standardized higher culture was one of the most significant reasons of a nation's permanence and also of its transforming power. Based on the dichotomy between agrarian and modern societies Gellner's theory of nationalism posits a sociological understanding. Following the tradition of Durkheim and Tönnies he assumes that the development of society is from simple to complex structures, from static social roles to changing roles in functional complementarity.[3] In this context, nationalism is seen as a necessary part of the process of transition from agrarian to industrial society. Modernity is distinguished by industry, mass education and standardized higher culture.

Historically speaking, nationalism first appeared in the countries having the signs of an early capitalist economy, namely Great Britain, France and Spain. Immediately after that it jumped into more complex and connected to that, more problematic areas like Central and Eastern Europe, the Balkan Peninsula, the Middle East and also Southern Caucasus in which several ethnic communities were living in rather smaller areas.[4] From that time on, ethnic and regional conflicts, nationally justified violence and wars became popular subjects of daily life.

As a natural result of these centuries' long preparations, people as well as intellectuals began to talk about the rights of nations to live in a

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[2] Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism,* (London: Basil Blackwell, 1983), 54-55.

[3] Ernest Gellner, *Contemporary Thought and Politics*, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974), 142.

[4] Gellner argues that with the rise of nationalism, connected to industrialization, the standardized higher culture became predominant in a world scale. As a matter of fact, in other parts of the world "nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where they do not exist". See Ernest Gellner, *Thought and Change*, (London: Wiedenfeld and Nicholson, 1964), 168.

nation-state. Two revolutions took place one after the other. The American Revolution was followed by the French Revolution, the latter was obviously more significant with its long lasting influences and results: however the former one was the basis of the liberal thought. On the one hand the American Revolution caused the French, while the support of the French government to Americans in their fight for independence caused several economic problems in the country. These problems had an undeniable accelerating effect on the population's uneasiness in French society. On the other hand it showed to French intellectuals that their ideals could be achieved. Eli Kedourie stated:

> "*A nation, to the French revolutionaries, meant a number of individuals who have signified as to their manner of their government. A nation becomes a natural division of the human race, endowed by God with its own character, which its citizens must, as a duty preserve pure and inviolable.(…) Nations are separate natural entities ordained by God, and the best political arrangement obtains when each nation forms a state of its own. The true and lasting state is one where a nation is formed through natural kinship and affection. States in which there is more than one nation, on the other hand, are unnatural, oppressive and finally doomed to decay..*"[5]

Although there was no consensus on the definition of nation, it is generally accepted that a nation -in the sense popularized by the French revolution- was defined on the base of sovereignty. Nationalistic ideas were spread all over Europe by Napoleon's armies. These ideas were even influential over the soldiers who were fighting against Napoleon. In Russia the Napoleonic invasion of 1812 caused a trauma from which a patriotic legend is created to transcend the previous internal divisions and fired up feelings that influenced the liberal Decembrist uprising of 1825 against the autocracy. Alexander M. Martin argues that "the war for the Fatherland had proved the Russian people's civic maturity and ought to have been followed by Russia's transformation into a liberal nation-state."[6]

At the beginning of the Napoleonic era, citizens of different countries started to express their allegiance to concepts such as nation, *la patrie*, the homeland and the fatherland. Scholars everywhere worked continuously in their archives to find out evidence of national glory.

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[5] Elie Kedourie, *Nationalism*, 2d ed. (London: Hutchinson University Library, 1974), 58-59.
[6] Alexander M. Martin, "Russia and the legacy of 1812", in *The Cambridge History of Russia, Imperial Russia 1689-1917, vol. 2.*, ed. Dominic Lieven, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 145.

This fervent wave of nationalism did not cause much problem in the so called "settled nations", because their populations were living in the same land for many centuries, they had a common culture and a shared history. If we take a controversial example, in the case of America the shared economic interests and the needs for security appeared as main factors on which the American nation was based. So, we can say that the approval of nationalism and the justification of nation-states are made differently by different groups of nationalists in each country related to its local specificities. Some nationalists brought about the common language and literature. Others were defending the significance of the territory, some others were emphasizing the common religion. However in a way or another, nationalists helped the masses to find out some common points, to catch a collective benefit under a new union. In the French meaning of the word the nation is seen as a population living in a defined territory, united around the common interest against particular interests, constituted by free individuals protected by law, who gave their approval to be ruled by the same state.[7]

Another typology of nationalism came into existence with the rise of German unity. Germany based its unification on ethnic nationalism according to which a nation should consist of a people who have a common language, culture and a proven capacity for conquest.[8] Louis L. Snyder claims that German nationalism arose as a reaction to Napoleonic aggression. In his own words

> *"To forget their humiliation and despair, Germans turned to their past when the glorious German Empire had been the fulcrum of European power. Their poets and philosophers sought for an organic folk community wrapped in the old cloak of tradition. They would mobilize their heroic past with its folk songs, fairy tales, sagas and poetry, with an accent of imagination instead of the Western European 'philosophes'".[9]*

As Hobsbawm argued, under German intellectual influence *"Europe had been swept by the romantic passion for the pure, simple and uncorrupted peasantry and for this folkloric rediscovery of 'the people', the vernacular languages it spoke were crucial"*.[10] This populist cultural

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[7] Louis L. Snyder, *Encyclopedia of Nationalism*, (New York: Paragon House, 1990), 102-105.
[8] Eric J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1870, Programme, Myth and Reality*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 37-38.
[9] Snyder, *Encyclopedia of Nationalism*, 11.
[10] Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1870*, 37-38.

romanticism went hand-in-hand with the idealized Hegelian state as the embodiment of a supreme moral idea.

As a matter of fact, in Europe the territorial and ethnic processes of nation-formation, reflecting the French and German experiences respectively, influenced all parts of the continent and progressively other parts of the world. Nation-states are formed with unified economies, territorial centralization, the provision of equal rights for larger strata and the growth of mass education systems.[11]

This process also influenced the last three multi-ethnic empires - Russian, Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian. The Russians progressively developed a national identity based on military resistance against Napoleon to sustain a communal sense of ancestry and national pride.[12] In this context, the self-expression of the non-Russian and non-Christian elements of the Russian Empire deserves special attention. As concepts of nation and nationalism became universal in the nineteenth century, both Russians as the dominant ethnic group and their subordinate communities were influenced through the process. The Tsardom tried to incorporate and assimilate in a better way numerous Muslim communities including Tatar and Azerbaijani populations of Turkic origin by policies of Russification and constitutionalism in the beginning of XXth. century. Nationalist ideas circulated among the local intelligentsias of both Russian and Muslim communities and stimulated reformist movements. Among several ethnic communities, Tatars from Volga and Crimea regions were economically the most advanced and culturally the most open-minded elements of the Tsardom. So, the Jadid movement, led by Gaspirali Ismail Bey, started first as a cultural and social reformism. The Jadidist promotion of modern secular education, the emphasis of a common Turkish language and the opening of new opportunities of social mobility inspired self-respect to formerly despised Turkish speaking communities. In this respect, the Jadid movement illustrates a good

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[11] Anthony D. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations,* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), 138.

[12] For the importance of wars in the rise of Russian national consciousness see Michael Cherniavsky, "Russia", in *National Consciousness, History and Political Culture in Early Modern Europe*, ed. Orest Ranum (Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1975), 126.

example of the progressive evolution of "non-dominant ethnic group's" national movements[13].

As Miroslav Hroch theorized it, this type of national movements rise first from an intellectual preparation including the creation of a national culture based on local language and the extensive use of this language in educational, administrative and economic life and then create "*a complete social structure from out of the ethnic group including educated elites, an officialdom and entrepreneurial classes, but also -where necessary- free peasants and organized workers*".[14]

As an intellectual source of inspiration, the Jadid movement influenced the All-Russian Muslims movement, the Azerbaijani nationalism and even the rise of nationalism in Ottoman Empire. For the purposes of this article we will concentrate more on its influence on the rise of the Azerbaijani national movement.

Azerbaijani Nation-Building: Historical and Political Facts

With the treaty of Adrianople (1829) Russia introduced its strategic control over Southern Caucasus. The Azerbaijani territory was firmly divided into two regions. The Russian Azerbaijan in the north was a region in which people were Turkic speaking and they considered themselves descendants of Shirvanshahs. Whereas the Iranian Azerbaijan was smaller and the majority was under Persian cultural influence, Russia preferred to strengthen its domination in the region and used Azerbaijan as a military outpost to control the corridor over Asia. Tadeusz Swietochowski noted "the rise of an Azerbaijani class of professional bureaucrats" in the process of the abolition of khanates and the formation of two provinces between the 1840s and the 1860s.[15] These developments can be interpreted in terms of a nation-building process. As the "association with a specific territory" is a basic premise of this process[16], the abolition of khanates and the adoption of

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[13] For Jadidism see Edward J. Lazzerini, "Ismail Bey Gasprinski and Muslim Modernism in Russia" (PhD diss., University of Washington, 1973) and Cengiz Çağla, "The Jadid Movement and Nation Building in Azerbaijan" (PhD diss., Boğaziçi University, 2000).

[14] Miroslav Hroch, "From National Movement to Fully Formed Nation: The Nation-Building Process in Europe", in *Mapping the Nation*, ed. Gopal Balakrishnan (London and New York: New Left and Verso, 1996), 81.

[15] Ibid, 14-17.

[16] This process can be called as "nation-formation" rather than the "nation-building". For this concept see Paul James, *Nation-Formation: Towards a Theory of Abstract Community*, (London: Sage, 1996).

two *gubernia* (prefectures) somehow contributed to define the territorial unit. The Azerbaijanis, especially the intellectuals started to visualize the core of their homeland.

The educational and administrative reforms were followed by the restructuring and the centralization of the judicial system. Till the beginning of the 1870s the changes in economic and social life followed a rather slow pattern. But the sudden increase of the extraction of oil in early 1870s opened a new era. A new native industrial bourgeoisie rose, Baku became a new center of interest with its multilingual population. In this process Azerbaijani Muslims, who were previously seen as the poorest elements of the society and who were also excluded from social life started to enjoy some economic and social power in society.[17]

Among the businessmen, investors and political figures Audrey Altstadt identified two dozen families as the very top elite of Baku's Azerbaijani community.[18] Alexander Bennigsen and Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay distinguish the Azerbaijani intelligentsia from the Crimean one by the existence of an industrial bourgeoisie and a landed nobility who were interested in the development of their country.[19] This new intelligentsia, having contacts with the European civilization, became a channel of transmission of western intellectual values and also it became the main agent for change. [20]

When we have a closer look at Azerbaijani intelligentsia in the shaping process of national consciousness, we see that most of the pioneering works were done by Mirza Fethali Ahundzade (1812-1878) and Hasan Bey Zerdabi (1837-1907)[21]. A leading figure of the Azerbaijani bourgeoisie, Zeynel Abdul Tagiyef, financed the jadidist newspaper *Tarjuman* (Interpreter) for an extensive period. In this newspaper, Gaspirali Ismail Bey spoke of the existence of one Turkish

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[17] Ronald Grigor Suny, "Nationalism and Social Class in the Russian Revolution: the Cases of Baku and Tiflis", in *Transcaucasia: Nationalism and Social Change*. ed. Ronald Grigor Suny, revised ed., (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1996), 241-260.

[18] Audrey Altstadt , "The Azerbaijani Bourgeoisie and the Cultural Enlightenment Movement in Baku: First Steps towards Nationalism ", in *Transcaucasia*. ed. R.G. Suny, 200.

[19] Alexander Bennigsen et Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay, *La Presse et les Mouvements Nationaux chez les Musulmans de Russie avant 1920* (Paris and the Hague: Monton, 1964).

[20] Tadeusz Swietochowski, *Russian Azerbaijan 1905-1920, The Shaping of National Identity in a Muslim Community*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 23.

[21] See Tadeusz Swietochowski, "National Consciousness and Political Orientations in Azerbaijan, 1905-1920", in *Transcaucasia*. ed. R.G. Suny, 112 and A. Vahap Yurtsever, *Mirza Fethali Ahundzade'nin Hayatı ve Eserleri*, (Ankara: Azerbaycan Kültür Derneği, 1950), 11-12.

nation, advocated the union of this nation in spiritual, linguistic and cultural realms which was summarized in his famous slogan "dilde, fikirde, işte birlik" (union in language, thought and work). The idea of creating a literary Turkish understandable to all Turks also strengthened the Azerbaijanis' search for self-awareness. Azerbaijani identity was defined then as Azerbaijani Turkishness, a concept having geographic and also ethnic content. The first Azerbaijani who used intensively the idea of a Turkish nation was Ali Bey Huseynzade (1864-1941). He studied in Baku, St. Petersburg and finally in Istanbul where he tried to spread the message of one single Turkish nation. He returned to Baku in 1904, started to publish the newspaper *Hayat* (Life) with the collaboration of Ahmed Bey Aghayev, Ali Merdan Bey Topchibashi and the financial support of Z. A. Tagiyef. Being the second national daily of Azerbaijan published in the Turkish language *Hayat* became the mouthpiece of the nationalist movement.[22]

In the columns of *Hayat*, Huseynzade defined the Azerbaijani Turkish community as a part of the Turkish "nation", as a Muslim community who want to live in peace and prosperity along the borders of the Russian Empire.[23] He drew the attention to the needs of self-awareness of the Turkish nation with its history, language and civilisation. He claimed that the Europeans' science, education, literature and art were developed extensively and that the Turkish community also should have learned and enjoyed these developments. If the Turks could adopt a contemporary educational system in which students could study all these in the Turkish language without forgetting their own culture and past they could reach to the prosperity. Huseynzade argued that it was only in this manner that the Turkish nation could compete with other nations and he claimed that *Hayat* would try to contribute to this process.[24]

In an article written on the City Duma[25] elections, Huseynzade underlined the basic preoccupations of the Azerbaijan bourgeoisie: autonomy for the Southern Caucasus region, economic development,

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[22] Bennigsen et Lemercier-Quelquejay, *La Presse*, 106.

[23] "Müselmanız, onun için dünyanın her neresinde heyrhani bulunduğumuz din gardaşlarımız terakki etse biz o terakkinin az canu din algışlardız! Türküz, binaaneleyh Türküz. Türkün her yerde terakki ve tekamül ile mes'udiyet ve refahiyet dileriz". See A. B. Huseynzade, "Gazetemizin Mesleki", *Hayat l*, (1905).

[24] Ibid.

[25] City Duma is the local parliament and legislative branch of power in the Russian Empire. It exists as a legislative body nowadays as well.

protection of national languages and religious freedom.[26] Constituting the largest single ethno-religious group's speaker in Baku, the Azerbaijani bourgeoisie wanted to secure its position in relation to the Russian government also vis-à-vis the Armenian bourgeoisie. According to Audrey Altstadt "…*the impetus for the Azerbaijani elite's turn inward to its own community must be seen as largely practical and defensive in the face of political discrimination and commercial competition from Christians.*"[27]

Culturally distinct with its own language, script and church, economically advanced, the Armenian community had an unpronounced status of a privileged minority in the region. The Armenian Gregorian Church was powerful and respected and Armenians had almost always kept good relationships with Russian authorities in terms of religious proximity with the Russian Orthodox Church. The Armenian-Azerbaijani antagonism produced a permanent source of conflict between the two communities. Armenians were better educated and better prepared to take advantages of the growth of the regional economy. *Molla Nasreddin* drew attentions several times to this discrepancy.[28] In addition to cultural and religious differences there were apparent conflicts of interest between both Armenian and Azerbaijani bourgeoisies and the two proletariats.

The competition with Armenians influenced the Azerbaijani elite to strengthen the ties with the rest of the Azerbaijani people. The Armenian competition was felt in economic and political realms so the Azerbaijani bourgeoisie needed the active and conscious support of the Turkic-speaking masses. Having the majority on the city duma they were especially concerned on the cultural enlightenment of the Turkish community. They supported jadidist schools, the theater and the press.

In this context, in the fall of 1905 Azerbaijanis founded a national clandestine political organization called *Difai* (Defence). If the socialist-oriented *Himmet* party is not taken into consideration *Difai* was the first nationalist organization of the Azerbaijani people. Writers of *Hayat* enthusiastically supported the movement. Ahmed Bey Aghayev, besides his articles, made long speeches in the mosques of Ganja to fire

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[26] Huseynzade, "Baku Vilayeti Mebusları", *Hayat 119*, (1906).

[27] Audrey Altstadt, "The Azerbaijani Bourgeoisie", 202.

[28] For example in a caricature published in *Molla Nasreddin 24*, (1909), a well organized Armenian district of Tiflis is compared with Muslim districts of the city Ordubad which are dirtier and badly organized.

up nationalist feelings.[29] Huseynzade demystified Armenian anti-Turkish propaganda in the columns of *Hayat*. In an article entitled "Nationality and Humanity", he developed a humanistic understanding of nationality which would not oppress the other nations. He answered an Armenian writer who claimed that the Islamic world was backward and the Azerbaijanis could not reach to prosperity in their Islamic structure. Huseynzade first accused this writer to be narrow minded and then explained that there was an evolution of the history towards the nation-states without neglecting the religious identity.[30] In this period the main concern of Huseynzade was defining the Azerbaijani Turkish community as a part of great Turkish nation .In a long article published in *Hayat*, he tried to specify the origin and the glorious past of the Turks.[31] He wrote that the communities called Tatar, Kirghiz, Azerbaijani, Uzbek, Turkmen, Uygur and Bashkurd were all of Turkic origin. It was a fallacy to accept them as separate individual nations. He underlined the lack of national consciousness among the Turkish communities. In his opinion, Genghis Khan and Tamerlane were to be considered as great heroes of Turkish history. Turkish people should create universities, assemblies and associations to conduct research on the origin and history of the Turkish nation. He provided numerous examples from Russian, Finnish, Danish and Hungarian universities and scientific institutions dealing with Asiatic peoples' history and languages. He cited the names of Shemsettin Sami and Najib Asim as pioneers in this field in the Ottoman Empire. Finally, he distinguished three different groups of Turkish communities living in the world at the beginning of the twentieth century; the Turkic peoples of Siberia, Turks of Anatolia and Europe and the Turks of Southern Caucasus. [32]

Ophelia Bayramlı, who prepared the collected works of Huseynzade for reprinting in 1990s, proposes two basic factors to explain the inspirations of the nationalist action of Huseynzade: his relationship with the Ottoman Party of Union and Progress and the

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[29] Naki Keykurun, *Azerbaycan Istiklal Mücadelesinin Hatıraları*, (Istanbul: Ekspres Matbaası, 1964), 14.

[30] Huseynzade,"Milliyet ve İnsaniyyet", *Hayat* 77, (1906).

[31] Huseynzade, "Türkler kimdir ve kimlerden ibarettir?", *Hayat 9-16*, (1905-1906).

[32] Huseynzade, "Türkler", *Hayat 22*, (1905).

impact of the Russian Revolution of 1905.[33] Concerning the role of the 1905 revolution Swietochowski argues that

> "*The upheaval of 1905 brought about the weakening of arbitrary government controls, one of the effects of which was release of the long-pent-up energies of the intelligentsia. Philantropic educational theatrical and artistic associations mushroomed busying themselves with setting up new schools funding scholarships and organizing theatrical performances* "[34]

Baku became the capital of Muslim journalism in Russia. The dailies *Hayat* (published by Huseynzade, Topchibashi and Aghayev) and *Irshad* (by Aghayev), the literary review *Füyuzat* (by Huseynzade) and the Tiflis-based satirical magazine *Molla Nasreddin* (by Celil Memedkuluzade) marked this period of intellectual proliferation. Ahmed Bey Aghayev (Ağaoğlu), the leading figure of the *Difai*, was taking part in the regional political process in terms of stirring the Azerbaijani masses in the way of self-defence. His efforts were revolutionary enough for the people who were previously defining themselves only as Muslims. Besides dealing with direct politics, he struggled also against the backwardness of Islamic societies. He defended the improvement of women's rights and the modernization of education with the adoption of the Latin alphabet.[35] After co-editing the *Hayat* with Topchibashi and Huseynzade he started to publish *Irshad* with the motto of "Liberty, Equality, Justice". He struggled against the Tsarist oppression and even against the native capitalist class in the columns of *Irshad*. He predicted that the energy of nations oppressed under Russian administration could even generate events overshadowing the French Revolution.[36]

According to Aghayev, the religion should be evolved and reformed in terms of the realities of the period.[37] Daily life was changing permanently. The history was evolving towards the growing nations. All nations had to pass through and live the stage called nationalism like the path followed by the English, French, Italian and German nations.[38] In this pre-set historical perspective, Aghayev tried

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[33] Ophelia Bayramlı, "A. B. Huseynzade'nin Hayatı ve Türkçülük faaliyeti", in A. B. Huseynzade, *Kırmızı Karanlıklar İçinde Yeşil Işıklar*, ed. by O. Bayramlı, (Baku: Azerneşr, 1996), 37.

[34] Swietochowski, *Russian Azerbaijan*, 56.

[35] Yusuf Akçuraoğlu, *Türk Yılı*, (Istanbul, 1928), 430-431.

[36] *Irşad 283*, (1906).

[37] Ahmed Ağaoğlu, "Türk Alemi", *Türk Yurdu 2*, (1328): 424.

[38] *Terakki 16*, (1909).

to create a synthesis between Islamic values and practices and a modern vision of nation. He wanted to prove that being a Muslim is not incompatible with being a Turkish nationalist.[39]

A similar search for a synthesis between modernity and the past in an original style came from Ali Bey Huseynzade. He focused on the Turkish identity proposing to "Turkify, Islamicize, Modernize" (Türkleşmek, İslamlaşmak, Muasırlaşmak).[40] He wrote that "*our publication's concern is focused on these issues: Turkism, Islam and European civilization. It follows that our system of thought seeks guidance from Turkic life and from the worship of Islam. It also calls for acquiring the benefits of civilization from contemporary Europe .*"[41]

In the columns of *Füyuzat* Huseynzade tried also to protect the native culture from the assimilating effects of Russian culture. In his opinion the Azerbaijani people were living in a chaotic environment dominated by currents like "neo-imperialism", "nationalism" and "socialism". There was a permanent struggle between progress and anachronism. The only possible alliance could be with the Ottomans who had their own modernization efforts in the era of Tanzimat.[42] He interpreted Russian imperialism as a "wild horse" and the Armenian chauvinism as "the tail of this horse" and he alerted his readers against this two-fold danger.[43]

Another intellectual who had a crucial importance in the nation-building process of Azerbaijan was Mehmet Emin Resulzade. Born in Baku in 1884, he joined social democratic circles of the city and contributed to several different reviews and newspapers. In 1903 and 1904 he was the president of the "Association of Young Azerbaijani Revolutionaries".[44] He wrote in *Himmet* (illegal, 1904-1905), *Tekamül* (1906-1907), *Yoldash* (1907-1908), *Irshad* (1905-1908), *Davet-Koch* (in Armenian and Turkish 1906), *Füyuzat* (1906-1907) and *Terakki* (1908-1909).[45]

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[39] For this type of interpretation of Aghayev's work see Süleyman Seyfi Öğün, "Bir Türkçü-Islamcı Eklemlenme Figürü Olarak Ağaoğlu Ahmet", *Tarih ve Toplum 116*,(1993): 46-49.

[40] Huseynzade, "Bize hangi ilimler lazımdır ?", *Hayat 6*, (1905).

[41] *Füyuzat 20*, (1907), quoted as Turkic life in Swietochowski, *Russian Azerbaijan*, 59.

[42] Yaşar Garayev, "Ali Bey'in Eseri ve Varisleri, in A. B. Huseynzade, *Kırmızı Karanlıklar*, 7.

[43] For Huseynzade's modernist symbolism, see ibid., 8-9.

[44] Shir Memed Huseynov wrote in detail Resulzade's biography in the preface of his collected works. See Mehmed Emin Resulzade, *Eserleri (1903-1909),* ed. by Shir Memed Huseynov, (Baku: Azerbaycan Devlet Neşriyatı, 1992.

[45] For a complete list of Resulzade's publications see Resulzade, *Eserleri*, 457-46l.

Rezulzade's intellectual and political activity started with his sympathy to the Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party (RSDWP) from 1900 on, and he continued with the foundation of an autonomous clandestine publication named *Himmet* (Endeavor) carrying as its motto the famous proverb of Muslim caliph Ali: "Joint efforts of men move mountains". Being the editor-in-chief and one of the main writers of this short-lived review, he made several appeals for national union. He opposed the fragmentation of the Azerbaijani youth like nationalists, democrats, socialists, moralists or jadidists. He claimed also that the premises of socialism and democracy were not opposing Islam.[46]

Himmet transformed itself into a genuine social-democratic party, Resulzade and his friends in the party took basically a modernist and anti-colonialist stand. Himmetists published also a bilingual Azerbaijani-Armenian newspaper called *Davet-Koch* (Call) as an organ of the Armenian-Muslim Leage and weekly review *Tekamül* (Perfection) edited by Resulzade. In the first issue of *Tekamül*, Resulzade discussed the nationality problem and claimed that when constitutionalists[47] were defending the equality among nations, the social democrats were distinguishing relations of dominance between nations. As a matter of fact, social democracy was not conflictual with a nation's progress in itself.[48] In several other articles, he defended "…a nationalism based on the principle of citizenship"[49], drew attention to

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[46] "Bizim cevanlarımız biri milletperest, öbürü demokrat, etikperest, ceditperest olup da bu cür deste deste olmakta haramız özüne mahsus bir yol götürüp muayyen bir meslek ile getmekten hamimiz tek telef olur. Ve hiç birimizin eli öz muradına çatman (…) Birleşmeli, öz fikir ve fiillerimizden birbirimizi halli (haberdar) etmeliyiz (…) Ne sosyalizmin ne demokratizmin umde akideleri islam ile muhalif değil". See *Himmet 3*, (1905).

[47] At the beginning of the twentieth century the Russian liberalism was represented mainly by the Constitutional Democratic Party shortly known as Kadets (an acronym formed by combining the first two letters of the Russian spelling of 'Constitutional Democrats'). Inspired by nineteenth century liberals like Alexander Herzen, Kadets were putting the individual liberty in the main axe of their thought. See Hans Kohn, *Le Panslavisme, Son Histoire et Son Idéologie*, trad. M. Matignon, (Paris: Payot, 1963), 148 and Richard Pipes, *The Formation of the Soviet Union: Communism and Nationalism*, revised ed., (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1964), 8.

[48] "Sosyal demokratsiya külli milletlerin özü için terakki edip medeniyetleşmesine zıd değildir. Onların zıd olduğu o millettir ki özge milletleri naf (yok etme) ve müzmehlil (tedricen aradan çıkarma) etmek istiyir." See M. E. Resulzade, "Milliyet Meselesi", *Tekamül 1*,(1906).

[49] *Tekamül 9*, (1907).

teachers' formation[50], defended "the nationalization of primary schools".[51]

In March 1907, *Tekamül* was closed down by the Pyotr Stolypin government, some of the leading Himmetists were arrested, Resulzade and others were exiled in Iran and Ottoman Empire. Resulzade, could return to Baku only in 1913 and joined the *Musavat* Party founded in 1912 by his ex-Himmetist friends Abbas Kasimzade and Korbelay Mihailzade. The word *Musavat* meaning equality symbolized the demand of equality among Russian and Muslim peoples of the empire. Kasimzade and Mihailzade had founded their clandestine party on the basis of the union of Muslims, worked for the independence of all Muslim countries and the creation of economic progress for the survival and welfare of them. The party published several proclamations in order to help the Ottoman Empire in the Balkanic war of 1912 and became more popular under the leadership of Resulzade.[52]

Besides his political activity, Resulzade returned to journalism and started to concentrate on political theory. Following Cemaleddin Afgani's thought he dealt more intensively in nationality and national language. Swietochowski argues that

"He guided its (the Musavat's) evolution from vague pan-islamism toward Turkism and in the process provided theoretical foundations for the growing but undefined national sentiments among the public. In an article published in the newspaper 'Dirilik' (Vigor) he tackled the still, for the Azerbaijanis, confusing terms umma and millet. There was, he insisted, a clear distinction between the two concepts. Umma carried an exclusively religious meaning and expressed the collective consciousness of all believers in Islam, whereas millet referred to a community based on the common language, culture, history as well as religion, the latter being only one of its attributes."[53]

This secular meaning of the nation shaped the ideology of the *Musavat*, otherwise called "Musavatism". Resulzade entered also into discussion of national language that was going on between those who were defending the Ottoman version of the Turkish language and the others defending the Azerbaijani vernacular. He refused both

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[50] *Yoldash 1*, (1907).

[51] *Terakki 107*, (1908).

[52] Mirza Bala Mehmetzade, *Milli Azerbaycan Hareketi: Milli Azerbaycan Musavat Fırkasının Tarihi*, (Berlin, 1938), 34.

[53] Swietochowski, "National Consciousness", 220.

tendencies and took part in a simple, unifying language understandable by the largest possible masses. Local vernaculars could not be rich enough to become a national language and the Ottoman one was alienated from the Turkish.[54]

In 1915 Resulzade started to publish *Achik Söz* (The Frank Word) in the columns of which he replaced the words of Tatar and Muslim by Turkish. This "Turkish Daily" started to propagate the national independence in an atmosphere marked by the conditions of the First World War. In the first issue of the newspaper, he proclaimed that the world map would be changed at the end of the war. It would take a new shape depending on the factors such as state organizations, power of armies, sacrifice of the citizens and also the rise of national ideals. He added that solutions denying the existence of national entities had to be short-lived.[55] *Achik Söz* quickly became the speaker of the Musavat Party among the intelligentsia and especially the Azerbaijani youth. Even Muslim students of Russian universities in other regions of Russia started to create their own organizations around *Achik Söz*.

The Russian Empire could no more withstand the pressures of the First World War. In February 1917, the Worker's and Army Soviets' uprising started, the State Duma demanded the resignation of Tsar Nicolas II. This event signified the end of the Romanov monarchy and the beginning of a new era of transformation. The Provisional Government offered different nationalities a declaration of rights, cancelling almost all restrictions previously imposed on citizens in religious and national matters[56]. In this context, all political and social organizations tried to improve their structure and defend their interests before the authorities. Ronald Grigor Suny states that

> "*In order to unify the Muslim community and create a single authoritative voice for all the Moslems of Baku, Azerbaijani leaders held several meetings in March to discuss the formation of a Moslem Council. Early in April the Council was formed and elected a provisional committee to lead it*".[57]

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[54] *Shelale 21* and *37*, (1913).

[55] *Achik Söz 1*, (1915).

[56] Hellène Carrère-d'Encausse. "The Fall of the Czarist Empire" in *The Central Asia:120 years of Russian Rule.* ed. Edward Allworth (Durham, N.C. : Duke University Press, 1989), 214.

[57] Ronald Grigor Suny, *The Baku Commune 1917-1918, Class and Nationality in the Russian Revolution*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), 86.

Resulzade was considering the Council as a potentially powerful political force and proposed the territorial autonomy for different Muslim-dominated regions of Russia including Azerbaijan. The local social democratic party *Himmet* wanted to limit the role of the national political organization to cultural affairs[58]. Finally the Council adopted a resolution demanding a Russian republic organized in a geographical federation basis and called for the creation of a new organization including the representatives of all-Russian Muslims[59].

When the *Musavat* thesis was adopted, Resulzade and his friends became the leaders of the largest political force of Azerbaijan. This time the conditions were quite different compared to earlier Congresses of all-Russian Muslims held between 1905 and 1907[60]. The first period was led by Tatar intellectuals who were for the union in the Russian Empire whereas the years of the World War imposed new conditions: interests among the rising local bourgeoisies were differentiated enough to defend local autonomies. In May 1917 a new all-Russian Muslims Congress was held in Moscow. The delegates from Turkistan, Kirgizistan, Bashkurdistan and Crimea supported the Musavat's "territorial autonomy" and self-rule principles whereas the Volga Tatars who lived in a variety of dispersed areas defended the thesis of "cultural autonomy" claiming that Russian Muslims' interests should be represented in a higher and central level. Socialists linked to the Russian Revolution were also sharing the Volga Tatars' approach for not to strengthen the positions of local landowners and capitalists. Resulzade arose as the main defender of the territorial autonomy thesis and recalled that they were living from then on in a world evolving through a world of nations and the Azerbaijani people were already seeing themselves first as Turkish second as Muslim. To limit the autonomy program with the all-Russian Muslims' united organization would be unjust for the Turkish peoples developing their own national consciousness. He claimed also that "there should be different sections for Turks, Iranians and Arabs in the big Muslim house".[61] The Congress ended with the victory of Resulzade and Musavat:

> *"The final vote on the question adopted territorial autonomy rather than purely cultural autonomy by more than a two/thirds majority. They*

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[58] Ibid., 87.

[59] Mehmetzade, *Milli Azerbaycan Hareketi*, 49.

[60] For the first two congresses see Serge A. Zenkovsky, *Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia*, (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1960), 41-43 and Azade-Ayşe Rorlich, *The Volga Tatars, A Profile in National Resilience*, (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1986), 111-118.

[61] Swietochowski, *Russian Azerbaijan*, 72.

adopted proposal stated:'The form of government that is most capable of protecting the interests of the Muslim peoples is a democratic republic based on the national, territorial and federal principles, with national/cultural autonomy for the nationalities that lack a distinct territory".[62]

The year of 1917 witnessed also the unification of Musavat with the Ganja-based "Turkic Party of Decentralization" led by Nasib Yusifbeyli. Yusifbeyli was a consistent jadidist, inspired by Gaspirali, who worked also in Istanbul in "Türk Derneği" (Turkish Association) and collaborated with Resulzade in Azerbaijan. His party was powerful especially in rural areas and among the local nobility.[63] Both parties were defending a secular nationalism and *"a vision of Azerbaijan as an autonomous republic in association with a Russia reorganized into a federation of free and equal states".[64]* The new party was called the "Turkic Party of Decentralization/Musavat", adopted the federalist program in the First Congress held in October 1917.[65]

Among the other actors influencing the Azerbaijani political process one could mention the Islamist *Ittihad* (Union), the pro-Bolshevik Himmet, the Bolsheviks constituted by Russian and Armenian socialists and Armenian Dashnakists. When Russian Bolsheviks overthrow the Provisional Government in St. Petersburg in October, Musavatists welcomed the revolution thinking that Lenin's slogan of "national self-determination" could be interpreted as a broad territorial autonomy for Azerbaijan. With this aspiration they supported also the Russian and Armenian-dominated Soviet in Baku and also the foundation of a supreme authority over Southern Caucasus in the form of regional parliament, called the Seim. For the Musavatists, the Seim seemed somehow the immediate fulfilment of their ideal of federalism. But, the Baku Soviet, who took the power in the city in October 1917, openly undermined the national demands of Azerbaijanis, entered into direct command of Lenin and refused separatism from revolutionary Russia. Although the Musavatists were represented in the Muslim Faction of the South Caucasian Seim, they were not able to control all the Azerbaijani territory and as the Baku Soviet transformed itself to a Bolshevik/Dashnakist dictatorship, the

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[62] Alan W. Fischer, *The Crimean Tatars*, (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1978), 114.

[63] Swietochowski sees this party as the inheritor of *Difai*. See Swietochowski, "National Consciousness", 221-222.

[64] Ibid, 222.

[65] For the details of this program see Mehmetzade, *Milli Azerbaycan Hareketi*, 52-53.

tension existing between Musavatist Azerbaijanis and Baku Soviet forces became antagonistic. According to Swietochowski, the violence started like a Musavat-led uprising on the 31st. of March, 1918. He states that

> "*The show/down was as much ideological as national in character. It started as a coup against the rule of the Soviet staged by the Azerbaijani nationalists who were assisted by counter/revolutionary Russian officers. Within three days the fighting turned into the familiar pattern of intercommunal massacre that claimed at least three thousand muslim lives as the troops of the Armenian Dashnaksutiun Party, allied with the Soviet, went into action".[66]*

The so-called dictatorship of the proletariat was instituted by the Bolshevik Soviet of the People Commissars. The Baku Commune "had consistently demonstrated its willingness to underrepresent the Muslim citizens of Baku[67], defenders of Musavat were seen as culturally inferior[68] and Musavat as a counter-revolutionary party threatening the existence of the revolutionary democracy[69].

The Soviet power was overthrown by another dictatorship, the one of the Socialist Revolutionairies (known as SRs), which stayed only six weeks. There was another process going on in regions outside of Baku. As Swietochowski puts it

> "*the Seim proclaimed on April 22 the Transcaucasian Federation, an ephemeral union of Georgians, Armenians and Azerbaijanis, which was dissolved after four weeks of internal strife and external pressures on the part of Turkey and Germany.*"[70]

After the failure of the Transcaucasian Federation, Georgia proclaimed its independence. Two days later, the 28th of May, 1918, Azerbaijani deputies of the Seim created their own National Council led by Resulzade, which turned to be the Azerbaijani Republic with its temporary capital Ganja.[71] This proclamation of an independent

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[66] Tadeusz Swietochowski, "The Himmät Party, Socialism and the National Question in Russian Azerbaijan, 1904-1920", *Cahiers du Monde Russe et Soviétique*, vol. 19, no. 1-2, (1978), 125.

[67] Suny, *The Baku Commune*, 139.

[68] Swietochowski, "The Himmät Party", 126.

[69] Suny, *The Baku Commune*, 221.

[70] Swietochowski, "The Himmät Party", 126-27.

[71] Mehmet Emin Resulzade, *Kafkasya Türkleri*, (Istanbul: Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları Vakfı, 1993), 45.

republic was the announcement of the birth of a new nation-state. The proclamation had six articles:

"1/ Azerbaijan, as a totally independent state, contains the southern and eastern part of Southern Caucasus.

2/ The form of government of the independent state of Azerbaijan is the democratic republic which is a state-of-law.

3/ Azerbaijani Democratic Republic is determined to have friendly relationships with all states and nations, especially with its neighbors.

4/ Azerbaijani Democratic Republic guarantees all civic and political rights of its citizens living in its frontiers independently of their ethnic, religious or class origins and professional or sexual differences.

5/ Azerbaijani Democratic Republic supports the free development of all nations living in its frontiers.

6/ Till the formation of the Constitutive Assembly, the supreme authority in Azerbaijan is the universally elected National Council. The Provisional Government is responsible to the National Council".[72]

Azerbaijan became the first Muslim state of the world founded on secular principles. The Ottoman Empire supported the new state with special conditions. In this process Resulzade played a mediator role between the Ottomans-supported Islamists and the anti-Ottoman socialists. Swietochowski argues that the Ottoman intervention to the newly born Azerbaijani state encouraged the independence tendency of the Azerbaijani intelligentsia who were previously -at least partly- for a panturkist union with the Ottomans. The independent Fethali Han Hoyski formed his government, Resulzade was forced by the Ottoman General Nuri Pasha to represent the new state in Istanbul. Baku was taken by the Islamic Army of the Caucasus jointly constituted by eight thousand Ottoman and seven thousand Azerbaijani soldiers. Two months later, as the Mudros Armistice ended Ottoman participation in the war, the Ottoman army in Azerbaijan was immediately replaced by the British. The Musavat-led government was able to go on with the schedule of nation-building: educational, administrative and military restructuring. The National Council proceeded to transform itself into an interim parliament with the participation of the new representatives of national minorities and other political parties. The degree of representativeness was openly raised and the Han Hoyski's government was accepted as the only legitimate authority by the British troops' commander, General W. M. Thomson. Resulzade once more emphasized the federalist and nationalist principles of this party,

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[72] "Milli Azerbaycan'ın Onbeş Yıllığı, *Azerbaycan Yurt Bilgisi 17*, 1933, 113-14.

expressed the disillusionment created by the so-called Bolshevik internationalism[73], raised the nations as the basic unities of the newly forming world hoping "for the eventual establishing of a world order by the Leage of Nations" recommending close regional ties with other Southern Caucasian republics and Daghestan. He also pronounced the famous phrase which became later a motto under clandestinity and exile in the Soviet period: "*The flag once raised will never fall!*"[74]

As the Russian Bolsheviks were winning the war against the Whites, occupation became senseless for Britain in the after-war period, British troops left Baku in August 1919. Deprived from the support of their most appreciated western ally, the Azerbaijani independence looked for an international recognition in order to guarantee its survival. Following many efforts of Ali Merdan Bey Topchibashi, in January 1920 the independence of Azerbaijan was recognized by the European powers represented in the Paris Peace Conference.[75] But on the regional political level, there was another crucial development: Kemalist government of Ankara and Bolsheviks of Moscow agreed on a power-sharing deal in which Ankara was granted political control over the area and Moscow free passage to Baku and a monopoly on oil output. Under these new conditions imposed by the Soviet/Turkish Entente, the Musavat-led government resigned and the Azerbaijani communists -having full support of the Eleventh Red Army- took the power. Several leading Musavatists were killed, some other entered into clandestinity and Resulzade this time was forced to be a guest in Moscow. This time the communist intelligentsia in power was led by Neriman Nerimanov, who was of Himmetist background as Resulzade and who would try to harmonize the aspiration of national independence of the Azerbaijani people and Soviet Russia's strategic interests in the region. In this context, "the best deal attainable" was a Bolshevik form of autonomy[76].

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[73] Bennigsen and Lemercier-Quelquejay underline also Resulzade's disappointment of the October revolution. In their opinion this experienced politician understood that the proletarian internationalism was quickly transformed into a 'great-Russian neo-chauvinism'. See Alexander Bennigsen et Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay, *Sultan Galiyev, le Père de la Revolution Tiers-Mondiste*, (Paris: Fayard, 1986), 5.
[74] For this historic speech delivered to the parliament on the 13th of December 1918 see Mehmetzade, *Milli Azerbaycan Hareketi*, 105-109.
[75] This process is described in details by Cemil Hasanlı. See Cemil Hasanlı, *Azerbaycan Tarihi 1918-1920*, (Ankara: Azerbaycan Kültür Derneği, 1998), 353-375.
[76] Swietochowski, "The Himmät Party", 134.

Conclusion

The nation-building process of Azerbaijan followed a specific pattern in which the rise of nationalism was based on ethnic identity and it preceded the nation-state formation. In the beginning, the Islamic identity as the *ümmet* (or umma) became the reference point of the Azerbaijani search for identity. Backed by the wealthy classes, Azerbaijanis looked for the recognition of their particularity in a colonial context. The defeat of Russia in 1904 by Japan and the revolution of 1905 accelerated and extended Muslim reformism to the political sphere. Muslims were organised in an all-Russian Muslim basis and allied themselves with Russian liberals in order to protect their rights and culture. Azerbaijanis also participated in this process but they also created their proper political parties in a national basis.

Azerbaijani nationalism rose out of the unusual cultural and political atmosphere of Baku: liberal constitutionalism, the proliferation of socialist factions and Armenian nationalism were all acting in the same environment. In the second decade of the XXth. century the Musavat Party became the spokesman of the Azerbaijani nationalism. This success and popularity was possible largely due to its leaders' rich intellectual formation and political experience which enabled them to formulate a strong ideology rooted in the national identity, conditioned by regional political facts and a realistic understanding of western civilization including its modern political institutions. Although the independence was short-lived and ended by the return of Russian hegemony to the region, the Azerbaijani experience of nation-state lasted as one of the particular examples of nation-formation and undeniably inspired later generations.

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Ethnic Cleansing, Genocide and Demographic Changes in Bosnia and Herzegovina

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Abstract:

Different cultures, religions and traditions and hence multiculturalism represented in demographic diversity was strongly engraved in Bosnian cities, towns and villages. Different groups of people in Bosnia and Herzegovina shared diverse demographic space that ensured continuation of peace, equal opportunities, mutual tolerance, civil rights and multiethnic coexistence. This paper aims to articulate historical developments of Bosnian demographic diversity by especially taking into consideration the multicultural model and the developments during the 1990s. Then, it is significant to analyze the ethnic cleansing and genocide and how they have changed the demographic structure of the country, especially with regards to the existence of multiethnic cities, towns and villages. This paper explores ethnic cleansing and genocide as tools within the context of demographic changes, especially in the Serb controlled territories. How the ethnic cleansing and genocide were organized and carried out? What are the root-causes of ethnic cleansing and genocide that were deeply rooted in radical nationalist ideologies and projects? Why radical ethno-cultural national ideology was systematically used for cleansing the territories from the "other" "alien" ethnicities, nations and people? In-depth analysis of the demographic changes as a result of ethnic cleansing and genocide will be based on Bosnian population censuses of 1991 and of 2013. A comparative analysis will clearly demonstrate to what extent ethnic cleansing and genocide affected centuries old demographic diversity of Bosnian cities, towns and villages.

Keywords: Demography; Ethnic Cleansing; Genocide; Multiculturalism; Migrations

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Introduction

The aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina by Serbia culminated in a systematic and planned ethnic cleansing and genocide for the achievement of homogenous Serbian state. Ethnic cleansing and Srebrenica Genocide should be studied in the context of already existing international conventions on holocaust, crimes against humanity and genocide because such conventions were direct effect of post-World War II developments. It seems that the past experiences, the legal international framework and the humanitarian feelings failed in Srebrenica. Again after Srebrenica the world began to address the questions of crimes against humanity and genocide not only in Bosnia and Herzegovina but in countries where conflicts have already been taking place like in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Palestine, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Tibet. Therefore, the humanity is living in the fear of new genocides in spite of international conventions, legal framework, the world order and the will of the great powers and the international community to keep peace, stability and order.

Particularly, it is important to survey Srebrenica Genocide by considering its origins, causes, implications and post-genocide copying mechanisms. Srebrenica Genocide occurred on July 11, 1995 in spite of the fact that it was under the United Nations protection. From the humanitarian point of view the genocide was taking place in front of the eyes of the whole world. Then, from the political and legal points of view the international institutions, including the Security Council and the great powers were powerless. Although the international community had predicted the genocide, their inaction and lack of responsibility contributed towards killings of Bosniaks. Srebrenica Genocide has shown that genocide itself is a long process that is well-planned by the perpetuators and as such is very much recognizable. It includes clear ideological and political doctrines, genocide executors among politicians, generals and intellectual elites and measurable and legally proven acts of crimes. Srebrenica Genocide clearly indicated that it was not a separate, individual incidental act but well-planned, perpetuated act of the political establishment that had clear political doctrine, ideology and a systematic plan. For Srebrenica Genocide specific individuals, political parties, political leaders, military and paramilitary forces and above all the state of Serbia were significantly responsible. Therefore, only the highest political authorities can effectively envision, plan and instigate their citizens to demonstrate hatred towards others and to

use the state structure for committing actual crimes. However, in order to make territorial and demographic changes, the political authorities and its leadership made key decisions as to carry out systematic killings of targeted ethnic group in which more than 100,000 people were killed, 2.2 million people were displaced, 50,000 women raped, more than 1000 religious monuments destroyed and thousands of people were kept in concentration camps.[1]

The Conception of Genocide

The word genocide was derived from the ancient Greek word *genos*, which means race or tribe and the Latin word *cide*, which means to kill. The conception of genocide is extremely complex and as such has several meanings. Due to its complexity, politicians, diplomats, lawyers, social scientists and the public at large have different views on what genocide is. The term genocide was introduced by Raphael Lemkin who was a lawyer, not a sociologist. Although he coined the term genocide, he also debated moral and legal dimensions of genocide within moral principles of just war theory. To him genocide was the extreme form of unjust war, aimed at national, ethnic and racial extermination.[2] Yet he placed the term genocide within political and military frame, not necessarily sociological. Explaining the notion of genocide, Lemkin (1944) in his book *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, Proposals for Redress,*[3] in chapter IX argued that genocide as a term implies the destruction of one ethnic group and not necessarily of an entire nation. It involves an organized and coordinated plan of different actions, aimed at the destruction of the basic foundations of life of national groups. Such plan also aims at the breakdown of the public institutions, socio-

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[1] See Norman M. Naimark, *Genocide: A World History,* Oxford: University Press, 2017, p. 128; Elisa von Joeden-Forgey, "Gender and Genocide." (pp. 61-81). In Bloxham Donald and Moses A. Dirk (Eds.). *The Oxford Handbook of Genocide Studies*. Oxford: University Press, 2010, pp. 69-72; Cathie Carmichael, "Genocide and Population Displacement in Post-Communist Eastern Europe." (pp. 509-529). In Bloxham Donald and Moses A. Dirk (Eds.). *The Oxford Handbook of Genocide Studies*. Oxford: University Press, 2010, 510-527; Robert M. Hayden, "Mass Killings and Images of Genocide in Bosnia 1941-5 and 1992-5." (487-517). In Stone Dan (Ed.). *The Historiography of Genocide*. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2011, p. 487; Alexandra Stiglmayer, (Ed.). *Mass Rape: The War against Women in Bosnia-Herzegovina*. Lincoln, NB: University of Nebraska Press, 1995, p. 82-196.

[2] Christopher Powell, "What Do Genocides Kill? A Relational Conception of Genocide," *Journal of Genocide Research*. 2007. Vol. 9. No. 4., pp. 527-528; Michael Freeman, "Genocide, Civilization and Modernity." *The British Journal of Sociology,* 1995, Vol. 46. No. 2., pp. 209-211.

[3] Rehael Lemkin, *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe*. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1944.

political, cultural and religious symbols, economic sustenance and security and emotional, intellectual and psychological aspects of life without which the continuation of life of that particular ethnic group are made impossible.[4] This is the reason why the scholars from different disciplines were studying crimes against humanity from biological, anthropological, racial and psycho-social perspectives.

Jones (2006), in his work *Genocide* enlisted the number of definitions of genocide which address *genocide's agents, victims, goals, scale, strategies and intent*. So genocide as such has theoretical and conceptual framework and it is not a simple sociological, historical, legal and political term.

For the sake of an illustration it is worth citing few definitions of genocide:

1.*Genocide is the deliberate destruction of physical life of individual human beings by reason of their membership of any human collectivity as such."* Peter Drost (1959)

2."*[Genocide is] a structural and systematic destruction of innocent people by a state bureaucratic apparatus... Genocide represents a systematic effort over time to liquidate a national population, usually a minority . . . [and] functions as a fundamental political policy to assure conformity and participation of the citizenry."* Irving Louis Horowitz (1976)

3."*Genocide is the deliberate destruction, in whole or in part, by a government or its agents, of a racial, sexual, religious, tribal or political minority. It can involve not only mass murder, but also starvation, forced deportation, and political, economic and biological subjugation. Genocide involves three major components: ideology, technology, and bureaucracy/organization."* Jack Nusan Porter (1982)

4."*Genocide in the generic sense means the mass killing of substantial numbers of human beings, when not in the course of military action against the military forces of an avowed enemy, under conditions of the essential defencelessness of the victim."* Israel Charny (1994)

5."*Genocides and politicides are the promotion, execution, and/or implied consent of sustained policies by governing elites or their agents – or, in the case of civil war, either of the contending authorities – that are intended to destroy, in whole or part, a communal, political, or politicized ethnic group."*Barbara Harff (2003).[5]

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[4] Ann Curthoys and John Docker, "Defining Genocide." (pp. 9-41). In Stone Dan (Ed.) *The Historiography of Genocide*, New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2011, pp. 10-13.

[5] Jones Adam, *Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction*. London and New York: Routledge, 2006, 15-18.

On December 9, 1948, the United Nations adopted the *Convention on the Prevention of the Crime of Genocide*.[6] It is important to mention that Lemkin was one of the most important participants at the *Convention*. Therefore, Lemkin's ideas were decisive in paving the way for the future genocide scholarship. His ideas were critically presented by Dominck J. Schaller and Jurgen Zimmerer (2009) in edited work entitled *The Origins of Genocide: Raphael Lemkin as a Historian of Mass Violence* and by John Cooper (2008) *Raphael Lamkin and the Struggle for the Genocide Convention*.[7] In 1948 the United Nations adopted its *Convention on Genocide*, whereby its definition includes various harmful acts "committed intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, religious group, as such."[8] According to Article 1 of the *Convention*, the genocide, "whether it was committed in peace or in war, under international law, constitutes a crime by which they undertake to prevent and punish," while, according to the definition of Article 2, genocide constitutes a genocide when: "Each of the following acts committed in the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, as such a) killing members of the group; b) causing serious bodily or psychological harm to members of the group; c) the deliberate imposition on the group of living conditions for which it is intended to lead to its complete or partial physical destruction; d) the introduction of measures aimed at preventing the occurrence of progeny in that group; e) deliberately transferring children from that group to another group." According to Article 3 the following acts shall be punishable: (a) Genocide; (b) Conspiracy to commit genocide; (c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide; (d) Attempt to commit genocide; (e) Complicity in genocide.[9]

The *Convention on the Prevention of the Crime of Genocide* emerged as a result of the completion of the World War II and foreseeing and gradual emergence of the Cold War. The Convention and the "Model" was very much useful for judging and sentencing the destruction and extermination of the Jews by the Nazis. Courthoys and Docker (2011)

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[6] *Convention on the Prevention of the Crime of Genocide.* 1948. Retrieved from https://www.oas.org/dil/1948_Convention_on_the_Prevention_and_Punishment_of_the_Crime_of_Genocide.pdf
[7] See Dominck J. Schaller and Jurgen Zimmerer, (Ed.), *The Origins of Genocide: Raphael Lemkin as a Historian of Mass Violence,* S.I.: Routledge, 2013 and John Cooper, *Raphael Lamkin and the Struggle for the Genocide Convention,* Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.
[8] Kuper Leo. *Genocide*. New York: Penguin, 1981, p. 210.
[9] Ann Curthoys and John Docker, "Defining Genocide." (pp. 9-41). In Stone Dan (Ed.) *The Historiography of Genocide*, New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2011, pp. 13-14.

rightly posed several pondering questions, for which answers could be hardly deduced from this document. For instance "Are there forms of genocide which do not involve mass killing? What are the criteria for assessing intention in genocidal events and processes? Do genocides necessarily involve state action or leadership? Should mass killing based on political categories be called genocide? What is meant by cultural genocide? And finally, to what extent must our definition of genocide for the purposes of historical scholarship conform to the definition used in international law?"[10] Therefore, in the following decades, especially after Srebrenica Genocide, the "Model" as such started to be questioned because of difficulties of identifying key perpetuators among politicians, military officers, artists, scholars, journalists and unaffiliated individuals. The *Convention* and the "Model" were effectively used because perpetrators and actors in committing the Holocaust were mostly political leaders and military officers. However, in comparison to the earliest applications of the *Convention* and the "Model" it was difficult to determine genocide goals, plans and motives in Srebrenica Genocide. Therefore, the meaning of the term "genocide" started to be open and it was subjected to different interpretations. The term genocide did not only include perpetuated, planned and systematic destruction of a specific group of people but also the ethnic cleansing and the destruction of physical, cultural, urban, humanitarian, social and economic forms of living. Such conditions had strengthened genocide against Bosniaks because renewal of the life was made impossible. For instance, "the Tribunal considered the relevance to the Srebrenica Muslim community of the destruction of approximately 7,000 men. It referred to an observation of the Trial Chamber about the patriarchal character of Bosnian Muslim society in Srebrenica, and the consequent impact upon the future of the community that would result from the killing of its adult male population."[11] According to Hayden (2011) "less than 1 per cent of the victims were women and 89.9 per cent men between the ages of 16 and 60."[12] Therefore, new ethnic reality was forged by Srebrenica Genocide because today Srebrenica is predominantly a Serb town.

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[10] Ibid., p. 9.
[11] William A. Schabas, "The Law and Genocide." (pp. 123-142). In Bloxham Donald and Moses A. Dirk (Eds.). *The Oxford Handbook of Genocide Studies*. Oxford: University Press, 2010, p. 137.
[12] Robert M. Hayden, "Mass Killings and Images of Genocide in Bosnia 1941-5 and 1992-5." (487-517). In Stone Dan (Ed.). *The Historiography of Genocide*. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2011, pp. 502-503.

Very initiation of genocide, its planning and realization depended significantly on the ideology. In this regard, nothing much has changed from the World War II, whereby Nazis committed the Holocaust because of Nazism and Serbs committed Srebrenica Genocide because of Serb nationalist hegemonic radical ideology. Therefore, it is very important that Srebrenica Genocide was primarily motivated by the Serb nationalist hegemonic radical ideology, not exclusively by Orthodox Christianity or the religious motives. Thus, in Bosnia and Herzegovina there was certainly no conflict between the Orthodox Christianity and the religion of Islam. The mosques and religious monuments were not destroyed because of their religious character but because they are the part of the Bosniak national identity and as such were targeted. Unfortunately, the Serb population was directed by the intellectuals, politicians and key leaders to move away from acceptable national identity and patriotism to radical, extreme, hegemonic, exclusive ethno-cultural nationalism. For instance, key Serbian document called the *Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts* (SANU *Memorandum 1986*) clearly indicated that

> *army, would react so violently to Slovenian, Croatian and Bosnian declarations of independence, for their ethno-centric ideology does not acknowledge the right of other nations to exist on a political nor even social or cultural level if they conflict with Greater Serbian aspirations. They veil their true intentions with the assertion that they are 'protecting the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia,' but the wanton destruction and the 'ethnic cleansing' practiced by Serbian militias (including the so-called 'Yugoslav' army) proves that they are waging a war of conquest and aggression inspired by an ideology of intolerance.[13]*

Such radical ethno-cultural national ideology was systematically used for the creation of Greater Serbia, which was supposed eventually to be cleansed from the "other" "alien" ethnicities, nations and people. For the sake of the creation of Greater Serbia, the Serbian leadership and its key associates were not hesitating to terrorize, cleanse, expel, kill and liquidate the members of other social groups. It is important to mention that "the media in parts of the former Yugoslavia played a crucial part in the attack against Croatia, the genocidal war in Bosnia and the atrocities in Kosovo, abetting the so-called "joint criminal enterprise" that was led by Milosevic. They

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[13] Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (SANU), *Memorandum,* Belgrade, 1986, n.p.,

mobilized nationalist myths, created cults of military commanders, and demonised and denigrated other national groups, though very rarely with the extreme means that we saw guiding Nazi propaganda.[14] Therefore, Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn (1990) introduced an historical-sociological approach to genocide. Perhaps, being influenced by Hobbes they identified four types of genocide: to eliminate threats, to implement an ideology, to acquire wealth and for revenge.[15] These motives revolve around key etymological concepts such as gain, glory, fear, revenge, ideology, power and terror.

History and Sociology of Srebrenica Genocide

One of the strategic goals of the Serbian national ideology was the control of Eastern parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina, alongside the Drina River. The Serbs had the strategic goal during the war (1992-1995) and in peacetime until today to keep this geopolitical region mono-ethnic, exclusively populated by the Serbs. Before the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina due to significant demographic concentration of Bosniaks this was the territory of separation between the Serbs in Serbia and the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Thus, in order to link Serbian population on both sides of the Drina River, as to fulfill an ideological dream of "all Serbs in one country," the Serbs made the ethnic cleansing of Bosniaks and Srebrenica Genocide. For the sake of fulfilling this historical objective "The ethnic- cleansing campaigns carried out by the Bosnian Serb Army and their associated militias (backed by Belgrade) involved some 3,600 towns and villages in Bosnia- Herzegovina and hundreds of thousands of Bosnian Muslims. The fundamental idea was to drive the Muslims— men, women, and children— from their homes in territory that the Serbs claimed as their own."[16]

In 1993 the Security Council passed Resolution 819, which declared Srebrenica as "safe-guarded zone," however this didn't prevent the Serbs to start a military operation against the "safe zone" of Srebrenica by the beginning of July, 1995. Prior to this operation the situation in besieged zone was disastrous and civilians were dying of

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[14] Mark Thompson, "Incitement, Prevention and Media Right." (pp. 97-107) In Idem., (Eds). *Confronting Genocide*. New York and London: Springer, 2011, p. 99.

[15] See Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn, *The History and Sociology of Genocide*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990.

[16] Norman M. Naimark, *Genocide: A World History*. Oxford: University Press, 2017, pp. 126-127.

starvation. The military operation was directly supported by the Serbian paramilitary forces and volunteers from Greece and Russia. According to Weiss-Wendt (2010) "out of 10,000 Serb volunteers who fought in Bosnia, half had previously served in the Yugoslav People's Army. Unsurprisingly, then, the military controlled most of the militias, with the rest run by the State Security Service."[17] Jones (2006) argued that paramilitary forces were used purposefully as to enable the Serbian government to deflect responsibility for invading Bosnia and Herzegovina and for committing crimes against humanity and genocide.[18]

Earlier Srebrenica was demilitarized and was made the "safe zone" of the United Nations under UNPROFOR's direct control and protection. However, the UN protection didn't prevent the Serb military forces to enter Srebrenica on July 11 and to liquidate in and around the "safe zone" more than 8000 Bosniaks. In less than a week, more than 8000 civilians were liquidated and buried in mass graves, civilians were beaten and humiliated publically, children were killed in front of their parents and young girls were raped.[19] The Serb militia systematically plunged thousands of dead bodies into mass graves. Srebrenica Genocide also had the final implication of forced displacement of around 30,000 people, mostly women and children. During the days of displacement the Serb militia was frequently stopping buses and trucks to brutally harass the women and children, take from them money and jewelry and they were selectively taking young boys and girls away from their mothers. Their bodies were later found in the mass graves.[20] They were not only liquidated and displaced because of their ethnic, religious, linguistic and cultural origins but because of a master plan to cleanse the territory, to exterminate Bosniaks form Eastern Bosnia and to create a homogeneous exclusively Serbian territory. Serb *modus operandi* was systematic as it started with surrounding the area to be cleansed and

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[17] Anton Weiss-Wendt, "The State and Genocide." (pp. 81-102). In Bloxham Donald and Moses A. Dirk (Eds.). *The Oxford Handbook of Genocide Studies*. Oxford: University Press, 2010, p. 95.

[18] Jones Adam. *The Genocidal Mind: Sociological and Sexual Perspectives*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006, p. 107.

[19] Elisa von Joeden-Forgey, "Gender and Genocide." (pp. 61-81). In Bloxham Donald and Moses A. Dirk (Eds.). *The Oxford Handbook of Genocide Studies*. Oxford: University Press, 2010, p. 69.

[20] See Campbell J. Kenneth. *Genocide and the Global Village*. New York: Palgrave, 2010, pp. 55-70 and Norman M. Naimark, *Genocide: A World History*. Oxford: University Press, 2017, p. 129.

the creation of large concentration camp. Then, the operation pave the way for the killing of key political leaders, military officers, lawyers, judges, public officials, writers and professors. The plan was carried, furthermore, towards the separation of women, children and old men from men of so-called "fighting age." The last stage of the operation was carried out through systematic executions, liquidations and the disposal of bodies in the mass graves.[21]

Therefore, a long-term designed plan for genocide and ethnic cleansing clearly indicated that this was a conscious, deliberate and well-planned aim to radically change the demographic map, which is today in Bosnia and Herzegovina very much visible as very small percentage of Bosniaks are living in this region. It is important to add that besides the ethnic cleansing and genocide, Serb political leaders and their military executors ensured also the destruction of cultural heritage, whereby many important historical, religious and cultural monuments were destroyed. Therefore, Srebrenica Genocide is significantly reflected in sociocide, curturicide, urbicide and memoricide.

The international community and the United Nations failed to support and protect the civilians in the "safe zone" for which they bear full responsibility as they did not prevent the crime of genocide. The United Nations acted contrary to the Charter on the *Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide* (1948), *the Geneva Conventions* (1949) and *Additional Protocols* (1977). The United Nations and UNPROFOR mandate in the "safe zone" was significantly reduced, especially the use of air forces, prior to the Serb military operation. Thus, UNPROFOR left the civilian population on its own and set its ultimate goal to protect its personnel and to enable the continuation of so-called peace negotiations. In this regard, some critics argue that Srebrenica as a "safe zone" was sacrificed because of the peace-talks. Otherwise it is difficult to believe that the world had no political and military capability to prevent Srebrenica Genocide. Why the United Nations did not request the decisive air power use in the defense of Srebrenica civilians? Why was a genocide committed against the Bosniaks in the presence of the Dutch Battalion? Why did the Dutch Battalion withdraw from the key check points and hand them over the Serb militia? Therefore, Provost and Akhavan (2013)

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[21] See Adam Jones, *The Genocidal Mind: Sociological and Sexual Perspectives*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006, 216.

are right in arguing that the "Dutch UN peacekeepers could have protected the Bosnian Muslim population of the Srebrenica "safe-area" against mass murder. Such was the political fallout of this revelation that it prompted the resignation of the Dutch cabinet in 2002. In all of these situations, intervention was possible, and opportunities were missed."[22]

Srebrenica Genocide has shown that the acts of genocide were based on a systematic planning and as such were justified by Serbian political establishment. Therefore, "in 2007, in a case filed by Bosnia and Herzegovina against Serbia, the International Court of Justice said there had been a breach of the Genocide Convention because Serbia failed to intervene with its allies, the Bosnian Serbs, so as to prevent the Srebrenica massacre of July 1995."[23] The Hague sentences, including for Srebrenica Genocide, unambiguously confirm genocidal intent, planning, preparation, organization and systematic execution of civilians, which was declared according to the international law as genocide and crimes against humanity. Thus, such crimes were perpetuated and planned, which left very little space for taking up responsibility and feeling of guilt. It is not strange to find that genocide denial is strong among those who directly committed it and among the common people from whom those actors of genocide came from.

Both, the Hague legal sentences and the scientific studies on Srebrenica Genocide undoubtedly confirm that Serbian national ideology, politics and policies contributed towards genocide, which was well-planned, perpetuated, systematic and organized. Serbia planned to use the historical opportunity to take over the parts of a sovereign state of Bosnia and Herzegovina and to exterminate Bosniaks as the majority population of the country. Actually when the war started "the Bosnian Serbs and the Croats armed themselves for a struggle to unite "their" respective population centers in Bosnia with their "homelands."[24] Thus, genocide was the tool to completely destroy one sovereign state and exterminate Bosniaks as a majority.

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[22] Provost Akhayan and Provost Rene, "Moving from Repression to Prevention of Genocide." (pp. 1-13). In Idem., (Eds). *Confronting Genocide*. New York and London: Springer, 2011, p. 3.
[23] William A. Schabas, "The Law and Genocide." (pp. 123-142). In Bloxham Donald and Moses A. Dirk (Eds.). *The Oxford Handbook of Genocide Studies*. Oxford: University Press, 2010, p. 129.
[24] Norman M. Naimark, *Genocide: A World History*. Oxford: University Press, 2017, p. 126.

Unfortunately, the same Serbian nationalist ideology stands behind the denial of Srebrenica Genocide. Same political establishment has till now escaped to admit Srebrenica Genocide; instead key Serbian politicians consider it as a terrible crime in which both Serbs and Bosniaks paid the price. Thus the human, state and moral responsibility of Serbia to make an apology to the Bosniak people and victims failed, as the Serbian Parliament failed to adopt the Resolution on Srebrenica Genocide. There are but few political leaders among the Serbs who admitted that the Serb Republic as entity in Bosnia and Herzegovina was created on genocide. Certainly, a systematic and intentional denial and negation are dangers for the repetition of genocide.

It is important to start with the question of how and why sociologists could not predict the disintegration of former Yugoslavian socialist society in terribly violent ways. What went wrong? Why did so-called modern and sophisticated Yugoslavian society commit crimes which culminated in Srebrenica Genocide? Such violent social transformation had not taken place in any other socialist state in transition in the Eastern Europe.[25] This shed doubt on the relevance and scientific approach of sociology in previous decades, as the logic and the scientific methodology of sociology were defeated in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Perhaps, this was the reason why Doubt (2000) wrote a book *Sociology after Bosnia and Kosovo*.[26] Since the genocide is itself a systematic, generic concept and planned targeting of a group of people with an aim of their extermination, while its perpetrators are rational, systematic and highly organized. These qualities are characteristics of highly developed states and societies, perhaps like that of former Yugoslavia. Therefore, we can talk about the "modernity" of a genocide or modern engineering project of genocide as Zygmundt Bauman in his works argued.[27] It has been proven without doubt that in "Bosnia, Serbian nationalists destroyed Bosniak and Croatian society while slaughtering only a minority, through intimidation, expulsion, torture, rape, and killing in improvised concentration camps. In contemporary destructions of

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[25] See Abid Dozic, "Sociologija i bosanskohercegovacki intelektualci nakon genocida u Srebrenici" [Sociology and Bosnian Intellectuals after Srebrenica Genocide]. Znakovi Vremena, 2005, Vol. 8. No. 29/30. pp. 114-131.

[26] See Keith Doubt, *Sociology after Bosnia and Kosovo: Recovering Justice.* Lantham: Rowman & Littlefield Press, 2000.

[27] Michael Freeman, "Genocide, Civilization and Modernity." *The British Journal of Sociology,* 1995, Vol. 46. No. 2. pp. 207-223.

indigenous peoples, the methods and organization have been much more basic than the Final Solution's. Not surprisingly, a student of these genocides has argued that Bauman's 'thesis linking genocide to a specific level of state formation, technological efficiency, rationality, and subjectivity is belied' by other examples."[28] Puzzling question, posed by Bauman (2000), is how and why modern rational, scientific, technological, democratic, cultural and civilizational society could commit the genocide? How to put together and make the relationship between so-called civilizing process and extreme violent and evil behavior?[29]

More than twenty years after the war, there is no societal consensus on the war, justice and the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina, thus, unresolved past is still hunting present-day Bosnian society. After the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) the first elections made no restrictions on the nationalist parties that participated in the war, therefore, the conflict had continued by the political means. The Dayton Peace Agreement gave preferences to ethno-nationalist division of power with regards to political, economic, ethnic, territorial and other divisions of the state and the society. Therefore, there was an articulation of mono-ethnic interests, which gave no chance to the reconciliation, peace and the common future.[30] Hopes for transitional justice in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as inevitable process of the peace-building, have been seen as an international "experiment" that will not bring any justice to any of the conflicting parties during the war. Hopes and expectations from the International Crime Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY) as a result of long trials, lack of transparency, questionable and low sentences for the surviving genocide perpetrators are lost and there is apathy with regards to an institutional delivery of justice. Even serious attempts of the International Community to articulate justice, peace and reconciliation have been tremendously questioned because of reemergence of nationalist political parties that are negating genocide and threatening the secession from Bosnia and Herzegovina.

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[28] Martin Shaw, "Sociology and Genocide." (pp. 142-163). In Bloxham Donald and Moses A. Dirk (Eds.). *The Oxford Handbook of Genocide Studies*. Oxford: University Press, 2010, p. 153.

[29] See Zygmundt Bauman, *Modernity and the Holocaust.* New York: Cornell University Press, 2000.

[30] Muhidin Mulalic & Hasan Korkut. "Implications of Dayton Peace Agreement on Current Political Issues in Bosnia-Herzegovina," *SDU Faculty of Arts and Sciences Journal of Social Sciences Special Issue on Balkans,* 2012, Vol. 27, pp. 107-117.

Since, genocide had taken place in Bosnia and Herzegovina sociologists and social psychologists and therapists began exploring these subjects. The term genocide from the very beginnings had a strong sociological, legal and linguistics focus.[31] Some of the most important works that had integrated sociological dimension of genocide were written by Helen Fein, *Genocide: A Sociological Perspective*. The question of the destruction of the state identity has become very popular subject among sociologists in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is interesting that for some Bosnia and Herzegovina is not their country but the constituency of three ethnicities within one state. Bosnian state is only represented through state symbols such as passport, flag, and state institutions; however there is no affection and feelings about belonging to the state by significant strata of the Bosnian society. This implies that Bosnia and Herzegovina and its society have been encountering a significant sociological crisis.[32]

Terms justice, law and peace are closely interconnected and interrelated and they are often used by Bosniaks in articulating the genocide and impossibility of the future without justice and peace. Most of the Bosniaks believe in common future with Serbs and Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina and with Serbia and Croatia as good neighbors only if justice determined by the law is accepted by all sides. However, Bosnian society has been struggling to achieve post-war justice, truth and peace. In Bosnia and Herzegovina there are three dimensions of the truth. On the contrary, political leaders do not acknowledge crimes committed by their people against others during the war. These dilemmas prevent Bosnia to build its future on social consensus and understanding. Due to complexity of these concepts and their political implications sociologists have not explored them to deserved extent.

Demography of Ethnic Cleansing and Genocide

Genocide and ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and Herzegovina, especially in the Eastern parts were well-planned and systematic acts of the Serb leadership. An old idea of ethnic hatred among the main Balkans ethnic groups, based on the notion of 'balkanization' was not the main reason for ethnic cleansing and genocide but they were

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[31] See Adam Jones, *The Genocidal Mind: Sociological and Sexual Perspectives*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006.

[32] Kemal Velagic, *Mladi Bosne i Hercegovine i sistem vrijednosti*. PhD. Dissertation, University of Sarajevo, 2010, pp. 26-27.

products of Serbian radical hegemonic ideology that began to be spread during the 1990s. In this regard, Serbian political elites, intellectuals and clergy played the significant role in creating Serbian ideological project and carrying out of the ethnic cleansing and genocide.[33] Ethnic cleansing across Bosnia and Herzegovina was carried out by the Serb political and military establishment against the Bosniak communities that were sharing the same territory. Thus, the ethnic cleansing included systematic, planned and deliberate political, administrative and military acts against the Bosniak community.

Ethnic cleansing as a political objective was officially adopted by the Serbs at their self-proclaimed *16th Assembly of the Serb People* that was organized on May 12, 1992 in Banja Luka. In this regard it is worth mentioning the adoption of the *Six Strategic Goals of the Serbian People* document. According to this document the main objective was the separation if the Serb majority population from the Bosniaks and Croats. The *Six Strategic Goals of the Serbian People* included the following six objectives: 1) establishment of state borders as to separate the Serbian people from the other two ethnic communities; 2) setting up a corridor between Semberija and Krajina; 3) establishment of a corridor in the Drina River valley, that is, eliminate the Drina as a border separating Serbian States; 4) establishment of a border on the Una and Neretva Rivers; 5) divide the city of Sarajevo into Serbian and Muslim parts and establish effective state authorities in both parts; and 6) ensure access to the sea for Republika Srpska.[34] Therefore, as a result of ethnic cleansing, genocide and war entity called Republika Srpska was accepted as one of three administrative units within Bosnia and Herzegovina as a result of Dayton Peace Agreement in 1995.[35] The mass exodus and expulsions of non-Serbs took place in different cities which resulted in significant demographic changes in present-day entity Republika Srpska (See Table 5, 6, and 7).

Table 1: The Population of Bosnia and Herzegovina (1948-2013)

Year of Census	Population

[33] See Norman Cigar, *Genocide in Bosnia: The Policy of 'Ethnic Cleansing'* Texas A&M: University Press, 1995; Norman M. Naimark, *Genocide: A World History*. Oxford: University Press, 2017; Michael Mann, *The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

[34] Hikmet Karcic, "Detention Camps as a Tool for Ethno-Religious Cleansing of Non-Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina" (PhD Dissertation, International University of Sarajevo, 2018), 39.

[35] Mirko Pejanovic, "Promjene etnicke structure opstina u Bosni i Hercegovini prema popisu stanovnistva 2013. Godine." In Cvitkovic Ivan (Ed.). *Demografske i Etnicke promjene u Bosni i Hercegovini*. Sarajevo: ANUBiH, 2017, 79-80.

1948	2.564.308
1953	2.847.459
1961	3.277.948
1971	3.746.111
1981	4.124.256
1991	4.377.033
2013	3.531.159

Source: Agency for Statistics of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
http://www.popis2013.ba/

Table 2: The Population of Ethnic Groups in BiH (2013 Census)

Ethnic Groups	Population	Percentage
Bosniaks	1.769.592	50,11 %
Serbs	1.086.733	30,77 %
Croats	544.780	15,42 %

Source: Agency for Statistics of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
http://www.popis2013.ba/

According to Table 1 and 2, the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2013 was 3.531.159 people (Entity Republika Srpska 1.228.423 and Entity Federacija BiH 2.219.220) which is lower in comparison to the census of 1991 for 845 874 people, which is overall a decrease of about 19.3 %. Thus, in comparison to all censuses in the previous decades, the census of 2013 for the first time clearly indicated the population decline. As a matter of fact, the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina is similar to that of the population in 1961. Among other justified reasons, one of the major reasons for population decline was the war (1992-1995), during which 95940 people were killed, about two million internally and externally displaced and 1.2 million people forcedly migrated abroad.[36]

Table 3: The Population of Ethnic Groups in FBiH and RS (2013 Census)

Ethnic Groups	FBiH	RS
Bosniaks	1.562.372 (70,40%)	171.839 (13,98%)
Serbs	56.550 (2,55%)	1,001.299 (81,51%)
Croats	497.883	29.645

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[36] Ibid., 70-74

	(22,44%)	(2,41%)

Source: Agency for Statistics of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
http://www.popis2013.ba/

Table 3 also clearly indicated significant mono-ethnic demographic concentration of population in entity Republika Srpska and Entity Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina is mono-ethnic with Bosnaks 70.40%, Croats 22.44% and Serbs only 2.55%. On the other hand, entity Republica Srpska is also mono-ethnic with Serbs 81.51%, Bosniaks 13.98% and Croats only 2.41%.

Table 4: Bosniak Population Increase (2013 Census)

	Town	Population Increase (with more than four thousand)
Ethnic Groups Bosniaks	Novi Grad Sarajevo	+ 62.182
	Ilidža	+ 28.783
	Tuzla	+ 18.105
	Novo Sarajevo	+ 14.286
	Zenica	+ 12.629
	Vogošća	+ 11.852
	Sanski Most	+10.208
	Živinice	+9.072
	Ilijaš	+7.606
	Hadžići	+ 6.728
	Tešanj	+5.520
	Srebrenik	+5423
	Bugojno	+4.453

Source: Agency for Statistics of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
http://www.popis2013.ba/

Table 5: Bosniak Population Decrease in RS (2013 Census)

	Town	Population Decrease (with more than four thousand)
	Zvornik	– 28.247
	Doboj	– 25.842

Ethnic Groups Bosniaks	Banja Luka	–20.907
	Prijedor	– 20.317
	Bosanska Krupa	– 19.526
	Foča	– 19.520
	Bijeljina	– 17.139
	Vlasenica	– 14.964
	Srebrenica	– 14.163
	Bratunac	– 13.732
	Višegrad	– 12.428
	Rogatica	– 12.092
	Lopare	– 10.619
	Gradiška	– 8.271
	Ugljevik	– 8.056
	Novi Grad	– 7.601
	Modriča	– 7.274
	Kotor-Varoš	– 5.856
	Teslić	– 5.618
	Derventa	– 5.191
	Trebinje	– 4.576

Source: Agency for Statistics of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
http://www.popis2013.ba/

Table 6. Bosniaks as Majority vs. Minority (1991 Census and 2013 Census)

	Town	**Percentage 1991**	**Percentage 2013**
Ethnic Groups Bosniaks	Zvornik	59,16%	33,76%
	Bratunac	64,32%	38,38%
	Foča	50,98 %	6,98 %
	Vlasenica	55,53 %	32,75 %
	Rogatica	59,36 %	10,37 %
	Višegrad	63,09 %	9,59 %
	Srebrenica	75,50%	54,68%

Source: Agency for Statistics of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
http://www.popis2013.ba/

Table 4, 5 and 6 clearly indicated that due to the ethnic cleansing, genocide and war demographic changes took place in present day entity Republika Srpska. It is also significant to mention that

significant decrease of Serb, Bosniak and Croat population in FBiH and RS took place because of the creation of new mono-ethnic municipalities on the border lines. According to the data in municipalities with Serb majority in present day Republika Srpska 312.560 Bosnjaks are less in comparison to the census of 1991.[37] According to Pejanovic (2017) 170,000 Bosniaks and 10,000 Croats returned back to their homes to the entity Republika Srpska after the war.[38] As according to Table 5 and 6 Bosniaks lost significant number of the population in Zvornik (-28.247), Doboj (-25.842), Banja Luka (-20.907), Prijedor (-20.317), Bosanska Krupa (-19.526), Foca (-19.520), Bijeljina (-17.139), Vlasenica (-14.964), Srebrenica (-14.163), Bratunac (-13.732), Visegrad (-12.428), Rogatica (-12.092). Table 6 clearly indicated that in 6 towns in present-day Republika Srpska Bosniaks were majority in 1991 while according to 2013 census they were reduced to minority due to ethnic cleansing, genocide and war.

Table 7. Multiethnic vs. Mono-Ethnic Cities in RS (1991 Census and 2013 Census)

City	Ethnicity	1991 Census	2013 Census
Banja Luka	Bosniaks	14,6%	4,2%
	Serbs	**54,6%,**	**89,6%**
	Croats	14,8%	2,8%
	Yugoslavs	12,1%	NA
	Others	3,9%	3,5%
Bosanska Gradiška	Bosniaks	26,4%	14,7%
	Serbs	**59,6%**	**80,9%**
	Croats	5,7%	1,6%
	Yugoslavs	5,5%	NA
	Others	2,7%	2,8%
Bosanski Brod	Bosniaks	12%	9,1%
	Serbs	**33,4%**	**69,1%**
	Croats	41,0%	19,8%
	Yugoslavs	10,7%	NA
	Others	2,9%	2,1%
Bosanski Šamac	Bosniaks	6,8%	7,3%
	Serbs	**41,3%**	**76,7%**
	Croats	44,7%	14,0%
	Yugoslavs	5,3%	NA

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[37] Ivan Cvitkovic, "Nacionalna i konfesionalna slika Bosne i Hercegovina." In Idem., (Ed.). *Demografske i Etnicke promjene u Bosni i Hercegovini*. Sarajevo: ANUBiH, 2017, 32.
[38] Pejanovic, "Promjene etnicke structure opstina u Bosni i Hercegovini prema popisu stanovnistva 2013. Godine," 81.

	Others	1,9%	1,9%
Derventa	Bosniaks	12,5%	6,9%
	Serbs	**40,6%**	**81,6%**
	Croats	38,9%	9,4%
	Yugoslavs	5,9%	NA
	Others	2,1%	2,1%
Modriča	Bosniaks	29,1%	12%
	Serbs	**35,2%**	**78,6%**
	Croats	27,5%	6,5%
	Yugoslavs	5,2%	NA
	Others	2,9%	2,8%
Mrkonjić Grad	Bosniaks	11,9%	2,2%
	Serbs	**76,9%**	**96,3%**
	Croats	7,8%	1,0%
	Yugoslavs	2,2%	NA
	Others	1,2%	0,5%
Prijedor	Bosniaks	43,9%	32,5%
	Serbs	**42,3%**	**62,5%**
	Croats	5,6%	2%
	Yugoslavs	5,7%	NA
	Others	2,5%	3,0%
Prnjavor	Bosniaks	15,2%	8,3%
	Serbs	**71,2%**	**85,3%**
	Croats	3,7%	1,3%
	Yugoslavs	3,7%	NA
	Others	6,2%	5,2%
Skender Vakuf	Bosniaks	5,5%	4,4%
	Serbs	**68,3%**	**94,8%**
	Croats	24,6%	0,3%
	Yugoslavs	0,9%	NA
	Others	0,7%	0,5%
Teslić	Bosniaks	21,4%	18,6%
	Serbs	**55,1%**	**75,4%**
	Croats	15,9%	3,7%
	Yugoslavs	5,8%	NA
	Others	1,8%	2,3%
Trebinje	Bosniaks	18,0%	3,4%
	Serbs	**68,9%**	**93,5%**
	Croats	4,0%	1,0%
	Yugoslavs	5,3%	NA
	Others	3,8%	2,1%

Source: Agency for Statistics of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
http://www.popis2013.ba/

Table 7 indicated multiethnic composition of cities in Republika Srpska while according to 2013 census multiethnic character of those cities was significantly changed. Pejanovic (2017) argued that according to 1991 census, 91 municipalities out of 109 had multiethnic and multicultural composition in Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, 46 municipalities had significant multiethnic and multicultural composition.[39] In this regard demographic changes were direct result of ethnic cleansing but such planned acts also included a systematic humiliation of Bosniaks and the destruction of their culture and heritage. Actually the term 'clean' in contrast to 'dirty' has cultural connotations because newly cleansed territory was supposed to be without any other ethnic 'dirt' or 'contamination'.[40]

Conclusion

This paper analyzed the key terms, concepts and theories of genocide by putting in the perspective Srebrenica Genocide. A conceptual and theoretical analysis clearly pointed to the complexity of using and applying the term genocide. To prevent future acts of genocide it is important to tackle effectively genocide denial, based on established facts and court sentences. The punishments for those who committed genocide and justice for the victims is ultimate obligation of the International community, regional powers and state actors of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The society at large must be educated about genocide as to recognize crimes against humanity and suffering of genocide victims. Jones (2006) skillfully summarized common views of genocide deniers by arguing that their discourse often revolves around the following statements: "hardly anybody died;" "it was self-defense;" "the deaths were not intentional;" "there was not central direction;" "there were not that many people to begin with;" "it was not/ is not genocide because;" "we would never do that;" "we are the real victims."[41]

Srebrenica Genocide should be taken as a historical lesson not only in Bosnia and Herzegovina but in the whole world. Considering such lessons we must teach our children about the dangers of racism, anti-Semitism, Islamophobia and other examples of human

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[39] Ibid., 74-79.

[40] See David Rieff, *Slaughterhouse: Bosnia and the Failure of the West*. New York: Vintage, 1995.

[41] Jones Adam, *Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction*. London and New York: Routledge, 2006, pp. 351-354.

intolerance. The young generations must be taught to value human rights, freedoms and liberties. On the other hand, they must be encouraged to reject hatred and intolerance so that Srebrenica never happens to any nation in the world. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the prevention of future genocide does not only depend on a symbolic sympathy towards genocide victims. It is important to understand the cultural and psycho-social reasons for not only why people commit genocide against their neighbors but why people in peace deny genocide. The culture of remembering the victims of genocide is of existential significance and through the creation of the collective memory we strongly affirm universal values of justice. Therefore, the culture of remembering the victims of genocide is of existential significance. Through research, conferences, exhibitions, personal and collective stories we should explain what genocide is, why it takes place and what are the consequences of genocide.

Srebrenica Genocide had received significant international attention. Prominent diplomats, politicians, policy-makers, writers, journalists, artists and intellectuals have done a lot to create cultural and civilization awareness regarding Srebrenica Memory. There are numerous books, exhibitions, memorials, seminars, symposiums, conferences and Summer School courses that keep the memory of Srebrenica Genocide. Potocari Memorial Center, where all those who were killed in Srebrenica Genocide, an Annual Commemoration and the March of Peace keep genocide memories and teach present and future generations "never again." The government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Srebrenica Mothers and different non-governmental organizations have been lobbying for the adoption of Srebrenica Genocide Declaration by the different countries and especially by the EU, the USA and the Balkan countries. Lately, the British Government made the proposal as to include Srebrenica Genocide into the history textbooks.

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Muslims, Law and Religious Freedom in Albania

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Abstract:

Freedom of religion is commonly defined via three dimensions, as the freedoms to choose, to criticize, or to not follow a religion. Hereby, social, political, and legal regulations are the main forces limiting and enabling the exercise of this specific human right. This article describes the current tripartite relationships between state, law, and religious organizations in Albania, focussing on the major institutions and issues. The basic and underlying assumption is that there is a high level of willingness for religious harmony and integrative behaviour on the part of organized religions, which is met by the state through a regulatory framework favouring acknowledged communities, but which also shows significant delays in decision-making and implementation processes. These findings are also valid for the relationship between the state as a guarantor of religious freedom and Muslim organizations.

Key words: Albania, Freedom of religion, Islam, Religious Organisations

Introduction: Religion and society in Albania

Describing the position of religion in its various dimensions (Riis 2011, 230) in present-day Albanian society, one has to take into account the latest historical path-dependencies of the second half of the 20th century as crucial impact factors. In Albania, religion in general and Islam in particular were severely prosecuted by the communist regime between 1944 and 1990, such that today religious organizations are still in the stage of re-establishing internal structures and enduring external

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channels of communication that would enable them to gain and maintain a certain influence over general developments in society.

The Republic of Albania is a comparatively small country of approximately 28,800 km², divided into twelve administrative regions ('*qark*'), within which 65 cities and 308 rather rural administrative municipalities are organized (Instituti i Statistikave 2014, 13). Albania's status as one of the poorest countries in Europe[1] directly influences every sphere of society, including religion and its practice. These circumstances led to massive emigration after the collapse of the single-party state in 1991. Population numbers have since recovered somewhat, and since 2010 have remained very consistent at approximately 2.9 million (Instituti i Statistikave 2016, 8). The latest census (2011) showed a relatively homogenous ethnic structure, with 82.6% of the population declaring themselves as Albanians[2]. Contrary to this ethnic homogeneity, the religious sphere is characterized by two factors: a multi-religious structure; and a generally open orientation of the population in spiritual matters towards different religions, which to some extent can be explained by the location and specific history of the territory, which had certain effects on religiosity, religions, and religious communities in Albania.

The fact that most of the Albanian population identifies with the religion of Islam in its Sunni interpretation positions the society as an interesting research topic in the area of practices of the fundamental human right of religious freedom, since it combines a multi-religious structure, a traditionally Muslim society and a European context (with Muslims forming a minority in the overwhelming majority of European societies). The multi-religious background of Albanian society additionally illustrates the increasing importance of a functioning relationship between state, law, and religion in Europe, since most societies on the continent are affected by profound processes of

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[1] Albanian GDP in 2016 was 4,125 US per capita/year; see World Bank: GDP per capita (current US$), https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?year_high_desc=true (01.11.2018).

[2] Instituti i Statistikave 2012. Censusi i Popullsisë dhe Banesave 2011, Popullsia banuese sipas përkatësisë etnike dhe kulturore ("*Census of Population and Housing 2011, resident population by ethnicity and cultural background*"), see http://www.instat.gov.al/en/themes/censuses/census-of-population-and-housing/#tab2 (15.11.2018). Additionally Greeks 0.87%, Macedonians 0.2%, Roma 0.3%, other 2.3%, no answer 13.96%.

pluralization in the religious sphere. When analysing religion and religious freedom, one should remain mindful of Albania's limited socio-economic development (in European terms), which is connected to widespread poverty and a high susceptibility of state institutions to corruption, which affect every sphere of society including the religious one.

Therefore, this article describes the current relationships between state, law, and religious organizations in Albania until 2018, focussing on the major institutions and issues. The basic and underlying assumption initially follows the findings of contemporary scientific observation of religion and its organized forms in the Republic of Albania, which highlights the high level of willingness to religious harmony and integrative behaviour on the part of organized religions; as well as active exchange, communication and a certain situation of concurrence between them (Endresen 2012, 241). The results of the present analysis underline that these findings are also valid for the assessment of the current relationship between religious freedom and Muslim organizations.

However, looking more closely at the micro- and meso-levels of everyday religious life in Albania, some unsolved issues may limit the practice of all facets of religious freedom of individuals and religious communities. In general, these circumstances are located in the area of religion and politics: the first point is the restitution of property to religious communities, the second a still ineffective state administration, and the third the politicization of religion.

Historical remarks on religious freedom in Albania

From the historical macro-perspective, the territory of present-day Albania and its people were mostly situated in a peripheral region of the great empires governed from Rome, Constantinople, Vienna, or Istanbul. Despite strong influence of these centres on religious matters in the region until the beginning of the 20th century, the spiritual characteristics of the people maintained a mixture of clanship (Siebertz 1910, 46) and traditional spirituality (with strong references to ancestor worship and nature) at the micro-level, which consequently led to an overall multi-religious understanding and individual syncretism. When the Ottoman Empire conquered vast territories of present-day Albania around 1423, the first conversions of the native population to

Islam were noticed (Young 1999, 7). Thereafter, in addition to the mentioned widespread traditional forms of spirituality and the two major Christian denominations (Catholic and Eastern-Orthodox), another component was added to the religious life of the country, which subsequently became dominant among the population.

Within the historical macro-perspective, five periods of political development can be identified since the beginning of modernity, which also help to structure findings for the issue of religious freedom: the period of the Ottoman Empire (1423–1912), the first independent Albania (1912–1939), the Italian occupation (1939–1944/45), the rigid socialist system (1944–1991) and the phase of democratization (1991 to present). The rule of the Ottomans, which lasted for almost 500 years from the end of the 14th century, meant in fact the belonging to a religious state of Islamic character (see the concept of caliphate) for many parts of Albania. Accordingly, the population was primarily defined and categorized from this very perspective; Non-Muslim groups, if religiously legitimized by the Ottoman Empire, were assigned and organized along the category of recognized religious communities, so-called '*millets*' (Zaffi 2006, 132). Despite the generally humble position of their members within the social system of the Ottoman Empire, these communities also enjoyed some privileges – such as the right to largely regulate their internal affairs in the field of religion (theology, rites, education) (ibid., 134). Therefore, despite the majority adoption of Islam by the inhabitants of the territories (which in some cases also included instrumental causes; Siebertz 1910, 108-09)[3], Orthodox Christianity, with its official recognition, had the opportunity to hold itself as an identity-forming element in parts of the population[4]. The fundamental state order of the Ottoman Empire allowed those recognized (religiously defined) groups to live together peacefully within its borders (Zaffi 2006, 152); however, general societal integration[5] did not take place, as later reform attempts of the Tanzimat in the 19th century failed to solve major questions of societal disintegration.

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[3] Tax incentives or adjustments to local customs.

[4] The Orthodox dioceses of Albania were organized under the jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople in the 19th century. The Catholic Church was persecuted long after the conquest of the territory by the Ottoman Empire.

[5] This is despite a certain level of integration occurring within institutions of the state, such as in the military.

As the 19th century progressed, national movements developed in South-Eastern Europe, which were often closely tied to a religion (mostly a Christian denomination) and consequently to a church organization; the latter developed into a factor that would create identity, and therefore also become a central political factor. In opposition to this trend, the idea of nation in the case of Albania was based on that of an ethnic and linguistic cultural nation; i.e. on an overarching understanding of the community beyond religious affiliation, due to the multi-religious structure of the inhabitants, the syncretistic-individual handling of religious practice at the micro-level (Siebertz 1910, 107), and the predominant harmony between the four major religions in connection to their political involvement.

In the course of the withdrawal of the Ottoman Empire from the region of today's Albania during the Balkan wars, the country declared itself independent in 1912. The country was subsequently recognized internationally and established as a monarchy by foreign powers at the London Conference and by the Protocols of Florence in 1913. The following occupation of Albania by various states during and after World War I prompted local elites to initiate joint action on issues of national concern, which in 1920 produced the first independently created constitutional text, the so-called Statute of Lushnja. However, its effective implementation was not possible, due to the then weak central power, the feudalistic character of the social and economic structure of the population, and the tribal fragmentation of the inhabitants. The text of the statute included an interesting detail concerning religious freedom: The internal structure of the second important body of the legislature of the state, the High Council ('*Këshilli i Lartë*')[6], which proposed the government, reserved seats for a high representative of each of the four recognized traditional religious communities in Albania (Sunni Muslim, Bektashi, Christian-Orthodox, and Christian-Catholic). This constitutional embedment emphasizes a high level of state recognition and therefore indicates the importance of the groups by already granting them political influence at the time the Albanian state was founded.

After several changes of government during the first half of the 1920s, the great landowner and former Prime Minister Ahmet Muhtar Zogolli (also Ahmet Zogu, 1895–1961) took power in January 1925 and

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[6] In addition to the first chamber, the National Council (alb. '*Këshilli Kombëtar*').

declared a constitution that provided for a presidential system. The text made only a general reference towards religion: In article 5, the state was declared as separated from any particular religion and as the guarantor of freedom of religion and belief (Statuti themeltar i Republikës Shqiptare 1925). Due to Zogolli's politics, Albania became greatly dependent on Italy. In 1928, Albania transitioned to a constitutional monarchy (with Zogolli as king) following the example of Italy, and installed a new constitution with an extensive text comprising 234 articles. These developments affected the area of religion and religious freedom only slightly: A paragraph was added to the above-mentioned article 5, which stated that religion should not be used for political purposes (Statuti themeltar i Mbretërisë Shqiptare 1928). Furthermore, simple laws concerning the issue were put into effect between the two world wars. Together, these laws illustrate the increasingly autocratic control of religion during King Zog's rule: The law of 1922 on religious communities[7], the Legal Statute of 1923[8], and the decree of Zogolli of July 9, 1929, on the formation of religious communities[9]. The first text formally guaranteed individual freedom of belief (Art. 2) and the freedom to practice the religions of recognized communities (Art. 1), defined here as Catholic, Orthodox, Muslim, and Bektashi (Art. 5). In comparison, the 1929 document with its new articles on religion suggests a functionalizing of religion in order to foster a specific 'national cohesion', since it: requested an Albanian nationality of the leaders of religious communities in the country (Art. 7), stated the obligation of the communities to develop patriotic and national sentiments of their believers during sermons (Art. 25) and prohibited the wearing of religious clothing without governmental permission (Art. 26).

These laws on religion were introduced during the institutionalization of the nation state, immediately after independence. They were also reactions to important developments in the religious sector, where pluralism was also institutionalized and

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[7] Këshilli i Ministrave. Ligj për mbi komunitet fetare. ("Law on Religious Communities."), 1922. See State Committee for Cults, http://kshk.gov.al/legjislacioni-per-fene-deri-ne-vitin-1939/, accessed December 5, 2018.

[8] Këshilli i Ministrave. *Statuti legal i komiteteve fetare*. ("*Legal Statute on Religious Communities.*"), 03.06.1923. See http://licodu.cois.it/?p=285&lang=en/, accessed December 4, 2018.

[9] Këshilli i Ministrave. Dekret – Ligje mbi formimin e komuniteteve fetare. ("Decree - Laws on the Establishment of Religious Communities."), 09.07.1929. See http://kshk.gov.al/legjislacioni-per-fene-deri-ne-vitin-1939/, accessed December 5, 2018.

took national forms: The Muslim community of Albania gradually separated from the Islamic authorities in Istanbul and erected its own organization, beginning with a meeting in 1923 (Zaimi 2013); The Bektashi Order established its headquarter in Tirana in the years following its 1925 abolition in Turkey; and after many years of confrontation with the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Constantinople, the Orthodox Church of Albania issued its unilateral declaration of independence in 1929, a move towards autocephaly, which finally was confirmed by the Ecumenical Patriarchate after further conflicts in 1937.

Already before the beginning of the Second World War, Italy invaded Albania on April 7, 1939, forced the king into exile, and issued a new constitution that established the Italian King Victor Emmanuel III as the king of Albania. This phase was ended after five years by the victory of the communist partisans in Albania in 1944/45, who subsequently sought to rapidly control and contain the activities of the country's religious communities. In a first step, the Catholic Church was defined as a foreign organization and became the target of harsh persecution, while all its spiritual personnel were either deported, detained, or immediately murdered (Tönnes 1975: 5). Secondly, the communist leadership sought to expropriate from religious communities all land that was suitable for agriculture or forestry, which was enforced through agrarian reforms of August 1945[10]. Consequently, by 1947, the four main religious communities lacked any substantial material assets. In 1946, a new constitution was introduction based on that of the Stalinist Soviet Union, which, on the other hand, formally took a liberal position towards religion in its wording: Article 18 allowed the organization of traditional religions and the exercise to all citizens, guaranteed freedom of belief, and separated religion from state and politics. In the wake of the break with Yugoslavia in 1948, those regulations were also confirmed by the 1949 Act on Religious Communities[11], which further limited the autonomy[12] and prohibited political activities (Art. 32-34) of these organizations. Based on the act,

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[10] Kryesija e Këshillit Antifashist. *Ligjë Nr. 108, "Mbi Reformën Agrare."* ("*About Agrarian Reform.*"), 29.08.1945. See http://licodu.cois.it/?p=5677&lang=en/, accessed December 4, 2018.

[11] Presidiumi i Kuvendit Popullor. *Ligjë Nr. 743, "Mbi Komunitetet Fetare."* ("*About Religious Communities.*"), 26.11.1949. See http://kshk.gov.al/legjislacioni-per-fene-ne-periudhen-1939-1945/, accessed September 10, 2018.

[12] According to article 13, religious leaders and their deputies had to be approved by the Council of Ministers immediately after their appointment.

further laws were implemented directly concerning the four traditional religious communities, through which the state effectively took over their supervision and control (Tönnes 1982, 248); in everyday life, however, the arbitrary persecution of religious dignitaries remained ubiquitous (Tönnes 1975, 6).

With the policy of severing ties with Yugoslavia (1948) and the Soviet Union (1968), the Albanian communist dictator Enver Hoxha (1908–1985) relied on cooperation with China between 1968 and 1978. From 1966 on, Mao Zedong (1893–1976) initiated a domestic 'Cultural Revolution' that was imitated by the Albanian regime. Henceforth, Albania's leadership worked to tighten up and legalize the persecution of religions and their followers. Examples include decrees on the final nationalization of land[13] and real estate[14] assets of religious communities of April 1967, following in November 1967 by the revocation of previous laws on religion[15], which led to the total prohibition of religious activity in the country. According to the logic of the regime, Albania was henceforth to be considered an 'atheist state' (ibid., 7), in which any religion had to give way to the ideology imposed by the Communist Party[16]. The existing arbitrary terror enacted against religious dignitaries and believers was thereby legalized and consequently enforced[17].

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[13] Presidiumi i Kuvendit Popullor. Dekreteve Nr. 4252 / 4253, "Për shtetëzimin e pasurisë së paluajtshme të komuniteteve fetare." ("On the nationalization of immovable property of religious communities"), 11.04.1967. See http://licodu.cois.it/?p=349&lang=en/, accessed October 4, 2018.

[14] Presidiumi i Kuvendit Popullor. Dekret Nr. 4263, "Mbi shtetëzimin e lokaleve që janë ndërtuar për ushtrim tregëtie, industrie, zejtarie ose profesioni, për zyra ose depo, tëcilat janë prone private, si edhe shtetëzimin e pasurisë së palujtëshme të komuniteteve fetare." ("On the nationalization of premises built for the exercise of trade, industry, handicrafts or profession, for offices or warehouses, which are private property, as well as the nationalization of the immovable property of religious communities."), 11.04.1967. See http://licodu.cois.it/?p=349&lang=en/, accessed October 4, 2018.

[15] Presidiumi i Kuvendit Popullor. *Dekret Nr. 4337 "Mbi cfuqizimin e disa dekreteve"* ("*On the Enforcement of Certain Decrees"*), 13.11.1967. See http://licodu.cois.it/?p=291&lang=en/, accessed October 4, 2018.

[16] According to the preamble of the 1976 constitution: "The Albanian people have found a constant inspiration in the great doctrine of Marxism-Leninism, (...) to later gradually pass into a communist society." (own translation, see Presidiumi i Kuvendit Popullor 1976).

[17] Articles of that time report that of the 368 religious dignitaries belonging to the Catholic Church in 1938, only 14 remained alive in the country until 1971; of those, twelve were imprisoned during that year (see Tönnes 1982, 251).

Final measures were implemented with the new constitution of 1976 (Presidiumi i Kuvendit Popullor 1976), which explicitly stated that the state did not recognize any religions, and sought to establish a "(…) *scientific materialistic world view.*" among its citizens (Art. 37). Religion and religious organizations were no longer permitted to operate, since Art. 55 prohibited "(...) *any form of fascist, anti-democratic, religious and antisocial organization.*". Thus, in communist Albania, under intense pressure of persecution, religious communities were deprived of any personal or material foundations. The confiscated religious buildings, in many cases of considerable historical value, were either the target of purposeful destruction or earmarked for uses that imposed high degrees of deterioration (e.g. agricultural or military functions) (Tönnes 1982, 250). Even today, the consequences of nationalization and persecution constitute profound problems in the exercise of religious freedom (see also chapter 5).

Democratization and freedom of religion after 1990

Influenced by the developments towards democratization in the reforming states of Eastern Europe, at the end of the 1980s the Albanian communist elite was no longer able to rebuff political changes. Thus, among several reform acts, the ban on practicing a religion or belief was lifted in December 1990; the spring of the following year, 1991, saw the first free elections for the national assembly ('*Kuvendi Popullor*', today '*Kuvendi i Shqipërisë*') of the Republic of Albania since the mid-1920s[18] (Kuvendi i Shqipërisë 2018). In contrast to the neighbouring states of former Yugoslavia, the country was not subsequently involved in violent conflicts or issues concerning sovereignty and international recognition. However, in common with these states, Albania nevertheless experienced great political instability during the 1990s. The first elections in March and April 1991 were won by the post-communist successor party (PS[19]), winning 169 of 250 seats in the assembly (Nohlen 2010, 137), while the second democratic poll just a year later in March 1992 was won by the opposition Democratic Party (PD[20]) (see Table 1). A long-term outcome has been the evolution of a dual split in the party system, which – supported by dependent family

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[18] See history of the National Assembly of Albania, https://www.parlament.al/Kuvendi/Historiku, accessed December 12, 2018.
[19] PS – Partia Socialiste e Shqipërisë (Socialist Party of Albania).
[20] PD – Partia Demokratike e Shqipërisë (Democratic Party of Albania).

and patronage networks – deeply influences the development of society until today.

The new transitional constitution, which was adopted only two weeks after the third round of the first parliamentary elections on April 29, 1991, only included short general statements about religious freedom (Kuvendi Popullor 1991). Article four confirmed that the state of Albania guarantees the fundamental human rights and freedoms as laid down in international documents. Article seven subsequently focused on religion directly, but included only two general sentences: In its first paragraph, it defined the relationship between religion and politics ('secular state'), and in the second it stipulated that "the state supervises religious freedom and creates conditions for its exercise" (ibid.).

Political competition intensified during the 1990s and grew into an open quarrel that directly affected the socio-economic sector. The inherited problem of widespread poverty could not be managed; instead, corruption and patronage networks connecting politics, economy, and crime led to social stagnation under the Democratic Party. This peaked in February and March 1997 with the collapse of financial pyramid schemes, in which a large proportion of the population lost all their savings. The consequences were a general implosion of societal and state structures: During the so-called 'lottery uprising', the state monopoly on law and order temporarily broke down, especially in southern Albania, and even the major religious communities were exposed unprotected to looting. The motifs had almost exclusively socio-economic/existential character and articulated frustration about the mentioned political-economic structures; the activities were not organized for ideological or religious reasons. The social disagreements led to early parliamentary elections in June and July 1997, which were won the opposition PS. Table 1 presents an overview of the election results of the national unicameral parliament between 1991 and 2017, since the polarization of the political system will be an important issue when discussing specific problematic areas of religious freedom in Albania.

Table 1: Second-round general election results (in percent) of Albania's two dominant political parties[21]

	1991	1992	1996	1997	2001
PS	56.2	25.7	20.4	52.7	41.5
PD	38.7	62.1	55.5	25.8	36.8

	2005	2009	2013	2017
PS	8.9	40.9	41.4	48.3
PD	7.7	40.2	30.6	28.9

A long-term perspective on the societal developments of 1991–2018 suggests that Albania is not only going through the transformation from a socialist to a market-based democratic system, but is also trying to leap from an agrarian to a service-based society. The results are intense processes of change, combined with background factors such as a high level of poverty, political–economic patronage systems, and family traditions.

Following failed attempts to implement a new constitution in previous years, a new text was drafted in the wake of the parliamentary elections of summer 1997 (Osterberg-Kaufmann 2016, 335) to replace the 1991 transitional document. The aim was, in the light of the experience of the transformation period so far, to re-adjust political power-sharing and control, thereby promoting further democratization of the country. On October 21, 1998, the national assembly voted to implement the new text, which was ratified by voters in a referendum on November 22. While the new document acknowledges fundamental democratic goals, everyday political practice (as well as subsequent constitutional changes 2007–2016) are widely interpreted as regressions of democratic standards (ibid., 349) – a trend that also affects the religious sphere in Albania.

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[21] Parties and Elections in Europe (2018): Albania, see http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/albania.html (01.05.2018).

If we shift the focus to the micro-level of religiosity, the identification of the anchoring of religious beliefs in the minds of the population (of Albania) and its structuring are complex issues (Riis 2011, 232). Religious affiliation, however, represents a significant contextual factor in the area of religious freedom and its governance. Various metrics note Albanian people's ambivalent attitude towards religion.

According to the WVS survey conducted in 1998, a majority of citizens (53.7%) considered themselves non-religious[22], while the results of the same survey show that almost the entire population associates with a religious group (compared to numbers in Table 2), thereby indicating identification with a cultural rather than a spiritual belonging. Within the same survey format four years later, 65.2% of respondents identified as being religious[23]; even the latest census of 2011 does not provide more precise information, since a high proportion of respondents (16.22%) did not disclose information about religion and so the results are questioned by several religious communities (see below).

Table 2: Population of Albania according to religious affiliation 1927–2011 (in percent)

	Muslim	Christian-Orthodox	Christian-Catholic	Bektashi	Other	No answer
1927 [24]	67.5	22.3	10			
1938 [25]	69	20.7	10.3			
1942 [26]	54.17	20.7	10.3	14.73		

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[22] Religious person 43.4%, non-religious person 47.8%, convinced atheist 4.9%, d.k. 3.8%. See Inglehart and Haerpfer et al. 2014 ("*V182 – Are you religious?*").

[23] Religious person 65.2%, non-religious person 25.0%, convinced atheist 5.3%, d.k. 4.5%. See Inglehart and Haerpfer et al. 2014 ("*V186 – Religious person*").

[24] The Orthodox Autocephalous Church of Albania 2012a.

[25] Tönnes 1975, 4.

[26] The Orthodox Autocephalous Church of Albania 2012a.

1998 [27]	70.7	20.4	7		1.8	0.1
2011 [28]	56.7	6.75	10.03	2.09	8.22	16.22

In the everyday life of the Albanian population, religiosity and faith are granted respectable interest but also great distance and relativization: Firstly, it is necessary to pay attention to the differentiation of underlying motifs of officially expressed religiosity in its specific context[29]; and secondly, that forms of religious affiliation overlap widely at the individual level in Albania (see the level of interreligious marriages, for example).

The religious structure of the Albanian population is dominated by that proportion who attribute themselves to the Sunni branch of Islam (56.7% in the 2011 census), which is the most widespread traditional religion in the country. Additionally, the followers of The Bektashi Order, who according to this census represent 2.09% of the population, are historically also largely attributable to the group more widely defined as Muslim. The Bektashi School is a specific form of Muslim Sufism that is close to the Shiite branch of Islam (and even closer to the group of Alevis) and which formally promotes liberal and humanistic values (for more information see the description of religious communities). From the historical and present-day perspective, the second-largest group after Sunni Muslims is Orthodox Christians, who always accounted for 20–25% of the population in the 20th century. The last census in 2011 showed that a remarkably low 6.75% of respondents reported belonging to this group – in turn, these data were directly rejected by the Orthodox Autocephalous Church of Albania (The Orthodox Autocephalous Church of Albania 2012). Furthermore, Catholic Christianity is represented by about 10% of the population. Other religions combined account for approximately eight percent, including the group of unbound believers (5.49%) and those of different Christian Protestant branches.

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[27] Inglehart and Haerpfer et al. 2014 ("*V179 – Religious denomination*").

[28] Instituti i Statistikave 2012.

[29] A simple structure of motivations to state a certain religiosity incorporates the three categories which can be labelled 'spiritual', 'cultural', and 'ancestry'.

Despite the described state-enforced atheism between 1945 and 1990, and the current low rates of attendance at religious places and rites[30], the Albanian population today has no great aversion to religion in general, or to a specific denomination or community (Association of Religion Data Archives 2015). Thus, the power of religion to determine a certain social order in society is rather low. At the individual level, religion is used more integratively and it is common practice to visit the festivities of other religions (which are generally open) and to engage in interfaith marriages (Young 1999: 6).

The most important religious communities in Albania are the Muslim Community of Albania ('*Komuniteti Mysliman i Shqipërisë*'; KMSh), the Orthodox Autocephalous Church ('*Kisha Orthodhokse Autoqefale e Shqipërisë*'), the Catholic Church ('*Kisha Katolike e Shqipërisë*'), the Bektashi Community with its world headquarters ('*Kryegjyshatës botëror Bektashi*'), and the Evangelical Brotherhood ('*Vëllazëria Ungjillore e Shqipërisë*'; VUSH). The Muslim Community of Albania, as the largest religious organization, covers the entire territory of the country with currently 34 muftiates (Komuniteti Mysliman i Shqipërisë 2018). In addition, with the establishment of seven religious schools ('medresetë') since 1991, and the University of Bedër since 2011 ('*Universiteti Hëna e Plotë*'), the community is able to offer the entire school curriculum within an Islamic framework. Belonging to the Muslim spectrum, the Bektashi religious group is a Sufi order that originated in the Ottoman Empire in the 14th/15th century and was founded by followers of the Islamic preacher and philosopher Haji Bektash Veli (1209–1271). Due to its openness and its ties to the state, the order also spread relatively quickly in South-Eastern Europe until the beginning of the 18th century, but it was always viewed with suspicion by the leading Sunni ulema of the Ottoman Empire. A first setback hit the community in 1826, when Sultan Mahmud II closed all Bektashi monasteries ('*tekke*') and banned the order. However, it was able to recover quickly with the Tanzimat reforms in the Ottoman Empire and unfolded far-reaching activities until it was again banned following the abolition of the caliphate by Mustafa Kemal Pasha (1881–1938) in 1925 and finally banished from Turkey. Thus, the order

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[30] About 70.3% of respondents visited these less than once a month in the 2002 survey. See Inglehart and Haerpfer et al. 2014 ("*V185.- How often do you attend religious services*").

established its world headquarters in 1931 in Tirana, which as such is recognized by the Albanian government in special regulations[31].

The Orthodox Autocephalous Church of Albania, traditionally strongly represented in the south and east of Albania, is widely represented through its eight church districts (two episcopal seats, six dioceses) (The Orthodox Autocephalous Church of Albania 2012b). Its leader, Anastasios (Yannoulatos), Archbishop of Tirana, Durres and the whole of Albania, is a highly integrative personality and recognized as such worldwide. He is a Greek citizen by birth, and for this reason a target of criticism by some political actors (see chapter five). Due to the historical Greek-Orthodox influence in the south of the country, the Roman Catholic Church, as the fourth important religious community, was traditionally more active in the north and west of Albania. This also reflects their internal structure of six church districts in the country, where one is responsible for the whole of southern Albania[32]. The last important organization present in public life is the Evangelical Brotherhood of Albania, an umbrella organization that includes a large number of Christian-Protestant communities in the country. The organization dates its roots in Albania back to 1873 and was officially founded on November 14, 1892 (Vëllazëria Ungjillore e Shqipërisë 2018). It does not represent a significant proportion of the population in terms of absolute numbers, but with its diffusion among intellectuals, its traditional anchoring in cities (ibid.) and its broad media presence, it is a social factor not to be underestimated.

The relationships between religious communities are generally characterized by harmony and mutual understanding. Regular meetings at national level, as well as regional forums organized by the communities themselves[33], ensure a respectful approach and perception as cooperative partners. Dissonances within Albania's religious sphere predominantly arise when political parties / the state claim interpretations in this area, foreign (financial) organizations try to gain influence or when controversies break out within the denominations about organizational or theological concerns (see also chapter 5).

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[31] See laws and regulations concerning the Bektashi Order in chapter four.

[32] The two archdioceses of Shkodra-Pult and Tirana-Durres, the three dioceses of Lezha, Sapa, Rreshen, and the Apostolic Administration of Southern Albania (Cheney 2018).

[33] See 'Inter-Religious Collaboration Center Elbasan' (http://interreligiouscenter.com/, accessed May 1, 2018).

Muslims and religious freedom today

At the constitutional level, the case of Albania followed the general developments in Central and Eastern Europe, where, after the end of the socialist system, specific factors shaped the actual course of the implementation of new norms. The interim constitution, adopted in 1991, was replaced by a new text in 1998, which would also be subject to interpretation (Osterberg-Kaufmann 2016, 349). This new constitution (Kuvendi i Republikës së Shqipërisë 1998)[34] contains statements on religion in a number of passages; in this analysis, a distinction is made between the two dimensions: of general references on the one hand, and explicit regulations on individual and collective religious freedoms on the other. General references are to be found first in the preamble, which proclaims that the text is adopted "*with faith in God and/or other universal values*" and "*in the spirit of religious coexistence and tolerance*". Furthermore, the first chapter, which refers to basic principles, defines religious coexistence as a basic value of the state (Art. 3) and prohibits political parties from initiating or supporting religious or ethnic hatred through their programmes or activities (Art. 9).

In the area of explicit regulation of individual and collective religious freedom, four articles are of central importance. First, the relationship between state and collectively organized religion is defined (Art. 10; no official religion, state neutral, religions equal, mutual independence, agreements governing relations, legal status of organized religion). Art. 24 guarantees freedom of religion for every individual, applies this principle also to collectives, and prohibits the compulsion to participate in a religion or to make one's religion public. Furthermore, Art. 18 states that all persons are legally equal and that no-one is to be discriminated against on grounds of religion. These individual and collective rights in the exercise of religious freedom also explicitly apply to national minorities (Art. 20, 2).

On a lower legal level, several laws and agreements are applied in Albania in the field of religious freedom. Here, they are structured

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[34] Adopted by the assembly on October 21, 1998, and by a national referendum on November 22, 1998. Result proclaimed by decree No. 2260 of November 28, 1998, by the President of the Republic.

according to the three areas of: a) general regulations for non-governmental organizations, b) treaties of the state with individual religious communities, and c) further regulations on the religious sector. In the area of non-governmental organizations, the state initially does not require registration of religious individuals or communities operating on its territory. However, in order to obtain the status of a legal entity and thereby exercise rights of ownership of land and real estate, religious communities must apply for a registration at a district court ('*Gjykatat e Rrethit Gjyqësor*') under the 1994 Non-Governmental Organizations Reform Act, which was reformed in 2001 (Kuvendi i Shqipërisë 2001a). Consent is usually granted through a court decision within 3–4 days; to date, there have been no reports of recognition being refused (U.S. Dept. of State 2018, 3). In order to achieve official recognition of charitable status, special laws are applied to charitable organizations and their registration (Kuvendi i Shqipërisë 2001b), which comprise a total of 93 individual regulations and to some degree intervene in the structure of the organizations (founding, internal development, financing).

The religious communities themselves, and especially the Catholic Church with its history of state–church treaties in Europe, pushed for specific regulations and individual contracts for their organizations alongside these general laws. Compared to non-governmental organizations of modern character, they had specific characteristics (such as non-commercial revenues [donations] and buildings, historically evolved structures), which they considered were not sufficiently acknowledged in previous legal arrangements. Hence, Albania's first comprehensive agreement with a religious organization[35] was the agreement with the Holy See of May 23, 2002 (Kuvendi i Shqipërisë 2002a, 836–838), in which the state recognized the structures constituted by the Catholic Church as having legal capacity (Art. 2, 5, and 6) and allowed the formation of Catholic schools, universities, and charitable institutions (Art. 7). Furthermore, the mission of the Catholic Church in Albania (Art. 1) and the use of its

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[35] Earlier agreements were limited to specific projects, such as cooperation between the government and the Catholic Church in constructing a hospital in Tirana in 2000. See Qeverisë së Republikës të Shqipërisë 2000.

own means of communication (Art. 3, 4) were permitted, and the peaceful resolution of possible disputes was envisaged (Art. 9, 10).

Table 3: Laws on religion and state treaties with religious communities, 1991–2017[36]

Regulation	Date	Specifics
Establishment of State Secretariat for Religion ('*Sekretariati Shtetëror për Fenë*')	1992	- 4 members - Close links to DP and KMSh
Establishment of State Committee for Cults ('*Komiteti Shtetëror për Kultet*')	23.09.1999	- 5 members; PM confirms - No registration required
Agreement with the Holy See to regulate mutual relations	23.05.2002	- First agreement with religious community
Law on the status of legal entities of the Catholic Church	31.03.2005	
Agreement with community Sant'Egidio about activities in Albania	30.10.2006	- Exemption from customs and taxes on goods of humanitarian activities
Agreement with the Holy See on economic and fiscal matters	31.01.2008	- Exemption from taxes on domestic and foreign contributions
Agreement with Muslim Community in Albania (KMSh) to regulate mutual relations	22.01.2009	- Confessional and basic political orientation / extremist trends - Comprehensive cooperation with state (taxes, education, construction, restitution, tourism) / most extensive text
Agreement with Autocephalous Orthodox Church of	22.01.2009	- Religious education with state - Restitution: specific objects

[36] For the first three arrangements see Komiteti Shtetëror për Kultet 2014.

Albania to regulate mutual relations		
Agreement with Bektashi World Community to regulate mutual relations	22.01.2009	- Recognition: world headquarters; part of national culture > close bond to the state
Law on state funding of religious communities	15.05.2009	- Art. 1: only those with agreements
Agreement with Evangelical Brotherhood of Albania to regulate mutual relations	10.03.2011	- No statements about national culture; no state funding

The document was followed by the Law on the Legal Status of Entities of the Catholic Church of March 31, 2005 (Kuvendi i Shqipërisë 2005) and the agreement with the Catholic community of Sant'Egidio (concerning its headquarter in Albania and its humanitarian activities in the country), of October 30, 2006 (Kuvendi i Shqipërisë 2006). In the latter, humanitarian goods were exempted from import customs duty, (Art. 6), the community of Sant'Egidio was granted a degree of immunity (Art. 4), and was able to regulate other tax matters. Furthermore, the additional agreement with the Holy See on economic and fiscal matters of January 31, 2008 (Kuvendi i Shqipërisë 2008) guaranteed organizations of the Catholic Church exemption from taxes on domestic and foreign donations (Art. 2), and from taxes on real estate (Art. 3) insofar as they are not used for commercial purposes (Art. 4); and includes reductions in contributions to social and health insurance for its religious personnel (Art. 7). In the overall view of all four texts on the Catholic Church, the following specifics can be identified in comparison to the other four agreements that the state subsequently arranged with the other religious communities: No statements are made as to whether the Catholic Church, together with the state, has its educational institutions certified, whether the church belongs qualifies as a 'national cultural asset', or on what basis and to what extent it can receive state support (see also chapter 5). Moreover, the restitution of previously nationalized goods is not addressed.

The fifth agreement made between the state and a religious community is that with the Muslim Community of Albania (KMSh) of

January 22, 2009 (Kuvendi i Shqipërisë 2009a), regulating the mutual relations. As with the state's agreements with the Orthodox Church and the Bektashi Order, the treaty may be traced back to a certain need for action by the state, to also establish arrangements with the larger traditional religious communities. This text has the broadest scope (containing 25 articles) and offers significant state support to the Muslim community. On the other hand, unlike the other four agreements, the state influences the doctrine of the religious community by assigning the organization to a specific school of Islamic law (Hanafi, Art. 2) and imposing actions on KMSh against "extremist trends and deformations of faith" (Art. 3). Similarly to the case for the Orthodox Church, the community is entitled to build-up religious school curricula in cooperation with the state and to certify its teaching personnel (Art. 17). The most urgent problem, the restitution of nationalized property, is more detailed in comparison to the other agreements; here, the state promises to comply with the principle of return before compensation (Art. 22) and to help with legalization of religious buildings (Art. 21). In addition, the state intends to participate in the restoration, design, and construction of cult objects of the community and in their touristic marketing (Art. 23).

The following agreement with the Autocephalous Orthodox Church of Albania (AOC) regulating the mutual relations, which was concluded on the same day (Kuvendi i Shqipërisë 2009b), is also comparatively extensive, and contains all the regulations on taxation, restitution and education mentioned for the KMSh. This also applies to the agreement with the Bektashi World Community (Kuvendi i Shqipërisë 2009c), in which only the statements on education are not mentioned in regard to those of the KMSh and AOC. However, the agreement also contains a number of specific peculiarities: The document recognizes the prominent position of the Bektashi community in Albanian society and its seat in Tirana as the world headquarter of the order (Art. 7). Additionally, the moral and material heritage of the Bektashi community for the country (Art. 23) are praised[37]. On the other hand, the community is required to carry out its collective rituals in the Albanian language and to assign persons of

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[37] Based on these arguments, the Bektashi community is considered to be eligible for financial support from the state under the law on state funding of religious communities of May 15, 2009.

Albanian nationality and "patriotic morality" to its leadership positions in the country (Art. 9).

The most recently concluded agreement with a religious community is that with the Evangelical Brotherhood of Albania (VUSH) of March 10, 2011 (Kuvendi i Shqipërisë 2011). The community had long pushed for the document, as it regards itself as a traditional religious group in Albania (see above) and consider itself disadvantaged in key issues (such as taxation, restitution and financial support) compared to the four large associations. Coming two years after the other four communities, the agreement granted the Brotherhood state recognition but omitted any article regulating the receipt of financial support from the state[38].

In sum, the agreements convey tax advantages on all five religious communities. Furthermore, the problem of restitution is addressed in all texts except those with the Catholic Church. The contracts with the Muslim Community, the Orthodox Church, and the Bektashi Order explicitly include the provision of state financial support (Art. 13 in each case). In addition, in relation to the KMSh and Orthodox Church, the state is willing to organize denominational education and to make efforts toward restitution; the document signed with the KMSh contains further statements on the theological orientation of the organization and on additional material state support (building of places of worship, tourism marketing). Hence, the differing relations that the state has established with the five communities certainly influence the practice of religious freedom in Albania.

Other regulations relating to the religious sector highlight the leading position of the four traditionally recognized religious communities (excluding VUSH) in their relationship with the state. The first important factor in this context is the decree made by the Social Democratic government of Ilir Meta (PS) of May 5, 2000[39], which

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[38] In contrast, article 13 addresses wider economic activity. Furthermore, the VUSH, unlike the other four communities, does not receive any state support (see below).

[39] Këshillit të Ministrave. Vendim Nr. 226, Për një ndryshim në vendimin nr.335, datë 2.9.1997, të Këshillit të Ministrave, "Për lëshimin e pasaportave diplomatike dhe të shërbimit" ("*Decision Nr. 226, For amendment of decision No.335, dated 2.9.1997, of the Council of Ministers, `On issuing diplomatic passports and service`*"). Fletorja Zyrtare, 2000 (13): 618.

provides for the issuing of diplomatic passports to the leaders of the four groups mentioned. The decree was extended with the decision of the government of Sali Berisha (PD) of January 14, 2009[40], so that today three persons from the top leadership of each of the four religious communities are issued diplomatic passports by Albania.

The second regulation in the religious sector goes beyond symbolic measures. The law on the local tax system of December 12, 2002 (Kuvendi i Shqipërisë 2002b) sets out local taxes on religious buildings (Art. 11) and on real estate inherited by the religious communities (Art. 18). The financial aspect is also addressed in the third legal framework, with the law (May 15, 2009) on financing religious communities from the state budget[41]. After four months, this complemented the aforementioned financial support regulations in the 'bilateral' agreements with the four major communities from the side of the state. In the latter document, the first article states that only those religious communities that have concluded an agreement with the government receive financial support, and explicitly names the four groups mentioned here. Furthermore, it stipulates that the state supports the maintenance and reconstruction of their places of worship (Art. 2), allocates social security funds for the personnel of the religious communities (Art. 3), and provides salaries to its (recognized) teachers at all educational levels (Art. 4). The government grants are still reserved only for four recognized communities; beside that issue, the final calculation of state funding was rather arbitrary during recent years. An additional important point within the field of financial support is the position of the State Committee for Cults (KSHK), which functions as a key institution when a religious community applies for a project under Article 2, because it has the right to submit selected projects to the government for decision (Art. 6). The committee is also responsible for supervising the use of financial resources (Art. 10).

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[40] Këshillit të Ministrave. Vendim Nr.49, Për një shtesë në vendimin Nr. 335, datë 2.9.1997, të Këshillit të Ministrave, "Për lëshimin e pasaportave diplomatike dhe të shërbimit" ("*Decision No. 49, For amendment of decision`No. 335, dated 2.9.1997, of the Council of Ministers, `On issuing diplomatic and service passports`*"). Fletorja Zyrtare, 2009 (4): 58.
[41] Kuvendi i Shqipërisë. Ligj 10140, Për financimin nga buxheti i shtetit të bashkësive fetare, që kanë nënshkruar marrëveshje me këshillin e ministrave ("*Law 10140, On Financing from the State Budget of Religious Communities, which have signed agreements with the Council of Ministers*"). Fletorja Zyrtare 2009 (87): 3822-3824.

The fourth state measure concerning other regulations on religion was to establish an institution as a point of contact for and cooperation with religious communities. Thus, in 1992, the government first established the State Secretariat for Religion ('*Sekretariati Shtetëror për Fenë*'), which was assigned to the Ministry of Culture, Youth, and Sports (Komiteti Shtetëror për Kultet 2014). It consisted of four members appointed by the Prime Minister (three of whom were required to work with a specific traditional religious community KMSh, Orthodox Church, Catholic Church). The leadership was assigned to the secretariat's contact person with the KMSh. During the first years, the position was filled by the prominent Muslim, Z. Bardhyl Fico (1932–2015), who, together with the first grand mufti of democratic Albania, Hafiz Sabri Koçi (1921–2004), revived and substantially shaped Islamic religious life in the country after 1990[42]. Following a government decision of September 23, 1999 (Këshillit të Ministrave 1999), the secretariat was transformed into the State Committee for Cults ('*Komiteti Shtetëror për Kultet*' - KSHK), which today coordinates the dialogue of state institutions with all religious communities, monitors their registration and communication, and oversees government-funded projects in the field (Art. 2). The committee now consists of five members (Art. 3), each working on a specific religious community and an additional, independent topic in the field of religion and politics (Komiteti Shtetëror për Kultet 2018).

Summarizing this chapter on state regulations on religion, an ambivalent 'set of interests' of this actor comes to the fore: On the one hand, the major goal is to promote religious harmony and liberality as a national cultural asset – which includes financial support for those religions recognized as being traditional (with their indisputable contribution to a constructive understanding of history and to an inclusive present-day society). This means, on the other hand, that the state even formally prefers certain religious communities, which deviates from the ideal-typical perspective of separation of religion and politics.

Current issues of religious freedom

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[42] Fico gained a reputation among wide parts of the population as his actions were socially inclusive; nevertheless, the constellation also expresses certain links between (a particular) religion and politics.

After the end of the socialist period, the area of religious freedom was marked by five main factors in the case of Albania, which were similar to those in other societies of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe: (1) the need to rebuild places of worship and equivalent infrastructure, a process which still is in progress due to extensive, targeted destruction during socialist times; (2) the question of restitution of property to religious communities; (3) far-reaching atheistic attitudes among the population, one consequence of which is difficulty recruiting appropriate leadership personnel to religious communities; (4) widespread poverty that increased dependence on foreign actors; and (5) the political interpretation and instrumentalization of religion from various interest groups.

In the following discussion of current problem areas in the field of religious freedom, it is always important to keep in mind the general context of broad pluralism in the structure of the religious field in Albania; the peaceful cooperation of organized, traditional religions; and the inter-religious orientation and tolerance of the population. Those facts are underlined at the institutional level, since the state does not require registration of religious groups. In order to obtain legal recognition associated with further (property) rights, including the ownership of religious buildings and a degree of tax relief, they must register as non-governmental organizations that do not pursue commercial interests. For Albania, there are no known cases of a religious community being denied registration at this level (U.S. Dept. of State 2018, 3). Additionally, the State Committee for Cults developed a catalogue of religious communities operating in Albania, so that it might contact them and maintain an updated overview[43].

The first issue is the advanced status of the five religious communities that have concluded agreements with the state. They enjoy constitutionally anchored privileges (Art. 10 constitution; Kuvendi i Shqipërisë 1998), which in practice mean a multitude of consequences for religious freedom in the country (Elbasani 2016, 263).

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[43] Information on the current scope and criteria of admission were not communicated despite several requests to the KSHK. For 2007, the list comprised 249 registered religious groups, including four traditional communities, 34 Islamic organizations, and 189 Christian Protestant groups that were mostly associated with the VUSH (United States 2008: 1).

Firstly, with the exception of VUSH, there is financial support from the state, although in recent years this has been relatively modest (in total €826,000 per annum between 2015 and 2018 for all four communities[44]). Also covered by the treaties, the Catholic and Orthodox Churches and the Muslim Community maintain state-licensed schools, while the KMSh, the Orthodox Church, and the Bektashi Order additionally provide educational facilities for their own staff (U.S. Dept. of State 2008, 7). The partial state funding of selected communities, which together represent the vast majority of the population in spiritual matters, was introduced parallel to promised government assistance in restitution. The general assessment of financial state support to traditional religious communities is ambivalent, since, on the one hand, it has a limited pluralistic design, corresponds to historical and current facts within the country, and also allows the preservation of cultural heritage, which in fact is also national historical heritage (often open to the public). On the other hand, minor religious groups – even those that are long-established in Albania and may therefore also be considered as traditional[45] – presently have no prospect of an agreement at that level or accompanying state support.

This point is connected to the second problem, which focuses on unequal state treatment among the five organizations that have signed agreements. Here, the Evangelical Brotherhood is recessed because it receives no state funding in practice. The community feels that this situation should change, and therefore works, according to its own statement (Komitetit Shtetëror për Kultet 2015), towards achieving equal financial support from state authorities. Furthermore, despite state concessions, the Brotherhood still reports problems in securing property rights for places of religious worship (U.S. Dept. of State 2018,

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[44] "According to representatives of the Catholic, Sunni Muslim, Orthodox, and Bektashi communities, the total government financial support for these four groups remained at 109 million lek ($850,000), the same as in 2015, with the Muslim community receiving a 28 percent share and the remaining three each receiving a 24 percent share." (U.S. Dept. of State 2018, 4).
[45] See, for example, the United Methodist Church in Albania, which has been active in the country since the 19th century through missionaries who were instrumental in integrating the Albanian dialects into a single alphabet, and who initiated the first girls' school at that time (World Methodist Council 2018).

5)[46]. A second indicator of hierarchization within the group of five acknowledged communities can be found in the reactions of the Autocephalous Orthodox Church of Albania to the most recent census results of 2011 (see Table 2). The Church claims serious shortcoming in the survey methodology and consequently disputes the results (The Orthodox Autocephalous Church of Albania 2012); similar concerns were raised by the Bektashi community and the Catholic Church. Accordingly, within that group, the Muslim Community of Albania has the closest political bonds, which means a higher level of state support as well as state control.

The third problem in the field of religious freedom is the restitution to religious communities of property that was nationalized during the communist era, which also greatly affects the Muslim community. In general, the state's response is characterized by inaccurate legislation, purposeful political slowdown, and slow legal implementation, combined with poor staffing and material equipment of the responsible authorities (Tg 2012). First of all, in the course of democratization and the introduction of the market economy, the government adopted a law on the restructuring of farms on October 17, 1992 (Këshillit i Ministrave 1992), which provided for compensation before return, the formation of new farms based on the old units of cooperatives (Art. 2), and established a central restructuring agency for privatization ('*Agjencia qendrore e ristrukturimit*'). On July 13, 1994, the national assembly set up a real estate registration office ('*Zyra e Regjistrimit të Pasurive të Paluajtshme*' - ZRPP) (Kuvendi Popullor 1994) to increase organizational efficiency.

However, all institutions worked with significant delays; approximately 25 years later, many cases are still unresolved and uncertainty increases among the non-state actors involved. Due to the slowdown and unclear legal situation, private individuals and (religious) organizations often took legal action to settle property issues

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[46] "VUSH members said they continued to rent existing buildings to use as places of worship, and reported continued difficulties in acquiring land on which to construct their own buildings, due to local government tax assessments and regulations. They stated these difficulties impeded their ability to hold religious services and to run youth and social activities." (U.S. Dept. of State 2018, 5).

concerning ownership of land and real estate[47]. In some cases, religious communities were involved; here, three cases can be proved at the higher legal level. Firstly, the Constitutional Court ('*Gjykata Kushtetuese*') ruled in two legal disputes (Gjykata Kushtetuese March 7, 2002; Gjykata Kushtetuese January 25, 2010) between private individuals and religious communities (here, the Muslim Community and the Orthodox Church), thereby clarifying property claims on land in the capital Tirana. Assessed from an outside perspective, the two decisions were based on the facts and the affected religious communities as actors were not better or worse off than the private individuals on the other side. Secondly, the decision of the Supreme Court ('*Gjykata e Lartë*' March 30, 2005) dealt with a lawsuit filed by three individuals against the Catholic Church, concerning a property in Tirana; the claim was ultimately dismissed due to acknowledged historic property rights of the church. Given the complexity of the restitution question, it can be assumed that many proceedings were filed at a lower legal level (Jazexhi 2012, 13).

The protracted legal process, as well as non-transparent mechanisms applied in the decision-making process of re-privatizing previously nationalized property, led domestic and foreign actors to publicly demand improvement of the situation (Venice Commission 2016, 19). Thus, in the wake of new, extensive legislation on privatization, which was prepared with advice of foreign actors and implemented in May 2015[48], an Agency for the Treatment of Real Estate ('*Agjencia e Trajtimit të Pronave*' - ATP) was founded, which began its work in 2016. That reform also removed bureaucratic and legal barriers that prevented the return of confiscated property, with the most prominent measure being the requirement that religious communities should provide full evidence of original ownership of the property in question[49]. According to foreign observers, there are notable positive developments concerning the restitution of places of worship, with quicker conclusion of land restitution and legalization of mosques in recent years (6 mosques in 2015; 137 in 2016) (U.S. Dept. of State 2017, 4). In order to gain a positive evaluation in the mentioned legalization

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[47] See also the files for Albania at the European Court of Human Rights, most of which deal with the two topics of the right to a fair trial and ownership of real estate (https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng, accessed May 5, 2018).

[48] Kuvendi i Shqipërisë. Ligj 133/2015, Për trajtimin e pronës dhe përfundimin e procesit të kompensimit të pronave. 05.12.2015. Fletorja Zyrtare, 2015 (255): 18035-18047.

[49] For further details on the restitution procedure and the role of the ATP, see Hoti 2016.

process, the government demanded confirmation of KMSh-membership from the specific mosque community, which indicates consequences for equal treatment of religions and for religious freedom in Albania. The Autocephalous Orthodox Church of Albania also notes improved willingness by the state to cooperate in the process of restitution of land and places of worship since 2016 (Mlloja 2018). However, in other areas of restitution, disputes with the state could not be solved (see historical writings, archives claimed by the Orthodox and Catholic Churches) (U.S. Dept. of State 2008, 3).

Overall, all four major religious communities in Albania have substantial claims in the area of restitution that, so far, have only partially been dealt with by the state. The vast majority of cases remain in an undefined state to date (U.S. Dept. of State 2018, 5). Future developments in this area will continue to be one of the most important issues in the relationship between politics and religion (religious communities) in Albania, a situation that also affects the relationship of Islam and religious freedom in the country.

The fourth issue is the close bond between certain political factions and religion in Albania. Due to the bipartisan political dominance of 'post-communists' and 'democrats' during the transition period, there was a high degree of substantive and personal ties between the first major oppositional party PD and the Muslim Community in Albania (KMSh). During the demise of the Communist Party in 1990/1991, religious dignitaries participated in demonstrations and openly called upon their communities to support the PD party (Elbasani 2016, 259/260). During the immediate transition until 1992, this political situation had a positive effect on religious life, as it enabled the flourishing of Islam and religion in general in Albania. With the close attachment of the KMSh to the state (institutional, support) and to the PD party, there was also greater expectation that its dignitaries would preach a "politically correct Islam" (ibid., 257), especially after the changes in government in 1992 and 2001. As a result, cultural–religious organizations such as 'Kultura Islame' (Islamic Culture)[50] evolved after the collapse of communism, which were founded by political actors of

[50] Today, a journal named 'Kultura Islame' exists in Albania, but no cultural organization of that name can be found.

the PD, with individuals in leading positions who had a biographical background in state security services (ibid., 260). This created a form of "*government sponsored religion*" (ibid., 262), which was also closely linked to the Albanian nation concept (Rama 2018). According to observers, however, recent attempts at political mobilization in the religious sphere have not found fertile ground (Misha 2012, 31)[51]. This is also evident in the case of the Christian-Orthodox supreme dignitary in Albania, Anastasios, who has been repeatedly criticized by political actors for his Greek nationality (U.S. Dept. of State 2018, 6). He submitted an application for Albanian citizenship in 2003, which was approved in late 2017 after more than 14 years of examination by state institutions (The Orthodox Autocephalous Church of Albania 2017).

However, when assessed from an ideal-type perspective, a certain degree of politicization of the religious sector is evident at this point with regard to the major religious organization, KMSh, considering the content of its 2009 agreement with the state, and that a certain continuity of personal entanglement of state and religious institutions still persists (ibid.).

An additional factor in the politicization of religion should also be addressed here: that of an integrative political instrumentalization. Albania's religious harmony is often emphasized by political actors, and presented within and outside the country as a defining feature of society (U.S. Dept. of State 2017, 7). Conversely, anti-religious sentiments articulated by political actors are also reported from Albania, mostly containing elements of biased atheism that openly opposes traditional religious communities (Elbasani 2016, 264).

The fifth issue has a more socio-economic character. Albania's widespread poverty also affected public and non-governmental organizations, which opened up to the outside world in search of funding after 1991. Similarly, religious communities, also cooperated with various foreign (and partly denominationally oriented) partners. Thus, the Catholic Church received funds for its own reconstruction

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[51] "The pledge to build or return property was used by politicians on both sides, but these efforts have remained limited, although recent attempts have been made to create parties with clear religious beliefs aimed at mobilizing voters for themselves."

and aid projects in Albania almost exclusively through its own international networks; the Autocephalous Orthodox Church of Albania raised funds throughout Europe for similar purposes[52]; and the Bektashi community received aid from diaspora communities such as that in North America. Albania's Muslim community attracted the attention of Arab states of the Middle East (e.g. Kuwait, Qatar, United Arab Emirates), which donated to Albania in the 1990s and facilitated the education of Albanian Muslim dignitaries in their countries. Since the 1990s, a flourishing of Islam in Albania can be observed, with the majority of new mosques[53] built with the support of foreign donors (ibid., 261)[54].

Albania's rigid communist system until 1990 left the KMSh with very meagre human resources and needing a new generation of religious Islamic dignitaries. Albania's lack of domestic structures meant that these individuals were educated in the mentioned donor states, which often represented a different tradition of (state) Islam than the Albanian form. This led to organizational and content-related theological disagreements between these new Muslim dignitaries and their counterparts from the older Albanian Islamic tradition which emphasized patriotism and religious tolerance. Subsequently, following the riots and political changes of 1997/1998, the KMSh was reorganized and reoriented towards a national concept that distanced itself somewhat from Arab influence, but was also considered to be more heavily controlled by the state (ibid., 263). The change in KMSh's political stance also brought new leadership to the organization in 2004: Senior positions were filled, with an emphasis on educated dignitaries making a "national commitment" (ibid., 264/265). As a result, three groups have emerged within the organization (national traditionalists, and Turkish- and Arab-educated), although everyday necessities and common interests mean that their borders are currently rather blurred and not hardened. On the other hand, Turkish funding also increased

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[52] According to the Archbishop of the Autocephalous Orthodox Church of Albania, Anastasios, in an interview with the author (March 31, 2017).

[53] Despite the efforts of local communities to preserve their old places of worship and the latest efforts of the state to restore mosques as cultural heritage.

[54] Elbasani reports that between 1992 and 1998, 500 new mosques were built in Albania by these donors. The numbers seem high, since Jazexhi (2012, 5) states 535 mosques for the KMSh for 2011 based on government resources.

in recent years, as the new Great Mosque of Prayer ('*Xhamia e Namazgjasë*') of the KMSh in Tirana, in the immediate vicinity of the National Assembly of Albania, is currently being constructed with Turkish financial support and advice[55]. Furthermore, the government initiated a protocol between the KMSh and the Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA), signed on February 16, 2010, which regulates that the latter "*(...) will finance the restoration of historical mosques.*" (Jazexhi 2012, 5).

The processes within the KMSh also point to developments in Albanian Islam outside the organization. Since 1990, other Muslim religious communities have emerged, which somehow challenged the position of the KMSh (ibid., 4/5)[56], but which to date have not gained access to state aid. In a few cases, they felt empowered to take legal action against this perceived unequal treatment, but such attempts have so far failed (Elbasani 2016, 266).

The last two issues concerning Muslims and religious freedom in Albania are of comparatively minor importance and related to the criminal field. Firstly, forms of violent Islamism have spread in Albania in recent years, which can constitute a de facto threat to other religious dignitaries. Thus, there were reports between 1998 and 2004 of Islamist attacks on representatives of traditional Albanian Islam (ibid., 264). As a result, the state reacted harshly, arresting some Muslim preachers on dubious charges (Kalaja 2010). The last issue discussed here is the vandalism that affects all religious communities on a regular basis, as the Bektashi Order complained in 2002 and the Autocephalous Orthodox Church in 2004 (U.S. Dept. of State 2006, 5). Both issues are located on an individual rather than organizational level, and do not restrict religious freedom in general.

Conclusion

The article described the history of religious freedom and the evolving relationships between politics and various religions in the predominantly Muslim society of Albania during the last 100 years. In summary: Political entanglement, control, and suppression of religion prevailed before 1990, but since then the traditional harmony between

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[55] According to a senior official of KMSh, in an interview with the author (March 29, 2017).
[56] Individual worshippers outside the KMSh also faced state persecution, see Kalaja 2010.

the religious communities themselves has been maintained as a national characteristic. The previous chapter focussed on current forms of tension between law, politics, and the freedoms of religious organizations in Albania. Although five traditional religious communities are favoured by the state in various dimensions, the religiously open social context with its large atheistic and overarching components generally enables religious freedom in Albania on a comprehensive level, from both the individual and organizational perspectives. Nevertheless, comprehensive legal guarantees (as determined in the constitution or in international agreements) are idealized frameworks, which in practice can only be partly fulfilled when confronted with the low level of societal development in Albania, characterized by difficult economic conditions on the side of the state, civil organizations, and the vast majority of the population (European Commission 2018, 27).

Some of the aforementioned aspects remain for discussion. The first and currently most significant issue concerns the restitution of property nationalized after 1944. The first laws to address this were implemented during an early phase of transition in 1990/1992; ever since, the establishment of corresponding state institutions (see ATP, ZRPP) has remained incomplete, such that delays in the final settlement of this question can still be expected. In practice, the state is currently unable to allocate sufficient financial resources to adequately compensate the affected religious communities – in effect, all parts of society are affected by that issue.

The second issue concerns the definition of equal treatment of religious communities: Significant financial and reputational differences are evident, between groups that signed agreements with the state and those did not. On the other hand, all five favoured communities fulfil an integrating function for Albanian society that should not be underestimated; nevertheless, the issue is certain to lead to future debates in Albania.

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Kuvendi i Shqipërisë. Ligj 10394, Marrëveshja ndërmjet Këshillit të Ministrave të Republikës së Shqipërisë dhe bashkësisë fetare "Vëllazëria Ungjillore e Shqipërisë" për rregullimin e marrëdhënieve të ndërsjella, Tirana: 10.03.2011. In: *Fletorja Zyrtare* 2011 (34): 1191-1198.

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L'Architecte de la plus grande mosquée de Roumanie: Victor G. Ştephănescu

Mihai Sorin Rădulescu[*]

Abstract:

The biggest and most representative mosque in Romania has been for over a century the "Carol I" Mosque of Constanţa (Küstendge/Köstence), built in 1910 after the project of the architect Victor G. Ştephănescu (1876 – 1950), of Bucharest. Son of composer George Ştephănescu (1843 – 1925), founder of the Romanian National Opera, and of his first wife, Caliopi Petrescu, sister of the father of the diplomat Nicolae Petrescu – Comnen, Victor G.Ştephănescu was one of Romania's most prolific architects before the First World War and during the Interwar Period. He was a member of the second generation of architects – after that of great architect Ion Mincu - of the "Neo-Romanian" current, a sort of Revival style of the medieval architecture of the Danubian Principalities.

Among the numerous buildings he planned in Bucharest and in other towns of the kingdom of Romania, there should be mentioned some buildings in the Carol Park in Bucharest (1906), the Geological Institute also in the capital city, the Coronation Cathedral in Alba Iulia, the Anglican Church in Bucharest and many others. The "Carol I" Mosque in Constanţa, situated in the center of the town, the capital of the Dobrudja, is a genuine architectural accomplishment and a proof of Romania's openness, at that time, to all religions and ethnical groups.

Key Words: Romanian composer George Ştephănescu, diplomat Nicolae Petrescu – Comnen, Romanian National Opera, „Carol I" Mosque in Constanţa (Küstendge, Romania), „Neo-Romanian" style, Carol park in Bucharest, Cathedral of the Coronation in Alba Iulia (Romania), Geological Institute in Bucharest

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Bien que la Roumanie soit un pays de tradition chrétienne – orthodoxe, elle compte quelques monuments musulmans remarquables [Figure no.1]. Ces bâtiments religieux se trouvent dans la Dobroudja, partie de l'actuelle Roumanie qui a appartenu dès le XVe siècle et jusqu'en 1878 à l'Empire ottoman. Les mosquées médiévales de cette région – celles de Constantza (Küstendge) et de Mangalia – sont encore debout et rapellent ce qu'a été l'atmosphère authentiquement pluriculturelle de cette province qui se trouvai au nord de la Turquie moyenâgeuse. Le rattachement de la Dobroudja à la Roumanie – consacré par le Traité de Paix de Berlin – a changé les données de la situation dans cette région où coexistaient Turcs, Tartars, Roumains, Bulgares, Roms, Arméniens, Juifs, Grecs et encore d'autres ethnies, dans un esprit de tolérance réciproque.

La Dobroudja a été soumise à un processus de roumanisation, comme toutes les autres provinces qui ont été rattachées au Royaume de Roumanie. Mais le nombre élevé de Musulmans dans cette région située entre le Danube et la Mer Noire, ainsi que les relations avec l'ancien pouvoir suzerain, l'Empire ottoman, ont favorisé le respect des autorités roumaines et de la population envers les traces du passé ottoman et de sa culture. Il s'agissait également d'une fascination de beaucoup d'intellectuels roumains – architectes, peintres, écrivains – pour cet héritage oriental qui enrichissait la Roumanie moderne et lui donnait une touche de couleur de plus.

C'est dans ce contexte, celui du règne de Charles Ier (1866 – 1914), le premier roi de Roumanie, qu'il faudrait situer la construction de la grande mosquée de Constantza (Küstendge) – qui porte d'ailleurs le nom du roi mentionné [Figure no.2]. Bâtie effectivement par l'ingénieur Gogu Constantinescu – un grand inventeur dont le souvenir est notamment gardé à Londres -, le projet architectural a été conçu par l'un des architectes les plus prolifiques de son époque, Victor G. Ştephănescu (1876 – 1950).

Ce dernier a suivi les traces d'un autre grand architecte roumain de son époque, Petre Antonescu (1873 – 1965), professeur à la Faculté d'Architecture de Bucarest. Le style "néo-roumain" – fondé par le brillant architecte Ion Mincu (1852 [?] – 1912) – a connu plusieurs variantes: celles

des architectes Grigore Cerkez, Nicolae Ghika – Budeşti, Petre Antonescu, Cristofi Cerchez et d'autres encore.

Victor G. Ştephănescu [Figure no.3] était le fils du compositeur George Ştephănescu (1843 – 1925)[1] et de sa première épouse née Caliopi[2] Petrescu (+ 1878), soeur du professeur Mihail Petrescu, père du diplomate Nicolae Petrescu - Comnen[3]. Celui-là était, donc, cousin germain de l'architecte. Le grand-père du côté paternel de Victor G. Ştephănescu, Mihail Hagi Stephan (+ 1870)[4], a été l'un des grands commerçants de Bucarest, dans la première moitié du XIXe siècle. Son épouse – la grand-mère[5] était la fille de Ioniţă Creţescu (1781 – 1836)[6], dit

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[1] Viorel Cosma, *Muzicieni români. Compozitori şi muzicologi. Lexicon* [Musiciens roumains. Compositeurs et musicologues. Lexicon] (Bucarest, Editura Muzicală a Uniunii Compozitorilor, 1970), 406 – 408.

Carmen Antoaneta Stoianov, *George Ştephănescu* (Bucarest, Editura Muzicală, 1981).

Le peintre Gabriel Ştephănescu Arephy (1893 – 1975) a eu de son marriage avec Antoinette Ascher (descendante des von Filderman) un fils, Mihail (1923 - 2015), héraldiste et professeur d'histoire, auteur de quelques articles intéressants dans les domaines de la vexillologie et de l'héraldique. Membre fondateur de la Commission d'Héraldique, de Généalogie et de Sphragistique auprès de l'Institut d'Histoire "N. Iorga" de Bucarest, Mihail G. Ştephănescu a vécu toute sa vie à Bucarest, dans la même maison que son oncle, l'architecte Victor G. Ştephănescu, rue Dogarilor no. 9. J'ai eu l'honneur de compter parmi ses amis pendant beaucoup d'années.

Gabriel Ştephănescu Arephy et son fils Mihail sont enterrés dans la tombe familiale, au cimetière orthodoxe Bellu, de Bucarest, dans la figure nᵒ 1, la tombe nᵒ 9. C'est de là que proviennent leurs années de naissance et de décès.

C'est toujours sur la croix de cette tombe que l'on peut lire le nom de "Ecaterina Ascher 1872 – 1960", la belle-mère du peintre Arephy.

[2] Voir aussi Victoria Dragu Dimitriu, *Alte poveşti ale Doamnelor şi Domnilor din Bucureşti* [D'autres histoires des Dames et des Messieurs de Bucarest] (Bucarest, Editions Vremea, 2006), 519: un document d'identité de Victor G. Ştephănescu où est mentionnée sa mère "Caleopi".

Caliopi Ştephănescu née Petrescu (Comnen) est enterrée dans la tombe familiale qui se trouve au cimetière orthodoxe Bellu, de Bucarest. On peut lire sur la croix l'année de sa mort: 1878.

[3] Paul Cernovodeanu, l'arbre généalogique de la famille Cernovodeanu. La mère du diplomate Nicolae Petrescu – Comnen était née Felicia Cernovodeanu, soeur du colonel Pavel Cernovodeanu, grand-père des frères – historiens Cernovodeanu, de Bucarest.

Voir aussi Victoria Dragu Dimitriu, *Alte poveşti*, le chapitre *Cu Mihail Ştephănescu, prin Bucureştii familiei sale* [Avec Mihail Ştephănescu, dans la Bucarest de sa famille], 202.

[4] Mihail Hagi Stephan est lui-aussi enterré dans la tombe familiale dans le cimetière orthodoxe Bellu (figure nᵒ 1, la tombe nᵒ 9). L'année de son décès est inscrite sur la croix.

[5] Mihail G. Ştephănescu, „O familie de revoluţionari şi un pahar de frăţie" [Une famille de révolutionnaires et un verre de fraternité], *Studia et Acta Musei Nicolae Bălcescu* (Bălceşti – pe – Topolog, 1969): 185 – 191.

Maria Ştephănescu née Creţescu (+ 1889) est enterré au cimetière Bellu, dans la tombe familiale mentionnée. L'année de son décès est inscrit sur la croix.

[6] Ioniţă Creţescu a été réinhumé dans la tombe familiale du cimetière Bellu. Ses années de naissance et de mort y figurent (1781 – 1836). Sont-elles correctes ?

"Ortopan"[7], capitaine de "panduri" dans l'armée de Tudor Vladimirescu et administrateur de la terre de Glogova[8] (dans le district de Gorj), propriété du grand boyard Nicolae Glogoveanu. C'est à Glogova que Ioniță Crețescu a fait la connaissance du boyard révolutionnaire Tudor Vladimirescu, lui-aussi un homme de confiance de Nicolae Glogoveanu.

Ioniță Crețescu et son épouse née Ilinca Papazoglu ont également eu deux fils: Alexandru et George. Alexandru Crețescu (+ 1885)[9] a fait une carrière assez importante: membre du Conseil d'Etat fondé par le prince régnant Alexandru Ioan Cuza, élu député du district d'Olt en novembre 1866 et ensuite en mars 1869[10]; ministre des Cultes et président de section à la Cour de Cassation[11].

Au XVIe – XVIIe siècles il y eut dans la Petite Valachie une famille de boyards "de Crețești"[12], un village près de la ville de Craïova où sont d'ailleurs gardées encore de nos jours – dans le Musée d'Art – les fresques de la belle église de Crețești (démolie depuis). Les Ștephănescu prétendaient descendre de ces boyards de Crețești, ce dont témoigne l'ex-libris utilisé par l'héraldiste Mihail G. Ștephănescu[13]: un écu coupé, dans le quartier d'en haut une aigle bicéphale, et dans le quartier d'en bas cinq

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[7] I.Neacșu, „Listă cu numele pandurilor și căpeteniilor lor care au participat la răscoala sub conducerea lui Tudor Vladimirescu (componența lor socială, completată cu date biografice) și un extras statistic nominal cu componența socială a 116 căpetenii de panduri" [Une liste avec les noms des "pandours" et de leur capitaines qui ont participé au soulèvement populaire dirigée par Tudor Vladimirescu (leur composition sociale, complétée a vec des données biographiques) et un extrait statistique nominal avec la composition sociale de 116 capitaines de "pandours"], *Studii și Materiale de Istorie Modernă*, vol. I (Bucarest, 1957) 405 – 406.

[8] C. D. Aricescu, *Scrieri alese* [Ecrits choisis], édition parue par les soins de Dan Simonescu et Petre Costinescu, préface de Ștefan Cazimir (Bucarest, Editions Minerva, 1982), 376.

[9] Le nom "Crețescu" était souvent écrit "Cretzescu", à la suite de l'influence de la langue française. Alexandru Crețescu est enterré au cimetière orthodoxe Bellu, de Bucarest. L'année de sa mort – 1885 – est inscrite là-bas.

[10] Mihai Sorin Rădulescu, *Elita liberală românească 1866 – 1900* [L'élite libérale roumaine 1866 – 1900] (Bucarest, Editions All, 1998), 269.

[11] C.D. Aricescu, *Scrieri alese*, 376, note no.2. Sur les Crețescu, voir aussi Victoria Dragu Dimitriu, *Alte povești*, 195, 222.

[12] George D. Florescu, "Incepătorii neamului boierilor din Crețești (Dolj)" [Les fondateurs de la famille des boyards de Crețești (Dolj)], *Arhivele Olteniei*, XXII, nos. 125 – 130 (Craïova, janvier – décembre 1943): 28 – 49.

Marcel Romanescu, "Ceva despre Brădești" (Quelque chose sur les boyards Brădescu), *Arhivele Olteniei*, XXII, nos.125 – 130: 50 – 73.

George D. Florescu, "Ceva despre câteva neamuri boierești oltenești înrudite între ele din veacul al XVII-lea" [Quelque chose sur quelques familles de boyards d'Olténie du XVIIème siècle apparentées entre elles], *Arhiva Românească*, t.IX, IIe partie (Bucarest, 1944): 337 – 372 (sur les boyards de Crețești).

[13] L'héraldiste Mihail G. Ștephănescu (1923 – 2015) portait le même prénom que son oncle – l'un des frères de son père qui s'appelait aussi „Mihail" et qui est mort en 1917. Il a été enterré dans la tombe familiale. L'année de sa mort est inscrite sur la croix.

anneaux qui font allusion à l'appartenance à la franc-maçonnerie. L'aigle bicéphale fait référence à de possibles ancêtres byzantins, soit du côté Gavalla, soit du côté des vieux boyards de Creţeşti.

Les Creţescu modernes et les Ştephănescu, leurs descendants, ont été en effet liés à la francmaçonnerie française[14]. Feu Mihail G. Ştephănescu m'a confié depuis longtemps le secret de son appartenance dès sa jeunesse à cette société secrète[15] qui a cessé d'exister en Roumanie pendant le régime totalitaire. Dans sa maison qui se trouve au n° 9 de la rue Dogarilor – où j'ai pu maintes fois admirer sa merveilleuse collection d'objets d'art – il m'a montré quelques objets maçonniques. De même, il a attiré mon attention sur le pavement en carreaux noir et blanc, à l'intérieur de la pièce – maîtresse de la maison.

George Ştephănescu a été intéressé par l'occultisme tout en faisant partie du cercle spiritiste autour de Bogdan Petriceicu Hasdeu[16].

Le musicien George Ştephănescu dont le nom est lié à la fondation – en 1885 – de l'Opéra national roumain et, dans l'histoire de la musique roumaine, à la composition de la première symphonie, s'est remarié en secondes noces à l'artiste Alexandrina Gavalla[17], issue – d'après son petit-fils, l'héraldiste Mihail G. Ştephănescu[18] - d'une vieille famille hellénique. De ce second lit sont issus nombre d'enfants, dont Vincenţa (1882 – 1976)[19], mariée à l'officier supérieur Geanolu[20] et Gabriel (1903 –

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[14] Horia Nestorescu – Bălceşti, *Enciclopedia ilustrată a francmasoneriei din România* [Encyclopédie illustré de la francmaçonnerie de Roumanie], vol.3 (Bucarest, Editions Phoebus, 2005) 314 – 315 (sur l'appartenance à la francmaçonnerie du peintre Gabriel Ştephănescu Arephy (1903 – 1975)). Les frères Alexandru et George Creţescu, ainsi que leur neveu, l'architecte Victor G. Ştephănescu, n'y figurent pas.

[15] Voir également Horia Nestorescu – Bălceşti, *Enciclopedia ilustrată,* vol.3, 312.

[16] B. P. Hasdeu, *Arhiva spiritistă* [Les archives spiritistes], vol. I (1889 – 26 février 1893), transcription, traduction des textes et notes par Jenica Tabacu (Bucarest, Editions Vestala, 2002) 412 – 413 et d'autres.

[17] Dr. Victor Gomoiu, avec la collaboration de Maria V. Gomoiu et Gh.Gomoiu, *Repertor de medici şi farmacişti* [Répertoire de médecins et pharmaciens] (Brăïla, 1938): le docteur Nicolae Gavalla est attesté de manière documentaire à Bucarest en 1813 et ensuite en 1815, en tant que médecin-en-chef – non pas rémunéré - du district de Teleorman. Il a épousé la fille de I. Razu. Le docteur Nicolae Gavalla (ou Găvan) était très probablement l'ascendant d'Alexandrina Gavalla, épouse Ştephănescu.

[18] Victoria Dragu Dimitriu, *Alte poveşti,* 225.

[19] Vincenţa Stephanescu est enterrée toujours au cimetière orthodoxe Bellu, de Bucarest, dans la tombe familiale (dans la figure n° 1, la tombe n° 9). Les années de sa naissance et de son décès figurent sur la croix.

[20] Mihai Sorin Rădulescu, "Geanolu de Târgovişte" [titre donné par la rédaction du journal; titre donné par moi: "Sur la famille Geanolu"], dans *Ziarul de Duminică,* no. 46 (328) (Bucarest, 24 novembre 2006): 4; supplément culturel de *Ziarul Financiar,* VIIIe année, no. 2020 (Bucarest, 24 novembre 2006).

1975)[21], peintre, qui a utilisé le pseudonyme Arephy – d'après le nom du village valaque d'Arefu, non loin de la citadelle voïévodale de Poienari, dans le district d'Argeş - où se trouvait la maison de campagne de son père[22]. Non loin d'Arefu s'élève la citadelle voïévodale de Poienari, aux pieds des Montagnes de Făgăraş.

Un autre fils de celui-ci a fait une carrière d'acteur à Paris, sous le nom de "Hagi-Stephan"[23].

L'atmosphère de la famille Ştephănescu était donc très artistique, avec un penchant aristocratique qui apparaît dans les mariages conclus par la plupart de ses membres[24]. Par contre, l'architecte Victor G. Ştephănescu[25] est resté célibataire.

Victor G. Ştephănescu (1876 – 1950)[26] a été élève de la fameuse Ecole des Beaux-Arts de Paris, là où ont étudié la plupart des grands architectes roumains. Son année de promotion fut 1901[27].

Pendant la Première Guerre Mondiale il fut le traducteur du Général Berthelot[28] [Figure no.4] ce qui explique en partie peut-être pourquoi on lui a confié le projet de la cathédrale orthodoxe d'Alba Iulia.

Vincenţia Ştephănescu et son époux, l'officier Geanolu ont eu un fils, Dumitru Vincent Geanolu, qui a habité Paris où j'ai fait sa connaissance en 1992. Du côté de son père, il était apparenté par alliance au grand historien roumain Nicolae Bălcescu. Voir Paul Cernovodeanu, „Documente privitoare la înaintaşii lui Nicolae Bălcescu (I)" [Documents concernant les ancêtres de Nicolae Bălcescu (I)], *Caietele Bălcescu*, IX – X (1984): 123.

Sur Dumitru Vincent Geanolu, voir aussi Victoria Dragu Dimitriu, *Alte poveşti,* 226.

[21] Voir aussi Victoria Dragu Dimitriu, *Alte poveşti*, 198, 214 – 217.

[22] Devenue maison mémoriale, mais restée en propriété privée de la famille.

[23] Conférence sur l'actrice franco-roumaine *Génica Athanassiou* tenue au Musée National de la Littérature Roumaine, Bucarest, mars 2018.

[24] On rencontre des alliances matrimoniales avec les familles Geano(g)lu, Bădulescu, Zamfirescu (descendant du riche propriétaire de Brăila, Nedelcu Chercea et de la famille princière Racovitza) et d'autres.

Pour la généalogie de la dernière épouse de l'héraldiste Mihail G. Ştephănescu, voir Mihai Sorin Rădulescu, "Goleştii din Belgia. Contribuţii epistolare" [Les Golesco de Belgique. Des contributions épistolaires], *Bucureşti. Materiale de Istorie şi Muzeografie*, XXVII (Bucarest, 2013): 205 – 220.

[25] Sur Victor G. Ştephănescu, voir aussi Victoria Dragu Dimitriu, *Alte poveşti,* 200 – 208. Mihail G. Ştephănescu, "Un arhitect uitat" [Un architecte oublié], dans „Anticartmagazin"n° 18 (mai 2007), 15 – 20.

[26] Les années de sa naissance et de sa mort figurent sur la croix de la tombe familiale, au cimetière Bellu. Au-dessous de son nom sont écrites ses qualités professionnelles: architecte, inspecteur général au Chemins de Fer Roumains et membre de la Commission des Monuments Historiques.

[27] "Corpul Arhitecţilor din România. Buletinul Corpului" [Le Corps des Architectes de Roumanie. Le bulletin du Corps], V[e] année (Bucarest, 1937): 154.

Victor G. Ştephănescu était membre du Corps des Architectes de Roumanie. Le numéro et la date de sa Légitimation de libre pratique: 413 – le 26 juillet 1934. Il habitait rue Dogarilor, no.9 ("Corpul Arhitecţilor din România. Buletinul Corpului", V[e] année: 154).

[28] Victoria Dragu Dimitriu, *Alte poveşti*, 200.

En ce qui concerne les adresses de Victor G. Ştephănescu, en 1934 il habitait au nº 10 de la rue Marin Serghiescu[29], à Bucarest. Puis en 1936, au nº 9 de la rue Dogarilor[30], toujours dans la capitale.

Victor G. Ştephănescu a eu un haut grade dans la hiérarchie de son métier: il est devenu architecte - inspecteur général Iʳᵉ classe[31]. Le 10 mai 1926 il est entré à la Régie autonome des Chemins de Fer[32] où il a travaillé plusieurs années. C'est dans ce contexte professionnel qu'il a substantiellement contribué à l'extension de la Gare du Nord de Bucarest [Figure no.5].

L'architecte est décédé en 1950. Il a été incinéré et ensuite sa cendre a été déposée dans le tombeau de la famille qui se trouve dans le cimetière orthodoxe Bellu, à Bucarest (dans la figure no.1, la tombe no.9)[33].

Les réalisations de Victor G. Ştephănescu sont particulièrement nombreuses[34]. Jusqu'à présent, il n'a pas encore fait l'objet d'une étude approfondie. La cause en est le développement plutôt précaire de l'historiographie de l'architecture roumaine, ainsi que la vision plutôt négative portée sur les représentants du style "néo-roumain"[35]. Il faudra

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[29] "Corpul Arhitecţilor din România. Buletinul Corpului", IIᵉ année (1934): 83. En 1935, son adresse était la même; voir "Corpul Arhitecţilor din România. Buletinul Corpului", IIIᵉ année (1935): 113. Le nom de cette rue est resté le même de nos jours.

[30] "Corpul Arhitecţilor din România. Buletinul Corpului", IVᵉ année (1936): 132.
Sur la maison de famille rue Dogarilor no.9, voir aussi Victoria Dragu Dimitriu, *Alte poveşti,* 229 – 230.

[31] "Corpul Arhitecţilor din România. Buletinul Corpului", IIᵉ année (1934), "Tablou de arhitecţii funcţionari din serviciile statului, judeţelor şi comunelor, încadraţi în Corpul Arhitecţilor din serviciile publice..." [Le tableau des architectes employés des services de l'Etat, des districts et des communes, engagés dans le Corps des Architectes des services publics…]: 109.

[32] Voir "Corpul Arhitecţilor din România. Buletinul Corpului", IIᵉ année. De nos jours, l'appartement de Victor G. Ştephănescu rue Dogarilor no.9, a été hérité par son arrière-nièce Mme Ilinca Ştephănescu, fille unique de feu Mihail G. Ştephănescu.

[33] G. Bezviconi, *Necropola capitalei* [La necropole de la capitale], éditeur: Iurie Colesnic (Chişinău, Editions Museum, 1997) 208.

[34] Paul Constantin, *Dicţionar universal al arhitecţilor* [Dictionnaire universel des architectes] (Bucarest, Editura Ştiinţifică şi Enciclopedică, 1986) 311.
Voir aussi Gabriela Tabacu, *Revista „Arhitectura". Studiu monografic şi indici 1906 – 1944* [La revue "Arhitectura". Etude monographique et index 1906 – 1944], IIᵉ édition révisée et complete (Bucarest, Editions Humanitas, 2008) 443.

[35] Sur le style "néo-roumain", voir *Gândirea estetică în arhitectura românească. A doua jumătate a secolului XIX şi prima jumătate a secolului XX* [La pensée esthétique dans l'architecture roumaine. La seconde moitié du XIXᵉ siècle et la première moitié du XXᵉ], étude introductive et coordination générale par le Dr architecte Gheorghe Săsărman; Anthologie et notes par les architectes Nicolae Lascu et Alexandrina Deac; Notes bibliographiques par l'architecte Nicolae Lascu (Bucarest, Editions Meridiane, 1983), 38 – 42.
Une vision plutôt critique sur le style "néo-roumain", chez G. M. Cantacuzino, "Despre stilul românesc" [Sur le style roumain], *Simetria*, V (Bucarest, automne 1943): 181 – 182.

pourtant dépasser tôt ou tard les clichés et les préjugés concernant ce courant architectural très riche en accomplissements. Même si l'architecture de Victor G. Ştephănescu – à l'exception notable de la grande mosquée de Constantza – pourrait souvent paraître grandiloquente et désuète -, elle se caractérise par une variété remarquable, par une solidité et un équilibre que les architectes de la Roumanie d'aujourd'hui pourraient très certainement envier. Cette architecture me semble très significative de l'essor économique, politique et culturel du royaume roumain, du désir de durabilité et de représentation du jeune Etat national avant la Première Guerre Mondiale et pendant l'entre-deux-guerres.

La grande exposition de 1906, commémorant les 40 années de règne du roi Charles Ier a été aménagée dans le parc de Bucarest baptisé d'après son nom, pendant le gouvernement dirigé par le *leader* conservateur Gheorghe Grigore Cantacuzino (1837 – 1913), alors que le maire de la Capitale était le docteur Constantin I. Istrati. C'est lors de cette exposition remarquable qu'a été confié à Victor G. Ştephănescu le projet de plusieurs bâtiments, dont le Palais des Arts, devenu ensuite le Musée Militaire, malheureusement démoli. Il se trouvait à l'endroit - même du grand monument funéraire érigé pendant le régime communiste pour les membres de la nomenklature. Le lieu a gardé une importance toute particulière en tant que la Tombe du Soldat Inconnu (devant l'ancien monument funéraire communiste).

En 1906 également, Victor G. Ştephănescu conçut le bâtiment qui abrita, dès sa fondation, l'Institut Géologique, au début de la Chaussée Kisseleff. L'exploration des ressources minières du jeune royaume avait besoin d'un bâtiment digne de ce nom et c'est justement dans un esprit imposant que Victor G. Ştephănescu élabora le projet de cet institut.

Les arches de sa façade rappellent très clairement l'architecture monastique du Moyen Âge roumain orthodoxe.

L'architecte a d'ailleurs fait grand usage dans beaucoup de ses bâtiments des arches sémicirculaires, de vieille tradition romaine et byzantine que le grand architecte Petre Antonescu chérissait lui – même aussi. Le complexe de la cathédrale orthodoxe d'Alba Iulia en est, par exemple, orné presqu'à l'excès de ces arches.

Coincidence ou nou, l'architecte de la mosquée "Charles Ier" de Constantza et l'ingénieur qui l'a construite, avaient tous les deux une connexion via l'Opéra de Bucarest: Victor G. Ştephănescu, en tant que fils de George Ştephănescu, et Gogu Constantinescu dont l'épouse née Cocorăscu, était la petite-fille de Scarlat Cocorăscu, issu d'une vieille

famille de boyards de la Valachie[36]. Scarlat Cocorăscu (ou Cocorescu) a été longtemps directeur de l'Opéra de Bucarest qui à son époque se trouvait dans une ancienne demeure de la famille Ghika, tout près du parc Cişmigiu. Et en plus, les Cocorăscu revendiquaient eux-aussi – à juste titre – une vieille ascendance princière valaque, plus exactement un lien de parenté étroit avec les Bassaraba (comme les anciens Creţescu également).

La mosquée "Charles Ier" de Constantza[37] est considérée comme le premier bâtiment de Roumanie en béton armé[38]. S'il fallait choisir un "*Wahrzeichen*" de la capitale de la Dobroudja, on pourrait certainement s'arrêter sur ce monument historique et d'art de grande valeur. C'est dommage que les vastes démolitions enterprises dans le centre de la ville de Constantza ont substantiellement affecté le contexte architectural dans lequel la mosquée a été érigé.

L'ancien Hôtel de Ville de Constantza [Figure no.6], Place Ovide – qui abrite de nos jours le Musée d'Histoire nationale et d'Archéologie – a également été conçu par Victor G. Ştephănescu. Situé dans la zone la plus historique de Constantza (la Péninsule), tout près de la mosquée "Charles Ier", ce bâtiment représente le coeur – même de l'ancien Hôtel de Ville représente le coeur – même de la ville, avec un style qui incarne l'idée de la Dobroudja en tant que province du royaume roumain. L'édifice romain avec mosaïque se trouve à quelques mètres distance. Le style de l'ancien Hôtel de Ville incarne l'idée de la Dobroudja en tant que province du royaume roumain.

L'architecte Victor G. Ştephănescu s'est avéré fort inspiré tant dans le projet de la grande mosquée qu'en concevant le symbole mentionné plus haut du pouvoir roumain instauré en 1878. Il est possible que ce soit en grande mesure l'enseignement de l'Ecole des Beaux – Arts de Paris, qui soit à l'origine de ces variations de style et de fonction.

Cette grande adaptabilité lui a également permis de concevoir l'Eglise anglicane de Bucarest. En briques rouges et tout-à-fait dans le style Tudor, cette église – située non loin du siège de la Légation britannique, rue Jules Michelet – évoque vraiment un quartier de Londres.

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[36] Voir l'arbre généalogique de la famille Cocorăscu par feu le généalogiste Alexandru V. Perietzianu – Buzău (1911 – 1995).

[37] Adrian Rădulescu, Stoica Lascu, Puiu Haşotti, *Ghid de oraş. Constanţa* [Guide de ville. Constantza], (Bucarest, Editions Sport – Turism, 1985), 73 – 74.
Minarete pe cerul Dobrogei. Geamii [Minarets sur le ciel de la Dobroudja. Mosquées] (Bucarest, Editions Igloo Media, 2012), 18 – 33.

[38] Sur cette manière de bâtir, voir Mihail Hangan, "Betonul armat în construcţia nouă" [Le béton armé dans le bâtiment nouveau], *Simetria*, IV (Bucarest, hiver 1941 – 1942): 49 – 51.

A Mamaïa, localité avoisinnée à Constantza, on doit à Victor G. Ştephănescu le Casino[39] qui se trouve au centre de la station, et la villa royale qui existe encore de nos jours – transformée en restaurant[40]. Comme récompense pour ces bâtiments très représentatifs du littoral roumain, Victor G. Ştephănescu a reçu en tant qu'honoraire un appartement de plaisance situé non loin du Casino. Après le changement de régime de Décembre 1989, son neveu, l'héraldiste Mihail G. Ştephănescu [Figure no.7], a réussi à récupérer cet appartement de Mamaïa.

La Bibliothèque municipale "Mihail Sadoveanu" de Bucarest, rue Take Ionescu, qui se trouve dans un ancien hôtel particulier – qui a appartenu à une certaine famille Lăzărescu – a également été conçue par Victor G.Ştephănescu. Les bâtiments de Mamaïa, ainsi que l'hôtel Lăzărescu ou la Centrale téléphonique du boulevard Dacia, ne sont plus érigés en style "néo-roumain". C'est désormais le style Art Déco – très en vogue à Bucarest dans les années '30 – qui caractérise ces constructions (et parfois même le style Art Nouveau qui a eu une longue vie en Roumanie).

La mosquée "Charles Ier" de Constantza reste un monument sans concurrence en Roumanie. Inspirée de l'architecture religieuse des rives du Bosphore, elle est encore de nos jours en très bon état. Ses dimensions monumentales ne sont pas en dissonance avec les maisons qui l'entourent. Située en plein centre – ville, elle est parfaitement intégrée dans le paysage urbain.

Au point de vue stylistique, elle s'apparente au grand casino de Constantza, projet d'un autre architecte – Daniel Renard. Bâti presque pendant la même période de temps, le casino – actuellement dans un état effroyable – est aussi un bâtiment inspiré par l'architecture religieuse stambouliote du XIXe siècle, réinterprétée en style Art Nouveau.

La mosquée "Charles Ier" reste encore de nos jours le monument musulman le plus représentative sur le territoire de la Roumanie. On peut se demander si les influences architecturales de Victor G. Ştephănescu, si variées, n'ont pas eu un lien avec son appartenance – supposée, mais pas encore prouvée – à la francmaçonnerie [Figure no.8] dont les idées de tolérance et d'universalisme sont bien connues.[41]

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[39] Victoria Dragu Dimitriu, *Alte poveşti,* 205.

[40] Avant décembre 1989 il s'appelait le "Bar Orient" et était un lieu chic – sinon **le plus chic** - de Mamaïa.

[41] Remerciements: (l'idée d'écrire sur l'architecte Victor G. Ştephănescu est à moi). Messieurs le Professeur Mehmed Hacisalihoğlu et Dr Hakan Demir (Istanbul); Mme Béatrice Aguettant (Paris); feu l'historien Paul Cernovodeanu (Bucarest); feu l'héraldiste Mihail G. Ştephănescu (Bucarest); feu Dumitru Vincent Geanolu (Paris); l'architecte

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Antik Yunan'dan Avrupa Krizine Teorik Çözüm Önerisi: Castoriadis'in Gözünden Yunan Mirası

Deniz Ertuğ∗

Abstract:

Philosopher, theorician, economist and psychanalist Cornelius Castoriadis (1922, Istanbul – 1997, Paris), is one of the most distinctive figures in the 21th-century French philosophy. His main philosophical theory, the autonomy project (*Le project d'autonomie*) could be considered as a theory he specifically formulated as a solution for the contemporary European crisis. For Castoriadis this crisis is so profound that it is necessary to develop a brand-new theory so that all the foundations, values and notions upon which the European system is built should be interrogated and re-established. In this respect, his project highly inspired by the Ancient Greek heritage, made quite an impact in philosophical and political circles in his time. In this paper, several notions of this Greek heritage which Castoriadis considers as a germ, rather than a model to be mimicked entirely, will be elaborated. The most important question to be asked here is which of the ancient Greek concepts could be considered as valuable for present-day European society. In the first part, the main principles of Castoriadis' project of autonomy will be clarified, and the second part will be on the most significant ancient Greek concepts which could be revaluated and reformulated for today's crisis.

Keywords: autonomy project, Cornelius Castoriadis, Ancient Greece, democracy, *polis*

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Giriş

Cornelius Castoriadis lise yıllarında sosyalizme gönül vermiş ve Yunan Komünist Partisi içinde uzunca bir süre yer almıştır. Lev Troçki'nin siyasi görüşlerinden oldukça etkilenmiş; parti içindeki Stalinist baskıya karşı çıkmıştır. 1946'daki Alman işgali ve 1946-49 yılları arasında yaşanan iç savaş Yunan toplumunu tam bir kargaşa içinde bırakmıştır. Troçkistler arasında çok aktif olması nedeniyle Castoriadis, bu ortamda siyaseten bilinen bir figür haline gelmiştir. Ancak parti içindeki Stalin ve Sovyet yanlılarının hedefi olmaktan kaçamamış, kendisine düzenlenen üç suikasttan kurtulduktan sonra hayatını devam ettirebilmek için Paris'e gitmek zorunda kalmıştır[1].

Burada gerek akademide, gerekse dostu ve çalışma arkadaşı olan Claude Lefort'la birlikte yayınladığı *Socialisme ou Barbarie* dergisi çevresinde oluşan grupla birlikte sosyal bilimler alanındaki çalışmalarını sürdürmüştür[2]. Castoriadis'e göre bu dergi toplumsal hayatın içinde yaşayan, gerçek bir Marksizmi temsil edecektir[3].

Uzun yıllar Marx'ı ve Marksizmi inceledikten sonra gerek Marx'ın kendi teorisinin gerekse diğer Marksistlerin öne sürdükleri teorilerin kıyasıya bir eleştirisini yapmıştır. Söz konusu dönemde Fransız sosyalistleri arasında Sovyetler Birliği efsanesini yıkan kişilerden birisi olarak ön plana çıkmış, özellikle Lefort'la birlikte SSCB'ye yönelik yaptıkları eleştiriler büyük yankı uyandırmıştır. Troçki'ye göre, SSCB "dejenere olmuş bürokratik bir devlet"ti ama Ekim Devrimi sonucunda kurulduğu için öyle veya böyle savunulmalıydı. Oysa Castoriadis ve Lefort SSCB'nin sosyalist bir devlet olduğuna karşı çıkmışlardır. Castoriadis bu devleti yeni bir sistem olarak görmüş ve "bürokratik kapitalist" devlet olarak nitelendirmiştir[4]. Bu bağlamda, bu sisteminin sosyalizmle bir alakası yoktur ve kapitalizmin yarattığı tahribattan farklı bir sonuç yaratamaz[5].

Sovyet sisteminin ve Marksizmin yarattığı hayalkırıklığına rağmen, Castoriadis bir müddet daha sosyalizmi bir sistem olarak

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[1] François Dosse, *Castoriadis: Une Vie* (Paris: Éditions La Découverte, 2014), 12-34.

[2] age, 57.

[3] Philippe Gottraux, "Socialisme ou Barbarie: Une revue iconoclaste dans la France de l'après-guerre," *La revue des revues* 23 (1997): 1.

[4] Dosse, *Castoriadis: Une Vie*, 51-52.

[5] Cornelius Castoriadis, *Political and Social Writings, Vol. 1* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), 87.

kafasındaki özgür toplumla bağdaştırmayı sürdürmüştür. Fakat özellikle 1960'lı yıllardan itibaren sosyalist jargon ile felsefe yapmanın kendini sosyalistlerden ayırmasına ve kendine has bir düşünce yolu açmasına engel olduğunu farkettiğinden bu terminoloji ile yollarını tamamen ayırmıştır. Bunun sonucunda bu kopuşla birlikte "otonomi projesi" üzerine çalışmaya başlamıştır. Buna göre, artık Marksizm çağa hitap etmemektedir. İster Sovyet tipi olsun, ister başka nitelikte sosyalist bir devlet olsun bu ideolojiye dayanan her sistem totaliter ve bürokratik olacaktır ve kapitalizmin hastalıklarını benzer şekilde içerecektir. Bu sebeple daha devrimci, daha yeni ve entelektüel bir toplumsal projeye ihtiyaç vardır.

Bu noktada şu soru sorulabilir: Castoriadis niçin böyle bir projeye gereksinim duymuştur? Bunu kendisi *To Epanastatiko Problēma Sēmera* isimli eserinde açıklamıştır. Buna göre, Avrupa toplumu çok ciddi bir toplumsal, kültürel, ekonomik ve politik kriz içindedir. Bu kriz artık evrensel bir hal almıştır. Batı toplumunun temelini oluşturan tüm kurumlar ve değerler bozulmuştur. Bu, sistemin bozulması veya yanlış işlemesi ile ilgili değil, tamamen temel değer ve kurumların çürümesi sorunudur[6]. Bu krizden çıkış ancak devrimci bir proje ile mümkündür. Fakat bu proje daha önceden miras alınan fikirsel geleneği eleştirel süzgeçten geçirmeyen ve yapılanı tekrarlayan bir anlayışa sahip olmayacak, bütünüyle yenilikçi ve devrimci olacaktır. Castoriadis bu projesini *L'Institution Imaginaire de la Société* ve *Les Carrefours du Labyrinthe* isimli eserlerinde detaylı şekilde açıklamıştır[7].

Castoriadis'in Avrupa'daki krizin çözümüne dair geliştirdiği özgür bireyden başlayarak özgür topluma varan otonomi projesi bu çalışmanın çıkış noktasını oluşturmaktadır. Bu proje özü itibariyle Antik Yunan geleneğinden beslenir ve tarihte özgür bir devlet örneği çizen Yunan *polis*inin günümüz toplumları için bir ilham kaynağı olabileceği inancını temel alır. Bu yazıda otonomi projesinin ruhunu oluşturan Antik Yunan'a dair Castoriadis'in en önemli bulduğu kavramlar tanıtılacak ve açıklanacaktır. Şüphesiz bu kavramların açıklanmasına geçmeden evvel ana hatlarıyla otonomi projesine değinmek yerinde olacaktır.

1. Özgür Toplum Beklentisi

Antik Yunan'ın tarihi bir misyonu olduğunu düşünen Castoriadis bu yapının günümüz için birebir kopyalanacak bir model olmasından

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[6] Kornēlios Kastoriadēs, *To Epanastatiko Problēma Sēmera* (Athēna: Upsilon, 2000b), 86.

[7] Gabriel Gagnon, "À la Recherche de l'autonomie." *Sociologie et sociétés* 14:2 (1982): 113-114.

ziyade bir nüve olduğunu ve bir değerler bütününü ifade ettiğini özellikle vurgular. Daha bir başka bir ifadeyle, *polis* kendine has bir fikri ve felsefi bakış açısını simgelemektedir. Castoriadis'e göre, kapitalizmin yarattığı bu çok boyutlu krizle boğuşmakta olan Batı toplumuna yeni bir toplum yaratmak için ihtiyaç duyacağı kavramsal alt yapıyı sunacak olan Antik Yunan'ın kendine ve dünyaya bakış açısıdır. Yunan teorisyenin öne çıkardığı kavramlara geçmeden önce düşündüğü ideal toplumun nasıl bir toplum olduğuna bakmak yerinde olacaktır. Bunun için otonomi projesinin temel çelişkisini oluşturan otonomi ve heteronomi kavramlarına değinmek gerekmektedir.

a.   Otonomi-Heteronomi

Otonomi kişi veya toplumun özerk ve özgür olmasını ifade eder. Buna karşın heteronomi kişi veya toplumun devinimden uzak ve durağan, sahip olduğu kavram ve kurumlara bağımlı ve bağlı olmasıdır. Dolayısıyla siyasi, kültürel, ekonomik ve toplumsal kurumların, sembol ve düşüncelerin bütünüyle kendisinin bir ürünü olduğunun farkında olan ve bunları sürekli olarak değişen şartlarla eleştirmeye ve gerekliyse dönüştürmeye hazır olan toplumlar otonom toplumlardır. Heteronom toplumlar ise bu mantığın tam tersine hareket eden, zamanda akmayan ve değişen koşullara ayak uydurmak yerine geçmişe saplanıp kalan toplumlardır. Bununla birlikte, sahip oldukları kurumlara ve değerler sistemine kutsallık atfederek bunları değişmez kabul eder ve toplumsal ihtiyaçları göz önüne almaz.

Castoriadis'in siyasi teorisinin ana hedefi her bakımdan otonom bir topluma ulaşmaktır[8]. Önemle belirtmek gerekir ki, otonomi tek yönlü değildir; bireysel (psikosomatik) ve toplumsal (sosyo-tarihsel) boyutta yani iki yönlüdür. Bu iki boyut birbiriyle ilişkilidir. Otonom bir bireyin varlığı o toplumun otonom olduğunu gösterdiği gibi, otonom bir toplum da ancak otonom bireylerden oluşmuş olabilir.

Otonom bir toplum kendi kendisini yöneten ve kendi kendisini kuran bir toplumdur. "Kendi kendisini kuran toplum" geleneklerini, değer sistemini ve kanunlarını toplumsal yaratımlar olarak görür ve kendi varlığını Tanrı veya doğa gibi dışarıdan herhangi bir kaynağa dayandırmaz. Bu bağlamda, eğer bir toplum kendisine toplum dışı bir odak noktası arıyorsa, heteronomdur. Başka bir deyişle, otonom bir toplum kendi kendisinin esas kaynağının kendisi olduğunun farkındadır. Kanunlar toplum tarafından yapılmaktadır ve bir kere

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[8] Cornelius Castoriadis, *The Castoriadis Reader* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1997b), 281-282.

yapıldıktan sonra değişmez ve eleştirilemez de değildir, toplum kendi sınırlarını kendisi koyar[9].

Castoriadis otonomi kavramını geliştirirken birkaç felsefi kaynaktan beslenmiştir. Öncelikle Marksist teoriyi ele almış, Lenin, Troçki ve diğer bazı önemli Marksistlerin yorumlarını da dahil ederek bunları eleştirel bir gözle yeniden değerlendirmiştir. Marx'ın teorisinin hem determinist hem de çelişkili olduğunu, Lenin'in bakış açısının ise otoriterlik ve bürokratikleşme eğilimi taşıdığını savunmuştur. Bu sebeple Marksizm ne kadar yenilense de temelinin çelişkili olmasından dolayı, her ne türü olursa olsun tümüyle reddedilmesi gerektiği sonucuna varmıştır. Çözüm ancak bütünüyle yenilenmiş devrimci bir teoriyle bulunabilir. Castoriadis, Marx'ın ve Aristoteles'in *praksis* anlayışını kabul etmiş ve *praksis*in yaratıcı ve kollektif bir eylem olduğunu ileri sürmüştür. Bununla beraber, Marx'a ve Aristoteles'e karşıt olarak *praksis*in zorunlu ve önceden tayin edilmiş bir rota çizme gerekliliğini de reddetmiştir. Bu nedenle otonomi tarihin bir noktasında tamamlanan bir durum değildir. Otonom toplum kendisini sürekli yeniler ve ona önceden gideceği bir yol tarif edilemez[10].

Otonomi kavramının ikinci felsefi temeli de psikanalize dayanır. Bu kapsamda, Castoriadis, insan *psike*sinin yaratıcı yönüne odaklanır. Freud'un teorilerini merkeze alırken, onun bilinçaltı kavramından çok etkilenmiştir. Bu kavramı genişletmiş ve toplumun tarihsel yaratımının kaynağı olarak gördüğü radikal tahayyül kavramı ile ilişkilendirmiştir[11]. Aslında Castoriadis'in toplumun radikal tahayyülü düşüncesi Antik Yunan'daki kişinin şahsi muhakemesi yani kendi kendisini değerlendirmesi anlayışına dayanmaktadır. Kişisel tecrübeler ve toplumsal kurumsallaşmanın karşısında psikanalizi bu eleştirel şahsi muhakemenin bir yöntemi olarak kullanmaya çalışır[12]. Bir başka deyişle, bireyin bu muhakemesini toplumun kollektif muhakemesinden ayırmaz. Bu otonom toplumun önemli bir niteliğidir. Çünkü kendisi üzerine düşünmeyen, kendi hedeflerini, hayallerini, değer sistemini sorgulamayan bir toplum otonom olamadığı gibi, o toplumdaki bireyler de böyle bir eylem gerçekleştiremez. Otonom bir toplumun kendisine dair muhakemesinin temelinde bireylerin şahsi muhakemesi yatmaktadır[13].

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[9] Cornelius Castoriadis, *The Imaginary Institution of Society* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005), 101-108.

[10] age, 75-76.

[11] Andreas Kalyvas, "Norm and Critique in Castoriadis's Theory of Autonomy," *Constellations*, 5:2, (1998a), 163.

[12] Castoriadis, *The Imaginary Institution*, 281-328.

[13] Cornelius Castoriadis, *Figures of the Thinkable,* (Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 2007), 151.

Öte yandan, Castoriadis'in ortaya attığı otonomi kavramında Antik Yunan mirasının etkisi çok büyüktür. Castoriadis'e göre, dünya tarihinde otonom toplumlar sadece iki kere ortaya çıkmıştır: Antik Yunan'da ve Avrupa modern toplumunda[14]. Burada Yunan felsefecinin *polis*i doğrudan kopyalamak üzere bir model olarak ele almadığı, bu mirasın bize bazı temel değer ve gerekli felsefi tartışma zeminini verdiğini düşündüğü daha önceden belirtilmişti[15]. Demokrasi ile yönetilen *polis* yepyeni bir yapıdır. Daha önce örneği görülmemiştir; adeta yoktan bir anda ortaya çıkmıştır (*creation ex nihilo*) ve insanlık tarihi için bir siyasal mucizedir. Demokrasinin ortaya çıkışı yalnızca insanların gücü kendi ellerine almaları bakımından değil, başlı başına insanlığın kendisi için önemlidir. Demokratik anlayış yoktan var olmuştur ve insan aklının olası potansiyelini yansıtmaktadır. Yunan *polis*i yeni bir ontolojik varlıktır ve böyle otonom bir toplumun varlığı toplumların potansiyelini göstermektedir. Bu, daha önce denenmemiş olan, önünde belli somut kaideleri ve belli reçeteleri ve şemaları olmayan, kendini doğrudan kendisi tarif eden bir toplumsallaşma şeklidir. Kaos ve dünyanın kesişiminde, kendini tamamlamamış ve kendini tamamlamak gibi bir gayesi olmayan, kendine nihai bir hedef çizmeyen, hareketli ve dinamik bir toplum modelidir[16].

Bununla beraber, dünya tarihinde hiçbir toplum herhangi bir kanun veya değer sistemi kendilerine sunulmuş şekilde meydana gelmemiştir. Bu yüzden toplum kendi kendisinin yazarı, yaratıcısı, meşrulaştırıcısı ve otoritesidir[17]. Burada asıl belirleyici olan, toplumun bu yaratıcılığının farkında olup, zamana ve şartlara göre eleştirel bir bakış açısıyla kurumlarını tartışmaya açmak için açık kapı bırakmasıdır[18]. Elbette kurumlar insanların doğrudan bir eseri değildir ve basitçe insan sayısına indirgenemez. Çünkü bunlar toplumun kendi tahayyülüne göre şekillenir. Bu tahayyülü ise belirleyen toplumsal hayali imlemlerdir (*signification imaginaire*). Bir başka deyişle, kurumlar toplumsal dinamiklere göre üretilirler[19].

Daha önce değinildiği üzere, toplumun otonom olması hem bireysel hem de toplumsal boyutu olan bir durumdur ve her iki boyut iç içe geçmiştir. Çünkü toplumsal kurumlar insanlar tarafından oluşturulurlar ve aynı zamanda toplumdaki her birey de onu toplumsallaştıran belirli bir topluma uygun şekilde üretilmiş veya

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[14] Castoriadis, *The Castoriadis Reader*, 311.

[15] Cornelius Castoriadis, *Fait et à Faire*, (Paris: Seuil, 1997c), 73.

[16] Castoriadis, *The Castoriadis Reader*, 269-283.

[17] Castoriadis, *The Imaginary Institution*, 108-110.

[18] age, 371-373.

[19] age, 135-146.

oluşturulmuştur[20]. Burada "şahsi yönetim" çok önemlidir. Bu hem bireyin kendi üzerindeki kontrolünü hem de toplumun kendi üzerindeki hakimiyetini ifade eder. Bireylerin kendilerini yönetme kabiliyetleri bireyin otonomisinin (yani bu bireyin *psike*sinin), kendi kendini oluşturma, kendi kendini yaratma niteliğinin bir sonucudur[21]. Bununla beraber, o birey belirli bir zaman ve belirli bir mekan içinde belli bir topluma maruz kalmaktadır. Bu yüzden toplumun diğer bireylerinin de etkisi altındadır[22]. Bu nedenle bir birey yalnızca ve yalnızca belirli bir sosyo-tarihsel bağlamda meydana gelebilir ve bu bağlam da yine toplumun kendi tahayyülünce belirlenmiştir[23].

Dolayısıyla, Castoriadis'in siyasi teorisinde bireysel özgürlük toplumsal özgürlükten ayrı düşünülmemiştir. Bireysel özgürlükten bahsederken, *psike*nin ve bilinçaltının arasında farklı bir ilişki olduğunu ileri sürmektedir. Bu, ne Freud'un öne sürdüğü gibi medeniyet yaratımında güdüsel itkilerin önemi anlayışıyla bağdaştırılabilir, ne de Marcuse'ün anarşik modeli veya Deleuze ve Guattari'nin "şizoanalizi"dir. Castoriadis'in düşüncesinde insan kendi arzularının farkındadır ve bütünüyle libidinal dürtülerle hareket etmez. Bu bağlamda, insan kendiliği toplumsal otonomiden ayrı ele alınamaz. Toplum varlığını kendi kendisine borçludur ve kendi kendisini kurar. Fakat, otonomi mutlak bireyselleşmiş özgürlük veya bağımsızlık olarak tanımlanamaz. Daha açık bir ifadeyle, birey toplumdan koparak sadece kendi isteklerini gerçekleştirme mantığıyla var olamaz. Ancak Kantçı anlamda toplumsal sınırların içerisinde kalarak hareket edebilir. Bu sebeple, bireyin toplumdan ayrı veya topluma karşı özgürlük elde etmesi mümkün değildir[24].

Burada önemle belirtmek gerekir ki, Castoriadis bireyi de toplumu da durağan ve değişmez iki kavram olarak düşünmemiştir. Otonomi projesinde birey belli bir toplum ve belli bir tarihsel dönem içinde ele alınır. Bu bağlamda, birey kendini toplumsal düzenden ayrıştırabilen ve içinde bulunduğu durumu soruşturabilen bir varlıktır. Yaşadığı durumu gözden geçirip, onun oluşumunu analiz edebilir ve durumu değiştirecek yeni öneriler getirebilir. Castoriadis, liberal ve bireyselci düşünceye ait birey tarifine karşıdır. Birey tamamen rasyonel bir bakış açısıyla yaşayan, toplumdan kopuk soyut bir özne değildir. Tam

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[20] Cornelius Castoriadis, *World in Fragments* (Standford: Stanford University Press, 1997a), 143, 155, 315.

[21] Castoriadis, The Imaginary Institution, 320.

[22] age, 102-103.

[23] age, 359-364.

[24] Fuyuki Kurasawa, "At the Crossroads of the Radical: The Challenges of Castoriadis's Thought," *Theory, Culture and Society*, 17:4 (2000), 147-148.

tersine, Castoriadis'in bireyi, içinde bulunduğu topluma gömülü, ona yapışık ve onun içinde varlığı ve manası olan, o toplumca üretilip o toplumu üreten bireydir. Bununla beraber, bu birey, yapısalcı bir anlayışla, toplumun içinde adeta bir *tabula rasa* olarak da görülmemelidir. İnsanı toplum içinde öznel kılan sorgulama yeteneği ve kapasitesidir. Castoriadis'e göre, bir birey kendi kendisini inceleyip, arzularını, ihtiyaçlarını, hayallerini değerlendirebilir ve kendi kendisini araştırmaya girişebilir. Böylece yeni anlayışlar ve yeni değer kümeleri ortaya atılabilir. Bu sebeple, birey toplumda hem içsel hem de dışsal olarak aktiftir. İçinde bulunduğu halihazırda kurulu toplumu tartışmaya açarak, onun hazır verdiği doğru, yanlış, iyi, kötü tüm değer algılarını ve buna yönelik tanımlamaları gözden geçirerek, derinlemesine inceleyerek, yeni bir toplumsal proje ortaya atabilir. Bu sebeple toplumsal otonominin yaratıcı ayağı bireysel süreçlere dayanmaktadır denebilir[25]

Otonomi birey ve toplumun birbirine sımsıkı bağlı bu ilişkisinin bir kesişimi sonucunda ortaya çıkıyorsa, "Otonom bir toplum hayal midir?" sorusu ileri sürülebilir. Castoriadis bu soruya şu cevabı vermektedir: "*Eğer bir toplum kendisini normlarının kaynağı olarak tanırsa, otonomi mümkündür*"[26]. Böyle bir bakış açısı, otonom toplumun önünü açacaktır. Şüphesiz bu süreç önce bireyde başlamaktadır. Bu iki basamaklı bir toplumsallaşma sürecidir. Birincil toplumsallaşmada insan başkalarının söylemini içselleştirmelidir. İkinci toplumsallaşma sürecinde ise, kişi kendi söylemini inşa edebilmek için başkalarının içselleştirilmiş söylemini eleştirel bir şekilde ele almalıdır. İnsanın kendisi de toplumsallaşmış bir öznedir. İlk toplumsallaşmada insan heteronom bir toplumsal kurumken, ikinci aşamada başkalarının söylemlerini eleştirebildiği için otonom hale gelir[27].

Sonuç olarak, Castoriadis otonominin ütopik veya ideal bir toplum olmadığını vurgular. Bu kavram bir toplumdaki hiçbir kurumun dokunulmaz olmadığı (şahsi eleştirisini yapan toplum) ve her toplumun kendisi tarafından yaratıldığı gerçeğine dayanır[28]. Bu noktada otonomi projesini ana hatlarıyla ele almak yerinde olacaktır.

b. Otonomi Projesi (*Le Projet d'Autonomie*)

Sosyalist manada bir devrim anlayışını tamamen reddeden Castoriadis, toplumlar için önceden belirlenmiş bir rota ve nihai bir

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[25] Kalyvas, "Norm and Critique", 168-170.

[26] Castoriadis, *The Castoriadis Reader*, 282.

[27] Castoriadis, *The Imaginary Institution*, 311-319.

[28] Cornelius Castoriadis, *Domaines de l'Homme* (Paris: Seuil, 1977), 356.

hedef çizmeyen ama topyekün bir toplumsal dönüşümü hedefleyen bir devrimci projenin peşine düşmüştür. Otonomi projesi herşeyden evvel bir devrim gerçekleştirmek hedefindedir ama her çağa ve her zamana cevap olacak kapalı bir sistem önermez; daha çok bireyden topluma yayılan özgürlükçü bir bakış açısının toplumun ruhuna sinmesini savunur.

Castoriadis Marksizmin birbiriyle çelişen iki unsuru olduğunu ileri sürer. Birincisi, devrimci unsurdur. Bu unsur Marx'ın tüm eserlerinde mevcuttur ve Rosa Luxemburg, Lenin, Troçki ve Lukacs gibi önde gelen Marksistlerin de çalışmalarında göze çarpar. Devrimcilik aynı zamanda sonuçları açısından adeta patlayıcı etkisi yaratacak bir unsurdur. Çünkü dünyayı yalnızca yorumlamak yerine değiştirmek mantığına oturur. Bu geleneksel felsefeden bir kopuştur ve onu aşarak toplumda gerçek bir değişim gerçekleştirmeyi hedefler. Bununla birlikte, tarih problemine bir çözüm ararken, kapalı bir diyalektiği reddeder. Komünizm bir hayal veya ideal devlet değildir, toplum gerçekten ona doğru gitmektedir. Bu fikir yeni bir toplum yaratma potansiyelini ve aynı zamanda yığınların topyekün bir dönüşümü sürüklemelerini öngörür. İnsanlar kendi tarihlerini kendileri yazmaktadır[29]. Marx'ın felsefesinin en önemli özelliği insanın değişim gücünü kendi ellerine alması gerektiğini vurgulamasıdır. İnsan Tanrı'nın onu kurtarmasını ve şartları değiştirmesini bekleyecek değildir, herhangi bir dışsal ve uhrevi odağa bel bağlamayacaktır; bütün sorunlarının çözümü kendisindedir. Sistemin itici gücünü insanda arayan Marxist felsefenin bu devrimci yönü teoriye özgürleştirici ve dinamik bir yön kazandırmaktadır[30].

Ancak ikinci unsur birincinin önünü kesmektedir. Yeni bir dünya beklentisi kapalı bir sistem oluşturma hedefi ile imkansız hale gelmektedir. Nihai sorulara nihai cevaplar bulma çabası ile birlikte bilimsel pozitivizm bir süre sonra rasyonalizm ve idealizme evrilmiştir. Tarih önceden verili kanunlara dayanan rasyonel bir sistem haline gelmiştir. Bu kavramsallaştırma kapitalizmin analizinden felsefi geleneğe, tarih teorisinden, proletaryanın tarihine ve siyasi programa kadar her yönüyle birbirine bağlıdır ve tam olarak birbirine uymaktadır. Bu sebeple, üretici güçlerin tüm toplumu yönlendireceği yargısına varılmasına yol açmıştır. Nihai bir sonuç öngörülmediği ileri sürülse de, pratikte nihai bir sonuç ortaya konmaya çalışılmıştır[31].

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[29] Castoriadis, *The Imaginary Institution*, 56-57.
[30] Castoriadis, *Domaines de l'Homme*, 90-91.
[31] Castoriadis, *The Imaginary Institution*, 56-58.

Sonuç olarak, Marksizm bu iki unsurdan dolayı çelişkili hale gelmiştir. Marx bir yandan tarihin bir sınıf savaşı tarihi olduğunu ve işçilerin özgürleşmesinin kendilerinin eliyle olacağını savunurken, tarihi gelişimin tamamen ekonomik alt yapıya dayandığını ileri sürmüştür[32]. Castoriadis'e göre, Marx, başlangıçta tarihi bir bütün olarak görmekten kaçınarak, tarihin her yönüyle değerlendirilip, incelenebileceğini ve tarihin insan eylemine dayandığını savunduğunda devrimci bir teorinin adımlarını atmıştı. Ancak toplumu yalnızca ekonomik kurallar vasıtasıyla ele alıp, bilimsel analiz fetişizmine kapıldıktan sonra teorinin çelişkili hale gelmesine sebep olmuştur[33]. Castoriadis'in Marx'la kopuşu tam da bu sebepten kaynaklanmaktadır. Bu çelişkili durum Marksist teoriye içkin yapısal bir sorundur. Toplumları belirli bir nihai sona ulaştıracak Marx'ın bahsettiği gibi bir içkin mantık söz konusuysa, bu teoriyi yazan kişinin insanlığı bu amaca ulaştıracak otorite olduğunu da kabul etmek gerekmektedir. Tarihin vasisi görevini üstlenen böyle bir bilimin aynı zamanda insan otonomisine ve yaratıcılığına saygı gösterdiğini söylemek mümkün değildir. Çünkü kapalı bir teori yaratma talebiyle, otonom eylem birbiri ile hiçbir şekilde bağdaşamaz, tam tersine birbirlerinin tam zıttıdırlar. Bu sebeple Marksist bir teoride otonomiye yer yoktur. Eğer proletarya kendilerine tarih tarafından biçilen görevi ve yolu sürdürürse, hiçbir şey yaratmamış olur çünkü her şey başından belirlenmiştir. Öte yandan, eğer işçi sınıfı otonom bir şekilde hareket ederse, yaratıcı bir eylem göstermiş olur ama teori açısından kendisinden bekleneni de yapmamış olur. Marksist teorinin bu mantığı proletaryanın potansiyelini zaafiyete uğratmaktadır ve sistem içinde bazı gruplara güç alanı oluşturmaktadır. Eğer tarihin gerçek bir teorisi varsa her şeyde tek bir rasyonalite geçerlidir. Şu halde gelişimin gidişatının bu rasyonalitenin uzmanlarının ellerine bırakılması gerekir. Bu nedenle, parti mutlak güç haline gelir ve bunun için meşru bir felsefi zemin de elde eder. Çünkü tarihsel materyalizm kavramı üzerine kurulmuştur ve otorite bakımından kutsal hale gelmiştir. Böylece demokrasi uygulanamaz hale gelir. Bu çerçevede, teori zaten önceden belirlenmiş olduğundan, en ufak bir farklı bakış açısı yoldan sapma olarak değerlendirilir. Eğer her şey tamamlanmış bir teori ve kapalı bir sistemle belirliyse, herhangi bir eylem (*praksis*) mümkün değildir[34]. Zaten önceden belirlenmiş bir tarihi rota söz konusudur ve proletarya

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[32] Philippe Caumières, *Le projet d'autonomie* (Paris: Éditions Michalon, 2007), 54.

[33] Philippe Caumières, *Castoriadis: Critique sociale et émancipation* (Paris: Éditions Textuel, 2011), 26-28.

[34] Nicolas Poirier, *L'Ontologie Politique de Castoriadis* (Paris: Éditions Payot & Rivages, 2011), 212-213.

için belirlenen bir hedef vardır; ne bugün için ne yarın için Marksizmde insan iradesine yer bırakılmamıştır[35].

Kısaca söylemek gerekirse, Marksizmin en büyük sorunu insan otonomisine hiçbir açık kapı bırakmayan kapalı bir sistem haline gelmiş olmasıdır. Gittikçe daha dogmatik hale gelen bu görüş, insan eylemini tamamen bir kenara bırakarak, devrimci bir proje olmaktan da gitgide uzaklaşmıştır[36]. Marx'ın yaşanmakta olan ve geçmişte yaşanan herşeyi tümden açıklama arzusu teoriyi yarı bilimsel ve çelişkili hale getirmiştir. Dolayısıyla Castoriadis, Marksizmin bu tutarsızlığı ve Marksist ekonomi ve Marx'ın tarih felsefesi üzerine yaptığı detaylı değerlendirmeler sonucunda bu görüşün tamamen bir kenara bırakılması gerektiğini savunmuştur[37]. Artık herhangi bir devrimci niteliği kalmayan Marksizmin toplumda değişim yaratacak devrimci bir eyleme ön ayak olması da mümkün değildir[38]. Dolayısıyla Castoriadis artık Marksizmin bütünüyle bir kenara bırakılması gerektiğini savunmaktadır. Bir yönüyle devrimci olmaya çalışan Marksist görüş artık muhafazakar hale gelmiştir[39]. Bu yüzden Marksizmi basitçe yeniden gözden geçirmek ve yeni bir versiyonunu sunmak yeterli gelmeyecektir[40].

Öte yandan, Avrupa'da kapitalizmin yarattığı kriz ve bunalıma yeni bir devrimci çözüm gerekmektedir fakat bu çözüm sosyalist devrim niteliği taşımamaktadır. Hedef sosyalizm değil, otonom bir toplum yapısının oluşmasıdır. Bir başka ifadeyle, otonomi projesinin çıkış noktası toplumda devrim niteliğinde bir değişikliğe gidilmesidir ama varılacak nihai bir nokta yoktur. Burada devrim "otonom topluma ulaşma"kla ilişkilendirilmiştir ama ulaşılacak olan "otonom toplum" Marx'ın öngördüğü "sınıfsız toplum" gibi belli somut niteliklere zamandan ve mekandan bağımsız olarak sahip olan ve tarihte donmuş bir model olmayacaktır[41]. Ayrıca Marksizmde olduğu gibi tüm toplum için zorunlu bir rota da çizmemektedir[42]. *Revolutionary Perspectives Today*'de "bilimsel" olduğu ileri sürülen kaideler üzerine şekillendirilen kapalı sistemlerin toplumu hiçbir yere götüremeyeceğini belirtir. Çünkü böyle bir teorinin insan gerçekliği ile

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[35] Kōnstantinos, Rantēs, "Ē ennoia tēs Dialektikēs ston Kornēlio Kastoriadē". In *Afierōma ston Kornēlio Kastoriadē*. ed. Dēmētrēs Armaos (Athēna: Sugchronē Delfikē Amfiktonia, 2010), 365-367.

[36] Castoriadis, *The Imaginary Institution*, 67-68.

[37] Caumières, *Le projet d'autonomie,* 43.

[38] Castoriadis, *The Castoriadis Reader*, 108.

[39] Caumières, *Castoriadis: Critique sociale,* 227.

[40] Castoriadis, *The Castoriadis Reader*, 111.

[41] Kastoriadēs, *To Epanastatiko Problēma*, 19-22.

[42] Castoriadis, *The Imaginary Institution,* 95.

ilgisi yoktur[43]. Marksizm artık imana dayanan bir bütüncül teori haline gelmiştir. İmana dayanması için bir teorinin mutlaka aşkın bir varlıkla veya özel niteliklere sahip bir insanla ilişkilendirilmiş olmasına gerek yoktur. Bir kere ortaya konmuş kişilerden bağımsız bir gerçekliğe sorgusuz sualsiz tabi olmayı gerektiren her kapalı sistem böyle bir düşünce sistemidir. Marksizm de bundan farklı bir nitelikte değildir. Bu yüzden bu teoriyi yenilemek mümkün değildir. Bunun yerine, gerçeklerle yüzleşebilen, değişen şartlar ve koşullarla yenilenebilen, açık bir teori gereklidir. Ancak böyle nitelikteki özgürleştirici ve devrimci bir teori ile toplumsal değişim hedeflenebilir ve gerçekleştirilebilir[44].

Otonomi bir kapalı devre sistemi değildir, tam tersine bir açıklıktır ve ontolojik olarak serbesttir. Ayrıca heteronom yapıların örgütsel, bilişsel ve bilimsel kapalı devresinin ötesine geçebilme olasılığını yakalamayı hedefler[45]. Dolayısıyla, otonom toplum tarihin bittiği ve ulaşılacak nihai nokta değildir. Durmadan değişen ve yeniden örgütlenen akışkan bir yapıdan bahsedilmektedir. Böyle bir toplumsal devinime geçiş de özü itibariyle devrimcidir.

Bu toplumsal devrimci hareket bağlamında Castoriadis devrimin tüm insanlar katılmadıkça başarılı olamayacağını da savunur. Burada Antik Yunan'ın tarihteki ilk devrimi gerçekleştirdiğine değinir. Antik Yunan örneği günümüzde insanların devrim kavramından anladığı olgudan şüphesiz farklıdır. Fakat aslında Atina demokrasi tarihi süregelen devrimlerin tarihidir. Bir başka ifadeyle, Atinalılar geleneksel toplumsal imlemleri (*signification*) ve kurumları sabit ve değişmez kabul etmez, bunları sürekli eleştiriye tabi tutar ve dönüştürür. Elbette söz konusu dönüşümler farklı şartlar altında gerçekleştirilmiştir. Örneğin Solon dönemin rakip toplumsal sınıfları tarafından birçok kurumu değiştirmesi için seçilmiştir. Ancak asıl devrim Cleisthenes (M.Ö. 508-506) ile gerçekleşmiş ve demokratik süreç başlamıştır. Kısaca söylemek gerekirse, Antik Yunan'da zamanın şartlarına göre gerekli siyasi ve toplumsal kurumsal değişiklikleri yapmakta tereddüt edilmemiştir[46].

Tarihçi Pierre Rosanvallon'a göre, Castoriadis devrim düşüncesini üç unsur üzerine bina etmiştir. Öncelikle, Marksist anlayıştan farklı olarak mutlak bilgi reddedilmektedir. Yani bütün toplumu kapsayan ve belirli toplumsal, ekonomik ve siyasi kaideler öngörüp bunlara binaen bir teori önerilmemektedir. İkincisi, Marksizmde olduğu gibi

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[43] Cornelius Castoriadis, *A Society Adrift,* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2010), 37.
[44] Castoriadis, *The Castoriadis Reader*, 113-114.
[45] age, 310.
[46] Kornēlios Kastoriadēs, Oi Omilies stēn Ellada, (Athēna: Upsilon, 2000a), 110-111.

proletarya gibi herhangi bir sınıf veya bireyden Mesih (kurtarıcı) olması beklenmez. Toplum kendi değişimini kendisi yerine getirir. Üçüncü olarak, otonomi projesi herhangi bir nihai hedef koymaz. Marksizmdeki sınıfsız toplum gibi bir model önermez. Bu nedenle özgürleştirici, dönüştürücü ve gerçek anlamda devrimcidir[47].

Sonuç olarak, hiçbir toplum için ideal bir örnek veya model yoktur. Çünkü toplum bir zaman ve mekanda donup kalan bir olgu değildir. Zamanla ve koşullarla kendini yenileyen dinamizm otonomi projesinin önerdiği toplumun niteliğidir. Otonom bir toplum kendini dönüştürme konusunda gücünün farkındadır ve ancak özgür veya otonom bireyler böyle bir toplumda yaşayabilirler[48]. Bu bağlamda otonom toplum yapısına ilham verecek Antik Yunan örneğine değinmek gereklidir.

2. Antik Yunan Mirası

Castoriadis'in felsefi anlayışının ve oluşturmaya çalıştığı otonomi projesinin büyük ölçüde Antik Yunan mirası üzerine bina edildiğini söylemek yanlış olmaz. Bu noktada Antik Yunan *polis*inin günümüzde Batı toplumlarında yaşanmakta olan siyasi, ekonomik, kültürel ve toplumsal krizin aşılmasına dair bir çözüm sunabileceğini savunan Castoriadis'in önemle vurguladığı bazı kavramlara bakmak faydalı olacaktır. *Recommencing the Revolution* isimli çalışmasında Castoriadis, devrimci hareketin "insanların yaptığı ve toplumda tabi olduğu herşeyle ve herşeyden önemlisi günlük hayatla" ilişkili olan kollektif bir hareket olması gerektiğini ifade eder. Burada Castoriadis, Antik Yunan'daki ortak meselelere herkesin bütünüyle katılımı fikrini yansıtmaktadır[49]. Bu da bizi zorunlu olarak Antik Yunan'ın doğrudan demokrasi kavramına ulaştırmaktadır.

a. Demokrasi

Castoriadis'in kastetmiş olduğu demokrasi kavramını anlayabilmek için kelimenin doğrudan etimolojik anlamını ele almak gerekmektedir. Bilindiği üzere, demokrasi (*dēmokratia*) "*to kratos tou dēmou*" yani "halkın gücü" olarak ifade edilir. Antik Yunan'da devlet

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[47] "L'Exigence Révolutionnaire: Entretien avec Olivier Mongin, Paul Thibaud et Pierre Rosanvallon", *Esprit* (1977), 20.

[48] Cornelius Castoriadis, *Rising Tide of Insignificancy*, 2003, http://www.notbored.org/RTI.pdf, 301-302.

[49] Castoriadis, *The Castoriadis Reader*, 135.

modern anlamda kullanılan *kratos* değil, *polis* veya *politieia* kelimesi ile ifade edilirdi. *Kratos* ise kuvvet veya güç anlamına gelmekteydi. Bu nedenle demokrasiyi aslında halkın egemenliği olarak değerlendirmek doğru olacaktır. Bu tanım zorunlu olarak iki soruyu doğurur: 1. Halk kimdir? 2. Egemenlik nedir? Bu iki soru uzun bir felsefi tartışmanın fitilini ateşler. Zira monarşi veya aristokraside bu sorular bir anlam ifade etmez. Çünkü monarşide, kral veya kraliçe miras olarak devraldığı iktidara sahiptir ve yönetme hakkını buna borçludur. Aristokraside aynı şekilde bir grup insanın gücü ellerinde tuttuğunu görüyoruz. Dolayısıyla burada tartışmaya açık bir halk ve egemenlik tanımı yoktur. Bu açıdan bakıldığında, yalnız demokraside bu sorular tartışmaya açılır ve zaman ve şartlarla yeniden tarif edilme imkanını sunar[50].

Castoriadis demokrasiyi bir kavram olarak önemli ve toplumları otonomiye ulaştıracak yegane rejim olarak görse de sanıldığının aksine mevcut şartlarda Avrupa'da herhangi bir demokratik ülke olmadığını vurgular. Batı ülkelerindeki sistem ismi demokrasi olsa da tam anlamıyla bir liberal oligarşidir. Avrupa'da kişi hak ve özgürlüklerinin var olması bir demokrasi yanılgısı yaratmaktadır. İnsanların hakları vardır. Konuşma, düşünme ve basın hakkı vardır ve görünürde istedikleri hükümeti seçiyor gibidirler. Ancak iş sayılara döküldüğünde gerçek ortaya çıkmaktadır. Bu açıdan Fransa'dan çarpıcı bir örnek veren Castoriadis, yaklaşık 35-37 milyon Fransız seçmene karşın, ekonomiyi, siyaseti ve basın da dahil kamuoyunu etkileme konumuna sahip kişinin sayısının 3700 olduğunu vurgular. Böyle bir oran Roma İmparatorluğu'nun en antidemokratik dönemlerinde bile söz konusu olmamıştır[51].

Demokrasi Batı literatüründe bireyselliğin zaferi olarak yansıtılmaktadır. Oysa bireyselcilik mevcut durumda tamamen "ne istiyorsanız onu yapın" mantığına indirgenmiş ve "Batı demokrasisi" halkın çıkarlarından ziyade bir avuç azınlığın çıkarlarını merkeze almış bir sistem haline gelmiştir[52]. Bu yüzden liberal "demokrasi"lerde kendi sorumluluğunun bilincinde olan herhangi bir birey yoktur. "Sorumlu vatandaş" kimdir? Castoriadis burada Aristoteles'e atıfta bulunarak, sorumlu bireyin yönetme ve yönetilme kabiliyeti olan insan olduğunu söyler. Ancak günümüzde insanların çeşitli özgürlükleri olmasına rağmen, özgürleşmekten uzak oldukları aşikardır. Sahip oldukları özgürlükler sadece savunma niteliğinde ve insanların bireysel

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[50] Kastoriadēs, *Oi Omilies*, 127-128.

[51] age, 123-124.

[52] Castoriadis, *The Castoriadis Reader*, 347.

zevklerini çoğaltmaya yöneliktir. Üstelik bu zevkler dahi şahsi olmaktan çok, toplumsal olarak dışarıdan kişiye dayatılmaktadır[53]. Dolayısıyla Batı'da otonom toplumdaki kendi kurumlarını kendi yarattığının bilincinde olan sorumlu vatandaşlık anlayışından tamamen uzaklaşılmıştır; verili bir düzenin parçası olan insanlar kendi küçük alanlarında özgür olduklarını düşünerek yaşayıp gitmektedirler.

Öte yandan, kapitalist sistem içinde nihai hedef üretimin ve tüketimin maksimizasyonu olduğu için, tüm vatandaşların katılımcı olduğu gerçek bir demokrasi olamaz. Bu şartlar altında otonomi de imkansızdır. Ayrıca, eğer kollektif otonomi yoksa, bireysel otonomi de düşünülemez. İnsanlar artık vatandaş değil, tüketicidirler. Demokratik bir sistem ancak ve ancak demokrasi tutkusu ile mümkün olabilir; toplumun her bir bireyi için otonomi ve toplumun ortak sorunlarına bir çözüm bulmak konusunda tutku olmasına bağlıdır. Bu ancak böyle bir duygu ile mümkün olabilir[54].

Demokrasi bireysel ve toplumsal otonomiye dayanan bir sistemdir. Bu çerçeveden bakılırsa, mevcut hiçbir sistemin otonom olmadığı yani tüm mevcut sistemlerin heteronom olduğu söylenebilir. Bir başka deyişle, dünya üzerindeki hemen hemen tüm toplumlar için sahip oldukları kurumlar (ister siyasi, ister kültürel, ister toplumsal olsun) değiştirilemez, sorguya tabi tutulamaz ve sanki dışarıdan birileri tarafından kurulmuş gibi algılanmaktadır. Oysa demokrasinin mantığı tüm kurumların değiştirilebilir olması kabulüne dayanır. Heteronom toplumlarda kurumlar sorgulanmaz ve kalıcı olarak değerlendirilir. Antik Yunan'da ve Avrupa'da 12. ve 13. yüzyıllarda yaşanan demokrasi atılımı işte bu heteronom mantığın silinip gitmesidir. Daha açık bir ifadeyle, bu iki dönemde Avrupa toplumu mevcut kurumları kutsal sayıp, bunlara bağlı kalmak yerine bunları yeniden tartışmaya açmıştır. Böylece otonom bir topluma giden yolun kapıları açılmıştır. Atinalılar için ne siyasi, ne kültürel, ne de ekonomik hiçbir kurum tanrılar veya diğer başka geleneksel iktidar sahibince verili sayılmaz. Bu yüzden tartışmaya açıktırlar; insanların bu kurumlarda değişiklik yapma şansı vardır. Bu yüzden gerçekten de tam bir "halk egemenliği"nden söz etmek mümkündür. Castoriadis otonomi ile insanların kendilerine ait olan bu potansiyelden haberdar olmalarının altını çizer. Yani insanlar şartlar gerektiriyorsa mevcut kurumları ve hatta sistemi bütünüyle değiştirebilirler. Hiçbir kural, kanun ve prensip kutsal değildir; bir toplum kendi kaderini

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[53] Castoriadis, *Rising Tide*, 78-79.
[54] age, 307-308.

kurgulamakta tamamen özgürdür. Bu sahip olunacak en büyük kuvvet ve nihai iktidardır[55].

Peloponnessos Savaşı isimli eserinde Thukydides, özgür bir *polis*i şu niteliklerle tanımlar: "özerk (otonom), kendi kendini yöneten ve kendi kendine yeten". Daha açık bir ifadeyle, özgür bir devlette insanlar kendi yasalarını kendileri yaparlar, bu yasalarla yargılanır ve yargılarlar ve kendi kendilerini yönetme kabiliyetine sahiptirler. Burada özellikle belirtilmesi gereken halka olan vurgudur. Antik Yunan'da vatandaş ve devlet arasındaki ilişkiyi "*andres gar polis*" ifadesi özetler: "devleti insanlar kurar". Dolayısıyla, eğer bir devlette insanların karar alma mekanizmasında ve yasama sürecinde söz hakkı yoksa, kendi yasalarına tabi değillerse, bu yasalarca yargılayıp yargılanmıyorlarsa ve kendi kendilerini yönetmiyorlarsa, o zaman bu insanların demokratik bir sistemde yaşadıkları söylenemez[56]. Antik Yunan'ın alameti farikası toplumun temel uğraşısının -devletin *polis* olarak adlandırıldığı göz önüne alınırsa-, gerçek anlamda politika olmasıdır. Bu çerçevede bakıldığında, otonom bir toplumun var olacağı tek sistem demokrasidir. Çünkü otonom bir toplumda anayasa, yasalar veya dünyaya, topluma, hayata, gerçeğe dair kollektif olarak oluşturulmuş herhangi bir temsiliyet sorgulanabilir, tartışılabilir ve gerekirse gereken değişikliklere gidilebilir[57].

Bunun yanısıra, Antik Yunan'da şehir devletinin siyasi faaliyeti üç alanda sınıflandırılmıştır: *oikos*, *agora* ve *ekklēsia*. Ana hatlarıyla söylemek gerekirse, *oikos* özel alanı, *agora* hem özel hem kamuya açık alanı, *ekklēsia* ise kamuya açık alanı ifade eder. Demokratik bir rejimde tüm bu alanlar titizlikle belirlenmiştir. Buna rağmen, yarı demokratik Batı sistemlerinde kamu ciddi ölçüde özel alan haline dönüştürülmüştür. Daha açık bir ifadeyle, karar alma süreci kapalı kapılar ardında (hükümet, parlamento, parti örgütleri vs.) gerçekleşmektedir. Oysa gerçek bir demokraside kamusal alan kamuya açık olmalıdır çünkü herkese aittir[58].

Ayrıca Castoriadis Antik Yunan'daki üç ikiliğe dikkat çeker. Bunlar modern sistemde birbirinden ayrı ele alınır: halk/temsilciler (*laos/antiprosōpoi*), halk/uzmanlar (*laos/eidēmones*) ve halk/devlet (*laos/kratos*). Halk ve temsilciler ikiliği bağlamında bakıldığında, Antik Yunanda ne siyaset felsefesinde ne de pratik hayatta temsiliyet mevcut değildir. Bir seçim bile yapıldığında, hiç kimse seçilenleri temsilci

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[55] Kastoriadēs, *Oi Omilies*, 128-129.

[56] age, 132.

[57] Castoriadis, *Figures*, 174.

[58] Castoriadis, *Rising Tide*, 341.

olarak görmez, daha çok basitçe görevlendirilen kişiler olarak görür. İnsanlar belli bir süre için seçilmekte ve sürekli değiştirilmektedir.

İkinci ikilikle ilgili olarak, siyaset alanında herhangi bir uzman grup bulunmamaktadır. Protagoras isimli eserinde Platon tam da buna değinmektedir. Sadece askerler, mimarlar ve gemi inşaatçıları uzman olarak değerlendiriliyorlarken, siyasi ve toplumsal konularda böyle bir ayrım söz konusu değildir; insanlar eğitimlerinden bağımsız olarak siyasette söz hakkına sahipti[59].

Halk ve devlet ikiliğine gelindiğinde, etimolojik bir açıklama gerekmektedir. Günümüzde yönetim ile ilişkilendirilen *kratos* yerine Antik Yunan'da devlet *polis* olarak nitelendirilmekteydi. Çünkü *kratos* "saf şiddet" anlamını akla getirmekteydi. Oysa *polis* bundan başka bir şeydir. Platon'un *Devlet* eseri (*Politeia*) Fransızca'ya *République* olarak çevrilmiştir. *Politeia* halkın genel ve ortak konularının işleyişini düzenlediği yasalar veya siyasi kurum olarak nitelendirilebilir. Bu sebeple, halk ve devlet bir bütün olarak görülmektedir. Bu yüzden Thukydides *Peloponnesos Savaşları* isimli eserinde "halk devlettir" der[60].

Bununla beraber, Herodot Salamina Savaşı öncesinde Themistokles'in bir konuşmasına değinmektedir: "*Kadınlarımız ve çocuklarımız Attika'yı terketti ve şimdi buradalar, Salaminas adasında. Gemilerimiz burada. Biz buradan ayrılıp, gidip başka bir yerde Atina'yı kurmaya hazırız*"[61]. Bu göstermektedir ki, Atinalılar için kuşkusuz toprak önemlidir ancak *polis*i tanımlayan coğrafi sınırdan ziyade siyasi topluluktur. Bu nedenle halk ve devlet bir bütündür ve siyasi topluluktan ayrışan bir devlet mekanizmasından söz edilemez. Bu nedenle daimi bir bürokrasi de yoktur. Vatandaşlar toplumsal ve siyasi meselelerde atak ve etkindirler. Aristoteles bunu şöyle ifade etmiştir: "*Vatandaş prensipleri ve hakimiyeti paylaşandır*"[62].

Herkesin siyasette sözü olduğundan dolayı, her Atinalı yasaları bilmektedir. Perikles Atina'da ortak toplumsal ve siyasi meselelerle ilgilenmeyen insanların parazit olarak görüldüklerini ve bu tip insanlara *idiōtēs* denildiğini vurgular. Günümüzdeki "idiot" kelimesi bu adlandırmadan gelmektedir. Bu anlayış Antik Yunan'ın devlet ve vatandaş ilişkisini gözler önüne sermektedir. Bu bağlamda, Atina demokrasisi hiçbir biçimde temsili değildir. Zaten seçim esasına da

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[59] Kornēlios Kastoriadēs, *Ē Ellēnikē idiaiterotēta, Tomos B, Ē Polis kai oi nomoi, Seminaria 1983-1984*, (Athēna: Ekdoseis Kritikē, 2008), 141-143.

[60] age, 150-151.

[61] age, 151.

[62] age, 154.

dayanmaz. Devlet görevlileri ve resmi yargıçlar "kura" ile belirlenir ve hiç kimse sürekli görevde kalmaz, daima değişir[63].

Öte yandan, eğer bir toplum kendini ilgilendiren yasalara dair karar alma sürecinde söz hakkına sahip değilse ve kendisini temsilen bir grup insanı seçmek zorunda kalıyorsa, o zaman bu temsilciler seçildikleri süre boyunca kendi çıkarlarını ve iktidarlarını geliştirmek adına hareket ederler. Bu durumda seçimler anlamını yitirmektedir[64]. Aslında Antik Yunan'da seçim usulü günümüzdeki anlamda değildir. Genellikle "evet-hayır" cevabını verecekleri bir tür referandum ile işler yürütülmektedir. Bu referandum da yönetecek insanları seçmek hedefiyle yapılmamaktadır. Heredot'tan Aristoteles'e kadar birçok Atinalı için seçim aristokratik bir kurumdur. Seçim insanların mükemmel (*aristos*) gördükleri insanları seçmeleridir. Aynı şekilde aday olan o kişinin de seçmenlere kendisinin mükemmel olduğunu kanıtlamaya çalıştığı bir süreç haline gelir. Bu açıdan seçim her zaman için Atinalıların bakış açısına göre halkla değil aristokrasi ile ilişkilendirilmiştir[65]. Burada önemle belirtmek gerekir ki, elbette Atina'da da güçlü gruplar ve liderler vardır ama bunların hiç birisi toplum üzerinde bir iktidar sahibi değildirler ve toplum bu insanları hep kontrol altında tutmayı başarmıştır[66].

Bununla beraber, bir noktaya daha dikkat çekmek gerekir. Antik Yunan'da halk örneğin askeri harekatlar gibi bazı konuların özel bilgiyle donatılmış kişilerce yapılmasının gerekli olduğunu da bilmektedir. Bu bağlamda her on senede bir generalleri ve subayları seçmek için seçim yapılmaktaydı. Bununla ilgili seçim kaçınılmazdı. Çünkü askeri bir konuda karar alma bütünüyle teknik bilgiye dayanmaktadır. Bu yüzden askeri alanda en bilgili ve en tecrübeli kişileri seçerlerdi. Fakat burada dikkat çekici olan nokta, yine bu generalleri ve subayları askeri konuda bilgisi olmayan sıradan insanların seçmesidir. Yani bir konudaki uzmanları da yine halkın kendisi seçiyordu. Bu bakış açısını demokrasiye karşı olduğu bilinen Platon bile savunmaktadır. Platon'a göre, bir zanaatçıyı bir başka zanaatçı değil, o zanaatçının yaptığı eseri kullanan kişi değerlendirebilir. Bu sebeple siyasetçiler halk tarafından seçilmelidir. Çünkü onların yaptıkları eylemlerden birincil olarak halk etkilenmektedir[67].

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[63] age, 131-132.

[64] age, 164-165.

[65] Kornēlios Kastoriadēs, *Ē Archaia Ellēnikē Dēmokratia kai Sēmasia tēs gia mas Sēmera* (Athēna: Upsilon, 1999), 34-36.

[66] Kastoriadēs, *Ē Ellēnikē idiaiterotēta*, 135-136.

[67] Kastoriadēs, *Ē Archaia Ellēnikē Dēmokratia*, 36-37.

Castoriadis'in otonomi projesinin ruhu Antik Yunan'daki doğrudan demokrasiyi yansıtır. İnsanların kendi gelecekleri ve ülkeleri hakkında söz hakkı olduğu ve sürekli olarak sistemin ve kurumların eleştirildiği bir yapıda köhneleşmiş kurumlar ve kemikleşmiş siyasi sistemler yaşayamaz. Doğrudan demokrasi bu sistemin ruhunu oluştururken, Antik Yunan'a ait bir başka kavram daha önem taşımaktadır ki burada devletin vatandaşını şekillendirmesi noktası ortaya çıkar: *paideia*

b.   *Paideia*

Paideia dilimize basitçe eğitim olarak çevrilemeyecek kadar geniş bir kavramı ifade etmektedir. Bu kavram ile kastedilen bir bireyin toplum içindeki öğrenim sürecinin bütünüdür. Bu, aileyi, arkadaşları, komşuları, orduyu, okulu, başkaca toplumsal tanışıklıkları, basını, gazeteleri, televizyonu vs. pek çok kurum ve kişiyi içerir[68]. Bu eğitim süreci okulla veya eğitim kurumları ile sınırlı değildir; bireyin doğumundan başlayarak ölümüne kadar tecrübe ettiği eğitim ve öğrenim sürecini ifade eder. Dolayısıyla toplumun her yönünde gerçekleşir[69].

Castoriadis'e göre, *paideia* çok önemli ve etkili bir kavramdır ve ancak demokratik bir *paideia* ile bireyler demokrasiyi anlayabilir, içselleştirebilir ve toplumda demokrasinin gerçek anlamda yaşanması söz konusu olabilir[70]. Demokratik bir toplumun olması için böyle bir eğitim sürecinin olması şarttır. Ancak demokratik bir *paideia* da sözde bir demokrasi içinde gelişemez. Demokratik bir siyasetin olabilmesi için özde ve aktif bir *paideia* sürecinin kurumsallaşmış olması gerekmektedir. Böyle bir süreç insanları siyasi hayata aktif olarak katılan bireyler olarak yetiştirmeyi hedefler. Bir başka deyişle, bireyler yasanın ruhunu anlayıp bunu tartışabilen ve görüşebilen bireyler olarak eğitilmelidir. Karşı çıktıkları yasalara saygı duymayı ve uymayı öğrenmelidirler. Bu yüzden Castoriadis otonom bir toplumun mükemmel bir toplum modeli oluşturmadığını gittikçe özgürleşen ve adil bir toplum anlamına geldiğini ifade eder. Burada *paideia* sonucunda insanların yasa ile açık bir ilişkisi olan vatandaşlar haline gelmesi gerekir[71].

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[68] Kastoriadēs, *Oi Omilies*, 130.

[69] Castoriadis, *Rising Tide*, 95.

[70] age, 349.

[71] Despoina Tsakirē, "Dēmokratia, nomos, paideia: Ē sumbolē tēs kastoriadikēs skepsēs stē diaugasē tēs dēmokratikēs praktikēs", in *Ē Genesē tēs Dēmokratias kai ē Sēmerinē Krisē*, ed. G. N. Oikonomou (Athēna: Eurasia, 2011), 253-254.

Demokratik bir toplumda bireyin doğduğu andan itibaren demokrasi kültürünü edinmesini hedefleyen ve bireyleri sorumlu vatandaşlar olarak yetiştiren bir eğitim süreci anlayışını Antik Yunanlar *paideia* adıyla kavramsallaştırmışlardır. Castoriadis de mevcut toplumların bu tür bir demokratik eğitim sürecine sahip olmaları gerektiğini ve bireylerin bu anlayıştan yoksun olmalarının otonom bir toplum yaratılmasının önünde engel olduğunu düşünmektedir. İnsanların demokrasiye olan gönülden bağının oluşumu toplumun ortak meselelerine ortak bir ilgi duymalarını da zorunlu olarak beraberinde getirir. Antik Yunan'da *astunomos orga* olarak adlandırılan bu kavram Castoriadis'e göre, Yunanların bize bıraktıkları bir diğer mirastır.

c. Astunomos Orga

Astunomos orga kavramına Sofokles'in *Antigone* isimli oyununda rastlıyoruz. *Antigone* "*polla ta deina kai ouden anthrōpou deinoteron pelei*" sözleriyle başlar; "*Mucizeler çoktur ama hiç birisi insandan daha muhteşem değildir*". Sofokles burada insana özel bir önem verir; insanın toplum içindeki dönüştürücü ve yaratıcı yönüne vurgu yapar. Bununla beraber *astunomos orga*ya da değinir. *Astunomos* Antik Yunanca'da kurumsal anlamına gelirken, *orga* tutku anlamına gelmektedir. Castoriadis bu kavrama atıfta bulunurken insanın tutkusunun doruk noktasında gerçek devletlerin kurulduğunu ve oluşturulduğunu savunur (daha önce *politeia* olarak da adlandırılan devlet kastediliyor). Buradaki tutku günlük dilden uzak bir şekilde anlaşılmalı, ortak yarara ve ortak meselelere olan ilgi ve alaka olarak görülmelidir. Castoriadis'e göre, böyle bir tutku olmaksızın bir toplumda belki iyi kitaplar yazılabilir veya siyasal ve düşünsel temelde iyi işleyen bir sistem mevcut olabilir ama hiçbir durumda özgürlükten söz edilemez. Bu nedenle bir anlam ifade etmeyecektir.

Bu noktada Castoriadis, antik dönemdeki insanlarla modern insanların özgürlük durumlarını kıyaslayan Fransız felsefeci Benjamin Constant'ı hatırlatır. Constant'a göre, antik dönemde insanların hayatlarına dair yapacak hiçbir şeyleri olmadığı için siyaset tutkusuna sahiptiler. Oysa şimdi insanlar devletten onların keyiflerinin bekçisi olmasını beklemektedirler. Castoriadis Constant'a katılırken, keyiflerinin garantisinin devletten ne talep ettikleri ile sınırlı olduğunu da vurgular. Mevcut durumda devlet adeta bir ebeveyn haline gelmiştir, hatta bir tür Noel Baba'dır. Bu artık öyle bir devlettir ki,

vatandaşlarına iş, maddiyat ve bazı imtiyazlar sağlamakla ve onların keyiflerini garanti altına almakla mükelleftir. Modern insanın toplum karşıtı eğilimi devam ettikçe, gerçek bir demokrasinin inşa edilmesi imkansız olacaktır. Bu nedenle ortak değerlere, meselelere tutku duymak, sorumluluk almak ve işbirliği yapmak duygusu yani *astunomos orga* olmazsa olmazdır[72].

Sonuç

Castoriadis siyasetin asıl hedefinin mutluluk değil özgürlük getirmek olduğunu söyler. Hem bireysel hem de toplumsal özgürlük. Bu ikisi birbiri ile doğrudan ilişkilidir. Çünkü kollektif otonomi ancak bireyin kendi kendini yönetmesi ve kendi kendini oluşturması ile mümkün olabilir. Bununla beraber, otonom bir toplum otonom bireylerce yaratılır[73]. Bu nedenle devrimci siyasetin insanların kendi hayatlarını kendi ellerine alma isteklerini destekleyici nitelikte olması gerekir[74].

Avrupa'nın içine düştüğü siyasal, kültürel, ekonomik ve toplumsal krizin tek çıkar yolu demokrasi ve eleştirel düşüncenin yeniden inşasıdır. Tıpkı Antik Yunan *polis*lerinde ve 12-13.yüzyıllarda Avrupa'da olduğu gibi. Böylece insanlar toplumsal, siyasi ve ekonomik sorunlarla ilgili tartışmalara doğrudan katılım sağlayabilir ve vatandaşlık bilinci ile hareket edebilir[75]. Bu düşünce Habermas'ın "Müzakereci demokrasi" anlayışı ile bağdaşır gibi gözükmektedir. Oysa tam tersine Habermas ve Castoriadis demokratik toplum konusunda farklı konumlarda bulunmaktadır. Habermas'a göre, Castoriadis topluma yaratıcı ve eyleyici bir görev yükleyerek onu kendi kendini kurumsallaştıran öznenin yerine geçirmektedir. Daha açık bir ifadeyle, toplumu tek bir siyasal aktör gibi yansıtmaktadır[76]. Aslında Habermas'ın bu eleştirisi doğru değildir. Çünkü Castoriadis bireyin özgürlüğünü ve aktifliğini savunurken, toplumu bireylerin üstünde, onu aşan bir siyasal araç olarak görmemiştir. Bununla beraber bireyin özgürlüğü ile toplum özgürlüğünü birbirinden ayrılmaz kavramlar olarak değerlendirmiştir. Bu bağlamda Castoriadis, tam tersine, birey ve toplumun eş dinamizmine inanan son kertede özgür ve devingen bir toplum-birey modelini öne sürmüştür. Tam da bu sebeple, topyekün

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[72] Kastoriadēs, *Oi Omilies*, 145-146.

[73] Castoriadis, *Rising Tide*, 337.

[74] Castoriadis, *A Society Adrift*, 47.

[75] Kornēlios Kastoriadēs, *Anthrōpologia, Politikē, Filosofia* (Athēna: Upsilon, 2001), 106-107.

[76] Andreas Kalyvas, "The Radical Instituting Power and Democratic Theory," *Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora,* 24:1, (1998b), 15-17.

teorilere karşı çıkarak, ucu açık ve kendini yenileyen bir dünya görüşünü savunmuştur. Castoriadis'in arayışında olduğu bu özgür ve kendi kendini yeniden yaratan dünya görüşü, Antik Yunan'ın temel felsefesini oluşturmaktadır. Bu nedenle, yaşanan krizden çıkış yolu için Antik Yunan ilham verici bir örnek olarak karşımızda durmaktadır. Demokrasiyi değerli kılan bu sistemde her türlü soruyu sorma meşru ve mümkündür[77]. Bununla beraber, tüm toplum karar alma sürecinde yer alır, yasaları, topluma ait değer sistemini ve kaideleri kendi belirlediğinin farkındadır ve toplumun gidişatında sorumluluk sahibidir (*en connaissance de cause*). Bu yüzden aldığı kararların da sonuçlarına katlanır. Böyle bir toplumda insanlar neye karar verdiklerinin farkındadırlar ve aldıkları kararların olumlu veya olumsuz olarak neye yol açacağını bilirler[78].

Sonuç olarak, Castoriadis'e göre, Batı dünyası gelecek için özgürleştirici bir sistem beklentisi taşıyorsa, Antik Yunan göz önüne alınmaya ve analiz edilmeye değer bir örnektir. Çünkü Antik Yunan'da bir kurum olarak toplumun neyi başarması gerektiği sorusu durmaksızın tartışılır. Bunun cevabı ise şöyledir: "*güzellikle yaşayan, bilgelikle yaşayan, ortak iyiyi seven insanların yaratılması*"[79]. Kısaca, kapitalist sistemin getirdiği hastalıklardan muzdarip, kültürel, ekonomik ve siyasal bir krizle boğuşan Batı toplumunun doğrudan demokrasiyi yeniden değerlendirmesi ve bunun ilk örneğini veren Antik Yunan'ı bir nüve ve bir ilham kaynağı olarak ele alması gelecekte özgür bireylerden oluşan özgür toplumların kurulması için iyi bir başlangıç noktası olabilir.

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[77] Castoriadis, *Rising Tide*, 336.

[78] Kastoriadēs, *To Epanastatiko Problēma*, 24.

[79] Castoriadis, *The Castoriadis Reader*, 288.

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A Review of Selected Books on the Russian Colonisation of Caucasus

Tsvetelina Tsvetkova∗

Блиев, Марк, Владимир Дегоев. *Кавказская война.* **[The Caucasian War]. Москва: Росет, 1994. – 592 с.**

(Bliev, Mark, Vladimir Degoev. Kavkazskaya Voyna. Moskva: Roset, 1994. – 592 p.)

The book is a fundamental research about the origins of the Caucasian War and the resistance of the North Caucasian people to the Russian empire in XIX century. After the collapse of the USSR, it represents the first serious attempt to overcome the ideologization in the communist historiography and to open a modern discussion about the North Caucasian nations and the Russian imperial rule over them, leaving off the frame of the "class struggle" model.

The monograph, written by Mark Bliev and Vladimir Degoev, who themselves are from Caucasian origin, contains an exceptional stratigraphic analysis of the social and economic development of the North Caucasian societies from XVIII to the first half of XIX c. It comes out of the frame of the traditional for the Soviet period understanding that the economic system of North Caucasian nations depended only on the axiom nature-climate. It concerns the role of agriculture and stock-breeding in the relations between the communities, their social structure and

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political organization and internal migration. The authors present the appearance and evolution of leaders in the different societies and their role for the socio-political transformations. The Bliev and Degoev argue that the so called "raid system" was a natural part of these transformations and one of the factors for the Caucasian War.

As the research traces back the origin of the Caucasian War, the authors accepted it as a "large-scale socio-political phenomenon". They bind its appearance to main factors such as the internal socio-political changes of the North Caucasian societies and the Russian military-political system that the Russian empire tried to establish in the beginning of 20`s of XIX century. The Caucasian War had a deep impact on both confronting sides, whose key historical figures were examined in-depth as their actions contributed to concrete developments in the relation tsarism-mountaineers.

Additionally, the book contains separate part devoted to the appearance of the muridism – "the ideology of the Caucasian War" as the authors consider it. They display its origin and characteristics, which were related not only to the resistance of Russian but solving social issues in the North Caucasian societies. The role of the first imams and then of Shamil in the strengthening of muridism is presented in details. M. Bliev and V. Degoev pay special attention to the military-administrative structure of the Shamil`s Imamate, its social and political development. They further the historical narrative after the capture of the imam and examin the question of so called "muhadzhirstvo" – "the dramatic final of the Caucasian War".

Гапуров, Шахрудин, Дукуваха Абдурахманов, Абдулкахир Израйилов. *Дагестан в Кавказской политике России в первой четверти XIX в.* **[Dagestan in Caucasian politics of Russia in the first quarter of XIX c.]. Нальчик: ГП КРБ "Республиканский полиграфкомбинат им. Революции 1905 г.", 2008. – 488 с. ISBN: 978-5-88195-953-1**

(Gapurov, Sh. A., Dukuvaha Abdurahmanov, Abdulkahir Izrayilov. Dagestan v Kavkazskoy politike Rossii v pervoy

chetverti XIX v. Nal`chik: GP KRB "Respublikansiy poligrafkombinat im. Revolyutsii 1905 g., 2008. – 488 p.)

The research presents the role of Dagestan in the Russian Caucasian policy at the end of XVIII – first half of XIX century. The narrative begins with the socio-economic situation in Dagestan in the beginning of XIX century, followed by the main stages of development of Russian imperial policy toward this region. The factors that had impact on the Russian-Dagestan rapprochement and the appearance of mutual interests are explained also regarding the relations between the nations in the Caucasian region and territorial changes.

The authors put a clear line between the period when the Russian empire used mainly political and economic methods to annex Dagestan gradually and the one, when an open confrontation started, which escalated in a military conflict. The last is marked by the beginning of the rule of Gen. Aleksey Yermolov – commander-in-chief of the Georgian (Caucasian) Corps and administer of the civil corps of the Caucasus and the Astrakhan *guberniya* between 1816-1827. His politics toward Dagestan and Chechnya as well as his plans for conquering Caucasus were among the main reasons, according to the authors, for the beginning of an anti-colonial movement among the Dagetsani khans.

Additionally, there is a separate part in the book that presents the nascence of muridism. It traces the stages of spread of the new ideology among the Dagestani population, which was considered as a result of resistance not only to the Russian aggression but also to local landlords. During the first stage the muridism advocated for social equality and rights, while the following further developments of the ideology brought to the appearance of slogans for social and national liberation. The authors examines also Gen. Yermolov`s tactics to limit the spread of muridism and his interference in internal affairs of Dagestan.

Дегоев, Владимир. *Кавказ и великие державы (1829–1864). Политика, война, дипломатия.* **[Caucasus and the**

Great Powers (1829–1864). Politics, War, Diplomacy.]. Москва: Рубежи XXI, 2009. – 560 с. ISBN: 978-5-347-00023-4

(Degoev, Vladimir. Kavkaz i velikie derzhavy (1829-1864). Politika, voyna, diplomatiya. Moskva: Rubezhi XXI., 2009. – 560 p.)

The monograph is based on a huge foreign and Russian documentary sources, part of which still unexplored by other researchers, aiming to examine the international confrontation in the Caucasian region during the period of the Caucasian War in XIX century, which, as the author argues, originates from the English-Russian imperial rivalry in the East, called "the great game".

Presenting in a broad context the historical processes in the development of international relations in Caucasus, the author pays attention to important details and primary facts, which facilitates the understanding of the topic. He accepts that while examining serious collisions between countries, it is impossible not to present the characteristics of the personages that were their generator and were involved directly in them. The portraits of those people are "depicted" in a vivid and artistic-biographical manner, which makes the book attractive not only for researchers, but also for the general public.

The monograph is separated in three parts. The first one analyses the period of the 30`s and 40`s of XIX century. It examines the Caucasian question during the peace negotiations in Edirne in 1829; the new Eastern strategy of Great Britain; the accident with the "Vixen ship" in 1837 and the diplomatic game to overcome a military confrontation; the British political and trade interests especially concerning Circassia; and the Caucasus in the plans of the Polish emigrant groups.

The second part presents the place and importance of Caucasus during the Crimean War (1853-1856). It explores the reasons for the break out of the war, the military actions as a consequence of the concrete interests of the allies against the Russian empire and their wish to use Caucasus as a tool for

reaching not only geostrategic advantage but also political supremacy. The diplomatic moves and intrigues lift the curtain of the international rivalry on the congress of Paris in 1856.

The last part of the book, which covers the period from 1856 to 1864, considers the change of the Russian foreign policy and the place of Caucasus in it. Even though the main line in the narrative goes through British-Russian confrontation, the author displays the Austrian interests, which aimed to keep Russia away from Europe for a long time, using its weak point – Caucasus, while implementing Austrian plans on the Balkans. This part ends with the capture of imam Shamil and the subsequent actions of the Circassians, who continued to resist to Russian conquest even by diplomatic steps in Istanbul and London.

Ибрагимова, Зарема. *Чеченский народ в Российской империи: адаптационный период.* **[Chechen Nation in the Russian Empire: Adaptation Period]. Москва: ПРОБЕЛ-2000, 2006. – 756 с. ISBN: 5-98604-071-6**
(Ibragimova, Zarema. Chechenskiy narod v Rossiyskoy imperii: adaptatsionnyi period. Moskva: PROBEL-2000, 2006. – 756 p.)

The monograph is an impressing research about the history of Russian national politics toward the Chechen nation in the period of XIX century. It presents the system of imperial administration that controls regions in the periphery of the Russian empire, methods and forms of rule, the system of civil and military power, used for the governing of the Chechen nation in specific and North Caucasus in general. The characteristic of the tsarist politics is shown through the prism of political, economic, social, cultural and religious measures for integration as it follows the main strive of the Russian empire – to unite all subjects of the emperor in a "single whole", keeping them under permanent state control.

The author encounters five points, explaining the importance especially of North Caucasus for Russia among

which is its geostrategic position, its natural resources and possibility to offer "a range for testing ideas and principles of federalism". This importance didn`t change in the centuries and Russia led a lot of battles to keep it within its territories.

In addition to the main line of investigation, the book provides information about the history and traditions of the Chechen nation, their religious beliefs, medicine and science. Their revolts against the Russian empire and the forced emigration process at the end of the Caucasian War in the Ottoman Empire are also among the chapters of the book as the author analyses in-depth the reasons and interrelations for their realization.

A serious problem, examined by Z. Ibragimova was the situation with the Chechen nation, who fighting against the empire for many years and being outside its structure and control, after the end of the Caucasian War had to adapt in the unitary Russian economic, social and political system. The problems that appeared in this period concerned also the characteristics of Russian authority.

The monograph contains rich scientific apparatus, based on Russian archival documents, books and articles.

Кавказ и Российская империя: проекты, идеи, иллюзии и реальность. Начало XIX – начало XX вв. **[Caucasus and the Russian Empire: Projects, Ideas, Illusions and Reality. Beginning of XIX – Beginning of XX c.]. Санкт-Петербург: Издательство журнала „Звезда", 2005. – 720 с. // Сост. Яков Гордин, Владимир Лапин, Галина Лисицына, Борис Миловидов**
        ISBN: 5-94214-077-4
(Kavkaz i Rossiyskaya imperiya: proekty, idei, illyuzii i real`nost`. Nachalo XIX – nachalo XX vv. Sankt-Peterburg: Izdatel`stvo zhurnala "Zvezda", 2005 – 720 p. // Sost. Yakov Gordin, Vladimir Lapin, Galina Lisitsyna, Boris Milovidov)

A significant number of official and unofficial Russian documents are gathered in this collection, revealing the quest for most effective, rational and mutually acceptable approach to incorporate the Caucasian region in the Russian empire within the frame of almost a century – from the beginning of XIX until the beginning of XX century. Many statesmen, military and public figures were involved in this quest as their various experiences – from the definitely negative to the fruitful ones – are united in the collection.

The sources are classified in three parts as every part starts with introduction by the authors, who make a review of the respective historical processes and background as well as the main figures in them. The first part of documentary collection presents the military plans for the Russian conquest of Caucasus. They were described in official statements, reports, recommendations, prescriptions and projects of mainly Russian generals, who occupied a senior state position in the imperial government or in the local governance of the Caucasian region. Additionally, memoirs, comments to correspondence, memos of the Nicholas I can be found.

The second part comprises of documents that contribute to the formation of a profound perception about the internal governance of the region. Here among the prescriptions and memos of key figures in the rule of Caucasian territories, and registers of local senior institutions, the reader can find opinions of archbishops for the religious affairs in the region and especially about the restoration of Christianity in North Caucasus. The financial matters and establishment of new institutions were also presented in the documents.

The third part concerns the problem about the mutual peaceful coexistence of Russians and Caucasians (especially the mountaineers) in the Russian empire, the integration of the last in the general imperial structure. The process was long and complicated due to the different approaches of the responsible for the ruling these lands Russian generals, whose opinion and knowledge about local population made them willing to use one

or another measure. The published materials present several views about the rapprochement of Russian and Caucasian nations.

The collection of sources provides opportunity to the reader to evaluate the sophisticated relations between imperial Russia and Caucasus, to ruminate about its consequences and result in order to acquire valuable lessons of history.

King, Charles. *The Ghost of Freedom. A History of the Caucasus*. **Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. – 314 p. ISBN 978-0-19-517775-6**

The book, written more as an intriguing storytelling, presents an insightful analysis of the history of the Caucasian region, spanning the period from the beginning of the Russian imperial expansion up to the rise of the new courtiers after their the Soviet Union`s collapse. By using primary and secondary sources of key importance for a research, concerning Caucasus, the author provides information that evinces the region as a peculiar "borderland, a frontier where different peoples, empires, and social systems came into contact". Charles King reveals this peculiarity reviewing in the beginning the diverse national and language universe of North and South Caucasus, the state of political relations before the Russian advance. Depicting the Russian conquest of the region, the author presents also the change of politics and approaches, the establishment of local Russian administration, including curious historical moments from this initial period. The system of political formations as kingdoms and khanates in South Caucasus as well as tribal societies and social structures in North Caucasus give additional notion to the reader about the complex reality that Russia had to cope with.

Special attention the author pays to the resistance of the North Caucasian people, the appearance of the muridism and the transformation of both Russian and Caucasian techniques in the armed conflict. The roles of three imams - Ghazi Muhammad, Hamzat Bek and Shamil, as well as figures of Gen. Aleksey

Yermolov and knyaz Mihail Vorontsov, display the approaches and view of both confronting sides.

Of great significance is the fact that the author presents how the image of the "highlander" was invented by the Russian poets and writers, who were coeval of the Caucasian War and experienced Caucasus in one or another way.

Approaching the end of XIX and beginning for XX century, the narrative goes through the social, economic and cultural change in the Caucasian societies, the way they were influenced by the modern political ideologies, the inter-ethnic conflicts that became a starting point for future confrontations. The broke out of the First World War and the post war period were the time when all Caucasian nations tried to achieve independence and put the base for a separate state-building, struggling at the same time to defend private interests in the complicated and dynamic the international conjuncture.

The author describes the socio-economic development of the Caucasian nations during the Soviet Era and the political changes as a prelude to the inter-ethnic conflicts that broke out with the collapse of the Soviet Union. He sheds a light on the origins of modern disputes, including the war in Chechnya, conflicts in Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, and debates over oil from the Caspian Sea and its impact on world markets. The modern European and international interests in the region are also disputed.

Breyfogle, Nicholas. *Heretics and Colonizers: Forging Russia`s Empire in the South Caucasus.* **Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005. – 347 p. ISBN: 978-0-8014-7746-1**

The Nicholas Breyfogles`s book presents very interesting aspect of the Russian colonization of South Caucasus, namely the sectarian colonization in XIX century. It began with the decree of Nicholas I in 1830 that ordered all religious sectarians (Dukhobors, Molokans, Subotniks) to be relocated to new conquered lands in Transcaucasia as a forcible exile or voluntary

resettlement. As the main aim of the emperor was to cleanse the Russian Orthodoxy from pernicious sects, soon he and his representatives, who governed the region, realized the benefits of having Slavic population in South Caucasus, which could influence on local population in correspondence to imperial political course.

The author focuses on the life of the sectarian peasants in Transcaucasia, their interaction with local population and administration, their road to adaptation in the new environment. He explores a wide variety of archival sources, including a large collection of previously unexamined letters, memoirs, and other documents produced by the sectarians that give a possibility to the reader to have an insight into the experiences of colonization and religious life.

The book ends its narrative with the dramatic events of the Dukhobor pacifist rebellion at the end of XIX century and the migration of thousands of Molokans and Dukhobors to North America in the early twentieth century, after the Russian state sought to replace the sectarians with Orthodox settlers.

Lang, David. *The Last Years of Georgian Monarchy 1658–1821*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1957. – 333 p.

The monograph is a serious research about political history of Georgia that also examines in-depth the social, economic, and cultural history of the kingdom in the dynamic period between 1658 and 1821. Published in 1957, it is still a leading work for researchers and readers, interested in Georgian and Transcaucasian history, by providing complete information and thorough analysis on the topic.

The author divides the period being studied into three distinct phases: the period of the Mukhranian dynasty (1658-1723), the period of Turko-Persian rule (1723-1747), and the period in which Russian domination occurred (1747-1832), arguing the inability of the Georgian monarchy to exert control on broad territorial span, which led to more autonomy for the

landlords and losses of territories to the main powers in the Caucasian region – Ottoman empire, Persia and Russian empire.

The book presents the efforts of Georgian rulers such as Erekle II and Giorgi XI to reunite the Georgian kingdom, which implicated them in constant struggles against invaders, and in internecine feuds between the different kingdoms and principalities. This totally exhausted the sources of the state formations in Eastern and Western Georgia, caused economic decline and general impoverishment, the situation of which imperial powers took advantage of.

The advance of the Russian empire on Caucasus and Russian interests of the geostrategic position of Georgia made it a serious rival of the Ottoman empire and Persia for political influence and later for territorial distribution. Tracing the beginning of close relations between Russia and Georgia, the author also examines the birth of close sentiments between the two nations, finding expression in mixed marriages in the noble society, opening of Georgian churches in Russia and formation of Georgian communities in big imperial cities. Meanwhile the author reveals the Russian imperial course for "liquidation of the Georgian monarchy" both in its Western and Ester part until those territories became part of the empire.

The book is based on archival materials, drawing from Georgian, Russian, Turkish, Persian, and European sources. David Lang also provides a list of sources from Soviet collections that were not available to Western historians until the Gorbachev era. The appendix includes chronological tables of the monarchs of the various Georgian kingdoms, as well as a list of the catolicos-patriarchs of the Georgian Orthodox Church.

Mostashari, Firouzeh. *On the Religious Frontier: Tsarist Russia and the Islam in the Caucasus*. **London; New York: I.B. Tauris, 2006 – 224 p. ISBN: 1850437718**

This book examines the history of nowadays territories of Republic of Azerbaijan under Russian imperial rule and the

measures of the Russian Caucasian administrators to integrate the region into the empire. The monograph based on Azerbajani and Russian archives aims to contribute to the debate for the nature of the Russian colonisalism and to pose the question whether Caucasus was a colony of the Russian empire or not.

The author compares the Russian expansion in Caucasus to that of the American West, describing the colonial relations with the term "contiguous colonialism".

Firouzeh Mostashari presents the history of the conquest of Transcaucasia as well as the establishment of the Russian colonial administration. The social, political and economic development and the local response to Russian governance of the territories of Azerbaijan are traced, showing the failure to assimilate the Azerbaijani elite to the imperial one. Thus, the "religious frontier" between Christians and Muslims was not only a geographical and political paradigm but also a social expression of the relations between colonisers and the colonised.

The reforms in the Russian Empire that started after 1861, the intensification of Russification in the last quarter of XIX century display the influence of the life-changing reality that provoked the Azerbaijani resistance to the Russian imperial politics. Part of this resistance was definitely the Azeraijani elite and intelligentsia, which the author pays special attention to and to the development of the nation-building process in the years of revolutions and First World War.

Цветкова, Цветелина. *Руската колонизация на Кавказ (1785-1864).* [The Russian Colonisation of Caucasus (1785-1864)]. София: Парадигма, 2019. – 570 с. ISBN: 978-954-326-383-7
(Tsvetkova, Tsvetelina. Ruskata kolonizatsiya na Kavkaz (1785-1864). Sofia: Paradigma, 2019. – 570 p.)

The monograph examines the Russian colonization of Caucasus as a combination of military and peaceful methods, aimed at establishing final control and obedience of the

Caucasian peoples, their gradual integration into the Russian political, administrative and socio-economic system until the Caucasian territories become an integral part of the Russian Empire. The book presents the key events that outline the beginning and the end of the purposeful Russian policy towards the Caucasian peoples. Methods and models of colonization are defined in relation to the characteristics of Russian political, socio-economic and military activities in the regions of the North and South Caucasus. The specific Russian policies and institutions in the concrete regions are presented as well as the stages of their development and their role in targeted colonization.

The book represents the first comprehensive scientific analysis of the Russian colonization of the Caucasus in view of its characterization, methods used and respective periodization of processes. It displays comprehensive methods and models, by using for scientific base unexamined and not-in-circulation sources, and at the same time reaches new conclusions using already-known documents. The approach to the topic is chronological and thematic, which was required by the subject of the study in order to present more profound and concrete examples of the methods of Russian colonization of the Caucasus.

The historical narrative starts with the establishment of the Caucasian Viceroyalty in1785 - the first regional institution, established in the Russian empire that was result of conceptualization and focusing of the Russian policy in the Caucasus. The end is marked by the end of the Caucasian War in 1864 and the consolidation of the Russian control over the Caucasian region.

BOOK REVIEW

Турска – регионална сила? [Turkey: A Regional Power?], **уредили Миша Ђурковић и Александар Раковић, Београд: Институт за европске студије, 2013, 293 с. ISBN 978-86-82057-45-1**
(Turska: Regionalna Sila? Eds. Misa Cirkovic and Aleksandar Rakovic, Belgrade: Institut za Evropske Studie, 2013, 293 p.)

Jahja Muhasilović[*]

An edition book *Turkey: A Regional Power?* was prepared by the group of distinguished and relevant Serbian authors among whom some are experts on Turkish foreign policy, orientalists, journalists, religious figures, and politicians that had a chance to follow closely Turkey and Ankara's foreign policy in the Balkans for years. The book came out of the conference with the same name that was organized in 2012 in the Serbian capital Belgrade. After the rising interest of Turkey for the region, it was decided to make a comprehensive handbook about modern Turkey that would give answers to Serbian public about the overall strategies, intentions and the expectations of Ankara in the Balkans. The articles that

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were presented at the above-mentioned conference were put together into one edited collection. The book is composed of eighteen articles that analyze this country its both internal and foreign policy in-depth. Articles are divided into three thematically prepared parts, *Identity of Modern Turkey*, *International Position of Turkey* and *Turkey and the Balkans*.

Although it was prepared by the experts from Serbian that have expertise in various fields of social sciences, in general, the book Turkey: A Regional Power? is written in a pretty tendentious tone. It is not free of a subjective approach when it comes to analyzing Turkey's role in regional politics. Throughout the articles, the readers are often reminded of Turkey's "negative" role in Kosovo's secession from Serbia and during the 1999 NATO bombing campaign against the Milosevic regime. Readers are indirectly warned about Turkey's probable unclean intentions in the region emphasizing that Ankara is taking the side of Albanian and Bosniak interests against the Serbian ones. The work is also imbued with a culturalist tone, representing Turkey as a Muslim-majority regional power defending the position of Muslims in the region, while authors are addressing the problems of Ankara's role in the region as adherents of the Eastern Orthodoxy, representing the whole picture as a sort of "clash of civilizations" between the crescent and the cross. It is clear that some authors of the edition are uncomfortable, or at least worried, with the rising prominence of Turkey in the region and giving advice to Serbian political elite how to deal with Ankara. Turkey is often portrayed as NATO's 'Troyan horse' in the Balkans that is returning to the region with the "British-American help", where it is going to play a crucial role in the future by using its close relations with Albanians and Bosniaks to further divide not only Serbs but other Eastern Orthodox nations as well.

The first article of the edited book is by the renowned Serbian orientalist Darko Tanaskovic who had a chance to work in Turkey as an Ambassador of Serbia during the late 1990s. In the first thematical part of the book where Turkey's identity is examined, Tanaskovic gives a closer look to the rising tendency of Neo-

Ottomanism in the article named *The Contradictions of the Neo-Ottomanism as a Practical Policy*. Tanaskovic recognizes the Neo-Ottomanist tendencies in Turkish foreign policy much before the AKP came to power in 2002, and gives the examples of this doctrinal practice as early as the reign of Turgut Özal (1927-1993). He connects the rise of self-confidence among the political elite in Ankara to the end of the Cold-War and creation of a multipolar global order after the collapse of the Soviet Union. After the economic crisis that Turkey pass through during the 1990s, with the AKP, and especially with the Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu (2009-2014), Ankara has renewed the ambitious foreign policy. But on the other hand, Tanaskovic reminds the readers that Turkey's ambitious foreign policy goals came to test after few wrong foreign policy maneuvers by the AKP government which altogether has shown what the real limits of Turkey's power are in the world. Tanaskovic connects this failure to the contradictions of the very idea of Neo-Ottomanism, which in itself contains various uncontainable ideologies like Islamism, Turkish nationalism but some elements of secularism as well. It is important to underline that like many other authors of the in the book, Tanaskovic also has some tendentious tone in describing Turkey's ambitions in the region.

The second article by Goran Nikolic, *Turkey's Economy: State and Prospects (With Reference to the Demographics)*, is a valuable socio-economic work that gives a glimpse of the shape of the Turkish economy. The author gives a short historical review of the economic miracle that Turkey passed through under the AKP government but also warns of its weaknesses. Turkish economic growth is too dependent on the inflow of foreign capital which was the engine of the post-2002 growth. This has made Turkey very vulnerable to the condition of the global economy. In order to keep growing and overcoming the middle-income trap, Ankara has to introduce various structural reforms, expand the formal labor market and modernize the educational system. Otherwise, the country is in the risk of facing a serious crisis that has the potential to negatively affect the neighboring regions as well.

In the article *Role of the Army in Turkey, Through History and Today*, author Dusan Spasojevic gives a historical review of the role the Turkish army has played since the foundation of the Republic in 1923. The Turkish army was the central force in the state, often overthrowing governments, conducting military coup's and protecting the secular order by any means. Turkish army, the second largest army in the NATO, was crucial in preventing the fragmentation of Turkey along the ethnic lines by undertaking four-decades-long war against the insurgent Kurdish PKK. Under the AKP government, the army's central role in Turkish politics is marginalized.

Cultural Policy of Turkey: Renewal of "Magnificent Century" deals with a trend in Turkey where once negated Ottoman past became an omnipresent motive of Ankara's culture policy. With the AKP and end of the Kemalist elite as a ruling class in the country, the glorious Ottoman past has been emphasized in the mass media. Turkish series that try to portray Turkey's imperial past is very popular in almost all countries in the Balkans and promotes Turkish soft power. Renewed interest for the pre-Republican past is reflecting a cultural transition that Turkey is passing through under the AKP.

Islamic Community of Turkey-Diyanet, written by the former Grand Mufti of Serbia Adem Zilkic, is a review article that focuses on the work of Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet), a state agency that is in charge of religious affairs in the country. Contrary to the Balkan states, where Islamic Communities are independent of the state, Diyanet is part of it. The article also deals with the non-state Islamic actors (Cemaats) like the grassroots Gülen movement which has created a strong influence among the Turkish population.

The article *Fethullah Gülen and Cemaat Hizmet* provides a closer look to probably the strongest religious movement in Turkey which managed to create a strong network of people and institutions not only in Turkey but all over the world. The article provides a historical review of how the movement managed to

spread its network in only a few decades. Unlike the official Islam that is represented by the Diyanet, Fethullah Gülen has managed to blend the traditionalism with the modernity creating an unusual synthesis that has claimed millions of followers across the world. The movement is active not only in the field of religion but in the world of high business, politics, academia, media and many others. But, the activities of the movement did not without the controversy. Gülen's schools were often accused by some states for closely working with the intelligence agencies, like CIA, that might stretch the back the to late 1970s The movement also came under the criticism lately in Turkey where AKP, once a close ally, is now trying to limit its strength in the country.

One of the most controversial subjects of modern Turkey, the right of its non-Muslim minorities, was evaluated in the article the *Position of Christians in Contemporary Turkey*. Although the position of the Christians in Turkey has improved considerably under the AKP government, the newly achieved improvements were not legalized by the Turkish constitution and the laws. Without a legal basis, there is a fear that the improvement could be only a current trend. The community is raising expectations that the new constitution that is under the preparation by the government could provide a legal basis and give the community the rights that were denied by the previous governments.

The construction of the few ambitious gas pipeline projects on the Turkish territory has turned Ankara into an important energy corridor. Some of the Russian and Caspian gas that is planned to go to Europe will pass through Turkey that in return will provide Ankara a strong position in its relations with its European counterparts. After the construction of the Blue Stream pipeline that is providing the Russian gas to Turkey, Ankara has allowed ambitious South Stream to pass through its territory. It will be especially interesting to follow what will be Ankara's stance under the Islamist AKP government after Turkey becomes a crucial energy hub for the European energy market. Turkey's emergence as a regional power and an energy hub is evaluated in details in

the article *Turkey's Pursuit of Energy donor: Energetic Cooperation Between Russia and Turkey*.

The United States is one of the most important countries for Turkey. Especially military relations with Washington have played a very important role in the past. For Misa Djurkovic, the author of the article *Relations between Turkey and the United States*, these relations had a strong reflection in Turkey's internal politics as well. Along Israel, Ankara was once perceived as the main ally of the US in the Middle East. But, with the AKP there is a change in Turkey's perception of the relations with these two countries. After the bilateral quarrel with the Israel Turkey extended its hand to the Muslims of the Middle East leaving the previous attitude of NATO's gendarmerie in the Middle East. The eruption of the Arab Spring in 2011 and the War in Syria have forced Ankara to reconsider its new approach and to apply for realpolitik in dealing with the crisis in the Arab World.

The Middle East is one of the most important regions for Ankara in its ambitious foreign policy. Especially under the Islamist AKP, Turkey first time after the foundation of the Republic sees itself culturally close to this region, where millions of Muslims live and the world's largest oil and gas reserves are. Turkey's ambitious plans for the integration with the Middle East are not going without the problems. Turkey's recent intensified engagement in the region is raising eyebrows not only among the established Powers like the United States and Russia but among regional countries as well. The article *Turkish Policy in the Middle East* is evaluating Ankara's foreign policy in the region and all the implications of the renewed interest for this very turbulent but extremely important region.

Central Asia and the Caucasus are the first regions where the ideas of 'Neo-Ottomanism' and "Turkish-Islamic synthesis" were tested during the 1990s. The dissolution of the Soviet Union opened the gates for Turkey to create closer relations with its Turkic counterparts in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Despite having high expectations in the region, Turkey failed to fulfill the

set goals in these regions. Partly because of Russia's already established influence, but because of the wrong strategies Turkey has followed. The article *"Neo-Ottomanism" in the Caspian Region* is examining Turkish policy towards the Caspian region with all its successes and failures.

Picture of Turkish Emigration in the Movies of Fatih Akın is an article from the sphere of culture. Fatih Akın, a renowned German film director of Turkish origin, is famous for movies that portray the Turkish community in Germany. His movies address the social and cultural issues that this community faces in Germany. Although the first generation of Turks in Germany manage to preserve their identity the second and third generation are often torn between the two identities.

The Two Empires: Brits and Ottomans (1774-1923) gives a historical review of the British-Turkish relations. Fearing the Russian expansion and trying to preserve the balance of power on the European continent, the British Empire become one of the biggest protectors of the Ottoman Empire against the Russian expansion into the Balkans and Caucasus. When it comes to the attitude of London towards Turkey, the author of the article tries to provide parallels between the behaviors of the Imperial British policy with the policies of the United Kingdom today.

Today in Turkey live millions of emigrants from the countries of the Former Yugoslavia. Emigration of the Yugoslav Muslims started much before this country was founded in 1918 and later its Socialist follows up in 1945 and continued almost until the end of the 20th century. For different reasons, the emigration of the Muslim population from Yugoslavia was encouraged both by Belgrade and Ankara. The article *Yugoslav-Turkey Demographic Arrangements Until the Middle 1950s* focuses on Muslim emigration until the 1950s.

The Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia probably had the most pragmatic foreign policy among the Socialist countries of Eastern Europe. Although ideologically close to the Soviet Union, Stalin's aggressive foreign policy has forced the SFRY to nourish

close relations with the Western Bloc. In that sense, SFRY together with Greece and Turkey, both NATO members, formed the Balkan Pact in 1953. Soon after the foundation Balkan Pact became ineffective primarily because of the tensions between Ankara and Athens. The article *Greek-Turkish Conflict and the Middle East Policy of Socialist Yugoslavia (1954-1957)* analyzes relations between the three members of the Balkans Pact, Yugoslav foreign policy regarding the Middle East and the implications of the tensions in relations between Greece and Turkey to the Middle East policy of the Balkan Pact members during the three years period from 1954 to 1957.

Through its religious diplomacy conducted by the Diyanet Turkey become one of the most important religious players among the Muslim communities in the Balkans. Recognizing this reality Belgrade accepted Turkey to be the mediator in the schism that is shaking the Islamic Communities in Serbia for a decade. The process of Turkey's brokering was popularly known in the region as 'Turkish initiative for the Unification of the Islamic Communities in the Republic of Serbia'. Aleksandar Rakovic, author of the article *Turkish Diplomatic Initiative for the Unification of the Islamic Communities in the Republic of Serbia (October-November 2011)*, had access to the negotiation process as the employee of the Ministry of Religion of Republic of Serbia in the period from 2008 to 2012. Rakovic gives an insight of the negotiations defending the position of the Islamic Community of Serbia that was supported by the Belgrade from the very beginning explaining the reasons why the Serbian Ministry of Religion has recognized the legitimacy of the Belgrade supported Islamic Community and not to its Novi Pazar-based opponent that is extended branch of the Islamic Community of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In recent years Ankara has shown some special interest for Bosnia and Herzegovina. Two countries have claimed special relations almost since the Bosnian independence. But Turkish political and economic activities in this country are mainly limited to one part of the country, the Bosniak-Muslim one. Ankara has failed to create stronger relations with the Bosnian Serbs and

Croats. Nenad Kecmanovic, former Bosnian Serb politician evaluates the relations Bosniaks have with Turkey in the article *Neo-Ottomanism or Panislamism: Reception of Neo-Ottomanism in Bosnia-Herzegovina*, claimes that by focusing only on Bosniak part of the country Turkish foreign policy in BiH has gained a Pan-Islamist character. Kecmanovic raises the question how Turkey as an alleged US pawn in the Balkans can fulfill Washington's expectations from multinational BiH as a future EU and NATO member while following Pan-Islamist policies in this country by ignoring the Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats as a constitutive nation.

The article *Ottoman Empire (Republic of Turkey) and Europe: Contrasts and Overlaps* analyzes the relations between the Western and Islamic civilization by focusing on Ottoman relations with Europe. Since the early days of Islam, this religion was rejected as the civilizational "other" by the Europeans. One of the most important experiences that have shaped the "otherness" of the Muslims was Europe's experience with the Ottoman expansion into the Continent. In the late Medieval and the Early Modern times Europeans knew Ottoman as the fearsome warriors and the superior force threatening to conquer the "Christendom". This will change with the weakening of the Ottoman Empire, after which it was seen as the backward empire. Some orientalist cliches about the Ottomans have survived until today and often shape the view of the Europeans when it comes to modern Turkey. This orientalist approach represents one of the mental barriers in accepting modern Turkey as part of the European family.

BOOK REVIEW

Taner Gökdemir, *Kızıl Acaristan Salnamesi (1922) Güneybatı Kafkasya'da Tarih Kimlik ve İdeoloji*, **İstanbul: Libra Kitap, 2019, 296 p., ISBN: 978-605-7884-01-5**

Keisuke Wakizaka[*]

The History of the Southwest Caucasus in the First Decades of the 20th Century from Muslim Georgians' Perspective

The main theme of the book "Kızıl Acaristan Salnamesi (1922) Güneybatı Kafkasya'da Tarih Kimlik ve İdeoloji" is the process of independent "Adjarian" identity after the October Revolution in 1917, which is different from Russian, Ottoman-Turkish and Georgian Identities and this book provides us with some important information about it. Especially, there are few works focusing on the situation of the Southwest Caucasus (Kars, Ardahan, Artvin, Iğdır, Adjaria, and Samtskhe-Javakheti) and most of them such as Ender Gökdemir's "Cenub-i Garbi Kafkas Hükümeti" (1998) and Erkan Karagöz's "Güneybatı Kafkasya: Siyasal ve Sosyal Mücadeleler Tarihi" (2010) deal with its history from Turkic population's perspective. Under these conditions,

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Taner Gökdemir's book analyzes Muslim Georgians' (Adjarians') view on the history of the Southwest Caucasus and this provides us with different perspectives about the region.

Taner Gökdemir argues that there was an attempt to create the independent "Adjarian" identity in after 1917 and that the book "Kızıl Acaristan Salnamesi (the Annual of the Red Adjaria)" played an important role in this process in his book. He emphasizes in the conclusion part that while Adjarian intellectuals tried to establish a new independent Adjarian identity free from the influences of Russia, Georgia and the Ottoman Empire, they could not be completely liberated from the Ottoman-Turkish influence and that its strong influence can be seen in the state institutions autonomous Adjaria and even in the style of Kızıl Acaristan Salnamesi. In order to prove this theory, the author translated all of this material and analyzed its structure, style and contents, explaining Adjaria's history.

Especially, in the second chapter, quoting sentences from "Kızıl Acaristan Salnamesi", the author discusses that Adjarian intellectuals tried to emphasize the religious and cultural differences between Adjarians, Ottoman-Turks and Georgians. According to them, Adjarians are different from Georgian because their religion, language and culture were affected deeply by Ottoman-Turks. But at the same time Adjarians are different from Turks because their language is Georgian. Besides, he argues that Adjarian intellectuals tried to establish Adjarian identity on the basis of class struggle between Adjarians and imperialist-chauvinist states such as Russia, the Ottoman State and Georgia because Adjarians failed to put forth national features belonging only to them. That is, he tried to present a theory that when certain groups which failed to put forth put forth national features in their nation-state building process, they head to make use of "class struggle" and hostility against foreign state as a basis of national identity through analyzing Adjaria's history.

However, while Gökdemir emphasizes that Adjarian intellectuals tried to establish a different Adjarian identity on the

basis of class struggle between Adjarians and oppressive imperialist-chauvinist states, he underlines that Adjarian intellectuals in 1920s tried to integrate Islam into socialist state system and that they could not completely get rid of the influence of the Ottoman State in their nation-state building process in the same chapter. The speeches of Adjarian intellectuals published in "Kızıl Acaristan Salnamesi" emphasized that Islam and socialism have many common features and that Islam, Adjarians' religion, is harmonious with socialism. In this way, Adjarian Muslim elites tried to integrate Islam into socialism-communism and to preserve their religion and Islamic traditions and culture in the framework of the Soviet Union. Moreover, Adjarian Muslim elites made efforts to configure to Islamic institutions (the Shariat Court and Vaqf) in the socialist state system and socialist Adjaria's state structure was deeply influenced by the Ottoman State's tradition. In other words, Gökdemir emphasizes that no matter how hard the Adjarian elites tried to deny the effects of the Ottoman States, which they defined as an imperialist oppressive states, the structure of Adjaria and Adjarians' identity preserved Ottoman-Turkish and Islamic traditions. Thus, the contradiction that Adjarians used Ottoman-Turkish elements which they tried to deny as oppressive-imperialist in the process of making Adjarian identity free from Georgian, Ottoman-Turkish and Russian elements came up.

This case which occurred in Adjaria shows us that no matter how hard ethnic groups tried to deny dominant states' elements in the process of nation-state building, they cannot be free from these elements and have to confront with the contradiction that they use dominant states' elements in order to establish a different identity from them. The readers can see this situation in the first and second chapters and the translation of "Kızıl Acaristan Salnamesi".

It is certain that Gökdemir's book has also shortcoming. For example, when he explains the history of Adjaria, he does not refer to Adjaria under the Provisional National Government of the Southwestern Caucasus, which was established in 1918 and

dominated Kars, Ardahan, Artvin, Iğdır, Adjaria and Samtskhe-Javakheti. This fact leaves a large blank in the studies of Adjaria's history and ethnic movements in the area.

In conclusion, it is never deniable that Taner Gökdemir's book contributed to the studies on Adjaria's history and presented a new theory on nation-state building in the former Soviet area in spite of some shortcomings. In order to understand the process of national identity building in the former Soviet area deeper, Gökdemir's book is an important reference book discussing the case in which ethnic groups do not have completely different elements from other states tried to establish different identity, through analyzing the process of Muslim Georgians' building a different identity as Adjarians.